Constitutional Law II

Section 20: Non-imprisonment for Debt

Elas Case Summaries

Lozano vs. Martinez Facts: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief. Ruling: Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction. First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of t0he century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial definition, both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State courts. 21 Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime." The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on grounds akin to those which justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under our present Rules of Court, such as imminent departure of the defendant from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, or concealment, removal or disposition of properties in fraud of creditors, etc. The Court, in that case, declared the detention of the defendant unlawful,

being violative of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and ordered his release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the statutory provision in question unconstitutional. Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes, 23 wherein a statutory provision which made illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday every week, was challenged for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered harmful to public welfare. IV Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to conceptualize. But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of those who challenge the validity of BP 22. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day. 26 By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the

Constitutional Law II

Section 20: Non-imprisonment for Debt

Elas Case Summaries

payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument wig be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two. 29 These de deposit thirds consists of currency in circulation. ma deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which among others, commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword. In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states of the United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social economic and political environmentin short, the milieuunder which they were made. We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. 32 Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. People vs. Nitafan Facts: Failing in his argument that B.P. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Check Law", is unconstitutional, 1 private

respondent now argues that the check he issued, a memorandum check, is in the nature of a promissory note, hence, outside the purview of the statute. Here, his argument must also fail. The facts are simple. Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an Information. On 18 July 1986, private respondent moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1 September 1986, respondent judge, ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the government. Ruling: A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. 6 Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, 7 has the same effect as an ordinary check, 8 and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check. 9 From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum check, which is in the form of an ordinary check, is still drawn on a bank and should therefore be distinguished from a promissory note, which is but a mere promise to pay. If private respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory note, as he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well have issued a promissory note, and this would be have exempted him form the coverage of the law. In the business community a promissory note, certainly, has less impact and persuadability than a check. Verily, a memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." A check is also defined as " [a] written order or request to a bank or persons carrying on the business of banking, by a party having money in their hands, desiring them to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or bearer, or to such person or order, a named sum of money," citing 2 Dan. Neg. Inst. 528; Blair v. Wilson, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 170; Deener v. Brown, 1 MacArth. (D.C.) 350; In re Brown, 2 Sto. 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985. See Chapman v. White, 6 N.Y. 412, 57 Am. Dec 464. 10 Another definition of check is that is "[a] draft drawn upon a bank and payable on demand, signed by the maker or drawer, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money to the order of the payee," citing State v. Perrigoue, 81 Wash, 2d 640, 503 p. 2d 1063, 1066. 11 A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ." (Emphasis supplied ). 12 Ubi lex no distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. But even if We retrace the enactment of the "Bouncing Check Law" to determine the parameters of the concept of "check", We can easily glean that the members of the then Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include all checks drawn against banks. This was particularly the ratiocination of Mar. Estelito P. Mendoza, co-sponsor of Cabinet Bill No. 9 which later became B.P. 22, when in response to the interpellation of Mr. Januario T. Seo, Mr. Mendoza explained that the draft or order must be addressed to a bank or depository, 13 and accepted the proposed amendment of Messrs. Antonio P. Roman and Arturo M. Tolentino that the words "draft or order", and certain terms which technically meant promissory notes, wherever they were found in the text of the bill, should be deleted since the bill was mainly directed against the pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no funds, and not to drafts which were not drawn against banks. 14 A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of

Constitutional Law II

Section 20: Non-imprisonment for Debt

Elas Case Summaries

indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum. 16 We are not unaware that a memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. This understanding may be manifested by writing across the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem." However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. Ajeno vs. Inserto Facts: In a verified complaint dated October 25, 1975, complainant Ludovico Ajeno of Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo, charged Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance, Iloilo City for ignorance of the law, particularly Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 1 and Article IV, Section 13 of the 1973 Constitution 2 by sentencing complainant "to suffer an imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, to Idemnify Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit." 3 Complainant claims that the indemnity of Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos is a civil liability and to order his imprisonment for non-payment thereof is in violation of the constitutional provision that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt." 4 He thus prays this Court to remove respondent Judge from office "for incompetence and for lack of the highest degree of intellectual responsibility and integrity required of him by the nature of his office. ... " In his comment to the charge of complainant, respondent Judge admitted his error in imposing upon the complainant the subsidary imprisonment of forty (40) days in case of insolvency, to pay the indemnity of P200.00 to Solomon Banagua, Jr. and alleged among others that he realized his oversight when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals; that it was never his intention to oppress anyone, much less the complainant; that at the time he committed the mistake he was relying on the doctrine that what the Constitution prohibits is imprisonment for debt arising exclusively from action ex contractu and does not include damages arising from action ex delictu, fines, penalties imposed in criminal proceedings, citing the case of People vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828. Ruling: In the present case, there is hardly any dispute that respondent Judge has violated Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which provides, among others, that if the principal penalty imposed be prision correcional six (6) years, or one (1) day to six (6) months (arresto mayor) and a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third (1/3) of the sentence nor more than one (1) year at the amended rate of one (1) day for each eight (P8.00) pesos fine. In the criminal case filed against him, complainant "was sentenced to four (4) months imprisonment and to indemnify the victim Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 for alleged medical expenses. It is clear here that the sum of P200.00 was intended to answer for the indemnity

