The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

Velupillai Pirabakaran
The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

P
eople familiar with Sri Lanka have found Mr.
Velupillai Pirabakaran, the leader of the LTTE, to be
most intriguing.
Friend and Ioe alike are Iascinated (awestruck, really) by his
perIormance as the leader oI a nation oI people threatened
with genocide, under conditions most challenging.
Unable to decipher and make sense oI this exceptional Ieat,
literally thousands oI articles have been written about him, all
attempting to understand, but none with any real insight. Most have tried to peg him
to the semblance oI a known somebody. Foes, oI course, have tried to compare
him to Iamous villains, and to the Iollowers, naturally, he is godlike.
None, however, have truly analyzed this extraordinary phenomenon in any great
depth as these continuing series oI articles.

Adoration
Part One - Premature Obituary in the Madras Hindu
Part Two - What is Leadership?
Part Three - Learning Irom Mistakes
Part Four - Humor in anti-Pirabhakaran polemics
Part Five - Pirabhakaran - the Morale Booster
Part Six - A Brando in the Battle Front
Part Seven - Violating the Seventh Commandment
Part Eight - Pirabhakaran as a cash-cow
Part Nine - Four Musketeers oI UNP
Part Ten - Civil War Leader Ior Tamils
Part Eleven - 1987 - Paradigm ShiIt in Eelam
Part Twelve - In the eyes oI Foreign Journalists
Part Thirteen - Pirabhakaran and Duraiappah
Part Fourteen - Casualty Breakdown in Eelam Civil War
Part FiIteen - Demand oI Discipline
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Pirabakaran
Speaks
People Listen
Guard of Honor
Expressing Concern
Thileepan Fasting
Grieving with
Kittu's Mother

Part Sixteen - Colombo Beggars in the bin Laden
Bandwagon
Part Seventeen - Emerging Truth in the 'Terrorist' Label
Part Eighteen - A Ramanujan in Military Science
Part Nineteen - Repercussions oI Rajiv-Jayewardene
Accord
Part Twenty - Implications oI Indo-LTTE War
Part Twenty One - Pol Potist` Label: Facts and Fantasy
Part Twenty Two - 1989 - The Year oI Indian Intrigue
Part Twenty Three - Standing-up Against India's Imperial
Itch
Part Twenty Four - Surviving the Plots oI RAW and
Premadasa
Part Twenty Five - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: Wading
through the Paper Maze
Part Twenty Six - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The Forensic
Science Angle
Part Twenty Seven - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The
Political Angle
Part Twenty Eight - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: the judicial
angle oI Justice S.S.M.Quadri
Part Twenty Nine - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: the judicial
angle oI Justice K.T.Thomas
Part Thirty - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: the judicial angle oI
Justice D.P.Wadhwa
Part Thirty One - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: Jigsaw
puzzles in the judicial angle
Part Thirty Two - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The
Conspiracy Angle
Part Thirty Three - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The
Sinhalese Angle
Part Thirty Four - The Tamil Sentiments and V.P. Singh's
Views
Part Thirty Five - Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - International
Links
Part Thirty Six -Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - One Spoke in
the South Asian Wheel oI Intrigue
Part Thirty Seven - Why is He Loved by the Tamils
Part Thirty Eight - The Quality oI Sinhalese Military
Competition
Part Thirty Nine - The Paradigm ShiIter
Part Forty - Valveddithurai`s GiIt
Part Forty One - Biographer's Interlude
Part Forty Two - Even Grass is a Weapon Ior the
Courageous
Part Forty Three - Prime Antagonist to Brown-Skinned
Buddhist Aryanism
Part Forty Four - Countering the Fangs oI Brown-Skinned
Buddhist Aryanism
Part Forty Five - The scenario at the eastern Iront: D.S.
Senanayake`s notorious Lebensraum (Living Space)
strategy: a synopsis
Part Forty-Six - TORMENT IN THE EASTERN FRONT:
Predicaments oI Scenario Sketchers
Part Forty Seven - Nuda Jeritas on The Muslim Factor
Part Forty Eight - Projecting Tamil Power
Part Forty Nine - Analyzing the Tamil Victims oI LTTE's
Power
Part FiIty - Thwarting the Careers oI Closet Tamil
Operatives
Part FiIty-One - Is Pirabakaran a Deviant and Merchant oI
Death?
Part FiIty-Two - Eelam's Karma - The Good, the Bad and
the Ugly
Part-FiIty-Three - Being a Tamil Hero

Part 1
Sachi Sri Kantha
2 May 2001
Premature Obituary in the Madras
Hindu
Introduction
It`s time that the Pirabhakaran phenomenon be studied
somewhat in depth. His adversaries Irom India and Sri Lanka
have called him names - a Hitler, a Pol Pot, a megalomaniac
and a mass murderer. The problem with these selI-serving
outbursts is that, the 20th century Indian subcontinent had not
seen a leader like him. In ideals and action, the closest one
who can be identiIied with Pirabhakaran is Subhas Chandra
Bose (1897-1945), though there are noticeable diIIerences in
the lives between both. Thus, the critics oI Pirabhakaran had
groped in the dark to pigeonhole him into slots with which they
are Iamiliar. In this exercise, they Iail miserably because,
Pirabhakaran is a trend-setter (aligned in the ranks oI Mao Ze
Dong) and couldn`t be Iit into pre-conceived slots. Thus, the
only reIerence his critics (which include some prominent
Tamils as well) make is to depict him as a tyrant. Their
behavior is like the crybabies who scream when what they had
in their hands does not work according to their whims.
Nevertheless, a couple oI commentators and journalists who
are knowledgeable (like Mervyn de Silva and Anita Pratap)
had identiIied Pirabhakaran as an unusual brand oI leader - in
contrast to the tub-thumping variety oI politicians in the Indian
subcontinent who are dozen a dime in every decade. Mervyn
de Silva, in selecting Pirabhakaran as the Man oI the Decade`
in 1990, wrote,
'As we look back to the 1980s, and study the decade as a
whole, we are inclined to concede primacy to the Tamil
threat to the unity, and indirectly, the sovereignty oI Sri
Lanka. In that struggle, there is one commanding
personality, the LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran,
regarded by many western experts as leader oI one oI the
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regarded by many western experts as leader oI one oI the
toughest guerrilla organisations in the world, and by
military analysts as a genius` in the theory oI
unconventional warIare (Lanka Guardian, Jan.1, 1990).
Eleven years have passed since this assessment was made.
Hitler`s rule could last only 12 years. Pol Pot`s dictum couldn`t
Ily more than 4 years. But Pirabhakaran had set the political
agenda Ior nearly two decades now in Sri Lanka and India. An
interesting, thoughtIul comment I read in the Internet web page
oI one Sam Sloane (Ishi Press International, USA) Iollowing
the verdict on Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial by the Indian
Court is worth repeating here. Under the caption, Who really
killed Rajiv Gandhi?` Sloane had written as Iollows:
'For nearly two decades, probably more people have
seriously been trying to kill Velupillai Prabhakaran, the
leader oI the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, than any
other person in the world. On Wednesday, an Indian
court sentenced Velupillai Prabhakaran to death in
absentia, just Ior the little thing oI killing Rajiv Gandhi.
Ha! Ha! Ha!
The judge in the Indian court came to the ridiculous
conclusion that the only person who wanted Rajiv dead
was Prabhakaran, and thereIore he must be guilty,
without any evidence linking him to Dhanu. I am no
admirer oI Prabhakaran, but I know Ior a Iact that there
were 16 million other Sri Lankans who wanted to kill
Rajiv Gandhi, plus a number oI Indians as well...
Pirabhakaran`s Premature Obituary in the Madras Hindu
BeIore Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991, the motley
brand oI spies belonging to India`s Intelligence Agencies had
plotted to kill Pirabhakaran. Among my collection oI
Pirabhakaraniana, nothing beats the Iollowing news item,
which appeared in the Hindu newspaper oI July 24, 1989. The
caption was, 'Prabhakaran reported killed in LTTE shootout.
The text in Iull was as Iollows.
'Madras, July 23: The top leader oI the Liberation Tigers
oI Tamil Eelam, Mr.V. Prabhakaran, was killed in a
shoot-out by the Mahatiya Iaction oI the LTTE a Iew
days ago, according to political sources in the North-
Eastern Province oI Sri Lanka. Mr. Mahatiya was the
Eastern Province oI Sri Lanka. Mr. Mahatiya was the
deputy leader oI the LTTE.
His body is reportedly at a village called
Ananthaperiyakulam 20 km north-east oI Vavuniya town.
Various political sections in the North-Eastern Province
oI Sri Lanka have been talking about this over the last
two days. Another indication is that a video-cassette is
being circulated in which Mr. Mahatiya has proclaimed
himselI the leader oI the LTTE. Mr. Mahatiya is also
reported to be wounded in one version. When contacted
in London, an LTTE representative, while not willing to
credit the reports, declined to issue a Iormal denial.
LTTE watchers say that the basic diIIerence between
Mr. Prabhakaran and Mr. Mahatiya was that Mr.
Prabhakaran opposed the line oI talking with the Sri
Lankan Government and collaborating openly with it
against India and the other Tamil organizations. Mr.
Prabhakaran was also against lining up with the Sri
Lankan President R. Premadasa, in the course leading to
a conIrontation with India as he took the position that
Sinhalese politicians could never be trusted. Besides, he
was reportedly opposed to killing the TULF leaders, A.
Amirthalingam and V. Yogeswaran, as he Ielt it would
alienate the Tamil people oI Sri Lanka and the people oI
India Irom the LTTE.
Mr. Mahatiya has, over the past two years, been the key
Iigure in the military structure oI the LTTE. He had
become co-equal with Mr. Prabhakaran, iI not the main
leader in the military there while Mr. Prabhakaran
remained the apparent political leader. Various political
elements in the North-Eastern Province had become
aware oI a situation oI dual power at the top in the
organization which has gone on an extremely violent
course over the past year and more.
In the last ten days starting Irom July 13 the top political
leaders oI the Eelam movement have been eliminated
violently - the outstanding moderate political Iigure, the
veteran A. Amirthalingam, his colleague, V. Yogeswaran
and the leader oI PLOT, Uma Maheswaran, who earlier
lost to Prabhakaran in the violent struggle Ior supremacy
in the militant movement.
Kittu also killed?
According to Sri Lankan Tamil sources here, Mr.
Krishnakumar alias Kittu, lieutenant oI Mr. Prabhakaran,
was also Ieared killed in the shoot-out. The rival groups
clashed in the Vavuniya jungles, Irom where Prabhakaran
and others were driven out beIore being shot.
Some other prominent LTTE leaders were also
understood to have been killed or grievously injured. The
sources said their inIormation was based on a message
the LTTE groups were passing among themselves, which
was intercepted at Koriakulam village near Vavuniya. The
sources added that people at Ananthaperiyakulam village
had been paying homage to Mr.Prabhakaran by
garlanding his portraits during the past two days.
LTTE denial
However, in Colombo, an LTTE spokesman dismissed as
baseless rumours being spread by interested parties` that
Mr. Prabhakaran was killed in a shootout. He said there
was no truth in the reports doing the rounds in Colombo
that two senior LTTE leaders had heated arguments with
Prabhakaran over the killings oI two senior TULF leaders
in the Colombo residence last week.
This news item was an example oI the sneaky designs oI
India`s spies who attempted to eliminate Pirabhakaran and
install a pliable person at the helm oI LTTE. It is to the credit
oI Pirabhakaran that he out-smarted the Indian manipulators.
The TULF leader Amirthalingam was ruined by the Indian-
wallahs because he surrendered his individuality to them.
Pirabhakaran did not make this mistake.
I checked Iive books in my personal library, which describe
the events oI 1989 in Sri Lanka, and strangely not a single one
mentions or comments about this bizarre news item oI the
Madras Hindu. These Iive books and their authors are as
Iollows:
1.

The Broken Palmvra, by Rajan Hoole, Daya
Somasundaram, K.Sritharan and Rajani Thiranagama; The Sri
Lanka Studies Institute, Claremont, CA, 1990.
2.

Indias Sri Lanka Fiasco, by Rajesh Kadian; Vision
Books, New Delhi, 1990.
3.

Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, by Rohan Gunaratna;
South Asian Network on ConIlict Research, Colombo,
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South Asian Network on ConIlict Research, Colombo,
1993.
4.

Tigers of Lanka, by M.R.Narayan Swamy; Konarak
Publishers, New Delhi, 1994.
5.

Assignment Colombo, by J.N.Dixit; Konarak Publishers,
New Delhi, 1998.
This tells something about the quality (or lack oI) these
Pirabhakaran-watchers. However, two sentences in Rajesh
Kadian`s book, speciIically, attracted my attention.
At a public meeting on 1 June 1989, a jubilant
Premadasa echoed the LTTE`s demand that the IPKF be
withdrawn. He even Iixed a day - 29 July 1989 - the
second anniversary oI the now visibly tattered accord.
(p.133).
Kindly check the dates once more. Is it a coincidence, that
between these two dates, Amirthalingam was assassinated on
July 13, 1989. Four days later, Uma Maheswaran was
assassinated, and on July 23, 'Prabhakaran (was) reported
killed in LTTE shootout, according to the Hindu newspaper?
Something Iishy indeed! The same news item in the Hindu
also mentioned that, Pirabhakaran 'was reportedly opposed to
killing the TULF leaders, A. Amirthalingam and V.
Yogeswaran, as he Ielt it would alienate the Tamil people oI
Sri Lanka and the people oI India Irom the LTTE.
It may not be wrong to inIer that India`s Intelligence operators
had planned assiduously to eliminate the then three leading
Iigures among Eelam, viz, Amirthalingam, Uma Maheswaran
and Pirabhakaran between June 1, 1989 and July 29, 1989.
Pirabhakaran somehow escaped Irom this trap.
The hatred oI the bosses oI Hindu newspaper also largely
derives Irom this impenetrability oI Pirabhakaran. His
impenetrability was a virtue Ior the Eelam Tamils` campaign.
He never allowed himselI to be compromised. Thus, the only
thing his adversaries could do was to throw mud and project
him as a tyrant.
1ime magazine interview
To the dismay oI India`s court jesters oI espionage,
Pirabhakaran survived and less than an year later gave an
interview to the Time magazine`s correspondent Anita Pratap,
Irom Mullaitivu. This interview, which appeared in the Time oI
April 8, 1990, deserves to be posted in the Internet in Iull.
One should note that long beIore the likes oI Chandrika
Kumaratunga, Anuruddha Ratwatte and Lakshman
Kadirgamar emerged in the Sri Lankan political scene, the
Time magazine Ieatured Pirabhakaran (younger but
experienced in leadership skills than the now parading
mediocrities) in two pages, as a newsworthy person. Even the
then Sri Lankan president R. Premadasa did not receive this
level oI prominence in the Time magazine. Why? The probable
reason is Pirabhakaran was diIIerent Irom other leaders who
emerged Irom the Indian subcontinent in the last quarter oI the
20th century. In this interview, Pirabhakaran reIlected on the
strengths and weaknesses oI LTTE, what he gained Irom his
conIrontation with India and what his motive in peace talks.
Here is the Iull interview. Note that the words within
parentheses were in the original text.
Q: What made you conIront India?
A: India claimed to have intervened in Sri Lanka to
secure Tamil interests. In actual Iact, India came to
secure its own interests. There was never any genuine
attempt to understand and solve our problems. India
deliberately aggravated Sri Lanka`s ethnic crisis. It
destabilized Sri Lanka |by training and arming Tamil
militants, including the Tigers| so that it could play a
dominant role in bringing Sri Lanka within its sphere oI
inIluence.
What I can`t Iorgive is the way India claimed to have
intervened to protect the Tamils and then launched this
war against our people. On the third day aIter the war
started, I sent an appeal to India to stop the attack
because oI the civilian casualties. But India mistook it as
a sign oI weakness and pressed ahead with the oIIensive,
thinking they could crush us.
Q: But isn`t it true that India has consistently stood Ior a
united Sri Lanka?
A: India used this excuse to impress the world that it was
the protector oI Sri Lanka. By adopting this line, India
ensured that other powers were excluded Irom interIering
in this region.
Q: You knew India was using the Sri Lankan problem to
pursue its interests, but didn`t you also use India by
taking advantage oI Indian training and arms?
A: Yes, we also used India. We were aware oI India`s
strategy but made use oI the opportunity to strengthen
ourselves militarily.
Q: What gave you the courage to take on the world`s
third largest army?
A: India Iailed to secure the release oI twelve oI my area
commanders who were arrested by the Sri Lankan
security Iorces. |When the captives later swallowed
cyanide| their suicides made me determined to conIront
the Indian army. Some oI my top colleagues cautioned
me against it and wondered how long the LTTE could
hold out. I gave them the Vietnam example - a small
nation can Iight a superpower with determination and
dedication. When I was deciding to Iight, the thought oI
winning or losing didn`t bother me. What you have to
assess is whether you have the will to Iight. People
cannot give up their cause, their rights, Ior Iear oI deIeat.
Q: Is there a lesson in this Ior India?
A: That however Iormidable a military power you may
be, you cannot impose upon a people anything against
their will.
Q: What guerilla technique was most useIul to you?
A: We used land mines to great eIIect. They caused a lot
oI Indian casualties.
Q: What did you consider were the Indian army`s main
strengths and weaknesses?
A: Their strength - and their weakness - was their huge
manpower. It created diIIiculties Ior us. It restricted our
mobility. But because they came in large numbers, they
suIIered many casualties. Also, they wasted a lot oI time,
energy and money on providing logistical support.
Another major weakness was that the Indian army was
not motivated. The soldiers didn`t know why they were
Iighting. They were conIused. They came to protect
Iighting. They were conIused. They came to protect
Tamils, and then they had to kill them.
Q: And what in your judgment were the LTTE`s own
strengths and weaknesses?
A: Our strength - and our weakness - was our
overconIidence. Sometimes our cadres took impossible
risks, like ambushing an Indian patrol at a point where
there were no escape routes. This cost us casualties. We
were sometimes careless. But also because oI our
overconIidence, our boys carried out some amazingly
brave attacks.
Q: The Indians say they Iought this was with one hand
tied behind their backs because they wanted to minimize
civilian casualties.
A: II they could indulge in such atrocities against our
people with one hand tied behind their backs, I shudder
to imagine what havoc they would have unleashed iI both
hands had been Iree. They used every technique - aerial
straIing, dropping 250-kg bombs, artillery bombardment,
harassment oI civilians. These are excuses peddled by a
deIeated army.
Q: Some 6,000 Tamil civilians were killed in the war with
the Indian army. Was it worth it?
A: Yes. We have proved that we will not allow any Iorce
to interIere with the Ireedom and independence oI our
people.
Q: But what have you gained?
A: I have gained selI conIidence, courage and the support
oI my people.
Q: What made you start negotiations with Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa?
A: Our people thought India would give us Tamil Eelam
|a separate Tamil state|. Instead India |reached an
agreement| against our will. So we thought it would be
better to talk to the Sri Lankan government and work out
a better deal. Besides LTTE will not allow a Ioreign Iorce
to intervene and dominate our people. Premadasa
articulated the same viewpoint. He was determined to end
the Ioreign intervention.
Q: Now that the Indian army has gone, many Iear that
conIrontation with the Sri Lankan government - your
historical enemy - is again inevitable.
A: We have had a long history oI state oppression against
our people. Earlier, the Tamils negotiated and were
repeatedly betrayed, and so the armed struggle was born.
II the Sri Lankan government resorts to state oppression
against the Tamils and Muslims, then we will Iight. But
we hope the current peace will continue.
Q: How sincere do you think Premadasa is about solving
the problems oI the Tamils?
A: We started the negotiations on the basis oI trust. We
have that trust.
Q: How serious is the LTTE about participating in the
provincial council elections?
A: We are very serious. We want to show India and the
world that we are the authentic representatives oI the
people.
Q: Have you given up the demand Ior an independent
Eelam?
A: We have not.
Q: Then what are you talking to Premadasa Ior? How
can you enter the democratic mainstream iI you still cling
to your separatist cause?
A: We are entering the political mainstream. Our demand
Ior selI-determination will not be an impediment Ior us to
enter the political process.
Q: Many people Ieel that your peace talks with
Premadasa are only a tactical move.
A: We have not cheated or betrayed anybody. At the
same time, iI we are cheated or betrayed, we will react.
But iI somebody trusts us, then we will reciprocate.
Though this interview with Pirabhakaran appeared in the Time
magazine 11 years ago, Irom his actions one can still Ieel that
Pirabhakaran has not changed an iota Irom his proIessed goal.
A decade is a long time in public liIe, and how many traditional
politicians can say that they have not Ilip-Ilopped (or
compromised) on their goals Ior status and accompanying bells
and whistles. This adamancy, and what Thomas Edison called
stick-to-it-iveness (in his Iormula to success) is what makes
Pirabhakaran dangerous` in the eyes oI his adversaries.
Mahathya Affair
II Pirabhakaran`s will couldn`t be broken, the spies and their
handlers had tried in vain by character assassination and smear
campaign to make him an unacceptable person` among
Tamils. They had Iailed in this as well. As a last resort, India`s
spooks had plotted penetration into his movement to eliminate
him physically. Until now, all eIIorts have Iailed miserably.
For record, here I provide a March 15, 1994 report Irom the
India Todav magazine, in the aItermath oI Mahathya aIIair. I
reproduce this Ieature authored by Rahul Pathak and P.
Jayaram entitled, 'No Longer Supreme: Pirabhakaran Iaces a
revolt over Mahathya`s trial in Iull. The malicious verbiage
and the purported conclusion oI this diatribe reveals something
to us now, aIter the passage oI 7 years. The main sources Ior
this news report, are none other than anonymous intelligence-
wallahs Irom India and Sri Lanka, and one unidentiIied LTTE
member`.
'Wherever they dream oI a Tamil Eelam, his word is
law. His Iollowers have taken to calling him Chakravartv
(emperor) and on his whim 113 persons have been
executed over the past year. But Velupillai Pirabhakaran
is now seeing the seeds oI a powerIul dissension sprout
within the organization he has until now held together
with iron discipline. Worse, he has not been able to stamp
it out with the ruthlessness that has become his hallmark,
according to Indian intelligence assessments.
In the span oI a single year, Pirabhakaran has lost three
oI his closest lieutenants. Kittu, the party`s spokesman,
was killed on January 16 last year, when the LTTE ship
MJ Ahat was overpowered by the Indian Coast Guard.
An upset Pirabhakaran accused his two deputies,
Mahatya and Yogi Yogaratnam, oI leaking inIormation to
Indian intelligence agencies. He had them arrested,
interrogated and was all set to have Mahathya eliminated
when he suddenly decided to backtrack. His Iollowers
say it was a tactical move. His detractors insist it was a
growing awareness oI Mahathya`s power.
In some ways, the LTTE chieI knew Irom the beginning
that Mahatya would be a tough nut to crack. It was he
that Mahatya would be a tough nut to crack. It was he
who had led the operations against the IPKF as the
regional commander oI Vanni` - an area that comprised
the volatile districts oI Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and
Kilinochchi. It was he who had headed the People`s
Front oI Liberation Tigers, the party`s political Iront. And
it was aIter Ialling out with him that Kittu Iound himselI
exiled to Europe. Mahatya was also the only man within
the LTTE who had the stature to disagree with
Pirabhakaran.
In 1989-90, during negotiations with the Sri Lankan
Government, Mahathya Iavoured a political solution to
the Tamil problem against Pirabhakaran`s conviction that
only military might could win Eelam Ior them. The
diIIerences simmered Iurther aIter the disastrous battle at
Elephant Pass. Pirabhakaran blamed Mahathya Ior
converting a certain victory into a crushing deIeat. In
May 1992, he divested his deputy oI all his posts and
things have been going wrong Ior the LTTE ever since.
Pirabhakaran`s own hide-out near JaIIna hospital was
bombed in November 1992. His current Iavourite, the
LTTE intelligence chieI Pottu Aman, was attacked and
his body guard killed on January 7, 1993. And on January
16, Kittu was drawn into a trap. Pirabhakaran saw
Mahatya`s hand behind all this. Mahathya`s old Iriend
Manickavasagar, known as the Engineer, was picked up
and grilled by Pottu Aman. On the basis oI his
conIessions`, Mahathya, along with 120 supporters, was
arrested on August 2, 1993. An LTTE court tried one oI
its most illustrious members. Its verdict, delivered on
December 19 last year, was that Mahathya was guilty oI
not only luring Kittu to his death, but also oI conspiring to
kill Pirabhakaran and oI being a RAW agent. Mahathya`s
execution was set Ior January 16, the same date as
Kittu`s death anniversary.
For once, the rest oI the LTTE did not Iall in line with
the Chakravarty`s command. Mahathya`s supporters
attacked their own camp at Chavakachcheri on January
6. On January 16, there were protest demonstrations in
JaIIna while the LTTE`s oIIice in Paris was torched.
Maybe people are unhappy, but Pirabhakaran has never
bothered about public opinion,` says a Sri Lankan
intelligence man, who Ieels the man is still in control, in
spite oI the sniping by Mahathya`s group.
spite oI the sniping by Mahathya`s group.
An LTTE member Irom Sri Lanka says that Mahathya
has been so badly tortured that he has become a
nadaipinam (walking dead) and is no longer in a position
to challenge Pirabhakaran. By keeping him alive, he says,
the LTTE chieI gives the appearance oI being reasonable.
Mahathya`s Iollowers, however, see this as a move to
check the inIighting that has now become rampant.
Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government has announced
civic elections in the Eastern Province early in March.
For Pirabhakaran, who had ensured the cessation oI all
political activity in his domain Ior the past Iour years,
even a moderate turnout would be a major disaster. The
Sri Lankans think he will weather the storm while Indian
intelligence agencies are convinced he is Iacing his
toughest test yet. But iI Mahathya was indeed a RAW
asset, there might be more to the Mahathya mystery.
Mahathya - a mole of RAW
The last two sentences in this India Todav report somewhat
intrigued me when I read this Ior the Iirst time. How come
Indian intelligence agencies were 'convinced that
Pirabhakaran was 'Iacing his toughest test yet, unless they
were pulling the strings and praying to the God, that
Pirabhakaran would be clipped by their designs. And now, we
know who ate crow in this sordid episode. Also, the Iirst part
oI last sentence, 'But iI Mahathya was indeed a RAW asset
had lot to hide than reveal about RAW`s treacherous attempt
to trip Pirabhakaran. Initially, I was unconvinced that
Mahathya could have been a traitor to the LTTE. But the
accusation that Mahathya had become a mole oI Indian
intelligence agency gained credence, when he was leIt out in
the charge sheet released by the India`s law enIorcement
oIIicials in May 1992, Ior the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial.
One should note that Mahathya served as the nominal number
2 oI LTTE during Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination in 1992, beIore
the riIt between Pirabhakaran and him came into open.
Also, by Iitting the inIormation planted by the Indian spies in
the now-discredited 1989 news item in the Hindu newspaper
(presented above) with the hints provided in the 1994 India
Todav Ieature, No Longer Supreme`, I came to inIer that
Pirabhakaran should be given the beneIit oI doubt in how he
handled the Mahathya aIIair.
For inIormation, I provide below, a letter I wrote on the
Mahathya aIIair, which was published in the Lanka Guardian
(April 1, 1994), edited by Mervyn de Silva. In this letter I had
analyzed the riIts between No.1 and No.2 oI other political
organizations, to provide a perspective on what Pirabhakaran
Iaced. It was entitled, 'Rule rather than Exception.
'The riIt between V.Prabhakaran and G.Mahendrarajah
(Mahathaya) oI the LTTE Iollows a predictable pattern,
any political (or Ior that matter, hierarchical) organization
would Iace with time. A cursory glance at the Sri Lankan
political history reveals that Iallout had occurred between
the leader and deputy leader oI every party and this
phenomenon is almost a rule rather than an exception.
The SLFP was Iormed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in
1951, when he Ielt that he was not given respect at No.2
in the UNP oI D.S. Senanayake, who was grooming his
son Dudley Senanayake Ior the throne`. The riIt
between the leader Dudley Senanayake and his then
nominal No.2, J.R. Jayewardene came out in the open
aIter the electoral deIeat oI UNP in 1970. In the SLFP
too, aIter Sirimavo Bandaranaike`s elevation to the No.1
position in 1960, the then senior leader oI the SLFP, C.P.
de Silva (aIter being dumped to the No.2 position) Ielt
that he had been insulted and he leIt the SLFP in 1964,
making Sirimavo snort the act as a stab in the back`.
Later, the newly promoted No.2 in the SLFP,
Maithiripala Senanayake, also Iell out with Sirimavo
Bandaranaike in the 1980s. For want oI space, I omit
examples Irom the traditional and neo`-LeIt parties,
where the nominal No.2 had parted company with the
leader at the drop oI a hat.
Among the Tamil political parties, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam
(then No.2 to G.G. Ponnambalam) leIt the Tamil
Congress in 1949 to Iorm the Federal Party. G.G.
Ponnambalam`s son, Kumar Ponnambalam also had to
cross swords with Motilal Nehru (the purported No.2) in
the ghost oI a Tamil Congress, whose membership may
not exceed hundred. Within the TULF (basically, the
Federal Party, which was renamed), in the post-
Chelvanayakam period, the relationship between the then
Chelvanayakam period, the relationship between the then
leader Amirthalingam and his nominal No.2 in the ranks
oI seniority (C. Rajadurai and V.N. Navaratnam) were
not cordial at best. As a result, Rajadurai leIt the TULF
to join UNP, and V.N. Navaratnam retired Irom active
politics aIter 1983. In the Ceylon Workers Congress,
veteran leader S. Thondaman is now having a headache
with his nominal No.2 M. Sellasamy. In 1960,
Thondaman had to oust Azeez, who was causing trouble
to him as then No.2 in the CWC.
The riIt between the No.1 and No.2 oI a political
organization is not peculiar to Sri Lanka. Every strong
leader (in the democratic USA and India as well as the
undemocratic` Russia and China) had to Iace this wall`
in his or her liIetime. Abraham Lincoln had two vice
presidents in his short tenure oI 5-year presidency period.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his 14-year period as the
American president, had three vice presidents. In the
Indian national scene, Indira Gandhi and later Morarji
Desai (who was Indira`s nominal No.2, beIore being
pushed out) as well as V.P. Singh, had to constantly look
over their shoulders to assure that their thrones` were
not toppled. While Indira succeeded, Morarji Desai and
V.P. Singh succumbed. China`s revolutionary leader Mao
Ze Dong had to tackle his No.2, Lin Piao, in a not so
comIortable manner` to assure his position.
In sum, Pirabhakaran had to survive Irom the crisis
precipitated by India`s intelligence agencies, and it is not an
exaggeration to inIer that he borrowed a page Irom guerrilla
leader Mao successIully, though unappetizing it had to be to
him, to his movement and to Eelam Tamils in general. His
decision was an unavoidable one and hard to swallow; but this
comes within the parish oI leadership (Mao and Castro are
among others who were in Pirabhakaran`s situation beIore) to
which he had elevated himselI. |Continued|
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart1.htm 1+f1+

Part 2
Sachi Sri Kantha
9 May 2001
What is Leadership?
"...Every age develops leaders that bespeak its fears, its longings, its creative
urges. Established culture values represent in a peculiar way the groundwork
of leadership... A simple example of (Pirabakaran's) innate intelligence was
his choice of 1iger as the symbol of his rebel group. What an astounding
choice, which reverberates with 1amil culture, militarism and glory!.."

Emory Borgadus (1882-1973) was an eminent American
sociologist, who has been eponymized by the Bogardus social
distance scale` he devised in the 1920s-1930s. In 1929, he also
published a research paper entitled, Leadership and Attitudes`
in the journal, Sociology and Social Research (March-April
1929, vol.13, no.4, pp.377-381). To comprehend the
Pirabhakaran phenomenon, it is pertinent to scan this paper by
Bogardus, on how he deIined and categorized leadership in
human endeavors. Thus, Iirst I provide excerpts oI this classic
paper by Bogardus.
What is Leadership?
Bogardus began his essay by stating,
'Leadership is the special inIluence that one person
exercises over other persons. |A leader is a person (1)
who surpasses his Iellows in achieving in some particular
plane oI activity, and (2) whose achievement is
recognized by his Iellows as being superior.| It is
maniIested when one human being arouses the dormant
attitudes oI other persons, changes the attitudes oI others,
or arouses new attitudes in others. In each oI these type-
situations, the other persons` are as important Iactors as
the leader, and the process by which one person succeeds
in aIIecting the attitudes oI others is most important oI all.
In other words, there is always a social situation matrix
wherein a leader and leadership operate. It is within this
organic social unity that we must look iI we would
discern the meaning oI leadership.
03f02f2009 The Pirabakaran Phenomenon Part 2
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart2.htm 1f8
discern the meaning oI leadership.
Then, Bogardus proceeded to categorize the leaders into three
types.
'II the leader is one who arouses, changes, or creates
new attitudes in the lives oI other persons, then the study
oI leadership must deal with the attitudes oI these other
persons`. In Iact they become one oI the chieI sources oI
leadership. The natural history oI all these attitudes and
oI the antecedent experiences which account Ior them is
needed. These attitudes, experiences, and liIe
organizations, and how they have been aroused, changed,
or created anew, tend to become the main objects Ior
leadership study, as much as the leader himselI. They are
what the leader himselI usually studies.
It is oIten the potential Iollowers who inIluence the
leaders as much as the leader inIluences the Iollowers. It
was Simmel who was one oI the Iirst to point out how
the leader is subservient to the Iollowers, how the
Iollowers may walk out` on their leader, how they may
reIuse to respond or to be led, how they may choose
imprisonment rather than obey the orders oI some
autocratic leader, and how the leader Iears any negative
or antagonistic responses that will lower his own status.
The well-established and relatively permanent behavior
patterns, the urge Ior status, and the innumerable
attitudes oI the potential Iollowers, are all dynamic and
powerIul Iorces that any would-be leader must treat
respectIully. None oI these may be wantonly violated.
|Type 1 Leader| To arouse the dormant attitudes oI
one`s Iellows and become a leader is relatively easy. By
being enthusiastic along traditional lines oI activity, by
ballyhooing, by raising the cry oI danger`, and by the use
oI other cheap devices, a member oI a group may shoot
up into the rank oI leader without much diIIiculty.
|Type 2 Leader| To change human attitudes requires
greater skill. The use oI indirect suggestion, the setting oI
new, appropriate, and attractive examples, the creation oI
a pleasing atmosphere Iavorable to the desired change,
the changing oI the Iollowers` environmental conditions in
ways to arouse pleasant Ieelings regarding the proposed
changes - these are some oI the techniques that create
leadership oI a higher order than is represented by the
standpatter or ballyhoo type oI leader.
|Type 3 Leader| To arouse entirely new attitudes and a
new creative type oI Iollowers is the supreme height oI
leadership. To arouse unsuspected possibilities and
originalities in other persons makes Ior the greatest
leadership. The techniques are oIten those oI the superior
teacher, case-worker, parent, who challenge and give
heavy responsibilities, who set Iorth unique opportunities,
who make the impossible seem possible, who by deed or
word arouse their Iollowers to superhuman eIIort.
It may be noted here that the three types oI leadership
discussed in the preceding paragraphs represent an
ascending scale oI diIIiculty but a descending scale oI
recognition.
Then, Bogardus concluded his essay with the Iollowing
paragraph.
'Every age develops leaders that bespeak its Iears, its
longings, its creative urges. Established culture values
represent in a peculiar way the groundwork oI leadership.
Social momentum or social stagnation are equally
important desiderata. As a social process, leadership is
that social inter stimulation which causes a number oI
people to set out toward an old goal with new zest or a
new goal with hopeIul courage, - with diIIerent persons
keeping indiIIerent paces. The Ioremost is the leader, but
without the others he never would have started, or having
started he would not be a leader. Without the antecedent
as well as the ever-continuing inter stimulation, there
would be no leadership. The interplay oI attitudes is the
dynamic heart oI leadership.
WonderIul thoughts on leadership, by a reputed sociologist.
When I read the above seven sentences repeatedly, written in
1929, I Ielt these sentences explained succinctly how the
political leadership oI Eelam Tamils passed hands since 1944
Irom Ponnambalam (1944-55) to Chelvanayakam (1956-77) to
Amirthalingam (1977-83) to Pirabhakaran (1983-to date).
Now, where can one place Pirabhakaran in the Bogardus rating
oI leadership scale? I present my case as Iollows:
In the past two centuries, among Tamils in India, Eelam,
Malaysia, Singapore and elsewhere, there have been thousands
who raised capital, and worked that capital to Iinancial
Iortunes. They belong to the Type 1 leaders oI Bogardus
category - 'those enthusiastic along traditional lines oI
activity.
Then, Type 2 leaders oI Bogardus category are those handIul
oI Tamils who raised a political party and led that party to
success. C.N. Annadurai and M.G. Ramachandran in India are
two leaders. Rajaji raised his Swatantra Party in 1959, but it
couldn`t produce success. Kamarajar or Karunanidhi or
Jayalalitha cannot claim that they raised` a political party;
rather, they inherited the parties they led, Irom their Iounders.
E.V. Ramasamy Naicker (Periyar) qualiIies partially in this
category, as a Iounder-leader oI the Dravida Kazhagam - a
new, selI-respect, social movement (which he reIrained Irom
transIorming into a political party) Ior Tamils. In Eelam, G.G.
Ponnambalam, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and S. Thondaman are
the three leaders who qualiIy in this category. Amirthalingam
and Kumar Ponnambalam do not qualiIy, since they inherited
the parties they led, Irom their Iounders. These Type 2
leaders, according to Bogardus, were successIul in 'the
changing oI the Iollowers` environmental conditions in ways to
arouse pleasant Ieelings regarding the proposed changes.
Then, in a class oI their own, are the Type 3 leaders. Only
Pirabhakaran among the Tamils oI the past two centuries can
claim that he raised an army and led his Iollowers to success.
His equals in India were only Mahatma Gandhi and Subhas
Chandra Bose. While Gandhi was a successIul leader oI his
non-violent army, Bose`s army, tagged as Indian National
Army (INA), couldn`t produce success. In the words oI
Bogardus, the achievement oI Type 3 leaders is 'to arouse
entirely new attitudes and a new creative type oI
Iollowers...who challenge and give heavy responsibilities, who
set Iorth unique opportunities, who make the impossible seem
possible, who by deed or word arouse their Iollowers to
superhuman eIIort. In this Type 3 category, Pirabhakaran is
in the league with Mao Ze Dong and Fidel Castro. His
interview to the Time magazine in 1990, presented in part 1 oI
this essay, shows how he qualiIies Ior the criterion oI Type 3
leadership, as categorized by Bogardus. OI course,
Pirabhakaran is criticised Ior many oI his actions by some
Tamils and non-Tamils. The Tamil proverb, Kaavaa
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart2.htm +f8
marathukku kal eri vi:huma? |Does the barren tree gets
bombarded with stones?| may explain partly why he is the
target oI criticism.

Intelligent and semi-literate`
One oI the wisecracks used to ridicule Pirabhakaran, repeated
ad-nauseam in the partisan press in Sri Lanka, is that he is a
semi-literate`; thus, incapable oI leadership. Literacy is a
much misused and misunderstood word. Many equate the
meaning oI literate` to intelligent`, which in reality is as
diIIerent Irom chalk and cheese. Let me explain the diIIerence.
The dictionary deIines the word literate` as 1. able to read and
write. 2. educated, cultured. (derived Irom the Latin root,
litteratus littera letter). The same dictionary deIines the
word intelligent` as 1. having an active, able mind; acute. 2.
marked or characterized by intelligence. 3. endowed with
intellect or understanding; reasoning. (derived Irom the Latin
root intelligere to understand).
Literate people need not be intelligent. Similarly, intelligent
people need not be literate. I will mention some well-known
examples. Henry Kissinger and Bill Clinton are more literate
than Muhammad Ali, but Ali is more intelligent than either
Kissinger or Clinton. One`s literacy doesn`t provide any
immunity Ior Ioul-ups in leadership. Kissinger`s or Clinton`s
problems in leadership attest to this. Compared to these two,
Muhammad Ali was able to project a successIul leadership in
sports and social activism due to his innate intelligence. In the
Indian subcontinent, Subramanian Swamy is literate but not
intelligent. Contrastingly, Kamarajar and MGR were more
intelligent than Swamy. Thus, it is more or less a rule that to
become a successIul leader and hold the aIIection oI his or her
Iollowers, one need to be intelligent rather than being literate
only.
Among the Tamils living now, there are tens oI thousands who
are more literate than Pirabhakaran. For instance, Lakshman
Kadirgamar |who is laughably posturing as a leader oI Eelam
Tamils Ior the past six years| is literate, but not intelligent. So,
he is devoid oI any Iollowers. But, as viewed Irom the criteria
set by Bogardus Ior leadership, Pirabhakaran qualiIies more
ably than the hundreds oI literate Tamils, because he is more
intelligent than others. A simple example oI his innate
intelligent than others. A simple example oI his innate
intelligence was his choice oI Tiger as the symbol oI his rebel
group. What an astounding choice, which reverberates with
Tamil culture, militarism and glory!
I reproduce excerpts oI my 1996 letter, which appeared in the
Asiaweek magazine, to buttress this point. This was written in
response to a critical Ieature by Anthony Davis, entitled,
Tigers Inc.`, which appeared as the cover story in the same
magazine oI July 26, 1996.
'Within the limits oI not antagonizing the political and
military-intelligence establishments in India, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka, Anthony Davis has done a good proIile oI
Tamil guerrilla leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Prabhakaran is not an angel. But he is not a devil either,
as projected by the Sri Lankan political establishment Ior
the past 13 years. Davis insults the intelligence oI the
majority oI the Tamil diaspora with the claim that
Prabhakaran can extort money Irom them at whim. He
remains their hope against the duplicity oI the Indian
Intelligence Service (RAW), who used the Sri Lankan
Tamil issue to advance Indian expansionism.
Those who have read the history oI the liberation
struggles in the US, China, Israel and Palestine can grasp
that Prabhakaran`s proIile as presented doesn`t diIIer
much Irom those oI George Washington, Mao Zedong,
Menachem Begin and Yassir AraIat. And don`t Iorget
that designated terrorists` like Begin, Nelson Mandela
and AraIat could metamorphose into statesmen` and
even receive the Nobel Peace Prize.
Davis`s source, Rohan Gunaratna, has Iigured out that
the Tigers may be harvesting revenues worth nearly $24
million per annum. But this Iigure is 1/25 oI the current
Sri Lankan annual deIense expenditure oI nearly $600
million. Prabhakaran may be deIicient in university
education, but he surely has heeded one oI Albert
Einstein`s maxims: Organized power can be opposed
only by organized power`. II you count the number oI Sri
Lankan service chieIs who have tried to outsmart
Prabhakaran since 1983, one can only marvel at his
skill.... |Asiaweek, Aug.16, 1996|
Formula for success
With aIIluence, contacts and luck, one can enter the portals oI
OxIord or Harvard universities to become literate. But that
does not assure attainment oI intelligence. On the contrary, one
can achieve intelligence and the acclaim as a genius, by proper
blessing oI genes as well as by hard work and use oI common
sense. This is what Thomas Edison prescribed.
'When I want to discover something, I begin by reading
up everything that has been done along that line in the
past - that`s what all the books in the library are Ior. I see
what has been accomplished at great labor and expense in
the past. I gather the data oI many thousands oI
experiments as a starting point and then I make thousands
more. The three essentials to achieve anything
worthwhile are, Iirst, hard work; second, stick-to-it-
iveness; third, common sense.
Though he has not entered any university in a nominal sense,
those who had met Pirabhakaran have recorded that he is well
read`. The diIIerence between Pirabhakaran and his
competitors Ior Eelam Tamil leadership (including the TULF)
lies in these three criteria presented by Edison.
The TULF leaders and other rebel groups (TELO, PLOTE,
EPRLF and later EPDP) all had liberation oI Eelam` as their
prime motto in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because they
lacked common sense to a higher degree, they allowed
themselves to be manipulatable puppets oI the Indian
Intelligence-wallahs. Also, due to lack oI intelligence, they
came to IorIeit the much-vaunted stick-to-it-iveness` attitude
which Pirabhakaran showed in abundance.
Pirabhakaran also endeared himselI to his Iollowers, by the
third ingredient in Edison`s Iormula Ior success - hard work.
As is evident Ior anyone, hard work` cannot be purchased like
military hardware in global arms bazaar or granted like a
degree certiIicate by any university Iollowing payment oI
tuition Iees and completing the course work.
Like Edison, Pirabhakaran was (and still is) an innovator par
excellence, as one could see Irom the battles he had Iought so
Iar. Like Mao, he also has grasped the skill oI when to retreat
and when to attack Ior maximum gain. He has been a thinker
and tinkerer in military tactics. Raising an army Irom zero
point and continuing to maul his opponent who outspends his
outIit by 25 to 40-Iold, demands intelligence oI exceptional
caliber. Pirabhakaran`s adversaries may boast oI training Irom
Sandhurst (UK), West Point (USA), India, Pakistan, Malaysia
and Israel. But one should marvel at how he is adopting to
changing circumstances by using adventurous plans. 'No plan
survives the Iirst Iive minutes encounter with the enemy is a
well-known military dictum oI Prussian Iield marshal Helmuth
von Moltke (1800-1891). But the success rate oI
Pirabhakaran`s plans are higher than his adversaries. Like great
military minds, he also possesses the ability to learn Irom mis-
steps and deIeats. |Continued|.

The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
Part 3
Sachi Sri Kantha
|23 May 2001|
Learning from Mistakes
II there is one attribute which consistently has helped
Pirabhakaran in his climb to success, one can say that he
possesses the sixth sense in learning Irom the mistakes oI selI
and rivals, so as to switch them into beneIits Ior his group.
Legendary chess champions and other great sportsmen like
Muhammad Ali and Michael Jordan were blessed with this
skill. There is no disagreement that during the past two
decades, Pirabhakaran has made a Iew mistakes. He himselI
has acknowledged openly to a couple oI these. BeIore I
present Pirabhakaran`s acknowledged mistake, I wish to share
some general thoughts on mistakes.
No sane human can brag that he or she is immune Irom
mistake in his or her liIe. This is particularly true Ior leaders. A
true military leader learns Irom his mistakes beIore it becomes
costlier in terms oI lives and limbs. This learning Irom the
mistake is what contributes to the resilience and what makes or
breaks a leader`s hold on his Iollowers. On mistakes and
leadership, the thoughts oI Isoroku Yamamoto, the legendary
Admiral who led Japan to her early military successes in the
Second World War, is worth to ponder.
'A man oI real purpose puts his Iaith in himselI always.
Sometimes he reIuses even to put his Iaith in the gods. So
Irom time to time he Ialls into error. This was oIten true
oI Lincoln. But that doesn`t detract Irom his greatness. A
man isn`t a god. Committing errors is part oI his
attraction as a human being; it inspires a Ieeling oI
warmth toward him, and so admiration and devotion are
aroused. In this sense, Lincoln was a very human man.
Without this quality, one can`t lead others. Only iI people
have this quality can they Iorgive each other`s mistakes
and help each other.
|H.Agawa - The Reluctant Admiral. Yamamoto and the
Imperial Navv,
Imperial Navv,
Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1990 printing, p.85|
As an aside, I note that my academic lineage tangentially links
to Admiral Yamamoto, via ProIessor Osamu Hayaishi, who
was my mentor at the Osaka Bioscience Institute. ProIessor
Hayaishi (now 81, and still active) is one oI the eminent,
internationally recognized biochemists oI our times. AIter
graduating Irom the Osaka University School oI Medicine in
1942, he served as a rookie medical oIIicer in the Japanese
Navy Ior three years. During the Iour years I was a member oI
his research group, I always appreciated his inquisitiveness in
Iinding something to learn Irom the mistakes made in
experiments. He Ielt more happy when we reported the
mistakes we made in experiments, than when we reported
good results`. Little by little, I also grasped the value oI
learning Irom mistakes and I have a Ieel that Admiral
Yamamoto`s thoughts on mistakes and leadership were passed
to me by ProIessor Hayaishi. II one accepts the wisdom, To
err is human`, then success is blessed Ior those who learn Irom
their mistakes, by recognizing their mistakes Iirst. Politicians
are the last breed everywhere to acknowledge their mistakes
and Sri Lankan politicians are no exceptions. Has Chandrika
Kumaratunga ever acknowledged until now that her 1994
election pledge to abolish the executive presidency was a
mistake?
At least three causes can be attributed to any mistake; namely,
inexperience, incompetence and vanity. Also, selI protection
(or in the case oI a leader, protection oI his group Irom
adversaries) can be a Iourth vital cause Ior mistakes. Children
and teenages make mistake mainly due to inexperience. That`s
why they receive guidance Irom elders (parents and teachers)
in the society. Adults make mistake mainly due to
incompetence and vanity.
A leader whose mistakes result Irom vanity can be expected to
lose his or her leadership status sooner than later.
Amirthalingam`s tactical mistakes between 1977 and 1983 in
his deals with the then ruling UNP, as well as India`s
Intelligence-wallahs, propelled the next generation oI Eelam
Tamils into the leadership stakes. Here is an example oI how
Pirabhakaran gained Irom the mistakes oI his rivals (Uma
Maheswaran and Sri Sabaratnam) Ior the Eelam leadership in
mid 1980s, while living in Madras. This was in relation to the
mid 1980s, while living in Madras. This was in relation to the
bond he came to develop with MGR, who was then the
popular and powerIul ChieI Minister oI Tamil Nadu. The
Iollowing excerpt is Irom Narayan Swamy`s book, Tigers of
Lanka.
'...Nobody could surmise what their relationship was like.
It was some chemistry`, said Panrutti S.Ramachandran,
MGR`s hatchet man on Sri Lanka. And the relationship
lasted almost until MGR`s death in December 1987, even
aIter the IPKF cracked down on the LTTE. Others in
Madras thought MGR saw in Prabhakaran the replica oI
the big screen hero that he himselI was, Iighting Ior a just
cause. But there were two other Iactors to the MGR-
Prabhakaran bonhomie. And they had to do with TELO
supremo Sri Sabarattinam and PLOT`s Uma.
'Sri, in contrast to Prabhakaran, moved close to
Karunanidhi, hailing him and privately rebuking MGR.
His belieI that TELO was New Delhi`s Iavourite and so
could get away with murder possibly led him to commit
this political sacrilege. It was also at Sri`s initiative that
he, Pathmanabha and Balakumar called on Karunanidhi
aIter the Iormation oI the ENLF in April 1984.
'Uma, on the other hand, began as a MGR Iavourite.
They were so close at one point aIter the 1983 riots that
MGR would publicly put his arms over Uma`s shoulders
while talking to him, as iI they were long lost chums. But
Uma Iell out because oI his close links with
S.D.Somasundaram, an AIADMK leader who by the
middle oI 1984 had rebelled against MGR. Uma
disregarded advice Irom colleagues that he should avoid
getting involved in Tamil Nadu politics and maintain a
distance Irom Karunanidhi. Uma`s aversion to Mohan
Das, the police oIIicer, also proved to be his undoing.
The Tamil Nadu police naturally turned against Uma.
The eclipse oI Sabarattinam and Uma eventually helped
Prabhakaran to become MGR`s Iavourite.
|M.R.Narayan Swamy - Tigers of Lanka, 2nd edition,
1996, pp.129-130|
One can inIer a couple oI salient Iacts. In mid-1980s,
Pirabhakaran was on par with Uma Maheswaran and Sri
Sabaratnam Ior the leadership contest among Tamil rebels.
The make or break point` came Irom how each oI these three
aspirants Ior Eelam leadership projected their personalities to
aspirants Ior Eelam leadership projected their personalities to
MGR. The mistakes made by Uma Maheswaran and Sri
Sabaratnam were that they were hastily tilting towards
S.D.Somasundaram (then a senior leader oI AIADMK who
was becoming a thorn to MGR) and Karunanidhi respectively.
In 1984, MGR suIIered a serious, debilitating stroke, and in
hindsight one can note that Uma Maheswaran and Sri
Sabaratnam were Iraming their plans Ior the post-MGR
scenario. Opposingly, Pirabhakaran was more closer in MGR`s
orbit. Luck and providence made MGR to live Ior another
three years, while holding the rank oI the chieI ministership,
which permitted growth and sustenance Ior LTTE. Thus,
incompetence resulting Irom lack oI intelligence (as proved by
their servile reliance on India`s Intelligence-wallahs) and vanity
cost much to Uma Maheswaran and Sri Sabaratnam, and they
lost the battle oI Eelam leadership to Pirabhakaran. Now, to
Pirabhakaran`s acknowledged mistake - the 1991 Battle oI
Elephant Pass.
1991 Battle of Elephant Pass
The seeds Ior the success oI capturing the Elephant Pass by
LTTE in 2000 were sown in the 1991 Battle oI Elephant Pass.
For record, I reproduce the Time magazine`s report |Sept.16,
1991|, written by Edward Desmond.
'Elephant Pass may one day be remembered as the key
battle in the long-running war oI the Tamil Tigers to gain
an independent homeland in Sri Lanka. But Ior which
side? AIter 24 days oI Iighting, last July, government
troops carried the day, but the Tigers` deIeat only
hardened support among the island`s Tamils Ior the
Ianatical guerrilla Iighters who reIuse to give up the
struggle. II nothing else, the battle oI Elephant Pass
marked a new level oI Iury in a war that has already
claimed 18,000 lives and is likely to take many more.
'For eight years the Tigers had kept the armies oI Sri
Lanka - and, between 1987 and 1990, India - at bay with
the classic guerrilla tactics oI ambush and evasion. Two
months ago, they tried something new: a conventional
assault on a well-entrenched army oI detachment at the
head oI Elephant Pass, a narrow 2-km stretch oI dunes
and marsh that connects the Sri Lankan mainland to the
JaIIna Peninsula, a Tiger homeland. The guerrillas
intended to overrun the base and regain control oI the
causeway, a decision that gave the army a rare
causeway, a decision that gave the army a rare
opportunity to Iight the elusive Tigers in the open, where
its artillery and attack helicopters could be better used.
'The battle lasted more than three weeks. Despite
months oI preparation, the Tigers Iailed to capture the
army base. In the end they withdrew; at least 564 oI
them had died. Nearly 200 government troops were also
killed, but the army had won its Iirtst large-scale
engagement with the Tigers. Senior oIIicers assumed the
setback had thrown the Tigers oII-balance and rushed to
Iollow up on their advantage.
'Last week the army launched an oIIensive oI its own,
Operation Lightning Strike, aimed at taking the Tiger`s
largest stronghold, deep in the Mullaitivu jungle oI
northern Sri Lanka. According to army sources, 13
soldiers and more than 200 Tigers, including three area
leaders, were killed in the skirmishes. Says Major General
Denzil Kobbekaduwa, who heads the Iield operations
against the Tigers: Nothing is going to stop us now. Our
mission is to seek them out, kill as many as possible and
destroy their Iighting capability`. Such conIidence looks
premature given the Tigers` history oI quick recovery
Irom setbacks and the broad backing they enjoy among
Sri Lanka`s 2.4 million Tamils...
'But even iI Tamil morale remains strong, the military
position oI the Tigers has weakened considerably. Their
8,000-strong Iighting Iorce lost almost one-tenth oI its
manpower at Elephant Pass. Worse, their underground
supply network in Tamil Nadu, the Indian state across
Palk Strait, is being destroyed by Indian security Iorces
searching Ior the assassins oI Iormer Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi...
'The Tigers prepared meticulously Ior the assault on
Elephant Pass. For nearly a year, under cover oI
darkness, they dug trenches leading up to the barbed
wire-encircled compound. They dotted the surrounding
landscape with bunkers built oI railroad ties and sandbags
to shield themselves against artillery Iire, even set up
some Iake outposts complete with uniIormed dummies.
Facing the Iormidable challenge oI crossing the open
terrain, the guerrillas turned bulldozers and tractors into
armored cars by covering them with steel plates. They
deployed antiaircraIt guns, mortars and a homemade
deployed antiaircraIt guns, mortars and a homemade
rocket system that could hurl a 50-kg device 1,000m.
'By May the government Iorces were certain that an
attack was coming and doubled the garrison`s strength to
1,000 men. When the assault began on July 10, nearly
3,000 Tiger Iighters, including 500 women, surged
through the trenches, Iiring their AK-47s and rocket-
propelled grenades at the base; though outgunned, the
besieged soldiers Iought back. Heavy Tiger antiaircraIt
Iire prevented helicopters Irom landing in the camp to
drop supplies and take away the wounded; a sergeant
major turned surgeon, amputing the limbs oI injured
troopers by Iollowing radioed instructions.
'The garrison was losing ground when the government
made a daring decision. Naval units landed 8,000 Iresh
troops on a beachhead 10 km Irom the base. Under Iire
Irom the moment it hit the beach, the relieI column
sometimes covered less than 500m a day as the Tigers
tried desperately to stop it by mounting headlong charges.
It was amazing how they came at us in waves`, recalls
Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne, an oIIicer with the
amphibious Iorce. AIter 24 days the relieI troops reached
the camp and broke the siege.
|Time magazine, Sept.16, 1991|
Pirabhakaran's acknowledgment of a mistake
'Vilupillai Prabhakaran, the leader oI the Tigers, told TIME
that his assault Iailed because his Iorces could not move Iood
and ammunition to the Iront owing to heavy straIing by
helicopter gunships and Iixed-wing planes. The Tigers`
armored bulldozers proved too slow or bogged down in the
sand. Key commanders were lost early on. Prabhakaran
admitted he Iailed to anticipate the amphibious landing but
claimed that the Tigers had won a moral victory. We have
shown the world that we have evolved Irom a guerrilla Iorce to
one that can Iight a conventional war with a modern army`, he
said. We learned the logistical problems oI conventional war.
Now we can Iight Iuture battles better.` |ibid|
Backbones supporting the Leadership
Previously I had presented |The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon,
Part 2| the view oI Emory Bogardus emphasizing the
importance oI Iollowers in strengthening the leadership. How
the Iollowers react to a mistake by the leader also can topple a
the Iollowers react to a mistake by the leader also can topple a
weak leader. But Pirabhakaran`s strength lies in moulding
strong Iollowers in his group. The lack oI success in the 1991
Battle oI Elephant Pass did not deIlate Pirabhakaran`s
Iollowers. According to the same Time magazine`s report,
'In JaIIna last week, the guerrillas appeared unaIIected
by the setback. In a hospital ward where 60 young
women lay recuperating Irom wounds, the atmosphere
was cheerIul. Said Sumathi, 16, who lost her right leg in
battle: All I want is to get an artiIicial leg so that I can get
back to the Iield. II I stay home, how will we get Eelam
|the independent Tamil homeland|?...Says Varadan, 16, a
guerrilla recruit: It is better to die Iighting than wait in the
village to be picked up and tortured to death.` |ibid|
Edward Desmond closed his report with a pithy sentence,
'The Sri Lankan army may have the momentum, but the war
is Iar Irom over. In a couple oI months, ten years will lapse
since this line was written. But the battles which Iollowed the
1991 Battle oI Elephant Pass proved that Pirabhakaran learnt
Irom his mistakes. This is no mean achievement.
Lessons from the Power of Silence
Mahatma Gandhi was a master in using silence as an eIIective
weapon in his Ireedom campaign against the British
imperialism. Not many have realized why Gandhi began his
vow oI silence`. A study oI Dalal`s reIerence work, Gandhi
1915-1948, a detailed chronologv (Gandhi Peace Foundation,
New Delhi, 1971) provides some clues. In page 36, Dalal
notes, under the date 1921 Feb.7,
'Probably Irom this day MKG |reIerring to Gandhi by
initials| began to observe Monday as silence day, with
three exceptions: (a) when he was in mortal danger, and
speaking would render aid, (b) when somebody else was
in danger and speaking would render aid, and (c) when
Viceroy or similar dignitary called speaking was
necessary. Silence usually started at 3:00 pm on Sunday
and lasted Ior 24 hours; but time could be altered to suit
needs.
The latter halI oI the last sentence is thought-provoking; 'time
could be altered to suit needs. It is not wrong to inIer that
Gandhi developed this new method to prevent leaks oI his
plans to his adversaries via the blabber mouths surrounding
plans to his adversaries via the blabber mouths surrounding
him. He was shrewd enough to realize that British rulers were
trying to outsmart him by planting spies in various garbs. When
one studies the speciIic dates in Dalal`s chronology oI
Gandhi`s activities, one can trace a trend that whenever
Gandhi was scheduled Ior campaigns or Ior some discussions
with his lieutenants like Nehru or Ior negotiations with his
adversaries, he had observed his vow oI silence`. OI course,
he duped the gullible media-vultures by telling some eccentric
reasons Ior his vow oI silence`. Developing this wall oI
impenetrability` by a simple but eloquent method was Gandhi`s
style oI tackling the intelligence arm` oI his adversaries.
I believe that, Pirabhakaran also had grasped the signiIicance
oI Gandhi`s vow oI silence` in building up his army. He rarely
makes himselI accessbile to media-vultures and gossip
mongers. This is another variant which distinguished him Irom
the leadership oI Amirthalingam. The TULF leader lost his
credibility by opening his mouth` to literally everyone (UNP
leadership, SLFP leadership, ever-present western diplomats`
in Colombo some oI whom were operatives oI the Intelligence
Agencies, media-vultures in India and Sri Lanka, RAW and
other Intelligence-wallahs oI India) thereby compromising the
cards he held in the roulette game oI politics. Amirthalingam
would have thought that by talking, he was carrying out
eIIective propaganda Ior the Tamil cause. But he was not
intelligent enough to realize that those who were listening to
him had their own agendas. Contrastingly, Pirabhakaran
became a keen student oI Gandhi in applying the vow oI
silence` to his support his other maneuvers. Thus, he is
castigated as reclusive` by the media-vultures who Ieast on
the verbal muck oI publicity-seeking politicians.
Anti-oratory leadership
Pirabhakaran has been called many things by his adversaries,
but orator` is not one. Pirabhakaran is not an orator. Period.
This is one oI his virtues, which Ilies on the Iace oI his critics
who compare him to Hitler. One oI the hallmarks oI Hitlerism
is mass-manipulating oratory. Chaplin parodied this Hitler
behaviorism eloquently in his Iirst talkie, The Great Dictator,
showing how microphones curl and dance with every utter and
grunt emanating Irom Hitler`s demoniacal mouth. Those who
had this giIt oI Hitler and who made much political hay in Sri
Lankan platIorms and parliament were undoubtedly, padre
Lankan platIorms and parliament were undoubtedly, padre
Bandranaike (in mid-1950s) and Premadasa (Irom 1970s to
early 1990s). These two politicians, in reality, can be cast as
Hitler-imitating-types |HITs in short| in the 20th century Sri
Lanka. Comparisons oI the political careers oI padre
Bandaranaike and Premadasa to that oI Hitler deserves some
attention and I will touch on it subsequently. One should note
that those - such as Chandrika Kumaratunga and Dayan
Jayatillaka - who are ardently tagging the Hitler label` to
Pirabhakaran are those who had proximity to the two HITs oI
Sri Lanka; Chandrika to padre Bandaranaike (by birth) and
Dayan Jayatillaka to Premadasa (by patronage). In being a
non-orator, Pirabhakaran is in league with the calm and
composed Chelvanayakam.
Tamils in India and Eelam had enjoyed tub-thumping oratory
oI their political leaders Ior decades. Oratory is an important
art Iorm, which has value in society. But the downIall oI
Tamils in political arena came when, politicians came to be
praised as leaders solely due to their oratorical skills.
Pirabhakaran broke this viscious trend by his silence and
reclusive habit. As a consequence, Tamils and non-Tamils
came to place much signiIicance in every word he uttered in
his annual Heroes Day Speech, delivered in November.
|Continued|

Part 4
Sachi Sri Kantha
|23 May 2001|
Humor in anti-Pirabhakaran Polemics
Once I used to get headache while reading the anti-
Pirabhakaran polemics penned by heavy hitters like Dayan
Jayatilleka and H.L.D.Mahindapala, published in the Lanka
Guardian magazine Ior which I subscribed and contributed
regularly to its vibrant Letters` section. Then six years ago,
aIter I became a member oI the International Society Ior
Humor Studies |a society Ior scholars engaged in humor
research|, my headaches disappeared when I realized that one
should enjoy the humor in these anti-Pirabhakaran polemics.
A Iew months ago, Dayan Jayatilleka |whom I would label as
the wayward son oI a worthy Iather, journalist Mervyn de
Silva| was piqued by Pirabhakaran`s use oI Ilame` metaphor
to pay homage to his Iallen Iollowers. In a commentary
entitled, The missing pages oI the Prabhakaran`s messages`,
he commented on the Year 2000 Heroes Day speech oI
Pirabhakaran, as Iollows:
'...Any student oI Nazism would recognize the hypnotic
use oI the Ilame, the torches. When I light the flame in
the memorv of our heroes, in these burning flames, in
the unusual fire dance, I see a vision. Shining like the
light thousands of human flames like a river of fire,
shedding light, and leading the wav...` this could have
come Irom a speech oI Adolph Hitler at a torch-light
parade in Nuremberg - the thousands oI human Ilames`
being Prabhakaran`s original contribution, adverting to the
selI-immolation by the black Tiger suicide bomber...
|Island. Weekend Express, Dec.16-17, 2000|
Dayan Jayatilleka`s gripe was that, Pirabhakaran has used the
words Ilame` or torch` in his Heroes Day speech and thus it
reIlects his Nazi mentality. Little did this apologist Ior
Premadasa could grasp in his petty thoughts that the Ilame`
metaphor is popular in the vocabulary oI Ireedom Iighters.
03f02f2009 The Pirabakaran Phenomenon Part +
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart+.htm 1f11
metaphor is popular in the vocabulary oI Ireedom Iighters.
An eminent opponent oI Nazism who answered to the name oI
Charles de Gaulle had used this Ilame` metaphor in his
Iamous resistance speech, delivered in the summer oI 1940 in
London. Gen. de Gaulle, who escaped to Britain to organize
the Free French movement and was sentenced to death in
absentia by a French court, rallied his Iighters with the words,
'... I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all
French oIIicers and men who are present on British soil,
or maybe in the Iuture, with or without their arms; I call
on all engineers and skilled workmen Irom the armaments
Iactories who are at present on British soil, or may be in
the Iuture, to get in touch with me. Whatever happens,
the Ilame oI French resistance must not and shall not
die.
|The Penguin Book of Twentieth Centurv Speeches,
ed. by Brian MacArthur, 1993, pp.189-191.|
Also, Jawaharlal Nehru, India`s Ireedom Iighter, in his
memorable August 1947 A Tryst with Destiny` speech, also
has used the torch` metaphor eloquently.
'...On this day our Iirst thoughts go to the architect oI
this Ireedom, the Father oI our Nation (Gandhi), who,
embodying the old spirit oI India, held aloIt the torch oI
Ireedom and lighted up the darkness that surrounded
us...We shall never allow that torch oI Ireedom to be
blown out, however high the wind or stormy the tempest.
Our next thoughts must be oI the unknown volunteers
and soldiers oI Ireedom who, without praise or reward,
have served India even unto death... |ibid, pp.234-237|
Not only Ireedom Iighters, even John F.Kennedy, who
signaled a youthIul generational switch in American leadership
used the torch` metaphor 40 years ago, in his 1961
Presidential Inauguration address. Study the Iollowing segment
oI Kennedy`s speech, written by his speechwriter Ted
Sorenson.
'...We dare not Iorget today that we are the heirs oI that
Iirst revolution. Let the word go Iorth Irom this time and
place, to Iriend and Ioe alike, that the torch has been
passed to a new generation oI Americans, born in this
century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter
peace, proud oI our ancient heritage, and unwilling to
witness or permit the slow undoing oI these human rights
to which this nation has always been committed, and to
which we are committed today at home and around the
world... |ibid, pp.300-303|
Then, 30 months later, Martin Luther King Jr. began his now-
Iamous I have a Dream` speech, also with the Ilame`
metaphor as Iollows:
'Five score years ago, a great American, in whose
symbolic shadow we stand, signed the Emancipation
Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great
beacon light oI hope to millions oI Negro slaves who had
been seared in the Ilames oI withering injustice. It came
as joyous daybreak to end the long night oI
captivity....|ibid, pp.330-336|
In sum, the above Iour examples oI notable speeches made by
de Gaulle, Nehru, Kennedy and Martin Luther King reveal two
Iacts. One is the bilious, pseudo-scholarship oI analysts like
Dayan Jayatilleka, which pollutes the press in Sri Lanka.
Secondly, though Pirabhakaran is not an orator, his use oI
Ilame` metaphor in dedicatory speeches has precedence and
nothing to be ashamed oI.
For the past Iew years, projecting Pirabhakaran as a Hitler` in
the Sri Lankan media has become a pastime Ior Dayan
Jayatilleka (and his colleagues like H.L.D.Mahindapala). But in
haste, he has been convoluting logic by no small proportions.
Here is another excerpt oI Jayatilleka`s bile, Irom a sermon
entitled, The Tamil National Question Revisited: The Package
and Globalisation`.
'... In science, we draw certain conclusions iI an
experiment repeatedly Iailed, with disastrous results.
Negotiations were not the answer to AdolI Hitler. Then
why should it be the answer to South Asia`s Hitler,
Velupillai Prabhakaran?...The convergence oI Zionism
and Eelamism constitutes a vital link. It was
V.Karalasingham in his The Wav Out for the Tamil
Speaking People who Iirst alerted us to this tendency.
Twenty years later, the MOSSAD dissident Viktor
Ostrovsky unveiled the operational links between the
Zionist military/intelligence apparat and the LTTE. It has
oIten been reported that the Boston`s Tamil Brahmins
gained entree to Washington`s Beltway through the good
oIIices oI the Iamed Zionist organization the B`nai
Brith... |Lanka Guardian, Feb.-Mar. 1998, pp.11-15 &
30-33|
Being a proIessional scientist, that pretentious, imperial we` in
his passage irked me - especially as it came Irom a phony, who
probably cannot distinguish Archimedes and Arrhenius or tell
the diIIerence between a Irog and a toad. I wrote a letter to
him, dated March 26, 1998. At that time, Jayatilleka was
Iunctioning as the editor oI the Lanka Guardian. I provide
excerpts oI this letter, since it deals with his Hitler imagery.
'Mr.Dayan Jayatilleka,
Editor, Lanka Guardian.
I read Irom cover to cover the recent Lanka Guardian
issue (Feb-March 1998) and wish to comment on items
which carried your by-line.
I`m amused by your comment on V.Prabhakaran as
South Asia`s Hitler`. In the same Ieature, you tag the
Tamils who live beyond the Sri Lankan borders as Tamil
Zionist` lobby. Can`t you grasp the irony oI this illogical,
oxymoronic comparison? In my reading oI the world
history, Hitler and Zionists were opposed to each other in
their goals. Boy! There is no doubt that you can write
polemics and you have a passion and skill Ior this type oI
verbal pyrotechnics. Sad to say, you are a pauper in logic.
The name Hitler` has become a putty in the hands oI
paranoid politicians and petty journalists to throw on their
opponents. George Bush used it eIIectively on Saddam
Hussein, while killing innocent 200,000 Iraq citizens to
satisIy his ego. The mere Iact that Prabhakaran did not
give Ialse promises to win a nation-wide election to
elevate himselI as a leader show`s that the comparison oI
him to Hitler is inappropriate. On the contrary, your
political mentor Premadasa, or Ior that matter his bete
noire Sirimavo Bandaranaike behaved like Hitler in killing
thousands oI civilians (Sinhalese and Tamils) aIter
winning the general elections with Ialse premises.
As Iar as non-Sinhalese citizens oI Sri Lanka are
concerned, the Gestapo state exists in reality in the
southern Sri Lanka. Recent experience oI journalist Iqbal
Aththas highlighted in the international press (or Ior that
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart+.htm +f11
Aththas highlighted in the international press (or Ior that
matter what happened to Richard de Zoysa) are examples
oI Gestapo style attacks on the human rights oI Sri
Lankan civilians. Unknown to elites like you, thousands
oI non-Sinhalese civilians suIIer Irom this type oI
humiliation...
You are entitled to your views on Eelam. But iI you read
widely and think it pragmatically, you will comprehend
that the global trend is Ior selI-determination and
separation oI oppressed ethnic groups, and not toward
integration with their perceived oppressors. This happens
in Tibet (against Chinese domination), Chechen (against
Russian domination), Kashmir (against Indian
domination), Quebec (against Canadian domination),
Scotland (against English domination), Palestine (against
Israeli domination), Kurdistan (against Iraq-Iran-Turkey
domination) and East Timor (against Indonesian
domination)...
Since I had analyzed the errors oI interpretation presented by
Viktor Ostrovsky, in my review oI his book Bv Wav of
Deception |originally written Ior Tamil Nation, March 1992|, I
didn`t reiterate on this aspect oI Jayatilleka`s distortion in this
particular letter. As I expected, this letter went unpublished.
As a polemicist, Jayatilleka is Iond oI using the cliches Hitler
and Zionists to smear Pirabhakaran and Tamils in the diaspora
respectively. Even at the end oI 1999, he was dangling both
the Hitler`s Ian` and Zionist` cliches to Pirabhakaran. In his
diatribe, The time oI the Tiger`, Jayatilleka wrote that
according to,
'ivekkam oldsters (such as Nithyanandans), Mein Kampf
is also on Prabhakaran`s short list oI Iavourite
texts...What must also be borne in mind is that Mr.
Prabhakaran`s nationalism is Iar Irom the mainstream
Zionism oI the Haganah and the Palmach; oI Ben Gurion,
Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban and Yitshak Rabin...His is the
equivalent oI the other Zionism, that oI the Irgun Zwei
Leumi and the Stern Gang; oI Jabotinsky, Menahem
Begin, Yitshak Shamir and Ariel Sharon... |Island
Weekend Express, Colombo, Dec.11-12, 1999|
Jayatilleka`s comparison oI Tamils in diaspora to Zionists can
convince only the gullibles who are ignorant oI the military
links Iorged by the oppressive Sri Lankan cabinets oI
links Iorged by the oppressive Sri Lankan cabinets oI
Jayewardene and Chandrika Kumaratunga with the Israeli
army and intelligence-wallahs. I reIrain Irom commenting on
Jayatilleka`s observation that the veteran Tamil leItist V.
Karalasingham was the Iirst to point out the convergence oI
Eelamism and Zionism, since I have yet to read
Karalasingham`s 52-page tract The Wav Out for the Tamil
Speaking People, which originally appeared in 1963, and was
republished in 1978 - with a postscript in 1977 and an addition
oI another 35 pages.
What is Iunny about Jayatilleka`s polemics is that, even other
Pirabhakaran-haters among the Sinhalese do not take his
thoughts seriously. During the general election campaign last
year, a hilarious expose on Jayatilleka`s career was authored
by Malinda Seneviratne oI Sihala Urumaya group, with the
caption, Some mild thoughts on Dayan Jayatilleka`. I present
an excerpt oI this commentary which summarises the record oI
Premadasa, one oI the two Hitler imitation type (HIT) leaders
Sri Lanka had in the recent past.
'Being a sycophant oI Ranasinghe Premadasa, I suppose
Dayan is obliged to say nice things about the man.
Premadasa was the architect oI the most violent period oI
our post-independence history. True the JVP is not as
innocent as their spokesmen claim. I don`t know Irom
which piece oI Marxist literature Dayan Iound solace (iI
he was a sincere Marxist) during those times oI deIending
Premadasa, but 60,000 people being tortured and killed
during a person`s tenure as head oI state is a Iar cry Irom
a positive experience... For the record, not a single
Sinhalese is contesting Irom JaIIna Irom either the PA,
the UNP or the JVP. II Prabhakaran proposed and
carried out ethnic cleansing in JaIIna, these parties have
eIIectively condoned it! The Sihala Urumaya did not only
pop up` in JaIIna, we also campaigned. Which is a lot
more than his old boss Varadarajah Perumal does in
those areas, armed and under heavy guard though he
is!... |Island, Colombo, Oct.9, 2000|
Pirabhakaran - the power buster`
As a country, Ceylon and its transmuted apparition, Sri Lanka
1972` had a lively existence Irom 1833 to 1983 - a total oI 150
years. This was a creation oI British colonialism, and the
years. This was a creation oI British colonialism, and the
independent Ceylon |and later Sri Lanka| could hold only Ior
35 years. Since 1983, Sri Lanka as a country is in a comatose
condition, near death. This state was induced partly due to
inept leadership skills oI the nominal power holders. But
Pirabhakaran`s role as a power buster in the nominal post-
independent Sri Lanka is nonetheless a marked one.
To comprehend what I mean as power buster`, I introduce
the concept oI power, as analyzed by Bertrand Russell. His
1938 book named Power. A New Social Analvsis is what I
consider now as my Iavorite book. I bought this book in 1988
- 50 years aIter he wrote it - when I was residing in Tokyo.
That was the year, Pirabhakaran was out-smarting the nominal
power holders in Sri Lanka and India |J.R.Jayewardene and
Rajiv Gandhi| by challenging the accepted status-quo in the
power equation. This is what Bertrand Russell had written in
his introductory chapter, The impulse to Power`.
'...The Iundamental concept in social science is Power,
in the same sense in which Energy is the Iundamental
concept in physics. Like energy, power has many Iorms,
such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, inIluence on
opinion. No one oI these can be regarded as subordinate
to any other, and there is no one Iorm Irom which the
others are derivative. The attempt to treat one Iorm oI
power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially
successIul, just as the study oI one Iorm oI energy will be
deIective at certain points, unless other Iorms are taken
into account. Wealth may result Irom military power or
Irom inIluence over opinion, just as either oI these may
result Irom wealth. The laws oI social dynamics are laws
which can only be stated in terms oI power, not in terms
oI this or that Iorm oI power... Power, like energy, must
be regarded as continually passing Irom any one oI its
Iorms into any other, and it should be the business oI
social science to seek the laws oI such transIormations.
The attempt to isolate any one Iorm oI power, more
especially, in our day, the economic Iorm, has been, and
still is, a source oI errors oI great practical importance...
AIter reading Bertrand Russell`s interpretation oI power, I
realized that the concept oI caste can be (and need to be)
looked through the Iunctional paradigm oI power. This led to
the Iollowing thoughts.
the Iollowing thoughts.
Classification of Power-based Casteism
Pirabhakaran remains the only individual to produce a
sustained, vehement challenge to the existing power-based
casteism oI the Sri Lankan society. By casteism, I do not mean
the structural caste diIIerentiation oI Hindus and Buddhists, as
anointed in birth. In a short correspondence to the Tamil
Times six years ago, I have described the Iunctional paradigm
oI power-based casteism. Excerpts are as Iollows:
'When one views the human society in anthropological
terms related to power distribution, it becomes apparent
that the division oI Iour varunas |the original Hindu term
Ior caste| existed and still exists in all the human societies
oI Iive continents. In terms oI power distribution, the
members oI any human society can be categorized under
Iour groups, which are roughly equivalent to the Iour
varunas oI Hindus. These are,
(1) Power Holders (royalty in good old days, but heads
oI state and their coterie)
(2) Power Sharers (military commanders and members
oI the Intelligence Agency oI every nation)
(3) Power Peddlers (bureaucrats, media moguls, chieI
executive oIIicers oI business enterprises and maIia
bosses)
(4) Powerless (ordinary citizens)
These Iour castes exist in almost all nations, irrespective
oI the political system (democratic or socialist or
dictatorial) that is practised. Even in the so-called
classless societies` promulgated by Lenin and Mao, these
Iour castes existed. The Politburo members, who owned
dachas, were the power holders. The generals
representing the armed Iorces and the top echelon
oIIicers oI the KGB belonged to the power sharing caste.
The editors oI the now-disgraced Pravda newspaper
represented the power peddling caste. Majority oI the
peasants represented the powerless caste. Power holders,
when pushed Irom their pedestals (due to palace plotting)
become power peddlers. Thatcher and Gorbachev are
good examples oI this transIormed caste, who join the
lecture circuit and earn a quick buck by other deals such
as syndicated columns and book publishing... |Tamil
Times- London, May 1995|
Times- London, May 1995|
One can illustrate the Iunctional paradigm oI caste
classiIication in Sri Lanka as Iollows:
Power-holding caste
Taken as a whole, the power-based Iour-caste system has
prevailed and still prevails in Sri Lanka. Those who belonged
(and belong) to the power-holding caste, which nominally
switches between the UNP and SLFP, have come to realize
the damage Pirabhakaran has caused as a power buster. Within
15 years, the Sri Lanka` has been separated into cleared
zone` and non-cleared zone`. Pirabhakaran, by raising an
army to challenge the existing status quo, has dissected the
power base held by the power-holding caste. Now, the writ oI
the nominal power holder doesn`t Iloat in the non-cleared
zone` oI Sri Lanka. For this, the power-holding caste places
the blame covertly on the power-sharing caste - the military.
Power-sharing caste
As one would expect, the power-sharing caste (military
hierarchy in Sri Lanka) has a proIessional antipathy to
Pirabhakaran. During the past 25 years, the list oI Sri Lankan
army commanders who have tried to capture Pirabhakaran
alive or dead` is long indeed - D.S.Attygalle, J.E.D.Perera,
T.I.Weeratunge, G.D.G.N.Seneviratne, H.Wanasinghe,
L.D.C.E.Waidyaratne, G.H. De Silva, R.de S.Daluwatte,
C.S.Weerasooriya, and now L.P.Balagalle. The tenures oI
each oI these honchos at the top military hierarchy have been
relatively brieI. Why they have Iailed in their prime mission (as
oI now) should tell something about the strength oI
Pirabhakaran.
Being a military tactician, Pirabhakaran also knows that,
despite all the outwardly expressed pleasantries, bouquets and
medals oI honor, the power-holding caste do not trust the
power-sharing caste completely. Why? Power is such an
aphrodisiac according to Kissinger dictum, that given
appropriate inducement and push, the power-sharing caste may
try to dislodge the power-holding caste Irom the throne, a la
Gen. Zia ul Haq and Gen. Pervez MusharraI. This could be
one reason why the retiring generals oI the rump Sri Lankan
state are continuously being posted to other countries as
ambassadors - so that they are kept away Irom the networks
oI power in Colombo. The history according to the Sri Lankan
oI power in Colombo. The history according to the Sri Lankan
army`s website, conveniently hides the unsuccessIul army
coups attempted by the past uniIormed oIIicers in 1962 and
1966. In the Sri Lankan army`s dictionary, unappetizing truths
(even iI they have become part oI island`s history) has to be
selective and hidden Irom exposure.
Power-peddling caste
The role played by the power-peddling caste has been
presented by two insiders oI this caste, namely Mervyn de
Silva and Ajith Samaranayake. Here are their observations.
'...When democratic leaders are in trouble, mavericks,
rogue-operators and the covert agencies come into their
own. One oI their Iavourite instruments is the media, to
whip up passions, to create conIusion, to send wrong
signals to increase tension. Wittingly or unwittingly, the
politician, the journalist and Ioreign correspondent, the
diplomat and the businessman are co-opted... |Mervyn
de Silva, Lanka Guardian, Oct.15, 1991, pp.2-6.|
Mervyn de Silva made this observation at the height oI the
anti-Premadasa plot` initiated by Lalith Athulathmudali and
Gamini Dissanayake. While Mervyn was subtle and protective
oI his links to power, Ajith Samaranayake commenting on the
same phenomenon six years later was more explicit.
'... One oI the most striking phenomena oI the last two
decades has been the emergence oI the mass media, not
merely in its traditional role as the purveyors oI
inIormation and opinion, but in its own right as a player in
the political arena... Those who once reported on the
comings and goings oI politicians Irom behind the
Iootlights have today come to the centre stage and delight
in the narcissistic pleasure oI watching their own images
in the columns oI newspapers and on the tube and
hearing their own voices over the air... It was Ior the
Wijewardenes and the Gunasenas to engage in the selI-
indulgence oI thinking themselves as the kingmakers.
Today, however, at many levels journalists themselves
share the same Iantasy... The incestuous nature oI the Sri
Lankan elite is such that these Iamilies have interlocking
political interests sometimes supported by Iamilial ties...
|Lanka Guardian, May 1998, pp.11-12|
While reading Samaranayake`s description oI delight in the
narcissistic pleasure oI watching their own images`, I could
easily think oI N.Ram oI the Chennai Hindu group publishers,
as one belonging to this power-peddling caste. Those who
throw epithets and cliches on Pirabhakaran such as Dayan
Jayatilleka and Mahindapala are members oI this caste who
lost their access to power due to the Iall oI their power-holding
patrons. Once this happens, the members oI this caste re-
position themselves to prostitute their saleable skill to the new
power-holders. Not only journalists, even politicians like
M.H.M.AshraII, Douglas Devananda and Nilan Tiruchelvam
can be included in this caste.
The Route of Mao and Giap
To the pre-Pirabhakaran Tamil political leadership, the Tamil
power meant only the number oI constituencies won in the
routine general elections, which could be bargained in the altar
oI parliament, which in turn with lapse oI time had turned into
a gloriIied Iish market.
Pirabhakaran, in a reIreshing bid to challenge the power-
holding caste, which has been throttling the Eelam Tamils since
1956, Iollowed the route oI two Asian masters - Mao and Vo
Nguyen Giap. He actively engaged the power-sharing caste,
which by 1970s had been converted into a 99 percent Sinhala-
Buddhist enterprise. II the Sri Lankan military had reIlected
the population ratio oI the country, Pirabhakaran would have
Iound it diIIicult to gather his recruits and establish his army.
Here again, the insecurity oI the power-holding caste Iollowing
the army coups oI 1962 and 1966 turned into costly mistakes
which Pirabhakaran was able to exploit as a power buster.
The dimwits holding the reins oI power in Sri Lanka should
have known that race isn`t an important criterion in an army
proIessional; ability and attitude are. Isn`t it right iI one would
state that the ethnic cleansing practised (since 1962) Irom a
borrowed Nazi Iormula by the power-holding caste contributed
signiIicantly to the impotence oI Sri Lankan army?
|Continued.|

