Causes and Countermeasures:

The Accident at TEPCOs Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

Masaya Yasui Deputy Director General, Nuclear Safety Regulation Reform Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) March, March 2012

Contents Accident Overview and Root Causes Current Status of Fukushima Dai ichi NPS Dai-ichi
I. Step 2 Completion of Roadmap towards Settlement of the Accident II. Progress Status of Ensuring Mid-Term Safety III. III Situation of Spent Fuel Pools

Technical Causes and Countermeasures of Accident at Fukushima Dai ichi NPS Dai-ichi
I. II. III. III IV. V. VI. VI Accident Sequence External Power Supply Systems On-site On site Power Supply Systems Cooling Systems Containment Systems Communication, Communication Instrumentation and Control Systems and Systems, Emergency Response Arrangements

Conclusion

Accident Overview and Root Causes

The Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Th TheaccidentatFukushimaDaiichi NPS id F k hi D i i hi NPSwascausedby db longlastingcompletepowerlossduetocommoncause failure(CCF)ofelectricalequipmentfollowingtsunami, f il (CCF) f l i l i f ll i i andinsufficientprovisionagainstsevereaccident. ItistemporarilyratedatINESLevel7,andpeoplewhere livedinthespecificareaincludingthosewithin20km radiusfromthesitearestillnotabletoreturnhome.

The moment when tsunami attacked Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (Source: TEPCO)

General View of root causes of the Accident

CCFofelectricequipmentandinsufficientsevereaccident provisionwereinducedbyfollowingrootcauses: Too late or missed incorporation of new tsunami Toolateormissedincorporationofnewtsunami knowledgeintohazardevaluation, The regulatory system not covering severe accident Theregulatorysystemnotcoveringsevereaccident, Insufficientapplicationofstateoftheart technologiesandinternationalgoodpracticestothe t h l i di t ti l d ti t th regulatoryprograms.

New Nuclear Regulatory Organizations

NuclearRegulatoryAuthority (NRA)willbeestablishedas (NRA) will be established as anexternalorganofthe MinistryofEnvironment Ministry of Environment (MOE)by: separatingthenuclear separating the nuclear safetyregulatoryfunction ofNISAfromMETIand, of NISA from METI and, unifyingrelevantfunctions ofotherministries(Size: of other ministries (Size: 500 Staff,50billionyen g ) Budget).

Nuclear Regulatory Authority

New Nuclear Regulatory Systems

NRAwillimplementnewregulatorysystemsstipulatedin amendedlaws,including: Regulationtakingsevereaccidentsintoconsideration. Regulation taking severe accidents into consideration Regulationapplyinglatestscientific/technical knowledgeonsafetyissuestoexistingfacilities. k l d f i i i f ili i (backfitting) Anoperationlimitof40yearstodealwithaged reactors

Technical Knowledge acquired from the Accident

Inordertoaddressrootcausesinapracticalmanner,NISA hascloselyinvestigatedaccidentsequencesfrom has closely investigated accident sequences from engineeringpointofview,andextractedtechnical knowledgeaswellascountermeasuresintheareasof: knowledge as well as countermeasures in the areas of: Externalpowersupplysystems Onsitepowersupplysystems Coolingsystems g y Containmentsystems Communication instrumentation and control systems Communication,instrumentationandcontrolsystems, andemergencyresponsearrangements

Current Status of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Step 2 Completion in Roadmap towards Settlement of the Accident (on Dec. 16, 2011)

Reactors: A condition equivalent to Cold Shutdown

Temperature of RPV bottom is, in general, below 100. Release of radioactive materials from PCV is under control and public radiation exposure by additional release is being significantly held down. (Not exceed 1 mSv/y at the site boundary as a target.) Mid-term Safety of Circulating Water Injection Cooling System

Spent Fuel Pools: More stable cooling

Circulating Cooling System by installation of heat exchanger

Radioactive Contaminated Water: Reduction of total amount

Full-fledged F ll fl d d processing facilities i f iliti Desalination processing (reuse) Storage Mitigation of contamination in the ocean

Mid-to-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Nuclear Power Units 1-4
Present Step 2 Completed Within 2 Years Within 10 Years After 30-40 Years

Step 1, 2
<Achieved Stable Conditions> Reactors: A condition equivalent to Cold Shutdown Spent Fuel Pools: More P l M stable cooling Radioactive Contaminated Water: Reduction

Phase 1
Period to the commencement of the fuel removal from the Spent Fuel Pools (Within 2 years)
-Commence the removal of fuels from the spent fuel pools (Unit 4 in 2 years) -Reduce the radiation impact due to additional emissions from the whole site and radioactive waste generated after the accident (secondary waste materials via water processing and debris etc.) Thus maintain an effective radiation dose of less than 1 mSv/yr at the site boundaries caused by the aforementioned. -Maintain stable reactor cooling and accumulated water processing and improve their credibility. -Commence R&D and decontamination towards the removal of fuel debris

Phase 2
Period to the commencement of the removal of fuel debris (Within 10 years)
-Complete th f l removal f C l t the fuel l from th spent the t fuel pools at all Units

Phase 3
Period to the end of the decommissioning (In 30-40 years)

-Complete the fuel debris removal (in 20-25 years)

-Complete preparations for the removal of -Complete the decommission fuel debris such as decontaminating the (in 30-40 years) insides of the buildings restoring the buildings, PCVs and filling the PCVs with water Then commence the removal of fuel -Implement radioactive waste processing and disposal debris (Target: within 10 years) -Continue stable reactor cooling -Complete the processing of accumulated water -Continue R&D on radioactive waste processing and disposal, and commence R&D on the reactor facilities decommission

-Commence R&D of radioactive waste processing and disposal

Actions towards systematic staff training and allocation, improving motivation, and securing worker safety will be continuously implemented.

Current Status of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP

Unit 1
Spent fuel pool Reactor pressure vessel Primary containment vessel

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

Pressure suppressio n chamber

TEPCO

Ministry of Defense

Air Photo Service

Air Photo Service

Reactor Pressure vessel

Temperature at reactor vessel bottom*

Circulating water injection cooling li 24.3 Nitrogen injection i j ti 25.4 Circulation cooling 26.5 14,100 m3

Circulating water injection cooling 47.1 47 1

Circulating water injection cooling 51.4 51 4 Nitrogen injection i j ti 44.4 Circulation cooling 14.4 23,800 m3

No fuel

Primary Containment vessel

Temperature of air in PCV*

Nitrogen injection g j 54.3 Circulation cooling 14.2

Circulation cooling 26 18,300 m3

Fuel pool
Temperature of pool water*

Highly-contaminated water in R/B and T/B**

22,000m3
** As of February 21, 2012

* As of 12:00 on February 24, 2012

Diagram of PCVs Gas Control System for Unit 3

(Source: TEPCO)

Result of Gas Sampling at PCVs Gas Control System

Concentration of sample p (Bq/cm3) Nuclides Unit 1 (Sampled on Mar. 8, Mar 8 2012) Gas vial container I-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 Kr-85 K 85 Xe-131m Xe-133 Xe-135 N.D. : not detected N.D. ND 3.510-1 5.510-1

Detection limits of Unit 1 (Bq/cm3)

Concentration of sample p (Bq/cm3) Unit 2 (Sampled on Mar. 7, Mar 7 2012) Gas vial container

Detection limits of Unit 3 (Bq/cm3)

Concentration of sample p (Bq/cm3) Unit 3 (Sampled on Mar. 1, Mar 1 2012) Gas vial container

Detection limits of Unit 3 (Bq/cm3)

1.310 1 310-1 3.010-1 3.610-1 2.510 1 2 510-1 2.9100 2.410-1 1.110-1

N.D. ND 5.910-1 8.110-1 N.D. ND N.D. N.D. N.D.

