Icj

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
BACKGROUND GUIDE
International Court of Justice

S p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s
 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
September 2008
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Director-General Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! I serve as the Undersecretary-General (USG) for Specialized
McGill University
Agencies, and this is my fifth NHSMUN and third on staff. I served as the Director and
Nancy Henry Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during my first two years on
Conference Director staff, and as a delegate I was on the ICJ and Security Council, so Specials has been near and
Tufts University dear to my heart for a very long time now. I have always thought that the intimacy and
personality of our committees give our delegates a substantive experience that cannot be
Michelle Shevin
rivaled, and I am unbelievably excited to serve as the USG of Specials.
Chief of Staff
Barnard College
I’m usually a junior at Dartmouth College studying Economics and Classical Archaeology, but
Cristina Rade I’m taking the fall off to work an internship with the Naval Postgraduate School in sunny
Chief of External Relations Monterey, CA. My academic interests include international trade policy, the pottery of the
Adelphi University
Athenian empire, and the role of the UN in the modern world. In my spare time, I love
Ryan Burke arbitrarily changing the order of my Netflix queue and travel.
Director of Security
University of South Carolina My summer was spent working with your Directors to create the best background guides
possible. I can attest to the amount of thought, research, and analysis that went into making
Matthew Low Specials this year, and I can also guarantee that your conference experience will be the best
Under-Secretary-General
University of California,
possible. However, we fully expect you to put in a commensurate level of effort! Your research
Berkeley and analysis will be critical to make your committees a success.
Daniel Nowicki My only regret since I’ve become USG-Specials is that I’ll have far less interaction with
Under-Secretary-General delegates than I used to. So if you see me at any point during the conference, feel free to stop
Georgetown University
and ask me about archaeology, NHSMUN, college, or anything you want to chat about. I look
Deanna Maxfield forward to seeing you all in March, and good luck with your research!
University of Southern Sincerely,
California Jerry Guo
Emily Robertson
jerry.guo@gmail.com
Under-Secretary-General 860.420.7788
Duke University
Lisa Cuesta
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Guo
Dartmouth College
NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari
Director-General Dear Justices,
McGill University
Nancy Henry I have the wonderful opportunity to welcome you to the thirty-fifth annual National High School
Conference Director Model United Nations Conference (NHSMUN). I am Chris Chasin, and I have the distinct honor of
Tufts University serving as the Director of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when NHSMUN convenes this
March. This year’s ICJ will, I have no doubt, be one of the best thanks to your diligent preparation,
Michelle Shevin
creativity, intelligence, and teamwork. I hope you are as excited about the conference as I am; I have
Chief of Staff
Barnard College always favored the ICJ and this year we have several particularly interesting cases being brought before
the Court.
Cristina Rade
Chief of External Relations As much as I’d like to further delve into the topics we will be debating in March, I’ll instead take this
Adelphi University
chance to tell you a little about myself. I am a Political Science major at Haverford College in
Ryan Burke Pennsylvania, with a focus on American and International politics and a possible Economics minor.
Director of Security Perhaps unsurprisingly, I grew up watching The West Wing, and aspire to be as intensely cool as Josh
University of South Carolina or Toby. When I’m not cyberstalking politico.com for the latest headlines, I enjoy backpacking, iced
Americanos, Chinese food, bubble tea, and photography.
Matthew Low
University of California,
This is my sixth year at NHSMUN and my second on staff. NHSMUN 2009 will mark my third time
Berkeley serving in the ICJ and my second serving on the dais. Representing a justice is far different from
representing a delegate in a regular committee and may at times seem daunting. Indeed, in such a small
Daniel Nowicki committee so focused on collaboration, all justices will participate in debate continuously and will
Under-Secretary-General contribute greatly to the final decision. This process, however, is constantly rewarding; the skills you
Georgetown University
learn in the course of the Conference will serve you for years to come. The ICJ allows you to directly
Deanna Maxfield influence the final document produced in committee session and will give you the ability to use skills
Under-Secretary-General seldom seen in conventional committees.
University of Southern
California It goes without saying that you will be extensively researching the topics at hand. However, I would
Emily Robertson
also suggest reading the rules and procedures of the Court and perhaps reading decisions and
Under-Secretary-General submissions from past ICJ cases to allow for better understanding of Court procedure. It is paramount
Duke University that when you arrive, you have a working understanding of the Court’s procedures and customs.
Lisa Cuesta In the meantime, please feel free to contact me with any thoughts, concerns, comments, or questions
Under-Secretary-General you may have. I can’t wait to meet you all in the spring.
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Guo All the best,

Dartmouth College Chris Chasin
cchasin@haverford.edu
370 Lancaster Avenue
Haverford, PA 19041
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
The 2009 National High School Model United Nations
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations
2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in
your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They
will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date
information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully
explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared
to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will
find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions
of another nation.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide
contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in
committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective
committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and
resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the
NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate
Preparation Guide.
An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views
in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to
write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to
be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research
and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper
must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and
should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-
spaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the
conference with brief comments and constructive advice.
You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your
delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to
which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific
requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position
papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and
social structures of its country, as well its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the
Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than
February 16th and mailed to:
Rosa Akbari, Director-General Chris Chasin

3631 av. Henri-Julien 370 Lancaster Avenue
Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 Haverford, PA 19041
Canada
(Country Summaries) (Position Papers)
Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors.
NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
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COMMITTEE HISTORY
The International Court of Justice is the principle organ of the United Nations dealing with issues of
international justice and law. Based out of the Peace Palace in the Hague, the Court has the authority to settle
International Law disputes between States and offer advisory opinions on legal issues at the request of the
General Assembly and other authorized agencies (Rosenne 31). All cases reviewed by the ICJ must be
referred to it, but States have the option of providing for ICJ jurisdiction in treaties.
The concept of contemporary international arbitration can be traced to the Jay Treaty of 1794 that created a
means for dispute arbitration between the United States and Great Britain (“History”). The 1871 Treaty of
Washington, in which neutral countries were worked into the arbitrating tribunals, furthered the principle of
international arbitration.
In 1899, Czar Nicholas II convened the first Hague Peace Conference to discuss peace and disarmament.
From this and the latter 1907 Hague Peace Conference evolved the Convention on the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes that provided for the creation of an institution, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA). The PCA began operating out of the Peace Palace in 1913, and it left a legacy of successful arbitration
while at the same time showing the flaws inherent in an entirely voluntary arbitration system.
The foundation of the League of Nations following World War I heralded the next major development for
International Judicial causes: the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Permanent Court of
International Justice was granted not just the right to resolve disputes between nations, but also the right to
offer advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the League of Nations. It had a
permanently constituted bench, a permanent Registry, and was governed by its own statute. The Court
opened its first session in January 1922 in the Peace Palace. Unlike arbitral tribunals, the Court offered a
permanent body governed by its own rules and statutes binding on all parties to the court. However, the
Permanent Court of International Justice was limited by restrictions placed on its jurisdiction limiting it only
to deciding cases in which both parties accepted its jurisdiction.
The outbreak of World War II stressed the faculties of the PCIJ to the breaking point. The Court had its last
sitting on 4 December 1939, after which no new cases were heard. During the war, both the United States
and the United Kingdom expressed interest in the reestablishment of an international court after the war,
with the stipulations that the Court Statute be based on that of the PCIJ, the Court still have the power to
render advisory opinions, that the Court’s jurisdiction not be compulsory, and that the Court not deal with
essentially political matters. In April 1945, a committee of jurists representing 44 States convened in
Washington to begin drafting a Statute for the future International Court of Justice, to be presented at the
San Francisco Conference. The draft text mirrored the Statute of the PCIJ, but left major questions regarding
the court’s creation, mission, jurisdiction, and body open to be decided in the San Francisco Conference
itself. The Conference decided to establish a completely new court: a principle body of the UN on equal
footing with the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat, without compulsory jurisdiction and
with all States as ispo facto parties to the statute.
With the dissolution of the League of Nations, the PCIJ dissolved and transferred its archives to the ICJ. The
last president of the PCIJ, Justice Jose Gustavo Guerrero, became the first president of the ICJ. Since its first
sitting in April of 1946, the Court has ruled on several hundred cases including both contentious cases and
advisory opinions referred by other UN organs. Although cases before the Court can take years to adjudicate,
the Court’s decisions are generally accepted and enforced.
The Court is comprised of 15 justices, one of whom is elected as the President of the Court. The General
Assembly and Security Council elect justices to nine-year terms, guided by the recommendation of the Statute
of the Court that the elected officials are “persons of high moral character who possess the qualifications
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required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices” (Rosenne 209). The
Court represents a diverse cross section of global cultures and legal systems through its 15 justices, though it
is generally accepted that the five veto powers (France, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom, United States) will always have justices in the Court. If a State brings a case to the Court
and does not currently have a judge on the Court, the State can elect to appoint an ad hoc judge to serve on
the Court to preserve impartiality. This helps to ensure the diversity of the Court and the equal representation
of different interpretations of International Law.
Between 1946 and 1996, the Court delivered 57 judgments in contentious cases, 62 substantive orders, and 24
advisory opinions (“List”). The Court has dealt with a broad range of cases addressing important legal issues
throughout the international community. Today, the ICJ has become a respected place for settling disputes; as
of June 2008, there are 14 cases on the ICJ’s docket dealing with issues such as boundary disputes,
environmental conflicts, and the prevention of and punishment for genocide.
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SIMULATION
Introduction
The International Court of Justice is recognized internationally as one of the most prestigious venues for legal
debate in the world. The Court is composed of justices widely respected for their legal knowledge and
arbitration skills, some of the world’s foremost jurists and scholars.
As Justices of the Court, delegates will be expected to uphold decorum and to conduct themselves in a
manner becoming their position and the respect that it garners.
Facts and the Court
The factual information used by delegates of the International Court of Justice should come from a variety of
sources. Though NHSMUN cases are unique and have never been on the Court’s docket, they are firmly
grounded in real events. In some cases, NHSMUN will use fictitious characters and events to create plausible
yet fictitious simulations. One of this year’s topics, the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Israel, is such a case; the events
described are fictional but could very well have actually occurred.
It is thus impossible for delegates to research the exact situation being brought before the Court in the first
topic. Needless to say, precedent is integral to International Law. Delegates should research pertinent
international laws, precedent setting cases, and background information on the issues the cases focus on.
Theory of Simulation
The International Court of Justice at NHSMUN will primarily follow the rules of procedure used by the
actual Court. That said, the ICJ will differ from all other committees and bodies at NHSMUN in that there
will be little (if any) structured debate. Oral arguments and deliberations occur in a manner similar to
caucusing, without a speakers’ list or speaking time. The Director will serve as the President of the Court and
the Assistant Director will serve as the Vice-President.
Without parliamentary procedure, resolutions, and other conventional formalities, the Court is able to evolve
and ultimately operate independently from the Dais. Ideas will be conveyed through open discussion rather
than debate, creating a forum for stimulating and productive reasoning. In such a setting, the responsibility of
the Dais is to structure and move debate, ensuring that the Court does not remain too long seized on one
matter. One tool the Dais will likely use is a straw-poll vote, a nonbinding poll of the justices used to gauge
the feelings of the Court.
The Court is unique in that its decisions are reached not through argument and contested voting, but through
agreement and consensus. Although a simple majority is needed to pass a decision, the Court generally strives
to bring the feelings of as many justices as possible into the decision, with those justices disagreeing writing
dissenting opinions. Justices will have to work to build strong consensus and to respectfully convince their
peers of their views, while at the same time altering their own views to incorporate those of their peers.
The Court encourages justices to change views, hold conflicting views, and question every aspect of the case.
This is the only way the Court can formulate a comprehensive opinion.
Court Procedure
The International Court of Justice at The Hague uses the Statute of the Court, the Rules of the Court, and a
Resolution Concerning International Judicial Practice of the Court to govern the Courts’ procedure; the
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Court at NHSMUN will draw largely from the same. Our Court has two very different topics brought before
it; a contentious case and an advisory opinion. Although the documentation and submissions of the two cases
are different, the procedure adhered to by the Court will be nearly identical in either case.
The process of bringing a case before the ICJ begins with written arguments. The contentious case’s
Arguments are the Memorial and Counter-Memorial provided in the upcoming pages. The advisory opinion’s
Arguments includes the request for an advisory opinion from an outside body and the associated documents.
The written documents form the basis for the case, and therefore justices must be very familiar with these
documents before the Court convenes.
Once the Court begins, its agenda will be set. There will be a brief discussion followed by a vote to determine
the order of the agenda. Unlike the Security Council, the Court does not operate under a deadline. Justices are
therefore encouraged to select the case they feel the most interesting and thought provoking, not most
pressing. After setting the agenda, the Justices will each present their initial views on the legal and factual
aspects of the case in oral arguments. Initial views will provide a framework for the Court to work with
during Oral Proceedings and Formal Deliberations, when the legal aspects of the case will be fully argued.
Initial views are strictly initial opinions –they do not by any means condemn a justice to one particular view
for the duration of the Conference.
Following the initial opinions, Oral Proceedings will occur during contentious cases. Representatives from the
States Party to the case will appear before the Court and briefly answer questions from the justices pertaining
to the legal arguments of either side. Although factual questions can be raised at this time, the Memorials and
Update Papers (provided to the Court by the Dais) should provide sufficient information to allow the Court
to rule on the case. Facts can be clarified during this time; the Dais will provide updates as it sees fit.
The Court will then proceed into Formal Deliberations, where Justices will finally debate the merits of the
case in an informal setting. Debate will be held with a semi-permanent moderated caucus and the President
and Vice President of the Court may limit the focus of discussion to particular aspect of the case as necessary.
Justices will collaborate to understand the questions of law and will eventually formulate formal opinions on
the case. By this point, the Court will enter an extended caucus so that justices can begin writing opinions.
The opinions will fall into three distinct categories. Those justices composing a majority of the Court who
feel the same way about the case will write a majority opinion. Those who agree with the majority opinion but
have different reasoning or logic will write a separate opinion to be attached to the majority. Dissenting justices
will compose a dissenting opinion, explaining why they disagree with the majority opinion. Although the final
vote will be taken by simple majority, all justices are urged to come as close to consensus as possible. In the
end, it is more important the Court as a body learn from the experience, as opposed to becoming locked in
conflict over minor details. Decisions will be explained in more detail during the Conference, but will
primarily follow the format used by the actual ICJ.
Summary of ICJ Procedure
 Written Proceedings
 Setting of Agenda
 Preliminary Discussion
 Oral Proceedings (for contentious cases), or
 Initial Arguments (for advisory opinions)
 Presentation of Preliminary Opinions
 Formal Deliberations
 Caucus and Decision Writing
 Delivery of Opinions.
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VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PREEMPTIVE ASSAULTS

(ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V. ISRAEL)
TOPIC A
MEMORIAL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter referred to as Iran) instituted proceedings against the
State of Israel (hereafter referred to as Israel) in an application presented to the International
Court of Justice at The Hague on 13 June 2008.
1.2 This memorial constitutes a request for the International Court of Justice to review the legality
of a violation of national territory and assault on foreign nationals in the context of pre-
emptive self-defense.
1.3 These proceedings have been requested as a result of a violation of

Iranian airspace by ten Israeli fighter jets and the resulting attack upon a residence located in
Azrak Do, which resulted in the deaths of 13 and severe injuries to another 15 individuals, as
well as the spread of radiation across a significant amount of land and a large population.
1.4 In this Memorial, Iran will detail Israel’s actions and describe the violation of significant tracts
of International Law involving States’ rights, human rights, and international transit that
occurred. Iran will argue that Israel’s actions in this matter constitute a gross violation of
International Law and will seek that the Court grant the victims and the nation of Iran
reparations for Israel’s actions.
1.5 Iran accepts the exclusive grounds of the International Court of Justice to rule in this case, as
evidenced in a letter sent to the President of the Court by Minister of Justice Gholam-Hossein
Elham on 13 June 2008. Iran will establish the grounds of jurisdiction in this matter in Chapter
Three of this memorial.
1.6 Pursuant to Article 49 of the Rules of the Court, this Memorial is divided into the following
sections:
 Section II contains a statement of the facts relating to the incident.
 Section III will establish the Court’s competency to consider this matter.
 Section IV contains a statement of the applicable law, and an analysis of the

relevant principles and rules of law as applied to the facts.
 The Memorial concludes by setting forth the submissions of the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the Court (“Rules”).
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Chapter Two: The Facts
2.1 On 20 May 2008, ten unidentified jet aircraft breached Iranian airspace at high speeds and low
altitudes. The planes were low enough to fall off of civil and military radar until they ascended
near their target. Once they appeared on radar, civil authorities demanded the flight conform
to requested traffic patterns so as not to endanger civil aviation. The flight ignored these
directions, prompting the Iranian Air Force to warn the aircraft that the threat they posed
would be neutralized.
2.2 The planes penetrated as deep as Azrak Do, where they released their ordinance, which
targeted a rural residential building. Four jets deployed ordinance against the residence, causing
a powerful explosion that damaged surrounding structures. The other six fighters circled the
scene, likely as an escort to the planes making the bombing run.
2.3 During the bombing run, radio chatter was heard in Hebrew from the attacking jets, leading to
the conclusion they were Israeli jets. The jets’ identities were later confirmed through visual
confirmation of the aircrafts’ Israeli markings from both ground based observers and
intercepting fighters.
2.4 The flight path the Israeli jets took to their target and Azrak-Do itself are located in a gap in
the Iranian Surface to Air Missile Network. Therefore, the Iranian Air Force scrambled four F-
14A Tomcat fighters based in Ahvaz to intercept the offending aircraft.
2.5 The interceptors came within range of the fleeing Israeli flight near the Iraqi border. The
Iranian interceptors achieved radio contact with the Israeli flight and again demanded the
Israeli aircraft obey Iranian air traffic controllers and land at the airfield in Ahvaz. The Israeli
flight was warned that if it did not comply, the Iranian aircraft would take offensive action.
The Israeli flight did not comply, compelling the two lead Iranian fighters to launch two
Sidewinder missiles against the Israeli flight; the missiles, however, were successfully
neutralized via Israeli countermeasures. The Iranian aircraft were forced to break off due to
the approach of the Iraqi border, but before doing so they fired four Phoenix missiles. Three
of the missiles were successfully evaded by the Israeli aircraft, but the fourth struck one of the
Israeli F-15I’s in the left rear quadrant, damaging the horizontal stabilizer. The damaged plane
is suspected to have survived.
2.6 The attack resulted in the immediate deaths of eight Iranian citizens and five foreign nationals,
along with severe injuries to 15 individuals and dangerous radiation exposure to 68 persons in
total. Those dead included Iranian nationals Ahmed Shapour, Mehdi Elham, Parvis Shayesteh,
Abdy Najar, Darush Javadzadeh, Hossein Zarbash, Fariborz Azadegan, Hassan Firooz, and
Mahmoud Abtahi, Saudi national Yousef al-Kattan, German national Jamaal Sabbag, Egyptian
national Tariq el-Naifeh, and Palestinian Rashid Moghadam.
2.7 The targeted residence was entirely destroyed, with debris from the blast flying over 100
meters. The residence collapsed in on itself and began to burn. Emergency responders on the
scene encountered one of the victims, Mehdi Elham, who reported to the responders, “…the
radiation is killing me!” His skin was covered in blisters indicative of radiation burns. This
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prompted the responders to contact the military to determine whether there was indeed
radiological contamination at the sight.
2.8 A contingent of military firefighters arrived equipped with mobile testing equipment, which
showed that at the scene of the attack radiation was being emitted at 1000 roentgens per hour.
This emission rendered a 500-meter radius unapproachable for extended periods without
factoring in the contamination of the initial blast, which rendered a three-kilometer radius
around the site unsafe with radiation levels ranging from .5 to 4 curies. Local authorities, acting
on standard containment procedures and in line with past incidents involving Strontium-90,
evacuated everyone within the three-kilometer radius and, until the source was contained,
further ordered the evacuation of another seven kilometers outside the site of the attack.
2.9 Those within the immediate evacuation area were treated by military doctors. Of the 81
individuals who were affected by the attack, 13 died immediately from injuries sustained in the
attack including severe burns and blunt trauma sustained in the explosion and radiation burns
caused by beta-particle radiation. As is to be expected, there was much pain and suffering for
the victims of the explosion itself. The injuries sustained were acute, and all those involved in
the immediate assault were administered painkilling medications due to the severity of their
injuries. Five more individuals died within a week of the attack from radiation sickness, and
ten more spent time in a government hospital recovering from radiation poisoning. However,
of the 63 survivors of the attack exposed to the radiation, the total count of fatalities is yet to
be known. With their exposure to radiation, the long-term effects of the attack on the civilians
in the irradiated zone cannot be predicted due to the possibility of cancers and leukemia.
2.10 Radiation poisoning of the sort present in this situation is an extremely painful phenomenon.
The radiation causes burns in the tissue, occurring either on the skins surface or throughout
the body depending on the type of radiation present. It can cause rapid onset cancer, and is
remarkably painful to those receiving high exposures. Even in cases of lesser exposure, the
burns are just as painful as conventional burns, and require extensive time and surgery to heal.
2.11 The radiation readings prompted the responders to evacuate those in the surrounding towns
and to request specialized military hazardous material experts be brought to the site. The
experts cordoned off the site and, after taking readings, began the process of removing the
debris.
2.12 The radiation source was a canister of Strontium-90 of Soviet origin. Iran had no knowledge
of this source’s existence before the attack. After the attack TV network, Al-Jazeera, quoted a
lower level official within the Iranian government who accused Israel of planting the canister.
However, the consensus among higher-ranking officials within the Iranian government is that
the canister was not a plant, but was a legitimate attempt by Iranian citizens to use radioactive
material to build a dirty bomb. Despite this, these officials blame Israel for the release of the
nuclear materials, because it was their explosive devices that destroyed the canister’s
containment and released nuclear material into the atmosphere.
2.13 Immediately after the attack was launched, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad placed a
call to the office of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, informing him of the attack. The
President’s office remained in contact with Ban Ki-Moon’s office throughout the resulting
discoveries of radioactive materials.
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2.14 Ahmadinejad then contacted the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, lodging a
formal complaint that the Israeli formation had been allowed to pass through their airspace
unhindered. Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the Israeli attack and Israel’s illegal usage of
their airspace. The Government of Iraq, though offering its condolences to Iran, refused to
publicly condemn Israel’s actions.
2.15 Once the remains of Jamaal Sabbag were identified, the German government was notified of
his demise. The German Government reacted quickly, with a government spokesman
declaring the attacks “an unforgivable breach of sovereignty and international law” to the
press. France, Great Britain, PR China, Russia and a host of other countries independently
protested the attacks as inappropriate and in violation of multiple bodies of law. Of the
Security Council veto powers, only the United States withheld its condemnation of Israel. In a
speech before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, United States
President George W. Bush, declared, “Israel’s attack cost innocent lives, but all attacks do. No,
we did not help Israel carry out their raid. And no, we did not know the raid would occur.
Ultimately, however, we do support Israeli efforts; just one less threat to Israel, America, and
our allies at home and abroad. As I’ve said often before, the path to victory takes sacrifices –in
the War on Terror, we have seen just such a victory.”
2.16 Within Israel, the response to the attack was positive. Many government officials came out in
public support of the attack, while several went so far as to conjecture that the terrorists were
state-funded, or even that Iran was using the terrorists as a front to build a nuclear arsenal of
dirty bombs. Deputy Prime Minister Tzipora Livni delivered the government’s official
statement on the attack to the international press, stating, “I am not able to release
information on the specifics of the attack. We had intelligence that showed a threat to Israel
and we acted to eliminate that threat. Our soldiers and airmen showed courage and skill in
their defense of this land and we are infinitely grateful for their heroism.”
2.17 Iran, through the efforts of Ban Ki-Moon as a mediator, attempted to open temporary
diplomatic relations with Israel in an effort to ameliorate the situation. Iran conveyed to Israel
a respectful list of goals it would like to see attained during the course of negotiations,
including the humble goals of seeing Israel held accountable for its actions on the world stage,
the punishment of those responsible for the loss of civilian life and release of radiological
matter, and the provision of restitution to Iran of equal value to the loss of land and loss of life
caused by the attack and resulting release of radiation. Israel, in a communiqué sent directly to
Iran, declared that: “Israel will not apologize for the use of force, which was necessary for the
continued welfare of the Israeli State and the prevention of terrorism worldwide.”
2.18 Never did Israel, either publicly or privately, apologize for the loss of life its attacks caused. At
no point, before or after the attack, did it share information with Iran that may have been
useful in helping to minimize the risk to Iranian civilians. Israel, acting in aggression with no
regard for International Law, proved itself to be unapologetic for the deaths and damages it
caused to the nation of Iran and its citizens.
2.19 It being clear that Israel would not consider negotiation or arbitration, Iran had no choice but
to submit the matter to the Court for adjudication.
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Chapter Three: Jurisdiction
3.1 This case meets the requirements set forth in Article 36, Section 2 of the Statute of the Court
for jurisdiction. As members of the United Nations, both Iran and Israel are States party to
this Statute.
3.2 Iran is the correct party to bring this suit to the Court, as the case involves injuries to Iranian
citizens and the release of radiological materials within Iranian borders. The Court allows
nations to bring suit on behalf of their citizens, and Iran exercises that right here.
3.3 Israel is the correct party against which to bring this suit. The Israeli Air Force carried out the
attack with the full knowledge and conscious consent of the Israeli Government, and thus the
loss of life and the violation of International Law that resulted are firmly Israel’s to bear.
3.4 In Article 36, Section 2 of the Statute of the Court establishes that the International Court of
Justice can render a decision in cases that concern:
a. The interpretation of a treaty. Iran contends that Israel’s actions violate a host of
International Laws and Covenants dealing with the laws of war, civil aviation,
unconventional weaponry, human rights, and environmental considerations.
b. Any question of international law. Israel has potentially violated Iran’s rights as a
State. By launching an attack on Iranian nationals in Iranian territory without the
express permission of the Iranian government, Israel displayed blatant disregard
for both Iran and the common laws of the global community.
c. The existence of any fact that, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation. Israel’s unlawful attack on Iran and resultant violations of International
Law could constitute a breach of international obligation if Israel is found
accountable, in that Israel directly caused the loss of life of foreign nationals
outside the bounds allowed by International Law.
d. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Bearing in mind the severe injuries of multiple Iranian nationals and the deaths
of eight Iranian nationals in Israel’s attack on Azrak Do, Iran seeks the Court
grant reparations for the loss of life and usable land caused by Israeli aggression.
3.5 Therefore, the Court has the authority to render a decision in this matter.
Chapter Four: Israel Has Violated International Law
4.1 Israel’s targeting of innocent civilians and their resulting injuries and deaths constitutes a clear
violation of one of the foremost bodies of International Law, the Geneva Convention. Article
3, Section 1 of the fourth Geneva Convention states that:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed

forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely…. To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
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a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,

cruel treatment and torture.
It is evident that Israel’s unprovoked and unnecessary assault on unarmed civilians who were
not party to conflict and the resulting deprivation of said civilians right to life clearly violated
the rights of civilians as outlined in the Geneva Convention.
4.2 The Actions of Israel further violate two clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 3 that establishes that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of
person” and Article 6 that establishes that “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere
as a person before the law.” Israel’s attack deprived civilians of their right to life, and it
deprived suspected terrorists of their rights as a person before the law.
4.3 Article 6, Section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
declares, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Article 16 of the ICCPR further states,
“Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.”
Through the aforementioned actions, Israel clearly violated both these clauses, as it was acting
outside of mitigating circumstances such as a State of War that would imply the suspension of
these rights.
4.4 The Charter of the United Nations declares in Article 2, Section 3 that “all members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered,” and further declares in Section 4 of the same that
“all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Israel’s actions in this situation were
clearly contrary to the founding principles of the United Nations as expressed by these exerts.
4.5 Article 3, Subparagraph (c) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation states that “no
state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon
without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms
thereof.” This, along with Subparagraph (d) of the same which states, “the contracting States
undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for
the safety of navigation of civil aircraft,” were both grievously violated by Israel. Not only did
Israeli jets violate sovereign Iranian airspace without permission to do so, but they also did so
in conflict with Iranian air traffic control, thus posing a direct risk to civilian air traffic.
4.6 Through the aforementioned violations, Israel also violated Operative Clause 3 of the Annex
to the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which reads “to recognize that international
cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must
comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law,
refugee law, and international humanitarian law.”
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Chapter Five: Submissions
5.1 For these reasons, the Submissions of Iran are as follows
May it please the Court:
(a) To adjudicate and declare that it has the jurisdiction to rule in the
submitted case;
(b) To adjudicate and declare that Iran is the proper party to bring suit in this
case;
(c) To adjudicate and declare that Israel is the proper party against which to
bring suit in this case;
And, in light of foregoing violations,
i. To adjudicate and declare that Israel has committed a gross violation of international
human rights and political law through its 20 May 2008 attack on Azrak Do;
ii. To adjudicate and declare that Israel immediately cease its practice of launching attacks
on terrorist organizations in neighboring countries unless such attacks are conducted
with the permission of the involved countries in such a manner as to protect national
sovereignty and international obligation;
iii. To adjudicate and declare that Israel make reparations to the nation of Iran and to the
individuals or families of those who were victim to the attack, as well as for the land
irradiated as a result of the attack;
iv. To adjudicate and declare that Israel is obligated to respect the decision of the Court and
that the Court’s decision should be enforced by the Security Council if such an action is
considered necessary to prevent further violations of national sovereignty and human
rights.
COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 The State of Israel (hereafter referred to as Israel) submits this Counter-Memorial in response
to the statements made in the Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter referred to
as Iran) to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on 7 July 2008.
1.2 This Counter-Memorial will explain Israel’s contention that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this
case, as no international crime or violation has occurred.
1.3 In Chapter Two of this Memorial, Israel will establish the facts of this case. In Chapter Three,
Iran’s contention that the Court has grounds for jurisdiction will be challenged. Chapter Four
will explain how Israel’s actions were not in fact in conflict with either the word or spirit of
international law. Finally, Israel will request that, in light of the above arguments, the Court
absolve Israel of any wrong doing in the matter at hand.
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Chapter Two: The Facts
2.1 On 7 March 2008, a Mossad agent operating in Iran reported that he had reason to believe a
terrorist group known as Piroozi-e Mardaam [The People’s Freedom] was seeking to acquire
nuclear materials.
2.2 The People’s Freedom is a known terrorist group implicated in many attacks. Founded in 1979
by Ahmed Shapour in Tehran as a Shi’a prayer network, the group was primarily a gathering
place for religiously conscious young men of both Arabic and Iranian heritage. With the start
of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the group mobilized with the Iranian Army and, through the
deployments of its members, found itself spreading as a social and religious outlet. Although
even at this time the correspondences of Ahmed Shapour displayed a strong dislike for Israel
and the Western world, this feeling was tempered by the imminent threat his country faced.
2.3 When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the surviving members of the People’s Freedom
became restless. Ahmed Shapour began distributing propaganda within the organization and to
the general public blaming the war on the United States and Israel, claiming that the infidel
governments could not stand to see an Islamic nation survive, and would continue to support
Iran’s enemies unless shown the costs of their actions. That year, the group launched its first
attack, when a gunman opened fire in a market in Dimona, Israel, killing three and wounding
11 before taking his own life.
2.4 The group soon moved its base of operations to a rural farm in the town of Azrak-Do. This
new spot offered more privacy, allowing the People’s Freedom to begin experimentation with
bomb construction. Ahmed Shapour began a powerful recruiting drive and brought many new
members in to the organization that, by this time, had taken on the goals of destroying Israel,
the United States, and all other “infidel” strongholds that may threaten Iranian greatness. At
this time too, Ahmed Shapour began to liaise with other terrorist groups, forming ties with
Hamas, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1991, the People’s Freedom
again took the offensive, launching seven separate attacks throughout the Middle East
resulting in the deaths of 45, including 23 Israeli citizens. Throughout the intervening years,
the People’s Freedom has continued to pursue an agenda of terrorism; conducting 25 separate
suicide attacks, one abortive attack on an Israeli civil airliner, one attack on a German embassy,
and several attacks on Israeli shipping on the high seas through the use of assault-boats.
2.5 Following the report of the Mossad agent, Ahmed Shapour was placed under electronic
surveillance, during which time it was discovered through overheard conversations and
satellite imaging that he was already in possession of nuclear materials of unknown amount
and type.
2.6 Further investigation by Mossad determined the suspected nuclear materials to be 4.9
kilograms of Strontium-90 originating from the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator of a
Russian nuclear lighthouse on Russia’s North Coast.
2.7 Based on this information, it became necessary for the Israeli government to remove the threat
of terrorism from a dirty-bomb that Ahmed Shapour’s possession of nuclear materials posed
to the world community. Therefore, a plan to neutralize the headquarters of the People’s
Freedom and to prevent its construction of a dirty bomb was hatched. The attack was timed to
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coincide with the timing of a meeting between members of the People’s Freedom, Saudi
nuclear expert, Yousef al-Kattan, and Hamas leader, Kutaiba al-Umara.
2.8 On 20 May 2008 at 6:34 p.m. (IDT), ten Israeli F-15I fighter-bombers crossed the Iranian
border by way of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Flying at low altitudes, they were undetected
by Iranian radar until they began to climb near Azrak-Do. Once at sufficient altitude, the four
F-15I’s outfitted with GBU-15 guided munitions began their bomb run, with each launching
two weapons. The planes then turned and returned to Israeli airspace. Iranian fighters based in
Ahvaz rose to give chase, firing on the fleeing flight of Israeli fighters. The Israeli planes were
under orders not to engage, and successfully deployed electronic countermeasures against the
Iranian aircraft. One aircraft sustained damage immediately after crossing the Iraqi border
from a missile strike on its horizontal stabilizer, but the damage was not catastrophic and all
planes returned safely to Israel.
2.9 The operation killed Ahmed Shapour as well as seven other members of the People’s
Freedom, including Hassan Firooz, Mehdi Elham, Rashid Moghadam, Parvis Shayesteh, Tariq
el-Naifeh, Jamaal Sabbag, and Yousef al-Kattan. In the aftermath of the operation, Israeli
agents at the scene confirmed that the site had abnormally high radiation levels, confirming the
necessity of the strike.
Chapter Three: Jurisdiction
3.1 Israel notes that Iran has made multiple arguments in favor of the Court’s jurisdiction in this
matter.
3.2 Israel concedes that it is the correct party against which to bring suit in this matter. The
operation was executed by the Israeli Air Force, for which the State of Israel is directly
responsible.
3.3 Furthermore, Israel concedes that Iran is the correct party to bring suit in this matter, as the
operation was executed in Iranian territory and affected Iranian structures and citizens.
3.4 However, Israel does not concede that its actions constitute a possible violation of
International Law. In the past, Israel has conducted similar pre-emptive strike operations, such
as Operation Opera. Although it was initially met with large amounts of international protest,
history has shown that this operation was in fact very fortunate in timing and execution. Israel
has also launched repeated attacks on Hamas, Hizballah, and similar groups in neighboring
nations without the permission of the respective governments of relevance, attacks that have,
in line with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, served to “make the world a safer
place.” Israel’s actions fall in line with these precedents. Israel’s military operation was not an
attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran, but rather, an attack on terrorist elements posing a
direct threat to Israel.
3.5 In taking up combatant status, the terrorists in question sacrificed many of their rights,
allowing Israel to treat them as combatants and thus to terminate the threat they posed with
due force. No violation of law occurred because Israel, acting in self defense and against
known hostile agents, was operating under its right to self defense, a right which preempts all
other international laws, thus meaning that no violation of International Law has occurred.
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Chapter Four: Israel Has Not Violated International Law
4.1 Had Israel acted without cause, it might be considered in violation of International Law, but
the actions of Israel were prompted by a direct threat. Certainly, attacking unarmed civilians
under normal circumstances is a violation of human rights law, but the targets of this attack
were by no means harmless and unarmed.
4.2 Israel will admit that there was regrettable collateral damage as a result of this operation.
However, all military operations inherently have collateral damage. While it is regrettable that
innocent civilians were injured, this method of attack, in theory, yielded the least potential for
loss of civilian life. The loss of civilian life in this attack is not a violation of International Law;
it is a regrettable fact of life, one that, for the protection of the greater good, must be accepted.
4.3 Israel’s actions were in self-defense, and therefore are protected under Article 51 of the
Charter of the UN, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
This right takes priority over the bodies of International Law which Iran claims were violated, thus
rendering irrelevant all alleged treaty violations.
4.4 Iran claims that Israel violated Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 3 declares
that those who are not engaged actively in hostilities shall not be harmed. However, Israel did
not unduly target passive observers. The people Israel targeted were not innocent civilians, but
rather militants actively constructing weapons of terror to be used against Israel and her allies.
Enemy munitions plants are routinely bombed during wars with loss of civilian life, both in the
form of plant employees and innocent civilians. The plant workers cannot be considered
civilians in this context however, as they are actively engaged in enabling the continuation of
conflict. The civilians, though their loss is regrettable, are viewed as inescapable losses and so
long as no effort is made to target them, their deaths are not considered an international crime.
So too, in this case, Israel attacked active parties to the conflict at hand; while the loss of
civilian life was tragic, it was one that was unavoidable and not intentionally caused, and thus
does not constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention.
4.5 Iran further claims that Israel violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by violating the right to life and
recognition before the law of the victims of the attack. Israel contends that, when committing
acts of such a grievous nature as constructing weapons of mass destruction, these rights
reserved for civilians and petty criminals no longer apply. The right to life and recognition
before the law of the terrorists in question is, out of necessity, preempted by the right of all
those victims whose lives would be forfeit if action were not taken. Israel cannot be held
accountable for jeopardizing the rights of the few to protect the rights of the many.
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4.6 Iran’s contention that Israel’s actions violate Article 2 of the UN Charter is baseless and
without merit. As per Security Council resolution 1373, “every State has a duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.”
Through its failure to fulfill this duty, Iran became responsible for the threat they posed. In
this situation, Israel was well within its rights to attack the terrorists in Iran, since in its failure
to act Iran became a party to the terrorist’s planned attack. Thus, Israel was not attacking
civilians, but rather a country. Israel’s attack was on Iran, a State that, through its acquiescence
to terrorists, was a party in a plot to attack Israel. The United States acted in a similar manner
following the September 11th attacks, invading Afghanistan on the grounds that it was
acquiescing to terrorists. The world community accepted this justification and the invasion
itself as wholly legal, creating customary law allowing States under threat of attack to intervene
when States harboring terrorists fail to act against the terrorist threat in an effective manner.
4.7 Iran’s final contention of substance is that Israel’s actions violated the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. Israel’s violation of Iranian airspace was a necessary act of self-
defense; though in the word of the law Israel did violate Article 3 Subparagraph, Israel did not
violate Subparagraph (d). The Israeli aircraft, for the bulk of their time in Iranian airspace,
remained well below the minimum flight altitudes of civilian aircraft and avoided airfields and
landing strips. Therefore, the only threat to civil aircraft was when the jets rose to initiate their
bombing run. However, at that time they appeared on civil and military radar, so air traffic
controllers could direct civil air traffic around them. Thus, at no time was there a threat to the
welfare of civil aviation.
4.8 Finally, as Israel has violated no major bodies of International Law, it cannot be held in
violation of the Annex to the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Chapter Five: Submissions
5.1 For these reasons, the Submissions of Israel are as follows:
May it please the Court,
(a) To adjudicate and declare that the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule
on this matter;
(b) To adjudicate and declare that Israel is not in violation of International Law;
And,
i. To adjudicate and declare that Israel has no further obligations in regards to this case.
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EXHIBIT 1: Visual Representation of the Attack
ABOVE: The flight path used by the Israeli aircraft. Source: Microsoft, Accessed 9 Sept. 2008.
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ABOVE: This map shows the Israeli flight path superimposed on a map of the Iranian SAM
network. The rings represent the maximum range of the missile systems, with red representing HQ-
2 systems, orange representing HAWK systems, and purple representing SA-5 sites (O’Connor).
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REFERENCE
Radiation Measurements
There are four common units used in the scientific community to measure radiation, all of which
will be important to understand in dealing with this case. They are as follows:
Roentgen: The roentgen is a unit measuring a quantity called exposure. It describes the amount of
gamma and X-rays present as a measurement of the molecular ionization in one mass of air. Thus,
one roentgen is equal to .000254 coulombs per kilogram of energy in dry air.
Roentgen Equivalent Man (rem): The rem describes a quantity called equivalent dose. The unit
relates the absorbed dose of radiation in human tissue to the biological damage done in the tissue by
the radiation.
Radiation Absorbed Dose (rad): The rad measures a quantity of radiation referred to as absorbed
dose. Its description of the absorption of radiation does not rely on radiation or material type.
Unlike in the rem, the damage caused by the radiation is not reflected in the rad. The rad is defined
as the absorption of 100 ergs per gram of material.
Curie: The curie is a unit used to measure radioactivity directly by describing the number of
transformations per second. One curie is the quantity of radioactive material that will undergo 37
billion transformations per second (Bergeron).
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THE LEGALITY OF THE USAGE OF DEPLETED URANIUM