Part 5
Sachi Sri Kantha
|5 June 2001|
Pirabhakaran - the Morale Booster
Truth is like a ghost
Truth is like a ghost! I owe debt to my student Ms. Sayuka
Yamada Ior this humorous metaphor on truth. Early this year,
to my undergraduate class I gave an assignment requesting
them to describe in their own words, What is Truth?`. Ms.
Yamada`s complete response was as Iollows:
'I think the truth is like a ghost. Everybody knows this
word. But nobody can say clearly what this is. All have
their own vague Iorms oI truths. Although the truth oIten
helps people, it also hurts them. And the truth sometimes
disappears. AIter all, the truth is a ghost.
As I mentioned last week |The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon -
part 4|, the hiding oI unsuccessIul 1962 and 1966 coups staged
by the Sri Lankan army in its oIIicial website illustrates Ms.
Yamada`s comparison between the truth and ghost. I enjoy
truth search` in the literature generated by anti-Pirabhakaran
propagandists. When Lady Reason visits them inIrequently,
truth is revealed in small quanta, which in turn bursts the anti-
Pirabhakaran balloons they Iloat. Two examples are given
below.
A sample of truth in the Island newspaper.
Less than a month ago, the Island (Colombo) newspaper
presented a brieI news item with the caption, Kins oI missing
servicemen hold satyagraha tomorrow`. According to this news
item, the Association oI Relatives oI Servicemen Missing in
Action is 1,800-member strong. Mr. E.P. Nanayakkara serves
as this association`s president. The Island stated,
'Nanayakkara revealed that he met the |Norwegian|
ambassador and Erik Solheim, responsible Ior the peace
eIIort. Nanayakkara said that he pleaded with the
Norwegians to go ahead with their eIIorts despite
opposition by a small group oI people. Those who talk oI
03f02f2009 The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 5
opposition by a small group oI people. Those who talk oI
war and collect signatures demanding an all out military
campaign against the LTTE have not sent their loved
ones to the Iront. Some oI them have not gone beyond
Anuradhapura in the recent past`, he said adding that he
has received several invitations Irom the LTTE to visit
Wanni to discuss the Iate oI the missing. But, the
government has not so Iar given approval Ior him to meet
with the LTTE, he said. |Island, May 13, 2001|
Last week |The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 4|, I
provided examples Ior the power-holding, power-sharing and
power-peddling castes in Sri Lanka. Here, Mr. Nanayakkara
and his group represents the Iourth and the last, powerless
caste. Among the Sinhalese, quite a segment oI the powerless
caste do not hold any grudge against Pirabhakaran or LTTE.
In Iact, they even covertly admire the actions oI Pirabhakaran
who stands up to the power-holding caste among the
Sinhalese. It was a Iact that when LTTE Iought against the
Indian army, quite a number oI Sinhalese (including those who
occupied lower ranks in the Sri Lankan army) vicariously
supported Pirabhakaran, since he and LTTE courageously
stood up to the bullying oI Indian army. This brings me to the
thoughts oI Dayan Jayatilleka again.
A quanta of truth from Mr.Dayan 1ayatilleka
Last week |The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 4| I had
critically commented on the anti-Pirabhakaran polemics oI
Dayan Jayatilleka. I should add that when Lady Reason visits
him inIrequently, he is also capable oI presenting vignettes oI
truth, which can explain some oI Pirabhakaran`s actions.
Dayan served as a minister in the North-East Provincial
Council between December 1988 and June 1989, under
Varadaraja Perumal oI EPRLF. Ten years later, in an article
entitled, Lessons Irom North-East Council`, he had presented
his impressions on why LTTE went to war with the Indian
army. Excerpts are given below.
'...Many writers, Sri Lankan and Indian, have written at
length on the resistance to the implementation oI the
Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord oI July 1987, and even
steps oI actual sabotage on the part oI the Government oI
India and the LTTE. This is only a part, perhaps the
overwhelmingly larger part oI the story, but not the
complete one. There were at least three other elements or
complete one. There were at least three other elements or
Iactors, which contributed to the actual outbreak oI war
between the LTTE and the IPKF on 10 October 1987...
'The Iirst was the People`s Liberation Organisation oI
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), which upon re-induction to Sri
Lanka Iollowing the Accord and the IPKF deployment,
initialed a campaign oI serial assassinations oI Tiger
cadres - a course oI action that could be termed pre-
emptive, iI one were charitably inclined. This course oI
sustained assassinations provided the Tigers with the
excuse to re-arm on a signiIicant scale, picking up their
recently cached automatic weapons and perhaps more
importantly, prompting an inIluential number oI Tamil
people to sympathise with the LTT`s reIusal to disarm.
'The second element was Varadharajah Perumal, the
Iuture ChieI Minister oI the North-East Provincial
Council, whose accurate reading oI the Iascist character
oI the LTTE led him to the strategic conclusion that a
situation must be created in which the IPKF would Iight
the LTTE. He was to opt Ior a strikingly similar strategy
later, in relation to the Sri Lankan state and the IPKF.
Perumal was not the leader oI the Eelam People`s
Revolutionary Front (EPRLF), but in the aItermath oI the
Accord, it was he who represented the organization in
Colombo which entailed the all important liaison with the
Indian High Commission and the Colombo government-
cum-security apparatus.
'The next element that contributed, this time unwittingly,
to the unraveling oI the Accord was the Indian High
Commission itselI led by the Iormidable High
Commissioner Mani Dixit...|Lanka Guardian, Jan-
Feb.1998, pp.2-4|
II one discards the anti-LTTE barbs which Dayan peppers
Irequently, his observations - though open secrets to Eelam
Tamils - give credence to some vital decisions made by
Pirabhakaran to protect LTTE and deIend the morale oI
Eelam Tamils. Also, Dayan`s comments about Pirabhakaran`s
Sudumalai speech made in August 1987 is worth noting here.
'...Contrary to the views oI the prejudiced,
Prabhakaran`s speech at Sudumalai was not a declaration
oI intent to undermine the Accord. It was a perIectly
oI intent to undermine the Accord. It was a perIectly
positioned, tensely poised statement accurately reIlecting
the diminished space that the man Iound himselI in, a
temporary lack oI balance but considerable determination
and Iocus to get out oI the trap... |ibid|
Also, Eelam Tamils should read this quantum oI truth
presented by Dayan in 1998, aIter the deaths oI both Rajiv
Gandhi and Gamini Dissanayake.
'Gamini Dissanayake, a senior Cabinet Minister and the
strongest supporter oI the Accord in Sri Lankan politics,
was ironically, one oI those who helped undermine it.
Dissanayake`s sponsorship or patronage oI the Weli Oya
settlement, on the border between the North Central
Province, and the Trincomalee district, in the very
aItermath oI the signing oI the Accord, clearly went
against its spirit - though he told this writer in 1988 that it
was done aIter Rajiv Gandhi was inIormed and without
any objections Irom him. The Weli Oya settlement
eIIectively cut oII any territorial link between the
Northern and Eastern Province on Sri Lanka`s Eastern
coastline... |ibid|
I was impressed by Dayan`s candor |he being a Premadasa
protege!| in accusing Gamini Dissanayake as one oI the
culprits who undermined the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene
Accord oI 1987.
Pirabhakaran - the morale-booster
Morale is one ingredient which Pirabhakaran contributed (and
still contributes) to Tamil nationalism in abundant proportions.
BeIore presenting my analysis on how Pirabhakaran became
the morale-booster Ior Eelam and Indian Tamils, I wish to
provide some generally understood Iacts about morale. For
this, I depend on the scholarship oI Emory Bogardus |see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 1|. Morale - or lack oI it- has
been much talked about in the Sri Lankan media during the
past decade. But I haven`t come across anyone reIerring to the
contributions oI Bogardus.
Sixty years ago, Bogardus wrote a paper entitled, National
Morale` |Sociologv and Social Research, Jan-Feb.1941,
vol.25, p.203-212|. In this paper, he stated two speciIic
examples oI what happened in France and China, during the
second halI oI 1930s. Excerpts are as Iollows:
'In war the main aims seems to be to break the morale oI
the enemy. The crumbling oI France in June 1940 is a
notorious case in point. France had soldiers, IortiIications,
munitions; but her morale was shattered, and she
surrendered. What was the situation? For years France
has had too many opinions, too much partisanship, too
many economic and political schisms, and too little
national morale. One group oI people in power, no matter
what group, was always attacked viciously by two or
three other groups not in power...
'In China the main immediate aim oI the Japanese
military has been to break the morale oI the Chinese. The
repeated heavy bombing oI Chunking has had as its main
objective the destruction not oI people and buildings so
much as that oI morale. These persistent bombings with
their terrible destruction oI liIe and maiming oI human
bodies are to be continued until the spirit oI resistance is
broken`. Likewise, a major aim oI the heavy bombing oI
London which began in September 1940 has been to
break the morale oI the English...
When the Japanese Imperial Army invaded North China in
1937, Mao showed his mettle as a guerrilla leader. He
delivered a most important speech entitled, Policies, Measures
and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion` on July
23, 1937. In this speech, he provided a ten-point program, as
Iollows:
1. Overthrow Japanese imperialism.
2. Mobilize the military strength oI the whole nation.
3. Mobilize the people oI the whole country.
4. ReIorm the government apparatus.
5. Adopt an anti-Japanese Ioreign policy.
6. Adopt war-time Iinancial and economic policies.
7. Improve the people`s livelihood.
8. Adopt an anti-Japanese educational policy.
9. Weed out traitor and pro-Japanese elements and
consolidate the rear.
10. Achieve national unity against Japan.
|source: Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge. Mao Tse Tung &
The Chinese Revolution 1893-1954, Little,Brown & Co,
Boston, 1972, p.337|
Pirabhakaran returned to Eelam Irom Tamil Nadu in January
1987. Without hesitation, I would say that only aIter his return
to Eelam, he metamorphosed into a real leader. Until then, he
was a leader-apprentice. II we substitute the word Japanese`
to the phrase Sinhalese and/or Indian` in the above ten-point
program oI Mao, we can easily comprehend the decisions
made by Pirabhakaran to boost the morale oI Eelam Tamils.
I will cite the thoughts oI Bogardus again, in relation to the
leadership role and morale. Even now, these words have not
lost their sheen. The problems oI Bill Clinton and Chandrika
Kumaratunga as leaders are explained in these words.
'....National morale is related to the conIidence oI the
people in the nation`s leaders. This conIidence depends
on the ability oI the leaders to achieve Ior the welIare and
glory oI the nation. II a leader can add to the nation`s
place in the sun, many oI his shortcomings will be
overlooked.
'ConIidence in leadership is connected with the leader`s
evident honesty and sincerity oI purpose. This
consideration is especially important in a democratic state.
A leader is expected to make some mistakes; but iI he
tries to cover these up, iI he Iails repeatedly to admit
them, or iI he blames them on others, he loses the
conIidence that the people have placed in him, and
national morale is weakened. On the other hand, iI he
says he will undoubtedly make some mistakes but will try
to correct them, he inspires good will and builds morale.
|ibid|
Pirabhakaran`s return to Eelam in January 1987 showed to
Tamils his honesty and sincerity oI purpose` towards his goal.
To explain, how Pirabhakaran liIted the morale oI Eelam
Tamils during 1987, I will rely on the inIormation provided by
Tamils during 1987, I will rely on the inIormation provided by
the authors oI The Broken Palmvra. Even though they have
projected themselves as anti-Pirabhakaran propagandists, their
book is also reliable Ior some truths. In 1987, aIter
Pirabhakaran`s return to Eelam,
'The government resumed aerial bombing oI JaIIna on
7th oI March. |p.101|
'The Sri Lankan government commenced random
shelling oI the civilian population in JaIIna, together with
aerial bombing on 22 April. One could hear shells Ialling
in quick succession in widely separated places, usually
around 6:30am and 6:30pm. Most would quickly take
their Iamilies into the house or into a trench iI they had
one, and say their prayers. The aerial bombing was oIten
oII the mark. The Sri Lankan airIorce tried Iour times to
bomb an LTTE camp in Point Pedro situated in the
crowded market area, and Iinally Iinished the job with a
bulldozer a month later, aIter taking over Vadamaratchi at
the end oI May. About a hundred civilians were killed
upto 26 May as a result oI the bombing and shelling.
|p.106|
'Worse than the ordinary aerial bombing was the use oI
so-called barrel bombs which were pushed out oI Avro
transports. These were crude devices which could not be
aimed at speciIic targets, and consisted oI a barrel oI Iuel
padded with a rubber-like inIlammable substance. On
hitting the ground the Iuel would explode. The molten
padding would Ily in all directions and stick to the skin oI
a victim and burn itselI out. A large number oI these were
dropped on Valvettithurai (48 according to one count).
Barrel bombs were also dropped at random in several
other parts oI the peninsula. One Ialling Sivan Kovel on
K.K.S.Road, JaIIna town, claimed 17 victims. This
seemed a sadistic extra without military purpose. |p.128|
The Operation Liberation, coordinated by the then Minister oI
National Security -Lalith Athulathmudali -commenced on May
26, 1987. Rajan Hoole et al. have written, 'The army moved
out oI Thondamanaru on the 26th. This was accompanied by
heavy aerial bombing and shelling, particularly in
Valvettithurai. There was also military activity, bombing and
shelling near the JaIIna Fort. |p.126|
Pirabhakaran`s response to the Operation Liberation campaign
was immediately interpreted by his adversaries as one oI
deIeat. But he basically was Iollowing the script, written IiIty
years previously by Mao. The motto song memorized by
Mao`s Red Army extolled the logic oI mobile warIare:
'Keep men, lose land; Land can be taken again.
Keep land, lose men; Land and men both lost.
|Han Suyin, ibid, p.472|
Also, Pirabhakaran had to boost the morale oI Eelam Tamils
who were suIIering Irom aerial bombing. The answer was
delivered on July 5, 1987. |Continued|


Part 6
Sachi Sri Kantha
12 1une 2001]
A Brando in the battle front
When I heard about the death oI movie legend Anthony Quinn
on June 4, memories oI my school days Ilooded my thoughts.
It was 1967 and aIter I saw his signature perIormance in the
movie Zorba the Greek at the Savoy theater in Wellawatte,
his Zorba character was a continuous presence in me Ior
nearly two years. For solace, I picked up his conIessional
autobiography One Man Tango Irom my bookshelI and
scanned the pages.
One anecdote which Quinn had mentioned relating to the
trainee phase oI his career where he met another movie legend
Marlon Brando captured my interest. What Pirabhakaran
decided to carry out on July 5, 1987 at the Eelam battleIront
was in the same league oI what Quinn saw in Brando, while
acting in Elia Kazan`s drama troupe in New York.
First to Quinn`s anecdote:
'Brando was an instant legend among our group. He
Ilouted convention in Streetcar [named Desire] and in
acting class - and Irom what I could gather, in the rest oI
his liIe as well. His improvisations in our Actors` Studio
sessions were prominent Ior the way he managed to
mock the process and still do provocative work. Once,
when he were asked to do a dance and Ireeze our poses
at the clap oI the instructor`s hands, Marlon wound up
locked in a headstand. We were then supposed to do a bit
based on our Irozen postures, and when Marlon`s turn
came he delivered his premise with deadpan seriousness.
I have a stomachache` he announced to the rest oI the
class and I`m standing on my head hoping I can pass it
out oI my mouth`. The others pretended at shock, but I
thought the insult was marvelous....
I quote this passage Irom Anthony Quinn because the words
and phrases used by him to describe Brando`s action are apt
Ior Pirabhakaran`s action on July 5, 1987 as well. An instant
legend` who Ilouted convention` in the rest oI his liIe`;
improvisation` by which he managed to mock the process
and still do provocative work` and delivered his premise with
deadpan seriousness`.
II Pirabhakaran was the Brando, my conjecture is that, his
peers and competing rivals to the Eelam leadership in mid-
1980s (Uma Maheswaran, Sri Sabaratnam, Pathmanabha,
Varadaraja Perumal and Douglas Devananda) turned out to be
Rodney DangerIields. For those who do not know who
Rodney DangerIield is, it is suIIice to note that he is an
American stand-up comic, in the same age category oI Brando,
and who became noticeable with his trade-mark quip I don`t
get any respect`. Though DangerIield couldn`t be a trailblazer
in the movie kingdom, he did receive notice Ior his selI-
parodying comic acts. Similarly, iI we leave out those who
have leIt the scene, the acts oI Varadaraja Perumal and
Minister Devananda provide comic relieI to Eelam Tamils.
Now, to the event oI July 5, 1987.
Suicide bombers: a counter-weapon for aerial terror
The authors oI the Broken Palmvra, had observed: 'During
|the Iirst halI oI| 1987, the Sri Lankan use oI airpower had a
deliberate vindictive purpose. Civilians were expected to get
killed. Its main eIIect was to keep the LTTE shiIting
houses...(p.132). I would inIer that, as pointed by Emory
Bogardus |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 5| citing
the examples oI Japan`s Imperial Army`s bombing in China
and Hitler`s bombing in London, that the main purpose oI the
aerial terror by the Sri Lankan army was to deplete the morale
oI Eelam Tamils. Pirabhakaran showed leadership skill to
restore the battered morale by incorporating suicide bombing
as an unique weapon oI his LTTE army.
The Broken Palmvra book records that landmark event in the
Eelam liberation war as Iollows:
'On July 5 |1987| the LTTE launched a suicide attack
against the Sri Lankan army camp at Nelliady Central
College... Miller, a member oI the LTTE`s new Black
Tigers drove a van packed with explosives through the
school gates into the Iront building. The government
claimed that 20 oI its soldiers died. Publicising its action
through notice boards as a great achievement`, the
LTTE claimed 100 soldiers killed. Other sources said the
government Iigure was much nearer the truth... (p.134)
Even if one accepts the government`s mortality figures, by
that single daring penetration into the army camp, LTTE
demonstrated that they had in possession one powerful
counter weapon to the aerial terror perpetrated by the Sri
Lankan army. Commenting on the suicide bomb attack, the
authors oI the Broken Palmvra had inIerred that,
'with many people, the LTTE had redeemed its
reputation aIter running away in the Iace oI Operation
Liberation. This again pointed to the Iickleness oI public
opinion in JaIIna... (p.135)
One can very well argue whether the public opinion in JaIIna
was Iickle as painted by the anti-Pirabhakaran propagandists or
more appropriately whether the authors oI the Broken Palmvra
lacked basic knowledge on military maneuvers to analyze the
strategy adopted by Pirabhakaran.
Until I leIt Sri Lanka, I was also ignorant (like the authors oI
the Broken Palmvra) oI how an army has to Iunction to
achieve its aim. That was 20 years ago. Then, during my
graduate studies at the University oI Illinois, I had the good
Iortune to have three mentors who were veterans oI the
Second World War and the Vietnam War. These three touched
my liIe in multiple dimensions.
My thesis advisor ProI. John Erdman (born 1945) served in an
engineering unit oI the American army in the Vietnam War.
My host Iather ProI. Stan Stolpe (born 1912) was a corporal
under the command oI Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Philippines
during the Second World War. My third mentor ProI. Upson
Garrigus (born 1917) served the American army in the
European theater oI the Second World War. While I was
Iollowing graduate studies in lecture rooms and laboratory, I
also learnt some Iacets oI military liIe style (discipline, morale
and punishment) Irom conversations with my American
mentors. Among the three, ProI. Stolpe was most inIormative.
mentors. Among the three, ProI. Stolpe was most inIormative.
Since he was my host Iather, I was invited to his house every
Sunday Ior lunch. While Ieasting on the lunch prepared by my
host mother Virginia, MacArthur stories were also served to
me in ample quantities by ProI. Stolpe Ior nearly Iour years. I
mention this detail to press the Iact that I assess the actions oI
Pirabhakaran and his army Irom what I learnt Irom my
American mentors, who served in the Second World War and
the Vietnam War.
Since 1987, Pirabhakaran`s use oI suicide bombers has been a
staple Ior halI-baked analyses oI journalists, analysts and
academics in Sri Lanka and India. Like prostitutes plying the
same trade at diIIerent locations with varying degrees oI make-
ups Ior diIIerent customers, some like Rohan Gunaratna earn
their living by re-hashing the once written script in umpteen
seminars and anti-LTTE pieces to the partisan press in Sri
Lanka and India. Regarding the suicide bombers oI LTTE,
these seminar papers` are replete with details oI what`,
when` and how`. But, they do not describe or analyze why`
the suicide bombers were incorporated in the LTTE army.
First, I provide two examples oI such analyses on LTTE`s
suicide bombers.
The view of Rohan Gunaratna
The Iollowing is an excerpt Irom an article, Suicide Terrorism:
Emerging Global Patterns` authored by Gunaratna. Though the
same story is told, as provided by the authors oI the Broken
Palmvra, the description oI the motive and the number oI
casualties reported Ialls between the 20 and 100, cited by
Rajan Hoole and his colleagues.
'...The Iirst LTTE suicide operation was conducted on
July 5, 1987, to stall the advance oI the Sri Lankan
military to capture JaIIna town. An LTTE driver
Wasanthan alias Captain Millar volunteered to drive a
vehicle Iull oI explosives into the makeshiIt army camp in
Nelliady. Although the suicide operation was not the
reason to abort the mission to capture JaIIna, the LTTE
propaganda claimed that Captain Millar`s success oI
killing 40 soldiers in Nelliady Irustrated the intentions oI
the government to recapture the heartland oI the Tamils.
The LTTE did not conduct suicide operations during the
IPKF period but initiated a series oI suicide attacks with
the political assassination oI Ranjan Wijeratne and Rajiv
the political assassination oI Ranjan Wijeratne and Rajiv
Gandhi in March and May 1991. These oII the battleIield
strikes were developed in Eelam War III, when the
LTTE integrated suicide bombers into their land and sea
Iighting Iorces.
'...The LTTE used suicide bombers to destroy the Joint
Operations Command, the nerve centre oI the Sri Lankan
security Iorces; the Central Bank; the World Trade
Centre; the sacred Temple oI the Tooth Relic, the most
hallowed Buddhist shrine in the world; and the oil storage
installations in Kollonnawa. The LTTE also used suicide
bombers to kill the navy chieI Admiral Clancy Fernando,
a Brigade commander oI the JaIIna peninsula Brigadier
Larry Wijeratne, and several others at the IoreIront oI
counter-insurgency operations. For instance, ChieI
Inspector Nilabdeen, the head oI the anti-terrorism unit,
in a suburban police station escaped with injuries, but
Razeek, a Iormer Tamil militant integrated to the army,
was killed in May 1999...
|The Colombo Chronicle, a Sri Lankan web magazine,
January 5, 2001|
Gunaratna, while providing inIormation on what (victims)`
and when` components related to the LTTE`s suicide bomb
attacks, conveniently hides the why` component in the
military story. However, he conceded in the concluding
segment oI this article that, 'There are distinctions between the
LTTE and Hamas suicide attacks. While all the LTTE suicide
attacks were aimed at destroying a political, military, economic
or religio-cultural target, the other groups used it as a tool oI
terror.
I would also like to stress that, though Gunaratna has attributed
the assassination oI Ranjan Wijeratne to an LTTE suicide
bomber, other sources in Colombo and India have expressed
diIIering conclusions. II one agrees to the view that
Gunaratna`s opinion is accurate, LTTE`s consideration oI
Ranjan Wijeratne (who was then a ranking member oI
President Premadasa`s Cabinet) as a legitimate military target
was no diIIerent Irom the position held by the American army
regarding the elimination oI Japan`s Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto in 1943.
The view of Sabil Francis
Sabil Francis is identiIied as a research scholar at the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I located his article
entitled, The uniqueness oI LTTE`s suicide bombers` |article
number 321, dated February 4, 2000| in the website oI the
Institute oI Peace and ConIlict Studies, New Delhi. I quote
excerpts Irom the sophomoric analysis oI Francis.
'...Though the LTTE was Iounded in 1974, suicide
bombing was only accepted as a tactic in the late 1980s.
The Iirst instance oI a suicide bombing was on July 5,
1987, when Captain Miller oI the LTTE Black Tigers
drove a van Iull oI explosives into a military camp at
Nelliaddy. More than 128 soldiers were killed. |Note: this
number exceeds even what was cited by the authors oI
Broken Palmvra!|
'...What are the motivations oI the Black Tigers, who
regularly indulge in Dry Runs` that could terriIy normal
person? None oI the classical theorists on guerrilla
warIare like Mao, Lenin or Che have advocated suicide
bombing. The only comparable instance are Islamic
militants in the Middle East. Their ideology believes that
they will go straight to heaven. The LTTE is oIIicially
atheist and the cadre, being Hindus, believe in
reincarnation oI the soul....
Francis attributes the motivation oI LTTE suicide attacks to
'mass cult hysteria that the LTTE consciously cultivates by
rituals and 'judicious use oI symbols rooted in Tamil myth.
Here I would say that this Indian research scholar` misses the
woods Ior the trees. The LTTE is being led by Pirabhakaran,
who is now recognized as a military leader oI repute to be born
in the post-Second World War period. Suicide bombing has to
be considered as one oI the arsenals he uses to annihilate his
adversaries. He developed this counter-weapon to boost the
morale oI his troops he led.
II classical theorists oI guerrilla warIare like Lenin, Mao and
Che have not advocated the use oI suicide bombing, there are
valid reasons. The circumstances Iaced by Lenin, Mao and
Che Guevara diIIered markedly in Russia, China and Central-
South America respectively. Lenin`s Iorces did not Iace aerial
bombing in the Iirst two decades oI the 20th century. Che
Guevara, though a brilliant theorist oI guerrilla war, couldn`t
succeed in the Iield (excluding Cuba) with his strategies. It may
succeed in the Iield (excluding Cuba) with his strategies. It may
be true that Mao may not have employed suicide warriors
against his adversaries, though this need veriIication Irom
authentic Chinese sources. However, Mao had stressed
strongly in his manual Ior guerrillas, that the success oI a
protracted war depends on taking Iactors into consideration
which reveals the weaknesses oI the enemy.
I would also mention that Vo Nguyen Giap (who received
guerrilla training in Yenan, North China under Chinese
communists in 1940) used suicide bombers in his conIrontation
with the French army in the early 1950s. Here are the relevant
passages Irom John Pimlott, written to the reIerence book War
in Peace (1945).
'... Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap were proponents
oI Mao Tse-tung`s theory oI revolutionary war and to
understand that it is to understand much oI their success.
Mao emphasized the Iactors oI time, space and will in his
writings; the revolutionary should trade space (territory)
to gain time and use that time to mobilize the political will
oI the people...
'... Once the Viet Minh emerged Irom rural areas and
tried to take their enemy on in open battle, however,
French military superiority should have tilted the balance.
Indeed, when Giap entered this phase too soon in 1951,
his Iorces were roundly deIeated at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe
and Phat Diem by a combination oI French deIensive
measures - prepared, entrenched positions surrounded by
barbed wire and mineIields - and superior weapons.
'Giap`s favoured tactics were to send in small suicide
squads to break through the defences and follow up
with wave upon wave of infantry attackers. These
tactics were countered in 1951 by artillery (oIten Iiring on
to predicted target areas), machine guns, aerial strikes
(particularly those using napalm) and, oI equal
importance, the tenacity oI French deIenders. But when
these advantages were undermined, as at Dien Bien Phu
where artillery was useless against Viet Minh positions in
the surrounding hills, aerial supply and support was
curtailed by the deployment oI Chinese anti-aircraIt
weapons and French deIences were weakened by a
policy oI encroaching entrenchment, the Viet Minh could,
and did, prevail. The French were, in the Iinal analysis,
and did, prevail. The French were, in the Iinal analysis,
out-Iought.
|War in Peace. Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare
since 1945,
Edited by Sir Robert Thompson,
Harmony Books, New York, 1985, pp.68-69|
I`m not sure whether Pirabhakaran would have checked
military source-books like the one quoted above. Considering
the deployment oI suicide squads and wave upon wave
inIantry attackers` used in the battles by LTTE since 1987, my
inIerence is that Pirabhakaran Iollowed the steps oI legendary
Giap, in establishing a battalion oI suicide warriors to counter
the aerial terror perpetrated in JaIIna.
Mervyn de Silva`s Observation
Among the many commentators on Pirabhakaran, I consider
Mervyn de Silva as the one who had a grasp in reading
Pirabhakaran`s mind. He recognized Pirabhakaran Ior what he
is; a diIIerent type oI leader and a rarity in the South Asian
politics. Eleven years ago, when the cordial bonhomie between
President Premadasa and Pirabhakaran came to a dead-end,
Mervyn de Silva wrote the Iollowing perceptive commentary
entitled, Prabhakaran makes his move`.
'... Mr. Prabhakaran, Ior he is a militarist, meaning a
man who uses military means Ior political ends. And by
military means, in this unconventional war, we do not
mean set-piece battles. Creating chaos and division in the
rear oI the enemy is a military tactic...
'Upto the IPKF`s pullout, the central concerns oI
President Premadasa and Mr. Prabhakaran converged.
For diIIerent reasons, oI course. The LTTE leader
wanted the IPKF oII his back and his men out oI the
jungle. President Premadasa wanted to disarm the ultra-
nationalist JVP by grabbing its principal ideological-
propagandist weapon what the JVP called Occupying
Hanuman (monkey) Army`.
'AIter that, politics took command Ior both. This meant
Ior Prabhakaran, Eelam` ideally, or regional autonomy
as close as possible to an independent state. BeIore that
he would like things done - such as the repeal oI the 6th
Amendment, which makes the espousal oI any separatist
Amendment, which makes the espousal oI any separatist
cause, illegal. More symbolic than anything else but yet it
is also a test oI the government`s (and the Sinhala-
dominated Parliament`s) bona fides.
'And then, the Provincial Council - its dissolution
Iollowed by elections. Both have been delayed. And a
condition laid down - surrender oI arms beIore the polls.
In his eyes, delays, conditions, uncertainties. So, he
decides to do something about it, a warning to the
government, to the Sinhala Establishment, perhaps even
to his own negotiators. Start a Iight, which is what he
knows best. By this, he can also achieve something else -
have his raw, teenage recruits bloodied, test the responses
and Iighting skills oI the Sri Lankan security Iorces.
|Lanka Guardian, June 15, 1990, pp.3-4|
Unlike other commentators who puII their commentaries with
verbiage, Mervyn de Silva was a writer with relevant words. I
considered that his above assessment oI why Pirabhakaran
ended his truce with President Premadasa was Iaultless.
Premadasa was also a politician with Iire-in-the-belly` and
street-smart` toughness. In the same issue oI the Lanka
Guardian, Iollowing his commentary, Mervyn de Silva had
printed the answers provided by Premadasa`s then lieutenant
Ranjan Wijeratne, with the caption 'Fighting Ranjan on
Tigers. AIter a passage oI 11 years, the pomposity shown by
Wijeratne is worth re-reading.
The incomplete mission of Ranjan Wijeratne
The seven-part question directed at Minister Wijeratne was as
Iollows:
(a) Whether the government has promised the LTTE not
to move out its Iorces without notiIying the LTTE?
(b) II so promised, who was responsible Ior ordering the
said soldiers to move out, thereby subjecting them to
injuries?
(c) From this incident it is clear that the LTTE maintains
illegal checking points in the North and the East. Has
the government empowered them to do so?
(d) II no such powers have been granted, will the
government take steps to do away with these
checkpoints?
(e) Will the government adopt legal action against the
LTTE with regard to the said attack?
LTTE with regard to the said attack?
(I) Will the government compensate those injured and the
dependents oI the killed?
(g) What steps will the government take to prevent the
repetition oI similar incidents?
Minister Ranjan Wijeratne was then in an euphoric phase,
Iollowing his liquidation oI JVP elites. His bombastic responses
to the above questions were as Iollows:
(a) I have given a pledge to get at their (the LTTE) necks.
(b) The said troops were traveling Irom one point to
another. The LTTE met them and opened Iire. We
have been making every eIIort to avoid bloodshed. At
this stage I ask Amnesty International to Iollow the
LTTE`s doings and not to accuse us oI genocide.
Taking note oI the LTTE`s actions we will deal with
them accordingly.
(c) Now they are running with their shoes out. Very soon
their pants will go too.
(d) There will be no LTTE or watch posts soon.
(e) We are not going to courts. We will use the barrel.
That is what they use on us.
(I) We will do that.
(g) Flatten the LTTE.
This response was delivered in June 1990. Six months later,
when the global attention was Iixed on the GulI War, the Sri
Lankan army played its card in the Colombo`s political table.
This is how the Economist magazine reported the scene in
January 1991.
'...Sri Lanka`s generals began pressing to resume the
Iight once it became clear that the ceaseIire was not
sticking. For perhaps the Iirst time, the army really Ilexed
its political muscle. That, it seems, was decisive. The
army says the Tigers are now vulnerable. They have
been weakened by a clamp-down on their activities in the
Indian state oI Tamil Nadu, Irom where they used to get
much oI their arms and Iuel.
'The army has been promising to wipe out the Tigers
within six months` Ior at least the past Iive years. It has
grown dramatically in size, Irom some 12,000 in 1984 to
60,000-plus today. But it is still Iighting against a guerrilla
Iorce that most people think can hold out almost
Iorce that most people think can hold out almost
indeIinitely. The Tigers still command a good deal of
support in the north and east of the country, which
may have been increased by the government`s policy
of bombing suspected guerrilla targets from the air.
Sympathy Ior the Tigers, the government claims, is
beginning to Iade. It will have to Iade much more beIore
the Tigers` days are numbered....|Economist, January
19, 1991, p.34|
As iI to corroborate this report oI Economist, at the height oI
the GulI War, Vadamarachchy region was bombed by the Sri
Lankan army on January 20, 1991. Two months later, I sent a
short letter to the Lanka Guardian captioned Valvettiturai
Bombing`, and Mervyn de Silva in his wisdom, did not publish
it. I wish to bring to light this unpublished letter.
'While I perused the 72 cumulative pages oI the three
issues oI the Lanka Guardian (Feb.1, Feb.15 and March
1) I received lately, I could not Iind any reIerence to the
Valvettiturai bombing carried out by the Government`s
Air Force between Jan.20 and 23 oI this year. None oI
the regular columns mentioned about this bombing which
occurred in the Northern region. However the 72 pages I
read were replete with material on Trotsky (by Regie
Siriwardene and S.Pathiravitana) and on the GulI War
(by Robert O`Neill, Bertram Bastiampillai and Izeth
Hussain).
'The Lanka Guardian also published a Iour page account
on the destruction and damage to Iraq between Feb.2 and
8, as seen through the eyes oI Ramsay Clark, a Iormer
Attorney General oI the USA. I wonder why none oI this
type oI reporting has been published on Valvettiturai
bombing. Is damage to Valvettiturai, oI less topical
interest to the Lanka Guardian and its readers than Iraq
and Trotsky?
Two weeks beIore I mailed this letter to Mervyn de Silva on
March 22, 1991, I also had come to learn that Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne, who was spearheading the Iight against the LTTE,
had died in a mysterious bomb blast in Colombo. |Continued.|


Part 7
Sachi Sri Kantha
|19 June 2001|
Violating the Seventh Commandment
1ulian West`s Passage to 1affna`
I should mention that what motivated me to send my letter oI
protest to the Lanka Guardian in March 1991, regarding the
Valveddithurai bombing was a sympathetic travelogue-essay oI
Julian West, published in the Asiaweek magazine oI March 8,
1991. It was entitled, Passage to JaIIna`.
Since the then Asiaweeks correspondent in Colombo had
described how he Ielt about visiting JaIIna in 1991, aIter a
lapse oI 17 years, and how it had been transIormed by the war
and the rise oI LTTE among Eelam Tamils, I Ieel that it has to
be placed Ior record in entirety in the web. I`m pretty sure that
many Tamils would have missed this essay when it Iirst
appeared.
For comparative purposes, one should also note that
Pirabhakaran didn`t receive any mention when Robert Holmes
chronicled the Eelam society in his Jaffna 1980 book. |See
also, American Ambassadors in Eelam - part 2, Jan. 3, 2001|
When Holmes was preparing his manuscript in JaIIna,
Pirabhakaran was 25 years old. Writing about the JaIIna scene
in 1979, Holmes had stated, 'Support Ior Eelam in the original
sense oI an independent homeland Ior the Tamils has declined.
In early 1979 the head oI the TULF |Amirthalingam|
announced the willingness oI his party to consider proposals
Ior regional autonomy. (p.299). A Iew sentences on Tamil
Tigers, written by Holmes state,
'...Tigers, oI which almost nothing is known Ior certain
but about which a vast amount has been speculated.
Credited with all sorts oI crimes in 1977 and 1978,
especially the assassination oI police oIIicers and
witnesses who helped the police, the Tigers in 1979 were
blamed Ior the death oI Iurther policemen and witnesses.
The Tigers were credited with enIorcing a belieI in the
The Tigers were credited with enIorcing a belieI in the
absolute desirability oI Tamil Eelam in 1977 and 1978,
but Iaith in Eelam certainly waned in 1979 in Iavour oI
local autonomy... (p.304).
Reporting a little over ten years later, Julian West provided a
well-balanced portrayal oI how Pirabhakaran`s inIluence on
Eelam Tamils had taken root, especially among the younger
generation. His eyewitness report oI January 1991 bombing
raids in Valvettithurai and how Eelam Tamils were terrorized
by aerial bombing also provide indirectly the motive Ior the
incorporation oI suicide bombers by Pirabhakaran. It also
included thumbnail sketches oI Malini and Nishanti, the
Tigresses, |who| represent the new JaIIna woman.`
Here is Julian West`s essay in entirety.
'I crawl into a sandy hole in the ground, preceded by a
small boy. Hardly able to breathe inside the concrete-
walled bunker, sand trickling through the palm-trunk
supports above my head, I try to imagine what it must
have been like - pressed in here with 30 or 40 Irightened
people - during the Sri Lankan Air Force bombing raids
three weeks earlier.
People sometimes stuII their ears with cotton wool to
deaden the sounds oI bombardment - described as one oI
the most Irightening aspects oI a raid - although the
bunkers are almost sound-prooI. Barely a Iew paces
away the turquoise waters oI the Indian Ocean lap
noiselessly, sole reminder oI the once-timeless beauty oI
Valveddithurai on Sri Lanka`s northern shore.
At mid-day on Jan.20 an airIorce helicopter Ilew over the
town, dropping leaIlets warning people to move out
within 48 hours. Three hours later, as people cowered in
bunkers, the Iirst bombers arrived. They were
accompanied by helicopter gunships and shelling Irom
Palali military base, 10km away. That night, Ilares Irom
naval vessels oIIshore lit up the town. Four days oI
continuous bombardment later, aIter more than 250
bombs had been dropped, Valveddithurai was virtually
reduced to rubble.
Emerging Irom the bunker, I am greeted by the same
desolate scene that shocked survivors. Whole streets are
destroyed. Barely a house is leIt undamaged.
Valveddithurai, birthplace oI Tiger guerilla leader
Valveddithurai, birthplace oI Tiger guerilla leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran and a well known smuggling area,
has been bombed several times during this seven-year
war. In the last attack, 500 houses and two large schools
were demolished and more than 100 other buildings,
including two historic Hindu temples, were irreparably
damaged. A Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
camp less than a kilometre away was untouched.
Valveddithurai was one oI the most densely populated
towns in Sri Lanka. Ten thousand people lived in a
1.6km coastal strip. The tightly packed houses collapsed
onto each other like a pack oI cards. Miraculously, only
ten people were killed and 20 seriously injured.
Forewarned by the leaIlets and the Iirst round oI attacks,
90 oI the population leIt Ior neighbouring villages. The
rest hid in bunkers. Almost every house in JaIIna
peninsula has one, which accounts Ior the relatively low
mortality rate in recent bombings.
We have been attacked since 1984, so we`re quite used
to it`, says Dr. K. Shanmugasunderam, head oI the
Valveddithurai Citizens Rehabilitation Committee, who
recites statistics oI destruction Irom his mobile oIIice`, a
straw shopping bag.
Not much is leIt oI Valveddithurai. A Iamily shiIts rubble
Irom the ruins oI their home. Another couple with a small
child attempt to cook a meal on the square-metre patch oI
Iloor that remains oI their house. I ask the man what they
intend to do. We`re hoping some aid organization will
help us rebuild. This is our land and though it`s small, we
don`t want to leave it.`
The destruction oI the historic Sivan Kovil and
Muttiramman temples, twin Siva and Shakti temples
more than 200 years old, has oIIended the residents
deeply. How would you Ieel iI a temple in your area was
destroyed?` asks Dr. Shanmugasunderam. I cannot
express it in words. But I Ieel it in my heart`. At his
insistence we take our shoes oII and tiptoe among the
broken glass and brick shards carpeting the Iloor. He
inIorms me that, had a bomb not just desecrated the
temple, non-Hindus like myselI would not be allowed in.
Valveddithurai people are intensely proud oI their
seaIaring history. They are especially proud oI having
produced Mr. Prabhakaran, their son`, and are
vehemently pro-Tiger. We have not lost our hearts,
despite the massive destruction`, says Dr.
despite the massive destruction`, says Dr.
Shanmugasunderam. We Ieel we can stand again. We`re
Iighting Ior our Ireedom and we`ll Iight till we reach our
objective`. Ironically almost the only intact ediIice is the
town Iountain - Iour brightly painted, cartoon-like tigers
rampant.
On Jan.30 air Iorce bombers attacked a crowded market
in Pudukudiyiruppu, a village south oI JaIIna peninsula
with a 90 reIugee population, killing 22 people and
seriously wounding thirteen. Three Siai Marchetti
bombers swooped down on the market at 5.30pm -
exactly the time most people are there`, says an observer.
A child had to have both legs amputated. Later we Iound
an arm. Pudukudiyiruppu was a very precise target.
There were no LTTE nearby`.
Throughout the night patients were relayed to JaIIna
General Hospital by the Red Cross and the Tigers, a Iive-
hour journey along cratered dirt roads and by Ierry. In
the casualty ward, a man with the saddest eyes I have
ever seen tells me he has lost his wiIe in the raid, leaving
him with their seven-year-old-son.
The same week a reIugee camp housing 40 Iamilies in a
girls` school, 10km Irom JaIIna town was also bombed.
Two people were killed and Iour wounded. A Iourteen-
year-old girl lost her leg. On the road south, at an ancient
shrine to the Hindu elephant god, Ganesh, bombs killed a
man, his baby daughter and a ten-year-old boy.
Bombing raids on the north have intensiIied since Jan.10,
the end oI a Tiger-proposed ten-day ceaseIire. The
LTTE was beleaguered by bad weather, adverse
international opinion and a crackdown on its activities in
India`s Tamil Nadu state. The army, believing the Tigers
were weakening, did not want the ceaseIire. Strategically
that was the time to hit them`, says a colonel in the
northern command.
Outside observers believe the intensity oI the present
campaign signals two things. Under the cover oI the GulI
crisis`, says a Tamil lawyer, the armed Iorces are
engaging in military operations oI an indiscriminate and
reckless nature`. The other indication is that the army is
working to a deadline, which some observers think may
be June this year. North oI Vavuniya, a town 140 km
south oI JaIIna, Sri Lankan Iorces hold only Palali air
base, Elephant Pass and Kankesanthurai naval base.
They have thereIore resorted to aerial strikes - most
They have thereIore resorted to aerial strikes - most
damaging to civilians.
The army claims it only bombs known Tiger targets. But
it admits that its aircraIt - single-engine Siai Marchetti
training planes, adapted to carry two bombs; Chinese Y-
8s and Y-12s; and British Avros, small passenger planes
Irom which homemade bombs are pushed out - do not
permit accuracy. We do not have the sort oI equipment
the Americans have`, says an army spokesman. Ours is
just look and see operation. However we sometimes
wonder iI it`s worth killing civilians just to get 20
terrorists`.
The bombs - oil drums Iilled with gelignite or sometimes
Ilammable gas and rubber tubes, which stick to the skin
like napalm - have no ballistic stability. II you look up
you can see them twisting and turning as they Iall`, says
the colonel. Sometimes we ourselves are mortally aIraid
oI where they`re going to land`. The Iorces accidentally
bombed two oI their own men recently.
InIiltration oI the Tigers among civilians also creates
inevitable casualties. The LTTE has taken over so many
houses, iI the Sri Lankan government wants to bomb
them, it will have to bomb the whole peninsula`, says an
exiled Tamil MP in Colombo. Deputy DeIence Minister
Ranjan Wijeratne told a recent press conIerence: We
don`t want to harm civilians. But they must understand
that it is dangerous to live in those areas where the LTTE
are operating. They must use their common sense and
move out oI JaIIna`.
I have come to JaIIna by accident - perhaps the best
word to describe a 280 km journey across battle lines and
through a Iree-Iire zone. I had intended to branch oII
westward. But once through the Sri Lankan army
checkpoint, I keep going up the long road north. To deter
attacks Irom helicopter gunships or stray bombers, I paste
a banner reading PRESS in large letters across the rooI oI
the car. And hope Ior the best. Journalists have no
permission to visit JaIIna.
Past the Sri Lankan army checkpoint at Vavuniya, I enter
a 1.6 km no-man`s land beIore the Tiger checkpoint.
About 3,000 people are waiting in line, bound Ior
Colombo. Many have waited Iive or six days. It is mid-
day. There is no shade. The temperature is in the 30s.
Each morning around 8.30 people run Irom the Tiger
checkpoint to queue at the army checkpoint. Each
checkpoint to queue at the army checkpoint. Each
aIternoon most are sent back. I am told the army is
processing an average oI ten people a day. Meanwhile
these people, who have already made an arduous two- or
three-day journey to Vavuniya, have to sleep out or
under trucks, sometimes in the rain. They have no Iood
and are at the mercy oI bicycle vendors selling rice
packets at Iour times the normal price. There is no water,
no lavatory. Now you see what we, as a minority, have
to go through`, says a salesman.
Conditions here are inhuman`, says Mr. Kulasekeram, a
thin, middle-aged clerk in the Land Commission
Department, returning home Irom a visit to his Iamily. He
whispers to me: Some ladies have not urinated Ior two
or three days`. A man with throat cancer is going to
hospital in Colombo. Later, I discover, a heart patient
who waited at the checkpoint Ior Iive days has died.
I last visited JaIIna seventeen years ago. Then, as now, it
seemed another country - separated Irom the rest oI Sri
Lanka not only by a causeway across a lagoon, but by
language, culture, religion and vegetation. JaIIna is an
arid, hot, sandy spit oI land where brittle Palmyra trees
stand sentinel against a burning sky, like huge Ians. At
night, in the dry atmosphere, the sky is brilliant with stars.
JaIIna people - Tamil-speaking Hindus - have been
conditioned by their sparse environment. They are
hardworking and thriIty, with a high percentage oI
doctors, lawyers and engineers. Geographically and
culturally the people oI JaIIna are closer to south India.
Valveddithurai is only 30 km Irom Tamil Nadu, halI the
distance to the nearest Sinhalese town. Their isolation
Irom the mainly Buddhist south was entrenched by a
Sinhala-only language policy, introduced in the 1950s,
designed to Iavour a Sinhalese workIorce. That
conIirmed their minority status - they comprise 18 oI
the island`s 17-million population - and germinated the
present separatist war.
As a JaIIna religious leader explains: Under the British
we were all equal. They Iound Tamils hard-working and
dependable, which is why there were so many English
schools in JaIIna - Ior employment. AIter the British leIt,
our youth Iound no avenue oI employment. The only
work here is coastal Iishing or Iarming.`
Then, JaIIna society seemed conservative and strict,
caste-bound and enclosed. Young people were brought
caste-bound and enclosed. Young people were brought
up to study. Girls were kept indoors, in the kitchen, until
marriage.
I Iind JaIIna changed Iorever. The Palmyra trees and
sandy wastes are still here. But in the last seven months
an estimated 20,000 buildings in the peninsula have been
wholly or partly destroyed. The walls oI those leIt
standing are cracked, ceilings have collapsed, barely a
window pane remains.
A shortage oI petrol and its prohibitive cost - $10 a litre,
thirteen times more than in the south - has grounded the
black Austin A-40s and Morris Minors that once chugged
solidly down the JaIIna lanes. Now a relay oI bicycles
Ierries kerosene and other essentials the 280 km round
trip Irom Vavuniya. Women, dressed as iI Ior a wedding
in astonishing red and gold saris, perch on the crossbars
oI bicycles, like birds oI paradise, bound Ior destinations
kilometers away. Only the Tigers drive vehicles.
AIter sunset most houses are in darkness. Kerosene costs
ten times the Colombo price and matches are unavailable.
We have been in the dark Ior the last ten months`, says
Mr. Kulasekaram. Our children can`t study anymore`.
There is no Iirewood or gas Ior cooking. Cash is short:
banks receive insuIIicient money Ior their needs.
Telephone lines were cut long ago.
Less than a third oI the Iood needed by JaIIna arrives.
Lorries are detained at Vavuniya Ior months, waiting Ior
transport permits. An oIIicial says only 3 oI Iood
intended Ior the area has been delivered in the past three
months. People are on the brink oI starvation`, he says.
They`re dying in silence`. Food sent by the government
Irom Colombo by ship, under the Red Cross Ilag, oIten
returns unloaded because oI high seas or attacks around
the military camp at Palali.
Once the ship arrived packed with sanitary towels. There
were thousands oI sanitary towels in JaIIna`, conIided a
nun. We don`t need sanitary towels, we need Iood.
People are living on one meal a day`.
In the airy, rambling JaIIna General Hospital, a doctor
tells me they lack essential drugs, dressings and surgical
instruments. Operations are oIten delayed because oI
lack oI oxygen`, he says. Also, we don`t have enough
oxygen Ior Iollow-ups, so some people die`. HalI the
1,015 beds cannot be used because oI bomb damage.
The Iace oI society, too, has changed. Most oI the middle
The Iace oI society, too, has changed. Most oI the middle
class and proIessionals have emigrated to Canada or
Australia. Since last June 125,000 reIugees have gone to
Tamil Nadu - swelling the number there to 200,000.
More Tamils now live in Greater London - 60,000 - than
in Colombo. In the peninsula 250,000 are displaced.
Most astonishing oI all to some older Tamils is the
emergence oI a young guerilla movement - the Tigers.
No one was as shocked as we were when our boys went
to war`, says a Tamil government servant. The
traditional set-up oI our society has changed`. Notes a
Tamil lawyer in Colombo: The under-35s now constitute
the ruling class`. As Mr.Anton Balasingham, the LTTE`s
amiable political spokesman, says: We are running the
law and order here. We are the civil administration`.
At the LTTE`s administrative oIIices, people wait to have
domestic and land disputes settled and to get exit permits
to leave the north. Armed cadres stroll in and out, but the
atmosphere is relaxed. Small uniIormed boys run errands,
though the oIIice is also staIIed by dedicated civilians.
It`s very diIIicult Ior us to live now`, says Sarojini, a 38-
year old woman in a blue sari, who works as a translator
and whose Iourteen-year-old son is a cadre. But we
don`t care about the Iood. We want Ireedom`.
In a real sense, the LTTE is like a large Iamily. Many
JaIIna people have relatives in the Tigers, and call them
our boys`. Their monkish disciplines are admirable, iI
austere: no smoking, no drinking, no marriage until a
certain age and number oI years oI service. They have
revolutionized the role oI women in JaIIna, giving them
equality, as Iighters, and striving to eliminate dowry and
caste systems.
Malini and Nishanti, tiny but stocky Tigresses, represent
the new JaIIna woman. Wearing combat Iatigues, their
hair tied up in braids - the regulation Tigress hairstyle -
the two area leaders giggle, hold hands and clasp each
other`s knees as we wheel down the road in a trishaw.
They are shy oI me - although they are the ones with the
T-81 Chinese assault riIle.
Both have received military training and Iought the Sri
Lankan army in several battles. Initially, they explain,
girls were involved in political work, but six years ago
they insisted women be allowed to Iight. They were Iirst
given AK-47 and M-16 assault riIles. Later they carried
heavy weapons like rocket-propelled grenade launchers,
heavy weapons like rocket-propelled grenade launchers,
bazookas and machine guns.
Malini says she and Iourteen other women halted the
advance oI Indian Peacekeeping Force troops on JaIIna
town in October 1987. We didn`t have uniIorms then, so
we were wearing skirts and blouses. The Indians didn`t
notice us, although we were carrying guns. They thought
we were just a group oI young girls. I ordered the girls to
lie down and Irom there we started Iiring`.
Malini, 28, is postponing marriage. Getting married and
having children is not a problem. But so many oI my
sisters have died so I have a responsibility to continue the
struggle`. So Iar 106 women Tigers have died in the war.
Nishanti, 22, joined the LTTE in 1987. Like many
Tigresses she ran away Irom home to join, knowing her
parents would stop her. They had hoped she would go to
university. I joined not to Iight against the enemy but to
liberate myselI`, says Nishanti. I`m opposed to the
dowry system. Now I wouldn`t accept a man who
wanted a dowry. Although Tamil women can choose to
work and be Iree, all these aspirations come to nothing in
the end. Women are enslaved by traditional systems and
male chauvinism`. As women guerillas, they experience
unheard-oI Ireedom.
Yet the Tiger`s domination oI JaIIna society, oIten
through Iear - real or imagined - gives them a sinister
complexion. More than once I`m told I cannot
photograph a poster or a hospital ward without
permission`. JaIIna now has no political parties, no trade
unions, no non-governmental organizations. Newspapers
are controlled. It has become a society with no political
Ireedom`, says a Colombo Tamil proIessor. The
intelligentsia, Iormerly an important component oI
society, has been subjugated.`
Still, support Ior the Tigers in JaIIna seems genuine, even
Iierce. Indiscriminate bombings and an economic
blockade on the north have inevitably driven people into
the Tigers` arms. Young people are still joining the
LTTE`, says the exiled politician. They Ieel iI they are
going to die anyway in bombing raids, they might as well
Iight Ior their rights`. Adds the lawyer: I don`t see how
the government can ever win back the conIidence oI
people who Ieel so alienated. People Irom JaIIna Ieel the
government has crossed a certain moral threshold which
IorIeits its right to claim the allegiance oI those citizens`.
IorIeits its right to claim the allegiance oI those citizens`.
Meanwhile combat continues. The week aIter my visit
Minister Wijeratne declared: We`re Iighting a war and
we`re Iighting it to a Iinish`. Mr.Balasingham claims the
LTTE would preIer a political solution to a political
problem`. But with its leader, Mr.Prabhakaran, in the role
oI jungle Iighter and hero, and with an entire generation
oI Tamil youth indoctrinated as guerillas or sympathetic
to the Tiger cause, the leap Irom warIare to politics looks
impossible. Mr.Balasingham syas there is now no
alternative but to Iight Ior an independent state`.
The civilian population is Ied up with this war`, says a
Tamil observer. But there is no space Ior them to speak
out. There are very Iew rational voices. The situation is
so dismal, one hardly sees any light at the end oI the
tunnel. It`s like a bad dream`. Replies the army colonel
when I ask him how long this war might last: I think
Ioreign correspondents can expect work in Sri Lanka Ior
a long time`.
Thus ended Julius West`s Passage to JaIIna`. I consider this
3,080 - word essay oI West as one oI the revealing documents
in the history oI Eelam Tamils. While hundreds oI
correspondents were covering the Baghdad bombing oI
January 1991 coordinated by Goerge Bush, Tamils had one
international report on Valveddithurai bombing oI January
1991, coordinated by Premadasa-Wijeratne team, due to the
eIIorts oI West.
Also, contrary to other reports Iiled by Ioreign correspondents,
in the travelogue oI West, the named Tamil sources (Dr. K.
Shanmugasunderam, Mr. Kulasekeram, Mr. Anton
Balasingham, Malini and Nishanti) were higher in number than
the named Sinhalese source (Minister Ranjan Wijeratne).
When it appeared in print, Wijeratne who had bragged, We`re
Iighting a war and we`re Iighting it to a Iinish` had also gone to
meet his Maker. Probably because oI this, there were two
critical responses Irom the Sinhalese readers oI the Asiaweek
magazine, complaining about bias. These were published in the
Iollowing month, under the caption Sri Lankan Voices`. I
reproduced these two letters.
First Letter:
'Re: Julian West`s Passage to JaIIna` (March 8): As a
Sri Lankan aIraid to visit parts oI his own country
because oI terrorist activity, I would like to see another
article aIter the same writer has interviewed government
deIence authorities, Sri Lankans oI other communities -
notably Sinhalese and Muslims - and Tamils living in
Sinhalese majority areas.
Perhaps Julian West could make a contribution to unity in
Sri Lanka by writing a comprehensive and unbiased
account oI the war. An important point in such an
account would be the Iact that Tamils live without Iear in
Sinhalese majority areas while Tamils endure great
hardship in areas inIested by the Tamil Tigers and
Sinhalese cannot exist at all in the north and east.
M. E. Mallawaratchie
Colombo, Sri Lanka
|Asiaweek, April 19, 1991|
Second Letter:
'West`s romantisation savours oI a stirring call to the
youth oI the region to press on. It is strange that the
article makes no reIerence to the comIortable living
enjoyed by this oppressed` minority in the city oI
Colombo, or the positions oI authority they continue to
hold in both the public and private sectors, or the
gruesome massacres oI innocent Sinhalese villagers Irom
time to time by the Tigers, or the repeated peace
overtures made to them by President Premadasa, or the
continuing intransigence oI the Tiger leadership, or the
wider ambitions oI the LTTE, including the
destabilization oI neighbouring India. The article would
have had more credibility and Iinesse iI it had alluded to a
Iew oI those Iacts.
Edward Gunawardene
Colombo, Sri Lanka
|Asiaweek, April 19, 1991|
My rebuttal to the two letters:
The Asiaweek was kind enough to publish my rebuttal to the
above two letters. This rebuttal appeared under the original
caption, Passage to JaIIna`.
'As a Sri Lankan Tamil I appreciate your publishing
Julian West`s well balanced Passage to JaIIna` (March
8). It portrayed the war-ravaged JaIIna peninsula warts
and all. In my opinion, readers M.E. Mallawaratchie and
Edward Gunawardene (Letters, April 19) are really
agonized by the popular support LTTE rebels command
among the Tamils oI Sri Lanka.
The recurrent attacks on Tamils in 1956, 1958, 1977,
1981 and 1983 prove the Ialsehood oI Mallawaratchie`s
claim that Tamils live without Iear in Sinhalese majority
areas`. This type oI aggression was a major Iactor in the
emergence oI the LTTE. It is an open secret that since
1971 more than 95 oI recruits to the Sri Lankan armed
Iorces have been Sinhalese, though Sinhalese constitute
about 75 oI the total population. Even Tamils living in
Sinhalese-majority areas have little chance oI joining the
armed Iorces. So much Ior the security Tamils enjoy in
the Sinhalese majority areas.
Sachi Sri Kantha
Osaka, Japan
|Asiaweek, May 17, 1991|

Violating the Seventh Commandment
While Eelam was being subjected to aerial terror by the Sri
Lankan army acting under the orders oI the then Commander
in ChieI - President Premadasa and his second in command,
Ranjan Wijeratne, the 41st American President George Bush
was splitting hairs on the issue oI how to tackle the Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein. Can the US government legally assassinate
Saddam Hussein was a prime issue oI discussion in the
American media. I think that this issue is pertinent to the
Eelam scene as well, since Pirabhakaran has been accused by
his adversaries Ior violating the Seventh Commandment, viz.
Thou shall not kill`.
I reproduce a one-page commentary |Saddam in the Cross
Hairs`| oI George J. Church which appeared in the Time
magazine, beIore the commencement oI GulI War. It deals
with how the US policy makers viewed the situation oI
ordering a hit on Saddam Hussein.
' No person emploved bv or acting on behalf of the
United States government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, assassination. That policy has been
aIIirmed by Iour successive Presidents - Gerald Ford,
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George Bush - and
enshrined in Executive Order 12333, issued in 1981 and
still in eIIect. Within the Executive Branch, that order has
the Iull Iorce oI law. So the US government could not
legally kill Saddam Hussein, even iI the dictator`s death
would stave oII or shorten a Middle East War.
Or could it? Yes, say some legal experts. In their opinion,
a hit on Saddam could be accomplished in ways that did
not violate the letter oI the order (the spirit is another
question). Simple though it seems to be, the order leaves
room Ior argument.
To begin with, what exactly is assassination`? Since the
Executive Order oIIers no deIinition, presumably
standard general concepts would apply. The Iavorite
deIinition oI Russell Bruemmer, Iormer general counsel
oI the CIA, is the premeditated killing oI a speciIically
targeted individual Ior political purposes`. He and others
contend, however, that such killing is sometimes allowed
under international law.
The obvious case is open war, in which anyone exercising
command responsibility becomes a legitimate target. As
unquestioned commander oI the Iraqi armed Iorces,
Saddam Hussein would presumably qualiIy as much as
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto did, whose plane was shot
down by US pilots in 1943 in a premeditated, speciIically
targeted and quite legal killing.
How about an undeclared war? That raises the problem
oI the legitimacy oI the war itselI. Abraham SoIaer,
Iormer legal counsel to the State Department, and others
advance this argument: Article 51 oI the United Nations
Charter recognizes the right oI selI-deIense against armed
attack, not only Ior the victim nation but also Ior others
coming to its aid. Kuwait has appealed Ior help under
Article 51, and the UN Security Council has in eIIect
underwritten that appeal by passing resolutions
condemning Iraq. Thus the US could legitimately strike
Iraq and exercise all the rights oI a belligerent, including
the right to kill the enemy commander, Saddam.
When General Michael Dugan boasted that iI war came,
American planes would probably target Saddam, his
Iamily and mistress, Secretary oI DeIense Dick Cheney
Iired him as Air Force ChieI oI StaII. Cheney told
reporters that Dugan`s strategy was potentially a
violation` oI the Executive Order. But a senior oIIicial in
the Pentagon argues that iI General Dugan had leIt
Saddam`s Iamily and mistress out oI it - better yet, iI he
had simply said the target was Iraqi command and control
- his statements would have been OK`.
Some experts Iurther argue that an indirect hit on Saddam
could be justiIied in situations short oI general war. They
contend that terrorism can be viewed as a species oI
armed attack, legitimizing selI-deIense in the Iorm oI
military action against terrorists and their sponsors. That
was the justiIication Ior the 1986 US air raid against
Libya, during which planes hit several places where
Muammar GaddaIi was known to have lived. Planners
insisted that they wee not targeting GaddaIi - that might
have been a bit too close to assassination - but aiming at
terrorist command-and-control centers. II GaddaIi had
happened to be in one - well, too bad.
Late last year the Justice Department reviewed how the
Executive Order might apply to US-supported coups. Its
conclusions are secret. But Iormer CIA counsel
Bruemmer has publicly voiced an opinion that the order
does not prohibit US oIIicials Irom encouraging and
supporting a coup, even when there is a likelihood oI
violence and a high probability that there will be casualties
among opponents oI the coup`. So long as the US does
not approve speciIic plans Ior the killing oI individuals, he
says, the prohibition against assassination has not been
violated`.
Again iI the government should determine that these
arguments are invalid? Simple: just change the order.
That can be done at the whim oI the President`, says
Michael Glennon, proIessor oI law at the University oI
CaliIornia, Davis. Capitol Hill sources assert that
President Bush could issue a rewritten order, or, more
likely, an exception` to the standing one, and legally keep
it secret. The only way to prevent that would be to write
a prohibition against assassinations into law. AIter
Congressional investigations in the 1970s turned up
evidence oI CIA-sponsored assassination plots, attempts
were made to enact such a law. But they Iailed, says one
legislator, because nobody was prepared to say right out
that assassination could never be US policy...
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart7.htm 1+f19
|Time magazine, October 8, 1990, p.29|
From the January 1991 showering oI bombs and missiles
targeted to Baghdad during the GulI War, one cannot inIer that
the American policy makers made valiant eIIorts to avoid a hit
on Saddam Hussein. On the contrary, the wily Iraqi leader
escaped death largely due to his protective barriers. Similarly,
the physical survival oI Pirabhakaran into the 21st century
should be attributed to his well-conceived protection protocols.
Available records show |see Ior instance, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon - part 1| that the Indian army and Sri Lankan
army had plotted to hit him Iatally. Thus, iI Pirabhakaran is
accused oI violating the Seventh Commandment, one can
opine that being a leader oI an army trying to protect the
Tamils, what he had done with his suicide bombers was to
neutralize the command-and control centers oI aerial terror.

Suicide bombers: a counter-terrorist weapon
The critics oI Pirabhakaran, due to their ignorance on military
knowledge, have Iailed to study why the use oI suicide
bombers became an important weapon Ior Pirabhakaran`s
army. Apart Irom boosting the sagging morale oI Tamils
suIIering Irom aerial terror, an intelligent military leader would
have to interdict the supply routes servicing the adversary`s
army. Blocking the land route to JaIIna served this purpose,
eIIectively, but partially. The sea route to JaIIna was available
to the Sri Lankan army, in addition to the costlier aerial route.
The Eelam leader speciIically targeted the sea-route, supplying
the armed Iorces stationed in the Northern region with the
suicide bombers.
Until now, I have not cited any LTTE sources, but Ior
conIirming this conjecture, I provide details on suicide
bombers which appeared in the LTTE publication, Kalhaththil
(In the Battle Front) oI July 29, 1999, who engaged the Sri
Lankan Iorces between 1987 and 1995. In this eulogy to the
LTTE martyrs, it was reported that Irom July 5, 1987 to May
29, 1999, the number oI Black Tigers who had achieved
martyrdom stood at 147. Among these 147 individuals, men
accounted Ior 110 and women made up the balance 37. Ninety
two oI the Black Tigers belonged to the Sea Black Tigers` and
55 were categorized as Land Black Tigers`.
The dates oI military operations as well as the locations and
the names oI Black Tigers who took part were reported as
Iollows:
1. 1987 July 5: Nelliaddy - Capt.Miller
2. 1990 July 10: Sea Tigers in Valvettithurai - Major
Kantharupan, Capt.Colin, Capt.Vinoth
3. 1990 November 23: Mankulam - Lt.Col.Borg
4. 1991 March 19: Silavaththai - Dumbo
5. 1991 May 4: Sea Tigers in Point Pedro -
Capt.Jayanthan, Capt.Sithambaram
6. 1993 August 26: Kilali - |cadre not identiIied|
7. 1993 August 29: Sea Tigers in Point Pedro -
Kadalarasan, Pugalarasan
8. 1993 November 11: Poonagari - Major Ganes,
Capt.Gobi
9. 1993 November 11: Palali airbase - Kalai Alagan,
Mathinilavan, Senkannan, Karikalan,
Sivayogan, Nallathambi, Seeralan, Kannan,
Senthamil Nambi, Iyannar, Veeramani,
Sivaranjan
10. 1994 August 2: Palai airbase - Major Jayanthan,
Thilagan, Seran, Capt.Navaratnam, Lt.Reagan
11. 1994 August 10: Sea Tiger operation -
Capt.Angaiyarkanni |Iirst woman Black Sea
Tiger|
12. 1994 October 19: attack on Sagaravardhana ship
- Lt.Col. Nalayini, Major Nangai,
Capt.Vaaman, Capt.Lakshman
13. 1994 November 8: Vettrilaikerni - |cadre not
identiIied|
14. 1995 April 18: Trincomalee harbor, attack on
Ranasuru and Sooraiva ships - Kathiravan,
Thanigaimaran, Mathusha, Santha
15. 1995 July 16: Kankesanthurai harbor - Major
Thangan, Major Senthaalan, Capt.Thamilini
16. 1995 September 3: Pulmoddai beach - Nagulan,
Kannalan
17. 1995 September 10: Kankesanthurai harbor -
Aruljothi, Mohan, Kumar
18. 1995 September 20: Kankesanthurai harbor, attack
on Lanka Mudhitha ship - Iour cadres
including Kannalan Siva
19. 1995 October 2: Battle at Mullaitivu sea - Major
Arumai, Capt.Thanigai
20. 1995 October 17: Trincomalee harbor - Ruban,
Sivakami, Sivasunthar
21. 1995 October 29: accident at Alaveddi, on their
way to Palali - Govindan, Venudas, Agathi,
Bradman, Nilavan, Sasikumar, Kesivan
22. 1995 December 5: Batticaloa, Puthukudiyirupu
camp - Major Rangan
The eulogy oI Kalhaththil which I studied had listed the Black
Tiger operations only upto the end oI 1995. It also noted the
1999 May 29 assassination oI Razeek (an accomplice oI the
Sri Lankan army in Batticaloa) by a Black Tiger, Arasappan.

Compliments from Critics
It tickles my Iunny bone when, even Pirabhakaran`s virulent
critics pay him compliments occasionally in a masked manner.
I provide just two recent examples, which have appeared in the
Island (Colombo) newspaper. In an opinion-piece with the
title, Why can`t LTTE be deIeated?`, Mr. N.B. Kiriella Irom
Colombo had observed,
'...Our armed Iorces have been provided with good
amount oI modern equipment such as guns, high speed
gun boats, Iighter/unmanned spy planes, trucks,
bulldozers, body armour, heavy duty trucks Ior
movement oI artillery etc. as opposed to the LTTE who
lack most oI the terms mentioned above. I have on more
than one occasion witnessed on TV news LTTE cadres
clad in slippers Iiring their guns with one hand whilst
holding the sarong with the other. I shudder to think what
havoc LTTE would have caused iI they were in
possession oI just one Iighter plane... |Island, May 18,
2001|
One can only pity Mr. Kiriella. II what he has seen on the Sri
Lankan TV makes him shudder` |viz. the cavalier Iashion in
which LTTE cadres clad in slippers Iiring their guns with one
hand whilst holding the sarong with the other`|, he should not
be dumb to comprehend the martial acumen oI Pirabhakaran,
who leads these cadres, is oI a caliber which is tough to match.
Here is a portion oI a recent editorial which appeared in the
Island newspaper oI June 13, entitled, Bread or Palaces?`
The Iocus oI this editorial was the Ilawed policies oI Chandrika
Kumaratunga, the current President.
'...Flogging the UNP Ior her Iailure to end the War`
during the last seven years is unlikely to convince even
the staunchest oI PA supporter. She tried to end it by
negotiations and by war but Iailed in both attempts.
Colossal deIence expenditure was incurred, much more
than what the UNP spent, during the seven PA years.
The military strategies adopted were clearly wrong. The
resources available to hold JaIIna-Vavuniya road were
not suIIicient and military commanders who said so were
sidelined and sent into retirement. The policy oI holding
real estate` rejected by astute commanders like General
Kobbekaduwe was ignored. Deputy Minister General
Ratwatte and some oI his top commanders who were in
command while our Iorces suIIered the greatest deIeats
are still in key posts.
The negotiated settlement held out by the PA - the draIt
constitutional amendment - has been a non-starter Irom
the very beginning. Prabhakaran having rejected it
outright... |Island editorial, June 13, 2001|
The only sound inIerence one can draw Irom these
observations is that iI Chandrika`s policies have recorded
repeated Iailures, Pirabhakaran must be doing something
Ilawless with his army.
The much quoted euphemistic comment about holding real
estate` which has been circulating in the Sri Lankan media Ior
the past decade also need some explanation. The Sri Lankan
army, with all its resources, has ceded a sizeable portion oI
land in the Tamil territory oI the island beyond its retrieval
capacity. Pirabhakaran`s army has captured it outrightly. This
development would have surprised the JaIIna chronicler
Robert Holmes very much. The moribund Sri Lankan state
will never be the same again, as it was 20 years ago.
|Continued.|

Part 8
Sachi Sri Kantha
27 1une 2001]
Pirabhakaran as a cash-cow
To the readers, I wish to diIIerentiate my position Irom that oI
other Pirabhakaran commentators. I categorically state that,
unlike some oI the other commentators and journalists, I have
not met Pirabhakaran in person even once. When an
opportunity arrives I will be glad to accept it. So, my analysis
oI his or LTTE`s actions may be Iar Irom perIect. But, unlike
other analysts who have written about Pirabhakaran, two inter-
twined links (being an Eelam Tamil and being born merely 18
months ahead oI him) give me an inside track oI
comprehending what he is trying to achieve and why he
marches to his own drumbeat, rather than being an old-line
Tamil politician. Majority oI the expert analysts who earn their
bread and butter by writing about Pirabhakaran, whether they
be Indian or other Ioreign journalists or Sri Lankan (Sinhalese)
commentators belonging to various party colors, do not
possess this sense oI identity with Pirabhakaran - one may call
it, an ethnic bond oI same-age cohort - like me.
There`s another diIIerence between me and most oI the other
Pirabhakaran commentators. I have not earned a penny Irom
my writings on Eelam politics, which began in 1974 during my
undergraduate days at the University oI Colombo. I earn my
living as a proIessional scientist and science author.
For majority oI Pirabhakaran commentators, he is a cash-cow.
One wonders how much the likes oI N.Ram, Rohan
Gunaratna, Dayan Jayatilleka and even the Broken Palmvra
scribes cash in per annum by their continuous stream oI anti-
Pirabhakaran literature. For instance, take a glance at the
Frontline magazine edited by N.Ram. He cannot continuously
publish articles, interviews and commentaries on other Tamil
ministers (Lakshman Kadirgamar, Douglas Devananda and
Arumugam Thondaman) who are posturing as leaders in Sri
Lanka. Kadirgamar was a non-entity beIore 1994 and will be
Lanka. Kadirgamar was a non-entity beIore 1994 and will be
again in the not-so distant Iuture. But Pirabhakaran has
remained a good copy Ior Ram Ior the past 15 years. This
aspect should also be taken into account in the Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon. He generates good cash Ilow, even Ior his
critics.
Perfecting the 1immy Malone offense
From what I can observe, Pirabhakaran has practised what I
call a Jimmy Malone oIIense`. This deserved some degree oI
special courage. Jimmy Malone was the veteran Chicago cop
character played by Sean Connery in the Al Capone bio-
picture The Untouchables. Malone, in his proIessional
wisdom, gives an advice to the young Eliot Ness about tackling
the American icon oI crime, as Iollows:
~You want to get Capone? Here`s how you get him.
He pulls a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of
yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the
morgue. That`s the Chicago way.
Delivered by Connery in his inimitable, riveting voice, that
piece oI advice would be a manthra Ior any budding military
leader like Pirabhakaran. Some oI Pirabhakaran`s successes in
creating panic in the adversary`s camp can be attributed
to perIecting this Jimmy Malone oIIense.
First vivid example oI this Jimmy Malone oIIense was
demonstrated by Pirabhakaran in May 1985 at Anuradhapura.
This is pertinent because by the beginning oI 1983, democratic
Sri Lanka has been turned into a personal IieIdom oI an aged
politician J.R. Jayewardene, who was more or less the
Colombo`s political version oI Chicago`s Al Capone in the late
1920s. Jayewardene pouted democracy but practised all kinds
oI political thuggery, not only on Tamils but also on his
Sinhalese opponents, who included the mother and husband oI
President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Pirabhakaran has
acknowledged his debt to the movie characters generated
by Clint Eastwood; but one cannot doubt that Sean Connery`s
movie roles, as an action-hero oI the 1960s, would also have
been a strong inIluence on Pirabhakaran.
A re-appraisal of the Anuradhapura Massacre of May
1985
Dayan Jayatilleka, in his recent vitriolic commentary about
LTTE`s 25th birth anniversary has noted,
LTTE`s 25th birth anniversary has noted,
'May 1985 is when the struggle Ior Tamil national
liberation lost its innocence and heralded the end oI its
heroic` phase with the Iirst large scale massacre oI
Sinhala civilians in the savage incursion into the sacred
space oI Anuradhapura... |Island, Colombo, May 6,
2001|
This is vintage Jayatilleka with his blinkers. He has described
the what`, when` and where` components oI the LTTE
action, but conveniently hidden the why` component. When it
suits him, he would cite the authors oI the Broken Palmvra
book. But when it reveals something, he will ignore it
outrightly. For this Anuradhapura conIrontation, Rajan Hoole
et al. has provided the background - noting brieIly the why`
component. According to them,
'In reprisal Ior the killing by the Sri Lankan Iorces oI 70
civilians in Valvettithurai and the damage to the homes oI
Prabhakaran and several other LTTE leaders, the LTTE
on 14 May 1985 conducted what came to be known as
the Anuradhapura massacre. A Iew LTTE men drove
into Anuradhapura and gunned down about 150 persons
with ruthless eIIiciency and got away. |The Broken
Palmvra, pp.80-81|
Another vignette oI truth, which was not highlighted by the
authors oI the Broken Palmvra, was provided by the Time
magazine, in its analysis on the questionable deals carried out
by the Indian Intelligence-wallahs in mid-1980s. Excerpts:
'...By late 1984, hundreds oI trained |Tamil| Iighters
were back in Sri Lanka, where they mounted acts oI
sabotage against government Iacilities. When attacks on
military targets Iailed to make Jayewardene budge, RAW
encouraged killings oI Sinhalese civilians to put more
pressure on Colombo. Says Uma Maheswaran, leader oI
the People`s Liberation Organization oI Tamil Eelam: A
RAW oIIicer asked us to throw a grenade into a Sinhalese
cinema or put a bomb in a bus or market in a Sinhalese
town. Only we and the Eelam People`s Revolutionary
Liberation Front reIused.` Agrees an Eelam People`s
leader: The RAW agents oIIered us money to massacre
Sinhalese. But we reIused.` The Tigers |reIerring to
LTTE|, by contrast, were cooperative. In May 1985 two
busloads oI Tigers drove into the ancient Sinhalese capital
busloads oI Tigers drove into the ancient Sinhalese capital
oI Anuradhapura and, in the town`s main bus station,
opened Iire with automatic weapons, slaughtering 143
civilians there and elsewhere. According to one oI the
participants in the killing spree, Tiger leader Vilupillai
Prabhakaran was in radio contact with RAW agents
during and aIter the massacre....|Time magazine-Asian
edition, April 3, 1989, pp.12-13|
Kindly note that even the Time magazine`s analysis Iailed to
mention the why` component in Pirabhakaran`s decision to
carry out the 1985 attack in Anuradhapura, which happened
only aIter his native town was damaged with the killing oI 70
Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan army and when his home
was also damaged. Another notable Iact in this Time
magazine`s report which appeared as a box-story with the
caption, 'Sri Lanka: Case Study oI a Disaster, was the open
accusation oI RAW by Uma Maheswaran Ior encouraging the
killings oI Sinhalese civilians to put more pressure on
Colombo.` At that time, Rajiv Gandhi was the prime minister
oI India who would have been kept regularly inIormed by the
tactics adopted by the RAW. That aIter Iour months oI this
open accusation oI RAW, Uma Maheswaran was bumped oII
in Colombo by the agents oI RAW is disturbing indeed |see
also, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 1|.
Among the contemporaries oI Pirabhakaran, who challenged
him Ior the Eelam leadership, I personally knew only Uma
Maheswaran in the mid-1970s, mainly because he was based
in Colombo around that time. Then he was Iull oI ideology and
brimming with vision Ior Eelam. Being a surveyor by
proIessional training, in one oI the group discussions I attended
in Wellawatte (around the 1977 general election period), which
I remember even now, he proposed building a coastal railway-
track Irom Point Pedro to Pottuvil. For sure, I would attest
that he had dreams in mid-1970s. But he couldn`t Iormulate
proper plans to realize his dreams. He got conIused and Ilouted
the Edison`s Iormula Ior success - hard work, common sense
and stick-to-it-iveness` - to transIorm himselI into a Tamil
politician in mid 1980s. That he later turned out to be Iailure
could be attributed to many Iactors - the distractions caused by
the lure oI Ileeting` power (being in proximity with Indian and
Sinhalese politicians and the ephemeral doodads oI photo
opportunities) and vanity, being the main contributing
elements.
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart8.htm +f1+
elements.
Why I mention this is that, an in-depth comparison on the
careers oI Uma Maheswaran and Pirabhakaran could illustrate
why one succeeded and the other Iailed miserably, though both
were partners at one time Irame oI the Eelam campaign. Every
human aims to achieve some power. Pirabhakaran was no
exception. But Ior that power to be stable |the word is stable,
and not permanent!|, one has to earn it the old Iashioned way.
In politics, business and military circles, those who were
anointed with power by crooked means or short-circuit routes
have seen their power-base evaporating quicker than they
could scream Geronimo`. Varadaraja Perumal is a good
example in the past, and Kadirgamar will be a good example
Ior the Iuture.
The Time magazine Ieature also reported that in 1985 'the
|Anuradhapura| killings prompted the Colombo government to
agree Ior the Iirst time to negotiate with the guerillas. The talks
collapsed, but the new Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi,
seemed reluctant to allow RAW to escalate the level oI
Iighting. Later, when India stepped up its support oI TELO,
the Tigers showed their displeasure at New Delhi`s Iavoritism
by attacking TELO camps and murdering some 150 oI its
members, thereby neutralizing RAW`s Iavorite Tamil clients.
RAW agents were apoplectic, but realized that they would
have to work with the Tigers as the dominant Tamil
Iorce....|ibid|
Simply put, Pirabhakaran`s intelligence was superior in quality
to that oI the RAW`s intelligence. The Indian mandarins and
politicians Iound it diIIicult to gulp this Iact. The type oI
retaliatory attacks perIected by LTTE, the Jimmy Malone
oIIense, have been a trade mark Ior the no-nonsense image oI
Israeli armed Iorces led by skilled warriors Moshe Dayan and
Yitshak Rabin. Even beIore Israel was born, President
Roosevelt`s army avenged the 1941 Japanese attack oI Pearl
Harbor by eliminating Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, using a
Jimmy Malone manoeuver.
One can argue whether what Pirabhakaran did was ethically
correct or not, but Ior the Iirst time in the recent Tamil history
oI the island, he stood up to the aggression against Eelam
Tamils, with a signature-act which scared the pants out oI his
adversaries. Until that moment, Tamils have been passive
victims oI state-supported aggression Ior decades. That
victims oI state-supported aggression Ior decades. That
hunted goat` image would have pleased the racist Sinhalese
politicians and the halI-baked Marxists like Dayan Jayatilleka
who proIess a Iacile love Ior Tamil rights. Pirabhakaran
showed to the Sri Lankan army and its then top-handler
Jayewardene, who more or less had begun to behave like an
aging Al Capone since 1983, that he had arrived and that he is
a real thing that Tamils and Sinhalese have never seen. Rohan
Gunaratna had stated in his book, Indian Intervention in Sri
Lanka (1993) that Pirabhakaran, while staying in Tamil Nadu,
chose Victor Oscar alias Marcelline Fuseless, the then LTTE
Mannar commander Ior leading the Anuradhapura operation.
Victor was subsequently killed in the battleIront in Adampan in
October 1986.
Commager on State Terrorism
To place in context, I`m oI the opinion that Pirabhakaran`s
Jimmy Malone oIIense in Anuradhapura was an answer to the
state terrorism. A month Iollowing the
Anuradhapura operation, a short essay on state terrorism
appeared in the New York Times oI June 27, 1985. This was
authored by the reputed American historian Henry Steele
Commager (1902-1998). It is reproduced below in its entirety
since it deserves notice in relation to the issue oI the
proscription oI LTTE by the USA, which came into eIIect in
1997. I will touch on the LTTE proscription by the USA in a
later section. First to Commager`s short essay.
Nations aren`t Innocent
Nothing can justiIy the terrorism practised by the Shiites,
the Iranians, the Palestinians and other desperate groups
who wage war on innocent victims. But then what can
justiIy terrorism as introduced and practised by most oI
the great powers whenever it served their ends over the
past century or so?
For what is terrorism but resort to deadly violence against
random and innocent victims, and shattering the Iabric oI
society with dynamite and Iire! What is most sobering is
that all the Old World nations practised intermittent
terrorism throughout the 19th century: the British in
India, the Belgians in Congo, the Russians and Poles
against their own Jews, the Turks against Armenians.
Americans, too, must conIess their own history oI
terrorism against those they Ieared or hated or regarded
as lesser breeds`. Thus, the extermination oI the Pequot
Indians as early as 1637; the Sand Creek massacre oI
some 500 Cheyenne women and children in 1864 - and
this aIter the tribe had surrendered; the lurid atrocities
against Filipinos struggling Ior independence at the
beginning oI this century; Lieut. William L. Calley`s
massacre oI 450 Vietnamese women, children and old
men at Mylai in 1969.
The Iormal rationalization - we might almost say
legitimization - oI terrorism came with World War II
when all the major participants abandoned precision`
bombing, directed against the military, Ior saturation
bombing directed against civilians. It was a policy that
eventually took the lives oI millions oI women and
children in London, Coventry, Hamburg, Berlin,
Dresden, Warsaw, Moscow, Tokyo and scores oI
other òpen cities`. The climax oI all this was the
Holocaust in Germany and, in 1945, the IateIul use oI the
atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
By the Vietnam War, terrorism was so taken Ior granted
that it almost ceased to excite comment. The Vietnamese
practised it in the traditional Iorm oI jungle warIare.
Americans practised it more systematically by pouring
seven million tons oI bombs on Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos (with none oI which we were technically at war) -
three times the tonnage on Germany and Japan during
World War II.` |New York Times, June 27, 1985|
Commager wrote this in 1985, and he was an acclaimed
historian. I`m perIectly convinced that this essay oI Commager
wouldn`t have been in the study notes oI Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne, who bragged about his skills as a terror-buster Ior a
little more than two years, Irom January 1989 to February
1991.
A re-appraisal of Rnjan Wijeratne`s assassination
(March 1991)
Quite a number oI anti-Eelam websites maintained by the Iront
organizations oI the Sri Lankan and Indian Intelligence
agencies (see Ior instance, the South Asia Terrorism Portal)
include the assassination oI Minister Ranjan Wijeratne as an
include the assassination oI Minister Ranjan Wijeratne as an
LTTE operation. I Ieel that contradictory views to this opinion
also deserve exposure Ior clariIying an issue, which has not
been investigated in depth.
I present Iour opinions on the assassination oI Minister
Wijeratne - two by Sinhalese (Rohan Gunaratna and Mervyn
de Silva), one by an Indian journalist and one by the devotees
oI Madhu Church.
(1) Jiew of Rohan Cunaratna (an analyst linked to the Sri
Lankan Intelligence arm)
As one would expect, Gunaratna implicated the LTTE in the
untimely death oI Wijeratne. Here is his description:
'On March 2 |1991|, Sri Lanka`s most powerIul and
most heavily guarded Minister oI State Ior DeIence
Ranjan Wijeratne was killed by a car bomb which was
detonated right in Colombo. Commenting on LTTE
transmissions monitored by Sri Lankan security Iorces, a
security oIIicial revealed: An apparently elated LTTE
voice was clearly heard over the intercepted broadcast as
saying the LTTE had more than acomplished its purpose
by leaving the scene oI the bomb explosion without any
clues`. The LTTE London oIIice denied the killing oI
Wijeratne but said his death would be a relieI` to the
Tamil minority. Sathasivam Krishnaswamy alias Kittu,
who heads that oIIice said: The LTTE acknowledges
that he |Wijeratne| symbolized the Sri Lankan racist and
oppressive system and was instrumental in the murder oI
thousands oI innocent Tamils`. Investigations revealed
that the bomb which killed Wijeratne had been placed
inside a parked car, and was triggered oII by its driver
Prem, a member oI the elite Black Tigers, specializing in
suicide attacks.
'Ranjan Wijeratne, speaking to the author |Gunaratna|
two days beIore his death, said that 5,000 men were
being trained and sent to the Iront every six weeks. He
said that Iour Ironts were established - Palaly, Vavuniya,
Mannar and Mulaitivu. He was hopeIul that the strength
oI the army will be raised to 100,000 by December 1991.
He said that the LTTE war could be won, but the
political and security elements had to be coordinated. But
his vision was not to be; within 48 hours, he had become
the latest casualty Iigure in a steadily rising death toll oI a
the latest casualty Iigure in a steadily rising death toll oI a
cruel civil war spanning almost a decade. The Sri Lankan
government was visibly shaken by the assassination oI its
most powerIul Minister. In his place, Premadasa
appointed Prime Minister D.B. Wijetunge as the Minister
oI State Ior DeIense. |Book: Indian Intervention in Sri
Lanka, 1993, Colombo, p.457|
I would like to Iocus on the phrase most powerIul Minister`.
That is one clue to probe the mystery oI Minister Wijeratne`s
assassination. In a previous page oI the same book, Gunaratna
provides hints oI the power struggle which broke out in 1990
between Premadasa and Wijeratne. The relevant passage is as
Iollows:
'The prelude to |Eelam| War |1990| was a conIlict oI
interests between the two powerIul men - Ranasinghe
Premadasa, the President and Commander-in-ChieI oI
the Sri Lankan armed Iorces, and his Minister oI State Ior
DeIence Ranjan Wijeratne, who on another Iront had just
saved Sri Lanka Irom Ialling into the hands oI the JVP.
Wijeratne`s intention was to crush the LTTE in the same
manner that he had dealt with the JVP. This would have
assured him honour and even the subsequent presidency
oI Sri Lanka (Ioot note: In an interview two days beIore
he was killed, he conIirmed his intentions to the author).
Wijeratne comprehended the contours oI the conIlict and
his solution was complex - it was more than asking the
IPKF to leave, or arming the LTTE to dislodge the TNA,
or working out a peace pact with the LTTE. Wijeratne
wanted the IPKF to Iinish oII` the LTTE. He had
assessed that the JVP threat was insigniIicant by mid-
1989. Initially, he vehemently opposed the arming oI the
LTTE and initiated a dialogue with India on the Iate oI its
proxy army - the TNA. But, Premadasa`s agenda was
diIIerent and was oIten in conIlict with his most powerIul
minister - Wijeratne had to tow the line or resign...
|ibid, p.434|
Now, one can see that by late 1989 (within an year oI
ascendancy as President) Premadasa had become concerned
with the power and glory which has accumulated to Minister
Wijeratne. But in the previous year, it was because oI
Wijeratne`s eIIorts, Premadasa was able to ward oII the intra-
party challenge Ior the presidential stakes mounted by his rivals
Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake. In his eulogy
Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake. In his eulogy
to Wijeratne, journalist Ajith Samaranayake had stressed this
Iact as Iollows:
'Ranjan Wijeratne`s was a brieI but a remarkable political
career. A blunt, tough-talking man, who brought the
discipline oI the plantations which he revered to the
business oI politics, the tall, silver-haired Minister was a
quixotic personality, an emerging legend wrapped in an
enigma. A dedicated UNPer, he reconciled all problems
by invoking the party code. He was the party man par
excellence...
'Widely regarded as an excellent organizer, he is well
known as having backed Mr.Premadasa`s claim to
succeed President Jayewardene at a time when other
claimants were in the Iield and uncertainty prevailed.
Under President Premadasa his rise was even more rapid.
He was Foreign Minister and thereaIter Minister oI
Plantation Industries but always the President`s deputy as
the State Minister oI DeIence... |Lanka Guardian,
March 15, 1991, p.8|
Though Kittu had issued a denial, one should note that Rohan
Gunaratna`s version implicating LTTE in the assassination oI
Wijeratne was written in late 1992, when Premadasa was still
in power. Now, to Mervyn de Silva`s prognosis on the
involvement oI multiple actors in the demise oI Wijeratne.
(2) Jiew of Mervyn de Silva (an independent analyst of
stature)
Mervyn de Silva, under the pseudonym Kautilya, wrote the
Iollowing eulogy to Wijeratne, entitled, Death oI a Soldier`.
Excerpts:
'Mr.Ranjan Wijeratne was made a general posthumously
but he was in Iact a soldier in civvies, always pure white
trousers and tunic. He was the party`s Iront-line
commander, and once installed State Minister oI
DeIence, Commander-in-ChieI de facto in two wars - the
war against the JVP in the South, and the much longer
war in the North-East...
'In his essential simplicity, he thought he could crush the
Tigers` as eIIectively as he did the JVP. He didn`t grasp
the essential diIIerences - the most important oI which
was motivation and the discipline exempliIied in the
was motivation and the discipline exempliIied in the
cyanide capsule. He believed, somewhat naively, that
more men, more arms, more money could give him the
victory he had scored so triumphantly in the South...
'While local detectives are investigating whether the high-
tech explosive was brought here in a container, the
Sunday Times added that links with a local casino chain
operated by a Singaporean operator may prompt the
policeto seek Interpol help...
'In a society torn by divisive conIlict, the violent and the
unseen, and by both steadIast allegiances as well as by
changing loyalties, Ranjan, unknown to him, became a
point oI intersection between those contemporary Iorces,
competitive claims diverse and Iierce issues. To name a
Iew, military solution/political settlement; old UNP/new
UNP; Sinhala nationalism/Thomian liberalism; law-and-
order`/dissent, opposition; army/party, etc. etc.
'No wonder so many theories, Irom the Singaporean
connection; to LTTE/EROS, DJV/EROS; inside-job/ and
any mix` oI these. What interested me was how each
individual and opinion group, quite oIten dispassionately,
almost pre-selected as salient this or that detail which
suited best his/her version. The Rashomon EIIect...
|Lanka Guardian, March 15, 1991, pp.6-7|
I will expand on Mervyn de Silva`s thoughts on the Rashomon
EIIect in the next chapter, aIter I present the analyses oI Rajiv
Sharma and John Colmey. This Rashomon EIIect` was to
repeat in the assassinations oI Rajiv Gandhi, R.Premadasa,
Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake which Iollowed
Wijeratne`s.
(3) Jiew of Rajiv Sharma (a journalist, probably with links
to the Indian Intelligence arm)
Rajiv Sharma, a journalist living in New Delhi, authored a
book Bevond the Tigers. Tracking Rafiv Gandhis
Assassination (1998). In this book, Minister Wijeratne`s then
boss President Premadasa has been pointed out as the main
culprit. The relevant passages are as Iollows:
'An ugly side oI Premadasa was reported in the press
during the investigations oI the assassination oI his
political rival and minister oI state Ior deIence, Ranjan
Wijeratne. Wijeratne was the Iormer chairman oI the
ruling United National Party, to which Premadasa
belonged. A popular Iigure with the military brass,
Wijeratne was entertaining hopes oI replacing Premadasa.
On March 1, 1991, Wijeratne was holding an
unscheduled meeting with the ChieIs oI the Army, Navy
and Air Force when Premadasa barged in unannounced.
The embarassment writ large on the Iaces oI the
assembled men was only too vivid Ior Premadasa to
miss. None spoke. A much worried Premadasa retreated
in silence. The Iollowing morning, when Wijeratne was
driving to his oIIice in his bullet-prooI Mercedes, he was
blown to bits.
'Murky aspects oI the hidden Premadasa-Wijeratne riIt
came to the Iore in a crucial interview Premadasa
Udugampola, Iormer head oI Sri Lanka`s bureau oI
special operations, gave to M.D.Nalapat in The Times of
India. Udugampolam who was Iorcibly retired at the age
oI 57, by his government when he was DIG |Deputy
Inspector General oI Police|, had incurred the wrath oI
the ruling establishment Ior demanding an independent
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the murder oI
Wijeratne...
(4) Jiew of devotees (as presented by 1ohn Colmey, an
American journalist)
I cannot leave out another interpretation oI Minister
Wijeratne`s assassination, since it describes the Iaith oI the
persecuted. In 1992, John Colmey, the Asiaweeks
correspondent based in Colombo, wrote a lengthy travelogue-
essay on his trip to JaIIna, along the lines oI Julian West (see,
The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 7). The relevant passage
is as Iollows:
'...On Feb.28, 1991, Deputy DeIence Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne gave a stiII warning to 9,000 reIugees at
Madhu Church. II they didn`t leave and allow the armed
Iorces to move on nearby Tiger positions, he told the
press, he would bomb the camp. The next night, with the
sound oI artillery Iire in the distance, hundreds oI
reIugees knelt beIore a statue oI the Virgin Mary that
welcomes visitors to Madhu with open arms, palms
turned up. Near midnight, say the people who prayed that
night, a miracle` happened. The statue`s arms began
closing and opening repeatedly. They considered it a sign
to stay.
to stay.
'The morning aIter the miracle`, Wijeratne and more
than 25 others were killed in Colombo by a massive Tiger
car bomb. The army`s march through Madhu veered in
another direction. Priests at the church don`t believe the
statue story. But they admit it partly explains why the
Madhu Church reIugee camp now has nearly 30,000
residents, with more on the way... |Asiaweek magazine,
August 14, 1992, pp.66-79|
No comments Irom me on this miracle`. But miracle or not,
three other personalities mentioned in Colmey`s Ieature who
had some choice words Ior Pirabhakaran had untimely deaths.
In the Iirst part oI his essay, Colmey described the activities oI
Brigadier Vijaya Wimalaratne as Iollows:
'51, a legend in the Sri Lankan army. He has been cited
Ior bravery seven times. He has commanded or planned
almost every major army oIIensive in JaIIna Peninsula in
the past ten years.
Colmey continued,
'When I leave Wimalaratne I tell him I may see
Prabhakaran in JaIIna. I ask iI he has a message Ior him.
Tell him` he says with a broad smile, there`s a devil
waiting to meet him on the other side.` |ibid|
Colmey also reported the aerial bombing oI Durga Devi
Devastanam Goddess Temple, about 1.5 km Irom Tellippalai
town. Excerpts:
'A helicopter pilot reported spotting people moving in the
temple area. The response Irom Air Force Command,
according to a monitored and recorded transmission: Hit
it`. Two Siai Marchettis and a British built Avro attacked
the temple and reIugee camp three times....|ibid|
By the time Colmey`s Ieature appeared in the Asiaweek oI
August 14, 1992, Brigadier Wimalaratne along with his Iriend
Maj-Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa had been called to their
Maker. Another politician with the name Mohammad AshraII
was reported in that 1992 Ieature as saying he would like to
slit Prabhakaran`s throat`. AshraII, as all know, died last year
in a helicopter crash. Even reporter Colmey Iaced problem
with President Premadasa. His lengthy essay in the Asiaweek
would have irked the paranoid Premadasa, since nothing was
would have irked the paranoid Premadasa, since nothing was
written about the President, while Brigadier Wimalaratne`s
achievements received abundant praise. Colmey was expelled
Irom Sri Lanka on the orders oI Premadasa. |Continued|
sangam.orgfP!RABAKARANfPart8.htm 1+f1+

Part 9
Sachi Sri Kantha
4 1uly 2001]
Four Musketeers of the UNP
Minister Wijeratne`s assassination and Rashomon theme
In his eulogy to Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Mervyn de Silva
subtly inIormed the readers about the conIlicts involving the
personalities who occupied the higher ranks oI power pedestal in
Colombo in 1991. OI course, he was experienced enough not to
name the then President Premadasa and his accomplices. Being
a movie critic during the early phase oI his journalistic career,
Mervyn de Silva rather alluded to Kurosawa`s Rashomon
theme, on the diIIiculty in extricating truth oI a dramatic event.
In his words,
'a dramatic event as perceived by Iour persons; diIIerent
versions oI the same reality, though only a single, shocking
and gruesome incident. Each person sticks to his/her story
IaithIully, convinced that it is the whole truth, the only
possible. Each is plausible and quite convincing. And yet
each is somehow coloured`, unconsciously distorted by
the mind` rather than the eye that sees. |Lanka
Guardian, March 15, 1991, pp.6-7|
Akira Kurosawa (1910-1998), the acclaimed Japanese movie
director, linked two short stories Rashomon (Rashomon gate)
and Yabu no Naka (In a Grove) written by author Ryunosuke
Akutagawa to create his Rashomon movie. His movie-script tells
about a rape in a Iorest and a subsequent murder oI raped
woman`s husband, Irom multiple angles oI participants and
witness.
For the beneIit oI readers, who may be unIamiliar with the
Rashomon theme, I brieIly paraphrase the plot oI this Japanese
masterpiece Irom Donald Richie`s The Films of Akira
Kurosawa |1970, 2nd edition, pp.70-80|.
First, a woodcutter tells how he went into the Iorest and
Iound some items belonging to the woman and went to the
police. There, he tells how he Iound the body. Then a
police. There, he tells how he Iound the body. Then a
priest presents his testimony about how he saw the
murdered man Takehiko and his wiIe beIore the tragic
events. Then, the policeman tells how he captured the
bandit who committed the crime. Policeman`s testimony
was interrupted by the bandit Tajomaru who tells his
participant version oI the crime. Then, the woman victim
who was raped tells her version. This was Iollowed by the
woman`s murdered husband who presents his version
through the lips oI a medium`. Finally, the woodcutter
revises his Iirst testimony, which he says needs correction.
According to the bandit (accused), he Iirst raped the
woman in Iront oI her husband and when he was about to
leave the scene, the woman stopped him and demanded a
duel between him and her husband. In that duel, he killed
the husband and the rape victim ran away.
According to the woman victim, when the bandit leIt her
aIter the rape, her husband spurned her because she lost
her purity. Then, in a spurt oI grieI, she killed her husband
and ran away.
According to the woman`s husband, aIter the rape, his wiIe
agreed to leave with the bandit, but insisted that bandit
should kill her husband Iirst. AIter the bandit leIt the scene
in anger, he committed suicide - being shamed by his
wiIe`s behavior.
According to the woodcutter, once the rape was done, bandit
was pleading with the woman to join him. She said that only
men can decide and she cannot decide what to do. Her husband
and bandit then had a duel and bandit killed the husband. Then,
the woman ran away.
My comment on Mervyn de Silva`s eulogy
Mervyn de Silva in his eulogy had mentioned that Rashomon
was Kurosawa`s Iirst movie, which was Iactually incorrect. I
wished to correct this error and I also wanted to bring to his
attention some Iacets oI bandit Tajomaru`s logic, as presented
by Akutagawa, the original author oI the two stories. Thus, I
sent the Iollowing letter dated March 31, 1991, to the Lanka
Guardian.
'Akira Kurosawa`s Iirst directorial venture was not
Rashomon, as stated by columnist Kautilya in his eulogy to
Minister Ranjan Wijeratne. In 1943, Kurosawa made his
movie directorial debut with a Iilm titled, Sugata Sanshiro,
movie directorial debut with a Iilm titled, Sugata Sanshiro,
about a judo master. His Iirst popular movie Yoidore
Tenshi (Drunken Angel), starring Toshiro MiIune as a sick
gangster, was released in 1948. Rashomon was released in
1950. It did introduce Kurosawa and the Japanese cinema
to the Western audiences. But giving undue credit to
Kurosawa Ior the Rashomon theme is like asserting that
Cecil B de Mille authored the Bible. The Rashomon movie
was based on two short stories (Yabu no Naka and
Rashomon) authored by Ryunosuke Akutagawa (1892-
1927), who committed suicide at the age oI 35 years.
Akutagawa adopted these two short stories Irom the tales
oI the 11th century Japanese anthology, Konfaku
Monogatari. So much Ior the origin oI Rashomon.
Columnist Kautilya, in reminiscing on Rashomon to
impress his readers, subtly implies that Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne is the samurai Takehiko |the murdered person in
the movie|. And with extensive citations Irom the Indian
newspapers Hindu and Dinamani, who have their own
axes to grind, Kautilya also Iocuses on the LTTE as the
robber Tajomaru (presumed villain oI the Rashomon
story). One can be surprised by the Iact that author
Akutagawa`s portrayal oI robber Tajomaru resembles the
logic presented by the LTTE Ior their past killings:
To me killing isn`t a matter oI such great consequence as
you might think... Am I the only one who kills people?
You, you don`t use your swords. You kill people with your
power, with your money. Sometimes you kill them on the
pretext oI working Ior their good. It`s true they don`t
bleed. They are in the best oI health, but all the same
you`ve killed them. It`s hard to say who is a greater sinner,
you or me...` conIesses Tajomaru in his deIence, to the
High Police Commissioner. Did Kautilya notice this
sequence perceptively in this movie?...
Once more, Mervyn de Silva (using his wisdom) preIerred not
to publish this letter in the Lanka Guardian in 1991. Thus, it
Iailed to join the ranks oI 43 oI my other letters he published in
his news magazine between 1981 and 1996. I should add that
among the 43 letters, three speciIically dealt with Pirabhakaran.