1.210 1 210-1 3.010-1 3.610-1 2.510 1 2 510-1 3.0100 2.710-1 1.010-1

N.D. ND 4.010-1 7.210-1 N.D. ND N.D. N.D. N.D.

1.310 1 310-1 3.210-1 3.810-1 2.510 1 2 510-1 3.3100 2.210-1 1.010-1

(Source: TEPCO)

Investigation Result of the Inside of PCV of Unit 2 (on Jan. 19, 2012)
Photos were taken inside the PCV by an industrial endoscope (length:10m) (length:10m).
<Industrial endoscope>

< Photos inside the PCV of Unit 2 >

(Source: TEPCO)

Treatment of High Level Radioactive Contaminated Water

Highly-radioactive contaminated water accumulated in the reactor building and Highly radioactive turbine buildings is treated to reduce the concentrations of radioactive materials and reused.
Waterleveliscontrolledtoprevent thecontaminatedwaterfrom the contaminated water from leakingtooutsidethebuilding

HighLevelRadioactiveContaminatedWaterTreatmentSystem

Reactorbuilding

Processmain building Hightemperature incineratorbuilding

Oilseparator

Contaminatedwater treatmentsystem

Turbinebuilding
Containedwithin concretewalls

Cesiumadsorptionsystem (Kurion,US)

1m

P
Highconcentration accumulatedwaterreceiver tanks(underground)

P
Decontaminationsystem (Areva,Fra) ( (Currentlyin y standbymode)

No.2cesiumadsorption No. 2 cesium adsorption system(Toshiba)

P Sea
Reactorwater R t t injectionpump

Accumulatedwateris transferredtothetank beforeitoverflows

Radioactive concentration isreducedto 1/10,000orless Lowtomedium concentrationtanks

Storagetanks

Fresh water t

Desalinationdevice Desalination device <reverseosmosis>

Condensatesalinewater receivertank Desalinationdevice Desalination device

<evaporationconcentration

Freshwater

Leakage is prevented by controlling the water level in the buildings and by installing weirs or monitoring function to other equipment and facilities

Concentratedliquid wastestoragetank

Trend of Accumulated Water Level

The accumulated water level in T/B has been drawn down around the tentative target level of O.P. 3000 during STEP 2 and maintained.
T/B B1 T/B B1 Water L W t Level (WL) l

mm]
4000
Unit 2 T/B B1[mm] 2T/B B1 WL mm] Unit 3 T/B B1 WL mm] 3T/B B1[mm]

3800

3600

3400

3200

3000

OP3,000

2800

2600

6/17

7/22

8/26

9/30

11/4

12/9

1/13

2/17

Nuclide Concentration of Accumulated Water in Turbine Building

Concentration ofsample (Bq/cm3) Unit1 nuclide Sampled Sampled on Mar. 27, 2011 3.0E+04 3 0E 04 1.2E+05 1.6E+05 Sampled on Jan.20, 2012 ND 2.2E+04 3.0E+04 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND <560 <300 ND ND 2.4E+05 2.2E+05 2 2E+05 Unit2 Sampled Sampled on Mar. 24, 2011 2.0E+06 2 0E 06 2.6E+06 2.8E+06 Sampled on Jan.12, 2012 ND 2.2E+05 3.0E+05 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND Unit 3 Sampled on Mar. 24, 2011 1.2E+06 1 2E 06 1.8E+05 1.8E+05 Sampled on Feb.12, 2012 ND 8.5E+04 1.1E+05 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND Unit 4 Sampled Sampled on Mar. 24, 2011 3.6E+02 3 6E 02 3.1E+01 3.2E+01 Sampled on Feb.12, 2012 ND 2.1E+04 2.8E+04 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND
(Source: TEPCO)

I131 I 131 Cs134 Cs137 Y91 Mo99 Tc99m Te129m Te132 I132 Cs136 Ba140 La 140 La140

* In the case the measurement is under the detection limit "ND" is marked.

Release Rate of Radioactive Materials from PCVs of Units 1-3

Current total release rate of Cesium 134 and 137 from PCVs of Units1-3 is Units1 3 estimated to be approx. 0.01 billion Bq/h at the maximum. (1/77,000,000 of early stages of the accident)

1.2

Release Rate (Billion Bq / hour)

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb

Installation of Reactor Building Cover (on Oct. 28, 2011)

A cover was installed in the Unit 1 building to restrain release of radioactive materials. Rubble is being removed from the upper part of the reactor buildings for Units 3 and 4 before installation of the covers.
Installation of the Unit 1 Cover
Start of steel framing Completion of steel framing

Debris removal at Unit 3

On Sep. 10, 2011 On Feb. 21, 2012

Covering of SFP

Debris and girder removal at Unit 4

Removal works of the girder of overhead traveling crane on Mar. 5, 2012

The Covering was completed

Building wall panels

Debris removal at the top

(Source: TEPCO)

Construction of Water Shielding Wall

A measure to prevent contamination of the ocean via the underground water water. Image of water shielding walls
Cross-section view Seaside water shielding wall

Existing wall

Permeable layer

Landfill Low permeable layer

Permeable layer

Low permeable layer

Start of Marine Soil Covering Construction at Inside Port

High contaminated radioactive materials were detected from marine soil sampled at inside of the port To prevent contamination of the ocean outside of the port, marine soil in front of the intake th i t k canal i planned t b covered with solidified soil. l is l d to be d ith lidifi d il

h ut So

br ea kw at er

Impermeable structure (restored) I bl t t ( t d)

k ea br r te wa

No rth

Dredging (seaway, anchor ground)

Water shielding walls

Install additional silt fence

Covering (Dredged soil dump) Covering (in front of the intake canal)

Covering g
(in front of the intake canal)

Unit 6 Unit 5

Shallow draft quay

Existing silt fence

Unit 1 Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

(Source:TEPCO)

Overview of Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs)

<Overview of location of spent fuel storage facilities>
Unit 6 Unit 5 Unit 1 SFP Unit 2 SFP Unit 3 SFP Unit 4 SFP Common pool

<Status of stored fuel in SFPs>

Number of stored fuel assemblies (Number of new fuel assemblies) 292 (100) 587 (28) 514 (52) 1331 (204) 6375 Capacity of p y storage 900 1240 1220 1590 6840

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Common pool

<Decay heat of SFPs>

Decay heat (MW) As A occurrence of f accident (Mar. 11) Unit 1 SFP Unit 2 SFP Unit 3 SFP Unit 4 SFP Common pool 0.18 0.62 0.54 2.26 1.13 7 months after th th ft the accident (Oct. 17) 0.14 0.43 0.39 1.15 1.12

(Source: Added to the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep. 9, 2011, revised Sept. 28, 2011, TEPCO)

Installing Support Structures at Bottom of SFP of Unit 4

It has been confirmed that the seismic resistance is sufficient without any reinforcements. As a precautionary measure, support structures at the bottom of the pool has been installed in order to further improve the safety margin. margin
Installation image Installation of support structures

Spent Fuel Pool

Install steel pillar

Injection grountJul.30

Before steel pillar installationMay.31

Install concrete wall

Concrete wall

Placing concreteJul. 21

Installation steel pillarJun.20

The latest condition of the upper floor of Unit 4 (Mar. 5, 2012) (source: TEPCO)

Situation of SFP
Unit 3: Due to Much debris from the explosion of the reactor building the status of building, the fuel can not be video-recorded. Unit 4: The fuel is confirmed to be stored in the racks and not severely damaged.