MUNITIONS—ADVISORY OPINION
TOPIC B
I. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
23 July 2008
Pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, I have the privilege
to inform you that the General Assembly has passed resolution 62/285. In this
resolution, the General Assembly requests, with all due expedience, an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the usage and possession of
depleted uranium munitions. A copy of the resolution and relevant documentation is
enclosed.
Sincerely,
(signed) Ban Ki-Moon
II. RESOLUTION 62/285
The General Assembly,
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations,
Recognizing the right to life each individual has,
Further recognizing the impropriety of military tactics which unnecessarily jeopardize right to life,
Aware of the increasing usage of depleted uranium munitions by armies of at least 16 countries,
Concerned by the large number of studies claiming that depleted uranium munitions pose long-
term health and environmental hazards to those residing in zones of conflict and
those engaged in conflict,
Equally aware of the number of studies claiming that depleted uranium munitions pose neither
ill health effects nor long term environmental effects to those in zones of conflict in
which depleted uranium munitions are used,
Disturbed by the lack of attention given to these reports by countries that deploy depleted
uranium weaponry,
Realizing there is much ambiguity regarding the legal status of depleted uranium since few
bodies of international law make reference to the topic,
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Further realizing ambiguity regarding depleted uranium usage arises from the bodies of law
concerning the rules of war such as the Hague Conventions, which neither address
depleted uranium nor define its effects as they apply to the law,
Applauding the efforts of multiple intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to

see further research and debate on this matter,
1. Decides, in accordance with Article 96 Paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United