Four Musketeers of UNP
A retrospective look Irom late 1988 to October 1994 reveals the
power struggle which depleted the Iront-line positioned Iour
musketeers oI the post-Jayewardene phase oI UNP. First,
Premadasa and Wijeratne joined hands to prevent
Athulathmudali and Dissanayake reaching the presidency
sweepstakes. Secondly, Wijeratne having gained stature as the
JVP-smasher staked claim to Premadasa`s throne. Miracle or
not, Wijeratne was assassinated in a car bomb blast in March
1991. Thirdly, sensing that Premadasa had become a lone wolI,
Athulathmudali and Dissanayake pounced on him through a
parliamentary plot. Fourthly, Premadasa with street-smart
toughness evicted both oI them Irom the party. FiIthly,
Premadasa had a quick draw on Athulathmudali. Sixthly,
Premadasa Iollowed the path oI two oI his tormentors -
Wijeratne and Athulathmudali. Finally, Dissanayake as a lone
wolI, while perIecting his throne-capturing act, paid Ior his sins.
All Iour oI them Iell Ior their Himalayan-sized avarice one by
one.
The oIIicial versions, though challenged by accumulated
evidences, implicate LTTE in the assassinations oI all Iour
musketeers oI UNP. This is simple and convenient Ior many
Sinhalese to believe and painless Ior the politically-corrupt Sri
Lankan law enIorcement agencies to peddle. However, ardent
supporters oI these Iour UNP musketeers (which include the
immediate Iamily members oI the deceased) have expressed
reservations on the oIIicial versions peddled by the Sri Lankan
media.
While not negating the Iact that Wijeratne and Premadasa (being
the de Iacto and de jure Commander in ChieI oI the Sri Lankan
army, during 1991-93) would have been legitimate military
targets oI LTTE, one should note that Irom January 1991 to
May 1993, the relationships among the Iour UNP musketeers
were not cordial. Though Athulathmudali and Dissanayake
presented a veneer oI cordiality to the public aIter their
expulsion Irom the UNP by Premadasa, their unity was bonded
only by their mutual hatred oI the man Irom Kehelwatte. Even
when they Iormed the new breakaway party (DUNF), they were
bickering on who would be the prime leader oI that splinter
party. Their co-leadership ploy resembled the Iarce oI
two persons trying to sit in one toilet seat at the same time.
Following the departures oI Athulathmudali and Premadasa, the
last man standing turned out to be Dissanayake. The DUNF
party he co-Iounded with Athulathmudali split into two Iactions,
party he co-Iounded with Athulathmudali split into two Iactions,
one led by Athulathmudali`s widow Srimani and the other led by
Dissanayake. Subsequently, Dissanayake returned to the UNP
through the connivance oI Premadasa`s
successor D.B.Wijetunge, and elevated himselI to the ranks oI
UNP`s presidential candidate - merely 18 months Iollowing
Premadasa`s assassination.
Probability Analysis on the Beneficiaries of Four
Assassinations
I present below the probability analysis on the beneIiciaries oI
the assassinations oI UNP`s Iour musketeers, which occurred
between March 1991 and October 1994.
(1) Minister Ranjan Wijeratne
Date oI assassination: March 2, 1991
Place oI assassination: Colombo
Immediate beneIiciary oI assassination: R.Premadasa (the
President oI Sri Lanka)
Level oI antagonism shown by beneIiciary to victim: high
BeneIiciary`s accessibility to area oI strike: convenient
Method oI assassination: explosive bomb in car
Accessibility oI assassination material to beneIiciary: easy
Assassin`s availability to beneIiciary: easy
BeneIiciary`s relationship to LTTE: had become
conIrontational since mid-1990.
(2) UAP-breakaway party's co-leader Lalith Athulathmudali
Date oI assassination: April 23, 1993
Immediate beneIiciaries oI assassination: R.Premadasa
(the President oI Sri Lanka) and probably Gamini
Dissanayake (co-leader oI the UNP-breakaway party)
Level oI antagonism shown by the main beneIiciary to
victim: high
Method oI assassination: shooting by gun
Accessibility oI assassination material to beneIiciary: easy
Assassin`s availability to beneIiciary: easy
conIrontational since mid-1990.
(3) President Ranasinghe Premadasa
Date oI assassination: May 1, 1993
Immediate beneIiciaries oI assassination: Gamini
Dissanayake (main leader oI UNP`s breakaway party)
and
India`s policy mandarins
Level oI antagonism shown by beneIiciaries to victim:
high
Method oI assassination: suicide bombing
Assassin`s availability to beneIiciary: not easy, but
available at a price
conIrontational since 1987.
(4) UAP's Presidential candidate, Camini Dissanayake
Date oI assassination: October 24, 1994
Immediate beneIiciary oI assassination: Chandrika
Kumaratunga (prime minister oI Sri Lanka)
Level oI antagonism shown by beneIiciary to victim: high
Method oI assassination: suicide bombing
Assassin`s availability to beneIiciary: not easy, but
available at a price
BeneIiciary`s relationship to LTTE: cordial at the time oI
assassination

Political Assassinations
Anti-LTTE propagandists like Rohan Gunaratna repeat ad
nauseam that LTTE is the only organization to assassinate the
heads oI state belonging to two countries. The manner in which
the investigations on the assassinations oI Rajiv Gandhi and
Premadasa progressed during 1991-94, prompted me to write
the Iollowing letter to the Tamil Times, in which I commented
on the then prevailing situation. Excerpts:
'Political assassinations and what Iollows when an
associate oI the assassinated leader ascends to the power
has remained predictable since the times oI Julius Caesar.
Bertrand Russell, in his classic work, Power (1938) wrote,
:A politician, if he is to succeed, must be able to win the
confidence of his machine, and then to arouse some
degree of enthusiasm in a majority of the electorate. 1he
qualities required for these two stages on the road to
power are by no means identical, and many men possess
the one without the other'.
According to this principle, the associate oI an assassinated
leader is placed in a precarious position, iI he is not
photogenic or does not possess mass appeal. So, he will do
everything not to revive the memories oI his assassinated
colleague. Lyndon Johnson ascended to the power
Iollowing John F.Kennedy`s assassination in 1963. Hosni
Mubarak became the leader oI Egypt aIter the
assassination oI Anwar Sadat in 1981.Narasimha Rao was
lucky to become the prime minister due to the assassination
oI Rajiv Gandhi. Similarly, D.B.Wijetunge owes his
position as the President to the assassins oI R.Premadasa.
One can see parallels in the styles oI how Johnson,
Mubarak, Rao and Wijetunge have behaved in solving the
problem` oI the assassinations oI their immediate
predecessors. Johnson and Mubarak rushed to deliver the
verdict` and tried their best to erase the public memories
oI their assassinated predecessors, though it is questionable
how much they succeeded in this venture. Still doubts
remain about who assassinated Kennedy and Sadat, and
Ior what reasons. Rao and Wijetunge worked in the
opposite direction to that oI Johnson and Mubarak. But
their motives remained the same. They are least interested
in Iinding an answer to the assassination, which brought
them to the pinnacle oI power.
Politicians who step into the shoes oI their assassinated
predecessors do not gain much by reviving the memories
oI their deceased seniors. An exception to this rule oI
thumb occurs when the new leader is a Iamily member oI
the deceased leader. Thus the chapters` on the murders oI
S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike and Rajiv Gandhi were closed in
quickest possible time, because Sirimavo Bandaranaike and
Rajiv Gandhi who Iollowed them respectively were related
to the deceased leaders... |Tamil Times, December 1994|
All told, once the victim`s Iuneral and the Iormal mourning
phase is passed, the beneIiciaries count their blessings and carry
on with their careers rather than trying to Iind out who
committed the assassination. Premadasa (iI he was not the
culprit, as pointed out by Rajiv Sharma: see, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon - part 8) was not bothered in Iinding out who
killed Wijeratne. Premadasa`s successor Wijetunge was not
keen in Iinding out who killed his predecessor, since he was
competing with the populist image` oI his predecessor.
Dissanayake was not that interested in Iinding out who killed his
colleague Athulathmudali, since it did not serve much Ior his
own political ascendancy. Finally, Chandrika Kumaratunga has
not bothered about Iinding out who killed Dissanayake, because
she was the immediate beneIiciary oI that assassination.
President Premadasa`s assassination
(as viewed by the New York Times)
President Premadasa was the second Sri Lankan head oI state to
be assassinated, the Iirst one being padre Bandaranaike. Few
days later, the New York Times editorially commented on
Premadasa`s assassination; rather than paying the usual eulogy
to the Iallen head oI state, the editorialist wrote a sobering
reIlection on why the assassination could not be averted.
Moreover, the editorial also linked S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike`s
dubious contribution to the nation-building process and its
repercussions to the Sinhala-Tamil unity.
What is striking Ior me in this editorial was the emphasis on the
why` component oI the assassination and not on who` did it.
There was not a single sentence oI praise Ior Premadasa. I
reproduce this New York Times editorial oI 20 sentences in
entirety, though the Iirst 16 sentences provide a capsule
summary oI events oI the post-1956 period, known to all Eelam
Tamils. But, this editorial was written mainly to an American
audience (non-Tamils) who had to be appraised on the
background to the why` component oI Premadasa`s
assassination.
1he 1ragedy of Sri Lanka
'When Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, it was
called Ceylon and seemed to have it all: reasonable
prosperity, a stable parliamentary system, habits oI
nonviolence and a landscape oI bewitching beauty.
Now Sri Lanka, its oIIicial name since 1972, is
synonymous with striIe and tragedy. Last Saturday its
president and two dozen others were blown to bits by a
suicide bomber. This Iollowed the murder oI the
president`s chieI rival and leader oI the opposition. The
cycle oI retribution seems certain to continue.
How did things go so horribly wrong? Sri Lanka`s story
says a good deal about the unintended consequences oI
rooting politics in religion an ethnicity. It starts with the
election victory in 1956 oI the OxIord-educated Solomon
Bandaranaike, a year that also marked the 2,500th
anniversary oI Buddha`s attainment oI Nirvana.
Capitalizing on religious Iervor, the prime minister made
Buddhism the Iavored religion and decreed that Sinhalese,
spoken by Buddhists, was henceIorth the sole oIIicial
language.
This angered a minority a mainly Hindu Tamils, who saw
themselves at a permanent disadvantage since they spoke a
wholly diIIerent language than the mostly Buddhist
Sinhalese. So Bandaranaike temporized, and suggested
allowing reasonable use` oI Tamils. Communal riots
erupted, and the well-meaning prime minister was
murdered in 1959 by a Buddhist Ianatic. In due course
there Iollowed a Iull-scale civil war as an extremist Tamil
Iaction clamored Ior a separate state and Iound support in
India, with its 50 million Tamils, just across the strait.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi saw a chance in 1987 to
placate Indian Tamils and win points as a peacemaker in
Sri Lanka. He dispatched 50,000 troops to Tamil
strongholds on the island as part oI a peace accord signed
in Colombo. But India`s sometimes brutal soldiers were
unable to disarm Tamil militants, and in 1991 Gandhi
himselI was assassinated, almost certainly by a Tamil
extremist.
The lesson is sobering. When an ethnic majority diminishes
the citizenship rights oI a well-established minority, even an
idyllic island can plunge into a bloodbath. It is an open
question whether Sri Lankans can ever recover what has
been lost. But there is time Ior other countries to ponder
Sri Lanka`s tragic experience. |New York Times, May 5,
Sri Lanka`s tragic experience. |New York Times, May 5,
1993|
It is an irony that even in death, Premadasa (though being the
Sri Lankan head oI state, at the time oI his death) was not
recognized by name by the New York Times; however, the two
who predeceased him in a violent Iashion (padre Bandaranaike
and Rajiv Gandhi) received mention by name in the editorial.
The Iollowing assertions in this editorial needs reiteration. First,
it acknowledges the Iull-scale civil war` in Sri Lanka in which
an extremist Tamil Iaction` |LTTE| was clamoring Ior a
separate state`. Secondly, the sobering lesson Ior other countries
Irom Sri Lanka`s predicament is that when an ethnic majority
diminishes the citizenship rights oI a well-established minority`,
assassinations are bound to happen. Thirdly, whether Sri
Lankans can ever recover what has been lost` is an open
question. These three assertions acknowledge the role played by
Pirabhakaran and his army in turning Sri Lanka into a moribund
state.
Why I stress these assertions is to rebut the propaganda oI
Minister Kadirgamar, his cronies, Sinhalese commentators and
Indian policy mandarins that Pirabhakaran is only a terrorist`
and nothing else. Here is a recent sample oI this propaganda.
Colombo`s pro-war newspaper The Island carried a bizarre
editorial Why only McVeigh?` last May, prior to the execution
oI Timothy McVeigh`s death penalty. It took to task the US
Secretary oI State Colin Powell as Iollows:
'...It was only the other day that US Secretary oI State
Colin Powell urged Sri Lanka and the LTTE to negotiate
and evolve a solution to the northern conIlict. While a
negotiated settlement oI the conIlict is the best, iI possible,
the question is whether such exhortations by powerIul
nations do not smack oI double standards. For, they
themselves do not hesitate to deal with those who unleash
violence against the state and civilians in the most stringent
manner, while preaching to others on virtues oI negotiating.
Take Ior example, McVeigh. He was thrown in prison and
condemned to die by lethal injection. The US law took its
due course against him and the American public are
demanding that he be executed - the Iirst Iederal execution
in 38 years. While this treatment is meted out to McVeigh,
Sri Lanka is urged to talk to the LTTE, whose leader
Prabhakaran, is responsible Ior dozens oI blasts and
Prabhakaran, is responsible Ior dozens oI blasts and
hundreds oI massacres in comparison to which McVeigh`s
crime might Iade into insigniIicance... |Island-Colombo,
May 13, 2001|
Pirabhakaran is not a McVeigh but a military leader
The Iirst rule in scientiIic analysis states BeIore correlation,
balance the units oI items to be compared to a common
denominator`. This is taught to children at the secondary school
level. Simply put, one cannot mix either kilogram and milligram
or kilometers and miles. II done, the outcome will be laughed at.
Sometimes even rocket scientists lose their reputations Ior
disobeying this rule as demonstrated a Iew years ago, when the
collaborating groups oI a space probe experiment on either side
oI the Atlantic, used kilometers and miles interchangeably in
their calculations and ended up with pie in their Iaces. Sri
Lanka`s science-challenged journalists are oblivious to this Iirst
rule in scientiIic analysis, since they thrive in obIuscation.
By comparing the crime oI Timothy McVeigh (1968-2001) and
the war-related operations carried out by Pirabhakaran`s army,
the editorialist oI the Island revealed his ignorance in American
law and especially the McVeigh case. McVeigh in his deposition
had stated that he was the sole perpetrator oI 1995 bomb blast
oI Oklahoma`s Federal Building. In the Iirst instance, he never
had an army` to lead. Secondly, Ior more than ten years the
turmoil in Sri Lanka has been recognized in international circles
as a civil war, and Pirabhakaran leads one oI the warring
Iactions oI this civil war. One can be relieved by the prevailing
circumstance that the current US secretary oI state Colin Powell
has a military background and is not an ignoramus like the
editorialist oI the Island newspaper.

What is a civil war and how it differs from terrorism?
The lackluster UNP leader Dingiri Banda Wijetunge, who
Iollowed Premadasa Ior the presidency in 1993 was the
ignoramus who became a laughing stock by equating LTTE`s
military manoeuvers in a civil war against the Sri Lankan army
as terrorism`. Here is a recent commentary on that episode, as
presented by an anonymous correspondent to the same Island
newspaper.
' We do not have an ethnic problem, we have a terrorist
problem` was how a certain Iormer president oI this
problem` was how a certain Iormer president oI this
country characterized our situation. The same person,
visiting Paris Ior an Aid Consortium meeting responded
harshly to a European Ioreign ministry oIIicial, who
inquired about the human rights situation in the country
with the Iollowing words: What human rights problem?
We do not have any human rights problem.`
The diplomat had been aghast. He had been taken aback
by the man`s tone and all he had to say later was: May
God help you iI these are your leaders,` ' |Island -
Colombo, March 4, 2001|
I`m oI the view that one should not assess harshly
D.B.Wijetunge (a man with a limited world-view), when even
more literate politicians like Minister Kadirgamar who routinely
romps the world Ior podium limelight, peddle the same view
unabashedly. Thus it is pertinent to present what are the criteria
used to categorize a civil war and how a civil war is
diIIerentiated Irom terrorism.
I`m more than happy to reIer readers to an excellent
retrospective study by Roy Licklider, ProIessor oI Political
Science, Rutgers University, which appeared in the American
Political Science Review journal oI September 1995. The title
oI his paper was, The consequences oI negotiated settlements
in civil wars, 1945-1993`, in which he has included Sri Lankan
case also as one oI his study samples. Licklider has deIined a
civil war as any conIlict that satisIies all oI the three Iollowing
criteria.
1. Some inIluential leaders must be concerned about
possibly having to live in the same political unit with their
current enemies aIter the killing stops. This concern must
be important enough to inIluence the kind oI settlement
they are prepared to accept.
2. There must be multiple sovereignty, deIined by
Charles Tilly as the population oI an area obeying more
than one institution. They pay taxes (to the opposition),
provide men to its armies, Ieed its Iunctionaries, honor its
symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources
despite the prohibitions oI a still-existing government they
Iormerly obeyed` (Tilly, 1978). This criterion diIIerentiates
civil wars Irom other types oI domestic violence, such as
street crime and riots, in which there is no centralized
control oI the opposition. To distinguish civil wars Irom
colonial wars, each side must have signiIicant number oI
colonial wars, each side must have signiIicant number oI
troops made up oI local residents.
3. A civil war, by our deIinition, involves large-scale
violence, killing people. I used the operational deIinitions
oI the Correlates oI War project: (a) 1,000 battle deaths or
more per year and (b) eIIective resistance, that is, at least
two sides must have been organized Ior violent conIlict
beIore the war started or else the weaker side must have
imposed casualties on its opponent equal to at least 5 oI
its own (to distinguish between civil wars and political
massacres).
|American Political Science Review, Sept.1995, vol.89,
no.3, pp.681-690|
However unpleasant it has to be to his adversaries, by ProI. Roy
Licklider`s three stipulated criteria Ior a civil war, Pirabhakaran
can only be categorized as a civil war leader and not as a
terrorist`. Let me recapitulate. He has organized an army. He
has a population behind him which provide men (and women) to
his army and honor the symbols oI his military unit. Importantly,
the population oI the area where Pirabhakaran commands
support, give time to it`s |his army`s| service, or yield other
resources despite the prohibitions oI a still existing government
they Iormerly obeyed`. Also, Pirabhakaran`s army has
signiIicant number oI troops made up oI local residents`. Sri
Lankan army has been accused oI using hired mercenaries. But
Pirabhakaran`s army is made up oI local residents.
Next, I wish to Iocus on when Pirabhakaran`s army transIormed
into one oI the warring parties in the Sri Lankan civil war. This
is because, there is some conIusion on this issue about the date
oI transIormation in the published literature. |Continued|

Part 10
Sachi Sri Kantha
8 August 2001]
Civil War Leader for Tamils
The Time magazine (Asia edition) oI February 5, 2001, carried
the Iollowing brieI prognosis on the immediate Iuture oI peace-
talks in Sri Lanka, which Iloated in the air early this year.
'Last year was declared the Year oI War` by Velupillai
Prabhakaran, the leader oI the separatist Liberation Tigers
oI Tamil Eelam. He proved it: the Tigers almost captured
the northern JaIIna peninsula beIore being turned back by
the army. The insurgents will call Ior negotiations, but
President Chandrika Kumaratunga will reIuse rebel
demands Ior concessions beIore talks actually begin - and
in the meantime will move to liquidate the Tigers on the
ground. That will harden Tamil opposition to a peace
settlement. The civil war will reach its 19th anniversary
with no end in sight.
OI the Iive sentences which have more or less summarized
correctly the recent events (during the six months since it
appeared in print), I would like to Iocus on the vital Iinal
sentence. The proper use oI the phrase civil war` by the Time
magazine is correct. But, the accuracy oI its count oI 19th
anniversary (scheduled Ior 2002) is somewhat oII the mark, iI
one adheres to the deIinitions oI civil war` Iormulated by ProI.
Roy Licklider (see, Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 9).
Commencement of Civil War in Sri Lanka
Majority oI the contemporary analysts oI Sri Lankan politics and
international journalists (including the Time magazine`s
commentator) point to July 1983 as the commencement date oI
civil war in Sri Lanka. By analyzing multiple sources and the
events which occurred between July 1983 and December 1986
in Eelam and by trying to correlate these to Licklider`s three
criteria which have to be satisIied Ior the designation oI civil
war, I inIer that the date oI commencement oI civil war should
03f02f2009 The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part .
sangam.orgf.fPart10.htm 1f13
war, I inIer that the date oI commencement oI civil war should
be marked Ior November 1986. The period Irom July 1983 to
October 1986, until the Battle at Mannar where LTTE leader
Victor became a martyr Ior the cause, has to be labeled as a
period oI civil unrest, Iollowed by civil striIe.
The dictionary deIinitions oI the three words in discussion
namely, unrest, striIe and war are as Iollows, and I provide
examples within parentheses.
Unrest is deIined as, trouble, turmoil, especiallv with regard
to public or political conditions and suggesting premonitions
of revolt. (bank raids; LTTE`s 1985 retaliatory attack in
Anuradhapura)
StriIe is deIined as, fighting, anv contest for advantage or
superioritv (InIighting in TELO between Bobby and Das
Iactions; LTTE`s decimation oI TELO)
War is deIined as, an armed conflict between nations or states,
the science of militarv operations.
To recapitulate, Licklider`s three criteria which need to be
satisIied Ior a designation oI civil war are:
1. Presence oI inIluential leaders concerned about the
possibility oI living in the same political unit with their
current enemies aIter the killing stops.
2. Existence oI multiple sovereignty: Population oI an area
obeying more than one institution, paying taxes, providing
men to its armies, Ieeding its Iunctionaries, honoring its
symbols, giving time to its service, yielding other resources
despite the prohibitions oI a still-existing government they
Iormerly obeyed.
3. Large scale violence, reIlected by (a) 1,000 battle deaths or
more per year, and (b) eIIective resistance where the
weaker side must have imposed casualties on its opponent
equal to at least 5 oI its own (to distinguish between civil
wars and political massacres).
Now, let me show why the civil war began during
Pirabhakaran`s sole-leadership oI Eelam Tamils, and not when
Amirthalingam was the nominal leader in July 1983, or when
there were competing claimants Ior leadership among the Tamil
militants, between August 1983 and end oI 1986.
militants, between August 1983 and end oI 1986.
Pirabhakaran`s ascent to Eelam leadership, though
unprecedented in South Asian setting, is legitimate, iI one
comprehends the peculiar conditions Sri Lanka Iaced in the mid-
1980s, when (1) parliamentary democratic process was
paralysed by the duplicitous 1982 reIerendum designed by an Al
Caponist President (2) the TULF leadership abandoned its
constituents and Iled to Madras, and (3) Sri Lankan government
was militarily showing aggression in the Tamil zones, under the
pretext oI eliminating the Tamil terrorists`.
1984 - the year of chaos
1984 will be remembered in the Eelam history as one in which
EPRLF made waves. It produced a bizarre abduction oI
American couple, Stanley and Mary Allen, by EPRLF militants.
This episode, Ior some reason, has been omitted in the Broken
Palmvra book, authored by Rajan Hoole and his colleagues.
Though Pirabhakaran was not involved in this abduction
episode, I wish to cite this episode to show the Rodney
DangerIield-type leadership skills shown by Pirabhakaran`s
competitors, and how Pirabhakaran`s stature was diIIerent Irom
them. The Allens` episode also deserves exposure since one oI
the perpetrators oI this kidnapping currently holds a cabinet post
in President Chandrika Kumaratunga`s government.
Allens Irom Ohio State, while working on a development project
in JaIIna, were abducted on May 10, 1984 in JaIIna by the
EPRLF. The EPRLF then demanded that Allens will be released
when 50 million rupees in gold is paid to the Tamil Nadu
government and a number oI EPRLF cadres held in Sri Lankan
custody were released. In hind-sight, one can only laugh at these
two Iool-hardy demands made by the EPRLF, when India was
playing host to a visit by the then Vice President George Bush.
Now, to the resolution oI this abduction episode, I can do no
better than quote the central player K.Mohandas, Iormer
Director General oI Police (Intelligence) oI Tamil Nadu, who
made his deposition to the Jain Commission (investigating Rajiv
Gandhi assassination) on January 2, 1996, as Iollows:
'One night I was sleeping in my house. I got a call Irom
the US Consul General Irom Madras at 11 pm. He told me
Irantically that Mr. and Mrs. Allen who were working as
water resources experts in JaIIna had been kidnapped by
militants. He wanted my assistance to rescue them. I told
militants. He wanted my assistance to rescue them. I told
him how could I help him, Ior the incident had happened in
JaIIna. He pressed that the President oI the United States
oI America was interested. The Consul General said that a
large amount oI gold (to be paid as ransom) and six or so
militants in Sri Lankan custody must be released. This
must be done within 48 hours or else Mr and Mrs Allen
would be shot dead. Then something struck me and I
asked the Consul General to Iind out the names oI the
militants whom they were asking Ior release. Then as soon
as I placed the phone down, I got a call Irom
G.Parthasarthy Irom Delhi repeating the same request.
'I rang up MGR and took his permission to take up this
matter. I immediately proceeded to oIIice calling all my
principal oIIicers to come to the oIIice. As soon as I
reached the oIIice, I got a call Irom the US Consul General
revealing the names oI the militants whose release the
kidnappers had wanted. My oIIicers immediately said that
they were Irom the EPRLF. So the hunt began to Iind out
whether there are any important EPRLF Iellows in
Madras. AIter about 24 hours, we got 3 or 4 oI them
sleeping in a house. There were also two women who were
released. The catch was very important. Among the people
we caught were one Mr.Padmanabha who was later
massacred by LTTE. Then, two, Vardharaja Perumal, the
subsequent ChieI Minister installed by the IPKF in East Sri
Lanka, and three, General Douglas, selI-styled, who was
the chieI oI militant wing oI the EPRLF. I asked my
oIIicers to take the three to a Iive star hotel. It was about
2.00 am with a lot oI security, the oIIicers started
questioning. But upto 6.00 am, they did not budge.
'So I went there with two commandos with loaded
revolver. I made the three Iellows stand. I placed my
revolver on the table and made the commandos aim with
their AK-47 at them. There was silence Ior two minutes. I
looked at them straight and said: It is your people who
have made ransom demand on Allens. I will not allow you
to open your mouth. Whatever happens to Allens will
happen to you three right in this room`. AIter Iive minutes,
General Douglas said that he would speak to his people in
JaIIna to release Allens. I said, Mind you, nothing in
return, no gold; no release oI their comrades`. General
Douglas contacted JaIIna and got the release oI Mr and
Mrs Allen and, within Iour hours, Mr and Mrs Allen
sangam.orgf.fPart10.htm +f13
Mrs Allen and, within Iour hours, Mr and Mrs Allen
were released at the residence oI Bishop oI JaIIna with
their eyes blindIolded. |Jain Commission Report, vol.5,
chapter 18|
This kidnapping incident organized by EPRLF cadres in JaIIna,
though no harm was done to Allens due to quick-minded action
taken by MGR`s police chieI K.Mohandas in Madras, created a
negative image on Eelam militants in the spring oI 1984.
Excerpts Irom a Time magazine report (August 27, 1984)
authored by Spencer Davidson, on what happened in JaIIna and
Mannar, will Iurther substantiate the civil striIe which was
engulIing the Eelam in that year oI chaos.
'For two weeks the violence had spread through Sri
Lanka`s northern province, a bloody tit Ior tat oI ambush
and attack, pitting government Iorces against insurgents
Iighting Ior independence Ior the country`s predominantly
Hindu Tamil minority. Roads lay deserted, banks and
oIIices were shuttered, and shops opened Ior only a Iew
hours each day. By the time a measure oI calm had been
restored last week, at least 150 people had lost their lives,
including 25 government troops - the last worst bloodletting
in Sri Lanka since July 1983, when hundreds died in
communal clashes between the majority Sinhalese and the
Tamils. Said a Western diplomat in Colombo: This is the
Iirst sustained and signiIicant challenge to the government`s
authority in a year`.
'...The violence reached a climax early last week when
troops rampaged in Mannar, about 50 miles southeast oI
JaIIna, in retaliation Ior a Tiger ambush in which ten
military men were said to have died. By the time the
soldiers` destructive Iury was spent, 123 shops had been
burned and Iive Mannar residents lay dead... Minister
Athulathmudali insists that the government would never
permit a backlash by the Sinhalese. That would be
disastrous`, he said last week, as the government oIIered
compensation and help in rebuilding Mannar. But
reconciliation will be diIIicult, iI not impossible. Even
President Jayewardene admits gloomily that there now
exists à virtually unbridgeable gap`.
Even an year Iollowing the July 1983 holocaust, when
Jayewardene`s regime invited Israeli military advisers Ior the
Iirst time in Sri Lanka, Pirabhakaran was not noted by the
Iirst time in Sri Lanka, Pirabhakaran was not noted by the
international news analysts. Here is an excerpt oI a commentary
which appeared in the Economist magazine oI September 15,
1984, under the title, Call in the ProIessionals`.
'...The number oI Israeli military advisers in Sri Lanka is
oIIicially put at 10, but there are probably about two
dozen, training Sri Lankans at a military establishment near
Colombo. They belong to Shin Beth, the Israeli internal
security agency and a cousin oI Mossad, the intelligence
service. It takes a long time to train someone in counter-
insurgency, and it is unlikely that any Israeli-taught men
have gone into action against the Tamil guerrillas Iighting
Ior a breakaway state in northern Sri Lanka.
This commentary also stated that the links EPRLF had to PLO
around that time would have been one oI the reasons Ior Israeli
support to the Sri Lankan government.
'...The Tamils` Eelamist People`s Radical Front has close
ties with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Its guerrillas
have received training in PLO camps in southern Lebanon.
A number oI them were detained when Israel overran the
camps during its invasion oI Lebanon in June 1982. This
PLO link swayed the Israelis when Sri Lanka came
shopping Ior advice. Under an agreement with the United
States, Israel is not supposed to help other governments
with their security unless Israel`s own security is involved.
As Tamils are being trained just across Israel`s border, this
condition was Ielt to be met.
The last sentence oI this Economist commentary oI September
15, 1984 is also revealing: Sri Lanka is not yet at civil war. But
chaos is doing well.` Thus, one year Iollowing the July 1983
holocaust, civil war between the Sri Lankan government and
Eelam Tamil militants was yet to begin. Narayan Swamy, in his
book Tigers of Lanka, citing Joice of Tigers (September 1984)
had observed,
'The LTTE announced that it was switching Irom our
tactic oI hit and run to a sustained guerrilla campaign` and
urged other liberation groups to join us as comrades-in-
arms to Iight our common enemy and deIend our people`
|1996, 2nd edition, p.132|
Then, it took another two years Ior LTTE to qualiIy as the
authentic Eelam army in the Sri Lankan civil war.
1985 - the year in the brink oI civil war
As I show below Irom the excerpts oI news reports and
commentaries which appeared in the Economist, Sundav Times
(London) and The Nation (New York), the situation in Eelam
transIormed Irom chaos into near civil-war` in 1985. This year
began badly Ior the LTTE. On January 9, 1985, LTTE lost
Pandithar, one oI its oldest members, to an army raid at
Achuveli, in addition to losing another 13 guerrillas.
A month later, on February 13, LTTE showed its vibrancy by
raiding the Kokkilai army camp in which more than 100
guerrillas took part. It announced that 106 army men were killed
and lost 16 oI their guerrillas. The Sri Lankan government,
beginning a trend oI announcing dubious Iatality Iigures in its
engagements with LTTE, inIormed the public that only 4 oI its
soldiers died in Kokkilai raid by LTTE, while killing 14
guerrillas. Narayan Swamy had recorded that,
'Ravi Jayewardene |the son oI the then President oI Sri
Lanka, who was serving as an advisor to the army| who
visited the camp 3 days later, was in Ior a shock. For the
Iirst time since the ethnic conIlict turned into a Iull-scale
conIrontation aIter July 1983, the Sri Lankans realised how
sophisticated the enemy was. |Tigers of Lanka, 1996,
p.141|
I would consider that this LTTE`s raid on Kokkilai army camp
in February 1985, which Iollowed TELO`s raid oI Colombo-
bound Yal Devi train at Murikandy on January 19, 1985, in
which 22 army men were killed, eIIectively terminated
Amirthalingam`s leadership status. While Sri Lanka was sliding
into the brink oI civil war, by Licklider`s criteria,
Amirthalingam`s leadership oI Eelam Tamils satisIied only the
Iirst criterion. By exiling himselI in Madras aIter the July 1983
holocaust, he couldn`t organize his TULF party cadres vibrantly
to satisIy the second and third criteria oI Licklider.
A competition Ior the Eelam Tamil leadership among the Iive
militant Iactions sprang up in 1985. The competing parties were,
TELO, LTTE, PLOTE, EPRLF and EROS. The leaders oI
each oI these Iive Iactions satisIied Licklider`s Iirst criterion Ior
civil war leadership. Also, they established their inIluence among
segments oI the Eelam Tamil population, thus satisIying
segments oI the Eelam Tamil population, thus satisIying
Licklider`s second criterion oI multiple sovereignty`. However
the leadership skills oI Pirabhakaran`s competitors (as
demonstrated Ior instance, by EPRLF`s kidnapping episode oI
Allens in 1984, or the slavery oI TELO to India`s intelligence-
wallahs, or the secretive cult-like dealings oI PLOTE) leIt much
to be desired, though this was hardly visible to the general public
in 1985.
The Economist magazine`s analysis entitled A small but
solvable war`, which appeared in August 3, 1985 was a succinct
summary oI the then situation in Eelam. Excerpts:
'The guerrillas were at Iirst small groups oI middle-class
extremists who did not reIlect the opinions oI most Tamils.
Known as the boys`, they came Irom among the educated
but Irustrated young, many oI whom had been unable to
get into universities because oI the policy oI Iavouring the
Sinhalese.
When the army went in to root them out, it turned minority
violence into mass secessionism. The indiscriminate
reprisals against civilians do not seem to have been ordered
by oIIicers; the problem was that 95 oI the men in the
army`s ranks were Sinhalese peasants, most oI whom
regarded Tamils as Ioreigners and saw their job as Iighting
a war, not restoring law and order.
Last year the government banned Iishing around the
Tamil`s bit oI the coast, and restricted movement in Tamil
areas. The Iishermen and Iarmers Iound it almost
impossible to make a living; so the peasants joined in what
had been a mainly middle class Iight, and the guerrillas
suddenly had a Ilood oI volunteers. Most people this
correspondent spoke to in the North supported the
guerrillas.
This commentary also recorded that, 'As the guerrilla
movement grew, control oI the north slipped away Irom the
government..... But by mid-1985, in real terms, even the
Eastern Sri Lanka was slipping away Irom the control oI Sri
Lankan government, as presented by Simon Winchester`s on-
the-scene report, published in the Sundav Times (London), June
23, 1985, under the caption, Behind the lines with the Tamil
guerrillas`.
It should be noted that Winchester and a photographer who
accompanied him were arrested near Mutur and brought to
Colombo, under the pretext that both oI them had 'entered Sri
Lanka as tourists and had no journalistic accreditation Irom the
|Sri Lankan| government (London Times, June 20, 1985). I
reproduce a brieI sketch oI a young Tamil Tiger Irom
Trincomalee, as presented by Winchester.
' We are continuing with the Iight`, insisted Gamesh, a
young man who, in normal times, had been a medical
student, and was still a talkative and polite middle-class
Tamil oI 24. When we met, in a secluded village 10 miles
south oI Trinco`, last week, he was carrying a Soviet-
made AK 47 assault riIle, a bandolier oI ammunition, a
pouch oI hand grenades and a commando kniIe.
With his two well-armed colleagues - one a chemistry
student, the other a Iormer civil servant - Irom a local unit
oI the Tamil Tigers guerrilla group, Gamesh was scornIul
oI Tuesday`s announcement oI an 18-week cessation oI
hostilities` between the Sri Lankan armed Iorces and the
small army oI militant Tamils, in which he is a section
leader...
The battle Ior control oI Trincomalee - Nelson called it the
Iinest harbour in the world`, and it was a prime Royal
Navy base until 1957 - is turning out to be the critical
struggle in Sri Lanka. Militant Tamils, who want all oI
northern and eastern Sri Lanka Ior themselves, as an
autonomous or semi-autonomous state to be named Tamil
Eelam, see Trincomalee as their natural capital city. But
the island`s Sinhalese majority, well aware oI the strategic
and commercial importance oI the harbour - as a base Ior
the Ceylon Navy and as an expanding centre Ior container
trade with the Orient - is equally determined not to allow it
to Iall into Tamil hands.
In our brieI reconnaissance oI the region - cut short by our
arrest, interrogation, and summary removal back to
Colombo - it became easy to understand the bitterness and
hatred that is currently dividing the communities in Sri
Lanka...
The Tamil Tiger guerrillas are widely admired, their violent
tactics now, to judge Irom conversations and interviews
conducted last week, accepted by virtually all sectors oI
rural Tamil society. The Iighters themselves, who agreed
rural Tamil society. The Iighters themselves, who agreed
only with great reluctance to be interviewed, were
conIident and, it has to be admitted, impressive. The trio
we met, though possibly not representative, were intelligent
young men. They were not the hooligans or cowboys
mentioned in the Colombo press and they also were not,
they insisted, Marxists. True, their weapons were Soviet-
made (the Sri Lankan army uses American M-16s). But
they said: We want no more socialism Ior Tamil Eelam
than President Jayewardene wants Ior Sri Lanka as a
whole. We want Ireedom Ior our people, that is all.`
But in pursuit oI that Ireedom had not some terrible acts oI
slaughter been committed by the guerrillas? Yes, but it is a
vicious circle`, said Gamesh, the medical student. Violence
breeds more violence. You have it in Ireland. We have
it here. It will not end until the cause is taken away.`
|Sundav Times, London, June 23, 1985|
Five months later, the Nation weekly oI New York carried an
analysis by Richard Greenberg, with the caption, Sri Lanka
Lurches toward Civil War` (November 30, 1985). Among the
named sources, it carried the comments oI V.Balakumar (the
leader oI EROS), B.Deogupillai (the Bishop oI JaIIna) and
A.S.Balasingham (the spokesman Ior the LTTE), in addition to
the then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali. The
published comments oI these Iour were as Iollows:
Balakumar: 'The Sri Lankan security Iorces have been our
best recruiter.
Rev.Deogupillai: 'Many people are aIraid oI the boys, but they
are even more aIraid oI the army.
Balasingham: 'The colonization oI the Tamil homeland by
Sinhalese settlers is part oI a deliberate policy aimed at the
genocide oI the Tamil people. In the Eastern Province, the
Sinhalese share oI the population has grown Irom 8.4 percent in
1946 to 24.9 percent in 1981. We will never accept anything
less than the union oI the two provinces which make up the
Tamil homeland.
Athulathmudali: 'The Iacts are simply against it. |on
relinquishing control over the Northern and Eastern provinces|
Pirabhakaran, who was living in Madras, was not cited
(probably not interviewed) by Greenberg. But, I wish to quote in
(probably not interviewed) by Greenberg. But, I wish to quote in
Iull one paragraph which (aIter the passage oI nearly 15 years)
proves the unbelievable organizing skill oI Pirabhakaran.
' II it`s war, it must be war`, President Jayewardene
declared in a speech aIter the collapse oI the Bhutan talks.
But the war` has already cost millions oI dollars, which
have been diverted Irom development. Even with a military
budget eight times larger than that oI 1977, the army leader
had admitted that a victory on the battle Iield is virtually
impossible, and the Finance Minister is predicting huge
deIicits and potential economic ruin iI the Iighting
continues. It is not clear that the guerrillas could sustain a
prolonged war either. |Nation, November 30, 1985|
15 years since this was published, Pirabhakaran had proved the
validity oI the then Sri Lankan army leader`s premonition that
victory on the battle Iield is virtually impossible. How? Among
the Iive main Eelam militant Iactions which jostled Ior power,
only Pirabhakaran`s LTTE developed into a Iull-Iledged army to
satisIy the third criterion oI Licklider Ior being a participant oI a
civil war. OI the other Iour Eelam militant groups (PLOTE,
TELO, EPRLF and EROS), EROS Iaction oI Balakumar joined
the LTTE. PLOTE IorIeited the stage by its erratic leadership
and its inability to engage the Sri Lankan army continuously.
TELO and subsequently EPRLF lost their sheen and paid Ior
their sins oI becoming the puppets oI India`s intelligence
agencies. One oI the wisecracks oI Lalith Athulathmudali, made
in 1986, was 'Once they |Eelamists| get their air-conditioned
cars they will Iorget Eelam turned out to be true to quite a
number oI leaders belonging to PLOTE and EPRLF, and their
breakaway groups like EPDP.
1986 - the first year of civil war
In my assessment, the commencement oI repetitive, aerial
bombing by the Sri Lankan military was a signiIicant marker to
delineate the beginning oI civil war Irom civil striIe. The Iirst
such aerial aggression in Eelam was reported in the Saturdav
Review oI February 22, 1986, as Iollows:
'7 civilians, including 2 children were killed and 16 others
injured in bombing and Iiring by the Sri Lankan Air Force
in the outskirts oI JaIIna on 19th February. 14 houses, a
rice mill, a power loom, the Vairavar temple and the bo-
tree were damaged. The places aIIected by the bombing
were Thavady, Suthmalai, Manipay, Kondavil and Navaly.
The bombing by 5 Air Force planes, had started around
4.30 pm and gone on Ior nearly one hour.
The apparent provocation Ior the aerial attack - the Iirst in
Sri Lanka since World War II when the Japanese bombed
Colombo and Trincomalee in 1942 - was the reported
presence oI a camp oI the Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) led
by Panagoda` Maheswaran in the Thavady area.
Another signiIicant marker which I used to support the proposal
that 1986 was the Iirst year oI civil war, and not 1983, is the
accumulating number oI LTTE cadres who lost their lives in
engagements with the Sri Lankan army. The threshold Ior
satisIying Licklider`s third criterion oI civil war (viz., eIIective
resistance where the weaker side must have imposed casualties
on its opponent equal to at least 5 oI its own`) was reached
only by the end oI 1986. According to the casualty statistics oI
LTTE cadres, published in the LTTE publication, Sooriya
Puthalvarkal - 2000, LTTE lost its Iirst cadre on November
27, 1982. Then, the accumulating losses were as Iolows: 5 in
1983, 36 in 1984, 123 in 1985 and 258 in 1986. By the end oI
1986, LTTE had lost 423 oI their Iighters to the civil unrest and
civil striIe, which preceded the civil war.
From the inIormation provided in Narayan Swamy`s book
Tigers of Lanka, I tabulated the loss oI Sri Lankan army men
who conIronted the LTTE, Iollowing the Kokkilai army camp
raid in February 1985. It is as Iollows:
1985 April 22: 20 soldiers ambushed at Mullaitivu.
1985 April 26: 10 soldiers killed in a gun battle at Ariyalai.
1985 May 7: 5 soldiers killed in an army truck blast near
Valvettithurai.
|undated|: attack on Mannar police station, killing several`
policemen.
|undated|: 10 police commandos killed in Trincomalee.
1985 June 1: 30 naval personnel killed in an attack on a naval
camp.
1985 September 27: 9 soldiers killed in a gun battle, Iollowing an
attack on a police station, 16 km Irom Anuradhapura.
1986 October 12: Iierce gun battle in Mannar, killing 28 army
men, and LTTE losing one oI its leaders, Victor, who led the
1985 retaliatory raid on Anuradhapura.
11986 October 14: landmine attack in Trincomalee, killing 10
army men.
Obviously, the above tabulation is Iactually incomplete. But, one
can inIer that iI LTTE`s armed cadre numbered around 1,500 at
that time (see, Time magazine, February 16, 1987, p.7), the
threshold oI reaching Licklider`s third criterion Ior being one oI
the warring parties oI civil war was reached near the end oI
1986, when the casualty Iigures inIlicted on Sri Lankan army by
LTTE`s |acknowledgeably, the weaker side| engagements
reached at least 5 oI LTTE`s strength. The strength oI Sri
Lankan army in 1984 was 12,000 (see, Time magazine, August
27, 1984, p.31). By the end oI 1986, this number would have
been increased to nearly 25,000 - 30,000. The end oI 1986 also
marked the closure oI Pirabhakaran`s leadership-apprentice
phase and his impending permanent return to Eelam Irom Tamil
Nadu. |Continued|

Part 11
Sachi Sri Kantha
17 August 2001]
1987 - Paradigm Shift in Eelam
One reason why I took some eIIort to diIIerentiate the muddling
terminology oI civil unrest, civil striIe and civil war (see,
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon - part 10) is to debunk the logic oI
some Rip Van Winkles among the non-Tamils, who still live in
Iool`s paradise by not coming to terms with Pirabhakaran`s
elevation as a civil war leader. A typical example is a polemic
piece authored by a regular contributor to Colombo`s partisan
press, who uses the pseudonym Leo Panthera`. Under the title,
The logico-semantics oI Waging War`, this polemicist had
expressed the Iollowing argument on Pirabhakaran. I quote a
portion:
'Are we Iaced with a war, a rebellion or the machinations
oI a criminal outIit? Believe it or not there is no consensus
on this Ioundational issue that must surely determine the
parameters oI the counterIorce that we employ to quell the
disturbance.
By common agreement a war` is the unhappy result oI a
conIlict between states that has escalated to such levels that
resolution is possible only through the use oI arms. Is the
Eelam War` oI this nature? One would think not - but we
have clarion calls Irom the so-called International
Community` beseeching the two sides` to come to an
amicable agreement. Here the unspoken assumption is that
Eelam State` exists de Iacto or is aborning iI a poetical
expression is allowed. Indeed, the state-controlled press
carried recently a lengthy statement Irom the Media
Minister (a Cabinet-rank oIIicial) begging the two sides` to
Iorget the past and make it post-haste to the negotiating
table.
II this is the oIIicial position it makes a paradigm shiIt with
regard to which the public must be appraised and educated
- not slipped in surreptitiously. II that which menaces the
- not slipped in surreptitiously. II that which menaces the
state is a rebellion, Ioreigners must be asked to keep oII. II
any kind oI war is contemplated, it must be against those
alien powers that are aiding and abetting the insurgents.
Finally, iI Prabhakaran and his gang are criminals - their
unparalleled record oI brutality and terrorism vouches Ior
this - the culprits should be caught, put on public trial and
hanged rather than being humbly invited to the negotiating
table... |Island, Colombo, June 29, 2001|
This laughable proposition can only appear in Colombo press.
This Pirabhakaran-hater, it appears, has yet to wake up Irom
Rip Van Winklian somnolence during which 15 years have
passed by, proving that he (or she?) Ieints ignorance to the
international coverage oI events in Sri Lanka, which I have
cited in the part 10 oI this series. It is a pity, that this polemicist
has yet to glance even what the Sri Lankan army has presented
as history in it`s website, launched on January 1, 2001. The
paradigm shiIt, which Leo Panthera writes about, had occurred
in 1987. According to the Sri Lankan army`s history, Eelam
War-I had begun actively in 1987. I quote:
'During the past Iourteen years, there were many
operations conducted against the LTTE. Operation
Liberation` was conducted to wrest control oI the
Vadamarachchi area in the JaIIna peninsula, and was
aimed at Iorcing the LTTE to enter negotiations...
In these two sentences, the Sri Lankan army has acknowledged
that its opponent in war was LTTE, and not any other Tamil
militant Iactions. It also states that, it conducted many major
operations during the past Iourteen years (and counting!) and the
aim was at Iorcing the LTTE to enter negotiations`. By
extension, LTTE`s leader Pirabhakaran has remained the civil
war leader oI Eelam Tamils Ior the past 15 years. The likes oI
Leo Panthera pollute the partisan press in Sri Lanka and India,
and until they clear their muddled thoughts, Pirabhakaran-
bashing will continue Ior sure. Eelam Tamils should comprehend
why this happen, and I provide an explanation.
Grief Stages of the Sri Lankan State
In 1969, Zurich-born American medical doctor Elisabeth
Kubler-Ross (born 1926) published a trend-setting book, On
Death and Dving. In this book, she presented her novel idea oI
Iive stages oI grieI, which occurs in patients who await the
death. I was introduced to the thoughts oI Kubler-Ross, when I
death. I was introduced to the thoughts oI Kubler-Ross, when I
took a summer course on Death Education` in 1983 at the
University oI Illinois. I was taught by ProI. Barbara Sirvis that
the Iive stages oI grieI, Iormulated by Kubler-Ross are:
Stage 1: Denial - the patient denies the Iorthcoming loss oI liIe,
and react by withdrawing Irom routine and social contacts.
Stage 2: Anger - the grieving patient becomes Iurious at the
person who inIlicted the hurt (Ior instance, who transmitted the
disease) or at care-givers (doctors misdiagnosed the malady).
Stage 3: Bargaining - the patient then makes bargain with the
God, pleading like II I repent Ior the sins, will you allow me to
live a little longer?`.
Stage 4: Depression - During this stage, the patient gives up
hope oI survival, though undercurrents oI anger and sadness still
persist.
Stage 5: Acceptance - The Iinal stage oI grieI, during which
anger and sadness prevailing in stage 4 tapers oII, and the
patient learns to accept the impending reality oI death.
To remember these Iive stages, I acronymized` them as
DABDA stages oI grieI: denial, anger, bargaining, depression
and acceptance. Later it dawned on me, that not only people but
even nations or states can die, Ior which history provide many
examples. When states are in such a moribund condition, the
citizens oI such states also pass through Kubler-Ross
Iormulation oI Iive stages oI grieI. The current Sri Lankan
state is a good example.
Repetitive outbursts on Pirabhakaran by the Sinhalese in the
parliament, multi-media and Internet can be understood, iI
we tag the Iive DABDA grieI stages to the impending death oI
the Sri Lankan state. Some polemicists like Leo Panthera
(quoted above) are in the Iirst stage oI grieI - Denial. These
Iolks can be labeled as Rip Van Winklians oI Lanka. Many oI
the Buddhist clergy and media scribes in Sri Lanka are in the
second stage oI grieI - Anger. They identiIy Pirabhakaran as the
one who has caused the grieI and vent their anger on him. Quite
a number oI Sinhalese politicians (belonging to SLFP and UNP)
are in the third stage oI grieI - Bargaining. For the past 15 years,
Jayewardene, Premadasa and Chandrika Kumaratunga have
been making use oI ruses to bargain Ior power, with
Pirabhakaran. In my view, Sri Lankan military personnel Iall
into two stages. Politicians (the big-wigs) among the military are
in the Bargaining` stage oI grieI. The Ioot soldiers (and their
Iamilies) who Iace the brunt oI LTTE`s power are in the Iourth
stage oI grieI - Depression. From what appears in the partisan
press in Colombo, a notable percent oI non-aIIluent Sinhalese
public also have reached the Depression stage. See an example
illustrated below. As oI mid-2001, only a minority among the
Sinhalese have reached the Iinal stage oI grieI - Acceptance oI
impending death oI Sri Lankan state.
Some recent examples of Depression (as revealed in
Colombo Press)
It is a good exercise Ior anyone, who come across any
commentary or criticism on the current plight oI Sri Lankan
state, to comprehend the mood oI the writer by classiIying
the commentary`s tone, according to the Iive stages oI grieI,
Iormulated by Kubler-Ross. Three examples are given below.
An opinion-piece, which appeared in the Island (Colombo) oI
August 9, 2001, aptly authored by a 'Depressed Citizen, Mt.
Lavinia, illustrates my point. It commented on the recent
Katunayake raid by the LTTE`s commandos. Excerpts:
'It is reported that the Bandaranaike International Airport
and the adjoining Air Force Camp were guarded by more
than 300 security personnel on that IateIul day (24.7.2001)
when our aircraIt received massive damage Irom only 20
LTTE cadres. Instead oI Iiring at the terrorists, some
security men were sleeping, some hid themselves, and
others ran away to save their lives, leaving the terrorists a
saIe passage to destroy everything at sight...
The security staII, oI course, had come back to lock the
stable door aIter the steed was stolen, and gain the
commendation oI the president Ior restoring normalcy in
double quick time! This had been the modus operandi` oI
our security oIIicers even when the LTTE attacked, inter
alia, the Central Bank, Oil Tanks, Galadari Hotel, Harbour
and Dalada Maligawa...
By the way, let not the Minister oI Tourism waste the
hard-earned money oI the tax payers in trying to promote
more hotels, and particularly in advertisements till the end
oI the accursed Eelam war. However much we may
advertise, the Ioreigners are no Iools to rush in where
advertise, the Ioreigners are no Iools to rush in where
angels Iear to tread, at the risk oI their liIe and limb....
In contrast to the verbal gymnastics oI Leo Panthera` (who is in
the Denial stage oI grieI), this Depressed Citizen` makes no
bones about the moribund state oI Sri Lanka, by yearning Ior
the end oI the accursed Eelam war`. I provide another example
oI Iush depression-tinged writing Irom C.A.Chandraprema, a
regular commentator to the Island newspaper. Excerpts Irom his
commentary entitled, Katunayake debacle: Incredible power oI
total indiIIerence` are as Iollows:
'The LTTE has in the many years since 1983, grown as
an organization and they have carried out many spectacular
attacks. They have bombed to smithereens the one and
only Central Bank, they have bombed the one and only oil
reIinery. In their attacks on military bases, the number oI
Sinhalese casualties are at World War Two levels.
Nowhere else in the world does one Iind trained soldiers
getting wiped out by their thousands in one go in internal
conIlicts. The casualty rates in the Sri Lankan army are
enough to even Irighten India....
The Ioreign media and the international community
probably thinks the Sri Lankan polity may now be literally
tearing their hair in anguish over the |Katunayake| Air Base
attack. But those living here will know that this is hardly
the case. OI course iI an attack like this had taken place in
the USA or the UK, the public will be Ieeling humiliated
and Iurious. To Ieel humiliated, one has to have a sense oI
shame.
But the Sinhalese have no sense oI shame. They lost it
long ago. The country`s main air base has been reduced to
ashes but nobody in the Air Force or the government has
resigned, nobody has been court martialled, nobody has
been sacked without pension, nobody has been demoted.
AIter the Katunayake debacle the President even thanked
the armed services Ior their eIIiciency. All that will happen
is that the debris will be cleared aIter the insurance
companies have looked at the remains and liIe will continue
as usual. You see, the Sinhalese cannot aIIord to have a
sense oI shame. II they had a sense oI shame, considering
all the things that have happened over the past two
decades, they would all be dead oI apoplexy by now!...
|Island, Colombo, July 28, 2001|
Another regular analyst K.Godage wailed on the same day`s
issue oI the Island newspaper that the LTTE attack on
Katunayake was a revenge attack. When one reads Godage`s
analysis, one can see how he describes his stage oI depression,
which was Iilled with undercurrents oI anger and sadness.
Excerpts:
'Shock, deep sadness and insecurity pervades this country
today, Ior we have been badly let down once again. The
questions being asked are, Who is responsible Ior our
security?` Is anybody accountable to anybody, leave alone
us the people, whom they are least concerned about?` The
words responsibility` and accountability` have lost their
meaning in this country...
DisgraceIul, quite unbelievable, shocking, pathetic` were
some oI the words that came to mind, when I Iirst heard oI
the attack. These thoughts were overtaken by anger and I
am certain that millions around this country Ielt the way as
I did. In recent years we have had six major attacks by the
LTTE in the city. Does not the sheer ineptitude oI those
responsible make you sick in the guts? And we are said to
be on some sort oI war Iooting... Do not those responsible
Ieel ashamed oI themselves? Is there no selI-respect leIt? I
suppose SHAME is something unknown to the authorities.
The LTTE leaders may be considering us as a pack oI
morons and imbeciles - and who can blame them? ....
AIter providing his two penny-worth` oI advice, such as
upgrading oI Intelligence oI the state`s security apparatus by
enlisting Ioreign assistance`, to the authorities concerned,
Godage concluded his sermon to the ruling mandarins,
'II the country`s main international airport cannot be
secured Irom terrorist attack what more? Can any Ioreigner
have any conIidence to even visit this country, leave alone
invest. The hotel cancellations are just coming in - and we
can expect doom and gloom in the months ahead. What a
let down!
I would add that Godage should Iocus more on upgrading the
intelligence` oI politicians who cling to the ropes oI power in Sri
Lanka.
To be Iair by K.Godage, he had included in his commentary,
nine speciIic massacres perpetrated by the Sri Lankan army on
Tamils Irom July 1983 to 1985, with a qualiIying note that 'The
LTTE in their charge against the armed Iorces oI Sri Lanka
|has| cited the Iollowing instances oI mass massacres. I cannot
vouch Ior their authenticity oI some oI the incidents cited but
according to them the Iollowing massacres occurred.
Taken together, what one can gather Irom these depression-
tinged writings oI Sinhalese public is that they circumstantially
pay compliments to Pirabhakaran`s strategic skills as a leader oI
an army. But Eelam Tamils should not Iorget that Pirabhakaran
earned his merits the old-Iashioned way; by trial and error, by
experimentation and improvisation, and by speciIically adhering
to the three components oI Edison`s Iormula Ior success -
stick-to-it-iveness`, common sense and hard work. What is
remarkable is the Iact that, during the past two centuries, he
never had the beneIit oI a military role model among Tamils in
India, Eelam, Malaysia or Singapore, to Iollow.
Brearley`s Thoughts on Leadership
It is opportune at this moment to introduce the thoughts on
leadership, as presented by a sportsman, who knew his beans.
Mike Brearley (born 1942) was a Iormer England test cricketer,
who is recognized Ior his winning record as a captain in the
1970s. Clear thinking, calmness under pressure and decisiveness
were his Iortes in delivering success as a leader. Currently, he
practices as a psychoanalyst, and I enjoyed reading his recent
essay, published in the British Medical Journal. I introduce this
essay on leadership Ior the readers, to assess Pirabhakaran`s
perIormance during the past 15 years.
Brearley`s eight thoughts on leadership skills are as Iollows:
1. Seen Irom a distance a successIul team may look well
organized and cohesive; get closer up and you see, in my
experience, the vigour and rivalries oI a group oI strong
personalities. It is like a lively argumentative Iamily.
2. The aim oI a team is not to remove individuality but to
harness it in the intents oI the whole.
3. When a team works well all its members share aims.
SelIishness is modiIied when our ends and identiIications
broaden.
4. The good leader gives weight to both Iorces, the needs
oI the individual and those oI the team. He or she will
Ioster an atmosphere in which members oI the group Ieel
Iree enough to have their heads, without slipping over into
selIishness. It can be a Iine line.
5. These tensions - selI interest versus group interest,
Ireedom versus equality, conIlict versus cohesion - appear
in all teams. Both elements in the contrast need attention,
and a sensitive leader helps the balance to veer in relation
to the prevailing wind, keeping the boat on course. The
leader`s task requires Ilexibility. He or she needs to be
Iirm and capable oI strong, decisive action but has to
listen, consult and give people their heads.
6. Another area oI Ilexibility lies between delegation and
taking decisions (and responsibility) oneselI. In the
ordinary running oI a team the conIident leader can allow,
Irom moment to moment, diIIerent individuals to be in
charge, provided always that he or she can when
necessary reassume control.
7. There are always tendencies within a group to go
against the task oI the team, and at such times the
leader`s responsibility is not only to listen and Iacilitate,
but also to persuade, enlist and conIront. At such times a
leader needs courage and a willingness to Iight the source
oI inIection, as well as tact and Ireedom oI mind.
8. Another requirement is to have the capacity to Iree
oneselI Irom the prevailing emotional valencies...Team
leaders need, as Freud said oI members oI his proIession,
courage.
In my opinion, Pirabhakaran scores well in each oI the eight
demands oI leadership, presented by Brearley. What is
noteworthy is that, Brearley had the beneIit oI a Iirst class
degree Irom Cambridge University beIore he embarked on his
success as one oI the two winningest test cricket captains (the
other being, Ray Illingworth), England produced in the past Iive
decades. But Pirabhakaran`s Iormal education was limited to
secondary school in JaIIna. In addition, the level oI risk and
responsibility is more daunting Ior Pirabhakaran than what was
Iaced by Brearley during his captainship oI the cricket team.
First, whereas Brearley led only 10 men, Pirabhakaran has to
lead now around 10,000 young men and women. Secondly,
whereas Brearley`s opponents in the Iield consisted oI only 11
men at any time Irame, Pirabhakaran has to Iace an opponent,
who is ten-Iold higher in head-count. Thirdly, whereas cricket,
Ior Brearley, is only a summer game; but civil war Ior
Pirabhakaran is a more serious eIIort.
Being a Classics scholar, Brearley closed his essay on leadership
with the Iollowing paragraph, which is worth reproducing:
'Good teams, in whatever sphere oI liIe, require a wide
range oI qualities that are in creative tension with each
other. The Greek historian Xenophon, writing about the
situation in 504 BC when the Greek City States were Iaced
with threats oI invasion Irom Persia, listed the personal
requirements Ior an elected general: ingenious, energetic,
careIul, Iull oI stamina and presence oI mind...loving and
tough, straightIorward and craIty, ready to gamble
everything and wishing to have everything, generous and
greedy, trusting and suspicious`. The situation has not
changed much since 504 BC. (British Medical Journal,
Nov.4, 2000; vol.321, pp.1141-1143)
Judging Irom his track record, since 1987 to the most recent
Katunayake raid (which generated the above-mentioned
depression-tinged breast-beating by the Sinhalese public), none
will dare to question iI one asserts that Pirabhakaran Iits the bill
- word Ior word - oI what Xenophon wanted in an elected
general. |Continued|.


Part 12
Sachi Sri Kantha
25 August 2001]
In the eyes of Foreign 1ournalists
Someone has recorded that journalists write only the Iirst draIt
oI history. I can extend this pithy maxim by adding that
historians (as well as individuals concerned, by means oI
autobiography and memoir) then scribble the second draIt oI
history, which in turn is scrutinized by the Old Man` Time,
who serves as the ultimate arbiter oI record keeping.
Pirabhakaran became a Iocus oI attention to the journalists in
1986. He was only 32 then. For the past 15 years, this
journalistic peeping via the key-hole` on Pirabhakaran has
continued unabated. A rarely available, exclusive interview
with Pirabhakaran is a career-booster Ior any budding
journalist in Sri Lanka or India. Even the doyen oI Sri Lankan
journalists, Mervyn de Silva, yearned Ior one interview Irom
Pirabhakaran, but was unsuccessIul. In 1987, the year which I
designated as the year oI paradigm shiIt` (see, Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon part 10), two biographical essays on
Pirabhakaran which appeared in the international magazines,
established his stature beyond the South Asian region, as a
young leader oI note. These were as Iollows:
1.

A Man oI Surprises`. Asiaweek (Hong Kong), August
16, 1987, p.16; an anonymous Ieature.
2.

The roar oI the Liberation Tigers. Newsweek,
November 9, 1987, p.26; authored by Ron Moreau and
Sudip Mazumdar.
Though Eelam Tamils know the Iactual details, I wish to
reproduce these in Iull, Ior the beneIit oI international
readership, since both Ieatures seem complimentary to each
other in minor details. But a skeptical eye is helpIul Ior two
reasons. One is about the little Iactual inaccuracies in names,
reasons. One is about the little Iactual inaccuracies in names,
numbers and dates, which pepper these Iirst draIts oI
history`. The other is to check the embellishments which
adorn these Ieatures, since truth doesn`t reveal its beauty to
journalists who are unlettered in the Tamil language and Tamil
cultural practices. In addition, complete reliance on Sri
Lankan military intelligence experts` (invariably Sinhalese),
unnamed Tamil source in Colombo` and unnamed Indian
diplomat` by the Ioreign journalists Ior inIormation on LTTE
also have added distortions to the truth to diverse degrees.
A Man of Surprises`
Asiaweek, August 16, 1987]
|Note: This biographical essay appeared Iollowing the Rajiv Gandhi-
Jayewardene Accord oI July 1987.|
Plump and pleasant-Iaced, Velupillai Prabhakaran
hardly seems cast in the same mould as Che Guevara, the
charismatic Argentine-born revolutionary on whom he
patterned himselI. Out oI his customary army Iatigues,
Prabhkaran, 33, looks like a minor politician. In Iact, he is
a tough, skilled guerrilla tactician who honed the
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into the most
powerIul oI the Iorces Iighting Ior a separate Tamil state
in Sri Lanka. When his guerrillas began turning in their
arms to Indian peacekeeping troops last week, it was
only because Prabhakaran had ordered it.
Born a member oI the low Karaya Iishing caste in
Valveddithurai village in northern JaIIna, Prabhakaran
learned early about discrimination. He could not enter the
same temple grounds or drink Irom the same well as the
village upper-caste Brahmins. Valveddithurai was then a
haven Ior smugglers, and the young Prabhakaran or
Thambi (Little Brother), as he was also called, - learned
to Iear the baton-wielding policemen Irom the Sinhalese-
dominated south who were sent to JaIIna to suppress
smuggling. Reports oI harassment and torture oI local
Tamils were Irequent.
InIluenced by Tamil poet Ponnudurai Sivakumar and
Marxist activist Tissa Weerasingham, the two
personalities Irom the early Tamil militant movement,
Prabhkaran joined the Tamil Youth Front in 1973. |Note:
Prabhkaran joined the Tamil Youth Front in 1973. |Note:
the description that Sivakumar was a poet is a glaring
error.| The same year, his name appeared on police
dossiers. Fearing capture, he Iled to Madras, capital oI
India`s southern Tamil Nadu state. He was then just
nineteen.
In Tamil Nadu, Prabhakaran received military training
in a program thought to have been Iunded by India`s
intelligence agency. On returning to JaIIna in 1975, he
joined the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), and within a year
had established himselI as head oI the 100-member
militant band. From the beginning Prabhakaran was
ambitious and power-hungry. He hated taking orders
Irom others and this was matched by the charisma oI a
natural leader`, says a Sri Lankan military intelligence
expert.
In the early morning oI July 27, 1975, JaIIna`s mayor,
AlIred Duraiappa, was about to get out oI his car to enter
a Hindu temple when three young men walked up and
shot him dead with .38 police pistols. One oI the hit men
was Prabhakaran. The assassination not only marked the
beginning oI the Tamil separatist movement, it
established Prabhkaran as the movement`s dominant
leader. Personality clashes with deputy Uma
Maheswaran, however, Iinally led to the TNT disbanding
in 1980. Prabhakaran then joined the Tamil Eelam
Liberation Organisation, another militant Tamil group
headed by Thangadurai. When the TELO leader was
captured by security Iorces, Prabhakaran jockeyed Ior
top spot, but was outmanoeuvred by Tall Sri`
Sabaratnam. Prabhkaran soon quit TELO to organize the
Liberation Tigers.
Prabhakaran was a strict disciplinarian. Training oI
our cadres was highly regimented and they were banned
Irom what he considered vices smoking, drinking and
the like`, recalls his lieutenant, Sivasubramaniam
Kanagaratnam, alias Capt. Raheem. Adds a Colombo-
based military oIIicer: Anybody who stepped out oI line
oI this tough disciplinary code was killed and their
Iamilies destroyed`. However, Prabhakaran in 1984
Ilouted his own strictures against sex and marriage when
he wed Madhi Vadani, an undergraduate Irom JaIIna
he wed Madhi Vadani, an undergraduate Irom JaIIna
University.
In 1982, the Tiger ChieI was ambushed in a Madras
bazaar by erstwhile comrade Maheswaran, who had
Iormed his own guerrilla band. In the ensuing shoot-out
both were injured, and later arrested by south Indian
police. But Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister
M.G.Ramachandran, who acted as the militant`s
beneIactor, had them released on bail. Singled out Ior
Iavour was Prabhakaran, who oIten used Tamil Nadu as
a sanctuary. The relationship cooled somewhat when the
chieI minister, at New Delhi`s prompting, ordered state
police last November to disarm all guerrillas, including
Prabhakaran.
AIter Sri Lanka`s ethnic riots oI July 1983, thousands
oI Tamils living in southern Sri Lanka Iled to India and to
a comparative saIety oI Tamil-dominated JaIIna
peninsula, a militant stronghold. The LTTE launched an
intensive recruitment drive and by the end oI 1984, its
cadres had swolledn to more than 10,000. To IulIill his
single-minded quest Ior power, Prabhakaran ordered a
vicious campaign against rival guerrilla groups. The
Tigers killed at least 1,700 militants, including TELO`s
Sabaratnam. The usual Iorm oI execution was to tie the
victim to a lamp post and shoot him or her at point-blank
range. One oI Prabhakaran`s main problems now will be
to protect himselI and his comrades Irom the wrath and
vengeance oI the survivors oI these groups`, a military
observer told Asiaweek.
Prabhakaran himselI is a master in the art oI survival.
He successIully escaped capture and death when, during
the Sri Lankan Army`s May |1987| oIIensive in JaIIna, he
was marked Ior assassination. Now that the Iighting
seems over, however, he may require a diIIerent kind oI
skill. He has proved himselI to be a shrewd and capable
leader`, notes Dr.Neelan Thiruchelvam, a moderate Tamil
intellectual, but his political ideology remains hazy and
without direction`. The Tiger boss has bluntly reIused a
political role as chieI minister oI an amalgamated
Northern and Eastern province, and even his closest
comrades do not know what his next move will be. But,
as his close lieutenant, Raheem, points out, Prabhakaran
as his close lieutenant, Raheem, points out, Prabhakaran
is a man oI surprises.`
In hindsight, one can chuckle at the 1987 comment oI Neelan
Tiruchelvam that 'his |Pirabhakaran`s| political ideology
remains hazy and without direction. It turned out to be that,
rather than Pirabhakaran who had not shiIted an iota Irom his
political stand since 1983, it was Tiruchelvam who exhibited
direction-less, hazy political ideology, between 1987 and 1999,
by shiIting his allegiances Irom TULF, to UNP and
subsequently SLFP.