(Source: The impact the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep.9, 2011, revised Sep.28, 2011, TEPCO))

assembly Situation of SFP of Unit 3

(Source: The impact of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear (S Th i t f th ff th P ifi t f T h k E th k t N l Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep.9, 2011, revised Sep.28, 2011, TEPCO))

(Source: TEPCO (Shot on Feb.9, 2012))

Situation of SFP of Unit 4

Situation of SFP (cont.)

The water analysis results show that the detected radioactive materials came from the damaged core and that there is little possibility of large-scale damage of spent fuels.
Unit 1
Detected nuclide cesium134 cesium137 iodine131 Half-life ~2 years ~30 years ~8 days 8 Sampled 6/22 1.2104 1.4104 68 Concentration (Bq/cm3) Sampled 8/19 Sampled 11/5 4 1.810 1.3104 2.3104 1.8104 lower than detection limit lower than detection limit Concentration (Bq/cm3) Sampled 8/19 Sampled 11/5 5 1.110 9.5104 1.1105 1.1105 lower than detection limit lower than detection limit Concentration (Bq/cm3) Sampled 7/7 S l d Sampled 8/19 S l d 9.4104 7.4104 1.1105 8.7104 lower than detection limit lower than detection limit

Unit 2
Detected nuclide cesium134 cesium137 iodine131 Half-life ~2 years y ~30 years ~8 days Half life Half-life ~2 years ~30 years ~8 days Half-life ~2 years ~30 years ~8 days Sampled 4/16 1.6105 1.5105 4.1103

Unit 3
Detected nuclide lid cesium134 cesium137 iodine131 Sampled 5/8 S l d 1.4105 1.5105 1.1104

Sampled 11/5 S l d 6.0104 7.4104 lower than detection limit

Unit 4
Detected nuclide cesium134 cesium137 iodine131 Sampled 4/12 88 93 220 Sampled 4/28 49 55 27

Concentration (Bq/cm3) Sampled 5/7 Sampled 8/20 56 44 67 61 16 l lower th d t ti li it than detection limit

Sampled 11/5 3.5 5.1 l lower th d t ti li it than detection limit

Red : sampled SFP water using a concrete pumper

Blue : sampled SFP water overflow into a skimmer surge tank from FPC sampling piping

Source: Added to The impact of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep.9, 2011, revised Sep.28, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Amount of water around the SFP of Unit 4

Reactor Drywell 680m3

Pit 760m3

SFP 1425m3

11.8m

RPV

Spent fuel

PCV

Trend of Water Level and Temperature of SFP

Since March 17 water was supplied to Units 1-4 by fire engines and concrete 17, 1 4, pumpers. The decay heat evaluation shows the fuel has never been exposed. As for Unit 4, water in the reactor well filled for annual inspection could flow into the SFP when the water level of SFP decreased decreased.
SFP of Unit 4
4/27 Full water level was confirmed by skimmer surge tank level

8m
W Water p level (top of fuel rack ==0m =0m)

7m 6m 5m 4m 3m 2m 1m 0m

Full water

3/15 the damage to building (assuming the drop of 3/14 water level to be 1m) was checked 3/16 the water level was checked from a23m helicopter (water level was 2-3m lower than the brim)

Measured value of water level Evaluated value of water level Measured value 160 of water temperature Evaluated value of water temperature

3/15

140 120 100

60
Assuming that water flew into from the well after the drop of water level in the pool Temperature of the surface layer

40 20 0 5/30

Pool+Well+DSpit Variation in water level including Pool, Well and DSpit

4/22 4/22 Assuming that the gate is hermetic tightened after the water evel of the pool is recovered at injection

3/11

3/21

3/31

4/10

4/20

4/30

5/10

5/20

Source: Added to The impact of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep.9, 2011, revised Sep.28, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.)

80

Wa temperatur () ater re

Prepare for Fuel Removal from SFP of Unit 4

Fuel removal are planned to be initiated in autumn 2013 2013. Currently Rubble is being removed to prepare for the relevant works. Construction of covering structure will be initiated in spring 2013.

fuel removal cover

Measure f M for rain water

Building image of fuel removal cover

Cross-section diagram
(Source: TEPCO)

Sequence, Causes and Countermeasures of accident at Fukushima Dai ichi NPS Dai-ichi
(Note) Slides from the next pages are created based on the Interim Report on Technical Knowledge of the Accident at Fukushima Dai ichi Nuclear Power Dai-ichi Station, TEPCO. NISA will further collect technical knowledge on this subject, and improve this Interim Report. Report The Interim Report in English will be published on NISA website (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/index.html) in the near future.

Accident Sequence

Progression of Accident (Outline of Accident Progression Common to Units 1-3)

Automatic reactor shutdown due to earthquake, loss of off-site power supply
Dependency on emergency power was inevitable.

Soaking / depletion of battery, depletion of compressed air, etc.

Many on-site works were necessary due to difficulty of measurement / control / communication.

Emergency diesel generator started up and power supply was secured. Reactor was cooled by core cooling system.
Start-up / Shutdown operations for ICRCIC were going on.

Shutdown of core cooling system

Unit 1 has lost its function at an early phase. Due to this reason, there was only short time to address the situation. it ti

Most of electric systems including emergency diesel generators and switchboards were unavailable due to tsunami tsunami.
(Only one of emergency air cooling DGs in Unit 6 maintained its function)

Fuels were exposed and melt down while cooling was not conducted.
Serious degradation of Containment led to the release of radioactive materials into environment environment.

Cooling sea water pumps installed along the coast were also unavailable. (Loss of ultimate heat sink) )

Water injection from fire protection system (Alternative water injection)

The exposure time of fuels is considered to be prolonged due to insufficient reactor depressurization (reactor depressurization operation for containment, reactor containment depressurization [vent]) to the pressure lower than the fire extinguishing pump head.

Station Blackout
(On March 13, Unit 5 received power supply from Unit 6 on emergency basis. )

Motor operated pumps etc. were unavailable. (Emergency cooling was carried out by emergency condenser IC in Unit 1, reactor core isolation cooling system [RCIC] in Unit 2, and RCIC and high pressure core injection system HPCI in Unit 3.) 3)

Hydrogen generated through zirconium water reaction. Explosions that seemed to be hydrogen explosion occurred in reactor buildings at Units 1, 3 and 4. (Pressure in the pressure suppression chamber in Unit 2 dropped simultaneously with the Unit 4 explosion.) )
The explosions deteriorated work performance in the surrounding areas. Water leakage from containments / buildings were observed.

Max. Acceleration Values Observed in Reactor Buildings of each Unit

Record Loc. Loc of seismometer (bottom floor of reactor bld.) Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit U it 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Max. acceleration (Gal) NS 460 348 322 281 311 298 EW 447 550 507 319 548 444 UD 258 302 231 200 256 244

Max. response acceleration to the design basis ground motion Ss (Gal) NS 487 441 449 447 452 445 EW 489 438 441 445 452 448 UD 412 420 429 422 427 415

Fukushima Dai-ichi

Each recording was interrupted at around 130-150(s) from recording start time 1Gal=0.01m/s2 , 981Gal=1G

Assumed Height and Actual Height of Tsunami in Each NPS

Not Onagawa NPS flooded Sea Water Pump Actual height of tsunami Assumed height of tsunami

Building Site Level 13.8

13

unit: m

13.8

13.6
Onagawa pail
SeawaterLevel InfrontofNPS

The boundary of the intensity of 5 5 seismic

Onagawa NPS Destructive flood Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

D/G on a basement submerged.

