50

JCS tXPIORING ETH

to hurt anyone else in one would have not But if jt a reason any to hurt someone else in this on rye have not this way, then its a reas reason not to steal ns evetaofle) Therefore its a war (since nrcnr mea brella now, the other persons um Once you admit that an ler of simple Consistenct. This is a maf similar circum e a reason not to harm you in other person ouId hav have is very it that the reason he would stances, and once von adm be consis only n uott, or to him, then to general and doesu t apph you now. ou that the same reason applies to tent you have to admit if you do. lla, and von ought to feel guilty shouldnt steal the umbre ed, argument if, when he was ask Someone could escape from this ed, 1 eone did that to vou he answer Flow would you like it if som brella ldnt like it if someone stole my um wouldnt resent it at all, I wou hitn to for ldnt think there was am reason in a rainstonu, hut 1 wou many people could honestly But how consider my feelings about it. theyre crazy, would think er? i think most people. unless g-ive that answ es, but harms matter, not only to themselv that their own interesu and too, We all ple a reason to care about them in a way that gives other peo not just had /or us but had, period. think that when we suffer it is lar that good and harm to particu The basis of morality is a belief vie of bad not just from their point people (or animals) is good or son , which every thinking per nt of view but from a more general poi sider each person has a reason to con can understand. lhat means that g what the interests of others in decidin not only his own interests but ershis is considerate only of some oth to do. And it isnt enough if he will cially cares about. Of course he family and friends, those he spe about himself. But he has ple. and also care more about certain peo does on the good or consider the effect of what he some reason to ers st of us, that is what he thinks oth harm of everyone. if hes like mo n if they arent friends of his. should do with regard to him. eve

Egoism and ivioral Scepticism

,James Rachels

Morality imwolves taking intn account nteresrs apart from our own. Dc we ever rIo so According to psychological egoism, we dont, because all human behavior is motivated only by self-interest According to ethical egoism, men if we could act in the interest of others, we ought not do hut should be concerned onlr with ouuelvm, In the selection that follons, James Rachel whose work we read previously considers both Psychological egoism and ethical egoism and concludes that neither is acceptable.

Study Questions
1. 2. 3, 4. wrong? Can a duly enacted law be morally ut others? Do you have any reason to care abo about you? Do others have any reason to care answers to questions 2 and 3 he Does consistency require that your the same?

1. Out ordinarr thinking about morality is full of assumptions that we almost never question. We assume, for example. that we have an obligation to consider the welfare of other people when we decide what actions to perform or what rules to obey: we think that we must refrain from acting in ways harmful to others, and that we must re spect their rights and interests as well as our own, We also assume that people are in fact capable of being motivated by such considerations that is, that people are not wholly selfish and that they do sometimes act in the interescs of others. Both of these assumptious have come under attack hr moral scep tics, as long ago as hr Glammcon in Book II of Platos Republic. Glaucon recalls the legend of Gvges, a shepherd who was said to have found a magic ring in a fissure opened bran earthquake, The ring would make its wearer invisible and thus would enable him to go anvhere and do anything undetected, Gvges used the power of the ring to gain entry tc the Royal Palace, where he seduced the Queen, murdered the

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asks us to King. and subsequently seized the throne. Now Glaucon there are two such rings, one given to a man of virtue imagine that un and one given to a rogue. The rogue. of course, will use his ring scrupuknisly and do anything necessary to increase his own wealth and power. He will recognize no moral constraints on his conduct. and, since the cloak of invisibility will protect hint from discover); he can do anything he pleases without fear of reprisal. So, there will be so-called virtuous no end to the mischief he will do. But how will the behave? Glaucon suggests that he will behave no better than the man rogue: No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other mens goods. when he could go to the market-place and fear lessly help himself to anything he wanted. enter houses and sleep with any woman he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word go about among men with the powers of a god. He would behave no better than the othen both would take the same course. Moreover, why shouldnt he? Once he is freed from the fear of reprisal. why shouldnt a man simply do what he pleases. or what he thinks is best for himself? What reason is there for him to continue being moral when it is dearly not to his own advantage to do so? These sceptical views suggested by Glaucon have come to be known as psychological egoism and ethical vgoLsm. respectivel Psycholog ical egoism is the view that all men are selfish in everything that they do. that is. that the only motive from which anyone ever acts is selfinterest On this view, even when men are acting in ways apparently calculated to benefit others, they are actually motivated by the belief that acting in this way is to their own advantage, and if they did not believe this, they would not be doing that action. Ethical egoism is, by contrast, a nonnative view about how men ought to act It is the view that, regardless of how men do in fact behave, they have no obliga tion to do anything except what is in their own interests. According to ethical egoist. a person is always justified in doing whatever is in his own interests, regardless of the effect on others. Clea4 ifeither of these views is conect, then the moral institution of life (to use Butlers well-turned phrase) is very different than what we normally think. The majority of mankind is grossly deceived about what is. or ought to be. the case, where morals are concerned. 2. Psychological egoism seems to fly in the face of the facts. We are tempted to say. Of course people act unselfishly all the time. For example, Smith gives up a trip to the country. which he would have