The roar of the Liberation Tigers
[Aewsweek; Aovember 9, 1987j
|Note: This biographical essay appeared, when LTTE was engaged in Iighting
the Indian army in Eelam.|
Velupillai Prabhakaran may not be a household name
elsewhere, but in Sri Lanka he has become the stuII oI
legend. He is the wily guerrilla leader whose outnumbered
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bloodied the
Indian Army in JaIIna, then slipped away to Iight again
another day. He is a strict disciplinarian who neither
smokes nor drinks. He wears a magnum revolver, and
once kept a leopard cub as a pet. He has slipped past
police and soldiers many times once disguised as a
Catholic priest, another time as a peanut vendor. For
inspiration he likes to watch Clint Eastwood video
cassettes. He is a 33-year old Iamily man with two small
children, but he is also addicted to the sound oI gunIire.
But above all, Prabhakaran is a man obsessed by a
dream; to carve out an independent Tamil state in Sri
Lanka.
In pursuit oI that dream, Prabhakaran turned to
political violence at an early age. Born in Valvettithurai, a
Iishing town on Sri Lanka`s northern coast, he grew up
burning with outrage over the discrimination Tamils had
to endure in Sri Lanka`s Sinhalese-dominated society. He
dropped out oI school and became a militant Tamil
separatist. In 1973 he Iled to India, one jump ahead oI Sri
separatist. In 1973 he Iled to India, one jump ahead oI Sri
Lankan police. But in 1975 he returned home and at the
age oI 21 led a three-man hit squad that assassinated
the mayor oI JaIIna. Prabhakaran took over the Tamil
Tigers, and by 1983 had molded them into a tough and
disciplined Iighting Iorce ready Ior battle. That year, on
July 23, he and a group oI his guerrillas ambushed a Sri
Lankan military convoy in the JaIIna peninsula. The
Tigers killed 13 soldiers. Prabhakaran, it is said,
personally cut down nine oI them with his machine gun.
The convoy ambush caused a quantum leap in Sri
Lanka`s ethnic conIlict. Outraged by the killings, Sri
Lanka`s Sinhalese went on a rampage all across the
country. In Colombo alone, Sinhalese mobs killed more
than 300 Tamil men, women and children. The anti-Tamil
violence gave Prabhakaran a pretext to declare an all-out
guerrilla war in deIense oI his own people.
But he had no intention oI allowing any separatist
group other than his own Tamil Tigers to lead the
struggle in the name oI Tamil Eelam, the Tamil state he
hopes one day to establish. Prabhakaran has targeted his
rivals ruthlessly as he has the Sinhalese. A year ago
Prabhakaran`s Tigers killed more than 100 rival militants,
then paraded the bodies through JaIIna as a warning to
other potential challengers. And even aIter the Indian-
sponsored peace treaty was signed last July, the LTTE
killed scores more rivals in order to establish absolute
Tiger supremacy in the administrative areas proposed in
the agreement.
Those who know him maintain that Prabhakaran has
no political ideology. He sometimes mouths Marxist
jargon, and admires Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. But
at heart he is a Ireedom Iighter not a revolutionary. The
ideology that drives him is little more than the dream oI
becoming the Iather oI a new country, the independent
state oI Tamil Eelam. How he would govern such a state
is Iar Irom clear. Prabhakaran is not politically astute
and doesn`t have a detailed grasp oI Tamil aspirations or
how to achieve them politically`, one Tamil source says.
He`s only interested in the big picture; how to establish
Tamil Eelam`.
The Indian oIIicials blame Prabhakaran Ior the
breakdown oI the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord
arranged last summer by India`s Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi. He had it within his power to give momentum to
the process oI bringing peace and normalcy`, says an
Indian diplomat. But he didn`t deliver. II he hadn`t been
unreasonable, we could have avoided this terrible
tragedy`. The Indian oIIensive against JaIIna gave
Prabhkaran a new lease as a guerrilla leader. He couldn`t
play the institutional, diplomatic game with any success`,
says a Tamil source in Colombo. But now he`s doing
what he knows best Iighting`. Somewhere in Sri Lanka,
Prabhakaran and 1,200 survivors oI the JaIIna siege are
still at large. Sooner or later, they are bound to strike
another blow Ior Tamil Eelam.
Analysis of Pirabhakaran`s Excesses
While reading the two biographical essays, one can note the
rendering oI two Iacts which mark the early career oI
Pirabhakaran. One is the 1975 assassination oI Duraiappah, in
which Pirabhakaran is identiIied as one oI the three hit-men.
The other is the ruthless nature oI Pirabhakaran`s LTTE which
elevated itselI to power in 1986, by decimating the competing
Tamil militant Iactions. As once noted by Sirimavo
Bandaranaike (when she was out oI power), 'Facts sometimes
do not give us the whole truth (Lanka Guardian, June 1,
1990, p.10). Journalists, being in a hurry to beat the deadline,
do not bother to reIlect on the question oI why` LTTE had to
take such a drastic action, which leIt an unpleasant taste in the
Eelam campaign.
At least one Indian journalist, K.P.Sunil, who also authored a
biographical essay on Pirabhkaran to the Illustrated Weeklv of
India (Bombay) oI June 7, 1987 with the caption Cornered`
had provided the Iollowing suggestion.
'While the LTTE was consolidating its position |between
1983 and 1985|, several other militant groups like the
Eelam People`s Revolutionary Liberation Front
(EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
(EROS), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), the
Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) and several other minor groups
with similar goals and objectives, but with marginal
diIIerences in ideology, had sprung up. With the
proliferation in the number of militant groups, the
Eelam movement started losing its identity and
Pirabhakaran probably encouraged by his superior
military strength and strike power, decided to
assimilate lesser groups through military action
rather than through a process of dialogue (emphasis
added).
In 1986, at Pirabhakaran`s initiative, the LTTE decimated
TELO, which in 1980 had been its ally in the Neerveli
Bank raid (when Rs. 8 million was looted) and also in
some oI its initial encounters with the Sri Lankan army.
Soon aIter, EPRLF was declared an enemy and became
the target oI Tiger attacks.
K.P.Sunil was correct in identiIying the Iactor why
Pirabhkaran made a swiIt move against his one-time Eelam
Tamil allies. I would also add that the two militant groups
which Pirabhakaran had targeted, namely TELO and EPRLF,
had become intelligence-hazards` to the vital growth oI LTTE
during that time. Being on the pay-roll oI India`s intelligence
wallahs, both TELO and EPRLF, by 1986, had lost track oI
their original mission and vitality and thus were becoming oI
nuisance value.
Regarding Pirabhakaran`s role as an assassin oI AlIred
Duraiappah, I present the Iollowing analogy. A notable number
oI Americans (such as Jimmy Stewart, George McGovern and
John Glenn) who later became Iamous in their chosen
proIessions, served as bomber pilots during the second world
war, and did kill quite a number oI civilians in Europe by their
actions. The only misIortune these civilians living in Germany
and Italy had was that they were living under the dictates oI
Hitler and Mussolini. But, none would dare to label Jimmy
Stewart, George McGovern and John Glenn as killers or as
assassins. In a similar vein, the homicide oI Duraiappah has to
be treated as a symptom oI tension-Iilled phase, which
engulIed JaIIna in January 1974, with the untimely death oI ten
Tamils at the end oI the Fourth International Tamil Research
ConIerence.
ConIerence.
In this context, I also like to cite the observations oI Dutch
anthropologist Peter Kloos, made in his 1997 study, The
Struggle between the Lion and the Tiger`. Kloos inIorms the
reader that he conducted a Iour-month Iield work in Sri Lanka
(July-October 1993). Contrary to what I had argued in an
earlier section (Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 10), Kloos
Iavors 1983, as the year oI the beginning oI civil war. He
began his analysis with the sentences,
'Sri Lanka is at war with itselI. Since 1983 a permanent
civil war oI exceptional cruelty is raging, especially in the
north and the east oI the island. This civil war is
sometimes characterized as an ethnic conIlict between a
Sinhala majority and a Tamil minority. To some extent it
is but such a characteristic may unduly overemphasize
ethnic homogeneity oI either population, and
underestimate internal diIIerences and conIlicts that
contribute to the construction oI ethnic identities. |in
The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness, edited by Cora
Govers and Hans Vermeulen, London: MacMillan, 1997|
Then, Kloos also identiIied two problems which researchers
had to Iace in studying the Sri Lankan civil war. The Iirst is,
'It is not possible under present circumstances to carry out
the research one would like to do. It is impossible to carry out
research in the LTTE-controlled north oI Sri Lanka and
among the LTTE themselves, unless one becomes a Tiger.
This, however, implies giving up independency oI views. The
second problem is that 'ethnic identity is a dynamic as well as
an elusive phenomenon; dynamic in the sense that it is being
reconstructed all the time, elusive because it can hardly be
objectiIied.
I think that these two problems identiIied by Kloos is very
relevant (though completely ignored by other academics) in
analyzing the main criticism against Pirabhakaran (and LTTE)
that he doesn`t serve the Tamil interests since he and his
group has killed so many Tamils who disagreed with his
views. In his concluding remarks, Kloos had observed:
'The Iiercest Iights in the mid 1980s were between
several Tamil secessionist groups rather than between
these Tamil groups and the Sri Lankan Government.
Although this intra-Tamil struggle has to some extent
been documented (see, Hoole et al. 1990; Narayan
Swamy, 1994) it is not very clear why the LTTE won that
struggle: it may have had the most ruthless and
uncompromising leader oI the almost Iorty Tamil
insurgent groups that had come into existence in the
1970s. The emergence oI the LTTE may thus have been
predicated on the extreme personality characteristics oI
their leader, but such an individual Iactor does not
explain why he was successIul. Fear Ior Tamils created
the Tigers, one could with some exaggeration say, but
Iear Ior the Tigers resulted in seeing a Tiger in any young
Tamil (LTTE attacks, real or supposed, are usually
Iollowed by razzia`s in Colombo, in which oIten
hundreds oI young Tamils are remanded). In these
processes oI escalation, cause and eIIect are hard to
distinguish Irom each other. (ibid)
I, Ior one, believe that the thoughts oI Kloos are well worth
comprehending. His reIerences to the books oI Hoole et al.
and Narayan Swamy relate to the books The Broken Palmvra
and Tigers of Lanka respectively. |Continued|

Part 13
Sachi Sri Kantha
1 September 2001]
Pirabhakaran and Duraiappah
Pirabhakaran`s Return which shifted the Paradigm
Pirabhakaran`s return to Eelam Irom Tamil Nadu in January 1987 was
a landmark event in recent South Asian history. It has parallels to
Mahatma Gandhi`s Iirst landing in South AIrica, Irom Rajkot in 1893.
That was a paradigm-shiIting journey, which the then imperial British
rulers never bothered to notice seriously. Why did a timid young
barrister Gandhi (then aged only 24), with a mediocre proIile in his
barrister job opted to travel to South AIrica? In his autobiography,
Gandhi states that even in his homeland, he was insulted by the
arrogance oI British authorities.
Similarly, why did Pirabhakaran (then aged 31) who had enjoyed the
cozy comIort oI MGR`s preIerential patronage Ior more than 3 years,
decided to return to Eelam? OI course, at an opportune time,
Pirabhakaran himselI will share it with the Eelam Tamils, what was in
his mind when the year 1986 was Iading into history. For now, I have
gathered more than Iour or Iive interpretations on why Pirabhakaran
returned to Eelam. All the diIIerent versions, oIIered by diIIerent
analysts, may have elements oI truth in them. Let me Iirst provide the
diIIerent versions which have appeared in print, and then siIt the
kernels oI truth.
(1) Indian Intelligence-wallah's version:
'.It was not until January 1987, that Prabhakaran returned to
JaIIna although the local commanders had been pleading with
him to visit them at least once. Two unrelated reasons made
Prabhakaran return. One was the genuine Ieeling Ior the suIIering
Tamils in the peninsula when the Sri Lankan Government
introduced the ban on movement oI Iuel, and two, he did not
want Kittu, who had attained Iame in the earlier Operation Short
ShriIt` when the LTTE successIully pushed back the Sri Lankan
Iorces into their camps in April 1986, to consolidate his standing
among the people oI JaIIna. |Jain Commission Report, 1997,
vol.5, chapter 16|
vol.5, chapter 16|
(2) 1ournalist Anita Pratap's version
'Prabhakaran`s view was that Rajiv Gandhi was not having the
true picture oI the Tamil problems and, thereIore, he was swayed
by the oIIicers. A little beIore November 1986, I met
Prabhakaran at Madras. I also met Prabhakaran in early
December 1986, aIter he returned Irom the SAARC meeting
|held in Bangalore|. I met him at Madras. He said that MGR was
Iurious that he |Prabhakaran| did not sign the Accord with
Jayawardhene at Bangalore. MGR summoned Prabhakaran and
gave him a tongue lashing. Prabhakaran gave his reasons Ior not
doing this. MGR said at that time, II you are operating in Tamil
Nadu, I have allowed you to operate in Tamil Nadu. But you
have to play by our rules`. But Prabhakaran said that I can`t
surrender my Cause`. At which point, MGR apparently told him
You Iight Ior it in your country`. Prabhakaran is a man oI
tremendous pride and he walked out oI that meeting and has
apparently never returned to Tamil Nadu |Jain Commission
Report, 1997, vol.5, chapter 22.|
(3) Prof.Kingsley M. de Silva's version [akin to UAP's versionj
'At the end oI the Bangalore ConIerence it was announced that,
Apart Irom the subjects oI Iinance, and administration which
were not clariIied with the TULF, the matters which require
Iurther clariIication and agreement |were|.Iully set out in (a)
working paper on (the) Bangalore discussions, dated 18
(November) 1986.`
The LTTE alone adamantly reIused to accept these proposals.
The Indian government showed its displeasure by imposing
restrictions on Sri Lankan Tamil activists operating Irom Indian
Territory. This was the Iirst time that such restrictions had been
imposed. The initiatives oI the Indian government in this regard
were nulliIied by the Tamil Nadu government`s unconcealed
reluctance to cooperate in these moves. In addition the Indian
government sought to prevent the LTTE leader Prabhakaran then
operating Irom Tamil Nadu Irom leaving India Ior JaIIna. These
pressures succeeded until the end oI 1986 by which time
Prabhakaran and the LTTE ideologue Balasingham slipped
across the Palk Straits to the JaIIna peninsula, to continue to Iight
Irom there. |in the article, The prelude to the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord oI 1987, part 3. Lanka Guardian, May 15, 1993, pp.18-
20|
(4) P.Aedumaran's [one of Pirabhakaran's confidantsj version
'On January 3 |1987|, Prabhakaran had a Iarewell meeting with
Nedumaran, the only Indian who was privy to the LTTE
supremo`s departure plans. he dismissed the others and
conIided to Nedumaran that he was leaving Ior ever because he
Ieared Ior his liIe in India. (II we remained here), we will not be
able to take independent decisions Ior our people`s welIare`,
Prabhakaran said. There is a plan to have me killed in Madras or
New Delhi. The danger will remain as long as I remain here. Our
struggle will intensiIy iI I return to Eelam. |in Narayan Swamy`s
book, Tigers of Lanka, 2
nd
ed, 1996, p.223|
(5) 1.A.Dixit's [India's top honcho in Colombo during 198-89j
version:
'By the end oI 1986, Prabhakaran was disillusioned with his
Indian connection. The pressure generated on the LTTE aIter the
Bangalore SAARC Summit made him decide that he must shiIt
his base to Sri Lanka Ior a long struggle. His judgement has been
proved correct with the passage oI time. |in his book,
Assignment Colombo, 1998, p.81|
Among the Iive versions presented above, we can leave out one oI the
selI-serving Indian Intelligence-wallah`s reasons, that Pirabhakaran
returned to Eelam because he Ieared the ascendancy oI his colleague
Kittu. The other reason provided by the Indian Intelligence-wallah
corroborates well with the versions oI others. Then, it is interesting to
compare the versions oI Anita Pratap and Kingsley de Silva, since both
are contradictory. According to Anita Pratap, MGR pushed
Pirabhakaran to leave Tamil Nadu. But ProI. de Silva has mentioned
that the 'Indian government sought to prevent the LTTE leader
Prabhakaran Irom leaving India Ior JaIIna, and he also states that the
Tamil Nadu government |to be understood as, MGR| nulliIied the
initiatives oI the Indian government.
When one studies the Iarewell message oI Pirabhakaran delivered to
Nedumaran that 'he |Pirabhakaran| was leaving Iorever because he
feared for his life in India, with that oI ProI. de Silva`s version that
India wanted to keep Pirabhakaran in India and that oI Anita
Pratap`s version that MGR pushed Pirabhakaran to leave Tamil
Nadu, one can inIer circumstantially that the Indian Intelligence-
wallahs might have planned to assassinate Pirabhakaran. MGR`s
parental-type oI admonition, based nonetheless on aIIection, to
Pirabhakaran to leave Tamil Nadu has to be understood as a
premonitory warning against the duplicitous mind-set oI India`s
intelligence wallahs. Even J.N.Dixit`s diplomatic version is an
admission on the Iailure oI India`s intelligence-wallahs to keep
Pirabhakaran within their handling range, and he compliments
Pirabhakaran`s intuition with the statement, 'His |Pirabhakaran`s|
judgement has been proved correct with the passage oI time.
Pirabhakaran and Duraiappah: a Patriot and a Loyalist
Pirabhakaran`s return to JaIIna in January 1987 completed a rite oI
passage; he had transIormed himselI Irom a Iugitive (since mid 1975)
to a Iull-Iledged leader. This (iI one may call, tortuous and torturous)
route to leadership does exist, as demonstrated by the careers oI Mao
Ze Dong, Menachem Begin and Fidel Castro. Even Pirabhakaran`s
boyhood idol Subhas Chandra Bose had taken this route to claim a
place in the pantheons oI India`s Ireedom struggle. Thus, I would like
to Iocus on the event which made Pirabhakaran, a Iugitive more than
25 years ago.
Why did Pirabhakaran assassinate Duraiappah? The simple answer, iI
expressed in the context oI American Ireedom struggle, Pirabhakaran
was (and is) a patriot, and Duraiappah was a loyalist. July 27, 1975 is
marked as the Iirst military encounter in Eelam history, similar to June
27, 1776, which marked the Iirst hanging oI an American soldier,
executed by order oI a military court oI Patriots. Thomas Hickey was
condemned as a traitor Ior conspiring to deliver General Washington to
the British rulers and hanged near Bowery Lane in the New York City.
Do I condone the assassination oI Duraiappah? More than ten years
ago, I had expressed my opinion on this question, in a letter to the
Tamil Times (London). In it, I had stated,
'Being a Tamil born in the post-independent Sri Lanka, like so
many hundreds oI thousands oI Tamils living in Sri Lanka, India
and elsewhere on this globe, I share the ideals Ior which the
LTTE is Iighting a revolutionary war against the Sri Lankan
government`s armed Iorces. But this does not mean that I agree
with all the actions oI the LTTE and I also have no authority to
speak on behalI oI the LTTE. However I am not going to give up
to anyone who does not acknowledge the positive contributions
oI the LTTE to the Tamil liberation struggle.
LTTE has behaved (and is behaving) like every other
revolutionary movement in the world which initiated an armed
struggle against a more powerIul, entrenched adversary.
Beginning Irom the American revolutionary war (led by George
Washington) in the 18
th
century to the Soviet revolution (led by
Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin), Chinese revolution (led by Mao Tse
Tung and Zhou En Lai) and Cuban revolution (led by Fidel
Castro and Che Guevara) in this century, all the revolutionary
struggles have shed much blood, not all belonging to that oI
adversary. Hundreds oI thousands oI innocent civilians also died
Ior no Iault oI theirs. There were also an adequate share oI
blunders in every revolutionary struggle which became a success.
So why one has to set a diIIerent standard to the Tamil Tigers,
while paying homage to the actions oI revolutionary heroes oI the
past, whether it is Washington or Lenin?...
II we study the historical events in proper perspective, the actions
oI LTTE inIringing the human rights oI Iellow citizens (whether
they are Tamils, Muslims or Sinhalese) is neither applausable nor
despicable, in terms oI a revolutionary struggle. It will be great iI
Eelam is born without a shed oI blood, but even under the
leadership oI the apostle oI non-violence Mahatma Gandhi, a Iree
India was born with a loss oI many millions oI lives, with another
pre-term baby` Pakistan, which itselI gave a tragic birth to
Bangladesh. |Tamil Times, January 1991, p.23|
Duraiappah`s assassination
It is Iunny that AlIred Duraiappah has a visible Internet presence. II
one has to believe the inIormation peddled in the internet by the anti-
LTTE scribes writing Irom Sri Lanka, Al Duraiappah should have
been a mysterious man, who died repeatedly in 1973
(V.K.Wickramasinghe, Island, April 29, 2000), in 1974 (Lakshman
Gunasekara, Sundav Observer, April 23, 2000), in 1975 and again in
1977 (Vimukthi Yapa, Sundav Leader, December 19, 1999).
It is my inIerence that Duraiappah`s Internet presence is due to the
Tunney Hunsacker eIIect`. II a non-Sri Lankan asks me who is
AlIred Duraiappah, I can respond saying, He is the Tunney Hunsaker
oI Tamil history.` Does the name Tunney Hunsacker rings a bell to
anyone? Even among boxing enthusiasts, only an avid Ian oI boxing
history may remember this name. His recognition comes Irom the Iact
that he was the Iirst proIessional opponent oI Muhammad Ali, who
won a decision against him on October 29, 1960 at Louisville,
Kentucky.
Duraiappah is remembered not Ior any oI his achievements in politics
or social service or academics, but as the Iirst military opponent oI
Pirabhakaran.
This being the reality, a valiant attempt to project Duraiappah as a
Tamil humanist and social worker was recently made by the scribes oI
Tamil humanist and social worker was recently made by the scribes oI
University Teachers Ior Human Rights (JaIIna), in their Bulletin No.24
oI September 2000. It deserves some critical analysis, thus I reproduce
the Iirst two paragraphs oI their sympathetic portrayal oI Duraiappah.
'27
th
July 2000 was the 25
th
anniversary oI the murder oI
JaIIna`s mayor and Iormer MP, AlIred Duraiappah. He may not
have represented any great principle or ideal in politics. But he
had one great virtue; he was a killer neither in private liIe nor in
politics. He did not aspire to lead the Tamil people, nor did he
care to project himselI outside the JaIIna electorate. Inside the
electorate his politics is simple. He tried to make everyone Ieel
that he was their Iamily member. He even tried to beIriend those
who regarded him an enemy and attended their Iunctions
uninvited. He knew everyone by name, and he could oIten be
seen in a Muslim tailor`s shop near the JaIIna Court where he
practiced, halI-seated on a table, chatting to ordinary people,
waving at passersby and inquiring aIter their aIIairs. It suited him
to have government patronage to pass on and so he aligned
himselI with the SLFP.
He posed a challenge to the nationalist TULF (Federal Party) in
the prestigious JaIIna electorate and nowhere else. It irked the
nationalists that this man who was oblivious to nationalist claims
and dealt only with jobs, transIers, market buildings, a stadium,
public lavatories and lamp posts could be popular with the
people.
A good piece oI writing, mixing Iacts and Iiction. Ah! the Duraiappah
Stadium the eponymous arena to proclaim his name in JaIIna. But
the Iacts related to the naming oI this stadium reveals one oI the vices
Duraiappah had, but hidden by his apologists. A personally aIIable
politician (akin to the big-city alderman in an American setting) oI
limited local inIluence, Duraiappah had his quota oI vanities. I
reproduce in Iull, a letter written by Jack Van Sanden (retired
D.I.S.Police) Irom Queensland, Australia, in 1981.
'When I was Superintendent oI Police, Northern Province, a
Public Committee convened under my chairmanship that did the
spade work, collected the necessary Iunds and completed the
JaIIna Sports Stadium. The credit Ior this Iormidable task must
go primarily to the public oI JaIIna who were more than lavish in
promoting this praiseworthy scheme and helping to bring it in to
being. This stadium was built Ior the present and past generations
oI sportsmen oI the North, Ior whose beneIit this project was
primarily intended. I may mention that the late Mr.A.S.
primarily intended. I may mention that the late Mr.A.S.
Mariyanayagam, who was then Asst. Supdt. oI Police, JaIIna and
Mr.P.A. Pragasam, who was the Manager oI Lake House
Branch, JaIIna, were a great asset to me in collecting the
necessary Iunds. II not Ior their assistance this scheme might not
have materialized.
AIter I leIt JaIIna on transIer the completed Stadium was
handed over to the Municipal Council by the Stadium Committee
as it Iound it diIIicult to maintain it. This would never have
happened had I continued to be in JaIIna. The late Mr.AlIred
Duraiappah, who was subsequently elected the Mayor oI JaIIna
named the Stadium aIter his name. He was only a member oI the
Stadium Committee that assisted me and at no time did he
Iunction as the President oI the Stadium Committee aIter I
vacated the post. For these reasons I am not happy with the
present name. I have no doubt that the JaIIna public appreciates
what I have done and the Municipal Council would consider
changing the name and give it a suitable name appropriate Ior the
peninsula. |Tribune, Colombo, November 28, 1981, p.23|
Older generation oI JaIIna Tamils who lived during Jack Van Sanden`s
tenure as the Superintendent oI Police, Northern Range, would have
no reason to doubt his sincerity. But I Ielt that, since this letter was
written in 1981, aIter Duraiappah`s death, I should check another
independent and reliable source related to Duraiappah`s standing in
JaIIna, to contradict the claims oI Rajan Hoole. What is available to
me is the Jaffna 1980 book, authored by Dr. Robert Holmes, an
American who resided in JaIIna Ior a long time, and who did not have
any direct dealings with Duraiappah. Holmes lived in JaIIna Irom 1948
to 1960 and leIt JaIIna by the time Duraiappah became an MP. Then,
Holmes returned to JaIIna again in 1978, aIter Duraiappah`s death, to
complete his book. I hypothesized that iI Duraiappah was such a social
helper as portrayed by Rajan Hoole, he would have received mention
at least in a sentence oI Jaffna 1980 book.
Despite Duraiappah`s recognition as a one-time MP Ior JaIIna and
Mayor oI JaIIna, nothing is mentioned about him in the 500 page book
authored by Holmes.
However, other Tamils who had gained some stature in the JaIIna
Tamil society Ior their knowledge and services and who were
contemporaries oI Duraiappah have been cited by Holmes. The names
which are Ieatured in this source book oI JaIIna include, in
alphabetical order, ProI.K.D.Arudpragasam, Dr.T.Arulampalam,
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, Guru Baba, Dr.R.E.W.Jehoratnam,
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, Guru Baba, Dr.R.E.W.Jehoratnam,
Dr.W.Luther Jeyasingham, Senator S.R.Kanaganayagam,
K.Kanagarajah (oI Milk White Soap establishment), K.Kanagaratnam
(one time MP Ior Vaddukoddai), ProI. K.Kanapathipillai,
C.Manogaran (academic), K.Navaratnam (traditional scholar),
ProI.K.Nesiah, Al Haj S.M.A.Rashid, Muhandiram E.P.Rasaiah,
Nadesan Satyendra, ProI.S.Selvanayakam, ProI.N.Selvaratnam,
Rev.A.C.Thambyrajah, 10 TULF MPs who represented the JaIIna
district in 1979, A.T.Vethaparanam, ProI.A.J.Wilson and 9 noted
writers and novelists (K.Daniel, S.Ganeshalingam, K.Gunarajah,
Kanaga Senthinathan, S.Ponnuthurai, V.A.Rajaratnam,
L.Sivagnanasundaram, Soccalingam and S.Yoganathan). This non-
recognition oI Duraiappah circumstantially disproves the claim made
by Rajan Hoole that Duraiappah was a beneIactor to the JaIIna
society.
I would add that Dr. Holmes was not an LTTE partisan and his book
was not a political tome. He had covered the major trunks and the
trends oI the JaIIna society during the period Duraiappah lived and it is
surprising that Duraiappah`s name Iailed to receive his attention. One
sentence written by Holmes on the average JaIIna person`s trust on
politicians is also an apt one and will Iind consensus among the
majority. 'The older generation was cynical about all politicians except
possibly S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the Iounder oI the Tamil Federalist
Party. (p.256) It was a perceptive observation made by an outside
observer oI the JaIIna society in late 1970s, which prophesied the
emergence oI Pirabhakaran, a military leader. About the cynicism oI
JaIIna man, Holmes had penetratingly observed:
'The JaIIna man is suspicious and with regard to his own kind,
irredeemably cynical. The milk oI human kindness is allowed to
sour beIore he shares it with his Iellows. It is probably the cynical
aspect oI the JaIIna man which provoked the dishonorable
mention in the litany, Colombo is the voice oI Ceylon, Kandy
the echo, Anuradhapura the sigh, JaIIna the sneer and Nuwara
Eliya the smile.`.
The negatives in this paragraph demand that it be said that Tamils are
not lacking in aIIection; they are simply rather careIul about whom
they bestow it upon. Such charity deIinitely begins at home. And the
channels oI aIIection are severely restricted by the caste system. The
JaIIna man`s cynicism is most scathing when one oI his Iellows does
something generous. The clear assumption is that, iI a person is
rational, he will not do anything Ior nothing`.Even the greatest oI
Indian Christian saints Sadhu Sundar Singh who came to JaIIna in
1918, was never in his career accused oI being an impostor except in
1918, was never in his career accused oI being an impostor except in
JaIIna.
Duraiappah did some generous things to JaIIna people during his
tenure as the Mayor oI JaIIna. But, as Holmes had pointed out, Ior
JaIIna voters in the 1960s and the Iirst halI oI 1970s also knew why
he did what he did.` That`s why they were cynical about all politicians
(Federal Party, Tamil Congress, LeItist parties and Independents
included) with the possible exception oI Chelvanayakam. Thus, it is
my contention that Duraiappah`s 1975 assassination should not be
studied in isolation. For an objective evaluation, the Iactors which
precipitated this assassination have to be explored and interpreted.
Until now, anti-LTTE analysts, Ior obvious reasons oI bias, have
ignored these precipitating Iactors.
Duraiappah became known nationally when he was elected to the
JaIIna constituency as an Independent in the March and July 1960
general elections, in three-cornered contests, deIeating the Tamil
Congress leader G.G.Ponnambalam and the Federal Party candidate.
In the 1965 general election, G.G.Ponnambalam deIeated Duraiappah
in the JaIIna constituency. Then, in the 1970 general election, both
Duraiappah and G.G.Ponnambalam were deIeated in the JaIIna
constituency by the Federal Party nominee, C.X.Martyn. Thus,
Duraiappah`s limelight at the national level lasted only 5 years.
That Duraiappah is an asterisk in the post-independent history oI Sri
Lanka is attested by the Iact that there is no entry on him in the
Historical Dictionarv of Sri Lanka, authored by S.W.R.de
A.Samarasinghe and Vidyamali Samarasinghe (Scarecrow Press,
Lanham, Maryland, 1998). This reIerence book Ieatures 23 prominent
personalities in its 269 entries. Among the 23 personalities Ieatured,
three Tamils are included. These being, in alphabetical order,
A.Amirthalingam, S.J.V.Chelvanayakam and V.Prabhakaran. Among
the 23 personalities covered in this reIerence book, Pirabhakaran is the
only individual, born in the post-1950 period. Duraiappah receives
recognition in this reIerence book, due to the Tunney Hunsacker
eIIect`, as the assassination victim oI Pirabhakaran.
Narayan Swamy, in his book Tigers of Lanka, while describing in
detail how Pirabhakaran had prepared Ior his conIrontation on July 27,
1975, has Iailed to discuss why Duraiappah had to meet his Iate like
that.
Prof.K.M.de Silva`s description of 1970-75 period
ProI.Kingsley de Silva has attained the stature as the Ioremost
contemporary historian oI Sri Lanka. Though partial to the UNP
politicians, he cannot be accused oI possessing anti-Sinhala bias. In his
second volume oI J.R.Jayewardene biography, published in 1994, de
Silva introduces Pirabhakaran as Iollows:
'By the mid 1970s radicalization oI politics in JaIIna was an
established Iact, and with radicalization came violence, including
the beginnings oI terrorism as a Iact oI liIe in the politics oI the
Tamils, especially in the north and east oI the island. At the
beginnings the targets in these careIully chosen acts oI political
violence were Tamils associated with the government,
culminating in the attempted murder oI a pro-government Tamil
MP, and then the murder oI the Mayor oI JaIIna, AlIred
Durayappah, a leading Iigure among Tamil supporters oI the UF
government in the north. Velupillai Prabhakaran, who was to
become, in time, the most prominent and violent oI the separatist
activists among the Tamils (See, India Todav, ProIile oI a Tiger,
30 June 1986 where Prabhakaran states that My Iirst military
encounter was in 1975 when I shot and killed the Iormer Mayor
oI JaIIna, AlIred Duraiappa`.) |J.R.Javewardene of Sri Lanka,
vol.2, 1994, p.345|
In this book, though ProI. de Silva mentions, 'radicalization oI politics
in JaIIna and 'with radicalization came violence, he has not
elaborated how and why radicalization came to settle down in the
Tamil zones oI the island. However, in his magnum opus A Historv of
Sri Lanka, published in 1981, ProI. de Silva had described the
practices oI political thuggery and patronage peddling oI ruling party
operatives as well as the emerging authoritarian tendencies which were
poisoning the Sri Lankan political atmosphere.
One can Iind answers to the question, why Pirabhakaran assassinated
Duraiappah, through the descriptions provided by ProI. Kingsley de
Silva, in the last chapter oI this book is entitled, Sri Lanka, 1970-
1977: democracy at bay`. In Iact, what ProI. de Silva describes was
the then prevailing situation all over the island. But, in the Tamil
zones, exhibited arrogance oI the state`s law enIorcement personnel
played into the hands oI restless young militants. Furthermore, during
1970 to 1977, the timidity and partiality oI the un-elected SLFP
organizers (like A.Duraiappah and C.Kumarasooriyar) and elected
Tamil MPs who became turn-coats (A.Thiyagarajah oI Vaddukoddai
constituency and C.Arulampalam oI Nallur constituency) insulted the
intelligence oI majority oI Tamil voters, not all oI them Tamil United
Front partisans.
ProI. de Silva possesses a superb command oI English, but he is prone
to use lengthy sentences. Thus, one has to read every word oI his
sentences repeatedly to understand the deep impact that decisive
period had in the psyche oI young Tamils. I quote this chapter
extensively, since in overall political context, it provides clues to why
Duraiappah came to be assassinated on July 27, 1975.
'Through the process oI constitution-making the ruling coalition
used its overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly to
give itselI an extended term oI two years (to May 1977) beyond
the original period oI Iive Ior which it had been elected in May
1970. In taking this action probably unprecedented in the
annals oI constitution-making in democratic states the
government showed scant regard Ior any sense oI public
integrity.
Under the U.F. |United Front| government, emergency powers
were invoked in dealing with the |JVP| insurgency, but they were
retained long aIter it had been crushed, and were extended Irom
month to month, not because they were really necessary but
because they were convenient in dealing with dissent. These
emergency regulations in eIIect suspended normal political
processes, iI not the constitution as a whole, and conIerred
extraordinary powers on the government. More signiIicant and
reprehensible was the second oI the government`s weapons. With
the passage (and subsequent amendment) oI the Interpretation
Ordinance oI 1972, the power oI the courts to hear appeals
against mala fide administrative decisions was drastically
curtailed, thus removing a meaningIul restraint upon the misuse
oI administrative power Ior political purposes by the government
against its opponents. Once this judicial check was removed, the
government had little hesitation in using the machinery oI the
state and administrative regulations to harass and intimidate its
political opponents. For security reasons, no public meetings
were permitted except with government approval until September
1972.
Forces within the government |which| pressed Ior increasingly
authoritarian attitudes toward its political opponents. This trend
was originally an aIter-eIIect oI the suppression oI the insurgency
oI 1972, but it persisted throughout the government`s tenure oI
oIIice, long aIter the threat to the security oI the state had
disappeared. Indeed this authoritarianism was one oI the most
disappeared. Indeed this authoritarianism was one oI the most
distinctive characteristics oI Mrs. Bandaranaike`s U.F.
government.
There was also a Ilagrant misuse oI state resources, including
radio, newspapers, vehicles and personnel Ior party purposes,
whether Ior propaganda rallies or Ior by-elections to the National
State Assembly. State employees (especially in the lower rungs oI
the administration), teachers, workers in the state sector oI the
economy in distribution, services and manuIacture, and plantation
workers in nationalized plantations were compelled to participate
in government party rallies on threat oI dismissal oI temporary
workers or transIer oI permanent employees to uncongenial
stations. The severe restrictions which had been imposed on the
political activity oI opposition parties served to emphasize the
Ilagrancy oI the discrimination in Iavour oI the government.
One other point needs elaboration, namely discrimination on
political grounds. This Iorm oI discrimination is a comparatively
novel one in the context oI the liberal political traditions oI Sri
Lanka. PreIerential treatment oI supporters oI the government in
recruitment and promotion within the state service has always
been a Ieature oI the process oI government in Sri Lanka since
independence, but now, Ior the Iirst time, preIerential treatment
oI government supporters was institutionalized`. This was
Iacilitated by the government`s repudiation oI the British colonial
type oI administration and its basic idea oI an impartial civil
service. Politicization oI the public service was not restricted to
key appointments at the policy-making levels, but extended
throughout the service and intruded into the judiciary as well,
although not to the same extent. The bases oI appointment were
political aIIiliation, personal connection, or still more dubious
considerations. It led to both ineIIiciency and corruption, with the
latter serving the Iunction oI mitigating the worst eIIects oI this
system oI open discrimination against employment oI children
and close relatives oI Opposition activists and suuporters, and the
Iormer serving the equally important one oI soItening the harsher
and more repressive Ieatures oI the authoritarianism which the
U.F. established and encouraged. With no local government
elections since May 1971, electoral activity was limited to by-
elections to Parliament. |pp.540-556|.
ProI. de Silva has described brieIly in the same chapter, how the
Sirimavo Bandaranaike-led government came to be unpopular among
the Tamils, mainly due to the antics oI its Badiuddin Mahmud, the
Minister oI Education.
Minister oI Education.
'In his hand, this cabinet post became at once a political base and
a Iountain oI patronage, to be used to strengthen the ties between
his |Muslim| community and the Party to which he belonged, the
SLFP. Such success as he achieved in this was by its very nature
transient. He was soon a controversial Iigure; his education policy
was one oI the major points oI divergence between the
government and the Tamils.
In one sentence, ProI. de Silva summarized the then-Iermenting
sentiments oI Tamils, especially among the youth.
'A by-product oI the increasing alienation oI the Tamils Irom the
Sinhalese since the adoption oI the |1972| new constitution was
the conversion oI a large section oI the Tamils oI the north to the
idea oI a separate state: it is an indication oI the intensity oI
Ieeling in the Tamil areas at what they saw as a deliberate
attempt to reduce them to subordinate status. |ibid, pp.550-
553|
However, he did not elaborate on the speciIic events which impacted
the JaIIna region between 1972 and 1974. These include,
1. S.J.V.Chelvanayakam resigning his Kankesanthurai seat in the
National State Assembly in October 2, 1972, challenging the
U.F. government to test the popularity oI its newly introduced
Constitution among the Tamils.
2. Undue postponement oI the Kankesanthurai by-election by the
government Ior over two years.
3. Vehement opposition oI the U.F. government Ior holding the 4
th
International Tamil Research ConIerence in JaIIna, in January
1974 and its unIortunate repercussions.
4. U.F. government eventually nominating a locally inIluential
Communist Party candidate Mr.V.Ponnambalam to contest the
by-election against Mr.Chelvanayakam.
5. Mr. Chelvanayakam winning the Kankesanthurai by-election,
held in February 6, 1975, by a margin oI over 16,000 votes
(Chelvanayakam polling 25,927 votes against Ponnambalam`s
9,457 votes).
Kankesanthurai by-election of 1975
The Iirst public announcement Ior a separate state Ior Tamils was
made by TULF leader Chelvanayakam during his campaign Ior
Kankesanthurai by-election in January 1975. Duraiappah, having
anointed himselI as the Prime Pimp` Ior the Sirimavo Bandaranaike`s
discriminatory policies in JaIIna peninsula canvassed support Ior the
unpopular U.F. government. His assassination took place Iive months
aIter the Kankesanthurai by-election.
Without digesting the political Ierment which engulIed the Tamil zones
oI the island in the Iirst halI oI 1970s and placing the assassination in
its political context, Iqbal Athas has cavalierly observed,
'Just weeks beIore Mr. Duraiappah was murdered, Mrs.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, then Prime Minister, visited JaIIna. At a
public meeting on that occasion Mr. Duraiappah appealed to Mrs.
Bandaranaike to release 19 youth in police custody Ior
inIringements during protest demonstrations against the
government. These youth were released in due course. The
group included Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader. The
Iirst act oI these youth was to show their gratitude by murdering
Mr. Duraiappah.|Sundav Times, Colombo, August 1, 1999|
It is pertinent to think why Duraiappah was assassinated, and not
V.Ponnambalam, who represented the U.F. Government in the much
delayed, Feb. 1975 by-election Ior Kankesanthurai. Is it because,
though V.Ponnambalam represented the Communist Party, he had a
clean image` and his sincerity oI purpose was not doubted by even
young Tamil militants. Contrastingly, Duraiappah, though being an ex-
MP Ior JaIIna, by his deeds had turned into a Prime Pimp` Ior the
repulsive SLFP rule. Thus, I would inIer that Duraiappah lost his liIe,
mainly because he served as the public Iace oI the repulsive policies
enIorced by Sirimavo Bandaranaike`s regime in JaIIna.
One yet-to be unexplored issue about this by-election was the illicit use
oI Ioreign Iunds against Chelvanayakam`s candidacy. With the Iall oI
Soviet Union in 1989, when its Intelligence Agency (KGB) archives
were opened, there appeared reports that KGB had oIIered Iunds to
inIluence the candidates oI its preIerence in the Sri Lankan elections. I
quote a news item, which appeared in the Hindu (International
Edition) in 1992, authored by Vladimir Radyuhin Irom Moscow.
'.In March 1989, the KGB chieI, Mr.Vladimir Kryuchkov,
inIormed the CPSU General Secretary, Mr.Mikhail Gorbachev,
that the Central Committee`s Iinancial support to Mrs. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike`s Sri Lanka Freedom Party enabled the latter to
sangam.orgf.fPart13.htm 1+f15
Bandaranaike`s Sri Lanka Freedom Party enabled the latter to
win eight times more seats in Parliament in the general elections
earlier that year. In the same letter, Mr.Kryuchkov reported that
the KGB also paid the way to Parliament Ior a number oI KGB
conIidants belonging both to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and
the United National Party`. The KGB chieI quoted
Mrs.Bandaranaike who had thanked Moscow Ior support and
assured it that her party would take advantage oI its increased
inIluence in parliament to block the pro-Western Ioreign policy
and the anti-democratic domestic course oI the ruling United
National Party. |Hindu, Madras, International edition, June
20, 1992, p.7|
What is revealing Irom this Moscow-based report was that, KGB had
Iunded SLFP candidates, even in the 1989 parliamentary elections in
Sri Lanka, when SLFP was out oI power. This being the case, with
some certainty one can inIer that KGB Iunds would have Ilowed into
the government coIIers in Sri Lanka, when it was in power and
contesting the Kankesanthurai by-election, through its Communist
Party candidate. The 1992 revelation in Moscow was made due to
Boris Yeltsin`s early initiatives to expose the Communist Party oI
Soviet Union (CPSU) support Ior Ioreign Communist Parties, so that
he could ban the CPSU in 1991 without a court ruling, Iollowing the
Iall oI Gorbachev. Since Yeltsin has transIerred powers to his protege,
Vladimir Putin, who is a past KGB operative, the chances oI studying
the role oI KGB Iunding Ior the 1975 Kankesanthurai by-election
appears remote now. (To be continued).

Part 14
Sachi Sri Kantha
8 September 2001]
Casualty Breakdown in Eelam Civil War
The significance of :1affna 198' book
I wish to reiterate the signiIicance oI Jaffna 1980 book authored by
Robert Holmes, which I have cited in Part-13 oI this series, to support
my proposition that AlIred Duraiappah`s contributions to JaIIna
society was a meager one. In my opinion, iI the Broken Palmvra
which was published 10 years later than Jaffna 1980 was an over-
rated book by Sri Lankan academics and polemicists, Jaffna 1980 has
been highly under-rated by all. One contributing Iactor Ior this over-
rating was that the lead author oI Broken Palmvra was a young Tamil
woman doctor, who had married a Sinhalese and who had lost her liIe
tragically in 1989.
Both the Jaffna 1980 and Broken Palmvra have two components in
common. One is that, both books describe the JaIIna society. The
other is that two oI the authors oI Broken Palmvra as well as the
author oI Jaffna 1980 shared the Christian values oI upbringing. Since
Robert Holmes, an American missionary, had lived in JaIIna Ior a long
time, with wisdom and experience, he also could observe the positive
aspects oI the Eelam Tamil society impartially, than the tinted-eyes oI
inexperienced, youthIul authors oI Broken Palmvra, who present a
We are the sinners` message. The practice oI casteism in JaIIna has
been critically commented by Holmes, but he more or less, has
moderated the tone oI criticism, based on his own upbringing in the
USA, where the racism against the Blacks in the Iirst halI oI 20
th
century was no less demeaning than the casteism practiced in JaIIna.
Dr.Holmes had leIt out several Tamil personalities who contributed
much to JaIIna culture. Why I chose that book is that, it provides a
birds-eye-view` oI how JaIIna was like in 1980, to an American -
who was not a tourist or a journalist. He had lived in post-independent
JaIIna Ior 12 years. That is a sort oI record Ior an outsider, and his
work on how JaIIna was in 1980 was commendable. We will never
see the JaIIna oI his descriptions. He did not write the history oI
JaIIna.
sangam.orgf.fPart1+.htm 1f16
JaIIna.
My reasoning Ior chosing that book as my reIerence source on
Duraiappah was that iI Duraiappah, as presented by Rajan Hoole, was
such a civic-minded politician, he would at least have been mentioned
once in that book. Holmes has not included other mayors oI JaIIna
and he had not even discussed about any politician, other than
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam and Amirthalingam (in passing). No mention
was made about G.G.Ponnambalam. That was the prevailing situation
in 1978-80. The point I wished to stress was, Ior an average JaIIna
man, only Chelvanayakam counted among the politicians at that time.
And Pirabhakaran was yet to emerge. In the absence oI another non-
Tamil, non-partisan, educated observer of the Jaffna scene, who had
lived in Jaffna for more than 10 vears, I can cite only his work.
LTTE`s view of its Tamil rivals in 1987
The seeds Ior the disinIormation campaign that the LTTE is an anti-
Tamil` organization were Iirst sown by the India`s Intelligence-wallahs
and their Eelam acolytes, once the oIIicers manning the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW) Iound to their chagrin that Pirabhakaran had
leIt Tamil Nadu. How LTTE viewed the situation in early 1987, when
Pirabhakaran returned to Eelam is revealed by the interview given by
Kiddu to Asiaweek`s correspondent Aruna Kulatunga in December
1986.
Since Kiddu has leIt the scene now, I reproduce in entirety his answers
to Kulatunga`s questions on the Tamil cause. He was only 26 then,
and held the position oI JaIIna military commander oI the Liberation
Tigers oI Tamil Eelam. In his interview, Kiddu had stated the obvious
Iact oI the meddling by India`s Intelligence-wallahs, without naming
the organization openly.
Asiaweek: Why did you join the militant movement?
Kiddu: Ours was never an ideological struggle against a majority
because oI race or religion. It had to do with economic Iactors
education, employment, our right to decide what we want to do.
Asiaweek: Tamil politicians are negotiating with the government
right now. Why have you reIused to do so?
Kiddu: The politicians have no say in JaIIna now. We are in
complete control. They don`t even come to JaIIna. We haven`t
negotiated with the government because there is nothing to
negotiate. We want a separate state and we have already
achieved our objective here in JaIIna. But iI they want to talk to
achieved our objective here in JaIIna. But iI they want to talk to
us, they are welcome.
Asiaweek: What action have you planned Ior the present and
Iuture?
Kiddu: For now, it`s a case oI containment. We have time on
our hands. Our cadres are very young, mostly in their late teens.
All are completely committed, all have been personally aIIected
by the violence. The LTTE has more than 10,000 regulars all
over the country. The whole population oI JaIIna supports us.
Asiaweek: What about the other Tamil militant groups?
Kiddu: PLOT |People`s Liberation Organisation oI Tamil
Eelam| has ceased to exist and its JaIIna leader, Vijayapalan, is in
our custody. We are now in the process oI disbanding EPRLF
|Eelam People`s Revolutionary Liberation Front|, just like we did
to TELO |Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation|. The latter was
acting against the common interests oI the Tamil people to
establish a state oI their own and govern it themselves. TELO
was being inIluenced and virtually controlled by outsiders.
Secondly, it was carrying out anti-social acts such as robbing
people oI money and levying taxes that were too high. EPRLF
came under the inIluence oI the same people who controlled
TELO.
We have asked EPRLF to disband itselI and turn over its
weapons to us. II it disobeys, we will have to take strong action.
That`s the only way to prevent a third party Irom interIering in
what is purely a problem between us and the Sinhalese. AIter all,
we are still Sri Lankans.
Asiaweek: Why insist on a separate state?
Kiddu: |That| is our ultimate goal. We will not lay down arms
until we achieve it. But, in the interim, we want the authorities to
recognize that we have the right to a separate state oI our own
and to occupy areas where Tamils have been living Ior ages.
Asiaweek: Do you think the new peace proposals are sincere?
Kiddu: We think they are a Iarce. The government says there is
devolution oI central power. But each department is ultimately
controlled by an appointee oI the president. Even the chieI
minister will be a presidential appointee. So what is the control
we are going to have?
The issue oI Asiaweek magazine |February 8, 1987|, which carried
Kiddu`s interview also inIormed the readers that he had a $35,000
Kiddu`s interview also inIormed the readers that he had a $35,000
price on his head. About Pirabhakaran`s return, it regurgitated the
Indian Intelligence-wallah`s story line |see, Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon-Part 13| as Iollows:
'Early last month, Prabhakaran returned to the peninsula
Irom his base in Madras, the capital oI Tamil Nadu State in south
India. His visit the Iirst in three years came amid rumors oI a
power struggle between the LTTE`s India-based leadership and
Iield commanders in JaIIna. Reports circulated recently that
Prabhakaran had arrested` Kiddu, who had begun asserting
himselI in his absence. However, LTTE sources contacted by
Asiaweek in JaIIna beIore direct telephone links were suspended
said the commander was not under detention. Earlier, Kiddu
himselI had denied a rupture with his leader and dismissed
reports oI one as propaganda by the government`...
The disinIormation campaign on LTTE gained momentum when the
Colombo-based hacks who were torch-carriers to the brutal
Premadasa regime, such as H.L.D.Mahindapala and Dayan Jayatilleka,
picked up the Indian chant to deIlect the criticism on human rights
abuse during the Iirst two years oI Premadasa period.
A Critique on the statistics of LTTE`s ~massacres
As a student (and simultaneously a teacher) oI science, I like to study
the numbers presented in any debate to evaluate the validity oI a
proposition. The dictionary deIines a proposition as, a scheme or
proposal oIIered Ior consideration or acceptance.` Since its emergence
in mid-1970s, one oI the oIt-repeated proposition on LTTE, by the
tub-thumbing politicians in Sri Lanka as well as India and regurgitated
in the partisan press oI Colombo as well as Chennai is that, LTTE led
by Pirabhakaran is not a liberation movement, but a brutal, Iascist and
terrorist` movement. This proposition, by extension, argues that LTTE
is thus not a true representative oI Eelam Tamils.
I was helped in developing a critique to this proposition by an editorial,
which appeared in the Island (Colombo) newspaper oI March 19,
2001 under the heading, Unmasking the Tiger`. It provided the
numbers I had wanted on the LTTE`s massacres` during the past 18
years, Irom an anti-LTTE source. First, I reproduce verbatim, the
numbers the Island editorialist had served to his readership.
'The Iollowing are prooI oI what LTTE terrorism is like behind
the Iaade oI liberation`. The LTTE has so Iar committed over
200 massacres obviously to rid the north and east oI Sinhalese
sangam.orgf.fPart1+.htm +f16
200 massacres obviously to rid the north and east oI Sinhalese
and Muslims. The Iollowing incidents selected at random are
glaring examples oI LTTE terrorism.
Year 1984
The LTTE kills 127 civilians, mostly Sinhalese, in the north.
Year 1985
The LTTE kills 150 Sinhala civilians at prayer in Anuradhapura.
Year 198
May 3: The LTTE bombs an Air Lanka plane in Colombo, killing
16 people
May 7: bombs the Central Telegraph OIIice, Colombo, killing 14
people.
Year 1987
The LTTE kills 113 people in Colombo by exploding a car bomb.
June: kills 29 Buddhist monks at Arantalawa.
Year 1988
March 3: The LTTE kills 15 Sinhalese civilians in Morawewa.
March 5: blows up a truck in Trincomalee killing 24 civilians.
May 1: blows up a bus in Trincomalee killing 22 passengers.
Nov.14: kills 27 Sinhalese civilians in a bus.
Year 1989
Feb.11: the LTTE kills by hacking and shooting 34 Sinhalese
civilians in Duluwewa.
Feb.28: kills 37 Sinhalese civilians at Borawewa.
April 23: kills 51 people in Trincomalee.
Year 199
The LTTE massacres 600-700 policemen who surrender on
government orders during the LTTE-UNP talks.
Aug.3: the LTTE uses machetes, guns and grenades to kill 40
Muslims praying in a mosque in the eastern village oI
Kattankudy.
Aug.12: the LTTE massacres 122 Muslims in Eravur.
Year 1991
April 21: the LTTE kills 21 Sinhalese villagers in Moneragala.
Kills 27 civilians in Batticaloa.
Year 1992
April 29: the LTTE kills 56 Muslims at Alinchipathana.
Oct.15: explodes a bicycle bomb in Batticaloa killing 22 Muslims.
Oct.15: the LTTE massacres 166 Muslims in Palliyagodella.
Year 1993
May 1: the LTTE assassinates Sri Lankan President Ranasingha
Premadasa, together with 22 others.
Year 1994
Jan.19: the LTTE kills 15 bus passengers at Anuradhapura.
March 21; the LTTE kills 22 Iishermen in Puttalam.
Nov.24: the LTTE kills Sri Lankan Opposition Leader Gamini
Dissanayake and 51 others in Colombo during the LTTE-
government talks.
Year 1995
The LTTE kills 42 Sinhalese civilians at Kallarawa.
June 4: the LTTE kills 24 Sinhalese civilians in Colombo.
Year 199
The LTTE bombs the Central Bank killing 82 civilians.
October: the LTTE bombs Hotel Galadari killing 18 civilians.
Year 1998
The LTTE bombs Dalada Maligawa killing 16 persons.
May: the LTTE explodes a vehicle bomb in Maradana killing
over 10 civilians.
Year 1999
The LTTE explodes a bomb at the Kandy private bus station
killing 2 civilians.
July: the LTTE assassinates TULF MP Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam.
December: the LTTE makes an attempt on President Chandrika
Kumaratunga, and kills 22 civilians. The LTTE bombs a UNP
election rally, killing 10 civilians.
Year 2
June: the LTTE kills Minister C.V.Gooneratne and 22 others.
October: the LTTE kills 6 persons opposite the Eye Hospital.
Thus could be seen the crimes the LTTE has perpetrated against
humanity and against the Tamil-speaking people`, like
Muslims.
In this list, the assassinations oI Ranjan Wijeratne and Lalith
Athulathmudali have been omitted, thus the Island`s wags now have
learnt belatedly that the LTTE was not involved in these high-proIile
killings.
Now, let me tabulate the number oI people who had died, since 1984,
due to LTTE`s terrorism` or crimes against humanity` as the
editorialist oI the Island has grandiosely implied. I leave out the '600-
700 policemen who were 'massacred Iollowing surrender on
700 policemen who were 'massacred Iollowing surrender on
government orders in 1990, since this category doesn`t Iall under the
civilians. This issue need to be discussed in a separate section.
The LTTE`s civilian victims since 1984, as recorded in the Island
editorial are: 127 150 16 14 113 29 15 24 22 27
34 37 51 40 122 21 27 56 22 166 23 15 22
52 42 24 82 18 16 10 2 1 22 10 23 6.
The total is 1,481.
Among these, those speciIically identiIied as Muslim civilians (40
122 56 22) amount to 240.
Though the anti-LTTE editorial stated that LTTE had committed
'over 200 massacres, the supplied information provides figures for
onlv 36 incidents for a period of almost 17 vears. Even some oI the
massacres` (especially those which occurred in the Eastern zone),
which have been designated by the Island editorialist as LTTE-
induced`, according to some observers, could have been perpetrated
by the other militant Iactions, which were tagging either the Indian
army or the Sri Lankan army.
It is also obvious that, iI there had been any other incidents where
non-Tamil civilians had been killed anywhere in Sri Lanka, with a
casualty list exceeding a dozen, the editorialist would certainly have
added these numbers with glee and attributed them to LTTE. In the
absence oI such incidents, the above list is all what the anti-LTTE
propagandists can provide Ior the purported LTTE massacres`. II the
number oI Muslims (240) who had been reported killed by the
LTTE` are subtracted Irom the grand total oI 1,481 then, it can be
inIerred that LTTE had been responsible Ior the death oI 1,241
Sinhalese civilians. Technically, in Sri Lanka, political power-holders
such as the President oI the state, the ministers and even MPs cannot
be included in the conventional civilian` classiIication, since once they
elevate their status Irom private citizens, they become non-civil` and
do not behave like civilians. Regular civilians do not have gun-totting
personal bodyguards and bulletprooI vehicles.
The above-cited statistics and the purported inIerence that 'LTTE has
perpetrated crimes against humanity may bring commendation, iI
presented at the Cabinet meeting oI Chandrika Kumaratunga. But, a
speaker who presents the same statistics, at an international scientiIic
meeting, would be laughed oII Irom the podium. The obvious derision
will be, LTTE`s numbers compared against what`?
This brings me to the issue oI non-use of controls by the journalists
and analysts who lead a science and logic-challenged existence in
Colombo and Chennai. Merely parrot-mouthing that LTTE is
responsible Ior the death oI nearly 1,500 Sinhalese and Muslim
civilians during the past 17 years doesn`t mean much, iI the query
compared to whom` is not answered. I would inIer that compared to
Mother Teresa`s army oI Christian missionaries, LTTE is guilty. But
compared to the Sri Lankan army and the Indian army, LTTE is not
guilty.
The concept of controls: sadly lacking in anti-LTTE features
At this juncture, I will brieIly introduce the concept oI controls in
evaluating a submitted Iact. This is one oI the cardinal principles in
scientiIic experimentation. I can do no better than cite excerpts Irom a
review authored by Edwin Boring (1886-1968) oI Harvard University
in 1954. For nearly Iour decades, Boring was an inIluential American
experimental psychologist. In his paper entitled, The nature and
history oI experimental control`, he had stated,
'the concept oI control is basic to all experimental design and is,
indeed, inherent in the essential relational nature oI a Iact. The
word control has three meanings: (1) a check, in the sense oI a
veriIication but thus also in the sense oI a restraint, since
veriIication restrains; (2) a restraint, in the sense oI a checking
and thus also in the sense oI maintaining constancy; and (3) a
guide or directing, in the sense oI producing a precisely
predetermined change, a constant and thus a restrained change.
The word check itselI has the Iirst two meanings, though not the
last, and the original meaning oI control was check, Ior the word
was counter-roll (contre-rolle), a duplicate register or account
made to veriIy an oIIicial or Iirst-made account and thus a check
by a later roll upon the earlier. So the thought oI correctness or
conIormity achieved by restraint runs all the way through the
history oI the word. |American Journal of Psvchologv,
Dec.1954, vol.67, pp.573-589|
Boring continued Iurther, as Iollows:
'The term control in the sense oI a check or test observation or
experiment came into scientiIic parlance in the latter halI oI the
nineteenth century. By 1893 we Iind the New English
Dictionarv deIining control as a standard oI comparison used to
check the inIerences deduced Irom an experiment by application
oI the Method oI DiIIerence`, which is the name oI John Stuart
Mill`s second method oI experimental inquiry.
The concept oI controls is a vital component in any scientiIic analysis,
whether it be the weather pattern in Sri Lanka or Einstein`s expertise
or Mozart`s mood swings. I insert here brieIly, an element oI my
personal struggle to explain the importance oI controls in any analysis.
Six years ago, I was engaged in a study on Einstein`s scientiIic
productivity, and iI I had presented my analysis on Einstein`s
productivity, like how the Island editorialist has done Ior LTTE`s
massacres`, my study wouldn`t have passed the scientiIic peer
review. I spent nearly six months in Iinding two appropriate controls
(who was oI equal stature) to Einstein and collecting the relevant data
oI those controls and only then I sat down to compare the scientiIic
productivity oI Einstein with those two controls, namely Landsteiner
and Freud. By including the two appropriate controls in my analysis, I
brought rigor and eventual acceptance oI my hypothesis. My study on
Einstein was published in the Medical Hvpotheses journal in 1996.
Selecting the appropriate controls demanded much oI my time and
eIIort, but that step was the vital component Ior the acceptance oI my
hypothesis.
ThereIore, iI one equates the civil unrest which led to civil striIe and
ultimately civil war in Sri Lanka as a long-running, unIortunate
experiment, and the civilian deaths which have occurred since 1983
have been due to multiple parties, oI which LTTE is one, Ior a proper
evaluation oI LTTE`s role in such civilian deaths, the roles oI other
parties also need to be considered in the calculation. Sadly, the concept
oI control is an unknown entity in the brains oI Colombo`s partisan
journalists as well as anti-LTTE analysts like the University Teachers
Ior Human Rights (JaIIna).
To evaluate the LTTE atrocities` in the island, an objective analyst
should take into account two types oI control; (1) internal control (2)
external control. An internal control will provide the statistics Ior
deaths occurring in the island, for which LTTE is not an immediate
cause. An external control will provide the statistics Ior deaths
occurring beyond the borders oI Sri Lanka, where a similar situation (a
civil war) prevails in which a liberation movement is Iighting an
entrenched government.
Casualty Break-down in the Eelam Civil War (1uly 1983-1uly
2001)
For the past 15 years or so, international journalists covering the
Eelam civil war, routinely provide a sentence to the eIIect that this war
had claimed the lives oI 50,000 or 60,000 or 70,000 Sri Lankans. But,
due to reasons oI ignorance or diIIiculties in clearly identiIying the
due to reasons oI ignorance or diIIiculties in clearly identiIying the
military participants and civilians, or Ior convenience oI not oIIending
the Sri Lankan government which allow them partial access to
battleIront, they do not divulge the breakdown oI casualties.
John Colmey`s lengthy report, which appeared in the Asiaweek
magazine in 1992 |just beIore the deaths oI Gen. Denzil
Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne| was an exception.
He, while traveling through JaIIna, then noted,
'Death toll |is| estimated at upto 25,000 so Iar in the civil war.
Killed since 1983: about 3,000 security Iorces men; 5,000-5,500
Tigers; 2,000-2,500 other militants, and 10,000-15,000 civilians.
In addition, as many as 150,000 have been tortured. Since 1983,
the army has grown Irom a ceremonial Iorce oI some 14,000
soldiers to a proIessional, highly motivated one oI 100,000. In the
same period the military budget has risen Iive Iold to |US|$ 433
million. |Asiaweek, August 14, 1992, pp.66-79|
This was, when Premadasa was the President oI Sri Lanka. Lately,
aIter what the Sri Lankans have Iaced under Chandrika
Kumaratunga`s seven years oI mis-rule, the Cevlon Dailv News oI
April 21, 2001, carried a Ieature entitled, The human cost oI the war`
which provided statistical inIormation on the deaths, as tabulated by
the National Peace Council Publication. Notable numbers appeared as
Iollows.
The estimates oI the total number oI deaths in the war until 1998,
ranged between 50,000 and 60,000.
Casualties among the combatants would be in the range between
25,000 and 35,000.
Until 1998, the oIIicial estimate oI deaths in the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces and other security personnel is approximately
12,000. Until 1999, the oIIicial estimate Ior members oI the
armed Iorces missing in action is 3,800.
The government estimate Ior deaths oI LTTE cadres is
approximately 18,000. But according to the estimates provided
by the LTTE, it had lost 13,603 cadres until December 1998.
Casualties among all the other organizations (not identiIied by
name) could be estimated at another 2,000.
The total number oI claims received by the Ministry oI
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Ior compensation in cases oI
death and disappearance in the North and East, until 1992
amounted to 17,529; however, this estimate may have to be
adjusted downwards. The total number oI civilian deaths in the
North and the East Ior which the government has paid
compensation during the period 1994-98 is 4,663.
Civilian deaths due to Tamil militant groups, mainly the LTTE,
during 1985-90 period could be estimated at about 2,000. During
the period 1990-1998 alone, there were about 78 major terrorist
acts in the border areas and in Colombo city and its suburbs; the
number oI civilian deaths caused by them was approximately
1,800.
Readers should note that though the numbers stated are reasonable
estimates, Ior obvious reasons, these are skewed against the LTTE, to
project the view that the Sri Lankan army has an exemplary human
rights record. The reality speaks otherwise.
Since the North and East oI the island have remained the major theater
oI the war, casualties among Tamil civilians outweighs the casualties
among Sinhalese civilians. Thus, my estimates, which can be cross-
checked with other published sources in the international press,
somehow varies a little Irom that oI the numbers presented by the
National Peace Council publication. Two additional points need to be
noticed. First, the above numbers do not clearly demarcate the lives
lost in the Eelam zone during the Indian army`s war against the LTTE
between October 1987 and March 1990. Secondly, the civilian
casualties due to the actions oI other Tamil militant Iactions which
played the roles as spotters` and bucket carriers` to both the Indian
army and the Sri Lankan army have been underestimated by nearly
1,000.
My estimate of casualties in the Sri Lankan civil war since 1983
The ever-increasing death toll in the Eelam civil unrest, which began in
1983, has to be attributed to the actions oI Iour parties, namely
1. Sri Lankan armed Iorces
2. Indian army (Irom August 1987 to March 1990)
3. LTTE
4. Other Tamil militant groups (PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO and
EPDP)
For sake oI convenience, I have not considered the role oI JVP, which
can be considered as the IiIth party. I omitted the JVP because its role
was mostly limited to the non-Eelam zones oI the island. Also, the
was mostly limited to the non-Eelam zones oI the island. Also, the
number oI civilian deaths due to JVP aggression (1987-1990), and
counter-oIIensives made by the UNP government have to be scaled
altogether in a expanded scale. For instance, the Economist magazine,
in its report Iollowing the assassination oI Gamini Dissanayake in 1994
observed that,
'Only Iive years ago its |Sri Lanka`s| rivers and beaches
were Iilled with mutilated corpses, victims oI government-
sponsored death squads unleashed to annihilate a Maoist-style
insurrection in the Sinhalese south. Up to 60,000 people died in
that conIlict twice the number oI casualties in the ethnic war.
Ranasinghe Premadasa, who presided over the death squads and
was himselI killed, was believed to have employed Tamil
militants to get rid oI his Sinhalese political opponents.
|Economist, Oct.29, 1994, pp.29-30|
In my calculation, the casualty numbers in the Eelam civil war, due to
the actions oI each oI the Iour parties stand as Iollows, as oI July 1,
2001:
Sri Lankan armed Iorces have caused 37,040 deaths; the Indian army
(between October 1987 and March 1990) caused 6,800 deaths; LTTE
has caused 19,800 deaths; Other Tamil militant groups have caused
2,900 deaths. Grand total oI casualties, thus amount to 66,540.
LTTE`s loss oI Iighters, since 1982, amount to 17,240 (AFP news
report, Island, Colombo, June 24, 2001). This number oI 17,240 has
to be sub-divided into three categories: LTTE cadres killed by Sri
Lankan armed Iorces (16,040), LTTE cadres killed by the Indian
army, during its IPKF operation (800), and LTTE cadres killed by
other Tamil militant Iactions (400). The casualty Iigures noted here,
were taken Irom Lisa Beyer`s commentary No tears here`, in the
Time magazine (Asia edition) oI April 2, 1990 which summed up the
Iailure oI India`s Vietnam war`.
The breakdown oI deaths, caused by the Iour parties can be tabulated
as Iollows:
(1) Number of deaths due to the actions of Sri Lankan armed
forces
LTTE cadres killed 16,040
Tamil and Muslim civilians killed 21,000
Total 37,040
(2) Number of deaths due to the actions of Indian army
(August 1987- March 1990)
LTTE cadres killed 800
Total 6,800
(3) Number of deaths due to the actions of LTTE
Sri Lankan armed Iorces killed 15,500
Indian armed Iorces killed 1,200
Sinhalese civilians killed 1,300
Tamil and Muslim civilians killed 1,000 |Tamils 760 and
Muslims 240|
Other Tamil militant cadres killed (including the Tamil National
Army, trained by the Indian army) 1,200
Total 19,800
(4) Number of deaths due to the actions of other Tamil militant
groups (PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO, EPDP)
Sri Lankan armed Iorces killed (during 1983-86) 100
LTTE cadres killed 400
Sinhalese civilians killed 400
Total 2,900
I wish to note that these Iigures stand revision, and I will be glad to
accept correction, iI anyone can provide me numbers with some
authentiIying, published documentation. There exists a diIIerence
between my analysis and that oI selI-nominated LTTE expert` Rohan
Gunaratna. Whereas being a scientist, I rely on published sources oI
inIormation, Gunaratna mostly cites Intelligence inIormation` Irom
secretive, unpublished sources which need Iurther veriIication Irom
secretive, unpublished sources which need Iurther veriIication Irom
other sources.
Sri Lankan Suicide statistics as an internal control
Now, I wish to provide an internal control statistic, to debunk the
claim oI LTTE atrocities` against civilians. This statistic is none other
than the number oI successIul suicides in Sri Lanka. Nalini Ellawala
had provided a table with her Ieature, Some community responses Ior
suicide prevention`, which appeared in the Island (Colombo) oI May
10, 2001. The suicide statistics are quoted Irom police records, which
obviously is an underestimate, and due to the prevailing civil war, one
can assume that these statistics were mainly collected Irom the
provinces, excluding the North and the East oI the island. The number
oI successIul suicides Ior years Irom 1995 to 2000 recorded were as
Iollows:
1995 had 8,519 suicides. 1996 had 7,367 suicides. 1997 had 6,228
suicides. 1998 had 5,869 suicides. 1999 had 5,907 suicides. Year 2000
had 5,412 suicides. A grand total oI 39,302 suicides committed in the
last six years. Among this 39,302 suicides, 29,759 were men and
9,543 were women. Thus, the suicide casualties, between the years
1995 and 2000 in the predominantly Sinhalese regions oI the island
exceed the deaths caused by LTTE actions (between 1983 and mid-
2001) by 20,000. It is somewhat hilarious, that while Pirabhakaran`s
motivated Black Tigers, who Iunction as Uvir-aavutham (LiIe
weapon) is much discussed by the LTTE specialists` like Rohan
Gunaratna and the partisan editorialists in the media, the civilian
suicides occurring in pandemic proportions among the Sinhalese are
only whispered about and hidden out oI shame.
Another pathetic news Ieature in my Iiles, authored by Feizal Samath
in early 1998 quotes Dr.Karunatissa Athukorale, a sociologist aIIiliated
to the University oI Peradeniya.
'Athukorala estimates that more than one person commits suicide
every hour in Sri Lanka, greater than the number that dies on the
country`s battle Iields. The civil war is estimated to have killed at
least 50,000 in the last 15 years. |InterPress Service, March
1998|
Thus, according to Dr.Atukorale, 24 x 365 8,760 suicides occur in
an year in Sri Lanka. The number oI civilian deaths between 1983 and
mid-2001which can be attributed to LTTE atrocities`, in my estimate,
amounts to 2,500 (highest range). But the total number oI recorded
suicides in Sri Lanka, between 1995 and 2000, adds to a grand
39,302. Comparison oI these two numbers strongly disproves the
sangam.orgf.fPart1+.htm 1+f16
39,302. Comparison oI these two numbers strongly disproves the
dubious proposition that LTTE has perpetrated crimes against
humanity`.
Fallacious Propaganda on LTTE`s Suicide Bombers
I read two opinions last year (one by C.A.Chandraprema, Island, June
7, 2000; and the other by Dr.Nalin Swaris, Island, June 21, 2000)
related to an anti-LTTE play Forbidden Area` scripted by one
Visakesa Chandrasekeren, who has been identiIied as a Tamil woman.
This play has introduced a nave preposition that the prime motive oI
LTTE women suicide bombers is sexual Irustration. I had wished to
comment on this Iallacious propaganda immediately, but I was waiting
Ior adequate supporting data on suicide statistics in Sri Lanka to
present my rebuttal. Now that this data has been presented by Nalini
Ellawala in the Island newspaper (May 10, 2001), I comment on the
naivete oI Ms.Chandrasekeren.
Ms.Chandrasekeren`s sexual Irustration` proposition reminded me oI
an old Angoda Mental Hospital joke.
Patient 1: Which is Iar Irom Colombo? Madras or Moon?
Patient 2: Moon, don`t you know this?
Patient 1: Idiot. It`s Madras you Iool. We can see the moon Irom
here, but we cannot see Madras.
In my opinion, Ms.Chandrasekeren deserves a peer-ranking with these
patients. Sexuality is a theme which has been exploited by pulp
novelists, pseudo-scholars, movie makers, and pimps in the hotel
industry to make proIit. And iI Ms.Chandrasekeren`s prime motive Ior
linking sexuality theme to her anti-LTTE play was proIit-oriented, I
would say she is entitled to her 15-minutes oI Iame`. But I can vouch
that she is an ignoramus on sexuality or suicide or Emile Durkheim or
the history oI warIare.
The Iact that Sri Lanka now has one oI the highest suicide rates in the
world Ior men and women has been highlighted in academic circles Ior
the past decade, and the Economist magazine also picked up this point
in 1994 to raise doubt on the theory that LTTE was involved in the
assassination oI Gamini Dissanayake. It commented that,
'It should be noted that the island`s predominantly Sinhalese
population has one oI the highest suicide rates in the world. In the
murky world oI Sri Lankan politics, it is not impossible that Mr
murky world oI Sri Lankan politics, it is not impossible that Mr
Dissanayake was murdered by someone else. Possible suspects
include Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinists (who assassinated Mrs
Kumaratunga`s Iather in 1959), senior army oIIicers (who tried
to stage a military coup just beIore August`s parliamentary
elections), and anti-Tiger paramilitary groups. AIter three decades
oI Irequently controversial political activity, Mr Dissanayake also
had many enemies, some oI them within the UNP itselI.
|Economist, Oct.29, 1994, pp.29-30|
According to Nalini Ellawala`s commentary the number oI women
who committed suicide in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000
were 2263, 1626, 1554, 1351, 1371 and 1378 respectively. These
Iigures add to a cumulative total oI 9,543 women who have committed
suicide. By population ratio, 75 percent oI 9,543 would have to be
Sinhalese, which turns out to be a little over 7,150. One should also
note that the cited Iigures, being police record statistics, should
deIinitely be a gross underestimation. For sake oI argument iI one
assumes that the young LTTE women residing in the island commit
suicide because oI sexual Irustration, the same logic should apply to
other Sri Lankan women who have committed suicide as well. So,
does the 7,150-odd Sinhala women who committed suicide between
1995 and 2000 also suIIered Irom sexual Irustration?
Furthermore, is sexual Irustration gender-speciIic? Is any medical data
available on this issue Ior Sri Lankans including Tamils? II not, one
should add the number oI men who had committed suicide, which
turns out to be, again according to the police records, a whopping total
oI 29,759 between 1995 and 2000. |Island, May 10, 2001|. Assuming
that 75 percent oI this number should be Sinhalese, nearly 22,300
Sinhalese men committed suicide between 1995 and 2000, since
Chandrika Kumaratunga became the President oI Sri Lanka. II one
extrapolates Visakesa Chandrasekeren`s logic, these individuals would
also have been sexually Irustrated. It is a shame that some Colombo
Tamil elites who label themselves dramatists` cast aspersions on the
monkish discipline oI LTTE women who stands above mere mortals
in courage and conviction. (Continued)

Part 15
Sachi Sri Kantha
22 September 2001]
Demand of Discipline

'A leader is useless when he acts against the prompting oI his
own conscience, surrounded as he must be by people holding all
kinds oI views. He will driIt like an anchorless ship, iI he has not
the inner voice to hold him Iirm and guide him
- Mahatma Gandhi, in Young India, Feb.23, 1922.
Eelam of mid-1980s: the frontier territory
When Pirabhakaran landed in January 1987, the then Tamil Eelam
could easily be visualized as resembling that oI a Irontier territory
depicted in many a Hollywood Western story line, which entertained
us decades ago. High Noon, Shane and Gun Fight at O.K.Corral are
some classic movies, which come to my mind.
II one re-reads Kiddu`s answers in his 1987 interview to the Asiaweek
magazine (presented in Part 14 oI this series) in 2001, the analogy
appears so apt. The old social order, which was maintained by the Sri
Lankan state, had begun to rot. Then, there emerged quite a number
oI puppet gangs, whose strings were pulled by the Indian Intelligence
operatives. These puppet gangs lacked a Ilag and lacked a vision as
well, though Ior convenience and masquerade carried the Eelam` tag
in their banners: - Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation, Eelam People
Revolutionary Liberation Front, People Liberation Organisation oI
Tamil Eelam, Eelam People Democratic Party etc. Pirabhakaran`s
entry in JaIIna was more or less like that oI the SheriII in the Irontier
territory, riding up on his horse and marking his area oI inIluence:
Listen bovs, vouve been trouble around here for a long time,
so get out of town bv sun rise, and dont ever let us see vou back
around these parts again
The decimation oI TELO and EPRLF and later Tamil National Army
(TNA), by the LTTE, between 1986 and 1990 had to be interpreted
along these lines. There was much agony among the Eelam Tamils Ior
along these lines. There was much agony among the Eelam Tamils Ior
deterioration oI discipline, especially aIter the introduction oI gun
culture` in the early 1980s. But, discipline in the island`s public liIe per
se had begun to disintegrate two decades beIore that, when the
Sinhalese politicians wrongly believed that the maniacal mantra Ape
Anduwa (Our Government) would serve as the panacea Ior their lack
oI tact and leadership skills.
Demand of Discipline
The curse oI post-independent Sri Lankan politics is the lack oI
discipline among the politicians who became the representatives oI
people. This came to be Ielt strongly since the ascension oI Sirimavo
Bandaranaike as the prime minister. The only Sinhalese politician oI
note who cared Ior a little dose oI discipline, when he was oIIered the
proverbial power-stick` was that irrepressible eccentric Wijayananda
Dahanayake. He even dictated, during his short tenure oI power (late
1959 to early 1960) Iollowing the assassination oI padre Bandaranaike,
that the D` in his name stood Ior discipline`. He was a school teacher
during colonial times, beIore he plunged into politics in mid 1940s.
Thus, Dahanayake knew something about the value oI discipline.
When the SLFP kitchen-plotters couldn`t stand the heat generated by
Dahanayake, they dumped him in early 1960 and with that, the
essential ingredient which could have saved the island was also thrown
out. Rather than the importance given to the country`, the people`,
and even the party`, the key-word in the SLFP came to be Iamily`
(read it as, Bandaranaike Iamily) and with that Ceylon`s Iuture as a
viable and productive country was sealed.
When Dahanayake cared about discipline, he was in his late 50s, and
Pirabhakaran was only 6 years old. The only island leader, Iollowing
Dahanayake, who cared about discipline came to be Pirabhakaran, and
when he instilled the signiIicance oI discipline Ior his cadres, he
himselI was youth in his 20s. In his strong adherence to discipline,
Pirabhakaran stands peerless among other Sri Lankans. But other
successIul Ireedom Iighters (Mahatma Gandhi Ior instance) have
instructed their Iollowers on the importance oI discipline. Arm chair
critics, bourgeoise scholars and pretentious Poo Bahs who are more
literate, but less intelligent than Pirabhakaran, Iault the LTTE leader
Ior his monkish demands in discipline highlighted by No smoking, No
drinking and No sex` Ior his cadres.
To assess the success oI Pirabhakaran`s discipline, I provide two
Ieatures which have appeared in the Time magazine (Asian edition), in
a span oI six years.
1. Edward Desmond`s Ieature entitled, Inside the Tiger Mind`
(Time magazine, Sept.16, 1991)
(Time magazine, Sept.16, 1991)
2. Tim McGirk`s report Irom JaIIna entitled, Running Away
Irom the Tigers` (Time magazine, November 17, 1997)
Since both Ieatures appeared in the Time magazine, there exists an
element oI coherence. The Iirst Ieature (reproduced in entirety)
appeared exactly 10 years ago, when LTTE had established itselI
solidly in the northern Eelam, Iollowing the withdrawal oI India`s
army. It describes the Pirabhakaran`s leadership style and his
adherence to strict discipline. The second Ieature, which appeared in
1997, describes the mind-set oI a Sri Lankan army. It presents
snippets oI the mind-set oI a Sri Lankan army`s Ioot soldier (a
deserter), revealing glimpses oI the lack oI discipline and why he was
absconding Irom his employer`, despite the Iact that in 1997, LTTE
had lost` JaIIna.
Now, to Edward Desmond`s Ieature.
Inside the Tiger Mind: Tamil fighters are forged from discipline,
nationalism and worship of their leader
1ime magazine, Asian edition, Sept.16, 1991]
'Just 300 meters beyond the northern-most checkpoint oI the Sri
Lankan army is a crude barrier across the road. Close by stands a
serious-looking young man, not more than 16 years old, dressed
in camouIlage Iatigues and carrying an AK-47 riIle. He looks
over the Tamil peasants and a journalist passing through on their
way to JaIIna and politely but Iirmly tells the reporter, Don`t
take pictures, and there is no need to talk to the people.`
The sentry`s stern directive is a measure oI the Tigers`
remarkable obedience. Tigers do what they are told, whether on
guard duty or in battle. The ultimate symbol is the vial oI cyanide
dangling on a string around the sentry`s neck a vial carried by
all the Iighters, including their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Rather than be captured, more than 600 oI the guerrillas have
committed suicide by taking the poison.
To-the-death determination has been the Tigers` most eIIective
weapon in their struggle against the bigger and better-equipped
armies oI Sri Lanka and, in the late 80s, India. It has also
ensured the guerrillas` absolute domination oI the JaIIna area.
Whenever Tiger recruiters visit JaIIna University, they ask
students, Who does not want to become a member oI the
Tiger`s student wing?` No hands go up. No one would dare.
The Tigers remain visibly popular among Tamil civilians, despite
the Iact that the guerrillas tolerate no dissent. InIormers,
the Iact that the guerrillas tolerate no dissent. InIormers,
complainers, questioners all risk the same punishment; a bullet in
the head. The body oI the victim is usually tied to a lamppost
with a stark explanation provided on a placard: THIS IS WHAT
HAPPENS TO TRAITORS. A group oI JaIIna University
proIessors complained two years ago about the Tigers` heavy-
handed tactics. One oI the academics was shot dead; the others
went into hiding in Colombo.
But the weapon oI Iear alone does not explain the Tigers`
success. Firm resolve is instilled during intense training and
indoctrination. Says Prabhakaran: Commitment comes Irom
strictly enIorced discipline`. The guerrillas, men and women
alike, are not allowed to drink, smoke or have sex. Anything but
unquestioning acceptance oI the Tiger credo to be loyal to
Prabhakaran and to Iight and sacriIice body, liIe and soul to
achieve an independent state oI Tamil Eelam is taboo. Small
inIractions result in humiliating tongue lashings, usually in Iront oI
other Tigers; severe oIIenses such as rape, murder or bribe taking
bring an instant death sentence. Last month a Tiger who had
killed a civilian in a dispute was publicly executed.
Tigers are expected to live austerely. They have no personal
possessions except their weapon and a change oI clothes. Family
ties are cut; the new Iamily is the Tiger legion. A Tiger`s weapon,
usually an AK-47, becomes the most important object in his liIe.
The guerrillas are warned never to let the riIle touch the ground;
they are told that at least 10 comrades might have died in the
eIIort to capture it. Says Anton Balasingham, a spokesman Ior
the guerrillas; We teach them to transcend their egos and
material pleasure, to subordinate their lives to a noble cause.`
Discipline is eIIective because the Tigers` cause, in the minds oI
the typically poor and middle-class young Tamils they recruit, is
just. The Tigers demand the creation oI Eelam; they are
convinced that the ethnic Sinhalese who dominate Sri Lanka`s
population and government will not give the Tamil minority a Iair
share in education, jobs and government. Over and over, recruits
are told oI atrocities by the Sri Lankan army, a point driven home
by propagandists who produce pictures oI mutilated bodies and
describe torture in horriIying detail.
The Tigers develop a passionate veneration oI Prabhakaran, their
36-year-old political and military leader. There is Prabhakaran the
war hero, who led the now Iamous ambush oI a Sri Lankan army
patrol in 1983 that touched oII the Tamil-Sinhalese war. There is
Prabhakaran the incorruptible, who reIuses to deviate Irom his
goal oI Eelam despite military pressure Irom India, despite oIIers
oI money and power Irom Colombo and New Delhi that turned
the heads oI less resolute Tamil leaders. There is also the
Prabhakaran who embodies the spirit oI a glorious Tamil past,
especially the Chola dynasty, a line oI belligerent kings in
southern India who in the 11
th
century invaded what is now
northern India, Java, Sumatra and Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran plays
on such history in political classes; he borrowed the Tiger symbol
Irom the Cholas` imperial crest.
It is in the end Prabhakaran whose will binds the Tigers. His
Iollowers call him Annai, or elder brother, and talk oI him with
wide-eyed awe, their only Iar the possibility that they might let
him down. He is mother, Iather and god all rolled into one`, says
a guerrilla named Sunil. Government soldiers tell oI a badly
wounded Iemale Tiger they captured at Elephant Pass. Her dying
words were not a call Ior mother but Ior Annai, Annai. |p.20|
For reasons oI shock, slant and surprise as well as due to deadline
pressure, journalists are known to use words and phrases which
sometimes appear less accurate, unless the context and nuance is
understood clearly. In the above sketch on Tiger psychology, some
speciIic citations need comment. First, Desmond describes that Iirm
resolve is instilled during intense training and indoctrination`. Here,
indoctrination` is not the appropriate word. By the same yardstick,
my daytime job also involves indoctrination` teaching undergraduate
and graduate students the discipline oI lab research and related
protocols. I also indoctrinate` students about how to communicate
eIIectively with non-Japanese and even with laboratory rats. Secondly,
details on the mention oI the group oI JaIIna University proIessors`
who complained about the Tigers` heavy-handed tactics` was also
technically inaccurate in that only Iour individuals made that group`,
and none oI them were proIessors` at that time, by the American or
British criteria oI academics.
Tim McGirk`s 1997 report presents a Sri Lankan army`s Ioot soldier,
who is on the run. He was also upset that his discipline-challenged
superiors stole his Iood ration.
Running away from the Tigers
1ime magazine, Asian edition, November 17, 1997]
'Corporal Rana is on the run. A tank gunner, Rana, 26, is one oI
the Sri Lankan army`s 23,000 deserters. He Iidgets with a lucky
amulet hanging around his neck, one that has shielded him in
battle against the Tamil Tigers and, more recently, Irom arrest by
military police. He was not the only soldier to go AWOL
|absence without leave| Irom his 800-man unit; Rana reckons
300 others slipped away into the jungle or simply never returned
Irom home leave. AIter serving nine straight months inside a war
zone, Iacing a Ianatical enemy who embraces martyrdom on the
battleIield, Rana (not his real name) couldn`t take it any longer.
Besides, he says, the oIIicers stole his Iood rations. So during a
Iurlough, Rana ran away. Now he spends his time at his parents`
village home, dodging the police and teasing his hair out into a
50s-style quiII. This amulet? A Buddhist monk made it Ior me
beIore I went away to war`, says Rana, still Iingering the tiny
golden cylinder. There`s a prayer inside. It`s supposed to guard
me.`
Slender as a Ilower stem, this talisman is nearly identical to ones
worn by the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who Ior
the past 14 years have been waging a campaign oI guerrilla
attacks, assassinations and suicide bombings Ior their goal oI
creating a separatist state in the north and northeast oI this Indian
Ocean island. But the Tigers` amulet contains not a protective
prayer but a lethal dose oI cyanide in the event oI capture. It is a
negative talisman oI sorts, and a potent one, asserting the Tiger`s
readiness to die Ior the cause. That shows the diIIerence in
attitude between the army and the Tamil rebels toward this grisly
conIlict that has leIt more than 50,000 combatants and civilians
dead; the soldiers just want to survive, while the Tigers welcome
death as a kind oI devotional sacriIice. Says Paikiasothy
Saravanamuttu, an analyst at the Center Ior Policy Alternatives, a
think-tank in Colombo: The average Sri Lankan doesn`t know
what he`s Iighting Ior. It`s an unreal war`.
Such doubts are not shared by the Tigers. The LTTE`s elusive
chieI, Velupillai Prabhakaran, 43, is not only a genius guerrilla
tactician but also a deIt manipulator oI symbols. He has tapped
an undercurrent oI martyrdom in Tamil Iolklore and Iilms (his
Iavorite actor is said to be Clint Eastwood) to create an army
mainly oI impressionable teenagers some as young as 11 and
12 ready to pop cyanide or become suicide bombers Ior their
leader. This Ianatical loyalty, senior military oIIicers concede, has
enabled Prabhakaran`s 8,000 to 10,000 insurgents to inIlict
punishing losses on a Sri Lankan army ten times that size.
The last paragraph oI Tim McGirk`s commentary read,
'The army is readying Ior a major assault against Prabhakaran`s
jungle bases in Mullaitivu district. But the army, like the Tigers, is
running short oI men. When only 450 volunteers signed up
during a national-wide recruitment drive with a goal oI 10,000,
authorities tried to lure back Corporal Rana and the 23,000 other
deserters. Several amnesties have been announced soldiers
were given back their Iull rank and salary - but when the Iinal
oIIer expired on Oct.24, some 10,000 runaways were still
missing. Among them was Rana. When I read about the battles,
sometimes I Ieel like going back to my unit`, he says. My Iriends
tell me it`s better now`. One improvement they have mentioned;
an oIIicer who stole his rations have deserted too. |p.24-25|
The punch-line that the oIIicer who stole the Iood rations oI Ioot
soldier Rana also deserted the Sri Lankan army is humorous and
ironic. It reveals that the oIIicers in the Sri Lankan army may have
surplus Iood and drinks, but they starve Irom surplus dose oI
discipline.
What is Discipline?
The 1991 Ieature on LTTE mentions about the importance oI
discipline to its success. That the Sri Lankan army couldn`t break the
backbone oI LTTE, during the passage oI ten years vindicates the
belieIs and claims oI Pirabhakaran related to discipline. What in Iact is
discipline?
To answer this question, I quote an excerpt Irom a talk oI physician
Franklin DuBois delivered in 1952, entitled, The security oI
discipline`.
'From time immemorial discipline has been recognized as an
essential ingredient oI man`s liIe. Experience has demonstrated
that objectives can be achieved and individuals can be happy only
iI human energies are directed in an orderly Iashion. Since a
person`s desires oIten conIlict with the desires oI others, society
has set up regulations Ior the common good, to which each
member oI the group must adhere or suIIer a penalty.
Discipline defined:
'To arrive at helpIul conclusions, one must Iirst have an
understanding oI what is meant by discipline. The immediate and
restrictive connotation is apt to be what is done to an individual
when he is disturbing to others, but we shall deal with the broader
concept that discipline is a process oI training and learning that
Iosters growth and development. Its derivation is the same as that
Iosters growth and development. Its derivation is the same as that
oI disciple: one who learns or voluntarily Iollows a leader`
(Webster). Discipline is, thereIore, primarily the process oI
making a disciple`.
While discipline may carry with it an idea oI punishment, this
should be only the discomIort that logically Iollows the pursuance
oI a selected course oI action and is voluntarily accepted as
incidental to the attainment oI a desired goal. One speaks oI the
discipline oI medicine, oI art, oI athletic training, when one reIers
to hardships Ioreseen and endured in an undertaking that leads to
the chosen objective. Like the athlete, the child in training must
learn to accept the restriction oI many oI his impulses. Discipline
is, in essence, adherence to the rules oI liIe; not a hardship to be
endured intolerantly, but an educational opportunity to be
welcomed enthusiastically, since it is only through discipline that
lasting satisIactions can be obtained. |Mental Hvgiene, July
1952, vol.36, no.3, pp.353-372|
Merit in sexual discipline
Radhika Coomaraswamy is one oI the intellectual Poo Bahs, who
happen to be a literate Eelam Tamil. She has critiqued the sexual
discipline oI young LTTE women, in her 1996 Rajani Thiranagama
Memorial Lecture (Sundav Times, Colombo, January 5, 1997). I
cannot let this criticism go untouched. The title oI
Ms.Coomaraswamy`s lecture was, LTTE women: is this liberation?`.
She has begun her lecture with the pompous claim:
'I am oIten asked, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, what I Ieel about the women cadres oI
the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As someone who
has been entrusted with the task oI attempting to protect women
victims oI violence, how do I respond to a situation where
women become the perpetrators oI violence?
Then, she identiIied herselI with one oI the giants among Ireedom-
Iighters by the statement, 'As women concerned with non-violence,
we can only be critical oI the dynamics which have led to this process
|oI militarisation|. As people concerned with human rights, we have to
question and challenge any discourse which attempts to promote this
perverse militarisation oI civil society as a step towards the realization
oI equal rights among women.
Having pretentiously identiIied herselI as a disciple oI Mahatma
Gandhi`s non-violence principle, Ms.Coomaraswamy, in her lecture,
Gandhi`s non-violence principle, Ms.Coomaraswamy, in her lecture,
subsequently ridiculed Gandhi`s other cherished values (oI selI-
sacriIice, austerity, sexual discipline and Ireedom Irom the Iear oI
death) as Iollows:
1. 'LTTE is also clear that the ideal woman remains a virgin;
sexuality is seen as an evil, debilitating Iorce. SelI-sacriIice,
austerity and androgyny are put Iorward as ideals.
2. 'Death, not liIe, is celebrated. The greatest Ieat Ior a woman
is to die a martyr. This celebration oI heroic death is an aspect
oI most nationalist movements, but in the LTTE it is a major
Iactor which determines and conditions the liIe oI women who
have dedicated themselves to the cause.
3. 'They |LTTE women| are denied sexual or sensual
experiences. This reIusal to accept hybridity, sensuality,
sexuality, the social mixing oI human beings as an important
part oI everyday liIe, is a Ioundational principle oI nationalist
ideologies and the LTTE is no exception.
It is surprising that Ms.Coomaraswamy has conveniently overlooked
the mission oI LTTE women. They are in combat duty and not
Iunctioning as cabaret artistes or Iashion models or casual sex workers.
Combat duty, as well as convent liIe, demands eschewing sexual thrill.
Those who undergo special training and adhere to disciplining their
minds can achieve higher goals than ordinary mortals who allow their
minds to sexual gratiIication.
Mahatma Gandhi has shown the lead in this adoptive strategy and
Pirabhakaran has Iollowed the steps oI Gandhi, in inculcating sexual
discipline among his cadres. In one oI his early works, to appear in
print, (A Guide to Health, originally published in Madras by
S.Ganesan in 1921), Gandhi preached about sexual discipline.
Following passages are excerpted Irom the chapter on Sexual
Relations:
'Many are the keys to health, and they are all quite essential: but
the one thing needIul, above all others, is Brahmacharva. What
do we mean by Brahmacharva? We mean by it that men and
women should reIrain Irom enjoying each other. That is to say,
they should not touch each other with a carnal thought, they
should not think oI it even in their dreams. Their mutual glances
should be Iree Irom all suggestion oI carnality. The hidden
strength that God has given us should be conserved by rigid selI-
discipline, and transmuted into energy and power not merely oI
discipline, and transmuted into energy and power not merely oI
body, but also oI mind and soul. |Mahatma Gandhi, The Health
Guide, 1965 edition, pp.145-166|
This Health Guide oI Gandhi, Iirst appeared when he was 42, and a
quarter century beIore India received its independence. Ms.
Coomaraswamy`s lament on the celebration oI death` seen among the
LTTE women has been answered by Gandhi 80 years ago, as Iollows:
.Brahmacharis: They know no Iear oI death, and they do not
Iorget God even in the hour oI death; nor do they indulge in vain
complaints. They die with a smile on their lips, and boldly Iace
the day oI judgement. They are true men and women; and oI
them alone can it be said that they have conserved their health.
|ibid|
Kindly note that Gandhi had used the word brahmachari in a gender-
neutral context. His healthy advice on sexual discipline seems more
relevant Ior achievers, considering the pathos in the careers oI John
F.Kennedy and Bill Clinton, who were Iound lacking in this
component.

