Civil Military Relations in Bangladesh Amader Shomoy Editor today wrote a signed commentary asking for military's entry

into mainstream politics. Also today, a five-day international workshop on Democracy, Governance and Security Reforms began at a city hotel. Coincidence? This workshop is being organised by Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies and supported by Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawaii, USA. The presence of the US Charge De Affairs, including supporters of 1/11 (Dr. Kamal and host of familiar faces) reflect the current thinking within both the Bangladesh Military and the US. The afternoon plenary session discussed on Civil-Military Relations: Bangladesh Perspective. The paper was presented by the Brig. General ATM Amin, Director, Counter Terrorism Bureau of DGFI. Two interesting observations: 1. The banner at the back had a big picture of Shagshad Bhaban. 2. Of the four people sitting at dias, three were from military, one from civil: Dhaka University Professor Imtiaz Ahmed of International Relations. The 13-page key-note paper doesn't provide much to talk about: it wanted a new model of civil-military relationship "to offer better and peaceful environment to its citizens". Dr. Imtiaz made it clear that there is no Bangladesh without democracy. Dr. Ataur doesn't want to go back to pre 1/11. No body wants. Dr. Imtiaz tabled 11-point solutions to current situation: 1. Make society free from corruption and punish big fishes. 2. Allow freedom of expression, to all: media, academia etc. 3. Introduce internal democracy 4. Political supervision of military 5. Remove ugly face of dual economy (rich-poor gap) 6. Remove women's and minority discrimination, at all levels 7. Establish Sufi-character of Bengali Islam 8. Effective and non-party civil society

9. End of familycracy and regionalism 10. End of energy crisis and 11. Public Security Council to ensure limit to abuse of power. I have few ideas of myself about civil-military relations in Bangladesh, which I will elaborate in future. For the moment, let me tell it bluntly: oil and water do not mix. They are made of different components. Sad that Bangladesh military is oblivious to this universal fact. Also, both represent a diametrically opposite systems: open (civil) and closed (military) system. No matter how best efforts are made, these two forces will never converge. Would welcome remarks.

Civil-military relations in Bangladesh Shahedul Anam Khan THE state of civil-military relations (CMR) in Bangladesh is not what it should be. And there are many reasons for it. But what is more irksome than having to bear such a condition is a situation where the two are not very forthcoming in either acknowledging the shortcomings or in engaging in free and frank discussions on the issue. Many would disagree that there is much wrong in the realm of CMR in Bangladesh, and cite areas where the military has been operating, whenever called upon to do so, to the satisfaction of both the parties, particularly in areas of disaster and post-disaster management. While one cannot take issue with that point of view one must point out that, the aspect of cooperation referred to above, involves but only one facet of the civilian component in the CMR matrix. In doing so we overlook the very important constituent of the "civil" in the equation, which is the civil society. Fractured as it is, recognition by the civil society of the military's role, as a partner in achieving the development goals and thwarting threats from within and without, determines the state of CMR in any country, more so in Bangladesh. It is an inescapable fact that historical antecedents which led to the birth of the country, and the experience of not only the nine month War of Liberation but also

of the stormy, albeit short, struggle against another form of colonialism between 1947 and '71, where the majority was dominated by the minority, shaped the psyche of the civil society as well as the military. That is what makes the issue of CMR in our context not only an interesting exercise but a very challenging one too if one were to honestly indulge in identifying the shortcomings and taking measures to remove them. And we must look at the issue dispassionately and objectively to determine the future course of CMR in Bangladesh. In that context, the four-day long workshop on CMR and its relevance to the security of Bangladesh, organized jointly BIISS and BEI, the two leading think tanks in Bangladesh along with the APCSS, Hawaii, is not only timely, the significance of CMR is accentuated by the fact that the country has just emerged from the cusp of a unique political dispensation that had lasted for two years, the making of which the military had a direct role in. This is perhaps the first of its kind of exercise that is being participated by the all the elements of the security sector -- the security forces that wield the power on behalf, and by the expressed orders, of the state -- and by the elected representatives of the people whose job it is to exercise not only scrutiny but also ensure accountability -- and members of the civil society whose job it is to ensure not only accountability but also demand on behalf of the society it represents, transparency in the working of all the elements whose smooth and harmonious interaction translates into an affordable and workable security policy. Although traditionally it inherited the legacy of colonial force in its psychological makeup, where the army was the major coercive power employed by the British to subdue local aspirations, it was the Bangali elements of the Pakistan army that willfully, not under any duress or any ulterior motive, as some incurable critics of the Bangladesh military so cynically misrepresent, broke ranks with the Pakistan army and joined the Liberation War alongside the people. Perhaps no other military in recent times had had to undergo so much upheaval internally, and suffer so many traumas infused by political turmoil since 1971, than the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It does not help to overlook the very nature of the birth of the military in Bangladesh. Neither does it help for insensitive

quarters to conduct an intellectual offensive which goes beyond the description of constructive criticism. And as regard the civil society, much of its circumspection stems from the way the Bangladesh military usurped state power, which saw a quasi-military and quasidemocracy for a good part of the seventies and eighties, not to speak of two presidents killed by some wayward elements of the army. But while the military, wittingly or otherwise, intervened in state affairs, it must be said that every time that happened some elements of the civil society tried to ingratiate themselves to the military by extolling the virtues of intervention and making it appear that it is the military that is the saviour of democracy in Bangladesh. It was patently clear, ever more so, after 1/11. The reality is that the military must subjugate itself to lawful political control, not because they are necessarily wiser but because they are the elected representatives of the people and through them remain accountable to the people. And it is "only those who are elected by the people have the authority and the responsibility to decide the fate of a nation." Brig Gen Shahedul Anam Khan, ndc psc (Retd) is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.

