MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA and ENRIQUE D. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, ROMEO F. EDU and FIDEL V.

RAMOS, respondents The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday." Motor vehicles of the following classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars). Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on June 11, 1979, Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found 4 violating such Letter of Instruction. It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in 5 contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting 6 attention to the fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of 7 "undue delegation of legislative power." It is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner''''s allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. The

govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitionersappellants, vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondentsappellees. This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the 1 same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no 2 case involving such issue having been filed. The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held: NO Ratio: It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Tablarin v Gutierrez Nature : Petition for review on certiorari Petitioners : Teresita Tablarin, et al, on their behalf and in behalf of applicants foradmission into Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-1988 and future yearswho have not yet taken or successfully hurdled the NMAT Respondents : Hon. Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez (RTC Branch XXXVII, Manila), Sec.Lourdes Quisumbing, in her capacity as Chair of the Board of Medical Education andthe Center for Educational Measurement (CEM)FACTS1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This was later amendedby RAs 4224 and 5946.~ Sec. 1 Objectives This Act provides for and shall govern (a) thestandardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination forregistration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines.~ RA 2382, as amended by RA 5946, created a Board of Medical Education,comprising of:1. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or duly authorizedrepresentative Chairman2. Secretary of Health or duly authorized representative3. Director of Higher Education or duly authorized representative4. Chairman of Medical Board or duly authorized representative5. A representative of the Philippine Medical Association6. The Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines7. A representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools8. A representative of the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges~ Functions of the board are in Section 5 (as emphasized in the case):(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognizedcollege of medicinexxx(f) To accept applicants for certification for admission to a medical school andkeep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicantsthe amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Educationxxx(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules andregulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.~ Section 7 prescribes minimum requirements for applicants to medicalschools:- not convicted of any crime of moral turpitude, and submits the following 1. Record of completion of BA/BS degree2. Certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from BME 3. Certificate of good moral character, by 2 former professors4. Birth certificate- 1985: Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issues MECS Order No. 52,establishing the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a standardized test foradmission into medical schools. No applicant would be issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA) without having taken and passed the NMAT.- March 5, 1987: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibitionwith a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, to stopthe enforcement of MECS Order No. 52 requiring the NMAT for admission intomedical colleges- April 20, 1987: Judge Gutierrez dismissed the petition, and the NMAT wasconducted as scheduled on April 27, 1987- Petitioners elevated the issue to the SC, raised the issue of whether or not apreliminary injunction may be issued to stop the conduction of the NMAT pendingthe case. SC said that the case of unconstitutionality must be strong enough for thecourt to issue such an injunction.ISSUES1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, unconstitutional?2. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, and undue delegation of legislative power?3. Is the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable admission requirement?4. Is the MECS Order No. 52 a violation of equal protection?RATIO 1:

To prove the unconstitutionality of an order or statute, a petitioner must demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the assailed order or statute collideswith the Constitutional provisions. - Petitioner invokes Sec. 11, 13, and 17 of Art II (State Policies) and Sec. 3 and 5 (3)of Art XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports), but theCourt held that the petitioners did not present even a prima facie case for Sec. 11,13 and 17.- The Court also held that Sec. 3 and Sec. 5 (3) of Art. XIV, in the context of professional education, should be to say that the State should take appropriatesteps to make quality education accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonableand equitable admission and academic requirements.RATIO 2: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power must beapplied with circumspection in respect of statutes that deal with subjects that arecomplex and technical. - Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The Public ServiceCommission penned by Justice Laurel, the Court held that there was a constantlygrowing tendency towards the delegation of legislative power due to the growing complexities of modern society, and that there was an accompanying trend of acceptance by the courts.Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held that the standards setfor subordinate legislation may be explicit or implied. In the case of an impliedstandard, it can be deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as awhole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set by the Acts objectives,considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7 of the same Act, and taking into consideration thebody of the Act itself.RATIO 3a: The Supreme Court cannot rule on the desirability or wisdom of a piece of legislation or administrative regulation. - The Court held that they cannot rule on the petitioners argument that the NMAT isan unnecessary requirement for admission into medical schools on top of all of theother existing requirements. This is a question of the wisdom of having the NMAT assuch an additional requirement, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court todecide.RATIO 3b: The valid exercise of police power shall include the regulation of accessto medical schools. - The Court held that the important State interest in limiting access to medicalschools is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in medical practitioners. The NMAT, as an additionalrequirement for admission, is a tool to help upgrade the selection process of thoseseeking to enter medical schools.RATIO 4: Administrative measures may remain flexible to meet circumstances asthey change. - The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing the Board of MedicalEducation to determine the NMAT cutoff score every year is not a violation of equalprotection. Far from being arbitrary and capricious, different cutoff scores fordifferent school years may be dictated by the changing circumstances andconditions surrounding the medical industry. Thus, the clause allows the Board of Medical Education some flexibility needed to meet such changing circumstances. City of Manila Vs Chinese Community Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into anextension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts havethe right to inquire to. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding. Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows: A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...; and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land described as follows: A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. ..., and A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254. Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road, on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk

2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666), on the NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, .... In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the abovementioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to

determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory MARINE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MARCAPI), ROBERTO GAYA, DAVID ZAFRA and SEGUNDO P. LUSTRE, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. RAINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), HON. JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ, as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and HON. ROSAURO SIBAL, as Chief of the Telecommunications Office (TELOF) of DOTC, respondents. the petitioners are self-described "Filipino enterpreneurs deeply involved in the business of marine radio 1 communications in the country. They are also operators of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public 2 marine coastal radio stations, and are holders of certificates of public convenience duly issued by the National Telecommunications Commission. Among other things, they handle correspondence between 3 vessel passengers or crew and the public. Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec 244 scra 272 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a

permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid. Held: WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. 2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.