4 I
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EGOISM AND MORAL 5CEPTICt5M

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enjoyed very much, in order to stay behind and help a friend with his studies, which is a miserable way to pass the time. This is a perfectly clear case of unselfish hehaion and if the psychological egoist thinks that such cases do not occia then he isjust mistaken. Given such ob vious instances of unselfish behavior, what reply can the egoist make? There are two general arguments by which he might tn to show that all actions, including those such as the one just outlined. are in fhct moth-ated 1w self-interest. Let us examine these in turn:
a. The first argument goes as follows: If we describe one person s action as selfish, and another persons action as unselfish, we are over looking the crucial fact that in both cases, assuming that the action is done voluntarily, the agrnt is mnrlr doing ,.hal he most wants to da If Smith stays behind to help his friend, that only shows that he wanted to help his friend more than he wanted to go to the cotmtry And why should he be praised for his unselfishness when he is only doing what he most wants to do? So, since Smith is only doing what he wants to do. he cannot be said to be acting unselfisl This argument is so bad that it would not deserve to be taken seri ously except for the fact that so many otherwise intelligent people have been taken in by it First, the argument rests on the premise that people never vo1untaiil do anything except what they is-ant to do. But this is patently false; there are at least two classes of actions that are exceptions to this generalization. One is the set of actions *hich we may not want to do, but which we do anyway as a means to an end which we want to achieve, for example, going to the dentist in order to stop a toothache, or going to work every day in order to be able to draw our pay at the end of the month. These cases may be regarded as consistent with the spirit of the egoist argument, however, since the ends mentioned are wanted by die agent. Bitt the other set of actions are those which we do, not because we want to, nor even because there is an end which we want to achieve, but because we feel our selves under an obligition to do them. For example. someone may do something because be has promised to do it, and thus feels obligated, even though he does not want to do it. It is sometimes suggested that in such cases we do the action because, after all, we want to keep our promises; so, even here, we are doing what we want. Howevet this dodge sdIl not work if I have promised to do something, and if I do not want to do it, then it is simply false to say that I want to keep my promise. In such cases we feel a conifict precisely because we do ,wt want to do what we feel obligated to do. It is reasonable to think that

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te0\: lie might oav Sniiil:s ,tetioll l1i5 loIIhtV lIHI) thts weond feels IhOt tillS ittend behind-- ttOl l)ec0II5 IC I\JIli 10. hut oCeOiOi lit necds help. argitnient, that Bitt sn)0S( We were to eciiecde, [or the sake of the irants. or at least that all voluntar i((tIoil s moltuateil by the agetlts uraiittd, it wo 11(1 not follow SiltItIl iS m 111 )liVatt(t, Lven if this lOre sehiOt tietesi. Fm it Smith wants to elfishly twi Smith is iw ting 5 or troth (1(0 wht ii it flit tfls lot going i (10 Si flIt hin% t tt will h 1}) his ft ii 11(1 What his mu (i0,0\ llILfltS. ihit 5 pret mselv hat makes him ueselfish. :\mtther 7 else om( ui1seifisltneS be. if tot tsaritttig to help 01 het s th;it (IC 5 to put tlw 5ittiit point i to sd\ that it is the (7,0 to! a want termines whether it is selfish oi not, The mere [bet that I am acting selfishly: that depends on (01 101 1(01115 does not mean that I am acting what 71 1 that I want. Ill want only my own good. and care nothing tfir he well-off others. then I tm setlish: bttt if I also t. ant other people happy, and if I act on that hesire. then mvac [ion is not selfish. So and