to the offended party. Therefore non-payment there of can not subject the accused to subsidiary imprisonment because under the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465, it is only for non-payment of the fine that the accused may be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment. But it is erroneous on the part of the complaint to claim that the error committed by the respondent Judge was in violation of the constitutional provision that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt," because the debt contemplated in the constitutional provision refers only to a contractual obligation or an obligation to pay money arising from a contract and not to an obligation arising from a crime. The obligation of the complainant to pay the sum of P200.00 to Solomon Banagua, Jr. does not arise from a contract but from a crime and is therefore beyond the scope of the constitutional provision mentioned. If at all, the error of the respondent Judge is his failure to observe the amendatory law, Republic Act No. 5465, in imposing the penalty to complainant. It was through his own negligence that he imposed forty (40) days of subsidiary imprisonment to complainant in case of non-payment of the P200.00 indemnity to the offended party. He was negligent when he failed to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demanded. He failed to use that diligence which is expected of judges like him to determine whether the provision of law he is enforcing is still applicable, whether it has been amended or not, or whether there are recent doctrines of the Supreme Court pertinent to the case. Had respondent Judge been more careful and cautious in this regard, he would have spared the complainant from the trouble and expense of prosecuting his case in the appellate court to correct the error. But what really mitigates respondent Judge's offense is the frank admission of his error and his honest disclaimer of bad faith in its commission. Thus he said in his comment: ... It was never my intention to oppress anyone, much less the complainant. As a matter of fact the complainant was charged with frustrated murder but I convicted him of less serious physical injuries only, in accordance with the evidence presented. ... Had counsel for the herein complainant filed a motion for reconsideration or called my attention in any manner, I could have rectified my error right then and there. The Rules of Court provides the remedy of appeal to rectify possible errors committed by judges in inferior courts. This remedy was availed of by complainant. That respondent Judge was really acting in good faith when he committed the aforementioned error is depicted by his full support to the doctrine that the prohibition in the Constitution that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt" protects only debt arising from contracts or action ex contractu but not an obligation arising from crimes or action ex delictu, citing the case of People vs. Cara, 41 Phil. 828, which doctrine has so far not been changed by this Court. Respondent Judge is correct in relying on said doctrine, but he failed to realize that if subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed now in case of insolvency of the accused to pay the indemnity, it is not because its imposition would constitute imprisonment for nonpayment of a debt but because of the new amendment introduced to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 5465, imposing subsidiary imprisonment only in case of non-payment of the fine, In the case of In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, this Court previously ruled that "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules." To hold therefore liable the respondent Judge administratively for ignorance of the law there must be reliable evidence to show that the judicial acts complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. None of these has been presented in this case. On the contrary the preponderance of evidence shows that the act of the respondent Judge was an honest error of judgment; it was not inspired by any ill-motive to oppress the complainant; and that it was the first violation of the norm of judicial conduct by the respondent Judge during the 36 years that he is in the service of the government. Vergara vs. Gedorio Facts: Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave., Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City

Constitutional Law II

Section 20: Non-imprisonment for Debt

Elas Case Summaries

policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).1 The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the probate court's order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao. It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:... Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected from them three months advance rentals.5 On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court.6 Petitioners were served copies of the motion by registered mail.7 The probate court granted the motion in its Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of which read as follows:... Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners, together with the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom to pay the rentals. Respondent Bolao then filed on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners in contempt, which was set for hearing on May 11, 2001.10 In its Order dated May 11, 2001, the probate court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals.11 Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the indirect contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.12 Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16, 2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested. Ruling: When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolao per Order dated October 5, 1999, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed before the trial court and hearing on the motion set on May 11, 2001. As previously stated, petitioners did not attend said hearing despite knowledge thereof; instead, they wrote the court on June 11, 2001 asking that the contempt findings against them be withdrawn. Clearly, they were given the opportunity to be heard, and as aptly stated by the court, they were given more than sufficient time to comply with the Order dated October 5, 1999.30 Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial court's finding of contempt and the order directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost selfrestraint.31 In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,32 the Court quoted the pronouncements of some American courts, to wit: Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of money

he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.Revell v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303; 144 Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287). xxx xxx xxx . . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.Atchison, etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's power to order the contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy persists [Ark.Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).33 which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court and directing their imprisonment for their contumacious refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix. In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense.34 It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied.35 In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment. Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit: SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a) because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which provides: SEC. 11.Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment. Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus: SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand. The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ. If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the locality. The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.

Constitutional Law II

Section 20: Non-imprisonment for Debt

Elas Case Summaries

(b)Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment. (c)Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees. The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court. In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment obligee. The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property, removal of improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal property. The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.36 In Sura vs. Martin, Sr.,37 we held that: Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution. Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs therein the Sheriff, thus: Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and

make return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.