Nations, to request that pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, the
International Court of Justice render an advisory opinion on the following questions:
i. What sources of information should be used by the UN when considering the harmfulness of
depleted uranium or other controversial items?
ii. Is depleted uranium usage for military purposes harmful to human health and environmental
continuity?
iii. Is depleted uranium usage for military purposes allowed under relevant international laws?
iv. What is the legality of depleted uranium munitions usage?
III. FACTS
3.1 Depleted uranium began to be produced during the 1940s as the United States and the
USSR began to develop nuclear weapons and power systems that required enriched
uranium.
3.2 Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the uranium enrichment process and is composed
of 99.8% Uranium-238, with the remainder being composed of 0.2% Uranium-235 and
traces quantities of Uranium-234. Depleted uranium is created when Uranium-235 is
extracted from uranium ore for use in fission through the process of isotope separation.
The process itself is necessary for the refinement of uranium to create nuclear power
and relies on the differences in mass between Uranium-235 and Uranium-238 to
separate the two elements via centrifuge or like techniques. The Uranium-235, enriched
uranium, sees use in civil and military nuclear applications, while the Uranium-238 and
remaining elements, depleted uranium, is stored or used in other applications
(WHO/SDE/PHE/01.1).
3.3 Uranium-238 is less radioactive than Uranium-234, and unlike Uranium-235, cannot
support fission. Of the primary forms of Uranium, it is the least hazardous.
3.4 The majority of depleted uranium emerges from refinement as uranium hexafluoride, an
unstable and harmful liquid that is highly reactive.
3.5 Depleted uranium is only 60% as radioactive as natural uranium ore, with a specific
activity of 15,902 Becquerel per gram, while natural uranium has a specific energy
around 26,503 Becquerel per gram. It is a heavy metal with notable toxicity in addition
to being a radiological substance (WHO/SDE/PHE/01.1).
3.6 Uranium enters the body through food, water, or air. When inhaled, uranium dust of
fine consistency can enter the lungs and remain trapped in them for years. When
ingested, small amounts of uranium enter the bloodstream, bones, and kidneys. The
radioactive emissions of uranium are weak and usually cannot penetrate the skin.
However, when it enters the body, the emissions easily penetrate through the flesh. Its
chemical toxicity can damage the proximal tubules to cause kidney disease and can
cause similar affects in other organs. It is also thought that depleted uranium poses a
risk of lung cancer and central nervous system damage, though these theories are
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unconfirmed by testing. It has also been confirmed through animal testing that depleted
uranium may cause reproductive problems, but the effects on humans are still
uncertain.
3.7 Depleted uranium is, as per the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (Annex I and II), a category II nuclear material requiring storage under
constant surveillance in an appropriately controlled location, as well as requiring special
procedures for transport. Although the Convention does not mention the weaponized
solid form of depleted uranium that is more stable, the same radiological and
toxological concerns are present in the solid state.
3.8 Following the development of uranium enrichment, there were no known uses for
depleted uranium. Uranium enriching nations stockpiled their supplies of the waste,
hoping that some day a process for re-enrichment would be found. Even with the
production of depleted uranium weaponry, the United States’ current stockpile of raw
depleted uranium is well over 600,000 tons.
3.9 As the Cold War escalated and weapons technology grew to be more advanced,
tungsten alloys then used in armor and munitions were found to be insufficient. It was
though that they had reached the peak of their ability to be further improved and could
no longer keep pace with modern forms of armor. Therefore, military researchers on
both sides of the conflict began to experiment with making munitions and armor from
depleted uranium alloy, which has a density of 19.1 grams per cubic centimeter, as
opposed to tungsten’s density of 13 grams per cubic centimeter (“Depleted Uranium
[DU] History”).
3.10 There currently are no common uses of depleted uranium besides in metallurgy. There
is a process that can be used to re-enrich depleted uranium, extracting more Uranium-
235 for nuclear power, but this process still leaves behind depleted waste.
3.11 Depleted uranium currently sees use as a component in alloy armor on tanks and
armored vehicles and as the penetrator in armor-piercing projectiles for light and heavy
weapon systems. Though radioactive, depleted uranium munitions do not pose major
risk to the aggressor before firing, because the human skin will prevent most
radiological harm. Once fired, the radiological effects of depleted uranium are
indiscriminate, affecting friend and foe alike.
3.12 Depleted uranium is preferred for use in armor piercing munitions because of its unique
properties. It is self-sharpening, meaning that instead of blunting its tip on impact like
conventional tungsten munitions, depleted uranium munitions will shatter in such a
manner as to remain continuously sharp throughout the impact.
3.13 Depleted uranium is also preferred for its pyrophoric nature. When depleted uranium
impacts a solid surface at high speeds, the impact and subsequent release of energy
cause the projectile to disintegrate into highly combustible particulate which ignites at
temperatures above 600°C. Thus, when a depleted uranium round penetrates an
armored vehicle, it will frequently ignite the interior of the vehicle, burning the crew or
igniting munitions or fuel inside. The dust created in this reaction can be inhaled and
will linger for months or years after the impact. If this dust is inhaled, it will serve to
insert depleted uranium directly into the body.
3.14 Currently, there are 16 States confirmed to possess depleted uranium weapons.
However, it is likely through NATO and alliances with countries using depleted
uranium munitions that several other nations possess depleted uranium weaponry as
well (“Which Countries”).
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IV. USAGE OF DEPLETED URANIUM
4.1 The United States is by far the largest user of depleted uranium by using it in armor for
M1A1 and M1A2 main battle tank (MBT), and for medium caliber munitions (25-
30mm) for aerial weapons platforms such as the GAU-8 cannon used on the A-10
Thunderbolt, the GAU-12 of the Harrier, and the M230 of the Apache, as well as
autocannons such as those on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the LAV-AT. Outside
of the US, depleted uranium sees usage in the armor of the British Challenger MBT, the
French LeClerc MBT, the Russian-built T-72 MBT, and in numerous smaller weapons
systems.
4.2 Depleted uranium munitions are used primarily in armor-piercing roles, though they
also have been deployed against buildings and soft targets. Against hard targets the
uranium penetrator will become pyrophoric, vaporizing and spreading depleted uranium
throughout the air and ground surrounding the sight of impact. Against soft targets, the
penetrator will remain mostly intact and thus cause a longer but lesser harm of
environmental hazard.
4.3 Countries possessing depleted uranium munitions include: Bahrain, Egypt, France,
Greece, India, Israel, Kuwait, Pakistan, PR China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4.4 Depleted uranium has been used in a handful of conflicts around the world. It saw use
during the first Gulf War, during the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, during the invasion of Afghanistan, and during
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
4.5 The aftermath of this usage in these conflicts has yet to be fully documented and
comprehended. Observers on the ground report abnormally high radiation levels and
contamination of food and water. Additionally, doctors in the affected areas report
increased rates of cancer and birth defects, though ties to depleted uranium are purely
speculative at this time.
V. RESEARCH ON DEPLETED URANIUM
5.1 According to the World Health Organization, depleted uranium in conflict zones poses
minimal health effects. In fact, the World Health Organization states in the “WHO
Guidance on Exposure to Depleted Uranium” that, “Healthy [UN] staff can be sent
into Depleted Uranium (DU) conflict areas without fear of adverse health consequences
from DU exposure.” The World Health Organization further notes that:
Even if present in areas in which large amounts of DU munitions were
used, the possibility that significant quantities of dust and debris could
have been inhaled or ingested by civilians is remote. Small intakes of
DU will be passed quickly by the urine or feces without residual effects
(WHO/SDE/OEH/01.12).
5.2 The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has executed a series of post-
conflict environmental assessments that have greatly helped to establish the effects of
depleted uranium on an environment after a conflict. The first of these studies was
conducted in Kosovo a year and a half after the cessation of hostilities, and it focused
on eleven sites where NATO admitted depleted uranium had been used. The second
study was conducted in Serbia and Montenegro two years after the cessation of conflict
- 25 -
and investigated six of the 12 sites struck with depleted uranium munitions in the two
countries, as well as one targeted military vehicle. The final study in the series occurred
in Bosnia and Herzegovina seven years after the cessation of hostilities and studied five
sites where NATO admitted to using depleted uranium and ten sites where locals
suspected the use of depleted uranium. These three studies collectively served to clarify
the effects of depleted uranium after usage in conflict. In all three studies, minimal soil
contamination was observed surrounding the impact sites of depleted uranium
munitions within a broad radius. Only within a radius between one and two meters was
such contamination detectable with handheld radiation detecting equipment, however.
5.3 The studies found that the depleted uranium was not likely to contaminate groundwater
supplies, and where water supplies did show traces of depleted uranium, the
concentrations were low enough that the corresponding radiation doses would pose
insignificant health effects. However, due to the unknown nature of water
contamination mechanisms, the UNEP proposed further sampling of the water supplies
to ensure the situation not get any worse.
5.4 The UNEP also noted that if heavy usage of depleted uranium occurs near a water
source the potential source of uranium contamination of groundwater could increase by
a factor of 100, yielding a low radiation dose which would be in excess of WHO health
standards and guidelines for drinking water. The studies further showed that a very low
likelihood exists of depleted uranium contaminating food due to the low dispersion rate
in the ground and the low uptake factor in food (Depleted Uranium in Kosovo 150).
5.5 Airborne contamination was also noted at several sites where wind or human activity
may have re-suspended the particulate matter. The contamination levels were low and
were only detectable within 100 meters of the impact site.
5.6 The studies also showed heavy corrosion of the depleted uranium penetrators, with the
entire penetrator corroding within 35 years. The oxidation of the penetrators poses
greater risk of physical contamination as the oxide will easily separate when contacted.
However, the reports further explained that even if a penetrator was to be handled and
a portion of the oxide ingested the contamination would not pose a significant threat to
human life.
5.7 The most harmful possibility would be an individual placing a depleted uranium
penetrator in their pocket and keeping it there for several weeks. This proximity would
expose the skin to beta-particle radiation, leading to a local radiation dose above safety
standards, though adverse health effects from such exposure are still unlikely.
5.8 Many other organizations have conducted research on depleted uranium and attained
starkly different findings. Sandia National Laboratories conducted a two-year study
based on exposure to depleted uranium during the 1991 Gulf War, and found no
negative health effects. At the same time, John Wise of the University of Southern
Maine has found that depleted uranium can cause damage to DNA in human lung cells.
Multiple programs such as the International Depleted Uranium Study Team, composed
of renowned scientists, are working to stop depleted uranium usage based on the harm
they believe it to cause.
5.9 One link that has been heavily drawn by the media and oncologists is between depleted
uranium and “Gulf War Syndrome.” Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq saw its cancer
rates soar, with patients for the first time reporting multiple types of unrelated cancer at
once and with a rising trend of cancer manifesting within families. The rising cancer
rates correspond with the regions in which depleted uranium saw usage during the
conflict, with the greatest concentrations of depleted uranium munitions usage
- 26 -
occurring in Basra where cancer rates increased twelvefold. Basra also saw the incidence
of malignant disease in children increase threefold, and saw the proportion of children
under five with leukemia rise fourfold.
5.10 Almost a million depleted uranium rounds were fired during the first Gulf War, as
compared to 30,000 fired in Kosovo, 2,500 rounds used in Serbia, and 200 rounds used
in Montenegro. Those believing this increase is caused by depleted uranium are quick to
point out that the rise in cancer rates was only observed in Iraq and not in neighboring
Kuwait, which was one of the primary fields of conflict. They theorize the reason for
this difference is that after the war, Kuwait used its financial success to organize a
massive effort to remove wreckage and munitions left over from the conflict, whereas
Iraq, besieged by embargo, was unable to remove the wreckage and hence left depleted
uranium penetrators and targets destroyed by depleted uranium munitions in place.
5.11 The depleted uranium used in Iraq is also suspected by many of being the cause of the
Gulf War Syndrome affecting American veterans, a collective excess increase of general
symptoms experienced by Gulf War veterans which also leads to reduced fertility and
increased infant mortality. Although handling of depleted uranium munitions is unlikely
to cause radiation-related illness, being in the proximity of depleted uranium munitions
being used in combat exposes the individual to dust, fragmentation, and other potential
means for the depleted uranium to be conveyed into the body.
5.12 The countries that use depleted uranium have published their own research studies that
unsurprisingly have found the usage of depleted uranium to be entirely safe. The
majority of depleted uranium-using countries have opposed all efforts to consider the
legality of the munitions, and a representative of the US government has even gone so
far as to claim that Iraq’s claims regarding the ill effects of Depleted Uranium were
fabricated in an effort to stop the US from using an effective weapons system which
Iraq could not counter (Naughton).
VI. MATTERS FOR LEGAL CONSIDERATION
6.1 The logical first step in considering this case is determining whether or not depleted
uranium is harmful. Once that has been determined, the Court can move to the obvious
matter at the heart of this case; whether the usage of depleted uranium violates any
standing international laws. If ruled to be indiscriminate in the harm it causes or if
found to harm noncombatants such a violation would be apparent. However, given the
complex nature of depleted uranium, other considerations must be given beyond the
fundamental rules of war. Consider also environmental treaties, human rights law, and
treaties concerning the handling of nuclear and chemical materials.
6.2 Those nations in which depleted uranium has been deployed would no doubt argue the
violation of at least some of the following international laws has occurred, in addition to
the violation of laws not listed below:
i. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;
ii. Article 23 of the Hague Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of War on
Land;
iii. Article 23 of the Hague Convention (IV) on Laws and Customs of War on
Land;
iv. The Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the
Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases;
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v. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,

Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
vi. First Protocol of the Geneva Convention;
vii. Fourth Protocol of the Geneva Convention;
viii. Protocols Three and Five of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons;
ix. Articles Six and Seven of the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights;
6.3 On the other side of this case, the Court must consider the right States using
depleted uranium have to defend their borders and interests, and whether that right
would be jeopardized if they were to stop using depleted uranium weaponry.
Certainly, depleted uranium-using States must feel depleted uranium is essential to
their defense if they are willing to use it, so the Court must consider these States’
need of depleted uranium for protective measures. The right to self-defense is, of
course, promised under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Whether this right can be
considered to necessitate the free usage of depleted uranium will be left to the Court
to decide.
6.4 This case will be complicated by the ambiguous nature of research surrounding the
topic. Research concerning the long term medical effects of depleted uranium is
limited and, in many cases, contradictory. Thus the Court, bearing in mind precedent
and the theory of the law, must decide how it wishes to treat the research and its
potential implications in the process of deciding this case. In particular, the following
points will need to be considered:
i. Should the Court rule based on the most or least damning research regarding
the effects of depleted uranium?
ii. Should the Court rule based on the research of outside sources or should its
ruling be based primarily on the research of UN bodies such as the WHO
and IAEA?
iii. Would it be appropriate for the Court to err on the side of caution and to
ban depleted uranium munitions until it can be more thoroughly proven that
they do not have ill health effects?
Precedent will also play heavily into the decision of this case. The International Court of Justice is
blessed with over a century of international laws concerning biological and chemical weapons. Using
these related bodies of law, the Court will be able to seek the spirit of the law as well as the word of
the law, helping the Court to rule on this matter.
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EXHIBIT 1: Weapons
ABOVE: The GAU-8/A Avenger gatling gun on an A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft owned by the United
States (“A-10 Thunderbolt II”).
ABOVE: An M1A1 Abrams tank capable of firing depleted uranium munitions (Kelly).
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ABOVE: Two depleted uranium shells, from left to right a 25mm Bushwhacker from a Bradley
fighting vehicle and a 30mm armor-piercing round used in the Avenger Gatling Gun (“Depleted
Uranium Penetrators”).
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RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, it is imperative that delegates answer each of these questions in their
position papers. You should work through the case aspect by aspect, proving point by point the legal reasoning which ultimately
yields the outcome you feel is appropriate. During this process, be sure to directly address the key questions that will need to be
answered for the Court to reach a decision. You are encouraged to branch outside the bounds of the Background Guide; utilize
laws, customs, and precedents that are not mentioned and consider legal reasoning not mentioned in the submissions to the Court.
TOPIC A
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to rule in this case?
2. How should the facts be regarded in this case?
3. Has Israel violated codified International Law? Customary law?
4. Is it legal for Israel to attack Iran with the goal of eradicating a terrorist threat that Iran has
proven incapable of eradicating? Is it legal for this attack to be preemptive?
5. Does Israel bear responsibility for the results of the attack in this case? Should it be held
accountable for the release of nuclear materials?
6. What options does the Court have in considering a decision? What do you think the decision
should be?
TOPIC B
1. Is the Court competent to rule in this case?
2. Assuming depleted uranium is in fact harmful, would its usage be illegal? Why?
3. Given the conflicted reports surrounding the hazards of depleted uranium, how should the
Court determine what information regarding depleted uranium to use?
4. What customary law and precedent-setting decisions of the Court must be considered in this
case? How do they effect the Court's decision?
5. What other weapons have been declared illegal, and what was the reasoning behind such a
declaration?
6. What is the legality of depleted uranium based munitions?
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APPENDIX A:
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY
International Law, like the concept upon which the United Nations was founded, is based upon the
sovereignty of individual States. A State fundamentally controls activities within its borders and can regulate
its activities as it chooses, provided it does not violate international law. Public international law, then, is a set
of limits on sovereignty that States have accepted; for instance, all States have agreed, at least theoretically, to
grant immunity to foreign diplomats traveling within their boundaries. International law sprung up and
developed as a result of increased global interaction; without inter-state relations, international law need not
exist.
International law throughout this appendix refers to “public international law,” governing interactions
between States. This can be distinguished from “private international law,” which—though not unrelated—
primarily concerns interaction between businesses and other non-governmental entities in the global
marketplace. Public international law itself has often referred only to interactions accepted by “civilized”
States, an amorphous term which indicates nations that have accepted a sense of global responsibility—much
as the United Nations Charter offers the organization open only to “peace-loving” States.
The concept and tenets of international law have been developing for millennia. The Greek city-states in the
first century B.C. had domestic laws, but also had treaties and codes that governed trade and other
interactions between colonies. In the medieval era (specifically the 17th century), Hugo Grotius, often called
the “father of international law,” published The Law of War and Peace (De Jure Bellis Ac Pacis) which set
forth several important principles relating to nations’ interactions, including the theory of pacta sunt servanda,
that nations must obey treaties they sign. States soon began to realize that the establishment of standardized
norms of international relations, codified through International Law, was necessary for protection, and
defense treaties and alliances came into existence across the globe. Mutual defense treaties that codified
military alliances were a prevalent factor throughout the world wars of the 20th century.
International law has always had both theoretical and practical aspects, which play off each other in the
practice of international law. On a theoretical level, two primary “schools” of or sets of beliefs concerning
international law developed: natural law and positivism. Believers in natural law hold that certain inalienable
rights and obligations simply “exist” for States, in harmony with nature and individuals, and that all States are
automatically bound by these; this is similar to the 18th century enlightenment scholars’ view of natural
domestic law by John Locke and others who posited certain “inalienable” rights bestowed upon all mankind.
Positivism within international law, by contrast, requires nations to actively consent to international
obligations before they become binding—either expressly (e.g., by signing a treaty) or by implication (e.g., by
behaving a particular way over an extended period of time). Some scholars have termed a third, intermediate
school as the “eclectics,” which recognizes the existence and interaction of both. However, positivism is the
primary school of international law known today, and international relations of the past century (including the
very founding principles of the United Nations) have largely been based on the fundamentality of
sovereignty.
Because international law is so theoretical and amorphous, many have wondered if international law is really
“law.” For a more complete introduction to the historical development of international law—knowledge of
which is helpful to interpreting the themes and under-riding spirit of modern public international law in
practice—see a good international law textbook, such as the first chapter of William Slomanson’s
Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. Other textbooks and guides are referenced in the first
portion of this paper.
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THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOURCES

International law stems from several sources, both unwritten and written, that are listed in Article 38.1 of the
ICJ Statute: The Court, whose function it is to decide, in accordance with international law, such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by contesting States;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Legal scholars have understood this as an essentially hierarchical view of international law: treaties and
conventions are the strongest form of international law, customs equally strong and binding although harder
to discern, principles of law more theoretical, and writings and teachings “subsidiary means.” This would
match with the positivist theory of international law discussed earlier; treaties show the strongest signs of
consent by the States to be bound formally to certain provisions, while writings of individual scholars show
the least.
International Conventions
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980) sets forth the rules that govern the creation and
interpretation of international, multilateral, and bilateral conventions. (The Vienna Convention is a ratified
treaty for many nations, but it is also considered a binding component of customary international law for all
States.) States conclude treaties in order to posit specific rights and responsibilities, usually for mutual gain;
they normally serve as codifications of previously existing practice, rather than sudden creations of new law.
They are written documents that are then signed and ratified by States (and only by States). While treaties
specify exactly what terms by which they come into law, most require that nations first sign a treaty and then
ratify it. The difference between signature and ratification—the steps which follow the negotiation of the
treaty—is largely a process of domestic law; in the US, for instance, the President signs the treaty and then the
Senate ratifies it. A treaty is generally not binding until it is ratified. States agreeing to a treaty may also specify
certain reservations—areas of the treaty with which they do not agree and do not consent to follow. Such
reservations are usually specified in writing at time of signature. In most cases, States can also accede to a
treaty later, even after it has come into force.
Treaties, once duly applicable upon a State, constitute binding international law; the concept is called by the
Latin term pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be obeyed, roughly translated). Good faith performance of
treaty requirements is considered a fundamental precept on which all international law is based.
In interpreting a treaty, one must pay attention to both the letter and the “spirit” of the treaty. The letter of
the treaty constitutes the text, including the preamble and the main body of the treaty. Presumably, the
drafters of the treaty chose words that they thought would specifically delineate the responsibilities and
obligations conveyed by the instrument, and therefore the text—down to the punctuation and capitalization
of clauses—is the primary source for interpretation. However, international law also takes into account the
context of the treaty—its “spirit”—which can often be ascertained by analyzing the pre-ambulatory clauses,
the phraseology of the convention (including the presence or absence of particular items), and the history
behind the creation of the document. The letter of the treaty must not contradict the spirit, nor vice versa; the
two should be seen hand-in-hand in analyzing how a treaty functions under international law and in applying
it to a particular case. Other specific precepts concerning the functioning of treaties—including States’ ability
to withdraw from a treaty, issues of state succession, etc.—are most definitively posited in the Vienna
Convention.
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International Customary Law

Customary law is one of the most difficult and most important elements of public international law; in some
ways, it reflects the essence of international law: reactive (shaped by state practice rather than simply
constructed) and changeable (developing over time). Customary law, as the name suggests, consists of
patterns of behavior that are so ingrained in state practice (in “custom”) that they become binding
components of international law. For instance, if every State in the world has refused to kill babies for
centuries, we could consider there to be an international customary prohibition against the murder of babies,
and a State that then murdered a baby could be held legally culpable.
Customary law does not simply “pop up.” It must be defined and shaped gradually over time; it is a function
of the number of States which practice—not just verbally consent to—the custom as well as the length of
acceptance and the intensity or consistency by which it is practiced. Past state action generally helps to
demonstrate the existence of a law as custom, as do international statements (such as General Assembly
resolutions, which, although not binding, can be evidence of global sentiment on an issue, particularly if
passed unanimously).
Some schools of legal thought argue that custom can exist for smaller segments of the global community, in
order to take into account cultural, political, and economic differences. For instance, a particular standard
could constitute customary law for Europe, or for all developing nations, or for all Islamic States. Customary
law must not contradict treaty law, of course, but in most cases treaties are merely the codification of
previously existing custom. Also, customary law allows a State to “opt out” by being a “persistent objector.”
A persistent objector is a State that has consistently rejected a customary norm, in practice rather than just in
rhetoric. This prevents a State from being held to a rule that it never chose to adopt. However, a State may
not use the persistent objector defense when it has historically never violated the particular law, or when it
egregiously violates the most fundamental rules accepted as custom.
A “peremptory norm” (jus cogens) is an element of customary law so strong and fundamental, one from
which no derogation is permitted. The Vienna Convention prohibits the conclusion of treaties that violate jus
cogens. For instance, because the UN Charter and the international community so clearly have chosen to
prohibit the aggressive use of antagonistic force, a treaty that legalized unprovoked, violent, unsanctioned
force between several nations would not be valid.
Principles of International Law

The principles of international law are those concepts that are generally recognized by “civilized nations.” In
part, this allows elements of domestic law to infuse into international law, for if most major legal systems
have a particular principle, it can be considered a subsidiary component of international law. Principles are
not binding components of international law like treaties and custom; instead, they are meant to be
supplemental evidence to fill in missing gaps and to provide a more complete legal code.
Scholarly W ritings and “Precedent”

Academic writings of influential international legal publicists and scholars are the final, and least binding,
sources of International Law. The International Court of Justice—and International Law as a whole—does
not adhere to stare decesis (literally, “to stand as a decision,” or more commonly termed “precedent”) as might
a domestic court (e.g., the United States’s judicial system). While it is not uncommon for decisions by the ICJ
to reference older decisions, it can theoretically—and often does—rule differently in two similar cases as the
facts of international law change. However, writings of scholars and previous findings of courts may serve as
persuasive evidence of custom, principle, or legal interpretation.
PLAYERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Because of its historical origins, international law has always governed interactions between States.
International law is based on “good faith”—that nations will do their best to follow the letter of the law, and
- 34 -
that the intention behind their actions will be fundamentally obedient. Recent trends in international law have
seen the inclusion of other players—international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), transnational businesses, and individuals—although their position in public
international law is tenuous at best. For instance, only States can be parties before the Court, and only States
can join the United Nations.
It is worth pausing briefly to clarify some confusing terms. While international law still has not adequately and
universally defined all terms, States are generally recognized to have a definable territory, a working
government, a non-transient population, and the ability to have foreign relations with other States. This
definition was accepted by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). (Arguably,
these are requirements to be a State, but fulfilling all requirements does not necessarily make one a State;
statehood, to some extent, is a function of recognition of statehood by other States.) A State is a sovereign
unit of international diplomacy. A nation, by contrast, is less well-defined; it refers to a general “group” of
persons, often linked by a common language, culture, heritage, or other attribute. There can be multiple
“nations”—or distinct national identities—within a State (e.g., American Indian reservations within the
United States of America), although some might argue that the right to “self-determination” allows each
nation to deserve statehood. For the purposes of international law, a government is a political entity that
engages in international relations for the State; this can be confusing when a State seems to have multiple or
no working governments, or when different States recognize different governments in another State (as was
until recently the case with Afghanistan).
However, despite the historical restriction of international law to State, numerous non-governmental
organizations now participate as observers within the UN, the Charter discusses the organization’s
relationship to other inter-governmental organizations, and trans-national corporations often lobby the UN
and other IGOs. Furthermore, as regional organizations like the European Union gain influence, some might
say are taking on the characteristics of States (producing money, holding a standing army, having a
parliament). It is clear that international law must learn to cope with a variety of players, and only time will tell
how it deals with these new challenges.
One direction of international relations points towards the individual becoming the subject of international
law, a move reflecting globalization’s ideal of people as citizens of a world community. Historically,
citizenship in a State was seen as a bond between an individual and his government; the allegiance of
citizenship was mutual, with the individual having responsibilities to the State (e.g., taxes, military service) and
the State having responsibilities to the individual (e.g., legal protection, infrastructure). With the rise of
international law, state responsibilities extended beyond the domestic to the international; States, to some
extent, are seen as responsible for the international protection of their citizens. Therefore, if a harm is done
against a citizen of State X by the government of State Y, a case in the ICJ would be brought by State X, not
by the citizen.
International human rights laws have conferred additional obligations on States with respect to the individual.
Rather than a State’s citizens serving as the sovereign charges of nothing more than their government, the
government is subject to certain international requirements, such as those specified in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. And humanitarian peacekeeping operations—like NATO’s air strikes in the
Balkans—demonstrate that certain players in the international community (largely Western States) believe that
actors other than a citizen’s own government may come to his or her aid. Under this theory, harm done to an
individual is seen as a harm to a wide community; genocide in one country has repercussions on surrounding
nations and the world as a whole. (This theory is sometimes called the “universality principle”; the
“nationality principle” specifies that States have jurisdiction over their nationals/citizens—no matter where
they may be located at a given time—and the “territorial principle” suggests that States have power to create
and to enforce laws which govern its sovereign physical territory.) Still, for now, States remain the primary
subjects of international law, and the only qualified players that hold sovereignty on the international playing
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field. A complicated set of laws, customs, and principles govern the existence of States, the succession of
States, the separation (secession) of States, and the recognition of governments.
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice, according to Article 92 of the UN Charter, is the “principal judicial organ
of the United Nations,” and functions according to its Statute. All States party to the UN Charter are
automatically party to the Statute of the Court; other States may become parties to the Statute without joining
the UN at the decision of the General Assembly. The Court is composed of fifteen members from different
States, elected by the General Assembly and Security Council as the most competent international legal
scholars, not as representatives of their respective governments. In cases where a matter before the Court
includes one party bearing the same nationality as a sitting judge, the other party may choose a person to act
as a sixteenth judge in that case.
The Statute grants the Court jurisdiction to hear two types of cases: contentious cases between States and
advisory opinions from authorized UN organs. All cases must concern questions of international law.
Contentious cases must normally concern a valid legal argument, which many scholars believe requires a
specific, actual injury to the State itself (or citizens of the State).
Jurisdiction is largely consensual; parties must opt to refer a case to the Court. In some cases, a treaty will
provide that a dispute concerning its interpretation can be referred to the ICJ by either party; most treaties
contain some method for dispute resolution. States can also provide for “compulsory ipso facto” jurisdiction
under Statute Article 36.2. In such cases, a State files a declaration that it automatically accepts the Court’s
jurisdiction over certain matters that its declaration specifies. In cases where one party disputes the Court’s
jurisdiction, the Court has the final privilege of settling the issue under Article 36.6.
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APPENDIX B:
THE HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR
An area of international public law that has played a key role in international relations throughout
the modern era has been the law of war. Since the beginning of recorded history, nations in conflict
have attempted to regulate and codify the rules of appropriate military conduct. Even in war, the
fundamental failure of diplomacy, nations seek the stability and normalcy of law. Chinese warrior
Sun Tzu suggested placing limits on the manner in which wars were conducted in the sixth century
BCE. In 200 BCE the concept of war crimes first appeared in the Hindu code of Manu. These early
efforts did not yield codified law, but rather served to create standards of decency during times of
war. In 1625, Hugo Grotius published “On the Laws of War and Peace.” Grotius’s publication, the
first in a series of three books focusing on the legal obligations of warring parties, was a major step
forward for the codification of national behavior during times of war. However, its only been in the
last two centuries that true constraints have been placed on warring parties, and only in the last
century that a body was formed to police and enforce the codified laws of war.
The modern codification of the laws of war began with the first Geneva Convention, signed in 1864
and intended to protect the sick and wounded in times of conflict. The Convention was inspired by
Red Cross founder Henri Dunant, and marked the beginning of the Red Crosses role in the drafting
and enforcement of international bodies regarding the laws of war.
The year of 1899 saw the passage of the Hague Conventions, which placed limits in three
declarations on the usage of expanding bullets, asphyxiating gas, and balloons as a means to launch
munitions. Within its four main sections, the Hague Conventions further discussed pacific dispute
settlement, the customs of land and maritime warfare, and the launching of munitions from balloons
(a repetition of the first declaration). In 1907 the second Hague Convention was passed, containing
thirteen sections and two declarations delving even deeper into the laws of war and broaching such
topics as the use of force to recover debts, the opening of hostilities, the status of hostile merchant
ships, the use of marine mines, naval bombardment, and the duties of Naval powers in war, in
addition to the original sections of the 1899 Conventions. The year of 1925 saw the creation of the
Geneva Gas Protocol, which prohibited usage of poison gas and biological agents in warfare. In
1929 the second and third Geneva Conventions were passed dealing with the treatment of the
wounded and the treatment of prisoners of war respectively. In 1949 the Geneva Conventions were
extended to protect armed forces operating at sea, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
codifies the protection of civilian persons in time of war, was established. The Hague Conventions
and the Geneva Conventions collectively form the fundamental laws of war, respected by almost all
nations as a minimum restriction on wartime behavior. The years after 1949 have seen many more
important codifications of the rules of war, including the 1977 UN Convention on Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques and the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
However, these are only the codifications of international law regarding conflict. Much of the law
surrounding warfare is in fact unwritten customary law. These laws are reflected not in conventions
and treaties, but rather in the actions of nations involved in conflicts. Customary law plays a large
part in any legal issue surrounding warfare, and must be considered alongside more easily observed
codified laws.
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IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
The following documents have been hand-selected by Directors to further aid in delegate preparation. Please make a concerted
effort to read and analyze these documents prior to the conference.
TOPIC A
A/RES/60/288. “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” 20 Sept. 2006