13Analytical value
Epicenter

10 4

5.5

Onahama pail

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

Sea water flooded. Fukushima Dai-ni NPS buildingspumpsslight. Damage of were Sea Water pump heat exchanger building

9 12 4 5.2

Tokai Dai-ni Dai ni NPS

Onahama Pail

Sea water pumps Tokai Dai-ni NPS to breakwater did not flood due wall breakwater wall

Intensity level: 4 5-lower 5-upper 6-lower 6-upper 7

Meteorological Agency (Preliminary Report)

6.2 8.9 4 5.7

Hitachi Pail

Source: Meteorological Agency Preliminary Report into the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake ([Online] http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/index.html)

Areas inundated by Tsunami at Each NPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi Flooding Fukushima Dai-ni Flooding

Counterflow

Counterflow

Onagawa

Tokai Dai-ni

Flooding Flooding

Counterflow

Text added by NISA to published materials from Niigata Prefectural Technology Committee and Google

Technical Knowledge about Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO Direction of Countermeasures (Point) - Interim Report <Accident sequence>
Earthquake
Shut down
Loss of External Power Supply Prevention of long-term Loss of External Power Supply caused by Earthquake q Earthq ake

<Direction of countermeasures>
PreventionoflossofSafety PreventionoflossofSafety functionsbycommoncausefailure functionsbycommoncausefailure External Power Supply
1.Improvereliabilityofexternalpowersupplyandgrid 2.Improve earthquakeresistanceofsubstation 3.Improveearthquakeresistanceofswitchyard 3 Improve earthquake resistance of switchyard 4.Recoverexternalpowersupplyquickly

Preventionofsevere accident

Mitigationofsignificant Mitigationofsignificant releaseofradioactivity

Start-up Emergency D/G and Core cooling system

On-site Power Supply

5.Dispersepowerequipment 6.Enhancecountermeasureforflooding g 7.Enhancediversityandredundancyof emergencypowersupply 8.EnhanceemergencyDCsupply 9.Preparededicatedbackuppowersupply 10.Facilitatealternative p powersupplyfromoutside pp y 11.Stockbackupelectrical equipment

Tsunami
Loss of Emergency D/G

Prevention of Loss of onsite Power Supply by common cause failure / Enhancement of Emergency Power Supply

Loss of DC
Flooding / Empt y Loss of Core Cooling System

Prevention of g Loss of Core Cooling System

Core Cooling / Injection system 12.Improvetheresponsecapabilitiesforaccidents 12 I th biliti f id t 13.Disperse thecoolingwatersystemandpreventflooding 14.EnhanceUHSatatimeofaccident 15.Improvethemaneuverabilityofisolationvalves 16.Enhancethealternativewaterinjectionfunctions 17.Improvethereliabilityofcoolingandinjectionsystem for spent fuel pool forspentfuelpool

Prevention of CV damage and Hydrogen Explosion

Prevention of early damage of Containment Vessel / Prevention of uncontrolled release of y Radioactivity 18.EnhancediversityofPCVcooling system 20.Proceedwithlowpressure 20. Proceed with low pressure injectionprocessreliably 21.Improvereliability and maneuverabilityofventingsystem 19.Preventionofthedamagingtophead flangeofPCVcausedbyoverheating 23.Mitigatetheeffectofradioactivity causedbyventing y g 22.Ensureindependencyofventsystem 24.PreventtheHydrogenexplosion (controlthegasconcentrationand theadequaterelease)

Core Damage Hydrogen Explosion

Loss of Communication, Instrumentation and control system

Control and Measurement system

Enhancement of Plant Controlling function and Monitoring function 25.Prepareemergencycommandcenter 26.Securethecommunicationtoolsforaccidents 27.Improvereliabilityofthemeasurementequipmentforaccidents 28.Enhancethemonitoringfunctionsfortheplantconditions 29.Enhanceemergencymonitoringfunctions 30.Createthestructureandconductthetrainingfortheemergencyresponse

. External Power Supply Systems

Damage of External Power Supply Systems

For 5 nuclear power stations (Higashidori, Onagawa, Fukushima Dai-ichi, Fukushima D i i and T k i D i i N l D i i hi F k hi Dai-ni, d Tokai Daini Nuclear P Power stations) affected by the earthquake,19 out of 22 external power lines
were not available to supply p pp y power due to the damage to electric g equipment caused by earthquake. (Onagawa and Fukushima Dai-ni NPSs could receive eternal power through surviving 3 lines.)

Situation at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Damaged circuit breakers and disconnectors in the switchyard (Units 1 and 2) Tripped transmission lines (Units 3 and 4) A collapse of an nearby embankment which felled electrical towers (Units 5 and 6)

Complete loss of external power

State of External Power Supplies to Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (from Immediately after an aftershock to Mar. 20) Shin-Fukushima Substation (seismic intensity: 6+) Shi F k hi S b t ti ( i i i t it 275kV
Temporary equipment (transformers) installed (6kV)

66kV

500kV

Overhead ground wires broken TEPCO nuclear power line (Tohoku Electric)
Confirmed that transmission possible around 19.00 19 00 on 11th March

Charging 18th March

Charging 20th March

Key: State immediately after earthquake

: Damage to facilities : Tripped : Charged : Power cut

Okuma Lin 3L ne

Okuma Lin 4L ne

Futaba L Line 1L

Okum Line 2L ma

Yono omori Line 1L e

Yono omori Line 2L e

Okum Line 1L ma

Futa Line 2L aba

Charging 15th March

Temporary equipment q p installed

Okuma 3/4 and Yonomori 1/2 partially combined

Rerouted through different pylons

Incoming circuit breaker damaged

Cannot Incoming circuit receive breaker and power as under d isolator i l t construction damaged

Pylons collapsed

Sending power only

Cables not working

Unit 1, Unit 2, Unit 3, Unit 4

Temporary equipment installed

Unit 5, Unit 6

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station

Damage at Switchyard at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

[275kV air blast breaker: completely destroyed]
Intact state Breaker insulators completely destroyed y y

Damage to Overhead Power Transmission equipment at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Collapse of pylon d t l d lid (Y C ll f l due to landslide (Yonomori Li no. 27) i Line

Landslip on slope

500kV Futaba Line

Viewpoint No.2 No.1
Landslip

Viewpoint No.3

No.27

No.28

(C) GeoEye

Landslip 66kV Yonomori Line

Landslip on slope (viewpoint )

No.26

Yonomori No. 28 (Power plant side)

Yonomori Y i No. 26

Status of restoration Temporary restoration by circuitous route on Mar. 18 (Reroute to Futaba Line no. 2) (R t t F t b Li Futaba line was changed to 66kV (completed in July)

Collapse of Pylon (viewpoint )

Countermeasures for External Power Supply Systems

Countermeasure 1 Improve reliability of external power supply and grid id

Example: Ensuring power supply from various routes (transmission power lines, electrical substations)

Countermeasure 2 Improve earthquake resistance of substation

Example: Using gas insulated equipment and high-strength isolators

Countermeasure 3 Improve earthquake resistance of switchyard

Example: Upgrading from air blast breakers (ABB) to gas insulated switchgear (GIS)

Countermeasure 4 Recover external power supply quickly

Example: Preparing materials and equipment and manuals equipment, Installing fault locators

Improveearthquakeresistanceofsubstation(onsite)

550kV gas insulated switchgear (GIS)

(Source: Japan AE Power Systems Co. website)

275kV air blast breaker (ABB)

(S (Source: Electrical Equipment Earthquake Countermeasures WG)

. On-site Power Supply Systems

Damage to On-site Power Supply Systems

Most of the power supply equipment installed on the basement floors of the turbine buildings (T/Bs) and the control buildings (C/Bs) near the ocean were damaged due to flooding or water damage. The emergency diesel generators (D/Gs) lost function due to flooding or water damage. Even intact D/Gs could not supply power because supporting equipment such as DC power supply, sea water pumps, high-voltage switch b d (M/C ) power centers (P/C ) and etc. lost hi h lt it h boards (M/Cs), t (P/Cs) d t l t function due to flooding or water damage.