Sexual discipline in Sri Lankan army
While Pirabhakaran has strictly enIorced sexual discipline Ior his army,
how does his rival army Iace the situation? The qualitative distinction
between the two armies is revealed by the Iollowing Ieature, which
appeared in the Sri Lankan government`s mouthpiece, Cevlon Dailv
News oI June 19, 1999, under the caption, Casual sex thrives in war
climate`. Excerpts:
'Anuradhapura as we know it, was a town oI religious and
archeological importance. It bore witness to the rich spiritual and
cultural heritage oI the country. Today it has a diIIerent story to
tell. During the last Iew weeks there were reports about unholy
activities in Anuradhapura. According to the reports, young
women Irom several parts oI the country come to the town to
provide pleasure Ior money to young men, some oI them in the
army.
Supplying women to young soldiers has become a hotel and
guest-house based business now. Three wheeler drivers mediate
between the two parties. From time to time, Anuradhapura police
has been raiding these places, and rounding up women who loiter
has been raiding these places, and rounding up women who loiter
around the hotels and send them to the remand prison. Once they
are presented in court, most oI them are released on a 500-rupee
bail, which is normally paid by the hotelier.
For hoteliers in Anuradhapura, this is a very good business. A
room is rented out Ior 400 or 500 rupees per night. They hire
women and keep them Ior their customers. Hoteliers are very
supportive and protective oI these women. Sometimes these
women who are rounded up and brought to the police station
reIuse the Iood given them by the police. Then it is the hotelier
who supplies Iood Ior them and in the courts it is the hotelier
who bails them out.`
Over the years, Anuradhapura became a camp town and a transit
point Ior the armed Iorces who travel to and Irom the North.
Invariably, they have a stop-over in Anuradhapura. Those who
come Irom the South get oII here and stay in camps until the
time Ior their next Ilight to the war Iront. Some soldiers with
nothing particular to engage in, loiter in the town where they meet
these women.
Altogether there are around 40 hotels in Anuradhapura engaged in
this trade. Some oI these are well-equipped residential houses
which have been rented out Ior 10,000 to 20,000 rupees per
month.
This situation arose in Anuradhapura, because it is a transit point.
Young soldiers come here. They look Ior a way out to release
their repressed minds and bodies. In the town, they have very
limited ways to enjoy themselves.
|According to Dr.Kithsiri Kaldera, Iormer head oI the STD clinic
in Anuradhapura hospital| There`s no cinema, no theatre, not
even a park. We should look at the problem Irom their point oI
view. Many oI these men have a common mentality about their
lives and Iuture. They seem to think this way: As we are people
who are destined to get killed sooner or later, |we| have to make
most out oI it Ior the short spell we are here, whether it is good
or bad.`.
Women Ilock to the town around the 20
th
to 30
th
oI the month
the time when the soldiers` pockets are Iull.|Malini Govinnage,
Cevlon Dailv News, June 19, 1999|
Govinnage`s Anuradhapura report, while conIirming the moral
bankruptcy oI analysts like Ms.Coomaraswamy, simultaneously attests
to the sound strategy oI Pirabhakaran in enIorcing sexual discipline
to the sound strategy oI Pirabhakaran in enIorcing sexual discipline
among his cadres. (Continued)

Part 16
Sachi Sri Kantha
29 September 2001]
Colombo Beggars in the bin Laden
Bandwagon
My recent experiment on a war-mongering Colombo hack
II the tragic events oI September 11, which occurred in the eastern
region oI USA, spilled blood oI unimaginable volume, the intelligence-
challenged hacks in Colombo sprung to action in the aItermath to
prove that they also can spill bile in equal proportions in the name oI
anti-terrorism campaign. While much oI the journalistic world Iocused
its eIIorts on Saudi Arabian exile Osama bin Laden and his Al-Quaida
network, the target oI Colombo-based hacks was not bin Laden, but
Pirabhakaran and LTTE.
For reasons oI exigency and relevance, I break Irom the regular
analysis on Pirabhakaran in this part, to present a short experiment I
did (a one-sided letter correspondence conducted via email) during the
past week to the editor oI The Island (Colombo) newspaper.
I expected one oI three outcomes Ior my experiment. One: that my
brieI letters commenting on the published editorials will be printed by
the newspaper. Two: that my letters will not appear in the newspaper.
Three: Assuming that the second outcome is more probable to occur, I
will receive a response via email acknowledging the receipt oI my
letters.
I did not anticipate the Iourth outcome, which turned out to be, that
one oI my letters receive partial mention in a subsequent editorial and
commented upon, though the real contents oI my letter would not be
revealed to the readers. First, this is what the editor oI the Island
newspaper wrote in his editorial oI Sept.24, entitled, Double standards
on terrorism`. Excerpts:
'.Prabhakaran has thrown out all Iorms oI devolution
proposed, including the celebrated Devolution Package. The
intransigent |1985| Thimpu demands, which are a short cut to a
separate state, remains inIlexible as ever. Thus, while attempting
separate state, remains inIlexible as ever. Thus, while attempting
to Iight terrorism militarily not in a way wars are usually Iought
but going by the Charter oI Human Rights and trying to talk to
the Tigers, have only resulted in a rag-tag band oI ruIIians turning
out to be a global terrorist Iorce. Western nations are aware that
they are largely responsible Ior keeping terrorism going on Ior 18
years in this country by helping the terrorists to Iinance their
terrorism here.
A good example oI this is an E-mail we received today Irom a
Tamil expatriate living in Japan in response to our recent editorial
about waging war and peace simultaneously. ReIerring to us in
scatological terms, he boasts that it is not this two-track policy oI
war and peace that has kept terrorism going. It is because oI the
invincibility oI the Tamils. With that kind oI thinkers Iinancing
Prabhakaran, to expect a negotiated settlement is only a pipe
dream.
I`m the Tamil expatriate living in Japan`, mentioned in the above
passage. I mailed three letters, and the purported scatological term`
appears in the third letter. The editor did not have the courtesy to
mention what this scatological term` was, and under what context I
used it. We are now living in the 21
st
century and the Victorian era
prudery has passed into history. II he had published all the three letters
which I sent to him, the impartial readers would understand his
ignorance, and the bias in his reIerences to Pirabhakaran, LTTE and
Eelam Tamils living in the diaspora. I`m glad that the Internet
revolution has made it possible to release the contents oI the letters to
debunk his logic and reason.
The scatological term` reIerred to by the editor oI The Island
newspaper is none other than Iart`. This word, once hidden in civil
discussions, has gained prominence during the past Iive decades in its
derivative sense, reIerring to something worthless` and annoying`,
especially in American English. J.D.Salinger used this word, in his
acclaimed novel, Catcher in the Rve, 50 years ago, as Iollows:
'All oI a sudden this guy sitting in the row in Iront oI me, Edgar
Marsalla, laid this terriIic Iart. It was a very crude thing to do, in
chapel and all, but it was also quite amusing.
Sour grapes
The big disappointment oI the Colombo hacks in the exclusion oI
LTTE Irom the list oI organizations Ior which President Bush`s
executive order on terrorism applies, generated the Sept.24
th
editorial
executive order on terrorism applies, generated the Sept.24
th
editorial
in the Island newspaper. The Sundav Times oI Colombo also carried a
critical anti-American editorial entitled, Forked tongue` on Sept.23.
One interesting Ieature among the Colombo hacks is that when the
wind blows against them, they bellyache and sneer on American
policy, but when the wind Iavors them, they smooch about America
and dance. Aesopian Ioxes have perIect companions among Colombo
hacks.
Now, I provide excerpts Irom Iour editorials published in The Island
(Colombo) newspaper in the aItermath oI September 11 events, in
which Pirabhakaran and LTTE were inappropriately linked with bin
Laden, and Iollow them with my prompt responses to this anti-Tamil
newspaper.
I wish to incorporate these in this Pirabhakaran series Ior their
relevance. The three subheadings which appear below were the titles
which I gave for mv letters. Kindly note that I engaged the editor oI
the Island, only Ior the post-Sept.11 editorials, where Pirabhakaran`s
name was speciIically mentioned in the contents.
Osama bin Laden and Pirabhakaran: the diIIerences
The Sept.17 editorial oI the Island newspaper carried the title,
Towards a terror-Iree world`. In the middle oI this editorial, the
Iollowing passage appeared.
'The question that arises here is how the US will achieve its
avowed objective oI meeting terrorism head on with its northern
neighbour nestling terrorists to her bosom? It was about a year
ago that two Canadian ministers came under Iire Irom the
Canadian press Ior having graced a Iund raising dinner oI the
LTTE, whose leader Prabhakaran is Sri Lanka`s bin Laden.
Then, the Iinal paragraph oI the same editorial stated,
'Success oI any global anti terror drive depends on its
sustainability and the commitment oI the developed world. Its
goal, on the other hand, must not be conIined to the US avenging
itselI. Instead its objective must be to prevent the same Iate
beIalling any other nation whether it is a Iriend oI the western
powers or not. Equally important is the resolve on the part oI
powerIul nations to bid Iarewell to the weapon oI terrorism as a
means oI Iorcing smaller nations into submission. For terrorism
always come home to roost. This is the lesson that bin Laden,
Prabhakaran and others oI their ilk have given the world.
Prabhakaran and others oI their ilk have given the world.
My response to this editorial, sent on Sept.18, via email to the editor
oI Island was as Iollows:
'This comment is with reIerence to your editorial entitled
Towards a terror-Iree world` (Sept.17). I`m always amazed by
your propensity to compare apples and oranges`, and your
comparison oI Osama bin Laden and Prabhakaran is a recent
example oI this perennial sickness. Here I submit Iour diIIerences
between Osama bin Laden and Prabhakaran, Ior your
inIormation.
(1)

Osama bin Laden is a native oI Saudi Arabia, currently
domiciled in AIghanistan. His targeted enemy is USA and he
is not waging a direct war against Saudi Arabia. Contrastingly,
Prabhakaran is a native oI then Ceylon, and currently still
living in the island. His army is waging a war against the Sri
Lankan state, and not against USA. Not a single American has
died due to the activities oI LTTE either in Sri Lanka or
elsewhere.
(2)

Osama bin Laden`s patrons are Pakistan and AIghanistan`s
Taliban, created by Pakistan`s Intelligence-wallahs.
Prabhakaran`s current adversary is Sri Lankan state, whose
prominent patron is Pakistan. So, one can inIer who is close
to Osama bin Laden. It`s the Sri Lankan state and not
Prabhakaran.
(3)

Osama bin Laden is not leading any liberation movement. But
Prabhakaran is leading a liberation movement, with covert and
overt ethnic Iollowers in excess oI millions. Though it is
reported that Osama bin Laden`s group has cells` in more
than 60 nations, his Iollowers do not amount to more than
even 100,000 (see, Osama bin Laden and his Group`,
Washington Post, Sept.13, 2001).
(4)

Even Ior the sake oI argument, iI one sticks the label oI
terrorist to both Osama bin Laden and Prabhakaran, anyone
with basic knowledge on terrorism can comprehend that
Osama bin Laden is a transplanted terrorist, similar to Che
Guevara. Do not Iorget that Che lost all his post-Cuban
period` wars, because he was always a stranger`.
Prabhakaran, on the other hand, lives among his own
Iollowers, and wages war against his adversaries.
You are entitled to your opinion, but at least do not insult the
intelligence oI your readers.
intelligence oI your readers.
OI Dictators and Tin-thrones
The Sept.19 editorial oI the Island newspaper again mentioned
Pirabhakaran in association with some oI the recent history`s
designated villains. Its title was, Sri Lanka and the Global Alliance on
Terrorism`. Excerpts:
'The pundits on terrorism oIten tell us that terrorism is merely a
symptom oI a deeper underlying disease that has to be addressed
Iirst iI terrorism is to be eradicated. By and large this contention
is correct, but quite oIten the godIathers oI terrorism are not
susceptible to logic, reason or plaintive cries oI humanity and
have their own visionary objectives which they are determined to
achieve come hell or high water. AdolI Hitler, Japanese
imperialists oI the Second World War, Communist
revolutionaries oI Russia and China and our own Third World tin
pot dictators like Pol Pot, Vellupillai Prabhakaran and Rohana
Wijeweera are some such examples. The cause Ior this kind oI
terrorism is the leader who does not listen to reason. Will bin
Laden listen to reason?
I responded to this editorial by an email dated, Sept. 20. The text oI
my communication to the editor oI the Island was as Iollows:
'The New York Times editorialist yesterday pleaded, What the
country needs Irom the |US| President right now is consistency,
in both message and tone` |New York Times, Sept.19|. II you
have to be taken seriously, I make a similar request on your
coverage on Prabhakaran. It seems to me that you suIIer Irom a
pathological tendency to compare the incomparables.
In your editorial oI Sept.19, entitled, Sri Lanka and the Global
Alliance on Terrorism`, you place Pol Pot, Velupillai Prabhakaran
and Rohana Wijeweera into the same cluster as Third World tin
pot dictators`. By conventional deIinition, a dictator is a head oI
state who has gained power by democratic or undemocratic
means. Hitler and Marcos gained power by democratic means
beIore becoming dictators. Pakistan`s Generals (beginning Irom
Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and to the current head oI
state Pervez MusharaI) and Indonesia`s Gen.Suharto gained
powers by undemocratic means to become dictators. Among the
three you have speciIically cited Irom Asia, Pol Pot was a head
oI state but not Prabhakaran and Wijeweera. By this convention,
you have inadvertently omitted two Sri Lankan heads oI state
(J.R.Jayewardene and Premadasa) who by their deeds proved to
(J.R.Jayewardene and Premadasa) who by their deeds proved to
be dictators. Even within your three incoherent choices, anyone
with common sense would tell that Pol Pot diIIers Irom the other
two. Pol Pot was pandered and supported by the power elites
Irom USA and China, Irom 1975 to 1990s. Contrastingly,
Prabhakaran stands on his own Ieet without being propped either
by USA or China.
Beggars in the bin Laden Bandwagon
The war-mongering Island newspaper continued to spew bile and
venom on Pirabhakaran and LTTE in its editorials oI September 21
and September 22.
Excerpts Irom the Sept.21 editorial entitled, War or peace?` are as
Iollows:
'Sri Lanka is, perhaps, the only country in the world that wages a
war and at the same time does not wage it. As a result, it has
neither deIeated terrorism nor made peace with terrorists. It has
only vacillated Ior 18 long years between war and peace and has
paid tremendously Ior its indecisiveness.
Now that bin Laden has roused a mighty giant` in President
Bush`s words, - Prabhakaran must be a worried man Iearing a
crackdown on the LTTE overseas. There should be no surprise iI
he waves an olive branch all oI a sudden Irom the Wanni and
oIIers to talk peace until the US crusade comes to an end.
Remember the LTTE has condemned the terrorist attack on the
US obviously in an eIIort to curry Iavour with the US authorities.
Perhaps, the LTTE might give serious thought to organizing
demonstrations abroad to condemn the attacks on the US so as to
save its skin.
The question is why Sri Lanka should not emulate the US. II the
US does not want to talk to terrorists, then why should we? Sri
Lanka cannot aIIord to be out oI step with the world leaders.
What the anti-terrorists groups demand is that the government
strike while the iron is hot. They don`t want the government to
allow a vital opportunity to go abegging. Any sensible government
keen to deIeat terrorism would have taken time by its Iorelock.
Knowing the LTTE Ior what it is and having been taken Ior a
ride on previous occasions, the government must desist Irom any
course oI action that will cause it to Iall into a peace trap again. It
must join Iorces with the US, which is on a worldwide crusade
against terrorism.
The Sept.22
nd
editorial oI the Island, entitled, Fighting global
terrorism: Can America help us?` did not mention Pirabhakaran by
name, but it pleaded like a beggar Ior alms and arms Irom the USA as
Iollows:
'The United States has banned the LTTE Ior reasons oI its own,
probably because oI the threat posed to the security to it. For
whatever reasons, Sri Lankans and the Sri Lankan government
have appreciated it very much. But it should be noted that the
United States still has a strict embargo placed on sale oI US
weapons to Sri Lanka. There is only limited cooperation in
deIence matters, which are limited to training personnel and the
like, but Sri Lanka needs much more assistance in armaments in
its Iight against terrorism.
Sri Lanka`s political, economic and military plight is such that it is
in no position to reIuse whatever assistance the US requests
despite the anti-imperialist` monitor |i.e., JVP| oI this
government on probation`. Besides we have had excellent
relations with the United States Ior long years and have no
interests in international terrorist groups. Time is now opportune
Ior Sri Lanka not only to give leadership oI Third World
countries in the American War on Terrorism but also make
reasonable requests Ior assistance in its war against a global
terrorist organization.
I opted Ior pungent humor to answer the bile oI the Island
newspaper`s editorialist, and responded with an email oI Sept.22,
carrying the caption, Beggars in the bin Laden Bandwagon. My
response was as Iollows:
'Scorn is not my usual weapon oI choice in a debate. But
sometimes literati like Shaw have used scorn as a weapon to
put their critics in place. Thus I make an exception in this letter.
For exiled Tamils like me, your editorial musings on LTTE and
Prabhakaran are nothing but beggar`s stinking Iarts, Ior the
Iollowing reasons. First, both are produced Irom the digested
materials oI previous days. Secondly, both are hardly deadly and
ignored by decent people. Thirdly, both provide some state oI relieI
to the producers.
This comparison was elicited by your two editorials entitled, War
or peace?` (Sept.21) and Fighting global terrorism: Can America
help us?` (Sept.22). The Iirst three sentences oI the Sept.21
editorial state, 'Sri Lanka is, perhaps, the only country in the world
that wages a war and at the same time does not wage it. As a
that wages a war and at the same time does not wage it. As a
result, it has neither deIeated terrorism nor made peace with
terrorists. It has only vacillated Ior 18 long years between war and
peace and has paid tremendously Ior its indecisiveness.
These are nothing but varnished lies. Petty minded politicians Irom
J.R.Jayewardene, Athulathmudali, Ranjan Wijeratne, Premadasa,
Wijetunga to Chandrika Kumaratunga and Ratwatte, in association
with a whole battalion oI non-Iield` Generals had waged war
against LTTE with Ierocity. Only thing which mattered during the
past 18 years was that the Tamil Tigers couldn`t be tamed. The
person in the street knows that Sri Lankan state`s exchequer has
been repeatedly robbed, on the pretext oI war, by the people
manning the war industry`. Now, Iishing on the pain oI American
psyche, the stately beggars and their torch-carriers are placating to
hitch a ride in the bin Laden bandwagon.
The second halI caption oI Sept.22 editorial Can America help
us?` is nothing but an apoplectic pleading Ior such a ride. One
single statistic is enough to show how bankrupt the Sri Lankan
state had become. 20 years ago, when I leIt Sri Lanka, one US
dollar exchanged Ior nearly 20 rupees. Seven years ago, when
Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power, the same single US
dollar was worth Ior nearly 45 rupees. Now, in the last quarter oI
year 2001, the pitiable Sri Lankan rupee had depreciated to the
exchange level oI 90 rupees Ior a US dollar. This constitutes one
oI the main reasons, why the Sri Lankan state couldn`t
continuously wage the war against the LTTE, and the
vacillation` smoke-screen presented by you is just baloney.
The baloney, bile and the bloated egos oI the Colombo (as well as
Chennai) hacks sometimes need to be pricked with pungent humor,
and my comparison oI their editorial musings to the beggar`s stinking
Iarts is the best I could deliver. II the editorialist oI the Island
newspaper had some backbone, he would have electronically printed
my third letter in its entirety, and made his comments in his editorial oI
Sept.24. But expecting reason and impartiality Irom servile hacks who
are burdened with unpleasant lives is akin to waiting Ior turkeys to
dance like peacocks. |Continued|

Part 17
Sachi Sri Kantha
06 October 2001]
Emerging Truth in the Terrorist` Label
One oI my Iavorite scientist-cum-authors is Harvard University`s
Stephen Jay Gould. One oI his book reviews was given the caption
The quack detector`. In it, he wrote,
'Beleaguered rationalism needs its skilled debaters writers who
can combine wit, penetrating analysis, sharp prose, and sweet
reason into an expansive view that expunges nonsense without
stiIling innovation, and that presents the excitement and humanity
oI science in a positive way. |in An Urchin in the Storm, 1987,
pp.240-246|
I have taken this message as my motto, and sharpened my skills
whenever an opportunity arises to present the Tamil point oI view. My
recent comparison oI the editorial musing oI the Island newspaper
editor |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 16| to that oI
beggar`s stinking Iarts was an example along this line. Sometime back,
I was engaged in a similar exercise with the editorial oI the Asiaweek
magazine, which also dealt with Pirabhakaran and terrorism.
Terrorism and Truth
In an unsigned editorial, the Asiaweek magazine oI November 30,
1994, |Keeping the Lid On: In the war against terrorists, Truth is the
Best Weapon`| included Pirabhakaran`s name and Tamil Tigers were
cited. It appeared a month Iollowing Gamini Dissanayake`s
assassination. The opening paragraph oI this editorial stated:
'Which oI the Iollowing have engaged in terrorism (a) Tamil
Tigers, (b) Sri Lanka, (c) Irish Republican Army, (d) Britain, (e)
Palestine Liberation Organization, (I) Israel? Many would
probably Iinger the groups or governments they don`t like or
those espousing causes they don`t agree with. Some people,
horriIied at the awarding oI a Nobel Peace Prize to Mr.Yassir
AraIat, the PLO leader, would have no qualms about embracing
Mr.Gerry Adams, the president oI the IRA`s political arm Sinn
Fein. Terrorism`, Mr.Binyamin Netanyahu, leader oI Israel`s
Fein. Terrorism`, Mr.Binyamin Netanyahu, leader oI Israel`s
rightist Likud Party, once explained, is the deliberate and
systematic murder, maiming and menacing oI the innocent to
inspire Iear Ior political ends.` That deIinition would cover a
spectrum oI brutality, Irom totalitarian arrests, torture and
executions to airline hijackings and mid-metropolis bombings.
Too oIten, however, governments and opinion shapers pick and
choose the carnage to condemn, allowing some but not others to
justiIy the ruthlessness oI their means with the righteousness oI
their ends.
In the concluding two paragraphs oI the editorial, the editorialist
observed the role oI media in combating terrorism, as Iollows:
'The media have been criticized Ior playing into terrorists` hands
by giving them prime-time coverage and, many times, seeming to
side with them, at least in their aspirations. Yet news and
commentary can also provide an eIIective weapon against
terrorism: truth. Central to the environment that spawns and
sustains terrorism is the web oI deceit spun by propaganda,
politicking and popular misconception. Keen to have their people
rallying behind them, many governments perpetuate the myth
that their opponents are madmen bent on senseless violence.
Terrorist groups draw moral and material succor Irom the Iiction
that their acts will eventually bring victory. Many like the suicide
bombers oI Tiger supreme Velupillai Prabhakaran see heroism,
not bestiality, in the explosive havoc they wreak on innocent
bystanders.
Ordinary citizens are oIten ignorant oI the underlying animosity
and injustice giving rise to conIlict. So are the leaders and
constituents oI powerIul countries that can positively inIluence a
Iractious situation. By clariIying the issues and reporting the
Iacts, the media take the crucial peace-making role which only an
impartial observer can play. That requires, oI course, a staunchly
objective eye disabused oI partisan misinIormation, much oI it
Irom the media themselves. While the news may not always tell
the truth about terrorists, it is the only line oI deIense against the
lies that keep their guns loaded and their ranks growing.
While these last two paragraphs contained little vignettes oI truth, still I
Ielt that they mixed a load oI selI-serving applause Ior the media and
subtle condemnation on Pirabhakaran`s adopted strategy in his war
against the Sri Lankan state. Thus, I engaged the editor oI Asiaweek
by sending a response to the above-mentioned editorial.
Unlike my recent experience with the Island newspaper`s editor, a
mangled version oI my correspondence was published in the Asiaweek
subsequently. I place both the mangled version and the original version
oI my response, to prove that the staunchly objective impartiality`
preached by the Asiaweek editorialist was a mirage.
Mangled version of my response:
'In my opinion your sermon, In the War Against Terrorists,
Truth is the Best Weapon`, belongs to the world oI Iairies and
angels (Keeping the Lid On, Editorials, Nov.30). I live in a real
world where the truth is always hidden or restrained Irom
revealing its naked beauty.
Truth is massaged and masked by the media in many countries.
Truth is also decorated by almost every practicing politician on
this globe according to his or her Iancy.
It is an open secret that the intelligence services oI many
countries manuIacture or clone truths according to their whims.
So you have the alphabet soup oI CIA, (Iormerly the) KGB,
MI6, Mossad, RAW and ISI working overtime to manipulate the
political, ethnic and religious Irictions prevailing in many
countries. I Iind it perplexing that in your sermon, you have not
bothered to mention these creators oI cloned truths`.
|Asiaweek, January 6, 1996|
In the original version oI my response, I had speciIically mentioned
about Pirabhakaran, since the editorial itselI had mentioned his
activities by name. But this had been clipped by editorial scissors.
Thus, I reproduce the original version oI my letter, dated December 3,
1994, which I entitled as, Truth and its many incarnations`.
Truth and its manv incarnations (original version)
'In my opinion, your sermon that In the War against terrorists,
truth is the best weapon`, belongs to the world oI Iairies and
angels. I live in real world where the truth is always hidden or
restrained Irom revealing its naked beauty.
Truth is massaged and masked by the media in many countries,
oI which Singapore is an extreme example. To sell a thousand
copies in Singapore, many competing international journals would
compromise real truth Ior massaged truth`. Have you Iorgotten
that recently your sister paper, Time, received a reprimand and
apologized Ior shading the truth in its depiction oI Iootball great
O.J.Simpson in its cover? Even Asiaweek sometimes twists the
truth to suit its stand. For example, in a Ioot-note to my
|previously| published letter, you have stated that you did not
include the name oI JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera in the list oI
Sri Lanka`s prominent assassination victims, because that list was
conIined to political, civic and military leaders`. The massaged
truth in your explanation is easily recognizable to all Sri Lankans,
since Rohana Wijeweera was a politician and he even contested
the 1982 presidential election.
Truth is also decorated by almost every practising politician in
this globe according to his or her Iancy. Show me a politician
who trumpets the truth in its naked beauty and I will show you a
saint. Even the reputation oI a living saint like Mother Teresa has
come under attack recently due to her past cozying with
politicians who have had a penchant Ior truths oI dubious variety.
More seriously, it is an open secret that the Intelligence services
oI many countries manuIacture or clone` truths according to
their whims. So you have the alphabet soup oI CIA, (Iormerly)
KGB, MI6, MOSSAD, RAW and ISI working overtime to
manipulate the political, ethnic and religious Irictions prevailing in
many countries. I Iind it perplexing that in your sermon, you have
not bothered to mention the questionable roles played by these
Intelligence agencies as creators oI cloned truths`. But, you have
identiIied Yassir AraIat, Gerry Adams and Velupillai Prabhakaran
as representatives oI terrorists`.
I wonder why have you not written a word about the types oI
truths the CIA and MOSSAD had spread in the past about
Mr.AraIat, or how the truth manuIacturing department oI MI6
works round the clock to slander the IRA or how RAW released
a truth about the violent death oI Prabhakaran in the jungles oI
Vanni Iive years ago. II you have a sincere campaign to abolish
all the Intelligence agencies in the world to save the real truths
Irom their cloned creations oI truths`, you can count on me to
raise my hand.
In my above-listing oI Intelligence agencies, I did not include the FBI,
since by turI designation, its area oI inIluence lies within the borders oI
USA. This letter was written in December 1994, and Pirabhakaran`s
LTTE did not appear in FBI`s scanning radar then. This brings me to
the discussion on LTTE`s designation as a terrorist organization in the
USA in 1997.
Emerging Truth in LTTE`s 1997 designation as a terrorist
organization in the USA
'There are no whole truths; all truths are halI-truths. It is trying
to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil.
- AlIred North Whitehead (1861-1947)
LTTE`s designation as a terrorist organization in the USA, came to be
applied Iirst in October 1997. Representatives oI Chandrika
Kumaratunga`s government, Sri Lanka`s muIIled press, Chennai
hacks, New Delhi`s Intelligence wallahs, and Sinhalese bureaucrats
and expatriates have their own truths on why LTTE received the
terrorist organization` designation. But my take is that the LTTE`s
designation as a terrorist organization` in the USA resulted due to the
turI battle between FBI, and Clinton administration, with the US State
Department playing the role oI an intermediary and also sanctioning
the interests oI American private military companies.
Unlike other journalists, experts` and analysts` (especially the selI-
styled LTTE expert Rohan Gunaratna), I do not rely on conIidential
and secretive sources. Even I do not have access to these conIidential
sources. As an academic, I scrounge the news media Ior open and
published sources oI Iacts and analyses and then try to Iit the pieces
like a jigsaw puzzle. This is my Iinding.
(1) Karl Inderfurth`s testimony
At the Clinton Administration`s Policy toward South Asia Hearing
beIore the Subcommittee on Asia and the PaciIic oI the Committee on
International Relations (House oI Representatives, 105
th
Congress oI
USA, October 22, 1997), the newly appointed Assistant Secretary oI
State Ior the Bureau oI South Asian AIIairs, Mr.Karl InderIurth made
the Iollowing observations:
'.In Sri Lanka last year, we had a $3 million aid program and a
two-way trade with over $1.5 billion. Trade, not aid, is the wave
oI the Iuture. In Sri Lanka, where heavy Iighting between
government and LTTE Iorces continues, the United States
supports a negotiated political settlement to the conIlict. Last
week`s massive bomb attack in Colombo only underlines the
importance oI ending the Iighting. We believe the Sri Lankan
Government`s wide-ranging proposals Ior constitutional reIorm
are a solid basis Ior a peaceIul solution to this tragic conIlict.
Earlier this month we designated the LTTE as a terrorist
organization Ior the purposes oI the Antiterrorism and EIIective
Death Penalty Act. We call upon the LTTE to stop its
indiscriminate attacks and support a negotiated settlement oI the
conIlict in Sri Lanka.
Mr.Doug Bereuter, one oI the committee members, raised the issue oI
LTTE to Mr.InderIurth Ior additional clariIication, as Iollows:
Mr.Doug Bereuter: Just a Iew minutes ago, you mentioned the
designation oI the LTTE as a terrorist organization. I think all oI us in
Congress were pleased to see the Administration release that list oI
terrorist organizations. Our expectation would be that this will place a
cramp on their Iund raising opportunities in this country.How do we
now plan to react to past Sri Lankan Government`s request Ior
assistance, and how speciIically will our domestic law enIorcement
agencies attempt to implement the requirements oI the act, oI the list
that has been promulgated under the act which lists the LTTE as a
terrorist organization?
Mr.InderIurth`s response was,
'Mr.Chairman, with respect to the terrorist designation, this is a
domestic matter. This relates to what we will do within our
country with respect to Iundraising by LTTE organizations or
sympathizers. It will relate to visas. It will relate to assets that can
be dealt with here. The FBI and other law enIorcement agencies
will be pursuing this indeed, already are. So the terrorist
designation does not speak to any Iurther cooperation we may
have with the Government oI Sri Lanka. It very much relates to
what we will do in this country.
Now with respect to the Sri Lankan Government, we do have a
normal, strong, bilateral relationship with them. We have made it
clear to them that we do not have any view that we should
become engaged directly in their insurgency and in terms oI any
provision oI military assistance. On the other hand, we have a
normal bilateral relationship where we do have training programs
with their military. We do have supply relationships, and we will
continue those. But in terms oI their insurgency and their war in
the North dealing with the LTTE, this is something that is very
much a Sri Lankan matter, but we will do what we can within the
conIines oI our law to assist.
The points to be reiterated in Mr.InderIurth`s testimony are as Iollows:
(1)

'with respect to the terrorist designation, this is a domestic
matter. This relates to what we will do within our country with
respect to Iund raising by LTTE organizations or
sympathizers.
(2)

'The FBI and other law enIorcement agencies will be pursuing
this indeed, already are.
(3)

'So the terrorist designation does not speak to any Iurther
cooperation we may have with the Government oI Sri Lanka. It
very much relates to what we will do in this country |USA|.
(4)

'in terms oI their insurgency and their war in the North dealing
with the LTTE, this is something that is very much a Sri
Lankan matter.
To these, should be added the Iollowing Iacts.
Fact 1: No record exists in documentation or hearsay oI a single
American individual dying due to LTTE`s violent activities in Sri
Lanka or elsewhere since 1983. But, Rev.Eugene J.Hebert (an
American Jesuit missionary, originally Irom Jennings, Lousiana) had
lost his liIe in Batticaloa in 1990, due to the repressive terror oI the Sri
Lankan state`s army personnel. Later when I analyse the LTTE`s
operation in the Eastern Eelam, I will present the last letter` written by
this missionary.
Fact 2: No record exists in documentation or hearsay about
Pirabhakaran preaching anti-American sentiments to his cadres.
Fact 3: FBI`s annual budget in 1993 was 2.0 billion US dollars. By
1998, it reached 3.0 billion US dollars. Currently the FBI budgest
stands at 3.6 billion US dollars. |cover story in the U.S.News & World
Report, June 18, 2001, p.17|.
Fact 4: Terrorism` was the theme song FBI played to the decision
makers in the Capitol Hill to receive Iunding. The cover story on FBI
which appeared in the U.S.News & World Report oI June 18, 2001
stated, 'The engine driving the budget increases, oI course, is
terrorism. Since 1993, the FBI`s counter-terrorism budget has
exploded, Irom $77 million to $376 million. The biggest increases
came aIter the carnage wrought by McVeigh in Oklahoma City. Just
recently, Freeh |the ex-Director oI FBI, who was a President Clinton
appointee| asked Ior an additional $26 million to expand a joint
terrorism strike Iorce. Not surprisingly, the terrorism pitch is a winning
one on Capitol Hill.
Fact 5: When LTTE was Iirst designated as a Ioreign terrorist
organization` by the US State Department in October 1997, LTTE
was not even banned in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan ban on LTTE
came in February 1998, Iollowing the damage to Dalada Maligawa
compounds.
(2) FBI`s role
Almost a month beIore the US News & World Report cover story on
the current status oI FBI, the New Yorker magazine oI May 14,2001
carried a proIile oI the recently retired FBI`s boss Louis Freeh in its
Annals oI Politics` column. It was authored by Elsa Walsh. Some
Iactual inIormation presented in this proIile oI Freeh reinIorced in me
the consequences oI the political tug oI war between Freeh`s FBI and
the Clinton administration, which came to aIIect the LTTE. Though
Freeh was appointed to the position by President Clinton, their
relationship lost cordiality soon aIter and they were not in talking
terms, not Ior weeks or months but Ior years! Some excerpts:
'Freeh noted in his retirement statement that during his tenure
|i.e., between 1993 and mid 2001| the Bureau |FBI| has more
than doubled its overseas presence. By the time he leaves, at
the end oI June, Freeh, .has overseen the largest expansion oI
the FBI in the agency`s history, and assured its central role in
national-security issues, very possibly becoming more powerIul
than J.Edgar Hoover.
Relations between Freeh and the Clinton White House soon
deteriorated, beginning with Freeh`s criticism oI White House
eIIorts to involve the FBI in the Administration`s decision, in
1993, to Iire members oI the travel staII, and his public objection
to the Administration`s proposed cuts in the FBI`s 1995 budget.
Taken together, the above Iacts |i.e, Karl InderIurth`s testimony, the
retired FBI director`s penchant Ior expanding his area oI control
beyond the borders oI USA, and Clinton administration`s numerous
scandals sexual and political and diversionary bullying tactics| led
me to inIer that Ior the FBI to receive additional annual Iunding Irom
Iederal budget, it had to show targets` which it was intending to
pursue. And LTTE became one oI the 30 nominally acceptable
targets` to be included in the US State Department`s list oI Foreign
Terrorist Organizations`. This situation may persist until the Eelam
Tamils generate a vigorous political lobby in the USA. One should note
that the power players oI American politics hesitate to label the Irish
Republican Army as a Ioreign terrorist organization` since the Irish
vote lobby is powerIul.
(3) Role of US State Department
The US State Department`s role in sanctioning (in a limited range, so
as not to embarrass the American presidency) was also revealed in an
as not to embarrass the American presidency) was also revealed in an
Australian Broadcasting Corporation`s Radio National program, which
aired on June 15, 1997. The Iocus oI this weekly investigative
documentary program, produced by Stan Correy, on that day was
private military companies. Full transcript has appeared in the internet.
Relevant sections on the consultancy Ior the Sri Lankan army by the
Military ProIessional Resources Inc. (MPRI), which is an American
gun Ior hire` soldier company and the comments oI Stan Correy (the
producer), David Isenberg (oI the Center Ior DeIence InIormation in
Washington DC), Paul Harris (a British correspondent), and General
Ed Soyster (MPRI`s spokesman) are provided below.
'Stan Correy: The other big company is MPRI Military
ProIessional Resources Inc. They began business in 1988, when a
group oI ex-Pentagon Generals decided to put their expertise out Ior
hire.
David Isenberg: They are a completely private sector organization,
albeit with extensive contacts with the public sector, the US military,
government and deIence establishment. they`re squeaky clean,
they don`t do anything which isn`t Iully vetted and scrutinized and
approved by the relevant US government agencies, and the US
State Department.
Stan Correy: MPRI`s success as a corporate army role model comes
about because oI its work in Croatia in 1995.
Paul Harris: The Croats launched an oIIensive simultaneously on
seven or eight Ironts and this is not Irom the old Warsaw Pact
textbook, this oIIensive was straight Irom the NATO textbook. And
I believe that the Croats were quite up to reading military strategy
and doing this on their own. Now by coincidence, MPRI had Ior a
couple oI years been training the Croatian army. MPRI oI course
would stoutly deny to you that they were in any way involved in
this oIIensive, but equally I think it`s nave to take that at Iace
value, and to me the oIIensive bore all the hallmarks oI a western-
style planned military strategy.
Stan Correy: MPRI do deny that they led the campaign in Krajina.
General Ed Soyster is MPRI`s spokesman. He is also a Iormer head
oI deIence intelligence Ior the US military. However the guns Ior
hire` label does still |hangs| around MPRI. The phrase US military
advisor` has a rather nasty echo in recent US history. AIter all, it
was US military advisors who began the protracted US involvement
in Vietnam. So when it leaked out last year |1996| that private
in Vietnam. So when it leaked out last year |1996| that private
American advisors, identiIied as MPRI, were said to be taking a
contract to train soldiers in one oI modern Asia`s civil wars, media
alarm bells began to ring.
Paul Harris explains how it all started at a going-away party in Sri
Lanka`s capital, Colombo.
Paul Harris: MPRI were involved in drawing up I understand, a
long-term training strategy Ior the Sri Lankan army, a program
which would vastly improve its capability. Well the news oI this
started to leak out aIter a drinks party at which the retiring
commander oI the Sri Lankan army, possibly had one over the
odds. He revealed that America was coming to the assistance oI the
Sri Lankans, and he rather let the cat out oI the bag. It was very
embarrassing to the American Embassy in Colombo, and Ior those
oI us who knew how many beans made Iive, it`s quite clear that
MPRI was involved, that the US government was involved at a
more oIIicial level, and the bottom line was that the Americans
withdrew Irom Sri Lanka, announced that withdrawal at the end oI
August |1996|, beginning oI September last year in a run-up oI
course, to Presidential elections |oI 1996|. And the White House
was extremely concerned about publicity which the actions were
getting in Washington, and they Ielt obliged to publicly say that
We`re not getting involved in another Asian adventure`. They
might have added, in the run-up to an election`. People in the US
State Department told me, Nothing to do with us, it must be those
MPRI people`. And oI course MPRI said, Oh well, we`re not
involved`. And so everybody was using the presence oI the other, as
you might say, to dodge the column.
Stanley Correy: Paul Harris. Well, General Ed Soyster doesn`t want
to dodge the column`. Yes, MPRI did go to Sri Lanka, but the
contract to train the Sri Lankan army was never signed.
Ed Soyster: We were contacted by the Sri Lankan government. In
Iact I personally went to Sri Lanka with another oIIicer in the
company, and discussed the possibility Ior training there. That
contract, like any other business arrangement, was not signed. We
did have a license Irom our State Department because oI the nature
oI the training that we were going to provide, to conduct a training.
But like any business, I don`t know any business contractor that
goes out on every opportunity and comes back with a contract. So
we`ve done no work there. Two oI us were there Ior about a week
with discussions, and that`s our total involvement in Sri Lanka.
Stan Correy: I suppose what people are saying is because you are a
US company and have the military background, and do work by the
State Department, your presence could be seen as American
involvement.
Ed Soyster: It certainly could be, because we are Americans. But
again I would emphasise that MPRI`s a private company; we`re not
a proxy Ior the government; we do work directly Ior our own army.
They`ve have crossed the bridge and recognized that this is a very
good way to receive training. But we are not supported by the
government in any way, not one nickel oI US money has every
gone to any eIIort oI MPRI overseas.
David Isenberg: A company like MPRI stands at the pinnacle oI this
new hierarchy oI private sector military Iirms. There`s intense
interest, because on the one hand they are private, and independent,
but on the other hand they are very close to the US government
military elite. In Iact all their overseas contracts are vetted by the
State Department. Couldn`t they very easily become another arm oI
the US government, doing what the State doesn`t want to do
directly with its own military?.
AIter reading this transcript, especially the comments oI General Ed
Soyster, one can inIer that the Gen.Soyster has not denied the link his
MPRI company had with the US State Department. First he had
asserted that 'We did have a license Irom our |US| State Department
because oI the nature oI the training that we were going to provide, to
conduct a training. Subsequently he also inIormed that 'We`re not a
proxy Ior the government; we do work directly Ior our own army.
Mr.David Isenberg had also corroborated this Iact with the statement,
'they |MPRI| don`t do anything which isn`t Iully vetted and
scrutinized and approved by the relevant US government agencies, and
the US State Department.
My inIerence is that during the 1996-97 period, the then US State
Department oIIicials played a double role; it had to cover the derriere
oI the scandal-ridden Clinton administration so that Clinton-Gore
ticket`s chances oI re-election Ior the second term against Dole-Kemp
ticket was not Iumbled, and it also had to provide business
opportunities` Ior the gun-Ior-hire` companies like MPRI. The
outcome was adding the LTTE to its Ioreign terrorist organization` list
in 1997.
The oIt-suggested reasons Ior this 1997 American action against the
LTTE, such as the long record oI LTTE`s atrocities`, Lakshman
Kadirgamar`s active international campaigning Ior strictures against
LTTE and the Sinhalese expatriate community`s powerIul backing oI
some US Congressional leaders are merely halI-truths.
How did Pirabhakaran cope with this setback? Since four years
have passed, one can see that he did not take any rash and
impulse-oriented decisions to confront the American policy. In
this, he had shown maturity in leadership. He knew who his
adversaries were (and are), and Americans are not in his list of
adversaries. I wonder whether he could have thought that the
1997 labeling as foreign terrorist organization` by the US State
Department was nothing but a painful thorn in his flesh. A
guerrilla warrior who has survived in jungles also would have
learnt something about how to extricate the thorn without
compounding the pain. (Continued)

Part 18
Sachi Sri Kantha
13 October 2001]
A Ramanujan in Military Science
First, read this short passage oI what Bertrand Russell wrote in
Chapter 5 entitled Science and War`, his short tract, The Impact of
Science on Societv (1952).
'The greatest men of the Renaissance commended themselves to
the powerful bv their skill in scientific warfare. When Leonardo
[da Jinci] wanted to get a fob from the Duke of Milan, he wrote
the Duke a long letter about his improvements in the art of
fortification, and in the last sentence mentioned brieflv that he
could also paint a bit. He got the fob, though I doubt if the
Duke read as far as the last sentence. When Galileo wanted
emplovment under the Grand Duke of Tuscanv, it was on his
calculations of the trafectories of cannon-balls that he relied. In
the French Revolution, such men of science as were not
guillotined owed their immunitv to their contributions to the
war effort.`
da Vinci (1452-1519) and Galileo (1564-1642) the two brains who
set the tone Ior the dominance oI science in the Western hemisphere
were contract scientists whose thoughts enriched the military science
oI their eras. This trend has continued until now. Enrico Fermi (1901-
54) and his colleagues, who split the atom 60 years ago, were
intellectual descendants oI da Vinci and Galileo. There`s nothing to be
ashamed oI in dabbling with military science. The downIall oI Tamils
during the past 500 years in the Indian subcontinent is due to the Iact
that Tamils were not encouraged by external (colonial and missionary)
and internal (societal and religious) Iorces to think in terms oI military
science. Pirabhakaran made a change in Tamil thinking.
I measure my words when I state that Pirabhakaran is a scientist
albeit an unconventional scientist. Pirabhakarans specialitv is
militarv science. Being a practising scientist Ior over two decades, I
can comprehend the scientist mind` in Pirabhakaran. A stale
can comprehend the scientist mind` in Pirabhakaran. A stale
wisecrack on Pirabhakaran is that he did not have a tertiary education.
But corollary to that wisecrack is that, the island where Pirabhakaran
was born did not have (and even now doesn`t have) a proper military
science program at the university level.
Ceylon had its ceremonial army oI course, but the cerebral power oI
its ranking leaders was so abysmal that they couldn`t even execute
successIul military coup detat, not once but twice in the 1960s. When
Pirabhakaran came oI age in 1972, there were no ranking military
thinkers (or deIence analysts in current parlor) in the island to brag
about. Here is the history oI the post-independent period`s Sri Lankan
army until 1972, as it appears currently in the Sri Lankan army
website:
'The Army Act was enacted in parliament on the 10
th
oI October
1949 which is recognized as the day, the Ceylon Army was
raised. The Army was to be comprised oI a Regular and a
Volunteer Iorce and the initial requirement was to raise the
Iollowing units in the Regular and Volunteer Forces.
The Regular Force.
An artillery Regiment to guard the coast and the airspace oI
the Island.
An InIantry Battalion to mainly assist the police in internal
security duties, Ior static guards and ceremonial duties.
A small detachment oI Signals to provide communications.
An element oI the Service Crops |sic!| Ior supply transport
and barrack services.
A new ordnance Depot
An Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Workshop
A Medical element to handle the British Army hospital in
Colombo and the Medical Reception Centre at Diyatalawa.
A Works Services element Ior repair and maintenance oI
buildings.
A small Military Police section to maintain discipline
A Recruit Training Depot
The Jolunteer Force.
An Artillery Regiment
An Engineer Squadron
An InIantry Battalion
A Medical Unit
A Service Corps Company
There were no Iormations and all units were directly Iunctioning
under Army Headquarters. Temporary Iield headquarters Iormed
at the time oI a requirement as it was done during the 1958
communal riots. The Iirst Iield Iormation was raised in 1963, to
prevent illicit immigration Irom South India. This headquarters
was known as Task Force Anti Illicit Immigration (TAFII), which
was disbanded in 1981. In May 1972, when Ceylon became the
Republic oI Sri Lanka, all Army units were renamed
accordingly.
In this chronological history oI the Sri Lankan army`, the
unsuccessIul 1962 and 1966 coups did not happen. So much Ior the
Iactual accuracy and integrity oI the Sri Lankan armed Iorces!
Thus, Pirabhakaran was a selI-taught military scientist, like what
Ramanujan was Ior mathematics. Ramanujan is renowned Ior his
mathematical calculations. Similarly Pirabhakaran has proved his
mettle in military calculations. Ramanujan`s mathematical caliber
couldn`t be assessed by his ordinary peers. The same was true Ior
Pirabhakaran`s military caliber.
Neither Ceylon nor the greater India (encompassing both Pakistan and
Bangladesh) did generate a ranking military leader, oI international
caliber, in the past 200 years. I substantiate this statement with the
statistic provided in the reIerence book, Whos Who in Militarv
Historv. from 1453 to the Present Dav, authored by John Keegan and
Andrew WheatcroIt (Routledge, 1996). This source book lists 699
names. Among these, only Iour Indian military leaders appear, namely
Babur (1483-1530), Akbar (1542-1605), Sivaji (1627-80) and Tippu
Sultan (1749-99). Thus, the last military leader oI rank Irom the Indian
subcontinent, died in 1799.
Pirabhakaran has been called names by his tub-thumbing political
adversaries and power-peddling journalists; a megalomaniac`, a
ruthless killer`, a tyrant`, and a terrorist` are Iew oI these.
Ignoramuses in military science Iail to note that these labels apply to
99 percent oI the 699 names recognized as the great military men, the
world has seen since 1453. Also, these labels Iit perIectly even to
democratic, street-smart politicians like Truman, Johnson, Nixon,
democratic, street-smart politicians like Truman, Johnson, Nixon,
J.R.Jayewardene and Premadasa when they waged war.
Watson`s rules for success in science
Why I assert Pirabhakaran`s unusual science acumen is that, he seems
to be adhering to more than a couple oI rules oI success (Ior a
scientist) proposed by James Watson. But, I cannot veriIy whether
Pirabhakaran knows these Watson`s rules, or even whether he knows
who Watson is.
Watson is a revered name in biomedical sciences, since he was one oI
the co-discoverers oI the double helical structure oI deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) in 1953. He also gained a reputation as a brash, no-
nonsense guy who broke the accepted norms and conventions oI
scientiIic world. In a talk delivered on March 2, 1993, to honor the
40
th
anniversary oI his Iamous discovery, he was in his Ilair. He
introduced his Iive rules Ior success, as a scientist. To excerpt Irom his
lecture script which appeared in the Science magazine oI Sept.24,
1993, Watson`s Iive rules are as Iollows:
Rule 1: 1o succeed in science, you have to avoid dumb people. In
the game oI science or liIe the highest goal isn`t simply to win, it`s
to win at something really diIIicult. Put another way, it`s to go
somewhere beyond your ability and come out on top.
Rule 2: 1o make a huge success, a scientist has to be prepared to
get into deep trouble. Sometime or another, people will tell you that
you`re not ready to do something. II you are going to make a big jump
in science, you will very likely be unqualiIied to succeed by deIinition.
The truth, however, won`t save you Irom criticism. Your very
willingness to take on a very big goal will oIIend some people who will
think that you are too big Ior your britches and crazy to boot.
Rule 3: Be sure you always have someone up your sleeve who will
save you when you find yourself in deep s.(Iour-letter word,
rhyming with hit`).
Rule 4: Aever do anything that bores you. Constantly exposing your
ideas to inIormed criticism is very important.
Rule 5: If you can't stand to be with your real peers, get out of
science. It`s very hard to succeed in science iI you don`t want to be
with other scientists. You have to go to key meetings where you may
spot key Iacts that would have escaped you. And you have to chat
spot key Iacts that would have escaped you. And you have to chat
with your competitors, even iI you Iind them objectionable.
OI these Iive rules Ior success proposed by Watson, Irom the past 15
years oI Pirabhakaran`s deeds, one could inIer that he has adhered to
Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 with conviction. His adherence to Rule 5 is a toss
up. Now, I explain what I mean by these assertions.
Avoiding dumb people: Pirabhakaran routinely avoided the dumb
people such as those who represented the Indian Intelligence Agencies
and the Sri Lankan politicians.
Cetting into deep trouble: Pirabhakaran got into deep trouble by
deciding to test` the skills oI his LTTE against the Indian army.
Having someone at hand for protection: Pirabhakaran had two great
patrons to protect him in his war against the Indian army. They were
MGR (an individual) and the Tamils (a population) living in the North
and East Eelam.
Aot doing anything that is boring: Pirabhakaran has learnt by
historical experience that the round table conIerences, All Party
Colloquia`, Constitutional amendments, Commissions and peace
negotiations with the third degree politicians are time-wasting strategies
which deny and postpone the political rights oI people whom he
represents and thus they have been boring Ior him.
Baptism by Fire in 1987-90
One tough decision Pirabhakaran took to gain stature among his peer
military scientists was the one he made in October 1987 to conIront
the Indian army which had landed in Eelam, Iollowing the
Jayewardene-Rajiv Gandhi Agreement oI July 1987. That was the war
which heralded Pirabhakaran`s arrival among the elite ranks as one oI
the top military strategists oI his era. It was baptism by Iire. None oI
the Sri Lankan army`s generals has the distinction oI Iighting a Ioreign
army and emerging as a victor in such an encounter. Thus, the source
oI anti-Pirabhakaran venom spilled by the Sinhalese analysts since
1990 derives Irom Pirabhakaran`s success in puncturing the armor oI
the Indian army.
Ten years ago, I wrote an analysis oI the LTTE`s war against the
Indian army which appeared in the Tamil Nation monthly (Aug.15,
1991). That was beIore the appearance oI Internet as an inIormation
medium. During the past 5-6 years, the LTTE`s war against the Indian
army has been presented in the Internet Irom many angles by
army has been presented in the Internet Irom many angles by
interested parties. These parties include, Indian army proIessionals
who directly took part in the war with LTTE, Sri Lankan army
proIessionals (Major General Lucky Algama, Major General Sarath
Munasinghe Ior instance) who were mere spectators oI this war, and
India`s partisan analysts like Subramanian Swamy, S.D.Muni, N.Ram,
as well as the Iriends oI Indian army. Quite a number oI these
observations are biased against the LTTE and obviously made to
tarnish Pirabhakaran`s acumen in leading an army. Thus, there is a
need to reproduce my analysis in entiretv to reach the wider audience.
First I present what I thought (in 1991) about the LTTE`s
perIormance against the Indian army, between October 1987 and
March 1989. Then, I will comment on (a) how it was substantiated by
the later observations oI other participants who played direct roles in
this war and had contact with Pirabhakaran, and also (b) how the
outcome oI Indian army`s conIrontation with LTTE, aIIected the
LTTE`s perIormance in the 1990s.
LTTE`s War with the Indian Army
|Tamil Nation, August 15, 1991|
'George Kohn, the compiler oI the standard reIerence book,
Dictionarv of Wars (Facts on File Publications, New York, 1986)
wrote in his introduction, War has a long and intriguing history and
has been a prominent Ieature oI human existence ever since the day
when rival men and women decided to settle their diIIerences by
use oI Iorce. In many instances, this history oI a people is the history
oI its wars. Only the nave can doubt the truth oI these statements.
India`s Iirst military encounter against a Ioreign adversary was
recorded as that oI Alexander`s Asiatic campaign (329-325 BC). The
Northern and Eastern provinces oI Sri Lanka became the battleIield
Ior India`s latest military encounter in 1987. Since the Indian army`s
war against Prabhakaran`s Tamil Tigers lasted almost two and a halI
years (October 1987 to March 1990), it is time to review the outcome
oI this war. Already so many military experts, political pundits and
journalists Irom India have presented India`s version` oI the most
unexpected military encounter the Indian army had to Iace in its post-
independence era.
The perIormance oI the Indian army in Sri Lanka was no better than
the perIormances oI India`s hundreds oI athletes who have
participated in the Olympic Games since 1948. Both the athletes and
the Indian army men in Sri Lanka shared one common denominator.
They Iailed to produce, gold, silver or even bronze-medal winning
They Iailed to produce, gold, silver or even bronze-medal winning
perIormances. But the lack luster perIormances oI India`s athletes and
army men have never deterred the post-mortem specialists in India to
oIIer Iace-saving excuses, reasons etc. etc. to hide their agony.
To analyze the perIormance oI the Indian army (I preIer this usage
than the euphemistic, Indian Peace Keeping Force) in Sri Lanka, we
Iirst have to reminisce on how this army Iared in the earlier wars it
Iaced since 1947. A capsule summary oI India`s wars, culled Irom the
authoritative book, War in Peace. Conventional and Guerrilla
Warfare since 1945 (edited by Sir Robert Thompson, 1985) is given
below.
(1) Sino-Indian War of 1962
Date: October-November 1962
Outcome: Chinese seizure oI disputed border region.
Casualties: India; 1,400 killed and 4,013 captured. China;
unknown.
(2) Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
Date: April September 27, 1965.
Main engagements: Lahore.
Outcome: UN policed ceaseIire.
Casualties: India; 2,212 dead, 7,636 wounded and 1,500
missing. Pakistan: estimated 5,800 plus dead.
(3) Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
Date: December 3-16, 1971.
Main engagements: Dacca.
Outcome: Independence Ior Bangladesh.
Casualties: India; 1,426 dead, 3,611 wounded and 2,149
missing. Pakistan; unknown.
To these three, should be added the Siege oI Sikh Golden Temple,
which occurred on June 6, 1984. Casualties: Indian troops, 55 killed.
Sikh militants, 500 plus killed and 1,500 plus captured.
Compared to these short military encounters oI the Indian army, their
mission against Prabhakaran`s Tamil Tigers became the most
protracted one. Though it is a bitter pill to swallow Ior many,
Prabhakaran emerged as a victorious military commander in the most
vigorous and mentally bruising battle he Iaced till 1989.
Between October and December 1987 (the Iirst three months oI the
war), aIter a bloody Iighting, the Indian Iorces took militarv control oI
the JaIIna region and the Tamil Tigers retreated to the jungle hideouts
in the Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Mannar and Trincomalee districts. Yves
de Saint Jabob`s AFP news report Irom New Delhi published in the
Mainichi Dailv News oI Japan (27 January 1988) inIormed that by
January 1988, 350 troops had died and that the war against Tamil
Tigers was costing India some 4 million dollars a day`. AIter another
15 months oI war, Barbara Crossette oI the New York Times (May 10,
1989) inIormed the world that, more than 900 Indians have been
killed and many thousands wounded`. And these were the oIIicial
Iigures` released Irom the Indian side.
The secret oI Prabhakaran`s survival in times oI turbulence (against
mind-numbing odds stacked against him) was dependent on three
important Iactors. These are,
1. his uncanny knack oI outsmarting the adversaries in most
unpredictable ways.
2. patronage oI Iormer Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister MGR
3. his support and rapport Irom the Tamil masses in the Northern
and Eastern provinces.
Let me expand on these three Iactors which helped Prabhakaran to
Iight the Indian army with conIidence.
Outsmarting the adversaries
Only outstanding leaders are blessed with this character trait. In this
century (20
th
), leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mao Tse Tung,
Marshal Tito, Fidel Castro and Yaser AraIat had this character trait.
They were able to survive so many depressing moments (which would
have sapped the vigor oI ordinary mortals) because they were blessed
with this trait.
When Iighting a war with an adversary, one has to bring the enemy to
your own terms to manipulate the events thereby turning the
disadvantages to one`s strengths. Imagine, iI Mahatmaji had played
according to the rules set by the British high command in London, he
would never have won independence Ior India. Instead, Mahatmaji set
his own rules oI combat with his adversaries and outsmarted the
mighty Iire power oI the British army.
Prabhakaran dictated his own terms oI combat in dealing with his
adversaries. As a result he was able to bruise the bloated egos oI so
many politicians as well as career soldiers during the past 7 years. Who
have not bitten the dust against the tactical manoeuvres oI
Prabhakaran? Rajiv Gandhi, J.R.Jayewardene, J.N.Dixit (ex-Indian
High Commissioner in Sri Lanka), Lalith Athulathmudali,
Gen.L.Sundarji (India`s ChieI oI Army staII), Maj.Gen.Harkirat Singh
(Commander oI the Indian troops in Oct.1987), Lt.Gen.Depinder
Singh, the manipulating oIIicers oI the Indian Intelligence (Research
and Analysis Wing), the ChieIs oI Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the
OIIicers oI the Sri Lankan Intelligence Service.
Patronage of MGR
MGR`s patronage was vital Ior Prabhakaran`s strategy against his Sri
Lankan adversaries and Indian army. During the Iirst three months oI
the intense combat against the Indian army, the Tamil Tigers Iought
valiantly with the moral support provided by MGR. Regarding MGR`s
critical support Ior Prabhakaran, one oI the reliable Indian journalists,
Salamat Ali wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review (February 4,
1988) as Iollows:
'While supporting New Delhi`s policies, MGR continued to back
the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, much to the dismay oI the
Indian Government. MGR also persuaded New Delhi that
because oI its size the LTTE should not be totally ignored. In
carrying out New Delhi`s instructions on the militant groups,
MGR went Iar beyond his brieI in the local handling oI the
LTTE. However, the central government did not consider it
prudent to antagonize MGR over the issue oI his special Iavours
to the LTTE.
When MGR learned that the July 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan peace
accord was nearing completion, he tipped the LTTE which
moved most oI its arsenal to secret hideouts in northern Sri
Lanka. MGR also told the LTTE that all militant groups would
be disarmed by the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, so they too hid
their arms, which later had to be searched out by the Indian
troops aIter a prolonged campaign.
Although the LTTE has been engaged in combat with Indian
troops since October, MGR kept his close links with it. His
statements on India`s Sri Lanka policy were deliberately vague
enough to yield diIIering interpretations by the LTTE and New
Delhi. Until MGR`s death, the LTTE`s speed boats used to
hurtle between Tamil Nadu and JaIIna`s northern coast with
impunity almost every night.
All the parties involved in the Eelam conIlict (Tamil Tigers, Sri Lankan
and Indian Tamils, UNP politicians and the Indian decision-makers)
were aware that MGR would not last long Iollowing his debilitating
stroke in October 1984. But they also did not anticipate the
unexpected turn oI events in MGR`s Iailing health within a couple oI
days prior to his death on December 24, 1987. The death oI MGR
was indeed a major blow to Prabhakaran.
Following MGR`s death, even J.R.Jayewardene cocksurely predicted
the demise oI Tamil Tigers. The Time (January 11, 1988; Asian
edition) reported that, he (Jayewardene) is conIident that the 35,000
Indian troops brought in under a joint accord with India will soon
Iinish` the Tigers`. But Prabhakaran`s rebels recovered Irom the loss
oI MGR and they survived the whole oI 1988, while Jayewardene
retired in disgrace.
3) Support of Tamil people
How much support and rapport, Prabhakaran and his youthIul rebels
had among the Tamils oI Northern and Eastern provinces is distinctly
visible when we compare the two reports published, one at the
beginning oI the war (October 1987) and the second one aIter 18
months, in March 1989.
Angus Deming and Ron Moreau reporting Ior the Newsweek (October
26, 1987) wrote,
'.they |Tamil Tigers| may also have lost the battle Ior the
hearts and minds oI JaIIna Tamils, many oI whom support the
peace accord and have grown weary oI the Tigers` violent ways.
As a result, says one Western diplomat in Colombo, the Tigers
don`t have a long-term deIensible position in JaIIna city. It`s only
a matter oI days beIore they either have to surrender or try to
escape`. That was the view oI the Indian military tacticians. But,
their expectations did not materialize even aIter pounding the
lives and limbs oI tens oI thousands oI non-combatant Tamils
living in the Eelam territory.
Barbara Crossette`s article entitled, II the War has ended, why are so
many dying?`, published in the New York Times oI March 9, 1989,
told the continued support Prabhakaran`s rebels enjoyed amongst the
Tamils.
'.The Tigers, almost unbelievably, have not lost public
sympathy, despite their terrorist tactics and the destructions that
came in their wake. Over and over again, a visitor to JaIIna hears
the Tigers complimented Ior never letting us down`. Quietly, the
Tigers are still a presence in JaIIna town, in villages elsewhere on
the peninsula and on surrounding islands. II Indians control the
roads by day, Tigers have the ability to cut them by night.
Indian troops, IearIul oI driving alone on the peninsula`s road,
roar along in convoys, scattering local people with angry glares
and the brandishing oI automatic weapons.
The Outcome
Prabhakaran and his rebels had to tackle the Indian army in three
phases.
(a) open warIare
(b) guerrilla operations
(c) a political campaign Ior popular support
Based on the initial outcome oI the open warIare (October-November
1987), the Indian army and Indian news media announced victories`
and now it is apparent that their boast was premature and a hollow
one. Once the Indian army gained military control during day time
(while losing the popular support oI the Tamil masses) in the JaIIna
region by Iirepower and air-strike, they were lost about their next
move. They presumed that mere show oI tank strength could cage the
Tamil Tigers but they were sadly mistaken. On paper, it looked like
that the Indian army would have disarmed the Tamil Tigers within Iive
days (That was the original estimate oI Rajiv Gandhi). The Indian
military brains estimated this on the duration oI their Indo-Pakistan
Wars oI 1965 and 1971.
The strength oI Tamil Tigers, on paper, amounted to 5,000 plus.
Hence the initial landing oI 15,000 Indian soldiers in August 1987.
This was based on the accepted rules oI conventional war that the
Indian army needed a 3:1 advantage in manpower and equipment to
take on a garrison in prepared positions. Then the agony oI the Indian
military tacticians became evident when they had to bring
reinIorcement in excess oI 100,000 men. Even this proved Iutile.
What Rajiv Gandhi`s military advisers Iailed to calculate was that
Prabhakaran`s hard-core army oI 5,000 plus was given solid cover by
more than a million non-combatant Tamils oI Northern and Eastern
provinces. Prabhakaran also Iollowed another maxim oI Mao`s
guerrilla warIare: Strategy is to pit one man against ten, but the tactics
are to pit ten men against one.`
In the Iinal analysis, the Indian army was outwitted and out-Iought by
Prabhakaran`s Tigers. Who will disagree with the comments oI one
Theepan, a Tamil Tiger Iield commander:
'We are elated to fight the Indians, the whole world admired us
for the fight we have given the worlds fourth largest armed
forces?` (Time. Dec.19, 1988).
The British weekly Economist harbors no love Ior the Tamil Tigers.
It`s Sri Lankan correspondent always reports with contempt about the
mission on which Prabhakaran has embarked. However, on the Iirst
anniversary oI the LTTE-Indian war, the Economist (October 22,
1988) came to its senses and presented a somewhat accurate appraisal
oI the result. Otherwise it would have lost it`s credibility as a critical
commentator oI contemporary events. The title oI the story was,
Rajiv gets lost on a Tiger hunt`. Some excerpts are worth recording
Ior the beneIit oI those who have not read it.
'More than 500 oI its |India`s| 50,000 soldiers have been killed,
almost all oI them by the Tamil Tiger guerrillas. Three times that
number have been wounded. And there is the incalculable
damage to the army`s pride Irom its Iailure, despite more than a
year oI eIIort and a vast superiority oI arms, to subdue the
Tigers.The Tigers have lost some 350 men since the Iighting
resumed in earnest last October, and now have around 2,000 in
the Iield.
Tigers are not alone in believing that one day they will get their
Tamil Eelam. Some oI the Indian oIIicers Iighting them believe
so too. They have experienced the Tigers` tenacity in battle and
have interrogated Tiger prisoners. They reckon the guerrillas
could go on Iighting indeIinitely.
The Economist continued its analysis Iurther.
'Even those who do not accept that bleak view now suspect that
the Tigers cannot simply be wiped out, as it was once thought
they could be. II the Indians cannot do it, the Sri Lankan army,
which is halI the size oI the Indian Iorce in Sri Lanka, seems
unlikely to.
In recent decades (iI not centuries), no military general Irom Sri Lanka
had the courage to take on the might oI an Indian army. But
Prabhakaran took the challenge in a most daring manner and had
surprised many oI his critics. The Time magazine (April 3, 1989; Asian
edition) had written the non-partisan verdict oI this war. In its cover
story on Super India: The next military power`, there appeared a box-
Ieature, with the caption, Sri Lanka: Case Study oI a Disaster`. The
last three sentences oI the analysis read:
'Some 800 Indian soldiers have died at the hands oI the Tigers.
India still has 100,000 troops and paramilitary Iorces committed
to the Sri Lanka operation, yet it has Iailed to put down the
guerrillas. The simmering conIlict may not be India`s Viet Nam,
but it provides the lesson Ior New Delhi that even an emerging
superpower must recognize its limits.
That certainly was grudging acknowledgement oI the victory Ior
Prabhakaran`s army.
Almost a year later, when India withdrew the last oI its troops Irom Sri
Lanka on March 24, 1990, Barbara Crossette oI the New York Times
openly acknowledged the LTTE`s victory over the Indian Army
(March 25, 1990). She wrote,
'The deIeat oI New Delhi`s policy is now complete. Not only has
India lost the battle with the Tamil Tigers, at the cost oI about
1,200 Indian lives, but it has also lost any hope oI direct inIluence
over the Sri Lankan northeast, particularly the strategic port oI
Trincomalee, whom an Indian-installed provincial government,
intended to blunt the Tigers` political potential, collapsed this
month.
So, in the Iinal verdict, oI the three phases which consisted the Indo-
LTTE war (1987-90), the LTTE won the two phases (guerrilla
campaign and the popular support Ior political campaign) aIter back-
tracking in the Iirst phase (open warIare). It was the longest war the
Indian army has Iought since India`s independence. However, the
Tamils cannot Ieel happy about the victory, since it has been achieved
at too great cost. The tragedy oI the Indo-LTTE war summed up in
statistics (only a partial one) should read as Iollows:
India: 1,200 plus killed and many thousands injured (oIIicial
estimate`)
LTTE: 1,000 plus killed and an equal number injured.
Tamil civilians: 5,000 plus killed and injured.
Thus ended my 1991 analysis on LTTE`s war against the Indian
army. In sum, I would like to reiterate that, I identiIied three Iactors
which were important Ior Pirabhakaran and LTTE`s survival against
the Indian army`s campaign. These were, Pirabhakaran`s innate
the Indian army`s campaign. These were, Pirabhakaran`s innate
intelligence, patronage oI MGR, and the mass support Irom the Eelam
Tamil population residing in the North and East oI the island. To my
satisIaction, J.N.Dixit (Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Irom
1985 to 1989), who was one oI the chieI Indian protagonists in charge
oI organizing the Indian army`s campaign, also conIirmed the
signiIicance oI all three Iactors in his memoirs, Assignment Colombo,
in 1998. Though I stated in 1991 that the number oI Tamil civilians
dead was 5,000 plus, subsequent research shows that this Iigure need
to be upwardly revised to 6,000 plus.
1.N.Dixit`s Assessment
Among a dozen oI books which have appeared describing the Indo-Sri
Lankan aIIairs oI the 1980s, Dixit`s book stands out prominently Ior
more than one reason. First, it appeared in 1998, aIter the deaths oI
many oI the prominent players oI that period. These include (in
chronological order oI death), MGR, Amirthalingam, Uma
Maheswaran, Rohana Wijeweera, Ranjan Wijeratne, Rajiv Gandhi,
Athulathmudali, Premadasa, Gamini Dissanayake and
J.R.Jayewardene. Secondly, Dixit`s rank as one oI the main
protagonists oI that era as well as his Irankness in penning the political
motives oI such dead political players provide gravitas to his book,
which are not Iound in other books authored by academics and
analysts. OI course, Dixit`s book has its spins and Iakes; it has its
serious omissions, the most glaring one being the non-mention oI
civilian causalities in Eelam during the Indian army`s oIIensives; it has
its minor Iactual errors; and it also has its garnish oI We did the best
thing We did the right thing` bombast. Despite these limitations, Dixit
did not mince his words, in describing Pirabhakaran`s blessings. He
has noted the talent oI Pirabhakaran the leading military scientist oI
Tamils as Iollows:
'The LTTE`s emergence as the most dominant and eIIective
politico-military Iorce representing Tamil interests was due to the
Iollowing |Dixit lists six| Iactors. First, the character and
personality oI Prabhakaran who is disciplined, austere and
passionately committed to the cause oI Sri Lankan Tamils`
liberation. Whatever he may be criticized Ior, it cannot be denied
that the man has an inner Iire and dedication and he is endowed
with natural military abilities, both strategic and tactical. He has
also proved that he is a keen observer oI the nature oI
competitive and critical politics. He has proved his abilities in
judging political events and his adroitness in responding them.
|Book: Assignment Colombo, 1988, pp.79-80|
What makes a great scientist is the possession oI keen observational
powers and Dixit`s assessment oI Pirabhakaran is nothing but
accurate. Later in the book, Dixit again reiterated the success oI
Pirabhakaran in the Iollowing terms.
'I met the leaders oI practically all Tamil militant groups during
my Iour years in Colombo. Prabhakaran naturally stands out
among them. Regardless oI the criticisms and prejudices that I
may have about this young man, I cannot help but acknowledge
his deep idealism and his political and military skills. His
commitment to the creation oI a Tamil Eelam, in my judgement,
is unalterable. He is taciturn not terribly articulate, but he is clear
in his sense oI priorities and precise in speech. Events over the
years have shown him as an accomplished political strategist and
military tactician, qualities strengthened Iurther by his
Iorbearance and his capacity Ior survival. The only time during
the last one-and-a-halI decades or so when his leadership and
political survival was really in danger was when he was
conIronted by the IPKF. His surviving the IPKF operations was
more due to the political contradictions aIIecting Sri Lankan and
Indian policies than his personal capacities. But his surviving the
IPKF and carrying on his struggle has made him a Iolk hero
among his people. His hold on Sri Lankan Tamils may be
partially due to the Iear oI the LTTE, but in recent years he has
had widespread political support Irom Sri Lankan Tamils. In
personal liIe he is austere, highly disciplined and totally
committed. He is incapable oI compromises and iI he does, it has
been and it is only Ior interim tactical purposes. He does not
tolerate opposition and he has proved himselI to be an
accomplished guerilla commander. His political stature and
credibility amongst the Tamils have increased over the years. He
also has considerable support in Tamil Nadu. I do not see any
prospect oI his accepting a compromise with the Sinhalese
government. |ibid, pp.320-321|
On the signiIicance oI MGR`s patronage to Pirabhakaran`s LTTE,
Dixit had emphasized this vital point three times in his book, and Rajiv
Gandhi`s disappointment to this phenomenon, as Iollows:
(1) 'Despite having supported Rajiv Gandhi in signing the Indo-
Sri Lanka Agreement, he |MGR| remained committed to
assisting the LTTE. This inclination oI MGR was so
Iundamental that he continued to provide Iinances and
logistical Iacilities to Prabhakaran even aIter the IPKF
launched operations against the LTTE. [ibid, p.219|
(2) 'He |Rajiv Gandhi| was disappointed that the late
M.G.Ramachandran also continued to provide Iinancial and
logistical support to the LTTE, even aIter the IPKF launched
operations against this organization. |ibid, pp.227-228|
(3) 'It is a Iact that Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister
M.G.Ramachandran provided suIIicient Iinances to the LTTE
to purchase arms and supplies even aIter IPKF was launched
against this militant group. |ibid, p.232|
I wish to stress this Iact that, Pirabhakaran was blessed in having a
great and powerIul patron in MGR between 1983 and 1987, which
satisIied Watson`s rule no.3 Ior success in science, which in case oI
Pirabhakaran was military science. Though LTTE has survived Ior 14
years since MGR`s death, many oI its road-blocks in the Indian
political arena has to be attributed to the lack oI having a powerIul
patron in the mold oI MGR. (Continued).

Part 19
Sachi Sri Kantha
20 October 2001]
Repercussions of Rajiv-1ayewardene
Accord
Aote to the Readers
In this part, I make liberal use oI interviews and opinions, which
have appeared in the open sources oI inIormation since 1997. Lest
some readers think that I`m more or less using the cut-and-paste`
version oI writing history, Ior reasons oI accuracy, I preIer citing
direct quotes (even iI they are lengthy!) Irom the main participants oI
the events under discussion, rather than trying to paraphrase what
they have described.
An unidentified] Indian Intelligence Agency`s Assessment
Apart Irom J.N.Dixit, even the operatives oI Indian Intelligence
Agencies had recorded the beneIits oI MGR`s patronage to
Pirabhakaran and LTTE in one oI their reports in mid-1980s. Ten
years later, the 1997 Jain Commission Report on Rajiv Gandhi
Assassination had made this public by reproducing an excerpt oI an
unidentiIied Indian Intelligence Agency, relating to Pirabhakaran and
other prominent personalities oI the LTTE during the period oI
1981-86`.
This report makes interesting reading in that, it was written Irom the
angle oI a spy (Iield oIIicer) who was keen to Iind a mole` among
the leading LTTE members. I reproduce the relevant paragraphs.
'What helped Prabhakaran most in the early stages was the
total support given by the Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister |i.e.
MGR|. Prabhakaran was always very respectIul towards MGR
and used the right phrases and right gestures. He admired
MGR Ior the immense popularity he evoked in the Tamil
masses and wanted to emulate him. On the other hand,
Prabhakaran was seen as a real hero. Enormous Iunds were
made available which helped LTTE to sustain themselves until
made available which helped LTTE to sustain themselves until
they were in control oI JaIIna peninsula and started collecting
taxes. On one or two occasions arms shipments were
reportedly cleared and this gave a decisive edge to the group
by the end oI 1984. This support added to the edge
Prabhakaran had in his leadership and the ability to invoke a
kind oI mad and total loyalty in his Iollowers. He has a selI-
constructive strain in him which he has successIully passed on
to some oI his close Iollowers. II driven to a corner,
Prabhakaran is capable oI committing suicide rather than Iace
humiliation. He has a love Ior guns and his Iace is said to glow
when he sees a good weapon. He would always carry the latest
pistol available in the world market, and is a good shot too.
|Jain Commission Report, vol.5, chapter 16|
Now, to the assessment on Pirabhakaran`s closest company within
LTTE and search Ior a mole` amongst them. From the cited
evidence oI Kittu being in Madras, it appears that this spy report
was originally written aIter the attack on Kittu, which happened on
March 31, 1987. One should overlook the stilted English
description, since it probably was written by a Iield oIIicer oI RAW
who was on a mole hunt.
'At the moment, Prabhakaran does not carry any threat to his
leadership. Only two persons could have posed a threat. OI
those, Kittu is now in Madras to get an artiIicial leg, and though
he is consulted on all matters his disability and absence Irom
the scene are big handicaps. In the early days when Kittu
wanted to marry his girlIriend, Prabhakaran prevented it on the
ground that a revolutionary should be wedded to the revolution,
though he himselI Iell in love with one oI the Iasting girls oI
JaIIna University who was brought to Madras by the LTTE,
and got married to her. Kittu continues to hold this against
Prabhakaran.
Mathiasri |reIerring to Mahendrarajah alias Mahathaya| could
claim seniority even over Prabhakaran as he has continued with
the Tigers while Prabhakaran brieIly joined TELO. Unlike
Prabhakaran, Mathiasri is very ambitious and the way Mathiasri
has taken precedence over Dileep Yogi (who joined the
movement only aIter 1983) has not gone unnoticed. Other
persons who are considered to be very close to Prabhakaran
would include Raghu, personal bodyguard oI Prabhakaran, and
Thilagar, a political adviser, and Shankar alias Swarnalingam
Thilagar, a political adviser, and Shankar alias Swarnalingam
who helped the LTTE in procuring arms and other equipment
Irom abroad. Anton Balasingham, the political adviser (he is no
doctor and does not hold a Ph.D.) is more a spokesman who,
as he himselI had remarked, is there to justiIy the action rather
than advise on actions to be taken. Balasingham, aIter taking his
post-graduate degree in JaIIna, brieIly dabbled in journalism
beIore taking up a regular job in UK High Commission. In the
1970s he went over to UK and in due course obtained British
citizenship. He lost his wiIe in London and married the
Australian nurse who was attending to her in the hospital. He is
known to be shrewd and has slowly eliminated all other
intellectuals who could have given sensible advice to
Prabhakaran. Except Ior Balasingham, Prabhakaran is
surrounded by a group oI school and college dropouts. At this
moment the rank and Iile is well-knit as the LTTE has the
muscle and money which would over to over an estimated 15
crores oI Sri Lankan rupees. The powerIul motivation Ior
attainment oI Eelam is no longer present and the problem
would be how to keep the cadres together with an alternative
motivation. This is a major problem Ior the group. |ibid|
Readers should take note oI Mahathaya`s proIile as presented in this
Indian Intelligence wallah`s description and especially the comment
only two persons` (Kittu and Mahathaya) could pose a threat to
Pirabhakaran. By aligning this Iield report which was made public in
1997 via the Jain Commission Report, with the already exposed Iact
that in July 1989, the RAW oIIicials had planted a news report in the
Hindu newspaper about the death oI Pirabhakaran in the jungles oI
Vanni |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 1|, it appears
diIIicult to contradict the accusation on Mahathaya that he did turn
into a Benedict Arnold oI Eelam.
Col. 1ohn Taylor`s Assessment:
Col.John Taylor was one oI the Iirst oIIicers assigned to the IPKF,
and in 1997 he reminisced to the RediII.Com.India his impression
on the conIrontation with LTTE to the RediII.Com.India. Col. John
Taylor`s observation is interesting in that he describes how the
Eelam Tamil public provided tremendous mass support` to the
LTTE. His words on the quality oI RAW`s intelligence (both in
literal and Iigurative senses) speak Ior themselves. Excerpts Irom the
website oI RediII.Com are as Iollows:
'By the time the Indian Peace Keeping Force was inducted
aIter the India-Sri Lanka Accord, the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil
Ealam had emerged a strong militant group on the island. They
had wiped out all opposition, both Tamil and Sinhala. They had
Iull control oI the North and East. They were running a parallel
government. The administration and judiciary were with them.
The LTTE was both loved and Ieared by all. When I was in Sri
Lanka, the only Sinhalas north oI the Elephant Pass were the
Sri Lankan troops stationed there. Only Tamils were saIe in the
area. Such was the total control oI the LTTE, because oI their
mass appeal. Many critics have labelled the IPKF`s role on
the island as India`s Vietnam. The Sri Lankan Tamils, Ied on
LTTE propaganda, boasted oI giving the Iourth largest army in
the world, a bloody nose. Nothing can be Iurther Irom the
truth.
The IPKF had successIully eliminated the middle order
leadership oI the LTTE and broken their stronghold over the
JaIIna peninsula. The LTTE was Iorced to take reIuge in the
jungles oI the North and East. The Elephant Pass was open Ior
the Iirst time aIter the LTTE had taken control oI the JaIIna.
Movement oI goods Irom the South, East and West was made
possible aIter a long period oI time. However, the IPKF
operations were not a complete success. We were unable to
unite the diIIerent Tamil groups, mainly because oI the
intransigent attitude oI the LTTE. It wanted the whole pie or
nothing.
Anyone with a military background will tell you that Ior an army
to be successIul in an operation oI the size and magnitude in
Sri Lanka, it must have excellent intelligence, Ireedom oI action
to plan and execute its operations, and sound logistic
support. We were aware oI the LTTE`s domination over
other militant organisations, but we were not aware oI their
innovative tactics, resourceIulness, tremendous mass support
and, most importantly, their excellent intelligence network.
Let me give you two small examples oI their subtle yet Iatally
successIul methods oI passing on inIormation. Whenever an
army patrol leIt their camp or post, the nearest temple or
church would ring their bells to indicate how many men were in
the patrol. II the bell chimed six times the strength oI the patrol
was six, and so on. Only later did we realise the truth oI
Hemingway`s classic For whom the Bells Toll. they were
tolling Ior us.
Passing through a village or township, a small boy or girl would
run ahead to the end oI the street, pass inIormation about the
patrol. The next messenger would be cycle-borne. Thus the
message went ahead -- messengers changing every 150 metres
or so. Even iI they were intercepted, the boy or girl only knew
his portion oI the route. No one person knew the ultimate
destination. While passing messages on their |LTTE| radio
sets, they switched Irequencies continuously. So the intercepts
were just one line oI a coded message. This was something we
were learning Ior the Iirst time, and the hard way too.
The Research and Analysis Wing was in charge oI collation oI
intelligence. The less said about them the better. The
intelligence agents were aIraid Ior their lives and hardly dared to
venture out oI their rooms. All the inIormation they passed on
was acquired Irom the army. Things should have been the other
way round. UnIortunately Rajiv Gandhi mainly accepted the
advise given by RAW and other intelligence agencies, and
decided to induct the IPKF. What we heard on the grapevine
was that the RAW advisors had told the PM, We will have
Prabhakaran in our custody within 72 hours.` This was never
conIirmed, but was an indicator oI our poor intelligence
assessment.
Major General Harkirat Singh`s Assessment:
Major General Harkirat Singh served as the Iirst commander oI the
Indian army`s campaign in Sri Lanka. His views are lucid and he
shoots straight. Thus it is reIreshing to digest this lengthy interview
Irom a man who kept silent Ior ten years. Though Pirabhakaran
turned out to be his adversary, this Indian soldier paid proper
respect to the tenacity oI Pirabhakaran. This 1997 interview, culled
Irom RediII.Com.India`s website, is also notable Ior many oI its
revelations: (1) How Pirabhakaran was treated in New Delhi beIore
Rajiv Gandhi leIt Ior Colombo to sign the July 1987 Agreement? (2)
How the Indian authorities armed the EPRLF during August 1987
which negated the spirit oI LTTE`s surrender oI weapons? (3) What
caused the suicides oI LTTE leaders Kumarappa, Pulendran and
another dozen cadres? (4) on High Commissioner Dixit`s orders to
Shoot Prabhakaran shoot Mahathaya`, (5) on Pirabhakaran`s
security cover.
In this lengthy excerpt, I have only deleted the inIrequent Hindi
interjections in his responses, and altered the spellings oI the names
oI individuals and places to their conventional Iorms.
'One early morning in 1987, Indian army`s 54 Division landed
in Sri Lanka Irom Secunderabad. At its head was Major
General Harkirat Singh, the Indian Peace Keeping Force`s Iirst
commander. General Singh Iirst tried to buy peace with the
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam. When that Iailed, he plunged
his men into a blood war. And India suIIered horriIying
casualties.
AIter the inIamous killing oI Indian soldiers on the JaIIna
University Iootball ground under his command, New Delhi
inducted Lieutenant General A.S.Kalkat. Thus, it slowly began
relieving General Singh oI his charge. Within a year, he returned
to India. General Singh has been subject to much criticism.
But, except Ior an interview immediately aIter his retirement, he
has kept his counsel. A decade aIter those terrible days, he
completed his memoirs on Lanka, wherein he blames key
individuals involved in the IPKF operation Ior the
unprecedented loss oI liIe, and questions several long-held
belieIs.
In a candid interview to Josy Joseph, he accuses several people
-- including then Indian army chieI General K Sunderji and high
commissioner to Colombo J N Dixit -- and admits that 'chaos
reigned in the jungles oI Sri Lanka where the Indian troops
Iaced humiliation.
Q: How did the IPKF, sent to enforce peace, get involved in a
bloodv fight with the LTTE? Do vou personallv believe that it
could have been prevented?
One aIternoon I was in my operations room when then vice
chieI oI army staII (S.F) Rodrigues came. Later he became
|army| chieI. He talked oI hard options. I advised him against
it. I told him, II you adopt hard options you would be Iighting
Ior the next 10 to 20 years. And this will lead to insurgency and
there is no stopping it. You are Iighting in Nagaland, Mizoram,
all over. This will be another. And sure enough, it has not
ended to date. And it won`t end.
Q: Whv?
I have all regards Ior Sri Lanka. The Tamils have sacriIiced |a
lot|, the LTTE is highly motivated and there is one aim: Eelam.
Independence. Till they get independence they are not going to
stop.
Q: So vou actuallv opposed what vou went out to do?
Actually |yes|. And, you know, |General Rodrigues said|, No,
no, no... don`t get cold Ieet. We will take care oI them.` I said,
They have Iought their entire lives in the jungles.` I have Ilown
over the jungles with Mahathiah, the number two man to
Prabhakaran, in my helicopter. We Ilew over the jungles oI
Vavuniya and he explained to me how they Iought against the
Sri Lankans all these years. So they knew each inch oI the land.
We would push them out oI JaIIna, they would get into the
jungles. Then you would be Iighting them Ior the next 10 years.
Q: You had no intelligence inputs?
All these people who were in Delhi, I am aIraid, they visited Sri
Lanka because it was a Ioreign country. They went back
without any hard intelligence. They had no intelligence to give
me about terrain, about enemy. I had to buy tourist maps in
Hyderabad beIore I went into operations. And I had to borrow
a Sri Lankan photocopying machine to make copies Ior my
staII.
Only one oIIicer, now he is a general, Memon, he got hold oI
some maps, because he was my staII oIIicer. He was my
brigade major once upon a time. He said, Sir, we have only
these maps. You please take them, you will need them. He was
very nice, he gave me a dozen maps. For army a dozen maps is
nothing. Every platoon commander has to have a map, a
section commander has to have a map.
Q: So vou went in with a tourist map?
We went in with a tourist map. We didn`t know the geography
oI this country at all, except that it was an island country. That
is it. What it was inside, my God, you couldn`t see A to B, it
was such thick Ioliage.
Q: What were the options given to vou?
It was wavering. Like this: iI there is a coup in Colombo, how
will we reinstate |then Sri Lankan president| Jayewardane?
Somebody came out with some kind oI plan. All right. II we
have to Iavour the LTTE, then how will we land in Sri Lanka?
II we are to Iavour Sri Lankans, how will we land in Sri Lanka?
AIter all, you just cannot land, you are going overseas, you are
going by sea, going by air. So various options had to be
discussed. This kind oI scenario we were working on. War was
never thought oI. Nobody told us that behind-the-scenes there
was an Accord being worked out.
Q: You were not told that the Indo-Lankan Accord was being
worked on?
OI course not. What happened was, I was going back to
Secunderabad. As I arrived at the airport, all my staII were
lined up there. I said, Why are you all here, only my ADC is
supposed to be here. They said, Sir, Iirst Ilight is to take oII at
1 O`clock tonight.` I said, For where?` For Sri Lanka.` I
said, It is 10 O`clock when I arrived and we are on a six-eight
hour notice?` Then my staII inIormed me, Sir, the Accord has
been signed in Sri Lanka, the prime minister is there, he rang up
the army commander Depinder Singh to move a division to Sri
Lanka.`..
Q: Your brigade commanders agreed to it?
They had no option, had to agree. Mentally we were prepared
because we had been talking about the Operation Ior sometime.
Say, we may be talking about it Ior a month, but there was no
intelligence given to us. I should have got a proper intelligence
summary, this is the terrain, this is the enemy strength. I should
have been given a proper operational instruction.
When you are going into the blue in army terminology, a proper
operational instruction must be given. A proper overseas
command must be Iormed. Nothing was done. The air Iorce
was commanding its own troops, army its own troops, navy its
own troops. Who is there to co-ordinate? Nobody. Everybody
went independently, there was no joint command. It was a tri-
service operation, air Iorce, navy and army involved, but there
was no joint command. There should have been a single
command to take this Iull Iorce across.
Q: Each one on his own?
Everybody did his own and we landed there. And we landed
there like a reIugee camp I saw in Assam, Chabua, when we
were Iighting the Chinese. Everybody was just being inducted,
nobody knew anything. Anyway, I met the Sri Lankan brigade
commander, went to his operations room and he told me what
commander, went to his operations room and he told me what
it was all about.
I said, Have you seen the Tigers, LTTE? He said, Never. I sit
inside my bunker and at last light I have APCs |armoured
personnel carriers| outside my bunker. Why should I go and
see the LTTE? I said, You have been there Ior a long time.
Alright, let us do one thing, you take me to the LTTE, I want to
establish contact with them.
We established contact. Kumaran |Kumarappa|, who got killed
in the boat tragedy, he was the JaIIna commander, very nice
chap, he came in a car and took me and one oI my brigade
commanders, who got killed in Srinagar, Fernandes, he got
blown oII by a mine aimed at the ammunition depot. We both
went with Kumaran. Mahathiah was standing outside a
bungalow. He said, General, I am not prepared to talk to you.`
I said, Why? I have come here with a message oI peace,
goodwill.` He said, Unless you bring back Prabhakaran, we
will not talk to you.` I said, Where is Prabhakaran?`
I didn`t even know that. They kept the army absolutely in the
dark. Prabhakaran was in the Ashoka Hotel in Delhi. Now I
know the room number also, 512 or 522. And he was to see the
prime minister, beIore the prime minister went in Ior the
Accord. Anyway he saw him, the PM gave him certain
assurances, and beIore he could say Jack Robinson`, the
prime minister was in Colombo, signing the Accord.
Prabhakaran learnt it on television that the Accord had been
signed and they were not party to it. It was one reason why the
LTTE never accepted the Accord and India`s stand.
II we had taken the LTTE into conIidence, they would have
known the whole thing, their terms would have been put across
to Jayewardene, and the situation would have been diIIerent.
Dixit was in a great hurry to get the Accord signed, with his
name up. He became Ioreign secretary; he got the award later.
But he never studied the mood oI the people, especially the
JVP. And since he didn`t study the mood oI the people, there
was an attempt to assassinate the prime minister. Then I
spoke to Depinder. I said, Prabhakaran must come back iI
you want me to talk about surrender oI weapons. That was the
main issue.` He picked up the Sri Lankan phone, spoke to
Delhi. Then he went back to Madras and pursued the matter.
He did a good job.
He did a good job.
The next day Prabhakaran`s aircraIt landed in JaIIna with
Prabhakaran and his bodyguards, his wiIe and children, Kittu
(whose leg was blown up) who was his right hand then. The air
Iorce pilot wanted a receipt Irom me saying that I received
these souls saIely. Then I was told that you will ensure that he
reaches saIely to JaIIna town and handed over to his people. I
said, Fine. We ensured that. We put him and the others in
various APCs so that iI one is blown oII, the other is alive. We
took them through the Sri Lankan lines to JaIIna.
I told my staII, take a receipt Irom Mahathiah that he has
received Prabhakaran. These are normal Iormalities. AIter all,
Prabhakaran is not a small man. He is the leader, a charismatic
leader oI the LTTE. His liIe is very precious. And a very simple
man. No bullshit about him. His wiIe lived with three saris --
one she wore, one she washed and one was ready to wear.
That is all. They never drank Coca-Cola. They oIIered us
Coca-Cola, but never drank it themselves. They drank that
goliwala soda.
Q: So that was vour first encounter with him?
AIter all that I said, Prabhakaran, we must meet.` He said,
General, tomorrow, 11 o`clock.` And we landed in the
Iootball ground oI the Medical College, JaIIna. The entire area
was manned by LTTE guns. I got down Irom the helicopter
and looked around. I walked till I met Prabhakaran. He was
standing outside a conIerence hall. He took me to his oIIice.
We spoke Ior Iive hours. I had to convince him that he should
surrender weapons.
Q: And he was convinced?
He gave it in writing. I can show you. The only letter he gave in
writing. I Ilew to Colombo showed it to |then Indian high
commissioner to Colombo J N| Dixit. His words: General
what you have achieved the nation will appreciate. And I speak
on the behalI oI the prime minister oI India.` These were his
words to me at that point oI time.
Right. The letter was Ilashed all over. Surrender ceremony was
Iixed Ior 5th oI August. Surrender started. Prabhakaran said, I
won`t come, my political oIIicer will come`. Quite right. Atal
Bihari the Indian prime minister doesn`t go Ior surrenders, it is
his minister who goes. So, Prabhakaran didn`t come. All the
his minister who goes. So, Prabhakaran didn`t come. All the
big shots oI Sri Lanka were there. AircraIt was there, propellers
on.
Attygalle |then Sri Lankan deIence secretary| said, My orders
are that I have to take the Iirst weapon to Colombo and give it
to Jayewardane. The surrender took place. A token surrender.
Yogi |Prabhakaran`s representative| took his pistol and gave it.
Then vehicle aIter vehicle the LTTE came, piled up the whole
area with ammunition, guns. Bahut accha tha. Later on, all ran
into trouble.
Q: Whv?
Because they did not stop arming the EPRLF |Eelam People`s
Revolutionary Liberation Front|. RAW was doing it, Ministry
oI Foreign AIIairs knew about it, Dixit knew about it, but they
couldn`t stop it. With the result that handing over arms by 21st
oI August came to a virtual standstill. And the whole thing took
an ugly turn. They started anti-IPKF demonstrations. Who is to
answer? The general oIIicer.
My God, thousands oI young girls and children used to come
in Iront in whites and later on what used to happen? When they
used to come we used to be careIul, they used to go to the
ground and behind would be Tigers, with guns. That is how
they used to take out our people. You couldn`t kill them
because there were children in the Iront, women in the Iront.
We were always Iighting with our hands tied behind our backs.
Q: Did vou tell the armv headquarters that the EPRLF was
being armed?
OI course.
Q: What was the reaction?
Nothing. No reaction. |Indian army chieI| General |K| Sunderji
never said anything. In the army headquarters there was a core
group headed by deIence minister, three chieIs and a Iew
senior oIIicers. They used to take decisions, decisions are
given to me by the staII oIIicer. Decisions, iI I question, the
answer will come, These are orders Irom higher echelons -
Higher echelons`, that is the Iamous answer we got. Higher
echelons`.
Q: What happened after the surrender came to a standstill?
There was a lot oI problems. Ethnic riots broke out. They
killed a lot oI Sri Lankans, tortured them. Between Tamils,
Sinhalese, Tamil Muslims. We did the spadework to stop it.
But then the Thileepan Iast happened. We tried our best. I went
and tried to meet him. LTTE chaps told me, General, the
people`s emotions are so high that iI you appear on the scene
they might create a problem`. They asked me to stay there. I
wanted to go and tell him, Give up. How will he give up?
Unless the assurances given by the prime minister oI India are
IulIilled I am not giving up, he said. I kept requesting the high
commissioner, Come and meet, come and meet, come and
meet. He dragged his Ieet, he delayed it, he didn`t come.
Finally he came when the man was dead. We should have
saved his liIe, one liIe.
Then the boat tragedy, I was in a meeting with Mahathiah and
Prabhakaran. You know, when we go Ior a meeting, they used
to have two video cameras Iocused on us, tape recorders,
everything. With great diIIiculty we had a thing like this |he
points at this correspondents recorder|. The poor brigade
commander used to keep that recording, then give it to his PA,
and then send it to the army headquarters. Whether anybody
took action on what our reports were, I don`t know.
Q: Even after the riots vou were in touch with Prabhakaran?
Oh yes. I never gave up with Prabhakaran. He is a leader oI the
LTTE. I had all the time to meet him because I knew he was the
only man who could solve the problem. Nobody else.
Otherwise, you take up arms, and we took arms and look what
happened.
Q: And what exactlv happened during the boat tragedv in
which the LTTE cadres committed mass suicide?
Yes, I was having a meeting with him, I came down Irom the
boat. Mahathiah had come down a little later. Kumaran
(Kumarappa), and Pulenderan (the Trincomalee leader), they
were in the boat. Mahathiah said, General, I want to talk to
you.` I had a major who could translate. Prabhakaran spoke to
me in English many a time. He appeared well-read. He
|Mahathiah| said, At all cost these people |who were
surrounded by Lankan troops| must be released. IPKF is here
to protect the LTTE, and they should not go to Colombo.
Otherwise, they will be tortured.`
They were 17, Iour we were able to save. So instead oI going
to Colombo, we Ilew them Irom the naval base to the JaIIna
airbase. Now, the tamasha started. There were LTTE, around
them were the Indian troops, around us were the Sri Lankan
troops, around them were the Indian troops, around them the
APCs oI Sri Lanka. Now tell me, iI you try to Iight, there
would have been a conIlict between the Sri Lankan and Indian
troops. OI course, the orders were very clear to the |Sri
Lankan| brigade commander, otherwise get into the helicopter
and reach Colombo, relinquish the command.
Anyway I was told, You go to Trincomalee and prevent
reinIorcement oI Trincomalee by Sri Lankans. Deny the airport
to them.` I reached Trincomalee, and we took over the control
tower, commandos were deployed, no troop movement was
allowed. It created lot oI ill-Ieeling with the Sri Lankan troops.
In the meantime, I had said that it was high time that Dixit, who
was on leave in Delhi, go to Colombo, and mediate their release
in the boat. Depinder Singh also Ilew.
Q: So how did the boat tragedv end?
I was guarding the airIield. And all oI them came, Depinder,
Dixit and some other staII oIIicers. They landed there, they
could not convince Jayewardane, and he was too clever Ior
them. Too clever. Depinder next day Ilew into Trincomalee
and told me, Hand over, let them go and do whatever they
want. Let us go and have a cup oI tea with them, with the three
chieIs.` They were staring at me. This man created all the
problems.
Anyway, we had a cup oI tea. At 2 O`clock I get a message,
Why is the G-O-C |General OIIicer in Command| IPKF
interIering in the constitutional activities oI Sri Lanka?` These
were the exact words. This message came all the way Irom the
Iorce headquarters in Madras. And, Please liIt your siege in
JaIIna, Let the Sri Lankans do what they want to.` I was upset.
I was in Trincomalee; they were in JaIIna, my staII oIIicers,
everybody was taking charge oI everything. I spoke to my
Colonel G S Hoshiar Singh. He said,Ànyway we have got
ambulances, cars, 13, 14 oI them, the hospital is all geared up
to Ilush poison.` Our troops withdrew, the Sri Lankan troops
charged, and these Iellows swallowed cyanide. Those who
chewed, they died on the spot, those who swallowed were
saved. This created chaos in the Indo-Sri Lankan entity. That
the Indian army, IPKF, could not save them. Now this man
blames me. This Dixit.
Q: What was Dixits approach to vour attempts to buv peace
with LTTE?
Once he said, Shoot Prabhakaran, shoot Mahathiah.` I said,
Sorry I don`t do that.` Those were his orders. When they
came to me at 12 o`clock at night Ior some work, he said
Shoot them. General, I have told you what I have ordered.` I
said, I don`t take your orders. And we are meeting under a
white Ilag, you don`t shoot people under white Ilag.`
Q: So who messed up during the boat tragedv?
The responsibility is entirely on the diplomats, entirely on the
|Sri Lankan| army headquarters. Otherwise, Ior me to save
those people was no problem. I would have just put them into
Iew APCs and smuggled them out. The Sri Lankans would
have just looked on. We would have taken them out, we had all
the troops there. No problem.
Q: What did vou feel when the orders came to leave the LTTE
men to their fate?
I Ielt terribly bad about it. Because Kumaran`s wedding was
attended by one oI my brigadiers. Pulenderan was also there. A
dreadIul man. Wanted Ior 34 murders by |Gen. Cyril|
Ranatunga. Every day he used to tell me, General, Give me
Pulenderan` I used to tell him I won`t give you Pulenderan, he
will travel with me in my Jeep`. And they |the LTTE| were very
cordial. They would take me anywhere. I had lot oI time Ior
them.
Q: Specificallv, did Dixit fail?
Dixit had the backing oI the Prime Minister oI India. He had a
Iree hand in the aIIairs oI Sri Lanka. He could have thumbed
the table and told Jayewardane, Sorry you have to do it. And
iI you don`t do it, you know what the results will be. There will
be riots, ethnic killings.` Dixit could have done it. There was no
question about Jayewardane not listening to him. Dixit may be a
High Commissioner, but he was a High Commissioner oI great
standing. When you have the backing oI the boss, you will be
on the top oI the world. You can make any statement to these
people.
Q: Could vou tell us preciselv what happened once the 17
Tigers swallowed cvanide?
Riots all over. The entire JaIIna was red. We had to move, take
up deIences. We had no deIence stores. Remember, we had no
deIence stores. We went with riIles. We did not have
supporting weapons, we did not have our deIence stores...
barbed by mines, pickets around your positions so that
nobody assaults the inIantry without a stop. We were in naked
barracks. I had stopped even tents, because aircraIt as it is
were Iew.
We carried our weapons and ammunition. We improvised wire
around us, put electricity on that so that nobody crosses over
at night. We had to improve everything, there was nothing till
the war started and things started coming. And all the time they
wanted us to Iraternise with the LTTE. All Madras battalions
were Ilown into Sri Lanka. So that we had more Tamil-speaking
people. So that we spoke to the LTTE, spread the message oI
goodwill, We are here to protect you. Surrender your
weapons.` They were no Iools. They knew that the Sri Lankan
police was totally ineIIective. The Sri Lankan police was
completely Iinished, yeh? II they surrendered their weapons
who would protect them?
Then they said, No, we will give 20 riIles Ior the protection oI
Prabhakaran, 15 Ior Mahathiah... Jayewardane himselI said this.
And Prabhakaran knew he could not survive with 15 people.
He used to have three-tier security around him. II Prabhakaran
is here, here |the innermost ring| will be the suicide people
who will sacriIice their lives. The next ring will be the Iighters
and the third ring will be Ior early warning. We could never lay
hands on him even during the war once he leIt JaIIna. I got him
only once where he said, Now, I am not going to survive, all
commanders are independent and will take over...` When we
did that bloody parachute drop.
Q: You mean the attack in the universitv campus?
Yeah. That was also a tragedy.
Q: But what exactlv happened?
What happened? I planned with nine helicopters. I needed nine
helicopters to land the troops. When the hour came, when the
Ilight had taken oII to mark the landing zone, the next Ilight had
taken oII to land the people to secure the landing zone, I am
told, Sorry, helicopters are not available hereaIter.
Q: Who said that?
The air Iorce. Why are helicopters not available? They have
gone to the east, there is some exercise going on. But my
requirement was nine helicopters, it was accepted by
|Lieutenant General| Depinder Singh. |Lieutenant General A S|
Kalkat had conIirmed that your plans are approved. And now
you are saying the helicopters are not available? It is too late!
It was too late Ior an operation: halI on the ground, halI in the
air. Bad luck. But that chap oI a major who landed there in the
third Ilight... Five Ilights went in, he landed in the third. Out oI
the Iive, one had a hole in it, so it never came back. Anyway,
this major oI the 17 Sikh Light InIantry, he did not dig down. In
army, the moment you land, the Iirst requirement is to give
yourselI protection. So that you can Iire your weapon and
don`t get shot. Whereas the commandos got into the barracks.
They told the chap, You also come into the barracks. He said,
No, no, my commanding oIIicer is going to come. So I must
meet him here.` At that time Prabhakaran said, I have had it, I
am not going to survive.` We had surrounded his headquarters.
All the commandos were behind the back. And we were very
happy because this intercept was taken by the Sri Lankans. The
Sri Lankans were our interceptors, incidentally. We had no
interception set-up. And we had a good rapport with the Sri
Lankan |army| people; they were ready to give us all intercepts.
Q: The Indian soldiers were killed after thev entered the
campus?
Yes, they never went into the campus. They went to the
Iootball ground. Open space. Prabhakaran came there and
kicked one chap. Let him survive to tell the story` he said. All
the others were killed. And so many people are dead, 24 people
are dead. II it was a success, it would have been a success,
what a great success! Prabhakaran captured! It is unIortunate
that persons were killed.
Q: You were worried after the boat tragedv?
One should not worry about this and that. That is OK. The
boat incident was a diplomatic Iailure, diplomatic-political
Iailure. The IPKF had nothing to do with it. I can write in bold
letters that even iI an open court is held people will talk about it.
letters that even iI an open court is held people will talk about it.
Operations, we had planned and we had executed them. But
our aircraIt support at the last minute was called oII. In place oI
nine helicopters, we were given Iive and Iour in the second
sorties. So we had to ground operations to link with that. That
upset the whole thing, we suIIered casualty.
Q: All that because vou had no idea of the LTTE?
Only that we didn`t know their dispossession. Their caches.
They had buried all their weapons, they had buried all their
ammunition, they had buried all their supplies, they buried their
money. And they knew where to dig. Their caches were all
over. Not like us. We had a long administration tail. Even live
goats were being sent. You can`t Iight a war like this.
Q: So from word go it was flawed?
They should have had a proper war game. They should have
known which troops to send. They should have known the
terrain in Sri Lanka. Not that we rescinded it, we were pretty
happy. I had in my mind that we would have the settlement by
December and be back in Secunderabad. But then the whole
critical political Iailure. We had no political backing. There
should have had a civil-military liaison oIIice. They should have
come Irom the beginning. All IAS, IFS oIIicers came much
later. All political problems, it is not Ior the army to handle. We
don`t handle political problems, we only Iight.
Q: At the end of it all, when vou were transferred out in an
vear, vou felt humiliated?
No. Why should I Ieel humiliated? No question. I never Ielt
guilty. It is this |then Indian high commissioner to Colombo J
N| Dixit. When I reIused his orders it was Dixit who went and
spoke to the chieI.
Q: But people humiliated vou?
Nobody. Even Dixit did not dare to talk to me. I will take oII
his pants. Really, I have not Iorgiven him. He has done the
greatest damage.
Q: Was the [IPKF] withdrawal rightlv timed?
The IPKF should have never withdrawn. Why should they be
withdrawn? Why they got withdrawn? Because |then Sri
Lankan prime minister| Premadasa wanted them to withdraw.
At what cost have we come back? We lost 1,500 to 2,000
At what cost have we come back? We lost 1,500 to 2,000
people. All the weapons we imported, we handed them over to
the EPRLF. He had no business to do that, |Lieutenant
General| Kalkat. The IPKF boarded the ships, the EPRLF was
annihilated by the LTTE, and all the weapons were taken away.
EPRLF was put into a ship and rehabilitated in some island oII
Orissa. They deserted JaIIna. And JaIIna is back with the
LTTE.
Q: Will the fight in Sri Lanka go on?
They are going to Iight. We have parallels in Nagaland. Troops
were inducted in 1957, now how many years? Still, Iighting...
Every day they are getting killed. This will carry on. The LTTE
is not a simple soul to crack. A hard nut. Lead by Prabhakaran,
a highly-motivated man. He has only one aim, Eelam. When
India went in, they didn`t want them |LTTE| to win
independence outside the |Sri Lankan| constitution because it
had problems in Kashmir etc. They didn`t want Trincomalee to
become Diego Garcia, because there were oil wells there. I
don`t see any peace in the near Iuture.
In sum, Dixit (diplomat), RAW (Indian Intelligence Agency), and
Indian soldiers Col. John Taylor and Maj.Gen.Harkirat Singh
represented diIIerent Iaces oI India. They worked against the
interests oI Pirabhakaran. However, their assessments oI their
encounters with Pirabhakaran and LTTE, project unanimous
conclusions; i.e., Pirabhakaran has been a highly motivated
strategist, who is innovative and talented. He possesses exceptional
survival and resilience skills. However, it took nearly 10 years Ior
their wisdom to be released to the public.
Rajiv Gandhi-1ayewardene Accord of 1987
The Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord oI 1987, which led to
LTTE`s war against the Indian army, is an ideal example Ior a
Rashomon` event. |Ior the explanation oI Rashomon theme, see
The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 9|. An event occurred, in
which quite a Iew participated and there was an observer. Then there
were others who heard the story. When the event was later
described by the participants, observer and the listeners, everyone
delivered his or her own version and the truth became entangled on
the description oI the event, including what happened immediately
beIore the event and aIter the event.
beIore the event and aIter the event.
Chronologically, I list some oI the prominent versions, as they came
out. The EPRLF`s version was presented by the Broken Palmvra
scribes in 1990. J.R.Jayewardene`s version was described by
ProI.K.M.de Silva in the second volume oI his sycophantic
biography on the UNP leader, which appeared in 1994. Indian
army`s version on its induction to Eelam was presented by
Gen.Harkirat Singh in 1997. Sri Lankan army`s version was also
presented by Major General Lucky Algama in 1997. India`s oIIicial
version came in the Iorm oI Dixit`s memoirs in 1998. Panrutti
Ramachandran, who was MGR`s right-hand man during that period,
presented MGR`s version in 2000. For record, I present Lucky
Algama`s version and Panrutti Ramachandran`s version as well.
Major General Lucky Algama`s assessment:
Lucky Algama lost his liIe in December 1999, at the campaign
platIorm oI the last Presidential election in Sri Lanka. He was a
major player in the Sri Lankan army during UNP`s rule. In October
1997, he was interviewed in London by Thilak S.Fernando, who has
posted this interview in his website |London Diary|, with the note,
an interview which never Iound its way to a Sri Lankan newspaper`.
Excerpt:
Fernandos question: During the period oI the Indian Peace
Keeping Force (IPKF) in the North and East oI Sri Lanka, the
strength oI their columns were reported to be in the region oI
85,000 cadres. Yet they could not capture Prabhakaran! What
was the Sri Lankan Army`s role during that period?`
Algama: The strategy oI the IPKF was to saturate the captured
areas with their troops. They could do that because their
manpower was enormous. II they wanted to capture
Prabhakaran, deIinitely there were ample opportunities to do
so. However, they did not capture him because their arrival on
Sri Lanka soil was Ior a completely diIIerent purpose due to
the wrong Ioreign policy adopted by the Sri Lankan
Government at the time. Our Ioreign policy appeared to be
detrimental to India at the time, thereIore, the IPKF came only
to saIeguard India`s interests and certainly not to solve Sri
Lanka`s problems.`
Panrutti S.Ramachandran`s assessment:
OI all the versions presented on the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene
Accord, this version seems to have closest alignment to what
Pirabhakaran and his patron MGR would have thought about it in
July 1987.
'.. Though the accord contained some positive aspects, it
was inherently deIective. The problem was between Sinhalese
and Tamils oI Sri Lankan origin in Sri Lanka. The accord
should have been between them, and not between India and Sri
Lanka. India can be a guarantor at best to see the
implementation oI any such agreement. UnIortunately, the
accord was more like a pre-arranged marriage by parents
without consulting the daughter, the eventual bride. Moreover
there was a clause in it, putting the onus on India to disarm the
LTTE, within two days oI signing oI the accord.
The accord was shown to the then Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister
MGR, almost as a fait accompli. He was asked to bring round
the LTTE Ior this arrangement. In Iact the LTTE raised at that
time a pertinent question, as to why they should vouch Ior an
agreement between India and Sri Lanka. On behalI oI MGR, I
took the onerous responsibility oI trying to convince the LTTE.
I prevailed upon the LTTE that there were aspects in this to be
looked into. For the Iirst time, the Government oI Sri Lanka
recognised Northern and Eastern provinces oI Sri Lanka as
Tamil homeland. Secondly in the past whenever Tamils entered
into agreements with the Sri Lankan government, it always went
back. But this accord allowed India to be a guarantor. Third, an
interim government Ior the Tamil homeland was incorporated
which gave legitimacy to LTTE and allow it to Iorm a
government. And Iurthermore it was only an interim
arrangement.
When everything went as planned, the Sri Lankan government
stabbed India by arresting LTTE cadres, who ultimately
committed suicide under the custody oI Sri Lankan army. The
IPKF presence in Sri Lanka could not save their lives. Naturally
LTTE was unwilling to go by the accord. Instead oI paciIying
or renegotiating with the LTTE, Rajiv ordered IPKF to disarm
them. That was the IateIul decision taken at Delhi in which I too
participated. I was asked to leave the meeting because oI my
strong protests against the decision (emphasis added).
Immediately, I met G.Parthasarathy at his residence in Delhi
and apprised him oI what happened in the meeting; he said,
'this boy (he was reIerring to Rajiv) is immature; Everything is
'this boy (he was reIerring to Rajiv) is immature; Everything is
gone; Nothing can be saved. His prophecy came true. The
intention oI the Indian government to 'disarm LTTE within 24
hours almost went on Ior two years, ending in a historical
tragedy, including the death oI Rajiv Gandhi. |India
Today.Com website, May 2000|
Pirabhakaran`s assessment and a retrospective summary
Pirabhakaran`s assessment oI the perIormance oI LTTE against the
Indian army appeared in the Time magazine (April 8, 1990; Asian
edition) and it has already been presented (see, Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon part 1). Retrospectively speaking, how did
Pirabhakaran`s LTTE Iare against the Indian army?
Indians present a Iace-saving excuse that iI they were allowed to stay
a Iew more months, they would have Iinished` their work in
disarming the LTTE, but Premadasa`s government spoiled this job.
Sri Lanka`s politicians and its army men (who were only spectators),
harboring an ample dose oI jealousy that Pirabhakaran had gained
more stature by his conIrontation with the Indian army, insist that iI
not Ior Premadasa`s back-handed help, LTTE would have been
history by 1990.
The strategy adopted by Pirabhakaran was similar to what Gen.Vo
Nguyen Giap did in Vietnam in the 1960s. As Giap reminisced his
Iamous strategy to Stanley Karnow in 1990,
'We were not strong enough to drive out a halI-million
American troops, but that wasn`t our aim. Our intention was to
break the will oI the American Government to continue the war.
|Gen.| Westmoreland was wrong to expect that his superior
Iire power would grind us down. II we had Iocused on the
balance oI Iorces, we would have been deIeated in two hours.
We were waging a people`s war America`s sophisticated
arms, electronic devices and all the rest were to no avail in the
end. In war there are the two Iactors human beings and
weapons. Ultimately, though, human beings are the decisive
Iactor. Human beings! Human beings! |New York Times
Maga:ine, June 24, 1990|
Pirabhakaran was shrewd enough to learn Irom an Asian military
genius and innovate the methods to his environs 15 years later. Like
what Giap did to the American government, Pirabhakaran decisively
broke the will oI the then Indian government. Pirabhakaran also
broke the will oI the then Indian government. Pirabhakaran also
adopted Mahatma Gandhi`s strategy and modiIied it to the 1980s.
Wrote Gandhi, about his strategy against the British army,
'The British want us to put the struggle on the plane oI
machine guns. They have weapons and we have not. Our only
assurance oI beating them is to keep it on the plane where we
have the weapons and they have not. |Time magazine, Feb.9,
1948|
Pirabhakaran`s success against the Indian army was achieved by
blending the strategies oI Gandhi and Giap to his advantage. II
tactical alliance with Premadasa helped his goal, he was bold enough
to give it a try. Next, I trace the three major outcomes oI the Indo-
LTTE war in the 1990s. (To be continued)