<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf>.
The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is, of course, directly related to the subject of Topic A. It will be an essential place
to seek customary law regarding actions taken to counter terrorist organizations.
“Charter of the United Nations.” 26 June 1945. 10 Sept. 2008 <http://www.icj-

cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=1&p3=0>.
The governing text of the United Nations, this document also codifies the basic international obligations of all nations, and thus
is an essential document to consider in almost all cases focusing on the breach of international obligation.
“Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War.” 12 Aug. 1949. 10
Sept. 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>.
The Fourth Geneva Convention, protecting civilians in times of conflict, is an important document to be familiar with when a
possible breach of international obligation has resulted in the death of civilians as a result of military action.
International Civil Aviation Organization. “Convention on International Civil Aviation.” 7 Dec. 1944. 10
Sept. 2008 < http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation is the governing text regarding international air transport. It is an essential
consideration when violations of airspace are involved.
“International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 16 Dec. 1966. 10 Sept. 2008
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the key foundations of modern international law. It codifies
the rights of people within a nation, and those of countries themselves. Thus, it is important to consider in this case.
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 10 Dec. 1948. 10 Sept. 2008

<http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf>.
Though not a binding legal document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lays out customary law that is essential when
the issue of human rights is being discussed.
TOPIC B
“Charter of the United Nations.” 26 June 1945. 10 Sept. 2008 <http://www.icj-

The governing text of the United Nations, this document also codifies the basic international obligations of all nations, and thus
is an essential document to consider in almost all cases focusing on the breach of international obligation.
“Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.” 10 Oct. 1980. 10 Sept. 2008
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=500&t=art>.
This Convention serves to restrict or prohibit conventional weapons of such indiscriminate or harmful nature as to be considered
illegal and immoral to use. This text will, of course, be important to consider as it is one of the primary precedent setting
documents to be considered when debating the legality of depleted uranium.
- 38 -
“Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious
Gases.” 29 July 1899. 26 Sept. 2008 <http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/FULL/165?OpenDocument>
Though a document of lesser importance in the modern era, this document, composed during the 1899 Hague Peace Conferences,
provides important codification and custom against the use of projectiles releasing deleterious gases.
“Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War.” 12 Aug. 1949. 10
Sept. 2008 <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>.
The Fourth Geneva Convention is an important consideration when the long term effects of a weapon on civilian population and
environment are called into question, since it is the premier text declaring the rights of civilians in times of conflict.
“Hague Convention.” 18 Oct. 1907. 10 Sept. 2008

<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm>.
Similar to many components of the Hague Convention of 1899, the Convention of 1907 expanded upon the protections offered
by its preceding document, and serves as the fundamental codification of the laws of civilized international conflict.
- 39 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMMITTEE HISTORY
“History—International Court of Justice.” International Court of Justice. 2007. International Court of Justice.
24 June 2007 <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1>.
This website, maintained by the Court, chronicles the history of the Court and the bodies and events which preceded its creation. It
is a valuable source for anyone seeking information about the origins of the Court.
“List of All Cases.” International Court of Justice. 2008. International Court of Justice. 12 July 2008
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2>.
This site, maintained by the Court, represents its docket since its inception and allows a cursory viewing of the many matters that
have been brought before the Court.
Rosenne, Shabtai. The World Court: What it is and How it Works. New York: Oceana Publications, 1962.
Provides a useful history of the ICJ and its origins as well as the changes it has undegone; contains the Charter of the United
Nations, the Statute of the Court, and other documents that help explain how the Court functions; also provides important Court
decisions and analyzes them.
TOPIC A
UN Sources
A/RES/60/288. “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” 20 Sept. 2006

This resolution and its annexes are key to understanding the UN's current stand on terrorism and the prevention thereof.
“Charter of the United Nations.” 26 June 1945. <http://www.icj-

The UN Charter is, of course, the defining document of the United Nations and is essential to consider when making decisions
regarding international obligations.
“Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War.” 12 Aug. 1949.
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>.
The Fourth Geneva Convention is an essential document when considering the humanitarian laws in place during times of
warfare, and cannot be overlooked in the cases before the Court.
International Civil Aviation Organization. “Convention on International Civil Aviation.” 7 Dec. 1944. <
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>.
The Chicago Convention, as it is commonly called, is an essential piece of international law dealing with civil aviation. It forms
the standard for most international and national civil aviation obligations, and is essential to the continuation of a safe and stable
system of international civil aviation.
“International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 16 Dec. 1966.

<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an essential document describing the obligations of the State in
regards to both its own citizens and those of other States. As one of the fundamental cores of international law, its consideration
is essential when international obligations are being considered.
S/RES/1373. “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts.” 28 Sept. 2001.
This is an essential source to understand how terrorist organizations and their host States are related in international law.
- 40 -
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 10 Dec. 1948. <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf>.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not binding international law, serves as the primary body of customary law
regarding human rights obligations internationally. Its consideration is essential in all matters where human rights obligations are
under scrutiny.
Non-UN Sources
Abayov, Tsafrir. “Israel Airstrike Kills Two Palestinians.” World. 1 Jan. 2006. USA Today. 26 Sep. 2008
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-01-01-palestinians-israel_x.htm?csp=34>.
This article provides an example of Israeli aggression in response to known threats, serving to help display the complex nature of
the situation Israel finds itself in defensively.
Alimov, Rashid. “Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators.” Bellona 24 Nov. 2003.

This source provided a large amount of information on the existence of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators in Russia and
chronicles the maintenance of these units, as well as past incidents involving them.
Armstrong, Andrea and Michael Reisman. “The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense.”
The American Journal of International Law 100.3 (July 2006): 525-50.
This article consists of an in depth academic examination of the concept of preemptive self-defense, in particular focusing on legal
obligations surrounding the concept drawing from the Charter of the United Nations and other bodies of law. Though Anglo-
centric the arguments made are also applicable to Israel’s present situation.
Bergeron, Allen. “What Are ‘The Roentgen, Rad, Rem, and Curie’?” Drexel University Website. Drexel
University. 11 Aug. 2008 <http://httpsrv.irt.drexel.edu/faculty/ina22/301/301ppr-roentgen.htm>.
This source is very helpful in understanding the different measures of radiation and how they relate to each other and radiation
amounts. This has been invaluable in helping to understand the units and hence severity of the radiation being considered in the
case.
D’Amato, Anthony. “Israel’s Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor.” The American Journal of International
Law 77.3 (July 1983): 584-8.
This editorial constitutes an in depth commentary and review of discourse on the law and obligations involved in Israel’s 1981 air
strike on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor, a previous situation which parallels the present one in many ways.
“F-15I Ra’am (Thunder).” Military. 27 April 2005. Global Security. 1 Aug. 2008
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/f-15i.htm>.
This source was useful in establishing the capabilities of one of Israel’s premier fighter aircraft.
Feldman, Shai. “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited.” International Security 7.2 (1982): 114-42.
This article takes a historical look at Osiraq, analyzing the events and decisions leading up to the strike, as well as discussing the
laws involved and the attacks effects on international relations.
“History of the Chernobyl Disaster.” Chernobyl Charities in the UK: Helping the Needy in Belarus. 1 Aug.
2008 <http://www.chernobyl.org.uk/index.html>.
This site provides information on the Chernobyl disaster, specifically the contamination levels and how the affected governments
responded to those levels in terms of evacuation and resettlement.
“Israel’s War with Hizbullah: Preserving Humanitarian Principles While Combating Terrorism.” Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apr. 2007. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/74D04C9D-FA73-
4A54-8CBA-DBCB1152C82E/0/DiplomaticNotes01.pdf>.
This document is an Israeli policy monograph designed to explain Israel’s policy regarding the application of Human Rights
concepts in its fight against terrorism.
- 41 -
Lissitzyn, Oliver. “The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law.” The American
Journal of International Law 47.4 (Oct. 1953): 559-89.
This comprises an in depth period analysis of the theories of International Law surrounding early aviation, and the nature of
airspace and the sovereignty found therein.
Luckey, T. D. “Nuclear Triage and the Dirty Bomb.” Radiation Protection Management 20.1 (2003): 11-7.
This source provided a valuable source of information on the triage and treatment of dirty bomb victims based on past radiation-
exposure triage situations.
Microsoft Streets and Trips 2002. Seattle: Microsoft, 2002.