much for this .trgnntent. P. Il me sec 01(1 argument lot 5W 1iotogcal e osni iS [ills: Suite socalled uitseilish actIons always produce a sense ol seit-satislactiotl in 2 the agent, atwi since this sense of satisfaction is a pleasant state of con sciotsne5S. if follows that the point of the action is really to achieve a pleasant state ol consciousness, rather titan to bring ahoul any good fbi otlttis. flittetoic, the actioli is unseinsli ot iii a stlf)eilitill level of analysis. Smith will fbcl much better with himself lbr having stated to help his friendif lie had gone to the country, he totild have [bit terribie ahout itanti that is the real point of the ,cboii m oiling to a weliTnown sterv, this argument was ont exptessed by Abraham Lincoln:
II (t1lW g,od I Its wh tii Tel ste re passilig over a eor(lurov bridge that spanned a slough. As they crossed this bridge they espied all c>lc1 lvizor-hacke(l sow ott the 1 sink making a terrible noise heCaiNe bet PPi I ttd (1 iltO I tIC 5111! igli and were ni dat i%(i of Toot ) 1 hI the old coallI began in dint tlte 1(111, Nh. lincoln called not. Dri\ei, cant vcu stop inst a nlomenil Iliuti Mr. i,iuruhit jumped out, ran hack, and tilled the little pigs out of the mud and water and placed 011(1-,

Thisargiinient suffers from dekcu si nnla i to the previous one. Wlit should we think that mmwielv because sonitotie (leiiwS satistac non horn helping ot btis tilts makes him selbsh Isnt the nnsellIsh man precisely the one who does derive satislbction from helping others, xvh ile the selfish utati does nod If 1,iitcoln got peace of mind horn iescuing the piglets does this show him to he selfish, or. ott the con tiiiv, clotsn t n show lilItI In be compassionate and good-iiearteclr (If a man were truly selfish, why should it bother his conscience that oth arc snffemmtieh less hips:) Similarly, it is tiothitig mote than shabby sophistry to sie, bec;tttse Smith takes satisi)tetion in helping his friend. that he is behaving selfishly 11 we say this rapidis. while thitiking aboitt somethitig else, peihaps it will sotnicl all right; bitt if we speak slowly, aiici pay attention to what we aie saving. ii sounds plain sills. Nioreovei. suppose we ask als Smith derives sittisiliction I roin help ing lus liieud. The anssve will he. it 15 because Smith cares for him and wants him to sticceed. If Smith did not have these concerns, then he would take tio ltltStt cc in assisting him: and these concerns, as we bait already Seth. are the marks ol tinsel) ishness. not selfishness. To put the point more generally: if we li:i; e a positi C attitndt toward the attainment of some goal, then we may derive satisfitction from attain ing that goal. But the oboe? of our attitude is I/o 01101/men? 0/that goal; alit1 we nittst want to attain tlit goal bi/d we caii hnd any satisfaction in it. We rho not, in othet weids. desire sonit soil of pleastnahle con sciousness and then try to figure ottt how [ achieve it; rather. we de
sire all sorts of different thingsinoner, a new fishing bloat, to he a better chess pliet. to ci ii proinction i our work, etcand because we desire ti-test things. we (letive satisfilcti( iii Itd 111 itttaining them, And so, if sorneotie desires the wehl;ue anti happiness of another person, he ttill derive satisfiictioti from that; httt this does not twean that this satisfaction is the object of his desire, or that lit is in any way selfish on account of it. It is a ineasitre ol the weakness 01 psychological egoism that these

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itlslipportable arguments are the ones most often advanced in its [aut. Wits, then. slw tllh anyone ever hayt t bought it a trtte siew Per h;ips because of a dtsire fiir theoretical si nphicitv: In thmkmg about hutnan cotiduct, it wmibd be nice if there ivere sotiw simple formula that wottld unite the diverse pheoomena of hutlian behavior under a
Ingfc txplanalt >iv pimciple, list ts snYiplu h(JtnitllltC in pht sics- bring together a great manvappareti liv diffe-ren t phenomena. And since it is obvious that sehliegarrl 15 an oveiwheltnmglv important factor in

our soul. 1(1 T;ti was tilt IdiS (SSeI)( 1 (tt elitslities I should tow no peace ot mind all clay had I gone on and tell that sobering old sow IvOrO tug oser those pigs. I (lid it to gel peace of nund, dont von seei