Part 20
Sachi Sri Kantha
27 October 2001]
Implications of Indo-LTTE War
Pirabhakaran`s 1udgement`
Leave it to Bertrand Russell Ior explaining in simple sentences, the
distilled essence oI principles in logic and liIe. Here is one oI his gems
about what we usually call as judgement` a giIt Iew leaders are
blessed with.
"One of the most important parts of education, and one of the
most neglected, is that which teaches how to reach true
conclusions on insufficient data. As a logician I am conscious
of uttering what is, in strict logic, mere nonsense when I say
this; nevertheless all success in practical life depends upon
ability to perform this apparently impossible feat. 1he
successful general is the one who guesses correctly what his
opponent will do; the successful organizer is the one who can
choose good subordinates after brief interviews. Even the
successful man of science makes a guess, which afterwards is
verified. In politics, the data are hardly ever sufficient to
enable a rational man to reach a reasoned conclusion, but
they are often such as to enable a man who is both rational
and shrewd to reach a sagacious conclusion. 1o do this,
requires the scientific absence of bias and power of
hypothetical thought, but it requires also something else - that
quality which is vaguely called :judgement'."
|Russell, in Education and the Social Order, 1932, p.227|
Every word oI this short paragraph is pregnant with meaning. Russell
describes the traits oI a successIul general, a successIul organizer, a
successIul man oI science and a successIul politician. One can assess
Ior himselI, how Pirabhakaran levels up with Russell`s attributes on
judgement` a leader is worth possessing. Since his ascent,
Pirabhakaran`s judgement has served him well in countering the (1)
patricians` guiles oI J.R.Jayewardene and Indian power brokers, (2)
street-smart toughness oI Premadasa, and (3) pseudo-peacenik`s
street-smart toughness oI Premadasa, and (3) pseudo-peacenik`s
charm oI Chandrika Kumaratunga.
IMPLICATIONS OF INDO-LTTE WAR (1987-89)
I could trace three major outcomes oI the Indo-LTTE War to
Pirabhakaran. These are,
(1) International Recognition to the LTTE
(2) Expansion oI the Sri Lankan Army
(3) Harassment oI Pirabhakaran by India`s Intelligence wallahs
Implications-wise, among these three outcomes, the Iirst one was
positive; the second one was neutral; and the third one was negative.
Two reasons allow me to mark the second outcome (Expansion oI the
Sri Lankan Army) in the neutral column. First, LTTE also beneIited to
an extent Irom the capture oI arms stored in the military camps which
Iell to them, thus subsidizing their own armament purchase budget.
Secondly, it accelerates the process oI breaking the will oI the
Sinhalese Ioot-soldiers` to Iight an unwanted war, despite the prodding
by desk-top generals and the jingoist vultures oI their society.
Now, let me present my assessment on each oI these outcomes.
(1) International Recognition to the LTTE
How does one assess international recognition? Many scales exist.
Some oI the recognized ones include, a Nobel prize, an Olympic gold
medal, a cover story in an international magazine, and a photo-news
Ieature in the Iirst page oI the New York Times. Pirabhakaran has
neither received a Nobel Prize nor won an Olympic gold medal. But,
he has been Ieatured as cover stories in international magazines
(Asiaweek, Far Eastern Economic Review Ior example) more than
once. Pirabhakaran`s photo also has appeared in the Iirst page oI New
York Times once. That was on August 5, 1987 accompanying a news
Ieature oI Seth Mydans Irom JaIIna, covering Pirabhakaran`s address
to Eelam Tamils at the Suthumalai Temple.
How many other Sri Lankan politicians (prime ministers and
presidents, both past and present) had their Iaces presented in the Iirst
page oI New York Times. Probably none. Or, Mrs. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike could be the only one other than Pirabhakaran to receive
such coverage in 1960. This is my conjecture, and need to be veriIied
in the Times archives.
in the Times archives.
On August 5, 1987, the lead editorial oI the New York Times carried
the caption, Going Ior Broke in Sri Lanka`. Commenting on the then
recently announced Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Peace Accord oI 1987,
the editorialist mused,
'. The Iirst test is whether Tamil guerrillas holed up on the
JaIIna Peninsula will honor their promises and yield up their guns
to Indian peacekeepers. Then comes the second test: whether the
Sinhalese majority is reasonable enough to resist unreasoning
attacks on the pact as a sellout. ManiIestly, pitIalls abound, but at
least they are visible and, with a modicum oI sanity, avoidable.
The New York Times editorialist was nave to expect such a modicum
oI sanity` among the politicians and the Intelligence agencies oI India
and Sri Lanka. Thus, both tests mentioned by him Iailed miserably,
and the political game oI Going Ior Broke in Sri Lanka` is still being
passionately played out in Colombo.
The 54
th
edition oI The International Whos Who 1990-91 (Europa
Publications Ltd., London, 1990), Ior the Iirst time carried a very brieI
entry on Pirabhakaran, as one oI the 20,000 notable individuals. It
stated,
'Pirubhakarran, Vellupillai; Sri Lankan guerrilla leader; born 26
Nov.1954, Velvettithurai, JaIIna peninsula; married; one son, one
daughter; joined Tamil movement 1970; Iounded Tamil New
Tigers guerrilla movement (Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam
since 1976) 1972.
Pirabhakaran was neither a Cabinet minister nor a titular head oI Sri
Lanka; he was neither an author nor a banker; he was neither an
entertainer nor a Nobelist. Still, he made it to the International Whos
Who on his own merits as a guerrilla leader`.
A more objective indicator on the success oI any leader, any idea or
any movement comes Irom the recognition received, not in regular
mass media, but in history books or other reliable reIerence sources
such as dictionaries and encyclopedias. Hundreds oI politicians capture
attention oI the media by devious means (Pirabhakaran`s critics such
as Subramanian Swamy, Lakshman Kadirgamar are good examples in
this game.) But what counts ultimately is how their deeds are inscribed
in the historical sources, Ior reIlection, study and remembrance by the
posterity.
One oI the earliest dictionaries to include a description on
Pirabhakaran`s movement was The Penguin Dictionarv of Third
World Terms (1992), authored by KoIi Buenor Hadjor, a proIessor oI
AIrican Studies at the University oI CaliIornia, Santa Barbara. This
compact dictionary provides descriptions on 251 eminent persons,
institutions, organizations, ideas, movements and terms which became
prominent in the Third World since 1945. LTTE receives a liberal one
and a halI page recognition in this dictionary, under the term Tamil
Tigers, Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE)`. This recognition
was made, obviously due to LTTE`s relevance in the South Asian
politics since mid-1980s and its conIrontation with the Indian army
during the 1987-89 period. It is interesting to note that none oI the
other Sri Lankan political leaders receive any recognition in this
dictionary. Compared to the entry on Tamil Tigers`, there is a halI-
page entry on non-aligned movement` and an eight-line entry on
Bandung ConIerence` and even under these two entries, the names oI
padre Bandaranaike or Sirimavo Bandaranaike are missing.
Other movements which receive recognition in this dictionary include,
ANC |AIrican National Congress|, black consciousness` oI South
AIrica, black power` oI Malcolm X, Eritrean liberation movement,
FDR-FMLN |Frente Democratico Revolucionario-Frente Farabundo
Marti de Liberacion Nacional| oI El Salvador, FLN |Front de
Liberation Nationale| oI Algeria, FRELIMO |Frente de Libertacao de
Mocambique|, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional oI Nicaragua,
FRETILIN |Frente Revolucionario de Timor Leste Independente|,
Gandhism, Garveyism oI Marcus Garvey, Guevarism, indegenismo in
Latin America, intiIada, Movimiento 19 de Abril oI Colombia,
Maoism, Mau Mau oI Kenya, Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria oI Chile, Malayan Races` Liberation Army, New Jewel
Movement oI Grenada, Nkrumahism, New People`s Army oI
Philippines, Pan AIricanism, Zimbabwean liberation movement,
Zionism.
I list these more than 20 movements to indicate that LTTE, as its
detractors and adversaries want to deny, is a liberation movement and
shares quite a number oI distinct Ieatures which are common to many
oI its sister organizations Iormed in the 20
th
century in other countries.
In the eyes oI their oppressors, all these movements (many which
were older than LTTE) carried the label oI terrorists`.
(2) Expansion of the Sri Lankan Army
When J.R.Jayewardene retired in 1988, the Sri Lankan armed Iorces
stood at the Iollowing level, according to the Asia Year Book 1989 oI
Far Eastern Economic Review magazine.
Total armed Iorces: some 48,000, including active reservists. Army
40,000 including recalled reservists; Navy 5,500; Air Force 3,700.
The Paramilitary component consisted oI Police Force 21,000,
including the Special Task Force consisting oI 2,000-man anti-guerrilla
unit; Home Guard 18,000; National Auxiliary Volunteer Force
5,000.
To explain how the Sri Lankan army has expanded, I provide a
longitudinal scan oI Sri Lankan news items I have gathered, since the
Indian army packed up and leIt the island. First, a 1990 Reuter news
commentary Irom my Iiles. It was authored by Feizal Samath, Irom
Colombo. Excerpts:
'Five months aIter Tamil guerrillas launched a major new
oIIensive in their bid to set up a separate homeland, Sri Lankan
government troops are still struggling to crush the rebels. When
they broke oII peace talks with the government in June |1990|
many Ielt the war would end in a month. But the Tigers took on
the army in Iace-to-Iace battles. When outnumbered, they slipped
into the jungle adopting guerrilla tactics again.
Government troops control all eastern towns but rebels move
Ireely on their outskirts. In the north, apart Irom a Iew towns, the
army is conIined to camps surrounded by IortiIied Tiger bunkers.
The government says more than 800 members oI the security
Iorces and 1,640 rebels have been killed since June. Hundreds oI
civilians have also died in the Iighting. These Iigures cannot be
independently veriIied.
From now it is all-out war. We will annihilate the Liberation
Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, take over the east and then go Ior the
north,` Deputy DeIense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne told
Parliament in June. We will Iight them till they retreat to the
Indian Ocean and our Navy will wait Ior them there,` he said.
But Wijeratne`s battle scenario never came to pass.
The war has eaten into Colombo`s meager Iinancial resources.
DeIense spending has risen to seven billion rupees ($ 175 million)
this year. Other government Iunding has been cut. |Asahi
Evening News, Japan, Nov.30, 1990|
In late 1990, one dollar was equivalent to 40 Sri Lankan rupees.
Five months later, aIter Ranjan Wijeratne`s departure Irom the scene,
S.Sivanayagam, the then editor oI Tamil Nation monthly, wrote a
sarcasm-tinged editorial on the expansion oI the Sri Lankan army. It is
worth a re-read Ior its splendid distillation on the history oI a laboring
army, Irom 1948 to 1990. But, this editorial will never be read by the
Sri Lankan army`s Iresh recruits. Excerpts:
More Generals Mean Less Peace in Lanka
1amil Aation, May 1, 1991, p.1]
'Have you noticed? the plethora oI Army Generals that Sri
Lanka has been producing lately? With pips, stars, medals,
ribbons and the whole trappings?. How did Sri Lanka manage
to give birth to so many Generals within such a short period? The
answer probably is Field Marshal` Prabhakaran!
.Time was when during the Iirst six years oI Independence
(1948-1954), the Ceylon Army was commanded by two
Britishers Brigadier the Earl oI Caithness and later Brigadier
F.S.Reid. It took three years Ior the army to achieve a strength oI
70 oIIicers and 610 other ranks. It was not until 1955 that a
Ceylonese assumed command Ior the Iirst time, and he happened
to be a Tamil Col.Anton Muttucumaru, promoted Brigadier, a
digniIied product oI OxIord University.
The Iirst Iunctioning General appeared on the scene twelve years
aIter Independence in 1960, in the person oI Major General
H.W.G.Wijeyekoon. Apart Irom the 1958 riots in which the
army did a creditable job in putting down Sinhala mob terrorism,
it had seen very little action. Until Junius Richard Jayewardene
began his war against the Tamils, the only possible army
casualties, iI at all any, could have come only through cirrhosis oI
the liver, by hitting the bottle` hard! Who would have ever
thought that the country today, yet without any signs oI Ioreign
invasion, would become chockIull oI prattling Generals, not only
overseeing action on the Front, but even chit-chatting at cocktails
at Canberra, Ottawa, London? President Jayewardene was
running short oI diplomats and discredited politicians that he
began sending deIunct Generals and Brigadiers to represent the
country abroad in various world capitals some are still there we
believe. Grant it to that man; he did not only militarise the
society, politicize the army, but militarized diplomacy as well!
The Sepala Attygalles, the Bull` Weeratungas, the Denis
Pereras, were all in their own ways the architects oI the suicidal
military policy against the Tamils, later to serve as accredited
ambassadors.
ambassadors.
.The Generals know, and we know, that army recruits, trained
hastily and sent to the battleIronts in recent times are not at all
suitable war material`. There were several instances, at
Mankulam and recently at Mannar, where they simply dropped
their arms and Iled. One cannot blame them, because thousands
oI youths unemployed Ior years, joined the army Ior a monthly
income, not to Iight a war and die, but to live and support
themselves and their Iamilies.
The point to be realised is, that behind every artillery piece, there
is a man, and behind that man (or woman) there is a
commitment. II every Tiger casualty is a determined, willing
sacriIice, every soldier who dies is an unwilling casualty, or a
helpless victim. UnIortunately, the Generals have to talk war,
because war is their business; and bread and butter.
Let me present some numbers to highlight the expansion oI Sri Lankan
army, Irom openly available sources oI inIormation. The Asiaweek
magazine, oI July 10, 1992, presented the increase in Sri Lanka`s
deIence expenditure Irom 1982 to 1992 as Iollows:
Year Defence
Expenditure
($ million)
of
Government
Expenditure
1982 52.9 2.90
1984 90.4 4.29
1986 207.0 8.32
1987 360.0 14.68
1989 246.9 9.42
1990 256.8 8.94
1991 403.7 12.37
1992 348.9 12.00

Two years later, the same Asiaweek magazine commented,
'Sri Lankans have a sense oI exhaustion. Now in its eleventh
year, the war between government troops and the Liberation
Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who are Iighting Ior a separate
state in the north is slowly bleeding the country. Keeping the
guerrillas at bay costs $1 million a day and siphons oII most oI
the rewards oI the country`s burgeoning economy. Strain on the
army has a taken a harsh toll. Suicide and desertion are
common. |Asiaweek, July 27, 1994, pp.20-22|
common. |Asiaweek, July 27, 1994, pp.20-22|
Chandrika Kumaratunga exploited this sense oI exhaustion Ielt by the
Sinhalese by donning the peace mask. But what happened during the
last seven years is best told by the bulging numbers oI army generals
and their Ioot soldiers. At the end oI 2000, the Sri Lankan armed
Iorces has been expanded, according to the US State Departments
Countrv Reports on Human Rights 2000 (Sri Lanka), as Iollows:
Army (including the Army volunteer force) - 120,000
Navy - 17,000
Air Force - 18,500
Police Force - 60,000
Home Guards > 15,000.
And, when the then Deputy DeIense Minister G.L.Peiris, while
presenting the Budget Appropriation Bill in the Sri Lankan parliament
on February 8, 2001, recorded that the military spending Ior the year
2001 had leapt to 63 billion rupees ( 720 million dollars, at the
currency exchange rate oI $1 88 rupees). This staggering amount,
according to the Cevlon Dailv News report oI Feb.9, 2001, is being
split into Iour components as Iollows:
Army (120,000) - 29.2 billion rupees ( 331.8 million
dollars)
Navy (17,000) - 8.3 billion rupees ( 93 million dollars)
Air Force (18,500) - 10.7 billion rupees ( 121.6 million
dollars)
Police (60,000) and Home Guards (~15,000) - 12.4
billion rupees (140.6 million dollars)
Disregarding the incurred costs Ior diIIerent niches oI expenditure such
as equipment purchase, maintenance, commission, training, health and
welIare, insurance premium, multi-media media propaganda and (last
but not the least!) entertainment, I calculated the per head per annum
costs Ior each member oI the Iour branches oI armed services. It
works out as Iollows:
Army - $2,765
Navy - $5,519
Air Force - $6,572
Police including Home Guard - $1,875.
Now the Sri Lankan composite` army (consisting oI army, navy and
air Iorce personnel numbering 155,500 individuals) bills itselI as the
biggest employer` in Sri Lanka.
In business terms, the health oI an employer is certiIied as good` iI it
generates revenues. But the status oI Sri Lankan army is equivalent to
that oI a perennially sick person. What was responsible Ior the Sri
Lankan army to be assessed in such contemptuous terms? a larger
share oI credit should go to Pirabhakaran`s judgement`. One should
also not discount the ineptitude leadership oI Anuruddha Ratwatte and
paranoia oI Chandrika Kumaratunga.
In his October 1997 interview to Thilak S.Fernando, Major General
Algama conIirmed some oI the observations made by S.Sivanayagam
in his Tamil Nation editorial oI May 1, 1991. Excerpts:
'Fernando: After the P.A. [Peoples Alliance] Government
came into power 35 retired Mafor Generals were recalled and
promoted to top ranks. Didnt that bring about discontent
within the Armv?
Algama: It was a political exercise which led to a certain amount
oI discontentment. Beyond that I won`t be able to comment on
that. As Ior me, I Ieel that I perIormed my duty to the Iull by the
country. UnIortunately certain high ranking elements in the army
decided to exhibit pseudo-loyalties to the new administration and
discredit others. In the process certain oIIicers were identiIied
with certain political parties and I was branded as a political
stooge oI the UNP due to proIessional jealousy. Not only that,
they involved me in a coup case also!
Fernando: Is there anv truth in the Coup case?
Algama: Absolutely none. The coup story has been primarily
hatched by the Military Intelligence. It was only when
investigations commenced that I realised it was something which
had emerged Irom within the army. In Iact, I have made an
appeal to President Kumaratunge to expedite the inquiry and take
disciplinary action against me iI I have done any wrong.
|Source: Thilak Fernando`s website: London Diarv|
Though a snippet, what was revealed by Major General Algama is
interesting about the Iunctioning oI Sri Lankan army`s military
intelligence section` and how much the Sri Lankan commander-in-
chieI relied on it.
Chandrika's 1997 interview to the Asiaweek and My response
Pirabhakaran`s judgement in deIlating the peace-balloon proposals` oI
President Chandrika Kumaratunga was criticized vehemently by the
partisan press in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, since 1995. Chandrika was
the new broom` which was supposed to clean the Sri Lankan rot. The
Sept.19, 1997 issue oI the Asiaweek magazine carried an interview she
gave to Arjuna Ranawana. I reproduce her answers to the some
questions, in which she commented about Pirabhakaran.
Ranawana: The armv is closing in on the Tigers, and vou sav
vou will push through constitutional reforms bv November
[1997]. How important is this period for Sri Lanka?
Chandrika: It is a very critical time. The military and the
political solutions go hand in hand a two-pronged attack on the
ethnic problem. I came in on a promise to bring peace. Within 10
days oI taking oIIice, I wrote to |Tiger leader| Mr.|Velupillai|
Prabhakaran inviting him to hammer out a peaceIul solution. We
had a ceaseIire, but he broke all agreements within eight months.
Not long aIter, we presented the proposal to devolve power to
the regions, which is the political solution to the problem. We
have gone a long way to making devolution a reality. I have taken
a personal responsibility in taking this to every nook and corner
oI the country, to every type oI people. Such public discussion oI
a law or amendment is unprecedented in our history. You cannot
have peace without devolution oI power, without the sharing oI
power. It is also tied up in the proposed new constitution with
larger guarantees Ior human rights and Ior wider democratic
practices, including the abolition oI the executive presidency.
Ranawana: But the Tigers have not responded to vour
constitutional reform proposals.
Chandrika: When we were having discussions with the LTTE, I
exchanged 44 letters with Prabhakaran, the Iirst time he ever
wrote to any politician in the south. I kept inviting him to agree
on dates to start discussing our political proposals. He kept
reIusing, dodging |the issue|, going around it, circumventing it,
never agreeing to it. He kept asking Ior more Iacilities. All oI
these we gave, because he kept saying it was going to Iacilitate
the lives oI the ordinary people. We wanted to remove all the
obstacles that the last government had Iaced Ior the normal
Iunctioning oI civilian liIe in the north and east. He misused all
that. Now we control much oI the north and east and have access
to the Tamil people there. We have Iound that a crushing
majority would vote with the devolution proposals. The same
crushing majority also keep telling us: please do not allow the
crushing majority also keep telling us: please do not allow the
LTTE to come back. We want to rehabilitate the LTTE. We
hope that a democratic LTTE will go back to JaIIna along with
the rest oI the Tamil leadership and participate in the democratic
process.
Ranawana: Manv Tamils believe that Sinhala-dominated
governments are willing to grant concessions to them onlv so
far as there is militarv pressure on the government bv the LTTE.
Thev fear that if pressure from the Tigers disappears if thev
are defeated vour government will no longer grant such
concessions.
Chandrika: I don`t agree. There used to be some truth in that,
but not anymore. Not under this government. This government
has done massive work to re-Iashion the people`s thinking. The
attitudes oI the majority Sinhala people have totally changed. The
Tigers became a reality because previous governments had a
diIIerent attitude toward the whole ethnic question. The Tamil
people Ielt they had no alternative but to take up arms against the
government, which not only turned a blind eye to their problems
but used Iorce against innocent Tamil people in the most heinous
Iashion one could imagine thinking that was the solution. The
Tamil people Ielt that somebody like Prabhakaran who, in my
opinion, is a ruthless, inhuman murderer should be supported
because they had no other solution. But Prabhakaran and his
terrorist politics are totally irrelevant today.
I also reproduce a short letter oI mine, criticising this publicity by
Chandrika Ior her War Ior Peace` campaign, which was later
published in the same magazine. My response was:
'I challenge your |Asiaweek`s| statements that President
Kumaratunga has curtailed state repression and engineered
something oI an economic turnaround.` In September |1997| it
was announced that Sri Lanka is seeking $500 million loan to
revive its unpopular move to increase the price oI bread
another election pledge up in smoke. I wish that you had asked
more penetrating questions oI the President. For example, Irom
where does she allocate money Ior Sri Lanka`s spiraling deIense
budget which stood at $836 million in 1996?
II the Sri Lankan army is winning` the war against the Liberation
Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE), why are there over 20,000
deserters, despite repeated amnesty oIIers? Aren`t these deserters
better Buddhists who (by Iollowing the preaching oI the
Enlightened One) teach something to the Sri Lankan commander-
Enlightened One) teach something to the Sri Lankan commander-
in-chieI, who gloats that the military and the political solutions go
hand in hand?` What happened to her pre-election pledge oI
abolishing the executive presidency?
|Asiaweek magazine, October 17, 1997|
Chandrika Assessed in 2001:
In the last quarter oI 2001, the partisan press which had serenaded
Chandrika and pilloried Pirabhakaran during 1995-97, has turned
around and unabashedly pricks the Iaade oI Chandrika`s peace mask.
Arrogance oI Power` stated a reecent editorial caption in the Island
newspaper oI Colombo. Authoritarian disdain` lamented the selI-
righteous Hindu newspaper oI Chennai. Let me cite the relevant
passages Irom these two editorials:
Editorial 1:
'Innumerable reasons can be cited Ior the collapse oI the
People`s Alliance government within one year. They could all be
summed up in a single expression arrogance oI power.
President Kumaratunga and her government simply did not give a
damn about what was said about her and her government and
proceeded to rule on the presumption oI being blessed with
eternal power.
The 1994 election maniIesto`s pledges were soon Iorgotten.
Pledges such as to bring down the cost oI living, cleanse public
liIe, conduct a transparent government, end political interIerence
in the public service and end abuse oI power by politicians, all Iell
by the wayside. Its ventriloquism on the North-East conIlict
promoting anti-war campaigns such as the islandwide Tawalama
campaign while at the same time appealing Ior recruits Ior the
armed services and escalating the war, not only resulted in
military disasters but also took Ior granted that the masses were
nave enough to believe their propaganda. |Colombo Island
editorial, Oct.12, 2001|
Editorial 2:
'.the President Ms.Chandrika Kumaratunga, has once again
acted with authoritarian disdain Ior political propriety by
dissolving parliament with unseemly haste in a cynical attempt to
conIound her opponents. it is evident that she has soIt-pedaled
in respect oI several economic and political policies including her
one-time preIerence Ior a quick and Iair resolution oI Sri Lanka`s
one-time preIerence Ior a quick and Iair resolution oI Sri Lanka`s
national question about the rights oI the Tamil people..
|Chennai Hindu editorial, Oct.13, 2001|
With eggs on their Iace, these editorialists now conIirm Pirabhakaran`s
judgement oI Chandrika`s peace-balloon proposals` as nothing but hot
air blown by a debutant, but craIty, second-generation politician.
Pirabhakaran was correct in calling in 1995 that Chandrika, as Iar as
Eelam Tamils were concerned, was merely a naked empress. A
reader`s letter written by R.M.A.B.Dassanayake oI Matale, was aptly
captioned by the Island newspaper`s editorial team as The balloon
has burst`. Excerpts:
'My companion seated on the same bench started oII with a
veritable pithy statement Balloon eka pipuruwa the balloon
has burst. All oI those who ran the show, Irom the apex, centre
and periphery exerted their energies to inIlate the balloon. With
nothing substantial, but just a volume oI hot air Ralu Hulang.
Swollen pride, Ialse utterances, deceptive tactics, incessant
maIia` talk Irom a spokesperson nicknamed maIia man`
multiple duplicity and contradictory views were the order oI the
day and these would gather greater momentum once again in the
run upto the upcoming elections as well.
They inIlated their balloon to such unlimited uncontrollable extent
that it burst with a bang exploded with cataclysmic sound and
Iury.. |Island, Colombo, Oct.23, 2001|
While Mr. Dassanayake`s letter had appeared, I doubt that a letter I
wrote to the same Island newspaper last week about Pirabhakaran`s
judgement on Chandrika Kumaratunga will be published. It was about
Pirabhakaran, Sri Lankan army and the hypocrisy oI Colombo`s
partisan press. Thus I reproduce relevant excerpts oI this letter sent by
email on October 19.
The Editor,
Island,
Colombo.
Dear Mr.Weerakoon:
A Question of Principled 1ournalism
.This letter is related to your most recent editorials: Pre-
election skullduggery to the Iore (Oct.17), A question oI
principled politics` (Oct.18) and Santa`s early arrival` (Oct.19).
In all these, you take issue with President Chandrika
Kumaratunga`s style oI governance, arrogance and cavalier
Kumaratunga`s style oI governance, arrogance and cavalier
disregard Ior accepted norms oI politics. It is as iI, you have
stumbled on these issues only lately. But Prabhakaran and LTTE
thinkers have scaled these same traits oI the current President in
1995 correctly.
Mr. Editor, you cannot have your cake and eat it as well. On one
hand, you have been preaching that Prabhakaran cannot be
trusted since he will never give up his Iight Ior Eelam and come
to the negotiation table. This stance is Iine, iI the other party has
been a model oI virtue. You say now that Prabhakaran`s main
adversary during the past 7 years is a bungling buIIoon who is
not worth her salt. You had stated that, Many will diIIer Irom
the President`s estimation oI herselI` (Oct.19). Bless you Ior
saying that openly now. So, isn`t your lament conIirms
Prabhakaran`s position Ior all these years. How about some
principled journalism on your part, Sir?
In your 20
th
anniversary editorial you bragged, We are oI the
opinion that all communities got equal rights` (Oct.4). Then, how
come the Sri Lankan army consists oI 95 (or more) Buddhists,
when the Buddhist population in the island is only 75? Either
you should be mathematically challenged to believe that 75 equals
95, or you are a hypocrite to say, We are certainly not against
the Tamil community. We support their rights and say that they
are citizens oI this country as much as those oI any other
community are`. II you sincerely believe what you say, will you
campaign Ior proportional representation oI all communities in
the Sri Lankan army.
(3) Harassment of Pirabhakaran by India`s Intelligence wallahs
This negative outcome oI the Indo-LTTE war has continued since
1991 Ior a decade. It can be explored under three main themes,
namely
(A) Anti-LTTE propaganda in the Indian news media.
(B) January 1993 piracy by the Indian Navy against LTTE in
international waters leading to the tragic deaths oI Kittu and his
associates.
(C) Criminal Case No. 329/91, implicating Pirabhakaran in the
conspiracy to murder the Iormer Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi.
All three themes are inter-related and available literature remains
scattered. I will try to analyze the material, which I have gathered
during the past decade (Continued)

Part 21
Sachi Sri Kantha
3 November 2001]
Pol Potist` Label: Facts and Fantasy
:It is difficult to say what truth is, but sometimes so
easy to recognize a falsehood.'
- Einstein, in a letter to Jeremiah McGuire,
October 24, 1953.
Pirabhakaran: viewed by Pulitzer prize-winning journalists
While digging through my personal collection oI old Time magazine
issues, Ior teaching American English usage to my undergraduate
students, I bumped into the August 12, 1991 issue, which Ieatured the
cover story, Busybodies & Crybabies: What`s happening to the
American character?` There I located a one-page commentary by
Margaret Carlson with the caption, The Busybodies on the Bus`.
First, I quote an excerpt Irom this revealing piece:
'American societvs busiest busvbodies are in the press, where,
under cover of the US Constitution, thev expose, scold and
ridicule public figures, and sometimes win Pulit:er Pri:es for
it. In the putative national interest, reporters have taken on the
roles of mother superior, partv boss, neighborhood snoop and
cop on the beat. in its police function the press relies less on
the Constitution than on the Ten Commandments, although not
all of them. Thou shalt not steal is much less interesting than
Thou shalt not commit adulterv.`
I cite this piece since it touches on the game oI Pirabhakaran-watching
practiced by Pulitzer Prize winning journalists. Also, I like to note that
the Busybodies & Crybabies` syndrome is not endemic to Americans.
Indian as well as Sri Lankan power brokers also suIIer Irom this
character malady. The current Sri Lankan President Chandrika
Kumaratunga has suIIered Irom this malady since her ascent to power
in 1994.
Pirabhakaran: as seen by 1oseph Lelyveld
As recently as last week, a Pulitzer prize-winning journalist has
commented on Pirabhakaran and LTTE. The New York Times
magazine oI October 28 |2001|, carried a Ieature entitled, All Suicide
Bombers are not Alike`, written by Joseph Lelyveld. He had been
introduced as 'a writer and editor Ior the New York Times Ior nearly
40 years. He is the author oI the Pulitzer prize-winning book, Move
Your Shadow.
Lelyveld received his Pulitzer honor in 1986 under the general non-
Iiction` category. To comprehend the September 11 horror
experienced by the Americans, he had traveled to Gaza, Cairo and
Hamburg and Iiled his story. To be Iair, Lelyveld`s take on
Pirabhakaran is Iar more accurate than Rohan Gunaratna, the selI-
anointed Pirabhakaran specialist` oI Sri Lankan Intelligence Arm.
AIter all, unlike the Iart-catchers |a servant who Iollows his master
closely enough to be aware oI his master`s breaking oI wind` states the
Slang and Euphemism Dictionarv oI Richard Spears, 1982| oI Indian
and Sri Lankan press, 40 years oI work at the New York Times should
have endowed him with some semblance oI balance in reporting.
I stress that New York Times is not an oracle. But, compared to
competition, it has earned its merits. Here is what, Lelyveld had
written, comparing the Japanese kamikaze Iighters oI World War II
and the Black Tigers oI Eelam.
'At Iirst the kamikazes volunteered to die Ior the emperor, under
the impression that their hopeless missions could turn the tide oI
battle in the PaciIic and save Japan Irom invasion. OII Okinawa
in 1945, more than 1,000 dived to their deaths over 10 weeks,
taking with them some 5,000 American sailors (a toll roughly
equivalent to that taken by the two airliners in Lower Manhattan
on Sept.11). As it became clear that the war had been lost, the
Japanese command continued to make suicide its tactic oI last
resort, sometimes telling young recruits being trained to serve as
human guidance systems on bombs and torpedoes little more
than that their missions might be dangerous`.
In the widely overlooked struggle oI the Tamil minority Ior an
independent homeland in Sri Lanka, the role oI Hirohito is played
by the movement`s shadowy leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who
has dispatched more suicide missions than anyone else now on
earth. The leader oIIers an ethos oI sacriIice rather than a
promise oI heavenly rewards, stressing the suIIering oI the
Tamils and the oppression oI the majority Sinhalese when he
dines with Black Tigers those Tamil Tigers who have
volunteered to die beIore sending them oII on missions Irom
volunteered to die beIore sending them oII on missions Irom
which there can be no return. Like them, he is said to wear a
cyanide capsule around his neck to avert capture and torture by
government Iorces. In the best oI times, Tamils have a high
suicide rate, unlike Palestinians (whose suicide rate is well below
that oI Israelis or ours). But Tigers who appear to be unstable or
depressed don`t get taken into the elite Black Tigers units whose
members are convinced, it seems, that they can do something
really useIul with their lives by ending them. OIten they operate
as squads, one bomber Iollowing another in order to hit the
emergency Iorces that rush to the scene oI the Iirst bombing. It`s
doubtless just an odd coincidence but striking, nevertheless, that
in the mid-1990`s Prabhakaran`s suicide bombers hit the twin
towers oI the World Trade Center in Colombo. Yet, in
September, the Tamil Tigers branded the attack in New York a
colossal human tragedy` and brutal crime`. They then launched
one oI their patented seaborne suicide attacks on a troop carrier.
The world views oI the Japanese, Tamil and Palestinian suicide
bombers were as distinct as the contexts in which they
operated.
|New York Times magazine, Oct.28, 2001|
While I agree with Lelyveld that the worldviews oI the Japanese
kamikaze pilots and Tamil Tigers are distinct as the contexts in which
they operated`, I disagree with his comparison oI Hirohito and
Pirabhakaran. In Japan, by convention, this name is always preIixed
with the title Emperor` and not used alone, but Americans are least
bothered about the conventions oI other nations! I know this better
than Lelyveld Ior two reasons. First, unlike Lelyveld, I have lived,
studied and worked in Lanka Ior 28 years and Japan Ior 14 years. I
also have lived in America Ior 6 years. Secondly, unlike Lelyveld, I am
Iluent in Japanese and Tamil languages. This brings me to the point
made by Margaret Carlson in 1991 (cited above) that Pulitzer prize
alone doesn`t grant instant knowledge or wisdom to a journalist,
however reputed he is, to comprehend the world beyond his reach.
Lelyveld also makes another selI-prattling statement: 'Wondering in
the days aIter Sept.11 how selI-annihilation had gone Irom being a
tactic Ior spreading gory mayhem on a local scale to a weapon oI mass
destruction, I started reading up on kamikazes and the Black Tigers oI
the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka. This is a strip-tease act, on the
part oI Lelyveld. He does not reveal what materials did he read?` He
also does not reveal whether he read the Japanese literature on
kamikazes and the Eelam Tamil literature on Black Tigers. I doubt it.
Suppose how much credibility I will get, iI I`m unlettered in English
Suppose how much credibility I will get, iI I`m unlettered in English
and I try to analyze the thoughts and maneuvers oI MacArthur during
the Second World War and Korean War Irom what is available in
Tamil and Sinhalese languages. Also, I wonder whether he has
bothered to read this series on the Pirabhakaran Phenomenon`.
One should not be harsh on Lelyveld. He has, at least linked (without
any justiIication) Pirabhakaran to Hirohito, whom Japanese revered.
But the Iallibility award Ior linking Pirabhakaran to a (now) reviled
Asian Iigure should go to another Pulitzer prize-winning journalist John
F.Burns oI New York Times. His piece, Asia`s Latest Master oI
Terror`, written in 1995, is widely cited in the anti-Pirabhakaran
websites generated by the Sinhalese groups.
Pirabhakaran: as seen by 1ohn Burns
First I provide the Iew sentences oI the piece Irom John Burns, related
to Pirabhakaran. Then, I explain why the portrayal oI Burns suIIers
Irom lack oI reality. According to Burns,
'It is a saIe bet that not too many people outside Sri Lanka and
its neighbor India know much about the Tigers; Iewer still would
recognize their leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran. But they should.
He has shown a blood thirstiness in dealing with opponents that
has been compared with some oI the cruelest Iigures in recent
Asian history, including Pol Pot oI Cambodia.
Mr.Prabhakaran, who is 40 years old, leads a movement whose
deeds in scale, pale alongside the genocide committed by Pol
Pot`s Khemer Rouge in the 1970s; the Tigers have never had
more than 10,000 Iighters, and their victims number 25,000 at
most. But what they lack in scope, they make up in brutality as
they Iight to separate Sri Lanka`s Tamils, a Hindu minority, Irom
the Buddhist majority. |New York Times, May 28, 1995|
My criticism oI John Burns is based on the Iollowing issues. First, he
doesn`t state who has compared Pirabhakaran to Pol Pot. He throws
in a smear statement, He |meaning Pirabhakaran| has shown a blood
thirstiness in dealing with opponents that has been compared with
some oI the cruelest Iigures in recent Asian history, including Pol Pot
oI Cambodia`. Reader is not provided with the inIormation whether
this comparison was oIIered by Pirabhakaran`s adversaries or by an
unbiased observer. Secondly, Burns Iailed to mention who did the
counting on LTTE`s 25,000 victims`, and what percentage oI these
victims are Sri Lankan armed Iorces. |For a breakdown on the
statistics oI LTTE`s victims, reIer to The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
part 14|. Last but not the least, Burns has Iailed to comprehend that
part 14|. Last but not the least, Burns has Iailed to comprehend that
LTTE is mainly composed oI Hindu and a noticeable percent oI
Christian youth; but Pol Pot`s Khmer Rouge were composed oI 99
percent Buddhists. Pirabhakaran is a Hindu. Pol Pot was a Theravada
Buddhist. This Iact is hidden by the Sinhalese commentators and the
anti-LTTE scribes oI India.
Sources who tagged the Pol Potist` label on Pirabhakaran
Since John Burns had not bothered to identiIy the source who tagged
the Pol Potist` label, I did some searching and Iound two reIerences
in 1990 and 1991. One is Mahindapala, ex-editor oI Colombo
Observer who was a Iart-catcher to President Premadasa. The other
one is N.Ram, the selI-pretentious busybody based in Chennai. I
cannot vouch whether these are the Iirst reports, but these appear to
be the earliest in my research collections.
Deanna Hodgin, who reported on Sri Lanka, Ior a cover story entitled,
An ethnic inIerno in island paradise` to the Insight magazine wrote,
'Balasingham says the organization (LTTE) is socialist but has
lately been trying to distance itselI Irom its Iormerly avowed
Marxism. The Marxist rhetoric is just an excuse to settle a one-
party state with Prabhakaran at the head` says M.Mahindapala,
the editor oI the Colombo-based Observer newspaper. The
history oI Marxism has shown that, instead oI the dictatorship oI
the proletariat, it becomes the dictatorship oI the party, which
becomes the dictatorship oI one man. In that way, the LTTE
could create a state like Pol Pot`s. |Insight magazine, Oct.22,
1990|
One should note that during 1989-90, Pol Potism oI Sri Lankan kind
was unleashed by the then ruling elites in Sri Lanka, who while parrot-
mouthing Buddhism killed innocent Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and
Muslims. Mahindapala held a noticeable rank in the power elite circle
as a torch carrier Ior the Premadasa-brand oI Pol Potism. Thus, it
appears to me that Mahindapala was one source Ior John F.Burns`s
comment on Pirabhakaran. Once this Pol Potist label` had appeared
in the New York Times, though soItened by Burns with a negating note
|a movement whose deeds in scale, pale alongside the genocide
committed by Pol Pot`s Khmer Rouge`|, Mahindapala continues to
perversely distort this negating note by repeating in his diatribes Irom
Australia where he resides now, that New York Times had called
Pirabhakaran as the current Pol Pot oI Asia. Though he was an editor
oI Colombo Observer, he Iinds it diIIicult to present exactly what John
Burns had written in his 1995 piece.
Six years ago, I wrote a critical letter about Mahindapala`s distorting
view on Pirabhakaran to the Lanka Guardian, which Mervyn de Silva
graciously did publish. I speciIically included the name oI Premadasa
(not illogical in its context), to whom Mahindapala served as a Iart-
catcher. At that time, I was unable to check the original report oI
Burns which appeared in the New York Times oI May 1995. Excerpts:
Prabhakaran Compared
'As a Prabhakaran-watcher, I thank H.L.D.Mahindapala Ior
bringing to my attention, the New York Times Ieature (May 28,
1995) oI John Burns on Prabhakaran (Lanka Guardian, Oct.15).
In it, Prabhakaran`s blood-thirstiness in dealing with opponents
has been stated as comparable to that oI some oI the cruelest
Iigures in recent Asian history, including Pol Pot`. Even iI one
takes this opinion on its Iace value, one wonders who are the
other cruelest Iigures in recent Asian history, whom John Burns
had in mind. II one takes a body count oI innocent victims (not
military opponents), Mao Ze Dong, Indira Gandhi, Suharto and
Ranasinghe Premadasa should enter this cruel leaders Hall oI
Fame without any diIIiculty. Isn`t Prabhakaran, then in good
company?
Unlike Mahindapala, I do not consider the New York Times as
the oracle oI the twentieth century. I provide a Iew examples
where this venerable newspaper had to eat crow. These are
culled Irom the book, The Experts Speak, The Definitive
Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation, by Chris CerI
and Victor Navasky (1984).
A New York Times editorial ridiculed in 1921 the attempts on
rocket propelling by space science pioneer Robert Goddard as
one who seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in high
schools`. In Nov.5, 1932, the same unimpeachable source` oI
Mahindapala, predicted the re-election oI the then President
Herbert Hoover over Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On July 14,
1972, the same New York Times commented that Senator
Thomas Eagleton as a casting director`s ideal Ior a running
mate`. Few weeks later it was revealed that he had undergone
psychiatric shock therapy and was dropped by the Democratic
Presidential candidate George McGovern. II the New York Times
could not predict developments correctly about the events within
the USA, how reliable is its assessment on events in Sri Lanka?
As to verbal abuse Irom opponents, Prabhakaran is not the Iirst
rebel leader to be sneered at by his contemporaries. Almost 200
years ago, the Iather oI America, George Washington was
roasted by Philadelphia Aurora as Iollows: II ever a nation was
debauched by a man, the American nation has been debauched
by Washington. II ever a nation was deceived by a man, the
American nation has been deceived by Washington. Let it serve
to be a warning that no man may be an idol.` Does Mahindapala
know that quite a large segment oI American citizens who were
loyal to the British Crown were chased by Washington`s patriotic
gang to Canada and West Indies? One who cites New York Times
Ior support should also bother to learn the revolutionary history
oI America. |Lanka Guardian, Nov.15, 1995, p.17|
Apart Irom Mahindapala, the other journalist who has used the Pol
Potist` term pejoratively to Pirabhakaran during the past 10 years is
N.Ram. In an article Understanding Prabhakaran`s LTTE`, which
appeared in the Lanka Guardian oI Feb.15, 1991, Ram has
commented,
'LTTE leadership has a distinct Pol Potist streak in its character,
methods and, above all, disregard Ior human liIe.
Ram was one oI the busybodies who believed that the Rajiv Gandhi-
Jayewardene Accord oI 1987 was the next best thing to thosai in
Tamil culture. He espoused the line that LTTE was the nauseating Ily
in the political thosai batter prepared by the India`s power elites Ior
consumption by Eelam Tamils. But, as the Iollowing excerpt Irom the
Hindu newspaper editorial shows, even in mid-1988 LTTE was not
considered as terrorists` by Ram`s parent institution in Chennai. Here,
Pirabhkaran is preIixed with a positive adjective resourceIul`.
'It might be too much to claim that the Liberation Tigers oI
Tamil Eelam, generalled by the resourceIul Mr.V.Prabhakaran, is
close to being brought to its knees. The Tigers clearly retain at
least a residual military capability and a substantial political
inIluence. However, there can be no serious doubt that they have
been tremendously weakened, Ior reasons which are perIectly
obvious. They have lost not merely their major staging bases but
also most oI the sanctuaries; nowhere are they saIe Irom the
highly mobile strike capability oI the IPKF; and they will Iace a
quite hopeless situation iI the present mode oI hostilities
continues much longer. It would be a serious political mistake to
regard the Tigers as some kind oI liberation movement capable oI
waging a Iorm oI inexhaustible guerilla warIare through winning
the hearts and minds oI the people; it would be equally unsound
to write them oII as a political Iorce, or consider them
terrorists`..|Hindu International edition, June 11, 1988|
terrorists`..|Hindu International edition, June 11, 1988|
Thus, it is saIe to inIer that when Pirabhakaran became unavailable to
be tapped as a source oI inIormation` or as a puppet` to the designs
oI India`s policy makers, he came to be tagged with the Pol Potist`
label by N.Ram.
Similarities between Pol Pot regime and the post-1970 Sinhalese
governments
Contrary to Mahindapala and N.Ram, I take the view that similarities
between Pol Pot and Pirabhakaran are akin to the similarities between
salt and white sugar. But the similarities between the post-1970
Sinhalese governments and Pol Pot regime (April 1975-Jan.1979) are
like that oI lime and lemon. Let me list the similarities.
(1) Who prided themselves as pious Buddhists? Pol Pot`s
henchmen and the ruling elites oI Sri Lanka.
(2) Who were supported by the Communist China with aid and
arms? Pol Pot and the Sinhalese governments.
(3) Who received the oIIicial sanction Ior their actions Irom Uncle
Sam? Pol Pot and the Sinhalese governments.
(4) Who killed their own ethnics in numbers exceeding 20,000, in
the name oI socialism? Sirimavo Bandaranaike regime in
alignment with the Communist Party, during the April 1971
insurrection. In Iact, this exhibition oI state-sponsored terrorism
pre-dated Pol Pot`s rule in Cambodia by merely 4 years, and
could have inspired Pol Pot`s gang to an extent, considering that
Sirimavo Bandaranaike received support Irom China Ior
extinguishing the JVP rebellion.
(5) Who recognized the Pol Pot`s regime in Sri Lanka? Again,
Sirimavo Bandaranaike`s socialist power brokers recognized Pol
Pot`s regime between 1975 and 1979. When Mrs.Bandaranaike
organized the 5
th
Non-Aligned Movement`s ConIerence in
August 1976, guess who represented Pol Pot`s regime Ior that
conIerence? The current leader oI Cambodia, Hun Sen, who
was then the Ioreign minister to Pol Pot`s regime. Subsequently
Hun Sen parted company with Pol Pot and returned to power
as Vietnam-backed leader oI Cambodia. That`s another story.
The link between the noxious strand oI Theravada Buddhist activism
cum halI-baked communism in Pol Pot`s Cambodia and Bandaranaike
clan`s Sri Lanka is a virgin territory Ior exploration. 95 percent oI the
clan`s Sri Lanka is a virgin territory Ior exploration. 95 percent oI the
Cambodian population practises Theravada Buddhism, and 70 percent
oI the Sinhalese also practise Theravada Buddhism. Power-holders in
both countries have been nominally these Theravada Buddhists. But
the loud-mouths oI Sri Lankan Theravada Buddhism such as Susantha
Goonetilleke and Nalin de Silva, Ior whom Pirabhakaran appears as a
demon, would never bother to explore this territory Ior obvious
reasons oI discomIort. In this context, the Iollowing news report Irom
the Cevlon Dailv News in 1999 by Nemsiri Mutukumara makes
interesting reading. Excerpts:
'Ambassador |Karunatilake| Amunugama made an oIIicial visit
to Phnom Penh where he met Cambodia`s Foreign Minister and
other high ranking government oIIicials. He also paid a courtesy
call on the high ranking Bhikku Sangha oI Cambodia and
expressed his gratitude personally Ior accepting the Sri Lanka
invitation and attending the Buddhist ConIerence last year.
Currently, Sri Lanka educators are providing consultancy service
and educational administrational techniques in regenerating Pali
and Buddhist education to the bhikku Sangha and Buddhist
women..
Recalling his Iirst overseas visit as Cambodian Foreign Minister,
Mr.Hun Sen has expressed his pleasant memories oI the Non-
Aligned Nations Summit ConIerence held at the BMICH in
Colombo in 1976 presided over by Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike. His meeting with Sri Lankan leaders oI the day is
considered absolutely beneIicial Ior Cambodia, the Prime
Minister has said.|Cevlon Dailv News, Dec.28, 1999|
I Iound this comment by Hun Sen quite appealing. He visited Colombo
in 1976, as a 25-year old Foreign Minister oI Pol Pot regime. That was
supposed to be his Iirst overseas trip. But one can read more Irom that
remark, related to what was happening in Cambodia then. Also, it
somewhat reinIorces the Iourth point I had stated above on state-
sponsored terrorism as well. As recently as last July, Nuon Chea (who
was Pol Pot`s deputy, and then ranking above Hun Sen) declared,
'I was not a big person in the Khmer Rouge. I was in charge oI
education, not the military. I IulIilled my duty to my nation and
to Buddhism. Anyway, how do you know that all the skulls in the
killing Iields stem Irom the Khmer Rouge period? Many people
died during |local coups|, the US bombings and the Vietnamese
invasion. No one thinks about that. |Asiaweek magazine, July
20, 2001|
Nuon Chea sounds like President Chandrika Kumaratunga`s elderly
uncle, in denying his neIarious role during Pol Pot`s regime. The
bottom line is Pol Potists were noxious Theravada Buddhists cum halI-
baked Communists and Pirabhakaran is neither a Buddhist nor a
Communist. Theravada Buddhism is a great religion and many millions
in the world practise it strictly according to the book. But the
combination oI Theravada Buddhism cum halI-baked communism in
the hands oI ruling power elites was a noxious mixture. It was covertly
supported by China. It poisoned the Iields oI Cambodia during Pol
Pot`s regime and the southern Sri Lanka in 1971, Iollowed by the
torturing and killing oI Tamils, which began with incarceration oI
Tamil youth who opposed the 1972 Republican Constitution oI Sri
Lanka. While Pol Pot`s regime was loading it over the innocent
Cambodian peasants between 1975 and 1978, Eelam Tamils also
suIIered in 1977 Iollowing the general election. The newly anointed
J.R.Jayewardene government accused the deIeated SLFP-CP
sympathizers as instigators oI terrorism against the Tamils, who had
voted Ior a plebiscite on Eelam in the Northern and Eastern provinces.
But the apologists Ior the Buddhist ruling elites ignored the evidence
that the Indian' Tamils who were living in the Central provinces oI Sri
Lanka and who did not vote Ior a plebiscite on Eelam were equally
tortured and killed by the Pol Potist elements among the Buddhist
community in Sri Lanka.
Another vital parallel between the Pol Potists in Cambodia who
destroyed the educational elements in the society between 1975 and
1978 and the Theravada Buddhists in Sri Lanka was seen in the
bibliocaust` (book burning) practised by the Buddhist hooligans during
the 1977 torture against the Eelam Tamils. The trial run` Ior the 1981
JaIIna Public Library bibliocaust was conducted in the houses and
rented apartments oI Colombo suburbs where Tamils lived.
Personally, I mourned the loss oI my Iriend M.K.Eelaventhan`s
valuable book collection on Eelam Tamil heritage. India`s busybody`
journalists like N.Ram and PraIul Bidwai who began tagging LTTE
idiotically, with the Pol Potist` appellation in early 1990s, are ignorant
(or conveniently hide) the Iact that Pol Potism in Sri Lanka practised
by the Theravada Buddhists cum halI-baked Communists ante-dated
the ascent oI Pirabhakaran. That is why, China patronized the Pol
Potist ruling elites in Cambodia and Sri Lanka equally. Ruling elites oI
China never patronized Pirabhakaran, though next to Giap, he has
remained as the best exponent oI Mao`s teachings on warIare in Asia.
(Continued).

Part 22
Sachi Sri Kantha
10 November 2001]
1989 - The Year of Indian Intrigue
"A statesman is an easy man - He tells his lies by
rote
a journalist makes up his lies and takes you by the
throat"
-W.B.Yeats (in his 1938 poem: The Old Stone Cross)
Rote Lies
When it comes to the spread oI lies, William Butler Yeats was apt in
his assessment oI statesmen and journalists. In my search Ior the
origin oI Pol Potist` label on Pirabhakaran, I came across two more
relevant citations, which substantiate my viewpoint (see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 21). In Iact, the Pol Potist label was
Iirst tagged to Rohana Wijeweera in 1988, an year beIore his
assassination. Here is an excerpt Irom the Time magazine`s
commentary by Marguerite Johnson.
'While most Sri Lankans think the JVP is the only Iorce that
could break Jayewardene`s iron clad on power, they do not view
it as an alternative. Privately, some politicians compare the JVP`s
elusive leader, Rohana Wijeweera, to Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge
head widely held responsible Ior the deaths oI more than 1
million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979. Even in its
stronghold in the South, the savagery oI the JVP generated more
Iear than support.|Time magazine, International edition,
Nov.28, 1988, p.13|
Wijeweera`s proIile was a carbon copy oI Pol Pot`s proIile. Both were
bred in the milieu oI Theravada Buddhism cum halI-baked
communism. While Pol Pot went to France Ior his higher studies and
absorbed the leItist ideology, Wijeweera made his pilgrimage to
Moscow. Later, both Pol Pot and Wijeweera became Ianatics oI the
Chinese brand oI communism. Thus, the comparison oI Wijeweera to
Pol Pot is not without some merits.
Pol Pot is not without some merits.
Only aIter the assassination oI Wijeweera in November 1989, the
Indian hacks (especially N.Ram) began an insinuation campaign
against Pirabhakaran, by tagging his movement as Pol Potist. This
campaign gained momentum Iollowing Rajiv Gandhi assassination in
May 1991. The Iollowing excerpt Irom a Newsweek report, Iiled by
Steve Le Vine Irom Madras reiterates this point.
'.To Indian police, the careIul plotting oI the murder and the
cold calm oI the killer point to the Black Tigers, a suicide-attack
unit oI Sri Lanka`s notorious rebel group, the Liberation Tigers oI
Tamil Eelam. The Tigers deny responsibility, but the Gandhi
assassination has nonetheless embellished their reputation as one
oI the world`s most dangerous and disciplined guerrilla armies.
There is no one like them`, says N.Ram, a Madras journalist
who has studied the Tamil rebels Ior years: They are totally selI-
sacriIicing`.
The Tigers are also ruthless. Their international network oI moral
and Iinancial support is more sophisticated than the Irish
Republican Army`s. Their brutality approaches that oI
Cambodia`s Khmer Rouge or Peru`s Shining Path.|Newsweek
magazine, July 1, 1991, p.13|
Those journalists, comparing Pirabhakaran to Pol Pot in brutality, also
exhibit their ignorance in numbers. Though it may sound ghoulish, I
wish to compare the deaths attributed to Pol Pot`s Khmer Rouge and
Pirabhakaran`s LTTE to prove the Iallacy perpetrated by number-
challenged journalists. Pol Pot, who was the head oI Khmer Rouge, is
blamed Ior the death oI at least one million Cambodian citizens (oI a
population oI 7 million) between April 1975 and December 1978. II
Ior argument-sake, Pirabhakaran has to be placed in the same ranks
with Pol Pot Ior brutality`, Pirabhakaran`s LTTE should have killed
2.7 million Sri Lankans Irom its current population oI 19 million. As I
have estimated (see, the Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 14), the
total number oI military and civilian deaths in Sri Lanka since 1983
stands around 66,540. Among these, LTTE is responsible Ior the
death oI nearly 2,300 Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim civilians. Thus,
there exists an incomparable three-order diIIerence (three zeros) in the
number oI persons killed by the LTTE and those who perished under
Pol Pot. By recorded number oI deaths during 1971 and 1989-90
periods, two Sri Lankan heads oI state (Sirimavo Bandaranaike and
Premadasa), who were also Theravada Buddhists, show convergence
with Pol Pot in killing their own civilian ethnics than Pirabhakaran.
One snippet in this Steve Le Vine`s report which piqued my interest
was the Iollowing blurb on Mahattaya.
'Prabhakaran sees traitors everywhere and quashes them
quickly. He once decided his top deputy Mahattaya`
Mahendrarajah was growing too powerIul, and |reportedly|
made Mahattaya bow down to him on his knees 100 times`,
according to a Tamil intellectual close to the rebels. The Indian
police speculate that Prabhakaran, once Iriendly with Rajiv
Gandhi, turned on him aIter peacekeeping troops dispatched by
the Indian leader in 1987 began moving against the rebels. |ibid|
Now, I will try to summarise the subliminal messages delivered in this
Newsweek report, which appeared Iew weeks aIter Rajiv Gandhi`s
assassination.
The Indian Intelligence wallahs had convinced themselves that LTTE
was behind Rajiv Gandhi`s murder.
(1) Brutality oI Tamil Tigers approaches that oI Cambodia`s
Khmer Rouge`.
(2) An unnamed Tamil intellectual close to the |LTTE| rebels` in
Madras paints Mahattaya as a victim oI Pirabhakaran`s bullying.
This intellectual could have been one oI the handlers oI
Mahattaya Ior the Indian Intelligence wallahs.
(3) The story leak that Mahattaya had been punished by
Pirabhakaran suggests that Mahattaya would be extricated Irom
the charges oI involvement in Rajiv Gandhi assassination. This
later turned out to be true.
The truth in the anecdote about Mahattaya being asked to do 100
push-ups` can be veriIied only with Pirabhakaran. I leave this issue to
other investigators. However, when did Mahattaya Iall out with
Pirabhakaran and who precipitated this split are oI interest to many.
BeIore analyzing the implications oI Rajiv Gandhi assassination to
Pirabhakaran, I wish to recapitulate the events oI 1989.
1989 - The Year of Indian Intrigue
The year 1989 is signiIicant Ior Sri Lankans Ior multiple reasons. First,
Premadasa assumed presidency in that year. Secondly, parliamentary
elections were held aIter a lapse oI nearly 12 years. Thirdly, Rohana
Wijeweera was assassinated by the state`s law enIorcement operatives.
For Eelam Tamils, the year 1989 saw the notable assassinations oI the
Iollowing:
July 13: TULF leaders Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran, in Colombo.
July 16: PLOTE leader Uma Maheswaran, in Colombo.
September 21: human rights activist Rajani Thiranagama, in JaIIna.
It is my premise that these Iour assassinations were inter-linked and
circumstantial evidence and motives suggest that Indian intelligence
operatives (Research and Analysis Wing) at that time were
conspirators Ior these assassinations. Motives are maniIold.
Embarrassing the LTTE leadership and creating conIusion in
Premadasa`s camp (Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran assassinations),
protecting the release oI embarrassing details on the stage-managed`
1988 Maldives Coup Plot (Uma Maheswaran assassination), protecting
the image oI Indian policy makers by means oI neutralizing criticism
on the human rights Iront (Rajani Thiranagama assassination) and
covering up the IPKF`s military quagmire in Eelam are the main
motives.
As I have observed in the Part 1 oI this series, the assassinations oI
Amirthalingam, Yogeswaran and Uma Maheswaran occurred between
June 1 and July 29. The then President Premadasa made his
Battaramulla declaration on June 1, requesting the Indian army to
leave the island by the end oI July 1989. As I also pointed out in the
Part 1, a premature obituary oI Pirabhakaran also appeared in the
Madras Hindu, Iollowing the murders oI Amirthalingam, Yogeswaran
and Uma Maheswaran, claiming that Mahattaya had ascended to the
LTTE`s leadership.
Narayan Swamy, in his book Tigers of Lanka, has described in a
paragraph how the Eelam Tamils were perplexed by the Indian
intrigue. To quote,
'|Eelam| Tamils were conIused by Indian policies and actions.
While the militants were trained and armed to Iight, the TULF
was prodded to talk peace to Colombo. When the militant groups
looked askance, they were told that the talks were a Iake; when
the TULF brass made queries, they were inIormed that peace
was the ultimate goal and the militants were only being used to
Iorce Jayewardene to make concessions on the negotiating table.
The TULF`s Amirthalingam played along, in the process angering
his own supporters. Eventually he too Ielt let down by New Delhi
and decided to beIriend the Tigers. And the LTTE just gunned
and decided to beIriend the Tigers. And the LTTE just gunned
him down. |2
nd
edition, 1996, pp.328-329|
Narayan Swamy is partially correct. But he Iailed to elaborate on the
signiIicant Iacts about which section oI LTTE assassinated
Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran, and whether Indian intelligence
operatives were behind it to embarrass Pirabhakaran and Premadasa,
who at that time had developed cordial relationship. However,
Narayan Swamy has opined about Pirabhakaran`s distrust oI the
Research Analysis Wing (RAW) oI Indian intelligence operatives.
States Narayan Swamy,
'It was the LTTE which the RAW never succeeded in controlling
or manipulating. How did this happen? This is where Velupillai
Prabhakaran`s Machiavellian qualities come to the Iore.
Prabhakaran used India (including RAW) as long as he wanted
to; he never allowed anyone to use him. He considered India
(Tamil Nadu in particular) important to his war designs and
banked heavily on the south Indian state. The contacts and
hideouts there proved useIul to him Ior years. RAW thought it
could control the LTTE by giving it weapons. It was wrong.
Prabhakaran got into the good books oI MGR. So no one could
harm him in Tamil Nadu. No member was allowed to interact
with RAW oIIicials without authorization. |ibid, p.329|
Assassins: Mahattaya's Protgs
I want the readers to Iocus on the identity oI assassins. The assassins
oI Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran have been identiIied as Vishu,
Aloysius and Vignan. ChieI assassin Vishu has been identiIied as
Mahattaya`s right-hand man` |Narayan Swamy`s book Tigers of
Lanka, 2
nd
ed, 1996, p.222|. All three were killed subsequently by the
security guards who were posted at the residence oI TULF leaders.
Uma Maheswaran`s assassins were not identiIied immediately, but that
job was attributed as the work oI PLOTE`s dissidents`.
Rajan Hoole, the Iriend oI Rajani Thiranagama, in his anti-LTTE
diatribe entitled, SuIIocation oI truth and its political implications`
(Sundav Observer, Colombo, Oct.26, 1997), mentions the name oI
'Senkathir, a protege oI Mahattaya`s who was accused oI being
Rajini`s killer by the EPRLF. On the Iate oI Senkathir, Mr.Hoole had
written,
'During 1991 he |Senkathir| is said to have disappeared in a
conIrontation with the Sri Lankan Army near Vavuniya. But his
body was not brought home. He was duly commemorated as a
body was not brought home. He was duly commemorated as a
martyr in Nelliady. His own community was however strongly
convinced that his death is an inside job. Others held that
Senkathir had gone over to the Sri Lankan Army
Thus, Rajan Hoole, the selI-anointed grapevine digger on LTTE, is not
sure about the Iate oI Senkathir. But he has noted that Senkathir was a
protege oI Mahattaya. My curiosity was aroused by the coincidences
oI Mahattaya`s proteges tagged as assassins oI Amirthalingam,
Yogeswaran and Rajani Thiranagama, whose deaths occurred within a
narrow span oI less than ten weeks. Within this tumultuous ten-week
period, there had also been an attempt on Pirabhakaran`s liIe by the
RAW operatives, which Iailed. Now, to clariIy the gray areas oI the
Indian intrigue, I quote Irom Rohan Gunaratna`s observations made in
1993.
'|Around April 1989| when news reached RAW that Premadasa
had established a communication with the LTTE.
disinIormation specialists at RAW Ied a story that Prabhakaran
had agreed Ior peace talks with the Sri Lankan government due
to a serious injury Mahattaya had suIIered and thereIore needed
urgent medical treatment.
In order to conIuse the Sri Lankan government, RAW generated
a story that Prabhakaran had been killed. This received wide
publicity in Sri Lanka and in India. News reports stated that the
killing was an altercation over Prabhakaran`s dictatorial ways.
RAW reported that Kopalasamy Mahendrarajah alias Ajit
Mahattaya, the LTTE deputy commander had assassinated
Prabhakaran. DisinIormation specialists at RAW supported this
claim by stating that the public were mourning at several places in
northern Sri Lanka and garlanding Prabhakaran`s picture placed
at public places. Further inIormation was Ied to the public
through the media and other channels that an audio-cassette by
Mahattaya announcing the death oI dear Brother` had been
released and that Mahattaya, the new commander oI the LTTE,
had called Ior a conIerence oI the area commanders. The IPKF
and individual military sources conIirmed the slaying oI the
LTTE leader. |Book: Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka. The
Role of Indias Intelligence Agencies, 1993, pp.284-285|
Though Gunaratna Iailed to speciIy exactly when this happened, this
bizarre promotion oI Mahattaya by the RAW operatives Iollowing the
assassinations oI Amirthalingam, Yogeswaran and Uma Maheswaran.
Gunaratna also had observed in another location oI his book, what
RAW operatives did to counter Premadasa`s Battaramulla declaration
RAW operatives did to counter Premadasa`s Battaramulla declaration
oI June 1, 1989. According to him,
'RAW proposed a three pronged plan oI action to bring the
situation under Indian control.
(a) Stage anti-pullout demonstrations in the North and East and
accuse the Government oI Sri Lanka oI breaking the Accord.
(b) Point out that the capability oI the LTTE oI attacking Tamils
still remains and that the Government oI Sri Lanka is incapable oI
controlling the LTTE
(c) The Citizens Volunteer Force (CVF) training to be augmented
to make it a quasi army under Indian supervision and control
Rajiv Gandhi approved the plan. |ibid, p.355|
From my understanding, what is oI interest in relation to the
assassinations oI Amirthalingam, Yogeswaran and Ms.Thiranagama is
the point (b), which was executed using Mahattaya`s proteges.
Gunaratna has Iurther indicated,
'A total oI seven letters, oI which six were made public by the
Sri Lankan government, except the last letter oI Rajiv Gandhi to
Ranasinghe Premadasa, were exchanged between the
Governments oI Sri Lanka and India on the question oI the
withdrawal oI the IPKF Irom Sri Lanka, Irom June 1, 1989 to
July 7, 1989.|ibid, p.290|
Less than a week later, Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran were
assassinated in Colombo by Mahattaya`s proteges.
Coverage of Amirthalingam-Yogeswaran Assassinations
I provide below three versions on the coverage oI assassinations oI
Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran, as presented in three books.
The authors oI Broken Palmvra (1990), who presented themselves as
non- sympathizers oI Amirthalingam`s politics, wrote,
'For reasons well understood in Colombo, the aIIiliations oI their
killers remained Ior months, oIIicially at least, a mystery. By
early 1990, however, the press in Colombo started treating
people to conIlicting reports in keeping with the general spirit oI
the times. The Colombo based Tamil daily, the Jirakesari,
carried reports according to which, at public meetings in the
North and East, LTTE spokesmen gave reasons why they killed
Amirthalingam. The English language press on the other hand,
carried reports quoting senior LTTE spokesmen in Colombo,
carried reports quoting senior LTTE spokesmen in Colombo,
denying the LTTE`s having a hand in the killings. Interestingly,
the denials and the aIIirmations sometimes appeared on the same
day.|p.426|
India`s Ioremost policy wonk oI that era, J.N.Dixit, in his book
Assignment Colombo (1998), placed his spin brieIly as Iollows:
'The LTTE`s apprehension that Amirthalingam may wean away
Sri Lankan Tamil public opinion to the democratic mainstream oI
Sri Lankan politics led to the LTTE killing him.
I would state that Dixit is cryptic about the conspirators oI
Amirthalingam`s assassination. My analysis oI the events in 1989, and
the circumstantial evidence, point towards RAW operatives as the
conspirators oI Amirthalingam assassination. The RAW operatives
used the Mahattaya`s wing oI LTTE to accomplish this task to
discredit LTTE.
Amirthalingam`s biographer, T.Sabaratnam, in his book The Murder of
a Moderate (1996) has presented the Iollowing details on the
assassination.
'There was a great deal oI conIusion about the political identity
oI the killers. Some said that Visu, who headed the LTTE
political wing in Vavuniya aIter the disappearance oI Dinesh, had
leIt the movement. Others said that Visu was still with the LTTE.
The LTTE London head-oIIice, however, issued a statement
denying any involvement. It condemned the murders and charged
that Iorces inimical to the then LTTE-government talks had
committed them to discredit the LTTE. The LTTE learnt with
deep distress the tragic demise oI the TULF leaders.
Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran. We suspect that diabolical
Iorces are at work to discredit the organization and to disrupt the
current peace talks between the LTTE and the government oI Sri
Lanka`.
The LTTE denial Iailed to remove the doubts oI the people about
its involvement. The great importance that the government
attached to the current peace talks was reIlected in the manner
the government-controlled newspaper, Dailv News, treated the
story on 14 July |1989|. It said, The authorities were checking
on the possibility that an attempt was being made to Ialsely Iather
the killings on the LTTE, high ranking oIIicials said.` |p.11|
Sabaratnam had continued Iurther:
'In August 1989, |Minister oI State Ior DeIence, Ranjan|
Wijeratne brought Inspector General oI Police Ernest Perera to
meet the press. Perera said a person named William
W.Mariyadasan oI Anderson Flats, Narahenpita, had been
arrested and that he had made a conIession. He and Nadarajah
Sathyanandan oI Kashapa Road, Narahenpita, had identiIied the
assassins when the inquest into their deaths were held on 21 July
1989. No relatives had come Iorward to identiIy or claim the
bodies oI the killers.
About what happened ultimately to Mariyadasan, was reported brieIly
by Sabaratnam as Iollows:
'Mariyadasan was indicted in the Panadura High Court. The
police produced the conIession they obtained Irom him under the
provisions oI the Prevention oI Terrorism Act. The court
accepted the conIession as proper evidence and convicted
Mariyadasan Ior 7 years rigorous imprisonment. But the Appeal
Court held the conIession inadmissible and discharged him on 9
February 1995. It held that the conIession was in Iact not given
by Mariyadasan.
Thus, the conIusion on the political identity` oI the assassins oI
Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran is understandable. For Sinhalese
politicians, hacks and propagandists the dead` Amirthalingam became
more useIul as a smear paint on Pirabhakaran, than the living Federal
Party stalwart and TULF leader Amirthalingam who toiled Ior Tamil
rights in his own limited ways until his death. Even now,
Amirthalingam`s name is cited Irequently in the editorials and speeches
oI hypocrite Sinhalese opinion makers to show how bad the LTTE is,
but they never pledge that they would like to IulIill what
Amirthalingam really wanted Ior Eelam Tamils when he was living.
Also, Ior the RAW operatives, who sapped the Madras-exiled TULF
leader Irom 1983 to 1988 like parasites Ieeding on a wounded host, a
dead` Amirthalingam (in the hands oI Mahattaya`s proteges) became
a convenient handy whip to beat the LTTE.
A Paradox in the assassinations of Duraiappah and
Amirthalingam
I noticed a paradox in the assassinations oI Duraiappah and
Amirthalingam. Duraiappah was assassinated in 1975. With candor,
Pirabhakaran had claimed in 1986 that he was involved in that
assassination. His adversaries, the scribes oI Broken Palmvra Ior
instance, whole-heartedly believe this. Here, the assumption is
Pirabhakaran is telling the truth`. Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran
were assassinated in 1989. LTTE denied responsibility (see above).
Pirabhakaran`s adversaries do not believe this to be true. II the 1989
assassinations are believed by Pirabhakaran`s adversaries as LTTE-
instigated, applying this same logic, 1975 assassination shouldn`t be
accepted as LTTE-instigated, since the working premise Ior the 1989
assassination is Pirabhakaran will not tell the truth`.
Only solution Ior this paradox seems to be: Pirabhakaran tells the
truth Ior one assassination; but does not tell the truth Ior another
assassination`. Isn`t this Iunny? But, at least it shows that the
Irequency oI Pirabhakaran telling the truth is higher than those who
work in the same league, such as politicians, army generals and
Intelligence operatives oI all nations. (Continued)

Part 23
Sachi Sri Kantha
17 November 2001]
Standing up Against India`s Imperial Itch
Front Aote: Corroboration of My Assessments
It is always encouraging to receive corroborative conIirmation. Thus,
beIore I present this week`s installment oI my analytical biography on
Pirabhakaran, I`m glad to incorporate the views oI those who shoot
Irom the opposite Ience. Both are certiIied Pirabhakaran-haters. One is
a Cabinet minister and the other one is a media analyst.
First to the highly visible analyst C.A.Chandraprema alias Thadi
Priyantha. In his recent commentary, The LTTE: To Talk or not to
Talk.?`, which had appeared in the Island (Colombo) newspaper
early this month, Chandraprema supports my view expressed in the
Part-22 oI this series, that Rohana Wijeweera was a carbon copy oI
Pol Pot.
OI course, Chandraprema has his own bias and blinders and peddles
his spins Ior livelihood. Still I wish to quote him, since he had authored
a book in English on the JVP`s Pol Potism oI 1987-89. Also, his
exposure on the military debacles suIIered by the Sri Lankan army is a
back-handed compliment to the successes oI LTTE`s Ioot-soldiers and
Pirabhakaran`s strategies. Excerpts:
'One should remember that the terrorists who killed the most
number oI innocent civilians in this country |Sri Lanka| is not the
LTTE but the JVP. The JVP`s record has not been broken by
the LTTE and will not be broken even iI the LTTE continues to
Iight and explode bombs until the year 2020. The LTTE has
killed thousands oI armed Iorces personnel but a lesser number
oI Sinhalese civilians. This is not due to any principles` on the
part oI the LTTE. During UNP times the civilian casualties oI the
LTTE were much bigger than the military casualties. But aIter
the PA assumed power |in 1994|, due to continuous bungling,
soldiers were killed at the rate oI thousands at one go thus
increasing the number oI military casualties as against civilian
casualties.
sangam.orgf.fPart23.htm 1f1+
When the LTTE attacked civilians, even though such attacks
were Iar more numerous than the attacks on armed Iorces
personnel, the number oI persons killed was less than in the case
oI military targets due to the obvious reason oI the greater
concentration oI military personnel whereas civilians are widely
dispersed and only a Iew can be reached in a night raid on a
Sinhala village. The most number oI ordinary Sinhalese were also
killed by the JVP and not the LTTE.|Island, Colombo,
November 7, 2001|
Then, I wish to cite the statistic oIIered by General Anuruddha
Ratwatte, on the number oI Sri Lankan army cadres killed so Iar.
According to a news report by L.B.Wijayasiri, which appeared in the
Cevlon Dailv News oI November 12, 2001, Gen.Ratwatte had stated
at a meeting held at the Kandyan Art Association Cultural Hall on
November 10, that, 'In their battle against the LTTE more than
18,000 heroic security personnel lost their lives while another 10,000
were disabled. A candid admission Irom Pirabhakaran`s nominal
adversary-general Ior the past 7 years. In my estimate (see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 14), I had calculated the number oI
Sri Lankan security personnel killed by LTTE as 15,500.
Gen.Ratwatte has conIirmed that I had underestimated by a margin oI
more than 2,500. I stand corrected.