Unit 1: Complete loss of power supply including D/C power Unit 2: Complete loss of power supply as same as Unit 1 Unit 3: Loss of all AC power supply

Impact of Tsunami on On-site Power Supply and Cooling Systems

Unit 1

Unit 2 2A (T/B basement) 2B (Common pool 1F) (C l

Unit 3

Unit 4 4A (T/B basement) 4B (Common pool 1F) (C l

Unit 5

Unit 6 6A: R/B basement 6B: DG building 1F (Usable) HPCS: R/B basement R/B 2F basement R/B 2F basement, etc. T/B mezzanine basement

Emergency Diesel Generator

1A, 1B (T/B basement)

3A, 3B (T/B basement)

5A, 5B (T/B basement)

high-voltage switch boards Power center (note) DC power (battery) Emergency core cooling equipment

T/B 1F T/B 1F etc. C/B basement, etc. However, IC required inspection

T/B basement, etc. T/B 1F etc. C/B basement, etc.

T/B basement, etc. T/B basement, etc. T/B mezzanine basement (RCIC and HPC usable)

T/B basement, etc. T/B 1F, etc. C/B basement, etc.

T/B basement, etc. T/B 2F, etc. T/B mezzanine basement

(RCIC usable)

: Unusable due to flooding or water damage : Partially unusable : Usable T/B: Turbine building C/B: Control building R/B: Reactor building (Note) Air circuit breaker (ACB), guard relay and peripheral equipment stored in a compact manner using a motive power panel that uses low-voltage circuits within the plant

Source: Modified to the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep. 9, 2011, revised Sept. 28, 2011, TEPCO)

State of Damage to On-site Power Supply equipment (Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 1) R/B
Closed as result of remote closing signal issued when AC power supply lost
Cooling water 106t/unit Sustain time 8h/2 units Reverse flow valve pit, etc.
IC(B) Injection Cooling AC power DC power g Flooding Water damage

Load

Pump Usable Unusable

D/G: Emergency diesel generator M/C (High-voltage power panel) : Motor power panels used in plant high-voltage circuits P/C (Power centers) :Motor powers panel used by low-voltage circuits within plant. MCC (Motor control center) : Low-capacity motor power panels used by low-voltage circuits within plant. D/C: Direct current power supply

IC PCV internal valve became inoperable due to loss of all AC power supply within AC power motor
MO2B MO1B

Could be used independently, but unusable in system

Emergency use diesel generator (D/G) was submerged in water, plus seawater cooling pump became unusable.
Seawater cooling pumps needed for each type of equipment became unusable as a result of tsunami

Unclear whether usable or not

Much of the power supply system is installed in T/B or C/B, and became unusable because of water damage

MO2AMO1A IC(A)

SLC-B

MO3AMO4A MO3B MO4B MCC 1D 480V

DC power supply also installed in C/B, but became unusable because of water damage in the building.

T/B

Fire engines

C/B
Central C C Control Room
CS-A/C, CCSW-C/D etc.

Signal/Operati Si l/O i on

Okuma Line no. 1

Regular system M/C 1A 6.9kV M/C 1S 6.9kV M/C 1B 6.9kV D/G1B Fuel Day Tank (16kl)

Fuel

DD/FP

ECCS pump etc.

SLC-A CRD-A, SHC A, SHC-A CCS-A/B etc.

M/C 1C 6.9kV M/C 1D 6.9kV 6 9kV MCC 1A 480V MCC 1F 480V P/C 1C 480V P/C 1D 480V DC 1A 125V DC 1B 125V
ACCESS AREA MCC 1A Capacity 480V MUWCA MUWC-B
CS-B/D, CCSW-C/D etc.

P/C 1S 480V P/C 1A 480V P/C 1B 480V D/G1A fuel day d tank k (5kl)

No.1 diesel tank (188kl)

HPCI pump

MCC 1C 480V

Filtered water tank (8000kl2) Condensation storage tank (1900kl)

S/C

S/C

2500Ah Capacity 2500Ah

D/G1A D/G1B

Cooling seawater system

Seawater cooling pump

Auxiliary equipment e i e t

Thermal exchange

CRD-B CRD B, SHC-B, CCS-C/D etc.

Sea

DC power auxiliary equipment required for activation of HPCI pump (auxiliary oil pump, etc.) lost, so HPCI could not be used

State of Damage to On-site Power Supply equipment (Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 2)

B system D/G was air cooled and protected from water p damage, but M/C and DC power supply were water damaged and unusable
Reverse flow valve Pit etc. Fire engines Fuel

R/B

Injection Cooling AC power DC power g Flooding Water damage

Load

Pump Usable Unusable

D/G: Emergency diesel generator M/C (High-voltage power panel) : Motor power panels used in plant high-voltage circuits P/C (Power centers) :Motor powers panel used by low-voltage circuits within plant. MCC (Motor control center) : Low-capacity motor power panels used by low-voltage circuits within plant. D/C: Direct current power supply

Could be used independently, but unusable in system

Emergency use diesel generator (D/G) was submerged in water, plus seawater cooling pump became unusable.
Seawater cooling pumps needed for each type of equipment became unusable as a result of tsunami

Much of the power supply system is installed in T/B or C/B, and became unusable because of water damage DC power supply also installed in C/B, but became unusable because of water damage in the building.

No.4 diesel tank (344kl)

DD/FP

T/B

D/G2B fuel day tank (20kl)

C/B

SLC-A

Filtered water Operating tank Auxiliary joint equipment (8000kl2 units)

MCC 2C 480V 80V

Central Control Room

CRD-A

Okuma No. 2 Line

No.1 diesel tank (188kl)

CS-A, RHR-A/C, RHRS-A/C etc.

D/G2B Condensatio n storage tank (2500kl)

ECCS pump etc. MCC 2D 480V

P/C 2C 480V
SLC-B MCC2C-2 480V MUWCA

Regular system P/C 2A 480V P/C 2B 480V D/G2A fuel day tank (16kl)

P/C 2D 480V

M/C 2E 6.9kV P/C 2E 480V DC 2D/GB 125V

S/C

S/C

MCC2C-1 480V

CRDB

RCIC pump Capacity 500Ah Auxiliary y Auxiliary y HPCI pump

DC 2A 125V DC 2B 125V Capacity1400 Ah Thermal exchange

Capacity 1200Ah
CS-B, RHR-B/D, RHRS-B/D etc.

M/C 2C 6.9kV M/C 2D 6.9kV P/C 2SB 480V

M/C 2A 6.9kV M/C 2B 6.9kV M/C 2SB 6.9kV D/G2A Coolant seawater Seawater cooling coo g pump

MUWC-B MCC2D 1 MCC2D-1 480V

M/D FP-A

MCC2D-2 480V

DC power auxiliary equipment required for activation of HPCI pump (auxiliary oil pump, etc.) lost, so HPCI could not be used. (Not clear why RCIC was able to maintain operating status).