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the answer is clearly No; while a he explained in these terms. But motivated eutire or in part 1w selfgreat many human actions are of the frets can we say that all interest onlv hva deliberate distortion clear, I think, it we correct three conduct is so motivated. ibis will be exposure of these conftt confusions which are commonplace. The iliv from the psychological last traces of plaitsib SlOflS will rtiflOVt the
egoist theso.

selbinterest, The two The hrst is the cordu. ion of selfishness with when i am feeling poorly, are clearly not the same. If I see a physician one would think of calling me I am acting in my own interest hut no teeth, working hard selfish ott account of it. Siniilarlv. brushing my seifhtiterest hut none of at mvjob, and obeying the law are all in my e selfish behavior these ,irc examples of selfish condiict This is becaus in circumstances in is behasior that ignores the interests of others, concept has a def which their interesrs ought not to he ignored. This h is not just to describe inite evaittatis e flavor; to call someone sellis call me selfish for his action bitt to condemn it. Thus. son would not (although it may earing a normal meal in normal circumstances me selfish for hoard surely he in my selfhnterest); but you would call ing Ihod while others about are starving. action is done The second confusion is the assumption that every motives. Thus, the regarding OI!1CI from selfinterest or from other m concludes that if thei-e is no such thing as genuine altruis egoist this is certainly a then all actions must he done from selfinterest. But tes, even af false dichotomy. The man who continues to smoke cigaret g and cancer, is ter learning about the connection between smokin standards sttre]y not acting from self-interest, not even by his own and he is seiflinterest would dictate that he quit smoking at once for the plea not acting altruistically either. F-Ic is, no doubt, smoking re-seeking sure of it. but all that this shows is that undisciplined pleasu led Butler and ,tcting from selthnterest are very different. TIns is what that men have so to remark that the thing to he lamented is, not world, for great regard to their own good or interest in the present they have not enough. are The last two paragraphs snow (a) that it is false that all actions nterest. selfish, and (b) that it is false that all actions are (lone Out of selfi and were, And it should be noted that these two points can be tnade, without any appeal to putatise examples of altruism. a The third cotlftisiOn is the common but false assumption that e con concern for ones own welfare is incompatible with any genuin ne cern for the welfare of others, lhus. since it is obvious that everyo (or very nearly everyone) does desire his own well-being, it might he

thought that no one can really be concerned with others, But again, this is false. There is no mci )mtSiStelicv in desiring that everyone, in cluding oneself and others, he well-off and happy. To he sure, it may llappett on occasion that our own interests conflict with the interests of others, and in these cases we will have to make hard choices. But even in these ens Cs we might sometimes opt for the interests of others, cspec ially when the others involved are our frniih- or friends. But more importantly, not all cases are like this: sometimes we are ahie to promote the welfaie of others when our own interests are not in volved at nfl, In these cases not even the strongest selfiregard need prevent us from acting constderately toward others, Once these confusions are cleared awaw it seems to me obvious enough that there is no reason whatever to accept psychological egoism. On the contrai if we simply observe peoples hehasior with an open mind, we may find that a great deal of it is motivated by self-regard, but by no means all of it; and that there is no reason to deny that the moral t1Stittltio1i of life tao include-a place br tIme virtue of l)elmetIcence.
3. The ethical egoist would say at this point. Of course it is possi ble fot people to act altruistically, anti perhaps many people do act that wayhut there is no reason why they /wuld do so. A person is umi dcc no obligation to do at tlnng except what is in his own interests. This is realh quite a radical doctrine. Suppose I have an urge to set fire to some public building (say, a department store) just for the fhs cination of watching the spectacular blaze: according to this view, the fret that several people might he burned to death provides no reason whatever why I should not do it. After all, this only concerns their wel fisie, not my own, and according to the ethical egoist the only person I need think of is myself. Some might deny that ethical egoism has ans such monstrous con sequences. They would point out that it is really to my own advantage trot to set the firefor, if 1 (10 that I may he catmght and put into prison (unlike Gyges, I have no magic ring for protection), Moreover, even if I could avoid being caught it is still to my advantage to respect th rights and interests of others, fOr it is to my advantage to live in a souetv in which peoples rights and interests are respected, Only iii such a society can I live a happy and secure life; so, in acting kindly to ward others, I wotmld mnereh- be doing my pait to create and maintain the sort of society which it is to my advantage to have. Therefore, it is said, the egoist would not be such a bad man: he wotmid he as kindly and considerate as anyone else, because he wotmld see that it is to his own advantage tc he kindly and considerate.