This mapping program proved useful in establishing the locations in question and in determining the flight path of the Israeli
aircraft.
O’Connor, Sean. “The Iranian SAM Network.” Weblog Entry. IMINT and Analysis. 27 Sept. 2007. Blogspot.
19 Aug. 2008 <http://geimint.blogspot.com/2007/09/iranian-sam-network.html>.
This source provides open source military analysis. It was extremely useful in establishing the extents of Iranian air defenses and
is helpful in understanding the Iranian response to the attack.
Osieke, Ebere. “Unconstitutional Acts in International Organisations: The Law and Practice of the ICAO.”
The International And Comparative Law Quarterly 28.1 (Jan. 1979): 1-26.
This consists of a discussion of the ICAO and its actions, focusing on several situations in which the ICAO acted in violation of
its constitutional document, the Chicago Convention.
Roth, Richard. “Syria Complains to U.N. About Israeli Airstrike.” CNN World. 11 Sept. 2007. CNN.com. 25
June 2008 <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/11/israel.syria/index.html>.
This news article chronicles a recent example of Israeli aerial aggression against foreign nations, in this case an Israeli air strike
on an unknown Syrian target.
Vause, John. “Israel Takes Heat for Gaza Airstrike.” CNN World. 23 July 2002. CNN.com. 25 June 2008
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast/index.html>.
This article chronicles another recent Israeli aerial attack, this one upon a leader of Hamas. The attack had significant civilian
casualties, yet was considered to be a success.
TOPIC B
UN Sources
“Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.” 10 Oct. 1980.
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/f6426235883f9d62c125641e00
52d53d?OpenDocument>
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is a key piece of international conflict law focusing on conventional weapons
which are unusable due to the nature of their effects.
“Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious
Gases.” 29 July 1899.
This document provides an important legal basis concerning the usage of gas-releasing projectiles during times of conflict.
“Depleted Uranium.” Fact Sheet N257. Jan. 2003. World Health Organization. 9 July 2008
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/>.
This source provides a good overview on the nature of depleted uranium; its composition, creation, and disposal are all touched
upon.
- 42 -
“Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” United Nations Environmental Programme. 2003.
<http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/BiH_DU_report.pdf>
This UNEP report analyzes a recent conflict in which depleted uranium was used, differing from other reports in that the focus is
on environmental impacts of the usage. This provides useful information that can be used in examining the extent of depleted
uranium's harmful effects.
“Depleted Uranium in Kosovo.” United Nations Environmental Programme. 2001.

<http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/uranium.pdf>
This UNEP report studies a recent conflict that saw the usage of depleted uranium, and works to establish the environmental
and medical effects of depleted uranium in a post-conflict assessment.
“Depleted Uranium in Serbia and Montenegro.” United Nations Environmental Programme. 2002.
<http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/duserbiamont.pdf>
This UNEP report analyzes a recent conflict that saw the use of depleted uranium, with a focus on the effects of depleted
uranium on the environment and human life within the conflict zone.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38. “Other Human Rights Issues.” 27 June 2002.

This working paper, originating in the Commission on Human Rights, deals with weapons of indiscriminate effect such as
depleted uranium munitions. It provides valuable perspectives on the issue, and conveys some of the thinking on the issue being
done by other bodies of the UN.
“Features: Depleted Uranium.” News Centre. International Atomic Energy Agency. 10 July 2008
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/DU/faq_depleted_uranium.shtml>.
This source provides a rough summary of information on depleted uranium gathered by the IAEA. It focuses especially on the
health effects of depleted uranium or, as the IAEA expresses, the lack therein of.
“Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War.” 12 Aug. 1949.
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>.
The Fourth Geneva Convention is an essential document when considering the humanitarian laws in place during times of
warfare, and cannot be overlooked in the cases before the Court.
“Hague Convention.” 18 Oct. 1907. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/pacific.htm>.

The Second Hague Convention was one of the premier documents of codified law regarding warfare during much of the modern
era. It's inclusion is essential when considering the rules of warfare.
ICJ Press Release 93/26. “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request for Advisory Opinion
by the General Assembly of the United Nations).” 8 July 2008.
This press release summarizes a critical precedent setting case that will greatly affect the process of debate in committee and will
need to be heavily considered before a decision can be rendered.
INFCIRC/274/REV.1. “The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.” May 1980.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material proves to be useful in establishing what common safety practices
should be when dealing with different types of radioactive materials.
“Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare.” 17 June 1925.
This document is an essential consideration when dealing with unconventional weaponry and the international obligations
surrounding such.
STI/PUB/1164. “Radiological Conditions in Areas of Kuwait with Residues of Depleted Uranium.” 2003.
This report provides an assessment of the Iraq wars effects through the study of the radiological waste remaining after the conflict
- 43 -
as a result of depleted uranium munitions. It provides hard data in a trustworthy format, making it an essential consideration
during this case.
WHO/SDE/OEH/01.12. “WHO Guidance on Exposure to Depleted Uranium.” 2001.

A WHO assessment of the health risks of depleted uranium which focuses on how these risks affect UN operations, this
document will provide valuable information on the WHO's view of the dangers of depleted uranium munitions.
WHO/SDE/PHE/01.1. "Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure, and Health Effects." April 2001.
This WHO review on depleted uranium is part of an ongoing and comprehensive assessment of potential health effects of exposure
to chemical, physical, and biological agents. Its purpose is to provide reference information to better allow member States to deal
appropriately with issues related to depleted uranium.
Non-UN Sources
“A-10 Thunderbolt II.” Air Combat Command. United States Air Force. 19 Aug. 2008.
<http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story_media.asp?id=123098090>.
This source was useful in providing imagery regarding the potential uses of depleted uranium.
Al-Azzawi, Souad. “Depleted Uranium Radioactive Contamination in Iraq: An Overview.” Center For
Research On Globalization. 31 Aug. 2006. Center for Research on Globalization. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=AL-
20060831&articleId=3116>
This source chronicles Iraqi claims regarding increased cancer incidence in regions where Depleted Uranium weaponry saw usage.
It provides a necessary perspective on claims that Depleted Uranium has negative health effects.
Collier, Robert. “Iraq Links Cancers to Uranium Weapons.” San Francisco Chronicle. 13 Jan. 2003: A-1.
This article details suspected Iraqi deaths brought on by depleted uranium, especially among children. It provides a local view of
the issue that is important to consider.
“Depleted Uranium [DU] History.” GlobalSecurity.org. 2008. Global Security. 10 July 2008
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/du-history.htm>.
This source chronicles the military history of depleted uranium development in the United States and United Kingdom.
“Depleted Uranium Penetrators.” Depleted Uranium Penetrators. 25 July 2007. Oak Ridge Associated
Universities. 19 Aug. 2008
<http://www.orau.org/ptp/collection/consumer%20products/dupenetrator.htm>.
This source provides several graphic representations of typical depleted uranium munitions.
Fahey, Dan. “Depleted Uranium Weapons.” International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation. 1999. INESAP. 9 July 2008 <http://www.inesap.org/bulletin17/bul17art04.htm>.
This source provides information on nations possessing depleted uranium weapons and chronicles the usage of such.
Fleming, Nic and Ian Sample. “When the Dust Settles.” The Guardian: Science. 17 Apr. 2003. The Guardian.
26 Sept. 2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2003/apr/17/science.highereducation1>
This article chronicles the conflict over depleted uranium's harmfulness and provides a summary of the conflicting theories.
Hanefeld, Jurgen. “After The War Comes Cancer.” Deutsche Welle. 3 Sept. 2005. Deutsche Welle. 26 Sept.
2008 <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1510710,00.html>
This article details increased childhood cancer and incidence of birth defects occurring in Iraq, and specifically focuses on the
human aspects of this crisis.
Kelly, Mike. “Armored Fighting Vehicle Field Firing Target System Range Unveiled.” Australian Government
- 44 -
Department of Defense. 9 Apr. 2008. Australian Government DOD. 19 Aug. 2008

<http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/kelly/gallery/20080409/index.htm>.
This source proved useful in displaying one of the weapon systems used in the deployment of depleted uranium munitions.
Marshall, Albert. “An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study.”
Sandia National Laboratories. Albuquerque: July 2005.
This report, funded by the Department of Energy, studies the results of depleted Uranium usage in the Gulf War in both Iraqi
civilians and US soldiers. It provides scientific research that, in the author’s opinion, shows that Depleted Uranium posed only
minor risks to those exposed to it during the conflict.
Naughton, James. “Briefing on Depleted Uranium.” US Department of Defense. 14 Mar. 2003.

This briefing provides valuable insight into how depleted uranium possessing nations view its usage and the obligations
surrounding it.
Peterson, Scott. “The Gulf War Battlefield Still ‘Hot’ with Depleted Uranium.” Middle East Report. 221.1
(1999): 2-5.
This article argues against depleted uranium usage, expressing concern about its long-term effects and elaborating on both the
medical harm it can cause and the long-lasting effects its usage has.
Randerson, James. “Study Suggests Cancer Risk From Depleted Uranium.” The Guardian: Cancer. 8 May
2007. The Guardian. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2007/may/08/cancer.medicineandhealth>
This article chronicles the discovery by University of Southern Maine researchers that depleted uranium can destroy DNA in the
lungs. It is useful in that it provides a theory contradictory to many of the reports on depleted uranium that have been brought to
the Court’s attention.
“Use of DU Weapons Could Be War Crime.” CNN: World. 14 Jan. 2001. CNN.com. 10 July 2008
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/01/14/balkans.uranium/>.
This article focuses on the nations launching studies into the use of depleted uranium in Kosovo, with special focus on possible
international suits and trends scientists claim connect rises in cancer and other illnesses to the munitions.
“Which Countries Have DU Weapons?” About DU: Who Uses It. 27 Sept. 2006. International Coalition to
Ban Uranium Weapons. 9 July 2008 <http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/a/9.html>.
This source provides a list of nations believed to have depleted uranium weaponry
- 45 -

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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

International Court of Justice

Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

NHSMUN is a project of the

Jerry Guo All the best,

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Rosa Akbari, Director-General Chris Chasin

(Country Summaries) (Position Papers)

Facts and the Court

Summary of ICJ Procedure

VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN PREEMPTIVE ASSAULTS

MEMORIAL OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Chapter One: Introduction

1.3 These proceedings have been requested as a result of a violation of

 Section II contains a statement of the facts relating to the incident.

 Section IV contains a statement of the applicable law, and an analysis of the

Chapter Two: The Facts

Chapter Three: Jurisdiction

Chapter Four: Israel Has Violated International Law

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed

a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,

Chapter Five: Submissions

5.1 For these reasons, the Submissions of Iran are as follows

May it please the Court:

And, in light of foregoing violations,

COUNTER-MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: The Facts

Chapter Three: Jurisdiction

Chapter Four: Israel Has Not Violated International Law

Chapter Five: Submissions

5.1 For these reasons, the Submissions of Israel are as follows:

May it please the Court,

EXHIBIT 1: Visual Representation of the Attack

THE LEGALITY OF THE USAGE OF DEPLETED URANIUM

I. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE

(signed) Ban Ki-Moon

II. RESOLUTION 62/285

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the right to life each individual has,

Applauding the efforts of multiple intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to

1. Decides, in accordance with Article 96 Paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United

IV. USAGE OF DEPLETED URANIUM

V. RESEARCH ON DEPLETED URANIUM

VI. MATTERS FOR LEGAL CONSIDERATION

v. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to rule in this case?

2. How should the facts be regarded in this case?

3. Has Israel violated codified International Law? Customary law?

1. Is the Court competent to rule in this case?

6. What is the legality of depleted uranium based munitions?

THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOURCES

International Customary Law

Principles of International Law

Scholarly W ritings and “Precedent”

PLAYERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

A/RES/60/288. “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” 20 Sept. 2006

“Charter of the United Nations.” 26 June 1945. 10 Sept. 2008 <http://www.icj-

“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 10 Dec. 1948. 10 Sept. 2008