Sea

State of Damage to On-site Power Supply equipment (Fukushima Dai-ichi, Unit 3)

R/B
Injection Cooling AC power DC power Flooding Water damage

Load

Pump Usable Unusable

D/G: Emergency diesel generator M/C (High-voltage power panel) : Motor power panels used in plant high-voltage circuits P/C (Power centers) :Motor powers panel used by low-voltage circuits within plant. MCC (Motor control center) : Low-capacity motor power panels used by low-voltage circuits within plant. D/C: Direct current power supply

Could be used independently, but unusable in system

Emergency use diesel generator (D/G) was submerged in water, plus seawater cooling pump became unusable.
Seawater cooling pumps needed for each type of equipment became unusable as a result of tsunami

Reverse flow valve Pit etc.

Unclear whether usable or not

Much of the power supply system is installed in T/B or C/B, and became unusable because of water damage

DC power supply also installed in T/B mezzanine, but became unusable because of water damage in the building.

T/ B

Okuma Line No. 4

Okuma Line No. 3

Fire (8kl2) engines

C/B

SLC-A

MCC 3C 480V

Central Control Room D/G3A fuel day tank (16kl) D/G3B fuel day tank (16kl)

Fuel

DD/FP

ECCS pump etc. MCC 3D 480V

MUWC-A

No.2 diesel tank (188kl)

SLC-B

CS-A, RHR-A/C, RHRS-A/C etc.

MCC3C-2 480V

Filtered water tank (8000kl2 units)

Capacity 2000Ah DC 3A/B 250V

CRDA

S/C

S/C

Condensed water storage tank (2500kl) RCIC pump

Auxiliary HPCI pump M/C 3SB 6.9kV Auxiliary Thermal exchange P/C 3SB 480V P/C 3SA 480V M/C 3SA 6.9kV

Regular system t M/C 3A 6.9kV M/C 3B 6.9kV

M/C 3C 6.9kV P/C 3A 480V P/C 3B 480V M/C 3D 6.9kV

MCC3C-1 480V MCC3D-1 480V 80V

DC 3A 125V DC 3B 125V V

Capacity 1200Ah Capacity 1400Ah

P/C 3C 480V P/C 3D 480V

MCC3D-2 480V

D/G3A

Seawater cooling pump

D/G3B
MUWC-B

As DC power supply avoided water damage, RCIC and HPCI function were maintained

CS-B, RHR-B/D, RHRS-B/D etc.

CRD-B

Seawater cooling system

Sea

Countermeasures for On-site Power Systems

Countermeasure 5 Disperse On-site power equipment

Example: St E l : Strengthening th redundancy of power supply and switch th i the d d f l d it h boards Ensuring the diversity of installation locations of on-site power equipment

Countermeasure 6 Enhance countermeasure for flooding

Example: Adopting watertight buildings/rooms and draining function

Countermeasure 7 Enhance diversity and redundancy of emergency AC power supply

Example: Strengthening the diversity of the cooling methods through air cooling, water cooling and etc.

Countermeasures for On-site Power Systems (cont.)

Countermeasure 8 Enhance emergency DC p g y power supply pp y
Example: Securing the storage capacity of batteries according to the characteristics of the plant (it is necessary to secure a storage capacity of at least 8 hours with the storage capacity of the batteries f b tt i of one system without i l ti th l d/ and at l t ith t isolating the load/ d t least t 24 hours after the unnecessary loads are isolated.)

Countermeasure 9 Prepare dedicated backup power supply

Example: Securing a power supply dedicated to particularly important instrumentation & control system, by separately preparing a charging system and batteries in addition to the existing and g g y g alternative power supplies

Countermeasure 10 Facilitate alternative power supply from outside p pp y

Example: Standardization of the power supply inlets outside of the buildings from power supply car Splitting them into two locations or more (including measures against salt water) i t lt t )

Countermeasure 11 Stock backup electrical equipment

E l : Securing spare parts of M/C P/Cs and cables i g t f M/Cs, P/C d bl Example: S Installing backup equipment Preparing portable lights

RelatedFacilitiesforCountermeasures

Watertight door (Source: The Shikoku Electric Power Co.,Inc.)

Gas turbine generator (Source: The Chugoku Electric Power Co.,Inc.)

Emergency generator of cooling methods through air cooling (Source:The Chugoku Electric Power Co.,Inc.) spare parts (electric motor) Replacement (pumps)

125V battery charger room Spare parts of electric motors and replacement of pumps (Source: The Chugoku Electric Power Co.,Inc.) Power supply inlets outside of the buildings (Source: The Shikoku Electric Power Co Inc ) Co.,Inc.) 250V battery charger room

. Cooling Systems

Relation between of Power Supply and Cooling Systems

Unit 1: Cooling systems became uncontrollable due to loss of all power supply in the early stage. Unit 2: All power supply was lost. RCIC continued cooling. Unit 3 RCIC and HPCI continued cooling until D/C power supply ran out. 3: C C C /C
The reactors shut down automatically due to earthquake, loss of external power supply.

Power supply equipment such as D/Gs was not unavailable due to tsunami, loss of all AC power supply

Unit 1 & 2
Loss of function of DC power supply due to tsunami

Unit 3
Function of DC power supply maintained

Unit 1
IC was unavailable to check status and operate. HPCI was unavailable to start up. Led to accident at early time

Unit 2
RCIC continued cooling. RCIC continued to operate until 13:25 on Mar 14 Mar.14.

Unit 3
RCIC or HPCI continued cooling until battery ran out. After RCIC stopped at 11:36 on Mar.12, HPCI started up automatically due to low level of water in reactor.

Operating Conditions of Isolation Condenser (IC) of Unit 1

Due to loss of DC power supply after tsunami, the indication of the valve status (open or close) t t ( l ) went off, and the IC became uncontrollable. Due to loss of DC power supply, the interlock of the isolation valve in failfail safe mode closed the IC valves.
Isolation Valve Operation Interlock
Loss of DC power supply of System A p pp y y or System B Due to loss of DC power supply of one system, failsafe operation in both system System A and System B isolation valve close signal

IC supply pipe isolation valve (MO-2A/B) IC return pipe isolation valve (MO-3A/B) Close operation Around 18:00 on March 11, 18 00 power supply was temporarily restored, and the normally open IC supply pipe isolation valve (MO-2A/B) was displayed as closed. closed

Isolation valve inside IC containment vessel (MO-1A, MO4A) Close operation Close

Subsequent investigations showed halfway open (both on and off lights were ON) display (Aperture unknown)

Operating Conditions of the Isolation Condenser (IC) of Unit 1 (cont.)

Since the valves inside Systematic and Schematic Diagram of the Isolation Condenser (IC) the PCV are operated with AC power, both AC Power status-check and t t h k d Reactor pressure over 7.13MPa operation were stays for more than 15 seconds IC auto startup impossible even when the DC power supply was temporarily Isolation Condenser A restored.
Coolant water

Valve inside h V l i id the containment Vessel operates on AC power

Steam evaporated from the vessel body is discharged in the atmosphere Steam emitted from the vent pipe is confirmed by the operating personnel

Isolation Condenser B

Reactor Pr ressure Vessel

The status of the IC was misunderstood.