58

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to maintain the doctiine cl ethical egoism as consislent view abotit

mistaken. This is a seducive line of thought, but it seems to me (including the egoists) to 1 Certain it is to evervones advantage preserve a tabIe society where peoples interests are genet ails pro tected. But there is no reason for the egoist to think that tuereh be eatie /e will not honor the rules of the social game. decent society will collanse. Be the vast majority of people are not egoistS. and there is tb reason to think that they will he converted by his example epecialk it he is discreet and does not unduly flaunt his sts le of life. What this line of reasoning shOws is not that the egoist himself must act benevolently. but that he must encourage ni/iris to do so. He must take care to conceal from public view his own self-centered method of decision making. and urge others to act on precepts sers different from those On which he is willing to act. The rational egmst. then. cannot advcucate that egoism he univer salk adopted by everyone, For lie wants a world in which his own in terests are maximized; and if other people adopted the egoistic policy of pursuing their own interests to the exclusion of his interests. as he pursues his interests to the exclusion of theirs. then such a world would he impossible. So he himself will he an egoist, hut he will want others to be altruists. This brings us to what is perhaps the most popular rehitation (ii ethical egoisni current among philosophical writersthe argument that ethical egoism is at bottom muonsiSteiit because it cannot he uni 5 versalized. The argument goes like this: To say that any action or policy of action is dg/ui (or that it ((ugh/to be adopted) entails that it is right Ibr ansoutr in the same sort of circum stances. I cannot, fhr example. say that it is tight for me to lie to you, and vet object when von lie to me (provided, of course, that the circum stances are the same). I cannot hold that it is all tIght for me to drink 5 your beer and then complain when you drink mine. This i just the re quiren uent that we he consistent in our esuluations; it isarequiretnefit of logic. Now it is said that ethical egoism cai inot meet this require ment because. as we have already seen, the egoist would not want others to act in the same way that he acts. Moreover, supprse he did advocate the universal adoption of egoistic policies: he wottld be saving to Peter, \ott ought to pursue our own interesrs even if it means destroing PaulS: and he scould he saving to Paul, thu ought to pursue your own interests even if it means destrosing Peter. Ihe attimdes expressed in these tsvo recommendatjons seem clearly inconsistenthe is urging the advancement of Peters interest at one moment, and countenancing their defeat at the next. Therelbre. the argtttnent goes. there is no way

it

how we ot.ig.ht to act. Wf. will l.hli into nconsstency whenr.wer we tm X\lat are we te una ic it fins aru mend Are we- to conclude that ethical ego Isill has been ret utedr ttch a conclustot, I ttunk, wotuld he unwarranted; for I think that we can show, contrar to this argument, how ethical egoism can be maintained consistcntis. he need only to interpret the egoIsts position in a sympathetic way: we should say that he has in mind a certatn kind of world which he would prefer over all others: it would be a world in 5(11 Ic hi owu interests were maxi mized, regardless of the eflects on the other people. The egoists pri mary pohcv of action, then, would he to act in such a way its to bring about, as nearly as possible, this sort of world. Rectardiess of however morally reprehensible we might find it. there is nothing im;onsi,vleni in Sr w one sdonttu c thiS 55 his idt il rod ac in, ill 155 (5 caiul ted to bring it about And if someone did adopt this as Ins ideal. then he would not advocate universal egoism; as we have already seen, he would warn other cole in he altrnsts. So if lie advocates am ptin cipies of c ondtuct br the general puhlmc. they will he altruistic princi ples. This could not be inconsistent; on the contrary, it would be per fectly consistent with his goal of cieatin a would in which his own interests are maxim lied, be u he womuuI have to he deceitful: un order to secure the good will of others, and a favorable h.earing fur his exhortations to altrnsm. he would base to pu c-tend that he was himself prepared to accept aitruistu principles But again, that would be all right; from the egoists point of view, this would merely he a matter of adopting the necessary means, to the achievement of his goaland while we migl-it not approve of this, there us nothing in consistent about it. Again, it might he said, He advocates one thing, but does another. Sm clv that t mconsist cut But it is 1ot: for what he advocates and what he does are hcth calculated as means to an end (t.he came end, we might tiote); and as such, he is d.oing what is ratio nally retuired tn each case. Therefoic, ontmaev to the prevtous argu t. there is nothing mconsstent in the ethical egoists view. I-Ic can.not he refuted h the claim that he contradicts himse.lf, is there. thei. no way to iehtte the- ethical egoistr If by refute we mean show that lit iasntacle mine. iogkai error, the answer us that there is not, Fiowever, there is mni.ething tnore that can he said, The ecoist challenge to out ordinary moral convictions tmoun t5 tO It de mend fur an explanation ci why we should adopt certain policies of actio.n, namely, poiicie.s in which the good of others is given impor vtnce, hr-i-an gic en answer to tills cietnaud, albc-it an ndirect one.