Civil-military relations and democracy in Bangladesh Dilara Choudhury While analysing democracy and civil-military relations in Bangladesh, two very important statements are noteworthy. First, in 1991, the newly elected Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, after resolving the debate over presidential vis--vis parliamentary system in bipartisan manner, stated that the Jatiya Sangshad was a symbol of the nation's collective wisdom, and it would take a hot-headed general to drive his tanks through that House (Talukdar Maniruzzaman: 1992). Such was the prevalent euphoria in the country about the future of democracy and the consequent prospect of a healthy civil-military relation. Khaleda Zia's statement signified a turning point in Bangladesh's civil-military relations in the context of military's interventions in politics for more than a decade, despite constitutional provision (Article 103) and the Army Act (Articles 292 and 293). It was justifiably assumed that with the deepening of democracy classical civilmilitary relations -- i.e. civilian control of military, which lies at the very heart of any functional democracy -- would be established. Crafting a functional democracy was the litmus test for the political leaders of Bangladesh. Regrettably, even after nearly twenty years of a democratic order, the military's potential intervention in politics still looms large in the horizon as indicated by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's recent statement while explaining the reason for the abolition of the caretaker government (CTG). Although her decision to abolish the system of CTG has been politically motivated, she tried to convince the opposition of her view that the possibility of military intervention through CTG -- like in 2007. However, her statement encapsulated the ominous fact that Bangladesh Army is a significant factor in Bangladesh politics. Why has Bangladesh not been able to establish a classical civil-military relation whereas it is a success story for military intervention prone South American countries like Nicaragua, Brazil and Chile? Why, after so many years of democracy, are we still living under the shadow of the military? Tragically, the principle reason lies in the nature of our politics,

which is characterised by deadly confrontations, revenge, and struggle for power by the two major political parties, giving rise to a dysfunctional democratic order with an abysmal record of institution building. This is equally applicable when it comes to institutionalising a classical civil-military relation. It is a gargantuan task, especially in countries where the military, even after quitting state power, are reluctant to give up their residual powers, exercise power from behind the scene and look for opportunities to seize power again. Problems are exacerbated if the party-systems are fraught with myriad difficulties like lack of consensus, mutual trust, and overt quest for power. As such, the leadership of these countries must muster all their wisdom and ingenuity to deepen democracy and, to begin with, try to get rid of army's residual powers. Unfortunately though, Bangladesh belongs to the above-mentioned category. The leadership has fallen short of demonstrating political acumen. Due to mutual antagonism successive regimes, despite some positive developments like chalking out peacetime role for the military, setting up of military academies and schools to inculcate professionalism, establishment of channels and institutions ensuring regular communications between civil-military leaders, strengthening of Parliamentary Committees and improving relations between media and ISPR, wanted to keep the armed forces on their respective sides due to a widely accepted perception that to win the elections they need the tacit support of the army. This ominous fact has, recently, been highlighted by AL general secretary's recent statement that all previous CTGs were military governments. As a result, both leaders, when in power, allegedly try to please the army. Both have reiterated that they would build a modern army, though there is no clear-cut defense policy. Parties in power have also, instead of formulating the right policies, especially a comprehensive defense policy, and creating a vibrant defence ministry through which the military would be subordinated to civilian leaders and society at large, tried to control the army via dual command. Holding of the defense ministry portfolio by the prime minister herself, creation of ad-hoc headquarters, bifurcation of the defense ministry and placement of the Armed Forces Division under the prime minister, have blocked the traditional command channel (Defense Ministry) under which the chiefs of three services operate. Files for the president's approval are processed, signifying that the prime minister wants to deal with important military matters herself, in other words, exercise control through her trusted P.S.O. who advises her on military matters, and processes files for the president's approval. These developments, as well as their attempts to win over the military, have accelerated the politicisation of the institution. As a result, successive

regimes have either failed, or are not willing, to eliminate the military's residual powers, which should have been the first step towards the desired goal. Military budgets are still nontransparent and unaccountable. There is no explanation why the budget has tripled in the last eleven years. A tendency to appoint retired or on lien army officials in civil administration, which is on the rise (78 during past BNP regime and 178 during two and half years of the present regime), also demonstrates the military's clout in politics. The points above clearly show why Bangladesh's democratic political order is still vulnerable to military intervention. It should be understood that military intervention in politics cannot be prevented through a constitutional bar. Whereas rooting democracy firmly, steady economic growth, and sound law and order situation can keep the military away from mainstream politics. What is then the fundamental duty of our political leadership? The politicians must fully adhere to their commitment to democracy, try to come to a sort of agreement like the "Charter of Democracy," signed by late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif before Pakistan's 2007 parliamentary elections, and stop their alleged activities to try to involve the military in their partisan battles. They must realise that democracy will end in Bangladesh if there is another military intervention, which will also mean the end of Bangladesh. It is their legal and moral responsibility to save the nation from that grim possibility. The writer is a political analyst.