From fire protection system

Open due to high reactor pressure

Auxiliary water supply system DC Power

Valve outside the t i t l containment vessel operates on DC power

Reac ctor Building

Analysis of Condition of PCV of Unit 2

In the analysis in June 2011 PCV leakage was assumed in order to explain slow June, 2011, rise of PCV pressure until Mar. 14. It is newly assumed that sea water intruded into the S/C room and contributed to the so slow rise o PCV p essu e se of C pressure.
Realtime

1.0

3/12

3/13

3/14

3/15 2Pd

MPa a) Pressure (MPa

Result of analysis simulating D/W () continuous run of 0.4 RCIC

0.6 0.2 0.0

Temperature (K)

0.8

D/W() Measured pressure (o)

Thermal energy inside the containment is released for some reasons. The rise in pressure of the drywell is slow even after the temperature of the pressure control room (S/C) reached h d the saturation temperature. The behavior of D/W is not reproduced

Newly assumed condition S/CRoom

1Pd

12

24

36

48

60

72

84

96

Elapsed time (H) (h) Variation in pressure of drywell (D/W) of PCV of Unit 2 Realtime
1.0
3/12 3/13 3/14 3/15 2Pd

500

0.8 Press MPa sure (MPa)

S/P saturation S/P temperature D/W temperature S/P temperature

D/W S/P

400 300
1Pd

0.6 0.4

() Measured pressure (o)

200

0.2 0.0

D/WD/W pressure S/C S/C pressure

100 0

12

24

36

48 60 (h) Elapsed time (H)

72

84

96

RCIC manual startup, Loss of all AC power, Switch of RCIC source from CST to S/C, RCIC operation i shutdown, Start of sea water injection, Confirm drop in RPV pressure S/R2 valve open, E l i sound d Explosion

Temper K (K) rature

Variation in temperature and pressure of PCV of Unit 2 (solid line indicates the result of analysis assuming the leakage of PCV)

Source: Added to About evaluation on the situation of the reactor core of Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3 of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station concerning the accident (Jun. 6, 2011, revised Oct. 20, 2011, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)

Operating Conditions and Causes of shot down of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System of Unit 3
Situation of HPCI of Unit 3 3,
(1) The amount of flow was adjusted using test lines. (2) Minimum flow line was closed. (3) The HPCI was manually shut down when the reactor pressure dropped below1MPa.
Test bypass Condenser valve storage tank Test line Control of C l f flux Turbin e Steam pipe Minimum flux Minimum flow line bypass valve Injection line Reactor R pressur e vessel

This decision on manual shut down Containment was made only by a worker on duty and some other staffs without consulting senior managers. Because the SRV could not be opened d t b tt d due to battery depreciation d i ti after the HPCI shut down, RPV pressure rose. And alternative low pressure coolant injection by fire truck did not work either.
Pressure control room

HPCI system diagram

Water level went down, and the core was exposed

Operating Conditions and Causes of shot down of HPCI System of Unit 3 (cont.)

Water level in the shroud (analysis) Downcomer water level (analysis) Measured value

RCIC shut down

HPCI start up

RPV pressure (analysis) Measured value

Reactor wat level (m) ter

RCIC shut down

HPCI start up

HPCI shut down

Date and time

Reactor pressure

HPCI shut down

Date and time

Trend of reactor water level of Unit 3

Trend of reactor pressure of Unit 3

Source: Response by Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc, for on submission of materials on facts on the results of investigation of the accident and its progress of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (instruction) issued on Dec. 16, 2011 (Dec.22, 2011)

Countermeasures for Cooling Systems

Countermeasure 12 Improve the response capabilities for accidents

Example: Establishing procedure manual E l : E t bli hi d l Securing both hardware (dosimeters and masks) and software (operation manuals and blueprints) to help judgement R&D of tsunami prediction systems p y

Countermeasure 13 Disperse the cooling water system and prevent flooding

Example: Adopting watertight buildings and pumping rooms, and draining function

Countermeasure 14 Enhance UHS at a time of accident

Example: Installing portable alternative RHRSs and/or air-cooling equipment

Countermeasure 15 Improve the maneuverability of isolation valves

Example: Ensuring portable air compressors and DC sources ll i Measures to manually operating

Countermeasures for Cooling Systems (cont.)

Countermeasure 16 Enhance the alternative water injection functions f ti

Example: Ensuring pumps with high discharge pressures Installing injection ports outside of the reactor building

Countermeasure 17 Improve the reliability of cooling and injection system for spent fuel pool
Example: E E l : Ensuring di i g diversity and redundancy of cooling and i j ti it d d d f li g d injection function (Moreover, studying to ensure a sufficient quantity of cooling water, a decentralized storage configuration, air-cooled facilities and the use of dry storage) y g

Countermeasures for Cooling Systems (cont.)

Watertight door (Source: The Chugoku Electric Power Co.,Inc.)

Portable alternative RHRSs (Source: TEPCO)

. Containment Systems

Impact on Loss of Function of Containment Systems

Radioactive material leakage presumably occurred when the pressure of the PCV was increased before the venting b f th i db f th ti because th the radioactive dose had increased after increasing of the pressure of the PCV of the Unit 1. Possible location of leakage was top flange, penetration of the containment vessel and/or equipment hatches. It is highly possible that the leakages were caused by deterioration of the organic sealing as a result of high temperatures by thermal radiation directly from the pressure vessel. When venting was conducted, the standby gas treatment systems (SGTS) was not properly isolated, thus hydrogen gas back flew into the reactor building. (in particular, Unit 4)

Results of Dose Measurement (Each Floor (Unit 2 Reactor Building))

Amount of leakage from upper part of the PCV must be relatively dominant because the dose of 5th floor is a few hundred mSv/h while the other floors are some dozen mSv/h.

2nd floor of the Unit 2 reactor building 5th floor of the Unit 2 reactor building 1st floor of the Unit 2 reactor building unit: mSv/h
(Source) Materials published by Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (Note) As for the results of measurement, internal contamination of pipes etc, and surface contamination of walls are not distinguished.

Results of Dose Measurement (Spot: Penetration of PCV, Machine Hatch)

There are several places where a locally high dose rate is detected detected.

Area of high dose rate (de ce atc ) (device hatch)

Area of high dose rate (penetration of PCV)

1st floor of the Unit 2 reactor building

1st floor of the Unit 3 reactor building

Places of Possible Leackage (Example of Mark-I type Reactor)

Top head flange Electric wiring penetration Top head manhole Piping penetration

Airlock for personnel Machine hatch

S/C manhole

Vent tube bellows

Others such as TIP penetration and CRD hatch.

(Source) Example of Onagawa Power Station of Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. (The photo of the top flange is courtesy of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Possibility of Containment Damage due to Over-pressurization and/or Over-heating (over-Heating Damage) Experiments show leakage can occur from the seal materials of wiring penetration and flange gaskets even under pressure of 0.41MPa if heated over 250. PCVs temperature were estimated over 500 for Unit 1, about 280 for Unit 2, and over 400 for Unit 3 by MELCOR analysis. According to JNES experiments, the leak rate can reach 100%/day at a containment pressure of 0.2MPa, taking only the deterioration of the top flange g gasket into account, which is consistent with the situation of large-scale vapor , g p release at the accident.
< wiring penetration >

Example of test results (low-voltage module)

< flange gaskets>

Estimation of leakage rate at the top flange gasket of deterioration due to over-heating

Leakage occurred at 32 hours, hours about 300

Leakage occurred at 36 hours, hours about 300

L Leakage rate (% %/day)

Water vapor atmosphere

Internal pressure of containment

(Source) JNES materials

Examination of Leakage Path Using Hydrogen Behavior Analysis

It is highly possible that the leakage occurred at the top flange because the explosion occurred on the top floor (5F) in Unit 1. The released hydrogen into 5F of the reactor building accumulated mainly in 5F. (The hydrogen density is about 20% in the case of 400kg hydrogen release ) release.)
Behaviors of hydrogen gas assuming the release of hydrogen of 400kg from the floor surface of the top floor of the reactor building (flow field) building.
[m/s]

Trend in hydrogen density in the reactor building assuming the release of hydrogen of 100kg/h for 4 hours hours.
M Mean of hyd molar fraction drogen f