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actions that would hurt other people The reason One ottaht not to do The reason one ougnt to (10 aenonS is othet people would he inirt. people wu1d he benefited. that would heite11 othet lle0P(t is til0 philosophical sieight-of-hand This may at first seem like a piece of tOe vatc of IltitlidO beings is some hsu it IS flOt. Tue point n that meniV tot the sake thing that most ol us value Jot its atoll .sakr, and not are demanded for of something else. Theretdre. when /drthr reasons poll t to til\ll1lfl ho s din i th tw mi oi 111111110 bt uith \st tu lOt toe ptnSu thee to satist this deiriand. It is not that we have no reason are for the in these policies, but that our reason tr that these policies good of human beings. department So if we are asked. Why shouldnt I set fire to this people may be store( one answer wotild be, hecause if ott do. not burned to death. ibis is a complete. sufficient reasolt whir Ii does someone seek reqnire qualincation or supplementation of arts sort. If ottslv wants to know why this actton shottlont he done. diats the rea But son. It we are pressed further and asked the sceptical question, not know wir shouldnt I do actions that will harm others? we mar what to eavbut this is because tixt questioner has included in his question the very answer we would like to give: Why shouldnt ton do aetiofl that will hanu otileist Because, (10mg those acbons would harm others. The egoist. no doubt. will not be happy with this. He will protest that no ma accept this nsa reason. but lObes not. And here the or guiflerit stops: there are limits to what call be accoiiiplisiied be argu tnent, and if the egoist really doesnt care abotit other peopleif he honestly doesnt care whether the are helped or hurt hr hi actions then we have reached those lituits. If we want to persuade him to act decently toward his fellow humans, we will have to make our appeal to cuch other attitudes as he dues possess. by threats, bribes, or other cajolery. Tha.t is :.siI that we can do. Illoagh soieint find this situatlOll rlistressing (we would like to embarrass he able to 5110w that the egoist iSlflSt nar(ag). it holds no cominotl morality. What we have collie tip against is simply rnent for a fundamental requireflieut of rattonal action. nilniely. that the exis tetce of reasons for action always depends on the priur exist en( e of certain attitudes in the agent. For example, tile fact that a certain coturse of action wo old make tiie agent a lot of m inev is a reason lcn doing it only if the ageilt wants to make money; tile fact that prac ticing at chess makes one a better player is a reason for practicing only if one wants to be a better plover: and 50 (111. Similarly, the uitct that a cotta n action would help the agent is a reasoil fhr firing the

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So a noncgolst will v w tt It uottlc h tint itlothcr pet sOn IS 11 1 t unt to do n u tion 511111115 Ix uttsr hr Ut s ihout w b it ii ipp Its to that other person. Whets the egoist says that lie does not accept that us i r i on h is S mng sonx thing dolt, \ti toidin lis He us siting th Ii hi, ii is 110 dh un n tm ft end )l I imds th ir hr fletti ka. pitt t or romp 1551011 th st ht is thc sot t of pu rsou who in look on went S of hhllilaIl misery with complete indifference, so long as he is not the not stuftet u e ( ( iiuin( ( goists people who [S ills don t tie it iii uhout intone oth i than the mseis es air i uw It is Important to keep thus t mnud wh 11 thinktmu, thotit stint ii s ,,Otsfll it Is C ss to lot get just not III lb lIlt lit ii to 111011 In psuitoingic ii ill skeup the Ii clii g of ssnipuths is Indeed mm withont tnt sslnp iths t ill would naiccis o)i, ncognl / [Ok i i 01 1 nfl I ISIS ssh it n ike still. ii cgomsln sUtil disttu hung dot lrtt I 0 the to st lice i
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I. There are, of course. many clii ferent ways in which tile sceptic might challenge tile assnlnptions underlying our moral practice. in this essay I have discussed only two of them. tile Iwo put forward