Amirthalingam: A Victim of Imperial India`s Itch
In the websites maintained by the Sinhala organizations, Appapillai
Amirthalingam appears only as a victim oI LTTE, and nothing is
mentioned about why he became a leader Ior the Eelam Tamils,
beIore the emergence oI Pirabhakaran. This I consider as unIair to
Amirthalingam`s long public career. Nothing is mentioned about why
he was lucky in 1956 to escape Irom death in Colombo at the hands oI
Sinhala hooligans, when padre Bandaranaike was the prime minister oI
Ceylon. Also, in the earlier chapters oI this analytical biography on
Pirabhakaran, I had critiqued the leadership style oI Amirthalingam as
inadequate in meeting the demands oI Eelam Tamils in the post-1977
period. But this criticism has to be balanced with my respect Ior
Amirthalingam`s contribution to the Tamil politics oI the pre-1977
period. Thus, I wish to reproduce my eulogy to him in entirety, written
aIter I learnt about his assassination.
Amirthalingam
'Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi and Sheik Mujibur Rahman
these three leaders share some distinct similarities in their
epoch-making public careers. All three are recognized as
symbolic Iathers` oI their modern nations` United States,
India and Bangladesh respectively. These visionaries also share
the Iate oI being assassinated by their own kinsmen. Now,
Appapillai Amirthalingam also has joined this elite group oI
leaders who had the will and vision to lead the struggle Ior
Ireedom oI their nations and then being murdered by some
deranged individuals belonging to their own ethnic group.
I still vividly remember an appearance oI a poem in the
Sutantiran (the weekly newspaper oI the then Federal Party)
sometime in the mid 1970s, with the title, Amirthalingan our
Abraham Lincoln`. It compared the political careers and the
struggles oI both leaders. Now I wonder, whether the poet who
penned those verses would have presaged the IateIul ending oI
Amirthalingam at the hands oI an assassin.
Call it coincidence (or not), in the Iinal analysis, the political
career oI Amirthalingam did in Iact show many resemblances to
that oI Lincoln.
1. Lincoln was the most esteemed and maligned oI the
American presidents. Similarly, Amirthalingam was the
most esteemed and maligned among the Sri Lankan
political leaders oI this century. Both were admired and
loved by their constituents, while at the same time,
attacked on a partisan basis as the person most responsible
Ior every major crisis which Iaced their nations when they
held the position oI some power.
2. Both were endowed with a mastery oI rhetoric which
endeared them to their supporters.
3. Both Lincoln and Amirthalingam were subjected to vitriolic
attacks Irom the Opposition parties as well as Irom the
radicals oI their own parties.
4. Epithets such as timid`, hot-headed`, dictator` and
political coward` were Ilung at Lincoln and Amrithalingam
by their own party radicals who disagreed with them.
However, Amirthalingam diIIered Irom Lincoln in one character
trait. While Lincoln (as well as Mahatma Gandhi) understood the
value oI silence and secrecy in politics, Amirthalingam did
everything in an open Iashion. Thereby, he exposed himselI to
physical abuse in the Satyagraha campaigns oI 1956, 1958 and
physical abuse in the Satyagraha campaigns oI 1956, 1958 and
1961. He (and his wiIe) were also accused oI instigating the 1977
Sinhala aggression against the Tamils oI Sri Lanka. While he was
the Leader oI the Opposition between 1977 and 1983, there was
even a No-conIidence motion against him in the Sri Lankan
parliament. Among the parliamentarians oI the ruling UNP, onlv
one sensible colleague, Shelton Ranarafa voted against this
nonsensical motion, while S.Thondaman abstained Irom voting.
All the other UNP members obeyed the orders oI the party whip.
Like Mahatma Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman, Amirthalingam also
had his share oI incarceration Ior the cause he believed in. And
like Gandhi, he also became easy Iodder Ior cynicism and ridicule
in the hands oI politically biased journalists, commentators and
cartoonists. One should only just glance through the pages oI the
partisan press oI Sri Lanka Irom 1977 and tabulate the cartoons
oI Wijesoma, Opatha and Amitha to learn how Amirthalingam
was derided Ior the views he stood Ior. A short, rotund Iigure in
verti and saalvai with a pottu on his Iorehead who always gets
mugged by a loyal Sri Lankan patriot` or who always was Iound
hanging by the tail oI a tiger that has been the caricature oI
Amirthalingam in the Sri Lankan national` press.
Amirthalingam diIIered Irom Mahatma Gandhi in one signiIicant
manner. He was not a journalist or an author. So, he has not leIt
behind any signiIicant writings which could be passed on to
posterity. What is leIt behind as his primary intellectual
contribution remains buried in the OIIicial Proceedings oI the Sri
Lankan National State Assembly (popularly known as Hansard).
So that his contributions to the human rights problem in Sri
Lanka are not distorted or belittled, eIIorts should be made to (a)
compile the speeches made by Amirthalingam in the Sri Lankan
parliament (1956-1970 period and 1977-1983 period); and (b)
publish them in Tamil and English. That will be a memorable
tribute Ior his Iour decades oI public service. |Tamil Times,
Sept.1989|
Still I stand by every word I wrote in 1989. The contempt shown by
the contemporary generation oI analysts who cloak themselves with
the human rights` badge and banners (especially the Broken Palmvra
scribes), Ior the battles Amirthalingam Iought in the human rights Iront
Ior nearly 25 years (1952-1977) is despicable. Amirthalingam Iought
his battles at a time when human rights` had not been hijacked into an
industry, with sponsorship Irom the repressive state oIIicials, military
men and news media.
sangam.orgf.fPart23.htm +f1+
men and news media.
When I wrote this eulogy in 1989, I was not aware that Amirthalingam
was a victim oI Imperial India`s itch. For any one wondering, what I
mean by this itch, I reproduce excerpts Irom an editorial captioned
Imperial India` which appeared in the Economist magazine, three
months beIore Amirthalingam`s assassination and a rebuttal to this
editorial by M.Rasgotra, who was then the High Commissioner Ior
India in London. The editorialist oI the Economist magazine noted:
'India is even bigger than it looks. Its soldiers control a large part
oI Sri Lanka and keep order in the Maldives. It treats Bangladesh
as supplicant. It leans arrogantly across Pakistan to give support
to the AIghan government in Kabul, which is Pakistan`s enemy.
Now it is trying to turn Nepal into a vassal.
The government oI Rajiv Gandhi would claim that it is not
expansionist: that its actions are neighbourly and helpIul. In Sri
Lanka it is trying to control the Tamil Tiger guerrillas; in the
Maldives last year it intervened to prevent a coup. The charge
that earlier India had supported Tamil demands Ior a separate
state in Sri Lanka, and allowed the Tigers to train on its territory,
is shrugged oII as history. A suggestion that the Maldives coup
was plotted by India to get its soldiers into the country is
probably nonsense, but it is believed by some normally sensible
people among India`s neighbours. Unhappily, today`s India is
considered capable oI acts usually associated with interIering
autocrats.
Some reckon India is Ilexing its muscles simply because Mr
Gandhi`s government Iaces a diIIicult election this year. A united
opposition could, just possibly, deIeat Mr Gandhi`s increasingly
discredited Congress Party. An adventurous Ioreign policy is the
last hope oI a worried government. |Economist, April 15, 1989,
pp.14 & 17|
Being an employee oI the Indian civil service, the then High
Commissioner oI India Ior UK had to respond, and his rebuttal letter
was a vintage example oI We did the right thing bombast` Ior which
Indian diplomats had been potty-trained assiduously. I reproduce Iirst
three paragraphs oI this letter Ior its verbose parries on India`s
imperialist tendencies and a vital statement on India`s stance regarding
Eelam. Wrote Mr. Rasgotra:
'Sir Your condemnation oI Imperial India` (April 15
th
) is
shocking in the immensity oI its prejudice and the immoderation
oI its language.
oI its language.
What lurid imagery! India`s new empire`; India`s bureaucrats
having authority over the entire sub-continent Irom Iran to
Burma`; Indian siege oI Nepal`; India garrisoned by its army oI
1.2 m|illion| men`. And Iinally Imperial India`. There was an
imperial India the India oI Clive and Curzon, which conquered
Burma, sent expeditions to Lhasa, waged wars in AIghanistan,
ruled Ceylon Irom Madras and maintained not an ambassador in
Kathmandu, but a resident. But all that ended with the Raj a
good 42 years ago. There must be some comIort in interpreting
someone else`s present in colours oI one`s own past.
You say, earlier, India had supported Tamil demands Ior a
separate state in Sri Lanka`. I dealt with the problem in its early
phase Irom 1982 to 1985 as India`s Ioreign secretary. I took
every possible occasion to make it clear to all concerned that
India had no sympathy Ior Elam. It had none then; it has none
now. Indian soldiers are not there to control a large part oI Sri
Lanka`. At great cost oI money and Indian lives, they are trying
to disarm the Tamil Tigers, who want to break up Sri Lanka with
the Iorce oI arms.
I doubt anyone will take seriously your dark murmurings about
India plotting the coup in the Maldives to get its soldiers into that
country. The coup Ioiled, those soldiers got out pretty Iast. A
very Iew remain and they too will be out as soon as the Maldives
government can relieve them.|Economist magazine, May 6,
1989|
One should appreciate Rasgotra`s candor in stating that India had no
sympathy Ior Eelam. But in my assessment, he had covered up two
vital points. First, while overstating his importance in Indian policy
making during the period |1982-85|, Rasgotra had reIrained Irom
mentioning that he had a boss who made the ultimate decision on
Indian policies. She was none other than Indira Gandhi. From 1969
until her death, she also dominated the Indian stage strutted by
eIIeminate men politicians and policy wimps. She was also known as a
leader who made decisions impulsively according to her whims. The
RAW, the Indian equivalent oI CIA or KGB, was her creation.
Secondly, Rasgotra had overlooked the meddling oI Indian intelligence
operatives the RAW personnel in the Eelam issue. While
Amirthalingam was exploited by the RAW personnel and in turn Iell
prey to their designs and paid with his liIe, Pirabhakaran was intelligent
enough to outwit the RAW operatives by his quick reading oI their
minds.
Jayaratnam Wilson, a keen observer oI Eelam Tamil politics Ior
decades, had noted the scenario during 1983-86 as Iollows:
'At various times, to my knowledge, Indian policy makers had
contemplated intervention |in Sri Lanka|, and plans had been
drawn up to that end. This had given hope to the TULF and the
leaders oI the Tamil militant groups. Whether this was done
deliberately in order to mislead the Tamil leaders can only be
conjectured, but the result oI such aid being oIIered was that the
Tamil leaders placed all their eggs in one basket the Indian
one. |Book: The Break-Up of Sri Lanka, C.Hurst & Co,
London, 1988, pp.203-204|
Wilson continues Iurther:
'The Research and Analysis Wing oI the Indian government
(known as RAW, the counterpart oI the CIA and KGB) was
active in promoting this view, and its agents inIiltrated the Tamil
groups. Apart Irom obtaining valuable and conIidential
inIormation, these agents set Tamil groups against one another so
as to create a balance and thus prevent any one group Irom
obtaining dominance over the others. RAW succeeded at Iirst,
but Iinally Iailed to prevent the LTTE Irom gaining the upper
hand. |ibid|
In my assessment, this is where, Pirabhakaran scored over
Amirthalingam. As I had pointed in my 1989 eulogy to Amirthalingam,
though being a conIessed and practising Gandhian, he did not value the
use oI silence` and allowed RAW operatives to inIiltrate his mind. II
Amirthalingam had to be Iaulted Ior his mis-steps, it is because since
1981 rather than being an active leader, he played the role oI a parrot
in the Tamil Iolk metaphor Ilavu kaatha Killi |the parrot which
awaited Ior the cotton Iruit to ripen|. He depended on the power oI
Indira Gandhi to liberate Eelam, and when she was assassinated on
October 31, 1984, Amirthalingam`s dream got busted like the
metaphorical cotton Iruit.
Also, the timing oI Amirthalingam`s assassination (when he had re-
entered the Sri Lankan parliament aIter a lapse oI more than Iive
years, on the National List oI TULF Iollowing his sojourn in Madras)
suggests that India`s intelligence operatives would have Ielt
uncomIortable about him revealing` bits oI embarrassing inIormation
about their dealings with him in the parliament. It is well known among
the students oI espionage, that Intelligence operatives wish to hide their
tracks, and they are apprehensive about their contacts and sources`
spilling the beans at inappropriate occasions. The trans-national arrest
oI Panama`s dictator Manuel Noreiga (a long-term paid source Ior
CIA) by President George Bush Sr. (a Iormer director oI CIA, who
had shared some secrets with Noreiga) to keep him silent and at distant
Irom public glare was a best example. Similarly, the elimination oI
PLOTE`s Uma Maheswaran Iollowing Amirthalingam`s assassination
in 1989 and even LTTE`s Kittu in 1993 by the actions instigated by
RAW have to be viewed Irom this angle as well. Though I have
reIrained Irom commenting on why V.Yogeswaran was assassinated
along with Amirthalingam, the answer could be that his was a
collateral damage` as they say in military lingo.
RAW`s dry run` on targeting TULF leaders to implicate
Pirabhakaran
It is my proposition that the double assassinations oI Amirthalingam
and Yogeswaran in 1989 in Colombo was not an isolated event. It was
preceded by a dry run` (a term, the Indian sleuths came to tag on
LTTE, Iollowing Rajiv Gandhi assassination in 1991) conducted in
1985 in JaIIna. Thus, one cannot ignore the victims oI this dry run`,
namely V.Dharmalingam and M.Alalasundaram. Dharmalingam had
served Eelam Tamils Ior 23 years as the MP Ior Uduvil (1960-1977)
and then Manipay (1977-83). Alalasundaram was a nominated MP Ior
Kopay (1981-83), Iollowing the death oI S.Kathiravelupillai in 1981.
Again, the attempted scapegoat Ior the killings oI Dharmalingam and
Alalasundaram was none other than Pirabhakaran.
I present two versions which have appeared on the assassinations oI
Dharmalingam and Alalasundaram. The Iirst version is Irom Indian
journalist, Narayan Swamy, since he has covered in detail, the
circumstances oI this assassination. The second version is Irom the
Broken Palmvra scribes, who had pointed out the assassins.
Narayan Swamy has described:
'|Rajiv| Gandhi was Iar Irom happy at the way things were
developing in Sri Lanka. He told a journalist: The real problem is
violence in Sri Lanka, and although it is sparked by the Tamil
groups, the major part oI the violence is on the part oI the |Sri
Lankan| security Iorces.
Just then, a mysterious twin murder took place in JaIIna. For
once, the security Iorces were not responsible. The victims were
Iormer TULF MPs M.Alalasundaram and V.Dharmalingam.
Although the murders were eventually linked to TELO, the crime
itselI has remained one oI the unresolved mysteries oI the Eelam
campaign.
On September 2 |1985|, two young men went to
Alalasundaram`s house and requested Ior character certiIicates.
As Alalasundaram turned to go inside, the visitors pounced on
him and dragged him into a waiting car. The kidnappers then
went to a marriage which Dharmalingam was attending and told
him that Alalasundaram wanted to see him. When he came near
the car, he too was pushed in and the young men vanished with
the two politicians.
Dharmalingam`s body was Iound the next day near a cemetery
with a bullet in the Iorehead. A handwritten note Iound nearby
said: This is the punishment Ior those who betray the Tamil race
and those who pawn Eelam, especially the TULF.` It was signed:
Tamils with SelI-Respect`. Alalasundaram`s body had two bullet
wounds in the chest and arms and was recovered Irom JaIIna
town.
The killings sent shock waves throughout Tamil areas, in
particular JaIIna. Dharmalingam was one oI the most respected
Tamil politicians who had quit the TULF and joined the more
radical TELF, but had been expelled. He was a man oI simple
habits, known Ior his generous heart, his only luxury being a
cycle. He was known to have helped many poor children get
admitted into schools by paying Ior their education. People
approached him with all kinds oI problems. Alalasundaram, an
advocate oI the Supreme Court, was also politically active in
JaIIna. When he was killed, he hardly had any money worth
speaking oI. He had to sell his wiIe`s jewellery when his daughter
wanted a bicycle.
The Indian government expressed shock and distress.
Dharmalingam`s son, Siddharthan, who was with PLOT, blamed
the killings on one oI the groups that comprise the Eelam
National Liberation Front`. Gandhi complained that, certain
Tamil extremists were killing other Tamils`. The TELO joined in
the growing condemnation, and in a statement hoped that no
organization involved in the liberation struggle was involved`.
Strong rumours attributed to both the Sri Lankan government and
Indian intelligence, pointed the accusing Iinger at the LTTE,
which had two years previously shot at Alalasundaram in the leg
on alleged charges oI corruption. The Tigers vehemently denied
the accusation. Initially, Iew believed them. |Book: Tigers of
Lanka, 1996, pp.160-161|
Now, to the analysis oI the Broken Palmvra scribes:
'It was well known that Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, and Sri
Sabaratnam, the TELO leader hated each other. The
assassination oI TULF MPs Mr.Dharmalingam and
Mr.Alalasundaram oI 2 August 1985 |Note: August is an error.
September was correct|, is an example oI the methods by which
one militant group tried to score over the others.
Mr.Dharmalingam and Mr.Alalasundaram were amongst the
TULF MPs who continued to reside in JaIIna. On the basis oI
testimonies given by several persons who had talked to TELO
exiles in India, it is believed that this is how it happened. The
LTTE leader Prabhakaran reportedly made a strong threatening
speech against the TULF. Sri Sabaratnam, the TELO leader,
then gave secret instructions to his men to assassinate the two
MPs expecting that Prabhakaran would get the blame and
discredit. As expected the LTTE was largely blamed.
In an independent testimony, a PLOTE sentry near
Mr.Dharmalingam`s residence identiIied a vehicle in which the
assassins came as belonging to the TELO. |Book: Broken
Palmvra, 1990, p.75|
While both Narayan Swamy and the Broken Palmvra scribes had
indicated that TELO was responsible Ior the assassinations oI
Dharmalingam and Alalasundaram, Ior reasons oI propriety or
convenience, they have not digged Iurther to inIorm on whose
instructions TELO carried out this attack on the Tamil legislators. It
was an open secret to Eelam Tamils that TELO had been turned into
the puppet oI RAW operatives, and as inIerred by the Broken Palmvra
scribes the motive Ior those two assassinations was to smear the image
oI Pirabhakaran who resisted being controlled by those RAW
operatives.
RAW in the mold of CIA
Like humans, institutions which are built by humans also, Iollowing
birth, undergo the phases oI inIancy, adolescence, maturity and
senility. The RAW was Iormed by Indira Gandhi in 1968, along the
lines oI the inIamous CIA, which was constituted in 1947. The RAW
had tasted success in its inIancy stage when it created` Bangladesh
Irom Pakistan in 1971. Then, its turn oI playing in the Sri Lankan Iield
opened in 1983 due to the bungling oI J.R.Jayewardene.
In this context, beIore answering why the RAW operatives could have
been the conspirators Ior the assassinations oI Dharmalingam and
Alalasundaram, I wish to provide some background on the activities oI
RAW, as I had culled Irom a review article penned by Capt.S.M.Hali,
to the Defence Journal (the monthly magazine oI Armed Forces oI
to the Defence Journal (the monthly magazine oI Armed Forces oI
Pakistan) oI Feb-March 1999. It was entitled, 'Raw at War Genesis
oI Secret Agencies in Ancient India. Hali himselI has picked up
segments oI cited inIormation Irom a 1981 book Inside RAW (Vikas
Publishing, New Delhi) by Asoka Raina. According to these sources,
1. The prime objective oI RAW is to monitor the political and
military developments in all adjoining countries, which have
direct bearing on India`s national security and in the Iormulation
oI its Ioreign policy.
2. RAW has been organized on the lines oI the CIA.
3. The Iunctions oI RAW vary according to the target. The main
ones being, Collection oI InIormation, Collation oI InIormation
and Aggressive Intelligence. The last category includes
espionage, psychological warIare, subversion, sabotage,
terrorism and creating dissension, insurgency and, ultimately
insurrection to destabilize the target country.
4. The modus operandi oI RAW include India`s Ioreign missions,
Multinationals, Media, Collaboration with other espionage
agencies, Third country technique (i.e., obtaining inIormation
and operating through third countries), and last but not the least,
spotting and recruitment.
5. Under the recruitment category, Hali notes, 'RAW operatives
are on the lookout Ior local recruits to serve their ends. Acting
on the Chanakyan principles, they tend to exploit human
weaknesses Ior wine, women and wealth, and, at times resort to
blackmail. Separatist tendencies and ethnic or sectarian
sensitivities are also well known grounds Ior manipulation.
Capt.Hali`s description oI RAW exploiting human weaknesses Ior
wine, women and wealth` deserves note in relation to the assassination
oI President Premadasa, Ior which LTTE has been accused without
deIinite prooI, other than the correlational evidence that a suicide
bomber was the assassin. This purported assassin Babu oIIering sexual
Iavor to Premadasa`s valet-cum-masseur E.M.P. Mohideen was
reported by the media |I learnt this Irom the AFP news reports, which
appeared in the Japan Times and Mainichi Dailv News oI Tokyo oI
June 5, 1993|. While alive, Premadasa himselI had suspected that
RAW operatives were aiming Ior his liIe due to his well-known
antipathy against Indian policies in South Asia. With time, details
related to this sex trap episode` enmeshing Premadasa assassination as
well as who gave the order to the Colombo Municipal Council`s Fire
Brigade to wash the scene oI assassination thereby covering the vital
Iorensic clues, have been hushed up by the Sri Lankan media.
Iorensic clues, have been hushed up by the Sri Lankan media.
Those who have studied the history oI CIA remember well that CIA
gained its notoriety when it reached the adolescent phase during the
late 1950s and 1960s by plotting the overthrows and assassinations oI
leaders who were perceived to be anti-American. Plotting the
overthrows and assassinations oI Indonesia`s Sukarno, Congo`s
Lumumba and Cuba`s Castro had become part and parcel oI the
CIA`s clumsy history. For these activities marking the adolescent
phase oI an Intelligence Agency, I provide a label the adolescent
itch` oI espionage. Like human adolescents, who crave Ior recognition
Irom adults by indulging in adult activities such as smoking cigarettes,
boozing, and patronizing prostitutes, some oI the proIessional Irolics oI
intelligence operatives also border on incredulity. Promoting
assassinations in territories beyond its own land has become an
adolesent initiation rite` Ior Intelligence agencies to receive
recognition` among their peers.
Nathan Miller, in his book Spving for America The Hidden Historv
of U.S. Intelligence (1989) provides some examples such as the CIA
making a pornographic movie with an actor wearing Sukarno mask,
and spraying the TV studio with a chemical where Castro was to give
a speech so that Castro would lose his charismatic appeal or dusting
his shoes with a chemical to damage his beard. There is paucity oI
such material Ior RAW`s activities, though I have no doubt that
Pirabhakaran may be willing to share with Eelam Tamils, some oI the
hilarious deeds` oI RAW operatives in the Iuture. But, the 47-year old
K.V.Unnikrishnan, the RAW`s top Iield oIIicer in Madras Ialling prey
to the honey-pot` trap oI CIA`s and Sri Lankan intelligence team in
1985-86 was an embarrassing episode in the annals oI Indian
intelligence wallahs. |Salamat Ali`s report Sex Ior secrets: An Indian
oIIicial is caught in the leaking act`, Far Eastern Economic Review,
October 15, 1987, p.40|. This was a classic case oI a hunter being
caught by his own trap.
Probable conspirator for the Dharmalingam and Alalasundaram
assassinations
I mention this particular exposure since Salamat Ali has reported that,
'BeIore his arrest |in 1987|, Unnikrishnan headed the RAW`s
operation in Madras and was directly in charge oI Indian dealings
with Sri Lankan Tamil militants based in the south Indian state oI
Tamil Nadu. Although he was not part oI the decision-making
apparatus, as Iield coordinator oI Tamil militants he was privy to
most oI the details oI the secret negotiations involving New Delhi,
Colombo and the militant Tamil groups. |ibid|
Colombo and the militant Tamil groups. |ibid|
It is my guess that this Unnikrishnan could have been a probable
conspirator Ior the 1985 assassinations oI Dharmalingam and
Alalasundaram. According to Salamat Ali,
'During a tenure in Colombo as the RAW`s representative six
years ago |i.e. in 1981|, he had become Iriendly with an
unnamed US consular oIIicial and, together with him, engaged in
several extra-marital aIIairs with unidentiIied women. Despite
these sexual escapades, he was apparently a hen-pecked husband
and his alleged American contact knew that Unnikrishnan was
mortally aIraid oI his wiIe.
AIter his return to India, he was brieIly stationed in New Delhi
beIore moving to Madras. Sometime in 1985, a woman
describing herselI as a stewardess with Pan American Airways
telephoned him Irom Bombay to say that his American consular
Iriend had told her to contact him iI she Ielt lonely. Unnikrishnan
Ilew Irom Madras to Bombay and a liaison developed between
the two. During 1985-86, she gave him complimentary air tickets
to Ily to Singapore. During those jaunts in Singapore,
compromising photographs oI the stewardess and her lover were
taken. |ibid|
The adolescent itch` oI organizing assassinations became unbearable
Ior the RAW operatives by mid 1980s and the TULF leaders
(Dharmalingam, Alalasundaram, Amirthalingam and Yogeswaran)
became sitting ducks between 1985 and 1989. Unlike other young
Tamil militants, only Pirabhakaran reIused to tango to the tune oI
these RAW operatives, because he had a vision oI his own.
The Sri Lankan link to the Unnikrishnan honey-pot trap has been
provided by none other than J.N.Dixit. He is a seasoned pro that he
doesn`t even mention RAW by name in his memoirs. To quote him,
'In some oI my discussions with Lalith Athulathmudali in the Iirst
halI oI 1986, I Ielt that he was extraordinarily well inIormed
about the personalities in our intelligence agencies and in the
Ministry oI External AIIairs at headquarters who were dealing
with Sri Lankan aIIairs. I reported these perceptions to Delhi.
The general comment which I conveyed was that the Sri Lankan
mission in Delhi and the Sri Lankan Deputy High Commission in
Madras seemed to be very eIIective in gathering inIormation and
operational intelligence. In the event, my being impressed by the
eIIiciency oI the Sri Lankan diplomatic missions was misplaced.
The Sri Lankan source oI inIormation was a senior operative oI
The Sri Lankan source oI inIormation was a senior operative oI
our own intelligence agency, Unnikrishnan, who had been
subverted most probably by the Americans through a Ioreign lady
working Ior Pan-American Airlines. His negative activities were
discovered sometime towards the middle oI 1986, which was
Iollowed by appropriate procedural action against him. The Iact
that the Sri Lankan Government`s advance knowledge about
Indian policies and intentions clearly diminished aIter
Unnikrishnan was neutralized proved that he was a major source
oI inIormation to the Sri Lankans. |Book: Assignment Colombo,
1998, p.61|
Like the military lingo, the diplomatic euphemism is also colorIul.
Kindly note the lingo used by Dixit such as negative activities`,
procedural action` and neutralized`. It is reasonable to inIer that in
this honey-pot trap episode, only Pirabhakaran came out without a
tarnished image, due to his innate intelligence and precautionary steps
in keeping away Irom the RAW operatives.
Thus, it is my contention that though technically the Indo-LTTE war
came to a close with the departure oI Indian army Irom the island in
March 1990, the war oI India`s RAW and other Intelligence agencies
against Pirabhakaran`s LTTE has continued Ior the next ten years.
Rajiv Gandhi assassination case trial (1992-99), capture oI MJ.Ahat
by the Indian navy which precipitated the death oI Kittu in 1993,
Interpol notices (1995) and other routine assassination plots` oI LTTE
released to the press were all maniIestations oI this continuing
undeclared war` oI RAW against LTTE. In the Iorthcoming chapters,
I plan to analyze each oI these issues. (Continued)
sangam.orgf.fPart23.htm 1+f1+

Part 24
Sachi Sri Kantha
24 November 2001]
Surviving the Plots of RAW and Premadasa
Rajani Thiranagama`s Assassination
BeIore I introduce my research Iindings on the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination, a theme which I have studied Ior over 10 years, I like to
present my thoughts on the Rajani Thiranagama assassination oI
September 1989, which also has eluded clean Iindings.
Rajani Thiranagama was an acquaintance (not close enough to call a
Iriend) oI me during my undergraduate years at the University oI
Colombo during 1974-75. Then, she was Rajani Rajasingam, a
medical student who actively took part in the cultural activities oI the
Colombo Campus Tamil Society, Ior which I served as the President
in 1975. She was an year junior to me, though I was in the Faculty oI
Science and she was aIIiliated to the Faculty oI Medicine. Then, the
Colombo Campus Tamil Society incorporated all the Tamil
undergraduates belonging to the Medical, Natural Science, Social
Science and Law Iaculties. It had a nearly 550-member strength.
Thus, her assassination was oI personal interest to me, other than its
political and social signiIicance.
According to the literature generated by Rajan Hoole, A leading anti-
Pirabhakaran activist, Dr.Rafani Thiranagama` was assassinated on
September 21, 1989 by the LTTE. First I quote his belieI, as
presented in his 1997 Ieature entitled, SuIIocation oI truth and its
political implications`. Then, I present the more extensive details Irom
a British correspondent, which Rajan Hoole himselI has cited |but not
included in his Ieature Ior reasons known only to him| Ior shedding
light into this unsolved assassination oI the JaIIna university academic.
Not many Eelam Tamils would have read what this British
correspondent wrote in 1990.
Rajan Hoole had written:
'Even on the very day she |Dr.Rajani Thiranagama| was
murdered, bicycle mechanics and tea boutique keepers were
saying that it was the LTTE who killed her.
saying that it was the LTTE who killed her.
The commemoration lasting three days was Iixed to begin two
months aIter the murder, on November 21, 1989. Once it clearly
dawned on everyone that the LTTE were the killers and that the
Indian Army was pulling out, it Iell to UTHR(J) to organize under
its aegis, while the staII unions lent their support. It was an
ambitious plan, a long Iling and as it turned out, a game oI
brinkmanship. But it worked.
The LTTE started showing an interest openly only when the
delegates began arriving on November 20. The commemoration
ran its course as planned while the LTTE had to be content
Iilming the proceedings Ior use in Iuture intelligence work. Its
nervousness about the proceedings was reIlected in its long
statement oI denial distributed on the occasion aIter a two
months silence, leaving little doubt as to who the killers were.
In just under a year Irom the commemoration, the last active
member oI the UTHR(J) at home, narrowly evaded LTTE
abduction squads trailing him and Iled the North in riII-raII
disguise. |Sundav Observer, Colombo, Oct.26, 1997|
Now, to the description about a British acquaintance oI Hoole, who
came to cover the liIe oI Rajani Thiranama.
'In January 1990, on the initiative oI an English activist who
came Ior the commemoration and was active in the British
Labour Party, the late John Merit oI the London Observer
arrived in JaIIna to do` a story on Rajini against the current
situation in JaIIna. He had been Iully brieIed oI what we knew.
HimselI a Roman Catholic, he posed the question to Bishop
Deogupillai oI JaIIna. We killed Rajani?` |Note bv Sachi: I
believe that this is a printer`s devil replacing Who` with We`.|
The Bishop replied that the people say it is a party close to the
Indian Army. Merit responded, Whom do you say Killed
Rajani?` I have to believe what the people say`, said the Bishop.
We were taken aback as John Merit was.
It was the time the Indian Army had begun its pull-out Irom
JaIIna. I say this not to Iault the Bishop. He was among the more
solid Iigures in JaIIna, had absolutely no sympathy Ior the LTTE
and the bad press he had received in the South over the years
was totally undeserved. It was simply based on the paranoia
reserved Ior any Tamil who spoke up against the actions oI the
state.|ibid|
By Hoole`s acknowledgement, Bishop Deogupillai 'had absolutelv no
svmpathv for the LTTE`. Even then, in his interview with John
Merritt, the Bishop did not indulge in insinuation that LTTE was
behind the assassination oI Rajani Thiranagama, |probably since he
wished to preserve his reputation|. But Hoole hasn`t been blessed with
the restraint the then learned Bishop Deogupillai had, probably because
they Iollowed diIIerent agendas. Another point noted by Hoole also
deserves attention. Even iI a respected Tamil like archbishop
Deogupillai (who doesn`t identiIy with LTTE) takes an independent
stand oI not demonizing LTTE in public, he or she will be smeared
with bad press in the |Sinhala| South` oI the island.
Now, to the Ieature John Merritt wrote to the London Observer,
which appeared in April 29, 1990. In this Ieature, John Merritt had
interviewed Rajani`s parents and archbishop Deogupillai, and they
were not sure on who were the murderers oI Rajani. One could guess
that they were either diplomatic` in not pointing the Iingers on the
LTTE Ior reasons oI personal saIety or they really were not sure
about Rajani`s assassins. However, Mr. Rajasingham, Rajani`s Iather,
had pointedly accused the Indian army as well as Sri Lankan army Ior
destroying many oI Rajani`s writings, reports and their Iamily
possessions. The question arises, that iI he was diplomatic enough, he
wouldn`t have bothered to even accuse the Indian army or the Sri
Lankan army directly in his comments to John Merritt. But he was
Iorthright in mentioning how these two agencies have harassed them
and Rajani.
Readers should take note that John Merritt is not an enlightened
Bertrand Russell. Thus, there is a dimension oI typical British colonial
condescension in the tone oI his description, including the pejorative
caption oI his piece, The Battle Ior No Man`s Land`.
As has stated by Rajan Hoole in 1997, Merritt`s trip to JaIIna was
sponsored by the human rights activists with whom Rajani became
acquainted, while in Britain; thus, obligatory appreciative notes` Ior
the unnamed small group oI people` who were toiling under hardship
as well as depreciative notes` Ior the violent-ridden LTTE, have been
sprinkled like raisins in the cake, Ior consumption. Also,
Pirabhakaran`s name is not mentioned even once in the entire Ieature,
though a couple oI quotes Irom Anton Balasingham are noted.
Despite these limitations, John Merritt`s article on Rajani deserve
citation in extenso, since it includes the views oI Rajani`s parents and
the then Roman Catholic Archbishop oI JaIIna, the Right Revd.
Theogu Pillai on who assassinated Rajani. Excerpts:
The Battle for No Man`s Land
On the Assassination oI Rajani Thiranagama:
'.She is just one oI an estimated 30,000 people killed last year
|1989| alone in a country where murder comes second only to
massacres. And, when the precise nature oI every successive
brutality seems to compete with the last to deIy imagination, her
death was relatively clean. Yet beside one oI her pictures
someone had posed the sort oI question it is no longer usual to
ask: Who Killed Rajani?`
Rajani Thiranagama was a 35-year old doctor, teacher and
mother oI two young girls, 11-year-old Narmadha and nine-year-
old Sharika. But it was a diIIerent vocation that led to her
death.
On 21 September last year she was shot dead while cycling home
Irom JaIIna University, where she was Head oI the Anatomy
Department. She had just Iinished marking the last oI her
students` Iinal exam papers. Her killer struck at about 6pm on the
quietest spot in her 15-minute journey. He had the time, when
she Iell aIter the Iirst shot, to Iire Iour more bullets into Rajani`s
head. Two students saw the killer cycle oII; they managed to
persuade the reluctant driver oI a passing car to take her to
hospital. But she was dead on arrival, and the students ran away
without leaving their names.
Like most oI the killings in a country where government
regulations conveniently permit the disposal oI bodies without
any inquiry, her murder has never been investigated. Rajani`s
mother, Mahilaruppiam, says: People say my Rajani was Ioolish.
They say she should have stuck to her work and stayed quiet
about the killings. But she couldn`t see anyone suIIer and she
couldn`t accept the young people carrying guns. She said all
killing was wrong whoever did it, Ior whatever reason. And
now we have lost our child and her children have lost their
mother`.
Rajani, a Christian Tamil, had lived through the Sri Lankan
government`s slow ruin oI the island`s Tamil minority, with its
weapons oI stark deprivation and the suppression oI the Tamil
language in Iavour oI the Sinhalese spoken by two thirds oI the
country`s 16 million population. When the pace speeded up it
was natural that she should identiIy with the aspirations Ior
survival and selI-determination embodied by the Liberation
Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, the LTTE-popularly known as The
Boys`. But then she saw, and began to speak against, the Tigers`
degeneration into what she believed was a purely militaristic
degeneration into what she believed was a purely militaristic
organization, exploiting the youth, with a callous disregard Ior the
people`.
Views of Rajani`s parents:
Her mother still talks oI Rajani in the present. You see, my
Rajani wants to see the killings stop and she has to side with
those who don`t carry guns`. AIter church on Sunday
Mahilaruppiam sits with her husband, Rajasingam, a Iormer
college and hospital administrator, on the long veranda now
overlooked by an LTTE camp in a house commandeered Irom
relatives who have Iled abroad. She says: We are Irightened, so
it is better not to be sure about who killed her. We are too old to
leave. Perhaps there is no point in blame, we won`t get our child
back.`
Rajasingam points to the LTTE camp: For more than a year,
beIore the Tigers were there, the Indian Peace Keeping Force
(IPKF) occupied that property. They took away Rajani`s writings
and the reports she had compiled on the killings. BeIore that, the
Sri Lankan army came here and destroyed many oI our
possessions and took away our Iamily photographs`. Government
Iorces were hunting Rajani`s older sister, a Iormer English tutor
at JaIIna University and now a reIugee in Britain, who was
arrested with two doctors and a priest and accused oI harbouring
members oI the LTTE. She was one oI the Iew survivors oI a
subsequent prison massacre oI hundreds oI suspects`.
So you see, what does it mean to ask who killed our Rajani,
when everyone is killing everyone?` Rajasingam asks. Rajani
was perhaps too honest. She once leIt a university senate meeting
in tears because the university authorities wouldn`t agree to an
inquiry into the murders oI students by government and Indian
Iorces.`
Rajani`s actions against the wishes oI the Indian army operatives:
'Singlehanded she |Rajani| had reopened the university two
years earlier |in 1987| when it was occupied by the IPKF, oIten
staying aIter curIew to organize repairs to the bomb damage.
Eventually her colleagues were persuaded to return by her
conviction that we must show a will oI our own to make our
own Iuture`. In a note to the vice-chancellor the day she
returned, she simply stated: There is no liIe Ior me apart Irom
my people so here I am`.
The Tigers had perhaps been the best hope the downtrodden
Tamils had, the teeth iI not the voice oI the oppressed, the
only group to oIIer eIIective resistance against genocide. Their
only group to oIIer eIIective resistance against genocide. Their
appeal in the north and east oI the island grew in direct
proportion to the barbarity oI the Indian and government Iorces.
Rajani was active in exposing and documenting the atrocities, the
limbs cut Irom live youths on saw benches, the crushing oI heads
under the wheels oI armoured vehicles, immersions in acid, rapes
and strangulations, the dismembered bodies draped Irom trees
and telegraph poles and the bullet-riddled corpses smouldering on
piles oI burning tyres by the roadsides.
But she became equally concerned with similar excesses by the
Tigers and their role in the militarisation oI the youth, as many oI
the LTTE`s young idealists died or grew disillusioned and leIt the
country.
Popular support Ior the Tigers grew when the IPKF arrived to
keep the peace` in July 1987. Their initials came to stand Ior
Indian People Killing Force`, as they massacred civilians,
including those in hospitals and reIugee camps, and subcontracted
the butchery to bands oI anti-Tiger, anti-government Tamil
militias. These Indian-trained and armed groups added to the
proliIeration oI paramilitary organizations throughout the island,
groups with two things in common: a blind pursuit oI murder that
made everybody someone`s enemy, and the word Liberation` in
their convoluted titles.
When doctors were too Irightened to reveal an IPKF massacre at
JaIIna Hospital in October 1987 which leIt 70 staII and patients
dead, and were even aIraid publicly to commemorate their dead
colleagues, Rajani interviewed survivors.
With a handIul oI other women, Rajani cycled throughout the
region, collecting inIormation on the murders and tortures, and on
the rapes that are a widespread but shameIully hidden
consequence oI the conIlicts. She listed the experiences oI the
mothers and young girls, counseling them and giving them
whatever they needed Irom whatever she had.
Merritt`s suggested motives of LTTE for killing Rajani:
AIter describing such actions oI Rajani, Merritt also had recorded that
'Rajani came to be regarded as a traitor by the Tigers. Her mother
says, They used to say oI her, Even when an Indian soldier dies she
will cry`. According to Merritt, what sealed the Iate oI Rajani was the
planned publication oI The Broken Palmvra the early copies oI
which had begun to circulate underground three months beIore
Rajani`s murder`. But Merritt tactIully omitted providing the vital
answer in the aIIirmative. Rather, he had attempted the answer to
answer in the aIIirmative. Rather, he had attempted the answer to
arrive Irom the mouth oI Rev.Deogupillai. The then spiritual shepherd
oI JaIIna`s 150,000 Roman Catholic Ilock had responded to the vital
question as Iollows:
' They say the Indians or someone did it. She |Rajani| was a bit
outspoken you know. It is no use complaining nothing happens. The
people know that.` But what is his own opinion? I don`t have one` he
says. It is best not to. Will you drink your tea?
In sum, contrary to what Rajan Hoole believes, Merritt has provided
adequate details |especially via the impressions oI Rajani`s Iather and
Rev.Deogupillai| Ior pointing the accusatory Iinger oI Rajani`s murder
to the Indian Intelligence wallahs. II there is truth in Rajan Hoole`s
assertion that Senkathir, a protege oI Mahattaya, was the assassin oI
Rajani Thiranagama, it aligns well with the proposition that she was
eliminated by the actions oI Indian Intelligence-wallahs who had Iorged
links to the then Mahattaya Iaction oI the LTTE.
Mahattaya`s Role as a RAW`s Mole: My View
On Mahattaya`s role as a RAW`s mole, I can only present what I had
gathered Irom circumstantial evidence. Previously I have cited an
intelligence memorandum submitted by one oI India`s intelligence
agencies to the Jain Commission |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
part 19|. This document, prepared by the operatives around mid
1987, was made public in only in 1997. Unless documents oI such
conIirmatory value surIace, how and when RAW operatives trapped
Mahattaya to neutralize Pirabhakaran cannot be determined precisely.
But, one can surmise that by July 1989, when Amirthalingam,
Yogeswaran and Uma Maheswaran were assassinated and there
appeared the RAW-planted premature obituary oI Pirabhakaran |see,
The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 1|, Mahattaya seems to have
capitulated to the viles oI operatives practising the second oldest
proIession.
In this context, I wish to provide excerpts Irom a published 1992 letter
oI mine, which was critical on the views oI N.Ram, the Chennai
busybody cum journalist. To quote,
'.Regarding his current status on the Eelam issue, Ram has
observed, Indian policy has become somewhat inert and
inactive. So there is no question oI my playing a role. Because I
don`t play an independent role. It is part oI a policy response.`
Ram uses words like policy`, assessment` and mistakes`
euphemistically to hide the role initiated and played by the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian counterpart oI
CIA and KGB. II Ram had stated openly on the Iailure oI the
RAW to inIiltrate the LTTE (rather than reIerring to it passively
as For one thing they were not accessible`), and his relationship
with the RAW, I would have admired his courage and conviction.
His antagonism to the LTTE is understandable, iI one separates
the kernel Irom the chaII. LTTE was (and still is) the only Tamil
militant group which the RAW personnel could not manipulate to
dance according to the whims oI the Indian policy mandarins.
|Tamil Times, October 15, 1992|
In response to this communication, I received an unsolicited,
anonymous letter, dated 10 February 1994, Irom a Tamil
correspondent Irom Australia. This letter criticized me Ior my then
ignorantly-held belieI that LTTE was impenetrable to the spookish
pranks oI RAW. This correspondent, who used to send me
anonymous letters had been a reader oI my writings published in the
Tamil Times, Tamil Nation and Lanka Guardian oI the early 1990s.
In one oI his letters, he had identiIied himselI as having worked in the
Lake House group oI newspapers in the early 1980s, but Ior reasons
known to him never had the courage to identiIy himselI to me so that I
could respond to him. For reasons unknown to me, he also had a gripe
on LTTE. He wrote,
'Dear Mr.Sri Kantha,
In your letter to the Tamil Times oI 15 October 1992, you
mentioned that LTTE was the only group which the RAW
personnel could not manipulate to dance according to the whims
oI Indian policy mandarins. But iI one were to go by a news item
in Kalathil oI 14 January 1994, LTTE`s second-in-command,
Mahataya, his body guard Suresh and another person code-
named Engineer` are now under investigation Ior their alleged
clandestine links with the RAW.
Some oI my Iriends, who were in Colombo during December 93
- January 94, on holidays, quoting people who had come to
Colombo Irom JaIIna said Mahataya, Yogi, and 74 others are
now kept under house-guard at Kalvayal, close to
Chavakachcheri, Ior the said oIIence. In other words, your
contention that LTTE was (and is?) an impenetrable monolith (iI
Kalathil`s statement was correct) has gone awry.
I wish to inIorm you that popular belieI among many Tamils in
Australia is that the so-called Mahataya`s RAW connection was a
Australia is that the so-called Mahataya`s RAW connection was a
trumped-up charge leveled at Mahataya by Prabhakaran so as to
eliminate Mahataya Irom LTTE`s leadership. These Tamils say
Prabhakaran would never countenance any one getting popular in the
LTTE, nor would he permit any leadership challenge to him.
My correspondent was entitled to his opinion on Pirabhakaran. But the
question arises, whether Pirabhakaran was so dumb not to know about
what was happening behind his back, to the organization he Iounded.
Was he unaware oI the premature obituary which was circulated by
the RAW operatives to promote Mahattaya in 1989 and cause
conIusion among Tamils in Eelam and Tamil Nadu? The observation
on Mahattaya by the Broken Palmvra scribes in 1990 is relevant here.
To quote,
'Mahattaya had a childhood steeped in want. He is very much a
loner and is not much oI a public man. Mahattaya is once said to
have had serious diIIerences with Prabhakaran. These appear to
have been patched up. Those who beIriended him in old times
can perhaps claim a hint oI loyalty that did not quite approach
Iriendship. He would be suspicious oI the kind oI ties Iormed by
Kittu. |Book: Broken Palmvra, 1990, p.183|
Thus, to be Iair by Pirabhakaran, considering the time lag between
mid-1989 and end oI 1993, during which
a. he had allowed Mahattaya adequate media limelight in 1990 Ior
Premadasa-LTTE peace negotiations, to speak on behalI oI
LTTE,
b. he had been publicised as the Iirst accused by the Indian
operatives in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial, without
Mahattaya being named within the list oI 41 accused persons
presented to the public in May 1992, and
c. he had lost Kittu and his more than a dozen associates in January
1993 under suspicious circumstances in high seas in an encounter
with the Indian navy,
with hindsight one can inIer that Pirabhakaran had knowingly or
unknowingly tolerated the clandestine links Mahattaya had with the
RAW operatives`. II he had tolerated unknowingly, then it shows that
Pirabhakaran trusted Mahattaya Ior a long time under much duress. II
he had tolerated knowingly, then it suggests that he allowed suIIicient
length oI time to accumulate prooI Ior his actions on punishing
Mahattaya and his associates.
V.Suryanarayan`s Version on Mahattaya
ProI.V.Suryanarayan, a regular commentator to the Chennai Frontline
magazine, can be labeled as one who is close to the RAW`s sphere oI
inIluence. In his 1999 analysis on the 1998 Heroes` Day address oI
Pirabhakaran to the Frontline`s readers, he has presented the view
which can only be transcribed Irom the RAW`s Iiles. This view is in
divergence to what I have scrutinized. To quote:
'President Ranasinghe Premadasa held negotiations with the
LTTE between May 1989 and June 1990. The two came
together because they Iound a convergence oI interests: to get the
IPKF out oI Sri Lanka.
The honeymoon lasted only until the IPKF leIt the island on
March 30, 1990. The vacuum leIt by the IPKF was Iilled by the
LTTE, which gained complete control oI the northeastern region.
AIter the IPKF leIt, Prabhakaran put Iorward two demands the
dissolution oI the North-Eastern Provincial Council and the repeal
oI the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The Government
rejected the demands and the Second Eelam War broke out. A
Iew months later Premadasa Iell victim to an LTTE suicide
squad. |Frontline magazine, Jan.16-29, 1999|
The last sentence is Iactually incorrect, unless Suryanarayan`s sense oI
the phrase Iew months` extends to more than 33 months. To be
precise, the Second Eelam War began in July 1990. Premadasa was
assassinated on May 1, 1993.
Sajith Premadasa`s Version on Mahattaya
On the negotiations President Premadasa had with LTTE during 1989-
90, I wish to cite a 1998 revelation, emerging Irom the President`s
son, Sajith Premadasa, a rising star in the current UNP.
Question by Roshan Peiris: 'It is reported that a Presidential
Commission is to be appointed to probe how vour father gave
arms to the LTTE. Anv comments?`
Sajith Premadasa: 'My Iather provided arms only to the LTTE
when deputy Mahattaya was emerging as a rival oI Velupillai
Prabhakaran. My Iather`s aim was to get Mahattaya to subvert
Prabhakaran. During World War II, Britain and the US gave
support to German generals who opposed Hitler. My Iather was
Iollowing a covert military strategy oI attempting to deIeat
Prabhakaran Irom within. |Sundav Times, Colombo, Oct.25,
1998|
This version was reiterated in a two page, anonymous commentary,
which appeared in the Economist magazine oI Dec.5, 1998. To quote,
'It was speciIically the Tiger`s leader, Mr Prabhakaran, some people
in the |Premadasa| government decided, who was the problem; he
should be killed. What happened then is disputed. Reportedly,
Ranasinghe Premadasa, who had become president in 1989, arranged
Ior the army to supply arms to the Tigers. For what? For dissident
rebels to use against Mr Prabhakaran, says the Iormer president`s son
Sajith. For the Tigers to use against the president`s enemies, say some
others. Whatever the truth, it was not Mr Prabhakaran who suIIered:
Mr Premadasa was killed by the Tigers in 1993.
While ignoring the judgemental claim in the latter halI oI the last
sentence |Ior which no irreIutable evidence has been presented in a Sri
Lankan court until now|, iI President Premadasa`s motives were to
promote Mahattaya against Pirabhakaran, as commented by his son
Sajith, then it reinIorces two points. One, the sinistral designs oI RAW
who had used Mahattaya to snoop on Premadasa`s strategy; the other
was Premadasa`s much recognized expertise in double-crossing
anyone, including Pirabhakaran, to advance his own agenda.
Being oblivious to this revelation, Chennai-based analyst Suryanarayan
also penned the RAW`s promotional line that,
'The LTTE also used the period during which it carried on
negotiations to carry Iorward its policy oI annihilation oI political
opponents. Thus, TULF leader A.Amirthalingam was killed while
the LTTE was holding talks with the Premadasa Government.
The group even justiIied the killing. In an interview to Mervyn de
Silva, Editor oI the Lanka Guardian, Mahattaya justiIied the
assassination oI Amirthalingam and his party colleague
Yogeswaran: They were killed not because they held views
diIIerent Irom that oI the LTTE, but because they were acting as
the agents oI India; in short, traitors, collaborators`. Ironically,
Mahattaya himselI was executed by Prabhakaran on the charge
oI being a RAW agent`. |ibid|
Even in 1999, Suryanarayan had omitted Irom mentioning some
secretive acts which RAW played between 1988-90. These include
items such as (1) who propped LTTE`s political opponents like the
EPRLF in 1988-90, (2) who were behind the establishment oI the
Tamil National Army (TNA) in 1990, (3) who promoted the
Mahattaya leadership by planting the story oI Pirabhakaran`s
premature obituary in 1989, and (4) who shielded Mahattaya`s name
Irom being listed in the LTTE accused list` oI Rajiv Gandhi
Irom being listed in the LTTE accused list` oI Rajiv Gandhi
assassination trial in 1992.
Fate of Mahattaya
On the Iate oI Mahattaya which Suryanarayan had alluded, the
Amnestv International Report oI August 1996 carried a Iew sentences,
as Iollows:
'It was also reported that Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah, alias
Mahattaya`, and several oI his supporters who were sentenced
to death in late 1993 had been executed. In an article published
on 29 November 1995 in the Indian magazine Outlook, an LTTE
spokesperson is quoted as having stated in early October 1995:
Mahattaya is no more. He was executed Ior plotting to kill
Prabhakaran |Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader oI the LTTE|`.
In late 1993 and early 1994, Amnesty International had called
upon the LTTE not to execute these prisoners and Ior them and
other political prisoners held by the LTTE to be granted
immediate and regular access to the ICRC.
I leave it Ior those such as Anton Balasingham, who had known both
Pirabhakaran and Mahattaya, to shed more light on the Mahattaya
episode, at appropriate time. |Continued|


Part 25
Sachi Sri Kantha
1 December 2001]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: Wading
through the Paper Maze
A review of my previous observations
II I`m permitted to use a well-worn Indian movie metaphor, the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination in May 1991 was a mega-hit` |no pun intended|.
Its implications Ior many disciplines such as sub-continental politics,
warIare, espionage, law, and last but not the least Iorensic science,
were oI epic proportions. Only the assassination oI the 35
th
American
president, John F.Kennedy in 1963, can be comparable to Rajiv
Gandhi assassinations Ior its multi-dimensional maze. Thus, Irom May
22, 1991, it had captured my interest. Between 1991 and 1994, I had
contributed nine brieI commentaries (to be precise, letters) to journals
and newspapers. These were as Iollows:
1. |Rajiv| Gandhi assassination. Lanka Guardian, Aug.1, 1991,
pp.21-22.
2. Looking Ior scapegoats. Far Eastern Economic Review,
Oct.3, 1991, p.7
3. Backed by the President |Premadasa|. Far Eastern
Economic Review, Nov.28, 1991.
4. Behind Rajiv Gandhi assassination. Japan Times, Jan.26,
1992, p.24.
5. The assassination oI John F.Kennedy and Rajiv Gandhi.
Tamil Nation (London), Mar.15, 1992, p.4
6. Truth elusive in Gandhi assassination. Asahi Evening News
(Tokyo), June 19, 1992, p.8
7. Assassinations oI John F.Kennedy and Rajiv Gandhi.
Mainichi Dailv News (Tokyo), June 25, 1992, p.2.
8. Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. Lanka Guardian, Oct.1,
1992, p.5
9. Political assassinations. Tamil Times (London), Dec.1994,
p.28
These were my initial observations, based on the inIormation which
appeared in the public domain until mid-1992, related to the purported
arrests and the charge-sheet prepared by the Indian investigators, in
charge oI the assassination. In my Aug.1, 1991 letter, published in the
Lanka Guardian, I commented on the (a) observations oI Lalith
Athulathmudali, (b) initial denial made by the Congress Party sources
that a Rajiv Gandhi-Kasi Anandan meeting on March 5, 1991 did not
take place in Rajiv`s private residence, and (c) the Colombo`s twist oI
the said meeting, as presented by the Deputy High Commissioner oI
Sri Lanka, who had met Rajiv Gandhi on March 10, 1991 at a public
Iunction, in which Gandhi had made some unappreciative remarks
about LTTE. In the published version oI my letter, my comparison oI
the stature oI poet Kasi Anandan to that oI Neelan Thiruchelvam
among young Tamils, was omitted by Mervyn de Silva. Thus the
Iollowing is the complete text oI my letter mailed to him on July 17,
1991.
Gandhi Assassination
[Lanka Guardian, Aug.1, 1991]
I wish to make the Iollowing comments regarding your coverage
oI the Gandhi assassination (LG, July 1).
(1) In your News Background, you quote Minister Lalith
Athulathmudali as stating that, Rajiv Gandhi may not have died iI
Mrs.Indira Gandhi had accepted the Sri Lankan proposal Ior joint
patrolling oI the Palk Straits. I wonder why minister
Athulathmudali`s memory has Iailed to see that Rajiv Gandhi was
given a second lease oI liIe on July 1987, only because the naval
rating who swung the gun at Gandhi in Colombo missed his
attempted target.
(2) The India Todav report which you republished calls poet Kasi
Anandan, the LTTE emissary to Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi, an
insigniIicant political Iigure among Sri Lankan Tamil circles.
Those three reporters who wrote the story have not checked their
Iacts. Between 1972 and 1976, Kasi Anandan was a political
prisoner under the Sirimavo Bandaranaike regime. He was one oI
the three political prisoners (other two were Maavai Senathirajah
and Vannai Ananthan) who symbolized the change in the
traditional Tamil political leadership. He tried to inIuse this
change by attempting to oust the veteran FP stalwart oI the
Eastern Province, C.Rajadurai in the 1977 general election. This
did create a headache Ior the TULF old guard and Kasi Anandan
did create a headache Ior the TULF old guard and Kasi Anandan
paid the price Ior losing in that general election. Nobody loves a
loser. But to say that 'he was never taken seriously as a political
Iigure, in my opinion, is Ilawed. Looked in another angle,
compared to the inIluence` oI Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam (who was
an appointed TULF MP Ior a while, and who had the Iortune oI
being the son oI FP leader M.Tiruchelvam) generated among the
Tamils, Kasi Anandan`s inIluence among the younger generation
oI Tamils in the 1970s was greater.
(3) What conIidence one can have in the opinion oI Congress (I)
sources, regarding the Rajiv Gandhi-Kasi Anandan meeting oI
March 5
th
? Isn`t these same sources which denied such a meeting
in the Iirst instance? Since now it has been acknowledged that
such a meeting did take place in Rajiv Gandhi`s private residence,
how about asking Sonia Gandhi about what transpired between
Rajiv and Kasi Anandan? Certainly Rajiv Gandhi would have
discussed this issue Irankly, as opposed to the diplomatic
niceties` exchanged between him and the Deputy High
Commissioner oI Sri Lanka on March 10
th
. The three reporters
make no mention about whether they approached Sonia Gandhi
about veriIying the truth oI Rajiv-Kasi Anandan meeting. And
this cable no.222 sent by the Deputy High Commissioner to the
Ioreign ministry in Colombo is really interesting. Has the
complete transcript oI this cable been released to the public, iI it
is really revealing? Has the LG able to receive a copy oI this
purported cable no.222? II so, will you publish it in Iull Ior the
record?
(4) Jon Swain`s republished report which states that Nadesan
Satyendra also met Rajiv Gandhi on March 5
th
has been exposed
as incorrect and the London Sundav Times did print a correction
and an apology. Will LG also do the same?
Editorial Comment: (relating to item 4 in the above letter): 'We
did not spot the Sunday Times correction. We regret the error.
AIter Pirabhakaran was named as the Iirst accused in the charge sheet
prepared by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) oI Central Bureau oI
Investigation (CBI) in India in May 1992, I wrote another letter to the
Lanka Guardian commenting on the contents oI the charge sheet. It
was as Iollows:
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case
[Lanka Guardian, Oct.1, 1992]
I thank you Ior publishing in detail the Final Report in
I thank you Ior publishing in detail the Final Report in
9/S/91/CBI/SCB/Madras - (Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case)
Under Section 173 Criminal Penal Code` (LG, Aug.15). What
strikes me vividly is its selectivity and superIiciality in
regurgitating the political events which happened in Tamil Nadu
and Sri Lanka. For instance, nothing oI the Iollowing has been
included in this document.
(1) The role oI Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in training
the Tamil militant groups in Tamil Nadu.
(2) The assassination attempt on Rajiv Gandhi in Colombo, aIter
the signing oI the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on July 1987.
(3) The training and arming oI the Tamil National Army by the
Indian Peace Keeping Force.
(4) Maldives invasion by the PLOTE mercenaries and the Indian
'assistance in restoring peace.
Even Ior a non-lawyer like me, it is apparent that the so-called Final
Report` resembles the Iield note book oI a RAW agent, than a legal
document.
Then I Ielt that it would be prudent to wait Ior the results` to appear
Irom the Indian investigations in court oI law and the two appointed
commissions. Now that the verdict at the Indian court oI law on the
Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial has been delivered, and the Iindings oI
two appointed commissions (namely the Verma Commission and Jain
Commission) had been released, albeit in truncated versions, Ior public
consumption, I wish to revisit this assassination Ior two reasons. One
is to Iocus on how the name oI Pirabhakaran was used by the Indian
operatives (prosecution team, journalists who were Ied by the Indian
intelligence wallahs, publicity seekers like Subramanian Swamy and
even the guardians oI law) to advance their image and own agenda. A
second reason is, Irom the standpoint oI an analytical scientist, to
highlight the paucity (or more probably, suppression) oI forensic
details in the public domain, relating to the deaths of 18 individuals
in Sriperumbudur on May 21, 1991, which included the prominent
victim Rajiv Gandhi and his purported woman assassin, named Dhanu.
As an example, I provide the Iollowing box-story which appeared in
the India Todav magazine oI Dec.15, 1991, reported by Anirudhya
Mitra with the blaring caption, Rajiv Assassination: Conspiracy
SurIaces`, and a titillating lead sentence: 'Investigations by the SIT
and Q` Branch oI the Tamil Nadu Police, reveal that Rajiv`s killing
was part oI a larger plot to Iorm a greater eelam. It carried the photos
oI Pirabhakaran and Pottu Amman, adjacent to this lead sentence. The
box-story was on the Letter Leads`, purported to be unearthed by the
SIT oIIicers.
SIT Evidence: Letter Leads
'Sivarasan may be dead, but he couldn`t carry the clinching evidence`
with him. Investigators say at least two documents they have
unearthed would prove that the assassination was ordered by
Pirabhakaran`.
The Iirst clincher is a letter that the assassin, Dhanu, wrote to
Pirabhakaran on May 10, 1991, Irom LTTE`s Kodungaiyur hide-out.
Thanking Pirabhakaran Ior entrusting her with the important` task,
Dhanu details her successIul dry-run on V.P.Singh in Madras on May
8.
The second piece oI evidence is the letter dated September 7 Irom
Santhan, who was the LTTE`s chieI coordinator in India, to
Pirabhakaran. It was intercepted when the Indian Navy arrested an
LTTE courier, Irumburei. It shows him as being down, but still
Iighting. Excerpts:
My dear elder brother,
I am writing this letter amidst crisis. But we have not lost
conIidence. The CBI seems to have come to know everything
about us Iollowing the arrest oI so many oI our members. All
Pottuamman`s boys got nabbed and that eventually led to the
death oI Raghuvaran (Sivarasan).The arrest oI Chinna Santhan
helped the CBI to know about who killed Padmanabha.
AIter seeing so many arrests, I had to distribute cyanide to all our
boys. As a result oI my instruction/order, 25 oI us have died.
The situation here is just like what it was in JaIIna during the
IPKF operation. Like our people hated to give the Indian soldiers
water, the same treatment is being meted out to our activists.
I suggest that we have a smaller team to work here. I have waited
several nights.no boat has come.how do I send goods? AIter
the death oI Rajiv, we were promised that boats will come once
the election was over. But no boat came.
Send boats and wireless sets beIore some more oI us get caught.
II I get wireless set, we can identiIy the arrival or the departure
point. Or, tell Irumburei in detail. The arrest oI Vardhan cut oII
my last link with you. Pottuamman`s boys do not carry my
message to you.The likely arrest oI Kolatur Maniyam is
worrying me as that would lead to many other Indians. The CBI
cannot catch me. Have Iaith in me.`
Yours,
Santhan
It would come as no surprise that these two planted Letter Leads`
were more likely Iorgeries. In my March 1992 column written to the
Tamil Nation, I questioned the validity oI the Iirst quoted letter by
Dhanu to Pirabhakaran, dated May 10, 1991. The second letter oI
Santhan to Pirabhakaran, dated September 7, 1991, was rejected as
'not admissible in evidence by Justice D.P.Wadhwa, in his Supreme
Court verdict oI 1999 |p.189 oI Justice Wadhwa`s verdict|.
Use of 1.F.Kennedy Assassination as an appropriate Control`
Among the nine brieI commentaries I wrote between 1991 and 1994
on Rajiv Gandhi assassination, I wish to reproduce my comparisons
between the Kennedy assassination and Rajiv Gandhi assassination as
well. ScientiIically speaking, Ior study oI any phenomenon, the
investigator has to make use oI a proper control. On the importance oI
controls in assessing the actions oI Pirabhakaran and LTTE, I have
commented previously |see, the Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 14|.
I have believed strongly that the parallels between the Kennedy
assassination in 1963 and Rajiv assassination in 1991 make the
Kennedy assassination as an appropriate control to compare and
contrast the evolution oI the results` and the incomplete nature oI the
evolved Iindings in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination. This is particularlv
so, related to the paucitv of forensic details of the Rafiv
assassination.
Now, to my parallels between the Kennedy and Rajiv assassinations,
as it appeared in the Tamil Nation oI March 1992, under my pen
name C.P.Goliard:
At death, John F.Kennedy was the President oI the USA, Rajiv
had served one term as the prime minister oI India and was
awaiting a Iavorable election verdict to regain that position.
Both Kennedy and Rajiv were 46 years old, at the time oI their
tragic deaths.
Both died in one oI the southern states oI their countries.
Kennedy, in Dallas, Texas; Rajiv, in Sri Perumbudur, Tamil
Nadu.
Reason Ior the visit to the southern states: Kennedy went to
Texas, to prepare Ior his 1964 re-election. Rajiv was in Tamil
Nadu, to campaign Ior the 1991 general election, to be re-elected
as the prime minister.
Both suIIered instant deaths: Kennedy, due to gun-shot wounds;
Rajiv, due to bomb-blast.
Kennedy`s assassin was a 24-year old male, who was shot to
death in an unexpected Iashion inside the Dallas police station
within 48 hours oI his victim`s death. Details about Rajiv`s
assassin, a Iemale, is sketchy. Her age has been noted as 24
years` and she met instant death like that oI her victims.
Because the assassins did not survive longer, the attention was
Iocused onto the person with secrets`. In the case oI Kennedy, it
was Jack Ruby, whose real name was Jacob Rubenstein. He was
seen close to the location oI crime (eye witness evidence) and on
Nov.24, 1963 (two days aIter the assassination oI Kennedy),
Ruby shot and killed Kennedy`s assassin. According to oIIicial
records, Ruby died as a prisoner on Jan.3, 1967, due to prostate
cancer`. In Rajiv`s assassination, the person with secrets` was
one Sivarajan`, whose real name has been traced by one
journalist as Packiyachandran. He was also seen at the location
oI crime (photo evidence). According to the Indian police
personnel, he committed suicide on Aug.20, 1991.
The relationship oI Jack Ruby with MaIia and Federal Bureau oI
Intelligence (FBI) has been probed Irom surviving documents.
Sivarajan`, who had been identiIied as the member oI TELO till
1986, would have had contacts with the Indian intelligence
agencies. This lead has not been pursued in detail yet.
The Warren Commission which investigated the murder oI
Kennedy concluded that a lone gun-man Lee Harvey Oswald
killed the president. The Iederal institutions (military
establishment, FBI and CIA) and the maIia were exonerated Irom
the conspiracy. But the American public distrust this conclusion.
In the case oI Rajiv`s assassination, the Indian press and the
investigating agencies (CBI, SIT and RAW) have alleged LTTE`s
involvement. However, the politicians, bureaucrats, academics
and semi-oIIicial journalists who represent India`s political status
quo` (according to Steve Coll, in the International Herald
Tribune oI June 15, 1991) believe that the CIA agents probably
organized the plot to kill the Iormer prime minister`.
We should note that at least in the case oI John F.Kennedy`s
assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, so much personal inIormation is
known now. But, how about the Iemale assassin oI Rajiv
Gandhi? Nine months have passed since May 21 oI last year, yet
nothing is known about her. The Indian press has given her a
name, Dhanu`. And the Dec.15, 1991 issue oI the India Todav
reported that the Special Investigation Team (SIT) had located
reported that the Special Investigation Team (SIT) had located
letter leads` which would prove that the assassination was
ordered by Pirabhakaran`. According to this news report,
Dhanu, wrote to Pirabhakaran on May 10, 1991, Irom the
LTTE`s Kodungaiyur hide-out, thanking Pirabhakaran oI
entrusting her with the important task.`
The humor in the letter lead` is that, the SIT and other Indian
sleuths have yet to identiIy who this Dhanu` is. When was she
born? Where did she live? Who are her kith and kin? Was she
unmarried, married, divorced, separated? Nothing is known yet.
She is not in the police Iiles oI Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka.
Without knowing answers to all these vital questions, how did the
SIT identiIy the purported letter the assassin has written as really
an authentic one? To prove the veracity oI this letter, they should
Iirst have in their hands other written documents which pre-date
this purported May 10 letter. The SIT has not revealed how and
where they obtained these authenticating documents, without
identiIying the person. II they truly succeeded in doing this,
certainly the Indian sleuths can even bring Rajiv Gandhi back to
liIe.
Readers should note that I wrote this in February 1992, based on the
then publicly available inIormation as reported in the India Todav oI
Dec.15, 1991, before the SIT Iiled its charge sheet on Pirabhakaran in
May 1992. The letter Irom assassin Dhanu to Pirabhakaran, iI there
existed a genuine one, would have been the proverbial smoking gun`
to link Pirabhakaran to the purported woman assassin oI Rajiv Gandhi
and hoist him as the prime conspirator. The Iact that the SIT
investigators produced such a letter lead` in December 1991
convincingly proves that they were indeed aiming to trap
Pirabhakaran.
To my surprise, the Supreme Court verdicts on the assassination trial
delivered by the Justice K.T.Thomas, Justice D.P.Wadhwa and
Justice S.S.M.Quadri delivered in May 1999, do not provide any
evidence Ior such a letter Irom Dhanu to Pirabhakaran. Rather, two
letters dated May 9, 1991 authored by Subha |the purported substitute
Iemale assassin| and Dhanu to 'Dear Akila sister and 'Pottanna
were incorporated in the judgement oI Justice Wadhwa, as 'Exhibit Ior
Prosecution-95 and 'Exhibit Ior Prosecution-96. The question arises
then, whether the December1991 revelation in the India Todav
magazine oI an existing letter` Irom Dhanu to Pirabhakaran dated
May 10, 1991 was a Iorgery.
A chronology of Investigation into the assassinations of Rajiv
Gandhi and K. Padmanabha
I provide below a chronology oI investigation into Rajiv Gandhi
assassination (court trial, Verma Commission and Jain Commission),
as it evolved Irom 1991 to 1999.
Mav 21, 1991: Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in Sriperumbudur,
Tamil Nadu. 17 others also lost their lives, including Dhanu (the
alleged woman assassin) and Hari Babu (the Ireelance photographer).
The names oI other 15 are as Iollows: P.K.Gupta (personal security
oIIicer to Rajiv Gandhi), Latha Kannan, Kokilavani, Iqbal
(superintendent oI police), Rajakuru (inspector oI police), Edward
Joseph (inspector oI police), Ethiraj (sub-inspector oI police),
Sundaraju Pillai (police constable), Ravi (commando police constable),
Dharman (police constable), Chandra (woman police constable),
Santhani Begum, Darryl Peter, Kumari Saroja Devi and Munuswamy.
Mav 27, 1991: Verma Commission (Justice J.S.Verma) was set up to
inquire, '(a) whether the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi could have
been averted and whether there were lapses or dereliction oI duty in
this regard on the part oI any oI the individuals responsible Ior his
security; (b) the deIiciencies, iI any, in the security system and
arrangements as prescribed or operated in practice which might have
contributed to the assassination.
Aug.20, 1991: Prime suspects Sivarasan, alleged substitute assassin
Subha and Iive other accomplices committed suicide` in Bangalore.
Thus, nine (including the alleged assassin Dhanu, photographer Hari
Babu) who were alleged to have links with the Rajiv assassination had
died.
Aug.23, 1991: Jain Commission (Justice M.C.Jain) was set up to
inquire, '(a) the sequence oI events leading to, and all the Iacts and
circumstances relating to, the assassination oI Mr.Rajiv Gandhi at
Sriperumbudur (other than the matters covered by the terms oI
reIerence Ior the Commission headed by Justice Verma) and (b)
'whether one person or persons or agencies were responsible Ior
conceiving, preparing and planning the assassination and whether there
was any conspiracy in this behalI and, iI so, all its ramiIications.
Sept.1, 1991: Pirabhakaran was interviewed by Chris Morris, the BBC
correspondent, in Eelam.
Sept.4, 1991: At 2115 hours, the BBC Tamil broadcast relayed the
Pirabhakaran interview in which, the LTTE leader stated that 'there is
no connection between the assassination oI Shri Rajiv Gandhi and the
LTTE organization whatsoever. The Indian Government appears to
tarnish their organization at international level |Jain Commission
report 1997, vol.8, chapter 49|
Mav 20, 1992: SIT oI the Central Bureau oI Investigation (CBI) Iiled a
449-page charge sheet (Final Report) beIore the Designated Court in
Madras, naming 41 persons as the accused. 26 among the 41 were Sri
Lankan nationals. Pirabhakaran was listed as the Iirst accused. Pottu
Amman Shanmuganathan Sivasankaran was listed as the second
accused. Akila Akilakka was listed as the third accused. | reIers
to alias`.| The designated court Judge S.M.Siddick passed an order
that none oI the proceedings should be published; even the names and
addresses oI the coded witnesses were not allowed to be published.
June 12, 1992: Verma Commission submitted its Iindings to the then
Home Minister oI India.
Aug.12, 1992: Tamil Nadu Special Investigation Team (TANSIT) Iiled
a 12-page charge sheet (with 250 pages oI supporting documents) in
Padmanabha murder case, beIore the Designated Court on 26
accused. Pottu Amman was listed as the Iirst accused. Accused 1 to
Accused 17 were charged under criminal conspiracy, murder, attempt
to murder etc. According to P.C.Pant, the Inspector General oI Police,
TANSIT, 'there was no evidence to connect the involvement oI the
LTTE supreme Prabhakaran in this case and hence he had not been
cited as an accused. |Hindu, International Edition, Aug.22, 1992|
Mav 5, 1993: Pre-trial proceedings (arguments by the prosecution and
deIence lawyers) Ior the assassination trial began at the Designated
Court, at the high-security Poonamallee Court complex.
P.Rajamanickam, the special public prosecutor who represented the
SIT, narrated the Iacts oI the case. OI the 41 charged by the SIT in
May 20, 1992, three (Pirabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Akila) were
designated as absconding accused`. Twelve who had died among the
41 charged were designated as deceased accused`. These were,
S.Packiachandran Raghuvaran Sivarasan, Dhanu Anbu
Kalaivani, Subha Nithya, S.Haribabu, Nehru Nero Gokul,
N.Shanmugam Jayaraj, Trichy Santhan Gundu Santhan, Suresh
Master, Dixon Kishore, Amman Gangai Kumar, Drive Anna
Keerthy and Jamuna Jameela. The designated court judge
S.M.Siddick listened to the prosecution case, in the presence oI all the
remaining 26 available accused`.
Nov.24, 1993: The Designated Court Iramed charges against the 26
accused. These proceedings were allowed to be covered by two news
accused. These proceedings were allowed to be covered by two news
agencies the Press Trust oI India and the United News oI India. The
26 accused who Iaced the trial were as Iollows:
Accused 1: S.Nalini (the only one who was present at the scene
oI the crime); Indian; arrested on June 14, 1991; conIessional
statement recorded on Aug.9, 1991.
Accused 2: T.Suthendraraja Santhan; Sri Lankan; arrested
on July 22, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on Sept.17,
1991.
Accused 3: Sriharan Murugan Thas Indu Master; Sri
Lankan; arrested on June 14, 1991; conIessional statement
recorded on Aug.8, 1991.
Accused 4: Shankar Koneswaran; Sri Lankan; arrested on
May 19, 1992; no conIession.
Accused 5: D.Vijayanandan Hari Ayya; Sri Lankan; arrested
on May 16, 1992; no conIession.
Accused 6: Sivaruban Suresh Suresh Kumar Ruban;
Sri Lankan; arrested on May 16, 1992; no conIession.
Accused 7: S.Kanagasabapathy Radhayya; Sri Lankan;
arrested on July 4, 1991; no conIession.
Accused 8: A.Chandralekha Athirai Sonia Gowri; Sri
Lankan; arrested on July 5, 1991; conIessional statement
recorded on Aug.29, 1991.
Accused 9: B.Robert Payas Kumaralingam; Sri Lankan;
arrested on June 18, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on
Aug.15, 1991.
Accused 10: S.Jayakumar Jayakumaran Jayam; Sri
Lankan; June 26, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on
Aug.22, 1991.
Accused 11: J.Shanthi; Indian; arrested on May 16, 1992; no
conIession.
Accused 12: S.Vijayan Perumal Vijayan; Sri Lankan;
arrested on July 8, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on
Sept.4, 1991.
Accused 13: V.Selvaluxmi; Indian; arrested on May 16, 1992;
no conIession.
Accused 14: S.Bhaskaran Velayudam; Indian; arrested on
July 8, 1991; no conIession.
Accused 15: S.Shanmugavadivelu Thambi Anna; Sri Lankan;
arrested on May 16, 1992; conIessional statement recorded on
May 17, 1992.
Accused 16: P.Ravichandran Ravi Pragasam; Indian;
arrested on Jan.6, 1992; conIessional statement recorded on
Feb.14, 1992.
Accused 17: M.Suseendran Mahesh; Indian; arrested on
Jan.6, 1992; conIessional statement recorded on Feb.14, 1992.
Accused 18: G.Perarivalan Arivu; Indian; arrested on June
19, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on Aug.15, 1991.
Accused 19: S.Irumborai Duraisingam; Indian; arrested on
Oct.9, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on Dec.3, 1991.
Accused 20: S.Bhagyanathan; Indian; arrested on June 11,
1991; conIessional statement recorded on Aug.5, 1991.
Accused 21: S.Padma; Indian; arrested on June 11, 1991; conIessional
statement recorded on Aug.7, 1991.
Accused 22: A.Sundaram Subha Sundaram; Indian; arrested
on July 2, 1991; no conIession.
Accused 23: K.Dhanasekaran Raju; Indian; arrested on
Oct.13, 1991; conIessional satement recorded on Nov.4, 1991.
Accused 24: N.Rajasuriya Rangan; Sri Lankan; arrested on
Aug.28, 1991; conIessional statement recorded on Oct.23,
1991.
Accused 25: T.Vigneswaran Vicky; Sri Lankan; arrested on
Feb.4, 1992; conIessional statement recorded on Feb.24, 1992.
Accused 26: J.Ranganath; Indian; arrested on Aug.28, 1991; no
conIession.
Jan.19, 1994: The assassination trial began, with the examination oI
the witnesses. Proceedings were conducted in camera. Other notable
statistics include: citation oI 1,044 prosecution witnesses, examination
oI 288 prosecution witnesses, presentation oI 1,477 documents by the
prosecution amounting to almost 10,000 pages, presentation oI 74
documents by the deIence, presentation oI 1,180 material objects by
the prosecution.
Mav 5, 1997: Examination oI 288 prosecution witnesses completed.
Aug. 1997: The Jain Commission submitted its Interim Report,
consisting oI 17 volumes, to the then Home Minister Indrajit Gupta.
consisting oI 17 volumes, to the then Home Minister Indrajit Gupta.
According to Prabhu Chawla oI India Todav (Nov.17, 1997), this
interim report was 5,280 pages long, comprising oI 8 volumes oI
interim Iindings, and 9 volumes oI annexures. The report carried the
testimonies oI 110 witnesses.
Nov.5, 1997: Arguments in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial
concluded at the Designated Court.
Nov.8, 1997: Designated Court II judge Arumuga Perumal Adithan,
acquitted 15 oI the 17 accused in the Padmanabha murder case, since
the prosecution had 'not proved beyond any reasonable doubt the
allegations against them. Chinna Santhan was declared guilty Ior
advising, abetting and Iacilitating the crime. Anandaraj was Iound
guilty Ior harboring Gundu Santhan, one oI the accused in the case.
|as reported in the Frontline magazine, Nov.15-28, 1997|
Jan.28, 1998: Designated Trial Court Judge V.Navaneetham (who had
replaced Judge S.M.Siddick) delivered the judgment, convicting and
sentencing all the 26 accused, who stood Ior trial, to death. According
to the Indian Express oI Feb.5, 1998, the judge delivered a 1,600 page
verdict, which contained 10 pages oI transcripts oI messages
exchanged between LTTE stations, primarily between March 22, 1991
and June 23, 1991.
Mar.7, 1998: The Jain Commission submitted its Final Report,
consisting oI 2,000 pages.
Mar.27, 1998: The Supreme Court stayed till Iurther orders` death
sentences oI the 26 accused which have been imposed by the
Designated Trial Court judge.
Sept.1998: The Supreme Court consisting oI three judges (Justice
K.T.Thomas, Justice D.P.Wadhwa and Justice S.S.M.Quadri) began
Iinal hearing on appeals Iiled by all 26 accused, sentenced to death by
judge V.Navaneetham.
Mav 11, 1999: Three judge bench oI the Supreme Court conIirmed
the death sentence on Nalini (Accused 1), Santhan (Accused 2),
Murugan (Accused 3) and Perarivalan (Accused 18). Death sentences
to Robert Payas (Accused 9), Jayakumar (Accused 10) and
Ravichandran (Accused 16), delivered at the Designated Trial Court,
was altered to liIe imprisonment. Other 19 appellants were Ireed.
The Labor of Saint Vyasa`s descendants`
By conventional standards, written documents are categorized as
Iollowing: (a) those with single digit number oI pages are letters and
communications, (b) those with double digit number oI pages are
pamphlets, tracts, children books, research papers and reports, (c)
those with triple digit number oI pages are theses, books and novels,
(d) those with quadruple digit number oI pages are epics`.
II one point was proved convincingly Irom the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination trial, I would say that, there live quite a number oI Saint
Vyasa`s descendants` in India, among the legal tribe. By general
acknowledgement, Mahabharata is recognized as the longest extant
epic in any culture. Pious Hindus believe that Saint Vyasa composed
this epic, while Lord Ganesa |the Hindu god oI wisdom|, took the
pains to record Vyasa`s words into script. The assassination
investigation oI Rajiv Gandhi generated documents which ran over
1,000 pages, along the lines oI Saint Vyasa`s masterpiece. A list is as
Iollows:
1. The verdict oI Trial Court judge Navaneetham 1,600 pages
2. Jain Commission: Interim Report 5,280 pages
3. Jain Commission: Final Report 2,000 pages
4. Prosecution documents in the assassination trial over 9,000
pages
It was impossible Ior me to get in my hand, every single page oI these
Iour documents. But, I had taken pains to study the three documents
which more or less had distilled the essence oI judge Navaneetham`s
verdict (1,600 pages) and the submitted prosecution documents
(exceeding 9,000) pages. These three documents were, namely,
1. Verdict oI Supreme Court Justice D.P.Wadhwa 201 pages
2. Verdict oI Supreme Court Justice K.T.Thomas 69 pages
3. Verdict oI Supreme Court Justice S.S.M.Quadri 25 pages
These judgements are currently available in the Central Bureau oI
Investigation (CBI) website oI India, under the Cases and Verdicts
File`. To reproduce portions Irom the opening paragraph oI theverdict,
Justice Wadhwa:
'. A charge oI conspiracy Ior oIIences under the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (TADA), Indian
Penal Code (IPC), Explosive Substances Act 1908, Arms Act
1959, Passport Act 1967, Foreigners Act 1946 and the Indian
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933 was laid against 41 persons, 12 oI
whom were already dead having committed suicide and three
whom were already dead having committed suicide and three
absconded. Out oI these, 26 Iaced the trial beIore the Designated
Court. Prosecution examined 288 witnesses and produced
numerous documents and material objects. Statements oI all the
accused were recorded under Section 313 oI the Code oI
Criminal Procedure (Code). They denied their involvement. The
Designated Court Iound them guilty oI the oIIences charged
against them. ThereaIter all the accused were heard on the
question oI sentence. Designated Court awarded death sentence
to all oI them on the charge oI conspiracy to murder. A judicial
massacre`, bemoaned Mr.Natarajan, learned senior counsel Ior
the accused, and rightly so in our opinion.
The mere Iact that these three Supreme Court Justices, in their May
1999 verdicts, had overruled the (a) judicial massacre` on 22 oI the
26 accused who stood Ior the trial, and (b) many other questionable
conclusions oI Designated Court judge Navaneetham, suggest that, one
can bypass the 10,000-odd pages oI legal muck-heap without any
trepidation.
Questionability of wireless-radio intercepts
One notable point I wish to highlight in the verdict oI Justice Wadhwa
was his observation on the unreliability oI the wireless-radio intercepts
submitted by the SIT investigators to prove their involvement oI
LTTE in the assassination. The disinIormation campaign promoted by
the Indian intelligence wallahs since 1992 and gulped by
Pirabhakaran`s opponents. For instance, the bile-spitting hack oI the
Island newspaper has noted with glee recently that
'The only occasion when judicial prooI was Iound oI
Prabhakaran was in the assassination oI Iormer Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, where Indian investigators were able to
pinpoint the murder on the LTTE supreme and his intelligence
chieI Pottu Amman with radio intercepts. |editorial; Island,
Colombo, Oct.29, 2001|
However, Justice Wadhwa in his verdict had observed his doubt on
the validity oI wireless-radio intercepts, as Iollows:
(1) 'Suspicion however strong does not take the place oI prooI. Wireless
messages are transmitted and received in coded language. It is nobody`s case
that Robert Payas (Accused 9) knew the nature or the contents oI the
messages. It must not be lost sight oI that LTTE had various activities and all
LTTE men were not necessarily involved in achieving the object oI conspiracy.
Evidence shows that other LTTE activists who had come to India were also
engaged in arranging houses Ior various purposes like housing the injured
LTTE cadre, storing oI medicines, etc. |p.174 oI verdict; analysis under the
LTTE cadre, storing oI medicines, etc. |p.174 oI verdict; analysis under the
activities oI Robert Payas (Accused 9), Jayakumar (Accused 10) and Shanti
(Accused 11)|
(2) 'It appears to us that prosecution is looking at every
circumstance with the proverbial jaundiced eye. |p.180 oI
verdict; analysis under the activities oI Shanmugavadivelu
(Accused 15)|
(3) 'Prosecution also does not tell us the contents oI the code
sheets and how these were used by Murugan (Accused 3).
Charge under Section 6(1A) oI Indian Wireless and Telegraphy
Act, must, thereIore, Iail. |p.191 oI verdict; analysis under the
activities oI Bhagyanathan (Accused 20) and Padma (Accused
21)|
Next, I wish to provide my assembled list oI prosecution witnesses and
analyze the contributions oI some oI these prominent witnesses who
still have some secrets` to reveal. (Continued)