25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 hour Elapsed time (h)

(Source) JNES materials

5F 4F 3F 2F 1F

Release to the top floor of the reactor building

ExaminationofLeakagePathUsingHydrogenBehaviorAnalysis(Contd)
For Unit 3 an analysis result of the explosion and the actual damage state show 3, probability of hydrogen leakage through hatches and/or penetrations to 1st floor of the reactor building.
Assuming 1,000kg H2 leakage from PCV to 1st floor of R/B, an analysis (using AUTODIN) results in damages not only on the upper part of R/B but also other parts including surrounding buildings p g g g The 3rd floor of Unit 3 R/B and the top of a twostory building next to the R/B have also been damaged.
3rd floor of the R/B
S E N W

Pressure Map

Ignition I iti point

Two-story building next to the R/B

Possibility of Back-flow to R/B by PCV Vents (Units 1-4)

To isolate SGTS at the time of PCV vents, the outlet valves of SGTS must be closed according to the operational procedure. But the outlet valves of SGTS of Unit 3 were not isolated. Those of Unit 4 were thought not to be isolated as well. Because of the damper at the outlet for Units 1-3 which closes during loss of power, the flow into the reactor building was supposed to be more prevented than Unit 4 Regarding Unit 3 4. 3, there are no significant backflow in one direction into the building but it is difficult to deny the occurrence of backflow itself. Unit 1
From the reactor building close/open close/open From pressure control room close/close close/open Vent line close/open close/close
Air operated damper Exhaust fan

GD: gravity damper (check valve that stays closed by b an anchor) h ) From the reactor building valves are all AO valves
close/open close/open close/open close/close close/open Exhaust fan close/close

Unit 2

close/open

close/close

Air operated damper Exhaust fan close/open

To roof ventilation From pressure

control room close/close Vent line

GD To roof close/open ventilatio p n Exhaust close/open GD fan close/close Vent line

close/close Vent line

close/open

close/open

Unit 3
From the reactor building ~3.5mSv/h ~2.0mSv/h ~1.3mSv/h close/open From pressure control room close/close Vent line close/open close/open close/open close/close p close/open close/close

Unit 4
From the reactor building ~0.1mSv/h close/open close/open close/open close/close ~0.5mSv/h ~6.7mSv/h close/open

No damper for backflow prevention

close/open close/open To roof ventilatio n

To roof GD From Exhaust fan close/open ventilation pressure control room close/open GD Exhaust fan close/close
l close/openclose/close Vent line Vent line

Exhaust fan Exhaust fan

l / close/open ~5.5mSv/h ~0.1mSv/h ~0.5mSv/h

close/open

Vent line

~3.1mSv/h ~1.6mSv/h ~3.2mSv/h : confirmed to be fully open at in situ investigation

: isolation valve for vent

: damper for backflow prevention

Legend of status of valve Normal standby/loss of power

Possibility of Back-flow to R/B by PCV Vents (Unit 3Unit 4)

When hydrogen gas generated in Unit 3 backflows in SGTS of Unit 4, it will be 4 released into the Unit 4 reactor building via the building ventilation system. The floor and ceiling of the 4th floor of Unit 4 were deformed in the direction of expansion. A th contamination in the building of U it 4 i l i As the t i ti i th b ildi f Unit is lower th th t i than that in Units 1-3, it is supposed that it exploded due to hydrogen that flew into the building through filter, while explosions of Units 1 and 3 were caused by hydrogen leaked mainly from PCV. PCV
Reactor building of Unit 4

Unit 3 side
Expansion of merging point

The dose rate at the exit side of SGTS is higher.

P th of inflow of vent of containment from Unit 3 to Unit 4 f t f t i tf U it t U it Path f i fl

Unit 4 side
: flow of hydrogen gas

Source: Added to The impact of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to Nuclear Reactor Facilities at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Sep. 9, 2011, revised Sept. 28, 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Countermeasures for Containment Systems

Countermeasure 18 Enhance diversity of PCV cooling system

Example: Ensuring additional heat removal function by using a PCV E l :E i dditi lh t lf ti b i spray (which can also remove radioactive substances in the CV) without using the AC power supply, RHR, and diversity of CV cooling function, e.g.air cooling g , g g

Countermeasure 19 Prevention of the damaging of PCV top-head flange caused by overheating

Example: Examining cooling from outside of top head

Countermeasure 20 Proceed with low pressure injection process reliably

Example: Securing response manual for complete loss of power supply

Countermeasure 21 Improve maneuverability of venting system

Example: Installing a compressor battery and/or equipment to manually open the valve p Examining the bypass pipe line with a valve of the rapture disk

Countermeasures for Containment Systems (cont.)

Countermeasure 22 Mitigate the effect of radioactivity caused by venting ti

Example: Installing radioactive substance removal (filtering) facilities to the vent system

Countermeasure 23 Ensure independency of vent system

Example: Isolating the vent pipes from the SGTS Prohibiting connection of the vent's pipe systems between the vent s Units

Countermeasure 24 Prevent the Hydrogen explosion (control the gas concentration and the adequate release)
Example: Controlling release of hydrogen and installing the hydrogen concentration detector

. Communication, Communication Instrumentation and Control Systems, and E d Emergency R Response A Arrangements t

Damages of Communication, Instrumentation and Control System

Most of the communication facilities were unavailable due to the power loss or other causes. The use of instrumentation devices was severely limited after tsunami-caused power loss because connection to outside batteries was needed. The monitoring post were also unavailable due to the tsunami-caused power loss.

Countermeasures for Communication, Instrumentation and Control System, and Emergency Response Arrangement

Countermeasure 25 Prepare emergency command center

Example: Securing power source E l :S i Preventing the influx of radioactive material Ensuring communications g y Monitoring functions of the nearby situation

Countermeasure 26 Secure the communication tools for accidents

Example: Securing p p g power source Installing equipment with earthquake resistance Taking measures to protect the primary communication base from water Establishing an emergency response information system and emergenc s stem televised conference system including a transmission system

Countermeasure 27 Improve reliability of the measurement equipment for accidents

Example: Securing power source Providing storage batteries dedicated to instruments and instruments, spare instrumentations & parts

Emergency Response Center in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

(Source: TEPCO)

Countermeasures for Communication, Instrumentation and Control System, and Emergency Response Arrangement (cont.)

Countermeasure 28 Enhance the monitoring functions for the plant conditions diti
Example: Utilizing surveillance cameras including inside the PCV Promoting research and development to expand the range of instrumentation specifications

Countermeasure 29 Enhance emergency monitoring functions

Example: Supplying power from emergency power sources and installation of dedicated power sources for monitoring posts

Countermeasure 30 Create the structure and conduct the training for the emergency response
Example Ensuring spare parts Establishing a system of securing the manpower and calling g y g p g out Training personals at night and bad weather

Conclusion

Conclusion

To avoid repeating accidents like TEPCOs Fukushima TEPCO s Dai-ichi, bills to reform regulatory organizations and systems were submitted to the Diet. We expect this will y p contribute also to increased regulatory competence. Some technical knowledge has been extracted through g g investigations from engineering point of view so far, and will be utilized to make the new regulatory framework able to function practically and effectively effectively, being shared with international community. On the way toward safe decommissioning of the accident site several decades after, we have a lot of issues still uncertain or necessary to be investigated y g further. Japan will share the latest information and lessons learned continually and tackle every issue in continually, cooperation with international colleagues.

To date, Japan has received a wide array of support from the world world. Japan expresses its deepest gratitude, and would sincerely ask for your continued support. Thank you for y y your attention !