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t daucoti ill tlie passage tilat I eited frOtlI Plato s Re!)ubil(. It is impor tant that the assumptions to deriving onr moral practice should not

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be confused with particular jtidginents made wtthin that practice. To delfind one is not to defend the other. T\e may aSsunleqtlite prop cdv. if my analysis has been correctthat the virtue of beneficence does. and indeed should, occupy au important place iii tile moral in stinmon (If life; and yet we ma make constant and miserable errors when it comes to judging when and in what svaw thjs virtue is to he ex ercised. Even worse, we may often he able to make accurate moral :udginents, and know what we ought to do, but Ilot do it. For these ills, phi osophvaione is not the (JilT.

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Notes
i. 11w Rep a htu oj Plato,
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Or. as it is Lometunes said, it kes han a cleor critsuience, or I-ic couldnt sI cep at n ttht it he had done oi herwise. or lIe oonicl have been ashamed at hiniseil ton (lot doing and SO on.

F. M. (.orntorcl (Oxthrd, 1941), p. 45.

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Quoted from the York, 1928), P9 3. Frank C. Sharp, )lhics (New ol 56 p I 059 11 nid it ht Ut if of N nflt 14 11 1 ii )t id l 161 ( idst /5, ilit d 0 iN I ph / a against pu It shoult he toted that most f the points 1 am making p. 2b. the chologica) egoism were first made by Joseph Butler. Butler made all points; all that is icit for us is to remember them. important unique to human beings. 5. The capaciptom altmuistlc behavi 0151)0 experiments with rhesus monkeys have shown that Some interesting if these animals will refrain from operating a device for securing food Masserman, Wechkin. and his causes other animals to stttfer pain. Sec AmeneafljOUrfl(1t Terris, Altruistic Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys.] he Prhth175. vol. 121(1964) p, 58185. coilI take this to he the view of A ii Rand. fl50iOi Os 1 tmc1ersnmii dci 7, Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Lniathan (London, 1654), chap. 17. Egoism. 8. See. [hr example. Brian Mcdhn. Ultimate Principles and Ethical q:aioswii j(irnii of Phiiocojiln. vol. 35 (19571. pp. 11118: and I). Fl. Monro, InnImUiS)fl and F/h/cc (Camhridgc 1967), chap. 16.
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Happiness and imrnoralit

Steven M. Cahn andjeffrie G. Murphy

fused doctrine,

An additional challenge to morality comes from those who believe that sometimes a pelsorl mat achieve happiness hr acting immorally. Is the happiness supposedly attained in this way mdv illnsoiv, or does it provide

a reason to disregard moral considerations? Ihe issue is discussed here bm Steven M. Cahn and [effric G. Murphy, Regents Professor of Law, Phi losophv. and Religions Studies at Arizona State Untvcrsitv.

Study Questions
1. Explain the distinction between psychological egoism and ethical egoism. 2. In the stotA about Abraham Lincoln, was his action motivated by selfishness? 3. Is a concern for ones own welfare incompatible with ann genuine

A. The Happy Immoralist Steven AL Calt n

Happiness, according to Philippa Foot. is a most intractable con cept. She commits herseif however, to the claim that great happi ness, unlike euphoria or even great pleasure, must come from some thing ielated to what is deep in human nature, and fundamental in human life, such as affection liar children and friends, the desire to work, and love of freedom and truth. I am not perstiaded hr this char acterization of happiness and offer the frillowing cottnterexample. Consider Frecl, a flctitiotts person, but an amalgamation of several people I have known, Freds lift has been devoted to achieving three aims: fame, wealth, and a reputation liar piohitv. He has no interest whatever in friends or truth. Indeed, he is treacherous and thoroughly dishonest. Nevertheless. he has attained his three goals and is. in fact, a rich celebrity renowned liar his supposed integrity. His acquiring a good tiame while acting unscrupulously is a tribute to his audacity, cunning, and luck. Now he rests self-satisfied, basking in renown.
PausAa,id B are front / ornl /Sooi1Phi/ae4hv Vot .35. Cnpvdtht V 2004. Reprinted 1w per ini-tott 4 bta,kweti Pnb)ishin 1_tO. Pans (and Pa,, ,ennt,ltI Pu peinti.Oon 1 rite ant) rn, 4

concern for the welfkre of others? 4. is it selCdefeating liar an ethical egnist to urge everyone to act egoistically?

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