Part 26
Sachi Sri Kantha
8 December 2001]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The Forensic
Science Angle
A Hexagonal Rashomon`
The Rajiv Gandhi assassination is a story within a story in the
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon. All the complex details have not come to
the surIace even aIter a lapse oI 10 years. However, iI I short-circuit
it, the Pirabhakaran story would be incomplete, since Pirabhakaran
was Iramed as the Iirst accused in the charge sheet produced by the
SIT in May 1992 and later his status was designated as an absconding
accused`.
I view the Rajiv Gandhi assassination as a hexagonal Rashomon`. In
the original Rashomon story oI Akutagawa, popularized by movie
director Kurosawa, there was a murder oI a man and a rape oI a
woman |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 9|. In the Rajiv
Gandhi event oI May 21st 1991, there was a murder oI a leading man
(coupled with 16 other tragic deaths) and a suicide by a woman. The
assassination oI John F.Kennedy (hereaIter abbreviated as JFK),
which I take as a control case to analyze the Rajiv assassination,
cannot match the complexity oI Rajiv assassination, since the
November 22nd 1963 event was only a murder oI a leading man. The
complexity in JFK case appeared on November 24, 1963, when the
second murder (that oI assassin) was committed.
The parallels between JFK and Rajiv assassinations are striking, iI one
equates USA and Cuba to India and Sri Lanka respectively. USA has
had a troubling relationship with Cuba prior to JFK`s death, and the
executive arm oI USA had tried to assassinate the Cuban leader Fidel
Castro, through its Intelligence agency CIA. India also experienced a
troubling relationship with Sri Lanka prior to Rajiv`s death, and the
executive arm oI India had tried to neutralize` the Eelam Tamil leader
Pirabhakaran, through its Intelligence agency RAW. Two additional
Ieatures related to the puzzle oI May 21, 1991 event deserve
emphasis, which do not have parallels with the JFK assassination. First
one being, apart Irom Pirabhakaran, mutual antagonism oI Rajiv and
one being, apart Irom Pirabhakaran, mutual antagonism oI Rajiv and
the then Sri Lankan Sinhalese leader Premadasa was a complicating
Iactor in solving the Rajiv assassination case. Secondly, unlike JFK,
Rajiv did survive a humiliating assassination attempt by a Sinhalese
naval rating in Colombo Iour years beIore his tragic death.
Benzene analogy
I like to portray the Rajiv assassination as a hexagonal Rashomon`,
with six angles. These are namely, Iorensic science angle, political
angle, judiciary angle, espionage angle, Eelam Tamil angle and
Sinhalese angle. From our lessons in high school chemistry, one can
note that benzene is the optimal example oI the hexagon structure.
Thus, the benzene analogy is apt here as well. The six carbons oI the
benzene ring are linked with three double bonds and three single bonds
and exist in a resonating Iorm. Similarly, the six angles oI the Rajiv
assassination event can also be visualized as existing in a double bond
single bond combination with each other. In the benzene ring, it is
not possible to point out which carbon is the leading carbon or Ior that
matter, one cannot de-link a carbon Irom the others without
destabilizing the entire structure. The alternating double bonds and
single bonds in the hexagonal ring oI benzene also applies well to the
six angles oI the Rajiv assassination. However, the Indian operatives in
law enIorcement and judiciary, Ior reasons oI convenience and Ior
covering their lapses as well as saving their butts, Iocused only on the
LTTE angle. In this segment, I Iocus on the Iorensic science angle oI
the assassination and cover the other angles in the Iorthcoming
segments.
Two Books
As oI now, two books in English have appeared in India, which covers
the Rajiv assassination as their main themes. There may be a couple oI
others, which were published in early 1990s in haste by hucksters to
make a quick buck`. These quickies` are not worth intense scrutiny,
since they were published beIore the results oI judicial inquiry. Thus, I
would Iocus my attention on the Iollowing two books.
1. Bevond the Tigers. Tracking Rafiv Gandhis Assassination, by
Rajeev Sharma (Kaveri Books, New Delhi, 1998, 278 pages).
2. The Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi. Unanswered Questions
and Unasked Queries, by Subramanian Swamy (Konark
Publishers, New Delhi, 2000, 317 pages).
Both books peddle their own spins. The Iirst one was authored by a
journalist, with probable sponsorship (Iactual and/or Iinancial) Irom
the Indian intelligence operatives. The Ioreword to this book was
written by Raja Vijay Karan, who was the Director oI CBI, during the
time oI Rajiv`s death. The second one was authored` by one oI the
political light-weights and egotistical-loudmouths in India, who
presumably delivered this book to save his butt. Swamy was the
Minister oI Law and Commerce in the lame-duck Cabinet oI
Chandrasekhar, at the time oI Rajiv`s death. Thus, both books deserve
scrutiny Ior the inIormation they provide, and in my opinion, both are
complimentary in their Iocus.
The prosecution witnesses
When the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial began, not much detail was
known to the public about the prosecution witnesses. As one who was
interested in the Iorensic science angle oI the assassination, I had to
wait till 1999 to Iind out the medical personnel who conducted the
postmortem examinations oI the victims. It was reported in the Indian
news media that a total oI 288 prosecution witnesses were presented.
Among these, only 144 receive citation in the judgements delivered by
Justice Wadhwa and Justice Thomas. From the Supreme Court
verdicts delivered by Justices D.P.Wadhwa and K.T.Thomas on May
11, 1999, I compiled the names and annotations oI these 144
prosecution witnesses. Justice Quadri did not cite a single witness in
his brieI judgement.
I`m not sure that until now, whether anyone else had taken the trouble
to compile this detailed list, though I Ielt that, considering the secrecy
component` attached to this assassination trail during its Designation
Court phase in Chennai`, it was worth an eIIort. I provide below the
list oI prosecution witnesses I had compiled. The abbreviation PW
stands Ior prosecution witness`. The list is in increasing numeral
order. Missing numbers denote that those witnesses did not receive
any citation in the judgement.
PW-18 C.S.Ganesh, Music Director
PW-19 D.Lakshmi Albert, Congress Party member & eyewitness
on May 21, 1991
PW-20 Dr.Ramadevi, Congress Party member & eyewitness on
May 21, 1991
PW-22 Sathyamoorthy, painter
PW-23 Bharathi, nurse & sister oI Bhagyanathan (20
th
accused)
PW-27 Shanmugam, Congress Party member
PW-29 Maragatham Chandrasekhar, Congress Party MP Ior
Sriperumpudur
PW-32 Anusuya, Sub Inspector oI Police, Security, on duty at the
Sriperumbudur meeting venue on May 21, 1991
PW-34 Sundararajan Murali
PW-35 Subramaniyan
PW-52 V.Thiagarajan, Superintendent oI Police, CBI
PW-54 T.Soundara Pandian, worker at Ebenezer Stores, and
employee oI M.Utham Singh (PW-56)
PW-56 M.Utham Singh, property agent and proprietor oI Ebenezer
Stores
PW-57 K.Thiagarajan
PW-58 S.Kalyan Krishnan, owner oI Easwari Lodge
PW-59 S.Raghu, oI Studio Memory Makers, St.Thomas Mount,
Madras
PW-60 V.Kantha Raja Chokan, house owner and LTTE
sympathizer
PW-61 T.Panneer Selvam, Kavitha Driving School
PW-62 P.Thirumathi Vimala, teacher
PW-63 K.Kottammal, employee oI Tamil Nadu State Electricity
Board & owner oI No.153, Muthamil Nagar,
Kodungaiyur, Madras
PW-65 Mridula, a teacher & wiIe oI Ranganath (26
th
accused)
PW-67 L.D.N.J.Wijesinghe, Senior Superintendent oI Police, Sri
Lanka, & interceptor oI LTTE wireless transmissions
PW-70 Sowmya Narayanan, staII member oI Telecom Department
PW-71 M.Janarthanam
PW-72 T.Ramamurthy, journalist
PW-73 Devasena Raj, colleague oI Padma (21
st
accused)
PW-74 Meena, wiIe oI T.Ramamurthy (PW-72)
PW-75 N.Vasantha Kumar, artist who compiled the two volumes oI
Satanic Forces Ior LTTE
PW-77 Sankaran Gnani, journalist
PW-78 T.P.Sitther, wireless operator, Ministry oI Home AIIairs,
Government oI India
PW-81 Manivannan, videographer who made the tape oI May 8,
1991 meeting addressed by V.P.Singh
PW-82 J.Duraisamy Naidu, owner oI No.12, Eveready Colony,
Kodungaiyur, Madras
PW-84 S.Mani, wireless decoder
PW-85 D.J.Swaminathan, neighbor oI Jayakumar (10
th
accused) at
Kodungaiyur
PW-86 M.Mariappan, houseworker oI Shanmugham (diseased
accused), Kodiakkarai
PW-88 Delip Chordia, dealer at International Tyre Service, Mount
Road, Madras
PW-90 Rani, neighbor oI Nalini (1
st
accused)
PW-91 N.Moideen, salesman at Hindustan Training Co.,
Royapettah High Road, Madras
PW-93 I.Suyambu, news correspondent & eyewitness oI May 8,
1991 meeting addressed by V.P.Singh
PW-94 A.K.Anbalagan, salesman at Poompuhar HandicraIts |Tamil
Nadu Govt. Sales Outlet|, Madras
PW-95 R.Ravichandran, salesman at a showroom
PW-96 N.Sujaya Narayan, colleague oI Nalini at Anabond Silicons
Pvt.Ltd., Madras
PW-97 N.Chokkanathan, a distant relative oI Bhaskaran (14
th
Accused)
PW-98 Hashmuth S.Setal, owner oI Barathi Cycle Company
PW-99 Esylen Mantel, oI Plot No.14, Eveready Colony,
Kodungaiyur.
PW-100 A.Ravindra Reddy, Manager, Komala Vilas Lodge
PW-102 P.Veerappan, a travel agent Ior passports & renewal oI old
passports & visas
PW-104 S.Vaidyanathan, a clerk at Sriram Travels
PW-106 Y.R.Nagarajan, receptionist at Golden Lodge, Jaipur
PW-107 Ramasamy, car driver
PW-108 S.Santhana Krishnan, a Iriend oI Hari Babu (deceased
accused)
PW-109 Jayakumari, a Sri Lankan national who arrived in India in
1986 through proper channel`
PW-111 Vijayendran, cinema actor
PW-114 C.Vamadevan, a Sri Lankan travel agent
PW-115 R.Ravi Srinivasan, a Iriend oI Nalini (1
st
Accused)
PW-116 M.Girija Vallabhan
PW-117 R.Shankar, proprietor oI Sriram Travels
PW-120 V.T.Sundaramani, Iather oI Hari Babu (deceased accused)
PW-121 Dr.Cecelia Cyril, medical oIIicer who conducted
postmortem oI victims and examined the injured
PW-124 Dr.M.N.Damodaran, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-127 Dr.Jishnu Mohan, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-128 Arulmani
PW-129 Dr.N.Ramasamy, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-130 Dr.B.Santhakumar, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-132 Sasikala, teacher
PW-133 Karpagam, relative oI Suseendran (17
th
Accused) and wiIe
oI D.Shanmugasundaram (PW-208)
PW-134 Dr.Veerapandian, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-146 Dr.T.S.Koshy, medical oIIicer who conducted postmortem
oI victims and examined the injured
PW-147 Dr.Amrit Patnaik, medical oIIicer who conducted the
postmortem on the dead body oI suicide assassin Dhanu
PW-149 Latha
PW-150 Dr.Raja Venkatesh, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-151 K.Ravi Shankar, photo studio owner (owner oI Hari
Babu`s Chinon camera)
PW-153 V.P.Raghunathan, manager oI Union Motors, Salem
PW-155 Dr.Kanagaraj, medical oIIicer who conducted postmortem
PW-157 Lt.Col. Manik Sabharwal, bomb expert
PW-162 Dr.A.Srinivasan, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-163 Dr.E.V.Yuvaraj, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-165 Dr.Ponnusamy, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-166 Dr.Poongothai, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-168 S.V.Krishnan, Sundaram Finance Ltd.
PW-169 Dr.Saraswathi, medical oIIicer who conducted postmortem
PW-171 S.Sundari, girlIriend oI Hari Babu (deceased accused)
PW-172 P.V.Francis, Commander in Indian Navy
PW-178 A.Nageswara Rao, house owner oI No.13, Park Avenue,
Velan Nagar Extn., Alwarthirunagar, Madras
PW-179 M.Gunathilal Soni, manager oI retail textile shop Queen
Corner`, Puruswakkom, where a chooridar (orange and
green color) was sold on May 11, 1991
PW-182 Dr.Ramesh Kumar, medical oIIicer who conducted
PW-183 K.Varadarajan, auto-rickshaw driver at Thiruvallur
PW-185 P.G.Abeykoon Bandara, Deputy Controller, Dept.oI
Immigration and Emigration, Sri Lanka
PW-186 Brigadier Vivek Sapatnekar, IPKF Operations, Sri Lanka
PW-187 P.S.Padmanaban, a student oI Madras Institute oI
Engineering Technology
PW-189 Gajalakshmi
PW-194 Dr.R.Kuppusamy
PW-195 R.Nagarajan, Congress Party member in Thiruvallur
PW-196 Ramkumar, partner oI Krishna Hotel, New Delhi
PW-197 Dr.Claud Fernandez, dentist whose clinic was visited by
Murugan (3
rd
accused) and Robert Payas (9
th
accused)
PW-198 P.Ramalingam, brother in law oI Hari Babu (deceased
accused) and son in law oI Sundaramani (PW-120)
PW-199 V.Kannan
PW-200 S.Meera
PW-203 S.Chinnamani, a salesman at Metro Square, Pondy
Bazaar, Madras
PW-205 A.Parimalam, elder sister oI Hari Babu (deceased accused)
PW-206 Lokamatha, aunt oI Ravichandran (16
th
Accused)
PW-208 Shanmugham Sundaram, husband oI Karpagam (PW-133)
PW-210 M.Sankari, house owner and sister oI Muthuraja (an
LTTE activist)
PW-211 K.Jagannathan
PW-213 K.Periasami, a Dravida Kazhagam activist
PW-214 M.Chandra, a maid in the neighborhood oI Kalyani
Nursing Home
PW-215 Chamundeeswari, a resident oI Sriperumpudur
PW-217 unnamed husband oI PW-206
PW-218 E.Aanjanappa, owner oI house in Puttan Halli
PW-222 K.N.Mohan, car mechanic & owner oI motor garage,
Bangalore
PW-223 R.Rajan
PW-226 R.Janaki
PW-227 K.Premkumar, a Iriend oI Ranganath (26
th
accused)
PW-229 R.Jayashankar
PW-230 R.Selvaraj, driver oI tanker lorry on June 27, 1991, Irom
Mettur to Madras
PW-231 V.Radhakrishnan, Customs Dept, State Government
(Tamil Nadu) & a Iriend oI Arivu (18
th
accused)
PW-232 S.Syed Ibrahim, insurance surveyor
PW-233 K.Bharathi, nurse
PW-234 Mangaleswaran, in charge oI Rameshwaram reIugee camp
PW-235 Rose D.Nayagam, in charge oI Tuticorin reIugee camp
PW-236 R.D.Kalia, Police Inspector
PW-239 P.P.S.Dhillon, Flight Commander oI the Helicopter Unit,
Port Blair
PW-242 Kasi Anandhan, member oI the Central Committee oI
LTTE
PW-243 Dr.L.Thirunavukkarasu, medical oIIicer who conducted
postmortem on the deceased accused, who committed
suicide
PW-244 Dr.S.Rajendran, medical oIIicer who conducted
suicide
PW-245 S.Vasudevan, cashier at petrol pump
PW-246 Dr.S.Maghivanan, medical oIIicer who conducted
suicide
PW-247 Dr.T.Sankughavel Samy, medical oIIicer who conducted
suicide
PW-252 Dr.G.J.Srinivasan, Assistant Director, Tamil Nadu
Forensic Science Laboratory, Madras, and owner oI
No.26, Sabari Nagar Extn., Porur, Madras
PW-254 Mohanraj, wireless expert & OIIicer in Charge oI
International Monitoring Station, Perungudi, Madras
PW-255 Aveek Sarkar, journalist who interviewed Rajiv Gandhi on
July 30-31, 1990, Ior the interview which appeared in the
Sundav magazine Aug.12-19, 1990.
PW-256 A.Selvaraj
PW-258 Vazhapadi K. Ramamurthi, President Tamil Nadu
Congress Committee, & later Thamilzhaga Rajiv Congress
PW-260 Nagarathinam, attending laundry business in Kodiakkarai
PW-262 K.Ramakrishnan, handwriting expert
PW-266 Venkateswaran, Investigating OIIicer
PW-267 Ch.Gandhi, handwriting expert, who checked the
handwriting oI Sivarasan (deceased accused)
PW-271 P.P.Chandrsekara Nair
PW-273 K.S.Madhavan, Sub Inspector oI Police, Tamil Nadu State
Police
PW-280 Dr.P.Chandrasekaran, Director, Tamil Nadu Forensic
Science Laboratory, Madras
PW-281 M.Narayanan, Deputy Superintendent oI Police, CBI (one
oI the Investigating OIIicers)
oI the Investigating OIIicers)
PW-282 Velliapandi, Inspector, CBI
PW-285 R.Sivaji, Superintendent oI Police, who arrested Santhan
(2
nd
accused)
PW-288 K.Raghothaman, DSP, CBI, SIT, ChieI Investigating
OIIicer

Absence of a single research communication on the assassination
To the students oI Iorensic science, the absence oI a single research
communication on Rajiv Gandhi assassination, in the public domain
aIter a lapse oI ten years is a real handicap. In comparison, the control
case oI John F.Kennedy assassination (see, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon part 25), by 1974, had generated over 10 research
papers at the end oI the Iirst ten-year period. My source oI reIerence
is the Medline database, maintained by the National Library oI
Medicine oI USA. As oI now, over 35 research papers have appeared
on the JFK assassination.
Among the 288 prosecution witnesses, 19 medical doctors (PW-121,
PW-124, PW 127, PW-129, PW-130, PW-134, PW-146, PW-147,
PW-150, PW-155, PW-163, PW-165, PW-166, PW-169, PW-182,
PW-243, PW-244, PW-246 and PW-247) have been identiIied as
those who carried out the postmortem examinations oI the victims,
injured persons and alleged assassin (Dhanu) and deceased accused
(Hari Babu) and on May 21, 1991 and deceased accused (Sivarasan,
Subha and Iive other accomplices) on August 20, 1991. Dr.P.Chandra
Sekharan, the then director oI Tamil Nadu Forensic Science
Laboratory was identiIied as PW-280. One wonders why not even one
oI these 20 qualiIied personnel in India who were at the proper place
at proper time have not bothered to present the Iorensic evidence to
their proIessional colleagues in an appropriate proIessional journal.
From my search, I have gathered bits and pieces` oI Iorensic details,
only Irom the interviews granted by Dr.P.Chandra Sekharan to the
Indian news media. Thus, I wish to quote some details, available Irom
his two interviews: (1) RediII on the Net (website) oI October 14,
1999, and (2) The Hindu Opportunities (hinduonnet website) oI
November 22, 2000.
Postmortem details of Dhanu and Rajiv Gandhi
In his October 14, 1999 interview, Dr.Chandra Sekharan had stated,
In his October 14, 1999 interview, Dr.Chandra Sekharan had stated,
'.I tried to go that night itselI, but could not because oI the road
blocks and the riots taking place all over the city. When I reached
the scene in the morning, the police had cordoned it oII.
.When I inspected all the 18 bodies including Rajiv Gandhi`s
17 bodies had been identiIied there was one which was just an
assembling oI dismembered parts. From the hair and smooth
skin, the absence oI body hair, it was obvious that it was a
Iemale. I even correlated minor details like the same nail polish
on Iinger and toenails. Only the head, the leIt Iorearm and two
lower limbs were there, including some torn portions. The entire
right hand and trunk oI the body were missing. That gave me a
clue that this was a woman who was a human bomb.
When we searched Iurther, I Iound pieces oI a denim vest with
Velcro Iastenings. This gave me an indication that the bomb
might have been carried in an abdominal belt. You see, when I
had been in England Ior a month on a case some time beIore, I
had bought a similar vest with a Velcro Iastening. The Iinal
conclusion was a belt-bomb carried by a woman.
This was conIirmed by the photographs taken immediately aIter
the blast. The bodies were all lying in a geometrical Iashion or in
lotus petal arrangement, all the Ieet pointing towards the centre.
Normally, when human beings are knocked about above their
centre oI gravity, say in the chest, they Iall Ilat. All the people
standing around Rajiv had Iallen around in a circle, so I
concluded that the explosion occurred at a height oI about three-
and-a-halI Ieet above the ground level.
Further examination revealed that the woman`s Iace was intact,
so that anyone who had known her would be able to recognize
her. But her scalp was avulsed, that is the Ileshy portion oI the
back oI the head was stripped oII, exposing her skull neatly. This
indicated that the explosives were worn on the back oI her belt
only. II they had been all around her waist, then the tangential
Iorce would have also stripped oII her Iace beyond recognition.
In our country, it is common that iI someone bends suddenly to
touch your Ieet, you will reIlexively try to stop them Irom doing
so. This is what Rajiv was doing, so his Iace was exactly above
her back and was completely blown oII. His Irontal Iace bones
were thrown 100 metres away. His body was cremated without
Irontal Iace bones. His back was intact.
By studying these injuries, I was able to put up real live models
and determine the position in which she was bending over, and
how he was positioned over her. It took me just over 24 hours to
draw these conclusions.
The miraculous camera and its film
In the same interview, Dr.Chandra Sekharan had stated,
'I was in charge oI this whole crime scene until the CBI came in,
so the Iilm Irom |photographer| Haribabu`s camera |who died in
the blast| was developed in my laboratory. As soon as I saw
photographs oI this woman in a green dress in the pictures, I was
able to say conclusively that this was the lady who had been the
human bomb. It was not Ior me to Iind out who she was or
whom she represented, but the identiIication oI Dhanu and
Sivarasan deIinitely helped the police to start solving the
conspiracy angle oI the crime.
It took me six months to produce a Iull crime scene
reconstruction document. I used many photographs taken by
press photographers just beIore and immediately aIter the crime.
On the miraculous Chinon camera and the Iilm prints which recorded
Rajiv`s Iinal moments, I entertain some doubts. I repeat, some doubts,
though I do not question the authenticity oI the reported Iacts. I cite
two passages Irom Rajeev Sharma`s book, related to the Chinon
camera and the Iilm.
First passage: |not corrected Ior grammatical errors|
'As everybody, including the hit squad members Iled aIter the
blast, nobody noticed Haribabu`s camera. It lay on the
photographer chest Ior quite some beIore a Tamil Nadu police
oIIicer, Raghavan, chanced upon it. Raghavan immediately
opened the camera took out the reel and handed it over to a
policeman to get it developed without any delay. Haribabu`s
photos exposed the LTTE on May 24 when Dhanu`s photograph
was published by The Hindu. Next day, other newspapers
published another photograph, showing Dhanu holding a garland.
By now, Dhanu was the suspected suicide bomber. |Book:
Bevond the Tigers, p.25|
Second passage:
'The oIIicial count oI the injured persons went up to 22 two days
aIter the explosion when Jayabalan, an amateur photographer, got
himselI admitted to a city hospital. He later told the SIT he
remembered having clicked just beIore the explosion.
I saw Haribabu, another photographer, surrounded by several
women. I also tried the same method Irom behind Haribabu and
clicked once. The next moment the blast occurred. I Ielt a severe
shock and thought Ior a second that there was an electric short
circuit. Then something hit my leg.`
As Jayabalan bolted, he was hit again, this time on the back oI his
head. Blood started oozing out. I cried Ior help and two
policemen standing by the dais came Iorward. But as they saw a
body oI a police inspector, they rushed towards him`, he was
quoted in the media as saying. He reached home on his own.
AIter two days when the city became calm, Jayabalan handed
over the camera with the Iilm roll and his stained clothes to the
DIG at the police headquarters. He had clicked at least eight
Irames. The unprocessed Iilm he returned to the police contained
the very last moments oI Rajiv`s liIe. |ibid, pp.37-38|
The reported observations oI photographer Jayabalan is interesting in
that they tell the last moments oI deceased accused Haribabu, the
photographer. The Indian press had immediately published the photos
said to be developed Irom the purported Iilm obtained Irom
Haribabu`s camera by police oIIicer Raghavan. One oI the penultimate
prints showed the backside oI alleged assassin Dhanu`s head (with
Ilowers), with Rajiv`s Iace towards the camera. That would reveal that
Haribabu was behind Dhanu. According to Jayabalan, Haribabu was
'standing on his toes and holding his camera over his head to get
pictures oI Rajiv Gandhi and that his camera was lying on his chest`
when it was picked up by police oIIicer Raghavan.
The explosive found in the belt bomb
According to Dr.Chandra Sekharan,
'We also determined that the explosive used was RDX, that is,
the research and development explosive developed in American
laboratories Ior military use. It is a semisolid explosive that is like
chappati dough and can be moulded to any shape. It is very
dangerous, but does not ignite until you heat it to 197 degrees. It
explodes at a detonating Iorce oI 29,000 Ieet per second and
burns in one by ten-thousandth oI second. The instantaneous
burning makes it detonate at a very high velocity. It does not
need any kind oI shell or covering like a grenade.
The people who made this belt-bomb had embedded it with 2
mm steel pellets, roughly about 10,000 (we recovered about
6,000, and many are still living with these pellets embedded in
them) in number. The idea oI these pellets was that they would
Ily at a velocity oI 29,000 Ieet per second in all directions, and
add to the damage done. So many pellets were recovered Irom
Rajiv`s body during the post-mortem and are in the museum in
Delhi now.
The outcome of forensic investigation
Dr.Chandra Sekharan in his November 2000 interview had observed:
'.In the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, I was handling the
entire crime scene examination Irom the beginning. I
reconstructed the scene oI the blast with all the minute details and
submitted a 100-page report with nearly 100 illustrations and
photographs to CBI and the Verma Commission.
Few queries
I summarise the observations made by Dr.Chandra Sekharan and my
queries as Iollows:
Fact 1: Following impact with the belt bomb, Rajiv Gandhi`s Irontal
Iace bones were thrown 100 meters away. |That is a pretty
long distance, almost covering the two goal posts oI a Iootball
arena!|
Fact 2: The explosive used in the belt bomb had a detonating Iorce oI
29,000 Ieet per second.
Fact 3: All those who were within the 3 meter radius oI the center oI
explosion had died, including the Ireelance photographer Hari
Babu, who was holding the Chinon camera above his head to
click at Rajiv.
Querv 1. But Hari Babu`s Chinon camera lying in his chest did not
suIIer any damage. The Iilm inside the camera did not suIIer
any exposure damage and the ten Irames shot beIore the
explosion were retrieved. A miracle indeed, considering that
the Chinon camera used by Hari Babu was also held within the
3 meter radius, and that it (with all certainty) was not protected
with a hard outer layer made up oI lead or some damage
resistant material.
Fact 4: It took six months Ior him to produce a Iull crime scene
reconstruction document. This could be interpreted as that,
Irom May 21, 1991 to end oI November 1991, the complete
details on the identity and the activity oI the alleged assassin
Dhanu was not reconstructed in Iull.
Dhanu was not reconstructed in Iull.
Querv 2. II so, on what basis, the SIT personnel and the Indian press
released inIormation on Dhanu`s identity and her links to
LTTE within days oI the assassination (see, Ior example the
above-cited Iirst passage oI Rajeev Sharma`s book) and beIore
November 1991?
Querv 3: Did Dr. Chandra Sekharan carry out a conIirmatory blast-
damage` experiment, using the same explosive and dummy
targets (within the 3 meter radius Irom the center oI explosion)
to see whether the Chinon camera worn by the Ireelance
photographer could not suIIer any damage during the blast and
that the Iilm contained in the camera would not be exposed? II
so, where did he carry out such an experiment?
Fact 5: Dr. Chandra Sekharan has stated in his Nov. 2000 interview
|aIter nine years!|, that he 'submitted a 100-page report with
nearly 100 illustrations and photographs to CBI and the Verma
Commission.
Querv 4: Why he or none oI his associates who were involved in the
Iorensic analysis oI the victims oI May 21, 1991 event have
not bothered to publish their Iorensic Iindings on such an
important assassination, in a peer-reviewed medico-legal
journal oI international standing |which is abstracted in the
National Library oI Medicine`s, Medline database|, until now?
Isn`t this a proIessional negligence and discourtesy to other
scientists?
Credibility of Dr. Chandra Sekharan`s professional competence
Although I`m hesitant to side-track Irom the issue oI Iorensic evidence
related to Rajiv assassination, I wish to bring to the attention oI the
readers the Iollowing news item which appeared in the Times of India
oI July 7, 2001, which brings into question the credibility oI Dr.
Chandra Sekharan`s proIessional competence. Interestingly, this may
not be irrelevant to the Rajiv assassination studies as well. Thus, I
reproduce the news item Irom Chennai in Iull:
Expert nails police video, faces music
'A leading Iorensic expert Irom Tamil Nadu, P.Chandra
Sekharan, has termed the police version oI the video clippings on
the arrest oI Iormer CM Karunanidhi a manipulated version`. In
a statement on Thursday |i.e., July 5, 2001|, Chandra Sekharan,
who established the human bomb theory on the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination case, contended that the police version looked
cruder than a Iake photograph`. He was reIerring to a picture
released by the earlier AIADMK government to show Janata
released by the earlier AIADMK government to show Janata
Party President Subramanian Swamy and TADA prisoner Ravi
together in order to imprison Swamy.
Commenting on the police clippings, Chandra Sekharan pointed
out that scene oI Union Industry and Commerce Minister
Murasoli Maran punching CB-CID Mohamed Ali in the Iace was
clearly a repeated animation` as it did not exhibit the natural
movements oI a human hand, but did clearly demonstrate the
rigid movement oI an animated arm`. He Iurther observed that
the clippings oI the police appeared in diIIerent versions and were
manipulated digitally.
However, the government, denying Chandra Sekharan`s
observations, initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. It
accused him oI having committed certain omissions and
commissions` during his tenure as director oI Iorensic science. It
ordered an inquiry by a senior IAS oIIicer into his actions.
An oIIicial release said: It is not known whether it is a mere
surmise by P.Chandra Sekharan since there is no scientiIic
explanation oIIered Ior his conclusions. It is pointed out that by
mere visual observation oI a video clipping, such an opinion
cannot be given. For Iorming and Iurnishing an opinion,
examination is necessary oI video morphing and video animation
by computer graphic experts.
I would be interested in learning more about the Tamil Nadu
government`s accusation that Dr.Chandra Sekharan had committed
certain omissions and commissions` during his tenure as director oI
Iorensic science. Whether these omissions and commissions` include
his investigations on the Rajiv assassination is not clear now.
For record, I should include that Dr.Chandra Sekharan was a recipient
oI India`s Padma Bhushan award in 2000. I became interested in
Dr.Chandra Sekharan`s curriculum vitae, which appeared in the Island
(Colombo) newspaper oI June 17, 2001, in relation to his services
oIIered to Ms.Lakmani Welgama, the widow oI the late Upali
Wijewardene, in a document Iorgery case. Two statistics cited under
his proIessional experience` in his curriculum vitae piqued my
curiosity. These are,
1. ~provided scientific evidence in more than a 100,000 cases.
This statistic is not a printer`s error, since it is mentioned in his pre-
interview proIile which appeared in the RediII on the Net (Oct.14,
1999) as well. 100,000 cases in a career spanning '35 years is a
stupendous Ieat to achieve, by any scale oI imagination. On an
stupendous Ieat to achieve, by any scale oI imagination. On an
average, this amounts to 2,857 cases per year, and almost 8 cases per
day Ior 12,775 days (i.e. 35 x 365 days). Even iI one assumes that
Dr.Chandra Sekharan did provide scientiIic evidence Ior 100,000
cases, what percent oI these turned out to be accurate deserves
scrutiny.
2. ~published 11 books and done 250 research papers. Though I
cannot check the quality oI his evidence Ior the said 100,000 cases`, I
used an independent measure to scrutinize the quality oI his 250
research papers`. The Medline database maintained by the National
Library oI Medicine (USA) incorporates into its computer Iiles all the
peer-reviewed research publications in biomedical sciences which
appear in quality journals since 1965. This is the currently accepted
gold-standard` Ior quality research among biomedical scientists.
Dr.Chandra Sekharan`s career has a 35-year span, according to his
vita; thus, all his quality publications would have been entered in the
Medline database. When I checked the Medline database, using the
two variants oI his name |namely Chandra Sekharan P and Sekharan
CP|, I received only 21 listed research papers in the checklist. That is
a pretty low Iigure Ior a scientist who prides himselI as having 35
years oI service and carrying the stature as the leading Iorensic
scientist in India. Facts-checking scientists always need a control to
validate their analysis. Thus, I used my 20-year publishing record as a
control reIerence and when I used the two variants oI my name
|namely Kantha SS and Sri Kantha S|, the same Medline database
generated 39 research papers in the checklist. I have produced a little
over 100 research papers in the past 20 years oI my career as a
scientist. Thus, my inIerence was that the quality oI Dr.Chandra
Sekharan`s 250 research papers` (among which 21 are listed in the
Medline database) is suboptimal to that oI mine (102 research papers
among which 39 are listed in the Medline database) indeed. I provide
these details so that any interested reader can check the source Ior its
validity.
I Iocused on these two statistics to demonstrate that Dr. Chandra
Sekharan`s curriculum vitae reveals a not-too inIrequent tendency seen
among Indian academics to embellish their academic credentials to
gullible public and journalists. Sad to say, this tendency is strongly
seen among the Indian academics who had their postgraduate degrees
in Indian institutions. According to the vita published in the Island
newspaper oI June 17, 2001, Dr.Chandra Sekharan has received the
Iollowing degrees: B.Sc. Mathematics and Physics (Annamalai
University), M.A.Physics with Electronics (Annamalai University),
M.Sc.Physics with Spectroscopy (Annamalai University),
M.Sc.Physics with Spectroscopy (Annamalai University),
Ph.D.Forensic Science Medical Faculty (Madras University). This is
not a criticism on the quality oI Indian education. Along history and
even in the twentieth century, India had produced tens oI originals in
subjects ranging Irom astronomy to yoga science. But, Ior every tens
oI originals, thousands oI Iakes also coexist in the Indian mileau in
every sphere oI activity, who thrive by their skills oI selI promotion.
Use of DNA fingerprinting for forensic investigations in India
The Deccan Herald oI Aug.21, 2001 carried a Press Trust oI India
news Ieature dated New Delhi, Aug.20` with a caption Potential oI
DNA Iingerprinting crippled by poor awareness`. It contained some
relevant inIormation about the Rajiv assassination case as presented by
Dr.Lalji Singh, the Director oI Centre Ior Cellular and Molecular
Biology, Hyderabad. Excerpts:
'.Dr.Singh has visited hundreds oI court rooms across the
country to be tried as witness`, and says his experience has been
unpleasant` and Iull oI suspicion`. He had even been accused oI
playing on the ignorance oI the judge`. This technology has mind
boggling potential in criminal investigation. But then, we have to
educate the judiciary oI its vital import`. And the cases he helped
investigate include Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
Establishing the identity oI Dhanu, the suicide bomber who killed
Iormer prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, was another occasion when
the DNA probe was used: We established that the DNA Iound in
the skull, charred muscle pieces on the suicide bomber`s belt
showed identical patterns, which led us to prove that Dhanu was
the bomber.` Equally crucial was comparing LTTE mastermind
Sivarasan`s DNA to that oI his parents who were Ilown in Irom
Sri Lanka Ior the purpose: Establishing the identity oI Sivarasan
was the only evidence we had to link the murder oI Rajiv to
LTTE`..
The last sentence is nothing more than gibberish. According to
Dr.Singh, they had compared the DNAs oI Sivarasan with that oI his
parents who were Ilown in Irom Sri Lanka Ior the purpose`.
Similarities in the DNA pattern oI Sivarasan to that oI his parents`
would only prove that Sivarasan was only a progeny oI his parents`
and nothing about linking the murder oI Rajiv to LTTE`. So much Ior
the Indian journalese and Iacts-checking credentials.
Now, to the interesting puzzle about Sivarasan`s parents, as noted by
Dr.Lalji Singh. On Sivarasan`s origins, the Eelam Tamil journalist
Dr.Lalji Singh. On Sivarasan`s origins, the Eelam Tamil journalist
D.B.S.Jeyaraj had published an exclusive investigation` in mid 1991
in the Frontline magazine, which was republished in the Lanka
Guardian oI Sept.15, 1991. According to this report, Sivarasan`s
mother Sivapackiyam, who is Irom Chavakachcheri, was alive in
1991. |I`m not sure whether she is still alive.| But Sivarasan`s Iather
Chandrasekharam Pillai, who is Irom Udupiddy, had died in late
1977. Thus, only one can be correct; either Jeyaraj or Dr.Singh. II
Jeyaraj is correct in his report, that Sivarasan`s Iather had died in late
1977, the person who was Ilown Irom Sri Lanka to India Ior DNA
Iinger printing match with Sivarasan`s sample was a consenting
impersonator. Thus collapses the credibility oI India`s Iorensic
scientists who were engaged in the Rajiv assassination case.
(Continued)

Part 27
Sachi Sri Kantha
15 December 2001]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: the political
angle
The Lady Vanishes
The Ladv Janishes was an AlIred Hitchcock thriller released in
1938. In that movie, Hitchcock spun a suspense yarn revolving around
a young girl on a train meeting an old lady who beIriends her, and then
vanishes Iollowing an accident (a Ilower-pot Ialling on the head) to the
heroine. In that yarn, Hitchcock included a parade oI bizarre
characters such as a circus magician, a baroness, a brain surgeon, a
nurse dressed as a nun, a wealthy oIIicial with his mistress, and two
cricket enthusiasts who were concerned only about the game`, to
push the storyline about that old lady trying to deliver a coded message
in a lullaby about a covert treaty between two powers.
What happened on May 21, 1991 in Sriperumbudur can be portrayed
as a reverse Hitchcock`s plot, where an old lady (Maragatham
Chandrasekar) was beIriended by a young girl (Dhanu) and her
handlers, who precipitated all the uproar with a suicidal bomb-blast
that the heroine never thought would happen in her electorate.
Maragatham Chandrasekar was the then sitting MP Ior
Sriperumbudur, winning the 1989 election on Congress Party ticket,
by deIeating K.Ganesan oI DMK by a margin oI 154,551 votes. She
won the 1991 election as well in Sriperumbudur aIter Rajiv`s
assassination, Ior the Congress Party, deIeating K.Sundaram oI DMK
by a margin oI 180,572 votes.
The political drama (spun around post hoc decoding` oI coded
messages between the LTTE cadres in Eelam and Tamil Nadu by the
invariably clever spooks oI India) staged in the past ten years in the
trial court, Commission sittings, Interpol Red Notice on Pirabhakaran,
extradition request Irom India, with additional ingredients such as
Yasser AraIat`s prior warning on assassination, third grade intelligence
leads` Irom Colombo, Swedish BoIors arms deals, Italian
connection` Irom Sonia`s side, India`s godman` Chandra Swamy and
his links to bizarre characters (international arms dealers, Narasimha
his links to bizarre characters (international arms dealers, Narasimha
Rao and Subramanian Swamy) in the legal, political and media arenas
could have provided headache and constipation, even to Hitchcock.
While the young girl Dhanu literally vanished at the end oI her act,
Maragatham Chandrasekar made her exit Irom this world less than two
months ago, on October 26, 2001. In my opinion, she had carried a lot
oI secrets to the grave related to Rajiv`s murder with her. Here is the
brieI obituary notice oI hers, which appeared in the Hindu newspaper
the Iollowing day.
Maragatham dead
'The Iormer Union Minister and Iive-time Lok Sabha member,
Ms.Maragatham Chandrasekar, passed away in a |Chennai| city
hospital here this evening. She was 84. She started her political
career in 1952 as Deputy Minister Ior Health in Nehru`s
Ministry. She had served in the Ministries oI Sastri, Indira
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. She was last elected Irom
Sriperumbudur in 1991, and it was there that the Iormer Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated while addressing her
election rally on May 21.
Apart Irom serving the AICC as its general secretary, she was
also Tamil Nadu Congress Committee president Ior a brieI period
during the eighties. She was a Rajya Sabha member Ior three
terms, beIore reverting back to the Lok Sabha in 1984. She is
survived by son, Mr.Lalit Chandrasekar, and daughter, Ms.Latha
Priyakumar. |Hindu, Oct.27, 2001|
Kindly note the name Latha Priyakumar, the daughter oI Maragatham
Chandrasekar. Her name was also highlighted and linked to the events
which happened on the night oI May 21, 1991. Latha Priyakumar,
contested the Sriperumbudur constituency in the 1996 election in place
oI her mother on the Congress Party ticket, but was deIeated by
T.Nagaratnam oI DMK by a margin oI 245,711 votes. She also
perIormed a vanishing act` while inquiries were progressing, about
which attention will be given later in this chapter. This mother-
daughter duo, who organized the May 1991 campaign meeting Ior
which Rajiv was invited to attend, were not included in the charge-
sheet prepared by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) oI India`s
CBI. This is because they were sharks` swimming in the Tamil Nadu
Congress politics Ior decades. But, the mother-daughter duo |Padma
and Nalini, who organized the saIe houses Ior LTTE cadres in Tamil
Nadu| were listed in the charge-sheet prepared by the SIT. This is
because, these two were sprats` Iloating in the Tamil Nadu mileau.
This explains the political angle oI the Rajiv assassination.
Subramanian Swamy, in his book on the assassination, has recorded
Maragatham Chandrasekar`s role on the events oI May 21, 1991 as
Iollows:
'.The meeting was organized by Mrs.M.Chandrasekhar, a
Congress (I) candidate Irom Sriperumbudur parliamentary
constituency, to canvass support Ior her and other Congress (I)
candidates Ior Assembly constituencies Irom that area. The
Sriperumbudur meeting was Rajiv Gandhi`s Iirst regular meeting
in Tamil Nadu during the election. Newspapers oI May 19
carried Rajiv Gandhi`s proposed visit to Tamil Nadu including
Sriperumbudur. Journey details were, however, Iinalized only as
late as May 20. As per his programme, Rajiv Gandhi was to
arrive at the venue oI the meeting at 9pm but as his aircraIt
developed problems in Visakhapatnam, his departure was delayed
by an hour. He arrived more than an hour late. Sri Perumbudur is
located at a distance oI 48 kms south-west oI Madras on the
Madras-Bangalore national highway.
Although RG told a naval oIIicer in Visakhapatnam that it was
Mrs.Maragatham Chandrasekhar who would be anxious and
disappointed iI he did not make it to Sriperumbudur,
Mrs.Chandrasekhar on the other hand told the Jain Commission
that she had never requested the meeting |Vol.I, chapter I-III,
p.68| |Book: The Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi, 2000, pp.122-
123|
Dr.Swamy`s views, irrespective oI his selI-serving pronouncements
and anti-LTTE propaganda, deserve attention since at the time oI
Rajiv assassination he held the portIolio oI Minister oI Law and
Commerce in the lame-duck cabinet oI Chandrasekhar. Thus, until he
lost that status in June 1991, it is reasonable to inIer that he would
have received privileged inIormation on the events oI May 21, 1991
Irom oIIicial sources. However, caution is needed in assessing the
inIormation relating to what Dr.Swamy promotes, exaggerates and
hides. Thus, though I have not come across another reIerence (even
Irom that oI Dr.P.Chandra Sekharan, the then chieI Iorensic scientist
oI Tamil Nadu) related to the dispersal oI Rajiv Gandhi`s body aIter
the bomb blast, I cite the Iollowing details stated by Dr.Swamy in his
book:
'The body oI Rajiv Gandhi was Ilung about 1.85 metres
eastwards (towards the barricade) with Iace downwards due to
the powerIul blast. His body was Iound intermingled with other
badly mutilated bodies oI policemen. When the explosion
badly mutilated bodies oI policemen. When the explosion
occurred, K.Ramamurthy, TNCC-I President, was on the dais
and G.K.Moopanar, Iormer party general secretary a little
distance away, behind the dais. Both escaped unhurt. Mrs.
Chandrasekhar who was hurt was luckily ahead oI Rajiv Gandhi,
but at some distance, outside the 3-metre radius killer zone.
|ibid, p.115|
Considering that politicians everywhere like to project themselves in
Iront oI cameras and videos, and that in India a leader oI Rajiv
Gandhi`s stature would be always surrounded by Iawning local
politicians, it still puzzles me that why on that critical moment oI bomb
blast, the three Congress Party politicians |namely, Maragatham
Chandrasekar, G.K.Moopanar and K.Ramamurthy| were not within
the three-meter killer zone radius. OI course, Maragatham
Chandrasekar did receive some injury, but Moopanar and
K.Ramamurthy escaped unhurt. Also the location oI Ms. Latha
Priyakumar, another Congress bigwig and daughter oI
Mrs.Chandrasekar, at the time oI bomb blast has not been reported
clearly. Few months ago, Moopanar also made his Iinal exit Irom this
world and like Maragatham Chandrasekar, he also could have carried
some secrets with him to the grave.
Political Game played by the SIT
Little over an year ago, the abduction oI Kannada movie star
Rajkumar by the bandit Veerappan`s gang made a splashing story Ior a
couple oI weeks in the Indian newsmedia. When that story came to its
ending with the release oI Rajkumar through the mediation oI
P.Nedumaran, one oI the leading LTTE sympathizers in Tamil Nadu,
a couple oI additional names were highlighted as those having
camaraderie with LTTE. One oI these names was Kolathur Mani alias
T.S.Mani. For relevance to political angle taken by the SIT oIIicials in
the Rajiv`s assassination investigation, I reproduce excerpts Irom a
commentary authored by L.R.Jagadheesan Irom Chennai on Nov.19,
2000, which appeared in the India Todav magazine`s website.
'.Very Iew people know that there were serious diIIerences oI
opinion within the SIT on how to treat Mani`s role in the Rajiv
assassination case. While some oIIicials Ielt he should be booked
as an accused in the case, since he had arranged the tanker lorry
which carried the killers Irom one hideout to another, others,
particularly one senior oIIicer, Ielt he should not be made an
accused, Ior two strategic reasons:
1. The SIT team reportedly took a conscious decision to
avoid booking Indian politicians as accused in the Rajiv
avoid booking Indian politicians as accused in the Rajiv
assassination case. The CBI sleuths Ielt naming politicians
as accused would hamper the investigation and divert the
attention oI the case and its seriousness. Mani, being the
Salem district Dravidar Kazhagam oIIice bearer, was let
oII on this count.
2. Senior SIT oIIicials Ielt Mani was an important source oI
inIormation on the LTTE`s involvement and so was not
named as an accused in the case.
The Iirst stated reason let the proverbial cat` out oI its bag, aIter a
passage oI eight years since the SIT charge sheeted 41 individuals as
the accused in the Rajiv assassination trial. II this reason was
legitimate, the extent oI duplicity perpetrated by the SIT operatives in
the assassination trial Irom 1992 to 2000 conIirms the observation
made by Mahatma Gandhi in 1909 about the so-called justice under
the law`. Noted the then 40-year old barrister who knew his beans on
legal issues,
~It is wrong to consider that courts are established for the
benefit of people. Those who want to perpetuate their power
do so through the courts |political pamphlet: Hind Swaraf or
Critique of Modern Civili:ation|
My take on why Kolathur Mani was not charged by the SIT in the
Rajiv assassination trial was that, apart Irom the valid second reason
(mentioned above, by which SIT would use him as a cheese piece` in
the trap to pry on LTTE`s activities in Tamil Nadu), he was let oII
mainly to protect the Congress Party operatives Maragatham
Chandrasekar and Latha Priyakumar.
Assassination story in Karunanidhi`s script
The DMK leader M.Karunanidhi has been a public Iigure in Tamil
Nadu Ior the past Iive decades, and a prominent all-Indian politician
since 1965. Thus he has experienced his peaks and valleys umpteen
times. There are many who do not grant a good grade Ior his politics,
but there has been no second opinion among Tamils (and this included
his Iriends turned-political adversaries like poet Kannadasan and
MGR) that as a proIessional scriptwriter in Tamil stage and screen,
Karunanidhi is without peers. So, it is apt to read how Karunanidhi
had described the Rajiv assassination Irom his vantage pedestal as a
scriptwriter.
In a 1997 interview he granted to the Frontline magazine`s editor
N.Ram and correspondent T.S.Subramanian Iollowing the release oI
N.Ram and correspondent T.S.Subramanian Iollowing the release oI
interim report oI Jain Commission Iindings, Karunanidhi had stated the
Iollowing:
'.II, I, as a writer, were asked to write a story on this
assassination case, I would write it as Iollows: Some stories
introduce a hero and a heroine, they go Iorward and Iinally end in
a conclusion. Some stories begin with the climax and are then
narrated in Ilashback. As Iar as this story is concerned, it is one
that should begin with the climax.
How should it begin? How did the human bomb Dhanu, charge-
sheeted in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, come to Tamil
Nadu? Who came with her? Where did she stay and with whom
did she stay? Who took her to Sriperumbudur? Who arranged the
programme oI Rajiv Gandhi? Who suddenly made changes in the
programme? To what places did Sivarajan go in Tamil Nadu?
Why could Sivarajan not be apprehended till he went to
Bangalore? It is said that the place where Sivarajan stayed and
was cornered in Bangalore belongs to a Congressman. What are
the details?
At the place where Rajiv Gandhi died, no Congressman was
injured. The persons who died there were police oIIicers who
provided him security. At this point oI time, there was an alliance
between Rajiv Gandhi`s party, the Congress (I), and the
AIADMK in Tamil Nadu. Why did no candidate belonging to that
alliance go to the public meeting addressed by Rajiv Gandhi?
AIter his death, why was no eIIort made to see the body at the
airport? Not only that. When Rajiv Gandhi traveled Irom the
airport to Chennai, though Jayalalitha was not then in town, did
any AIADMK candidate who contested with Congress (I)
support, or any AIADMK worker, receive him? . |Frontline
magazine, Nov.29-Dec.12, 1997|
Murasoli Maran`s queries
Though ten years, two Commissions (Verma and Jain), and two legal
trials (Designated Court under TADA and Supreme Court appeal)
pertaining to Rajiv assassination have passed into history, answers to
every question raised by Karunanidhi have not been Iorthcoming Irom
those who ascended to the inquisitor`s pedestal. Karunanidhi`s queries
was reiterated by his nephew Murasoli Maran, currently a Iederal
cabinet minister in the India, when the Final Report oI the Jain
Commission was debated in the Lok Sabha on Aug.5, 1998. Maran`s
concluding remarks in the debate are as Iollows:
Shri Murasoli Maran (Madras Central): '.I want to know
how Sriperumbudur meeting was organized at such a short
notice? How as Rajivji persuaded to accept the invitation when
some senior leaders oI the Congress were not enthusiastic about
it? Where did the human bomb obtain local hospitality? That is
very important. Whose guest was she? She could have been a
guest oI somebody else. How was she able to approach the target
breaking the security cordon? . (Interruptions) This is called
access theory. Shri K.Subrahmanian, oI the Institute oI DeIence
Studies and Analysis pointed out that there is unwillingness to go
into those issues because oI the Iear that such an exercise would
reIlect.(Interruptions)
Mr.Speaker: Shri Maran, please conclude.
Shri Murasoli Maran (Madras Central): I would conclude
shortly, Sir. There was unwillingness. I want my Iriends to note
that iI they want to get to the truth, it is very important to
examine the aspect oI access to the target. Generally, in the
investigation oI a murder case, it is very important to know as to
how the murderer approached the victim. That question was not
taken up at all. We are not aIraid oI MDMA because we have
nothing to Iear and nothing to hide. |Note: MDMA is the
abbreviation Ior the Multi-Disciplinary Monitoring Agency,
Iormed by the Union Home Ministry oI India to probe the larger
conspiracy in Rajiv`s assassination, Iollowing the
recommendations made by the Jain Commission in early 1998|
We know the BJP leaders Ior several years. (Interruptions) We
have warmed lot oI these benches in this House and the other
House Ior more than three decades. We have seen a lot oI
politics together. I always carried a loIty impression about the
BJP leaders like hon. Prime Minister Atalji |Vajpayee| and hon.
Home Minister Advaniji I still do. But I am shocked to see how
the great leaders, the tall leaders, could descend to such a low
level. I am sorry Ior them. We understand their political
compulsions. So be it! Thank you. |Lok Sabha Debates, Aug.5,
1998|
When Murasoli Maran made this speech, he was not a cabinet
minister. Then, AIADMK was aligned to the BJP, and M.Thambi
Durai, an AIADMK politician, was the Minister oI Law and Justice.
Shortwhile later, a political realignment resulted by which DMK
aligned to the BJP, Iollowing AIADMK`s exit. I believe that the
MDMA, reIerred to by Murasoli Maran, was set up by the BJP Ior
two reasons: one, as an exhaust valve to release the political hot air
emanating Irom Congress Party circles. The second reason was
emanating Irom Congress Party circles. The second reason was
ominous: to rein on Pirabhakaran`s political activities at the
international Iorums.
Pirabhakaran`s status in the Rajiv assassination case
It is appropriate to analyze now the status oI Pirabhakaran in the Rajiv
assassination case. Since May 1992, his status has been variously
described (Ior reasons oI ignorance or malice) as absconder, accused,
criminal, Iugitive, proclaimed oIIender and suspect. Legally speaking,
each oI these terms has subtle diIIerence among them and they cannot
be used interchangeably. The Blacks Law Dictionarv (1979, 5
th
edition) distinguishes each oI these terms as Iollows:
Abscond |or absconder|: To go in a clandestine manner out oI the
jurisdiction oI the courts, or to lie concealed, in order to avoid their
process. To hide, conceal, or absent oneselI clandestinely, with the
intent to avoid legal process.
Accused: The generic name Ior the deIendant in a criminal case.
Person becomes accused` within meaning oI guarantee oI speedy trial
only at point at which either Iormal indictment or inIormation has been
returned against him, or when he becomes subject to actual restraints
on his liberty imposed by arrest, whichever Iirst occurs.
Criminal: One who has committed a criminal oIIense; one who has
been legally convicted oI a crime; one adjudged guilty oI crime.
Fugitive: One who Ilees; used in criminal law with the implication oI a
Ilight, evasion or escape Irom arrest, prosecution or imprisonment.
Suspect: A person reputed or suspected to be involved in a crime.
Among these Iive terms, two (criminal and Iugitive) are unapplicable to
Pirabhakaran. As oI now, he has not been legally convicted oI the
crime in the Rajiv`s assassination trial held in India. According to the
legal system adopted in India, one cannot be tried in absentia. Also, he
is not a Iugitive. The assassination took place in India, and
Pirabhakaran was not present at the scene oI crime according to the
collected documents and he has been residing beyond the boundaries
oI India since January 1987. Thus, technically the term Iugitive` is
nonsensical to use on Pirabhakaran. However, politicians speak
nonsense, and the ex-Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake is no
exception. An year ago, he had alluded to Pirabhakaran as a Iugitive
with the comment, When a Iugitive wants to talk peace, it would be
the priority oI the Government to think on those lines rather than act
to extradite him` |Hindu newspaper, Dec.4, 2000|
to extradite him` |Hindu newspaper, Dec.4, 2000|
The legal documents prepared in India label him as absconding
accused`, combining the two terms absconder and accused. That
Pirabhakaran is absconding Irom the Indian operatives is laughable; it
can be true, iI it is qualiIied to include the inIormation that Ior valid
reasons in the past, Pirabhakaran has absconded Irom the Indian
Intelligence-wallahs to avoid unnecessary harassment. Also, he is not a
citizen oI India. Thus, he is at liberty to choose whom he should meet
or not. The description accused` also does not Iit properly to
Pirabhakaran`s status. According to one deIinition oI the term
accused` in the Blacks Law Dictionarv, he has not been subjected
'to actual restraints on his liberty imposed by arrest. Though
Pirabhakaran can be classiIied as an accused` on the description that
Iormal indictment or inIormation has been returned against him`, the
question arises whether such an indictment was personally delivered to
him by a messenger Irom the court. Since he has been living in Eelam,
beyond the jurisdiction oI Indian courts, a news-release making him an
accused` in the Rajiv assassination trial would not be an acceptable
criterion. II Iacts are to be believed, Pirabhakaran was publicized as an
accused` in the charge sheet prepared by the SIT in May 1992. He
should have been served with court summons. And there exists no
public record that Pirabhakaran accepted such a court summons Irom
the oIIicial Indian representatives in Sri Lanka, assuming that such a
document has in Iact been delivered Irom India. In the absence oI
such validation, it is inappropriate to label him as an accused` with
whatever preIixes. This brings us to the question oI extradition oI
Pirabhakaran Irom Sri Lanka.
Politics of Extradition
I provide below Iive selected reports and commentaries, which have
appeared in the newsmedia since 1997, related to Pirabhakaran`s
extradition to India. The last Iour reports appeared a little more than an
year ago. The humor in each oI the Iive Ieatures is selI-evident.
Feature 1:
Documents pertaining to Prabhakaran's extradition under study
|by Upali Rupasinghe|
'Deputy Inspector General oI Police (CID), T.V.Sumanasekera
told newsmen here that documents pertaining to LTTE leader
Prabhakaran`s extradition, which also include evidence oI his
allgeged involvement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination had been
taken into cognizance. Mr. Sumanasekera, now attending the
ongoing Interpol conIerence said this move Iollowed India`s
ongoing Interpol conIerence said this move Iollowed India`s
request Ior the LTTE chieI`s extradition. He said a search was on
Ior Prabhakaran who is also the prime accused in the suicide
bomb attack on the Central Bank in Colombo last year. The
Attorney-General is examining India`s request, he said. The
army aIter re-taking JaIIna peninsula is now in the process oI
liberating the main supply route Irom Colombo to JaIIna and
aIter this the possibility oI Prabhakaran`s arrest will improve`
Mr.Sumanasekera said. |Cevlon Dailv News, Oct.22, 1997|
Feature 2:
Advani vows to extradite Prabhakaran
|by Jawed Naqvi|
'In remarks possibly aimed at placating a livid opposition, Indian
Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani has committed himselI to
extraditing Sri Lankan Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran,
but diplomatic sources said on Friday the idea was Iar-Ietched. It
is a bit oI quixotic dream iI taken seriously`, said a diplomat in
New Delhi. Mr Advani is probably playing to an extraordinarily
gullible audience`.
The diplomat`s comments complemented remarks to this
correspondent complemented remarks to this correspondent two
years ago by the late Sri Lankan Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike who thought that the idea to arrest Prabhakaran
was laughable`. India wants us to arrest him when we ourselves
do not know where to Iind him`, Bandaranaike had chuckled, in
response to an Indian-inspired Interpol red corner alert Ior
Prabhakaran.
Newspapers in Delhi quoted Advani as telling parliament on Thursday
|Nov.30, 2000| that Indian oIIicials had visited Colombo a week ago
to seek the extradition oI the head oI Liberation Tigers Ior Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). The Multi-Disciplinary Monitoring Agency (MDMA)
team was in Sri Lanka between Nov 13 and 23 and met the attorney
general and solicitor general.
Prabhakaran has been Iound guilty by a special trial court in India
oI conspiracy in the assassination oI Iormer prime minister Rajiv
Gandhi in May 1991 by a woman suicide bomber. |Dawn
newspaper, Karachchi, Dec.3, 2000|
Note: The last statement is not correct. Pirabhakaran was not under
trial at the Special Court which convened at Poonamalee. But, in
reports about Pirabhakaran such inaccuracies are abundant due to the
reports about Pirabhakaran such inaccuracies are abundant due to the
ignorance oI reporters.
Feature 3:
India seeks Lanka's help to probe 1iger links
|AFP newsreport Irom Colombo|
'India has sought Sri Lanka`s help to investigate possible links
between the island`s Tamil Tiger rebels and politicians in Tamil
Nadu, reports said here on Sunday. New Delhi, which sought the
extradition oI Sri Lanka`s top Tamil Tiger supreme Velupillai
Prabhakaran in June 1995, had a team oI oIIicials visiting
Colombo last month Ior routine Iollow-up action, oIIicials and
diplomats said.
The Sundav Times said the Indian team reviewed an earlier
request` that Delhi had made Ior the extradition oI Prabhakaran,
wanted in connection with the 1991 assassination oI Iormer
Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi. However, another private
newspaper, the Sundav Leader, quoted Sri Lankan attorney
general K.C.Kamalasabayson as saying that Indian oIIicials had
not speciIically asked Ior Prabhakaran`s extradition this time.
Kamalasabayson said the Indians wanted to interview a member
oI the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) identiIied as
Nixon` who is in police custody here.
Calling Ior extradition was a Iormal procedural exercise and was
not a speciIic request made during the team`s visit`
Kamalasabayson was quoted as saying. Sri Lanka`s attorney
general`s department was not immediately available Ior comment.
The extradition oI Prabhakaran will remain an academic question
as long as the 46 year-old rebel leader remains at large. He is
believed to be somewhere in the island`s north-east.
|Rediff.com. News website, Dec.4, 2000|
Feature 4:
:MDMA did not discuss Prabhakaran extradition'
|Nirupama Subramanian|
The Attorney-General oI Sri Lanka, Mr.K.C.Kamalasabeyson,
has said the Multi-Disciplinary Monitoring Agency (MDMA)
team that was here last month did not raise extradition oI the
LTTE leader, Mr.Velupillai Prabhakaran. Mr. Kamalasabeyson
told the Sundav Leader that the Indian team wanted to
interrogate an LTTE suspect, Nixon, who is in custody here and
interrogate an LTTE suspect, Nixon, who is in custody here and
was allegedly involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv
Gandhi.
Though permission was reIused, the Attorney-General obtained a
court order permitting Sri Lanka`s CID to interrogate him and
record his statement in the presence oI the MDMA team. The
MDMA was set up by the Home Ministry in 1998 to Iollow up
leads that were said to have emerged Irom the Jain Commission
oI Inquiry into the Rajiv Gandhi assassination. The Home
Minister, Mr.L.K.Advani`s statement in Parliament last week that
the MDMA was in Sri Lanka to press Ior the extradition oI
Mr.Prabhakaran has already had its impact. |Hindu
newspaper, Dec.4, 2000|
Feature 5:
1he fast forward generation
|Columnist K.S.Mahadevan|
'.What is one to make oI |Union Home Minister L.K.|
Advani`s assertion in parliament that the special team that visited
Sri Lanka recently had raised the Prabhakaran extradition issue
and Colombo`s bland denial that it never did? The Sri Lankan
authorities have gone one step Iurther saying that they have other
Iish to Iry than take up the extradition issue at this juncture when
the peace moves are gathering momentum.
Did not the External AIIairs Ministry brieI Advani properly? Or is
it the government`s case that the media have blown out oI
proportion a routine answer in the House? Who will deny that the
government has egg on its Iace? . |Chennai Online website,
Dec.5, 2000|
From the above-cited Iive Ieatures, one can itemize a Iew
observations. One, Pirabhakaran always oIIers a good copy to the
newsmedia in the Indian subcontinent. Two, one should never
underestimate the agony oI the Sri Lankan army and its ever-quotable
spokesman who in 1997 predicted that the possibility oI Prabhakaran`s
arrest would improve with the liberation oI the main supply route Irom
Colombo to JaIIna. Three, Sirimavo Bandaranaike did possess some
level oI comprehension to quote that the idea oI arresting Pirabhakaran
was laughable`. Four, India`s pompous mandarins wouldn`t care
much about having an egg in their Iaces occasionally.
The proverbial egg on its Iace` policy Iollowed by the mandarins oI
India brings to my memory another humorous anecdote which
happened three months aIter Rajiv`s assassination. In August 1991,
when the Soviet coup plotters succeeded in short-circuiting
Gorbachev`s command Ior a day or two, the policy mandarins Irom
India hurriedly sent a telex message congratulating the Soviet coup
plotters Ior their success in the execution oI a political change in that
country.
To sum up on Pirabhakaran`s current status in India as per Rajiv
assassination trial, I am oI the opinion that technically he is only a
suspect` and nothing more. The Blacks Law Dictionarv deIines
suspect as a person reputed or suspected to be involved in a crime`
(p.1297). It also deIines suspicion` as belieI or opinion based upon
Iacts or circumstances which do not amount to prooI` (p.1298).
Torturing of Facts
Since suspicion is deIined as belieI or opinion based upon Iacts or
circumstances which do not amount to prooI`, I wish to analyze how
the SIT collected the Iacts, and whether it tortured vital Iacts
pertaining to Rajiv assassination. In scientiIic analysis, Iacts are
equated to assembled data.
James Mills wrote a perspective commentary on, Data Torturing`
prevalent among scientists. It appeared in the New England Journal of
Medicine oI Oct.14, 1993. In this commentary, Mills identiIied two
types oI data torturing. These being,
(1) Opportunistic data torturing, where the analyst simply pores over
the data until a signiIicant association is Iound between variables and
then devises a biologically plausible hypothesis to Iit the association.
(2) Procrustean data torturing, where the analyst Iirst decide on the
hypothesis to be proved and make the data Iit the hypothesis. The
adjective Procrustean` is derived Irom a robber named Procrustes in
Greek mythology. |According to this myth, he haunted the travelers
along the road to Athens and pledged hospitality to the travelers with a
magical bed that would Iit any guest. When the guests came to rest on
his bed, Procrustes either stretched the guests or cut oII their limbs to
Iit them perIectly into his magical bed.|
AIter ten years, it is becoming clear that the SIT operatives led by
D.R.Kartikeyan basically carried out Procrustean data torturing Ior an
year Irom the date oI assassination to come out with their charge sheet
on May 20, 1992, implicating Pirabhakaran and LTTE. Their
hypothesis was LTTE did it` and they chose (or leIt out) data which
did (or did not) Iit their convenient hypothesis. The revelation in the
India Todav magazine (Nov.19, 2000; cited above) that the SIT team
India Todav magazine (Nov.19, 2000; cited above) that the SIT team
reportedly took a conscious decision to avoid booking Indian
politicians as accused in the Rajiv assassination case is a pointer to its
Procrustean data torturing technique.
Mr. Kartigeyan, the assigned chieI investigating oIIicer oI SIT, was
interviewed by Suhasini Haidar Ior the RediII.com website, Iollowing
the Supreme Court appeals verdict, on May 14, 1999. He had stated
that his job was like that oI a scientist in a laboratory`. I quote some
excerpts.
Question: 'What is your reaction to the SC judgment that
conIirmed death only to 4 oI the 26? Does it hurt that although
the apex court praised your work, they ended up releasing 19 oI
the accused?
Kartigevan: No, it doesn`t hurt, and I would like to say at the
outset that I genuinely believe that truth does prevail. My task
was to Iind the truth behind Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination. I did
that. It is not Ior me to convict or acquit these people. AIter all,
that is the process oI law. II it was up to me to punish the guilty,
then why bother with the trial court in Madras? Similarly, iI the
special court`s judgment could not be overruled, then why would
there be a process oI appeals in the Supreme Court? In any case,
Irom what I understand oI this judgment, the Supreme Court 3-
judge bench has not said these people were not guilty. They have
released them because in their opinion, they were not guilty oI
an act oI terror`. And that is a matter oI opinion. I mean, I might
Ieel that Rajiv Gandhi was killed Ior decisions he took as the
prime minister oI this country, but they might Ieel it was a
personal thing. And the Iact is that they did convict 7 people.
Question: The judgment also spoke oI a paucity oI evidence`.
Were you satisIied with the extent oI evidence produced during
the investigations?
Kartikevan: Look, my job was like that oI a scientist in a
laboratory. I can only Iind evidence that is already there. Me and
my team worked 7 days a week, 20 hours a day Ior a whole
year. We viewed 500 videocassettes, scanned thousands oI
photographs, and interrogated 5,000 people. All together, our
evidence would probably Iill this room. Whatever evidence was
there, we produced that. But we couldn`t concoct evidence, and I
reIused outright to allow any doubtIul inIormation, even iI it was
merely to help make the truth appear to be true`. |Rediff.com
website news, May 14, 1999|
Though, Kartikeyan had asserted that he had submitted evidence
(which Iit his hypothesis derived Irom Procrustean data torturing),
other reports had appeared that he also consciously omitted data which
were oI political signiIicance.
Kartikeyan`s Omissions
Some oI Kartikeyan`s omissions have been reported by Rajeev
Sharma in his 1998 book. To quote Irom the chapter 7 entitled Sins
oI Omission` oI this book,
'. Justice Verma`s report said: This part of the report of the
DIB |relating to the then Director oI Intelligence Bureau,
M.K.Narayanan, who submitted a report to the then Prime
Minister Chandra Sekhar on May 22, 1991, Iollowing his
inspection oI the assassination site| mentioning the fact that
scanning of video pictures was being done to identifv the ladv
does indicate that on 22.5.91, there were available video
pictures of that part of the meeting which could reveal the
identification of the suspected human bomb. No such video
pictures were made available bv the SIT or Tamil Nadu police
and it was specificallv stated bv the SIT chief, D.R.Kartikevan
that no other video cassettes were available with the SIT.
The commission pointed out this unusual feature of the video
cassette to the SIT chief D.R.Kartikevan since it mav have
greater significance for investigation of the crime even though
to the commission it amounts to absence of some useful
evidence alone.` |Italics are retained as in the original.|
Kartikeyan later told the Verma panel that Ioreign experts were
examining the cassettes to Iind out whether these had been tampered
with to obliterate any part oI the recording. The commission was told
at its last sitting that the outcome oI that inquiry was awaited.
The SIT produced Iour video cassettes beIore the Verma commission.
The Tamil Nadu congress committee had got Rajiv Gandhi`s visit to
Sriperumbudur recorded on video Irom the time he landed at
Meenambakkam airport. But the organizers told the commission that
they did not have the cassettes and believed the police had seized
them.
Justice Verma said in an extremely meaningIul observation: The
commission reIrains Irom commenting on this aspect since it can be
avoided in this inquiry but may have signiIicance in some other
proceeding.`
Two video cassettes had the recording oI the May 21 event and the
third oI the next day. The May 21 cassettes were screened at an open
hearing oI the Verma commission. These were blurred at the crucial
portions and neither showed the actual assassination taking place nor
Iocused on the suicide bomber. Crucial questions arise. Was Rajiv`s
assassination videographed till the very last second? Did the camera
Iocus on the hit squad members? Who all were seated or standing near
Dhanu and Sivarasan? II the cassettes were intentionally blurred, who
ordered their tampering and why? Were Rajiv`s assassins standing
close to any prominent person? II so, who are they? |Book: Bevond
the Tigers, 1998, pp.126-127|
Latha Priyakumar`s evasion
One oI the eye-witnesses to the Rajiv assassination who has evaded
inquisition was Ms. Latha Priyakumar, the daughter oI Mrs.
Maragatham Chandrasekar. She does not even receive mention by
name in Subramanian Swamy`s book on the assassination. Considering
the personality oI Swamy who needles everyone at the slightest
occasion, this omission is surprising. But, Rajeev Sharma`s book
provides details on the discomIort Iaced by Ms. Latha Priyakumar
during the hearings oI Verma Commission. To quote a page Irom
Rajeev Sharma on this issue,
'It was Kumudavalli, a Congress party member, who put Latha
Priyakumar in the dock. She Iiled an aIIidavit beIore the Verma
commission stating she saw Latha Kannan and Kokila (the
mother-daughter duo who were in the receiving line oI Rajiv
beIore Dhanu, and Kokila was the one who was scheduled to
read a Hindi poem to Rajiv) getting oII Irom Latha Priyakumar`s
car at the public meeting venue at Sriperumbudur on May 21,
1991. Later she saw Kannan and Kokila talking with Dhanu and
Sivarasan, while they waited Ior Rajiv.
Did Latha Priyakumar actually help Kokila gain access to Rajiv?
Justice Verma says this by itselI might not be oI much
signiIicance. In a clear indictment oI Latha Priyakumar, he says:
Latha Priyakumar does not appear to be a credible witness. Her
deposition does not appear to be Iorthright and she gave the
impression oI withholding some knowledge she has`.
C.S.Vaidyanathan, councel Ior |police| oIIicers oI Tamil Nadu,
blamed Latha Priyakumar Ior breach oI access control by
securing permission Ior Kokila to recite a poem Irom the queue
oI garlanders which took more time than the act oI garlanding.
This detained Rajiv increasing the risk to him, he argued.
Latha Priyakumar insisted she reached the venue only aIter 9pm
even though witnesses, including Lakshmi Albert, said she was
present Irom 8.30pm. Priyakumar admitted having leIt between
Arakkonam at 7pm and 7.30pm in a taxi Ior Sriperumbudur.
Rajiv`s meeting was scheduled Ior 9pm and she had to cover
about 40 to 45 kilometres, she could not have taken more than an
hour to reach the venue.
Says Justice Verma: She tried to evade this question by saying
that she was sleeping throughout the way even though the road
was bumpy and, thereIore, she did not even know the route
which her taxi took. There were certain suggestions made to her
which relate to matters outside the scope oI this inquiry`.
The Verma commission did not go deep into the alleged role oI
Latha Priyakumar and did not even consider the aIIidavit oI
Kumudavalli because oI its terms oI reIerence. |Book: Bevond
the Tigers, 1998, p.131|
In the Iollowing page, Rajeev Sharma had described in a paragraph the
lack oI action taken by the inquisitors on witness Kumudavalli`s
incriminating aIIidavit. To quote,
'Justice Verma had sent Kumudavalli`s aIIidavit and other
important documents to the MHA |Ministry oI Home AIIairs|,
noting that these pertained to matters outside the scope and
purview oI his inquiry. He had also clearly said in his noting that
these papers could have an important bearing on the case and the
needIul could be done. This was in 1992. But nothing much
appeared to have happened in this direction in the last six years.
Kumudavalli has neither been questioned by the SIT nor the trial
court. She deposed beIore the Jain commission as late as in July
1996. It is still not known what is the outcome oI investigation
into Kumudavalli`s disclosures, iI any investigation has been
conducted, that is. |ibid, p.132|
It would be too much to expect any proper investigation on
Kumudavalli`s disclosures iI Kartikeyan, the leader oI SIT, had trusted
the powers oI Procrustean data torturing. A credible proven link
between the suspected LTTE operatives` and the Congress Party
bigwigs in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka would be like a Iire in the
basement oI Congress palace. One should not Iorget that Ior Iive years
until 1996, the Congress Party was in power in India under the
leadership oI charisma-less Narasimha Rao, a wily survivor oI many a
Iactional battles Irom the Southern India (also the Iirst time the
executive leadership oI the Congress Party had Iortuitiously landed in
his lap, due to Sonia`s reIusal to accept the role in 1991) and political
his lap, due to Sonia`s reIusal to accept the role in 1991) and political
compulsion demanded that Kartikeyan take the easy route to quickly
solve the murder mystery` by ignoring the links oI Latha Priyakumar
and implicate only LTTE and Pirabhakaran (Continued).

Part 28
Sachi Sri Kantha
22 December 2001]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: the judicial
angle of 1ustice S.S.M.Quadri
Front Note: On Combating Factual Abuse by Colombo Hacks
He will lie, sir, with such volubilitv that vou would think
truth were a fool
Shakespeare, in Alls well that ends well, IV, iii.
The internet has been a godsend Ior researchers like me. It has
permitted access Ior various documents which are in the public
domain, Ior me to study the Pirabhakaran Phenomenon. II not Ior
internet, I wouldn`t have been able to study in Iull, the Supreme Court
verdicts delivered in May 1999 by Justice D.P.Wadhwa, Justice
K.T.Thomas and Justice S.S.M.Quadri on the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination trial.
However, internet also has enabled hacks to promote halI-baked
research and malicious distortion oI Iacts Ior their neIarious purposes.
It is sad to note that Colombo has become a breeding ground Ior such
Iactual abuse in the internet via the anti-Tamil mouth-pieces oI
journalism, which nominally pass as daily newspapers`. BeIore the
advent oI internet, these Colombo-based mouth-pieces oI halI-baked
journalism were not accessible Ior researchers and non-Sri Lankan
journalists beyond the boundaries oI Sri Lanka Ior months. But,
internet has accelerated the access oI these newspapers to those
Ioreign correspondents` who are in need oI quick inIormation` Ior
Iilling the blanks Ior their own halI-baked reports. Thus, Iactual abuse
perpetrated by the Colombo hacks on Pirabhakaran routinely spread
like viruses. One simple Iorm oI protection, in my belieI, is to write
brieI rebuttals Ior such distortion and place these in the internet
websites so that these get linked to the original sources oI
misinIormation. As a Pirabhakaran-watcher, I do my share Ior the
simple reason that Eelam Tamil opinion deserves to be recorded,
simple reason that Eelam Tamil opinion deserves to be recorded,
however time-consuming or distracting Irom routine work, they may
be.
Thus, beIore I proceed to analyze this week`s theme on the judicial
angle oI Justice Quadri related to Rajiv Gandhi assassination, I wish to
place on record three emails I had sent to the editor oI Island
(Colombo) newspaper which touch on Pirabhakaran. Why I sent these
emails are selI-explanatory.
Letter 1: sent on Oct.19, 21
The Editor,
Island,
Colombo.
Dear Mr. Weerakoon:
A Question of Principled 1ournalism
It`s always good Iun Ior me to read your editorials, and to enjoy
the irony soaked in them. And I thank the internet pioneers in my
heart who have allowed me to read your partisan views with easy
access. Since you solicit comments on your thoughts, I hope you
wouldn`t mind hearing Irom me Irequently these days. In the old
days oI Wijewardena Mudalali and Dasa Mudalali, editors who
were Iart-catchers Ior those robber barons could censor the
unpleasant thoughts oI readers which diIIered Irom Mudalali`s
position in Sri Lankan politics. Even when I was in Sri Lanka,
long beIore Prabhakaran`s appearance in the political radar, none
oI the Iew letters I sent to the Dailv News or the Sun appeared in
print. In that sense, I admire Mervyn de Silva Ior his vision and
sense oI balance. Thank God, those days have gone by. Even iI
you do not have the will to place my opinions in the pages oI
your newspaper, I can Iind a website to present these opinions
Ior other readers to enjoy.
This letter is related to your most recent editorials: Pre-election
skullduggery to the Iore` (Oct.17), A question oI principled
politics` (Oct.18), and Santa`s early arrival` (Oct.19). In all
these, you take issue with President Chandrika Kumaratunga`s
style oI governance, arrogance and cavalier disregard Ior
accepted norms oI politics. It is as iI, you have stumbled on these
issues only lately. But Prabhakaran and LTTE thinkers have
scaled these same traits oI the current President in 1995
correctly.
Mr. Editor, you cannot have your cake and eat it as well. On one
trusted since he will never give up his Iight Ior Eelam and come
to the negotiation table. This stance is Iine, iI the other party has
been a model oI virtue. You say now that Prabhakaran`s main
adversary during the past 7 years is a bungling buIIoon who is
not worth her salt.
You had stated that, Many will diIIer Irom the President`s
estimation oI herselI` (Oct.19). Bless you Ior saying that openly
now. So, isn`t your lament conIirms Prabhakaran`s position Ior
all these years? How about some principled journalism on your
part, Sir?
In your 20th anniversary editorial you bragged, We are oI the
opinion that all communities got equal rights` (Oct.4). Then, how
come the Sri Lankan army consists oI 95 (or more) Buddhists,
when the Buddhist population in the island is only 75? Either
you should be mathematically-challenged to believe that 75
equals 95, or you are a hypocrite to say, 'We are certainly not
against the Tamil community. We support their rights and say
that they are citizens oI this country as much as those oI any
other community are. II you sincerely believe what you say, will
you campaign Ior proportional representation oI all communities
in the Sri Lankan army?
But I can sense your Ieeling oI desperation. You have a day job
to do, and you have to write something` to Iill the blank space.
Otherwise you will not get paid. How about more logical thinking
on your part? Isn`t it better to leave the blank space as it is in the
editorial column occasionally, like you leave out Wijesoma`s
cartoons on some days, with the note Not available today`?
Letter 2: sent on Dec.13, 21
The Editor,
Island
Dear Mr.Weerakoon:
In another two weeks, this year will come to an end. I thank you
Ior your resourceIul editorials, which I came to read earnestly
Irom this year via internet. This is because, I`m collecting source
materials Ior my new book entitled, Farting Jesters in Fabled
Lanka. This is serious. I do have plans to publish this book in
2005, when Chandrika completes her presidency.
Your past observations on Chandrika Kumaratunga, Anuruddha
Ratwatte, Anura Bandaranaike, Lakshman Kadirgamar, Ratnasiri
Wickremanayake, and their ilk have been oI help to me to my
selected theme Farting Jesters`. Also, your regular contributors
such as moralist Mahindapala (Irom Australia), O-My Gosh!`
Godage, colic Chandraprema and ragman Ranatunge (Irom
London) add more Iun as Iarting jesters to the Islands columns.
What a team you had assembled to prance on Pirabhakaran.
Sometimes I used to wonder whether iI not Ior Pirabhakaran, all
these guys would be out oI work and starving. This includes you
as well.
Now the new political jesters have gained their position oI power,
I do hope that you contribute your insight more on the new
jesters as well, which will be oI help to me Ior my work. My only
delight in looking at the Island has been Wijesoma`s scribblings.
But oI late, he also has become senile and has lost his wit. Hope
the new political jesters will provide him some invigorating tonic.
Thanks.
Letter 3: sent on Dec.15, 21
The Editor,
Island,
Colombo.
Dear Mr.Weerakoon:
On the South Asian way of fighting terrorism
Further to my previous communication to you on my interest in
collecting materials Ior my Iorthcoming book Farting Jesters in
Fabled Lanka, I wish to comment on your editorial oI Dec.15,
2001 entitled South Asian way oI Iighting terrorism`. You
are entitled to your opinion, being a Iart-catcher oI your
employer. But, to retain your credibility as a Colombo journalist,
you should work hard Mr.Weerakoon. You cannot distort Iacts
to suit your misguided opinion. This is in reIerence to your
innuendo in one sentence you have included in your editorial
which states, 'Another example oI the subjective attitude oI India
towards terrorism is that despite the LTTE leader Velupillai
Prabhakaran being sentenced to death by the Indian Supreme
Court Ior the assassination oI Iormer Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi...
I take oIIence with this Iabrication oI the Indian court`s verdict.
Either you have not read the verdict delivered by the three judges
oI the Supreme Court (which is available online in the website
maintained by the Central Bureau oI Intelligence-India) or you
maliciously reported a lie to mislead your readership. Only Iart-
maliciously reported a lie to mislead your readership. Only Iart-
catchers oI your caliber in Colombo journalism can do this.
Mervyn de Silva wouldn`t have written such a nonsense.
The legal Iacts pertaining to the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial
shows that the LTTE leader Pirabhakaran was not under trial.
According to the Indian authorities, he is an absconding
accused`. But Ior him to become an accused, a court summons
should have been served on him. It has still not been established
whether such a court summons was served to him by the oIIicial
Indian representatives in Sri Lanka, since 1992. II you have
some journalistic conscience, would you have the courage to
publish this rebuttal to your editorial?
To end this Iront note, I should add that the idea Ior the Iunny title Ior
my proposed book, Farting Jesters in Fabled Lanka originated
when I read the Island editorial oI Nov.20, 2001, which recorded the
antics oI President Chandrika Kumaratunga (again linking
Pirabhakaran!) in a TV transmission oI a recent test cricket match.
Excerpts:
'On Saturday |i.e., Nov.17, 2001|, viewers oI Rupavahini`s second
channel, Eye, that was showing the Iinal day`s play oI the First Test
match between the West Indies and Sri Lanka may have been
wondering what President Kumaratunga had to do with the match.
She kept on appearing in between overs smiling and holding hands
with children, next thundering that although Prabhakaran had
robbed her oI one eye she will not dance to his tune etc. Whether
these were paid advertisements or not there were no indications. Is
it a presidential privilege to barge into international cricket TV
commentaries? It is certainly not cricket, any true cricketer will
say.
For priority reasons, I place in public domain the proposed title Ior my
book, so that none can steal it Irom me. In my opinion, the peak in
scorn index by using Iart` as a word was achieved by Lyndon
Johnson who oIIered the ultimate put-down on one oI his successors,
Gerald Ford that Jerry Ford is so dumb that he can`t Iart and chew
gum at the same time` |source: The Penguin Dictionarv of Modern
Quotations, by J.M. and M.J.Cohen, rev.ed., 1980, p.175|. I would
add that it would surprise that Texan arm-twister that the Sri Lankan
politicians who had ruled the country Ior the recent past seven years
(Chandrika Kumaratunga, Mangala Samaraweera, Lakshman
Kadirgamar and their ilk) can chew chicken, Iart gas, swindle dough
and talk rubbish all at the same time. Here is the word directly Irom
the horse`s mouth; I cite excerpts Irom a report by Ravi
the horse`s mouth; I cite excerpts Irom a report by Ravi
Ladduwahetty, which appeared in the oIIicial mouth-piece Cevlon
Dailv News early this year.
'Over 40 percent oI the Iunds allocated Ior development was
consumed in wastage, ineIIiciency and corruption by the state
sector, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga said
yesterday..I am not going to tolerate corruption in the state
sector, she said.The President also said that promotions and
increments Ior the public sector in the Iuture would strictly be
based on merit. |February 14, 2001|
Now, to the main body oI this week`s chapter.
Calibrating the 1ustice Scale in India
In science, the Iirst step carried out beIore one makes a measurement
oI any parameter is calibration oI the instrument or equipment to
check whether the results obtained by the instrument will bring
accurate and precise data. This calibration step is vital to the success
oI any experiment or even Ior any measurement taken at home such
as one`s weight or body temperature. Similarly, it is appropriate to
calibrate the justice scale` Iirst beIore analyzing the verdict oI the
Rajiv assassination trial.
As a simple calibration step, I thought oI presenting to the readers the
status oI Indian judiciary as it existed in 1992, and revealed in a critical
Ieature entitled Crumbling Citadel` (by Rahul Pathak and Anirudhya
Mitra) in the India Todav magazine. The second named reporter had
contributed articles on LTTE to this magazine as well. In this Ieature,
which appeared at the same time when the charge sheet prepared by
SIT identiIied 41 accused in the Rajiv assassination trial, Pathak and
Mitra had Iocused on three major problems eroding the worth oI
Indian judiciary. These were, namely, (1) politicization, (2) corruption,
and (3) system overload. Among the three, I reproduce the details
presented under the politicization problem.
Politicisation of Indian 1udiciary
'.A whole industry oI touts and Iixers has grown around the
buzz that judgements can be bought. Smugglers Irom all over
rush to certain high courts where they believe relieI will be easily
available.
Mrs |Indira| Gandhi pioneered the operation to take over the
judiciary. She superceded those who opposed her. Sixteen judges
were transIerred during the Emergency and another 40 were to
were transIerred during the Emergency and another 40 were to
Iollow suit when she was ousted. Ironically, the move obtained
the sanction oI the Supreme Court Iollowing its controversial
verdict in the judges` transIer case. The court ruled that since the
President was the ultimate appointing authority and was bound
by the advice oI his council oI ministers, these ministers had the
last word in the appointment and transIer oI judges.
Now, political interIerence is no longer a surreptious exercise. It
is stated policy. The V.P.Singh government stalled the
appointment oI 67 candidates and got away with it by telling the
Supreme Court that the new chieI ministers had the right to re-
examine them. The chieI justice oI India Iound himselI discarding
the names he himselI had cleared in Iavour oI the Iavourites oI
the new bosses.
Politicians are Iorever looking Ior a higher judiciary that they can
control. There is a kind oI quid pro quo between them. As each
helps the other, both are Iorced to overlook misdemeanours and
improprieties. A perIect example oI the pitIalls oI this
arrangement surIaced early last year |i.e. 1991| when Rajiv
Gandhi placed a secret call to Rabi Ray, then Speaker oI the Lok
Sabha. The impeachment motion against Justice Ramaswamy
had just been initiated. Rajiv told the Speaker that Ramaswamy
had been appointed chieI justice oI the Punjab and Haryana High
Court because he had promised to be strict` in granting bail to
militants. He had kept his word and done a signal service to the
nation. Rabi Ray was asked to keep this in mind while dealing
with the motion.
Judges retire at 65 and are entitled a maximum pension oI Rs.
4,500 a month. Many need perks like commissions oI inquiry.
But there are also other carrots politicians dangle. Sometimes,
the carrot being dangled in Iront oI a judge becomes a gun
pointed at his head. The perks reIerred to are political
appointments such as Congress Party nomination to the Rajya
Sabha...
Eminent lawyer and Iormer law minister Shanti Bhushan says the
entire tragedy oI the country has been that judges have tried to
anticipate what the Government expects oI them. |India Todav
magazine, June 30, 1992, pp. 51-57|
I value this Ieature, since aIter its appearance, no credible criticism
appeared in the India Todav magazine to contradict the report. Thus,
one can saIely assume that the Rajiv assassination trial also was
burdened with the three problems (politicization, corruption and
burdened with the three problems (politicization, corruption and
system overload) identiIied by Pathak and Mitra which have been
corroding the Indian judiciary system. This need to be kept in mind in
interpreting the verdicts delivered in the Rajiv assassination trial. The
third problem i.e, system overload was visibly evident Irom the
years consumed Ior completion oI the trial and appeal. The problems
oI politicization and corruption couldn`t be understated as well.
But what Shanti Bhushan had commented was not Iar-Ietched.
Supreme Court Verdict of 1ustice S.S.M.Quadri
In this chapter, I wish to present the Supreme Court verdict oI Justice
Quadri Ior three speciIic reasons. First, oI the three verdicts, it was the
brieIest, consisting oI 25 printed pages (The printout oI the verdict was
taken Irom the website maintained by the India`s Central Bureau oI
Intelligence. HereaIter, the page numbers I cite Ior all three verdicts
reIers to the printed page number oI each separate verdict). Secondly,
Justice Quadri had provided a clear summary oI what the trial was,
what were the charges and how it progressed. Thirdly, probably not to
conIuse the political issues and the aIIiliated bias, Justice Quadri has
not mentioned Pirabhakaran`s name in the 25 pages, even once.
Summary of the Assassination Trial
In the words of 1ustice Quadri,
'On June 26, 1992, aIter a lengthy investigation, the SIT Iiled
charge sheet in respect oI oIIences under the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), Indian
Penal Code, 1890 (IPC), Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Arms
Act, 1959, Passport Act, 1967, Foreigners Act, 1946 and the
Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, against 41 persons, 12 oI
them died (2 in the blast and 10 having committed suicide) and
three were declared absconding. |p.3|
Only reIerence by Justice Quadri to Pirabhakaran`s status in the case
is the last statement. Then, he lists the names oI 26 accused, coded 1
to 26 with the preIix A`.
'The case was thus tried against the Iollowing 26 accused
persons: A-1 (S.Nalini), A-2 (T.Suthendraraja Santhan), A-3
(Sriharan Murugan Thas Indu Master), A-4 (Shankar
Koneswaran), A-5 (D.Vijayanandan Hari Ayya), A-6
(Sivaruban Suresh Suresh Kumar Ruban), A-7
(S.Kanagasabapathy Radhayya), A-8 (A.Chandralekha
Athirai Sonia Gowri), A-9 (B.Robert Payas
Athirai Sonia Gowri), A-9 (B.Robert Payas
Kumaralingam), A-10 (S.Jayakumar Jayakumaran Jayam),
A-11 (J.Shanti), A-12 (S.Vijayan Perumal Vijayan), A-13
(V.Selvaluxmi), A-14 (S.Bhaskaran Velayudam), A-15
(S.Shanmugavadivelu Thambi Anna), A-16 (P.Ravichandran
Ravi Pragasam), A-17 (M.Suseendran Mahesh), A-18
(G.Perarivelan Arivu), A-19 (S.Irumborai Duraisingam), A-
20 (S.Bhagyanathan), A-21 (S.Padma), A-22 (A.Sundaram), A-
23 (K.Dhanasekaran Raju), A-24 (N.Rajasuriya Rangan),
A-25 (T.Vigneswaran Vicky), A-26 (J.Ranganath). Thirteen oI
these accused are Sri Lankan and an equal number comprises oI
Indians. |p.3|
Charges
Justice Quadri had categorized the charges against these 26 accused as
Iollows: |IPC reIers to Indian Penal Code|
'The Designated Court Iramed as many as 251 charges oI which
Charge No.1 is common to all the accused Ior the other 250
charges, accused are charged separately under diIIerent heads.
For the sake oI brevity, all charges can be conveniently classiIied
under three categories:
A. Under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC
B. Under Sections 3, 4 and 5 oI the TADA Act; and
C. (i) Under various provisions oI IPC (ii) Under Sections 3, 4
and 5 oI the Explosive Substances Act, 1908; (iii) Section 25 oI
the Arms Act, 1959; (iv) Section 12 oI the Passport Act, 1967;
(v) Section 14 oI the Foreigners Act, 1946; (vi) Section 6(1A) oI
the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933. |p.3|
Supporting materials used to prove the Charges
'To bring home the guilt oI the accused in respect oI the charges
Iramed against each oI them, the prosecution placed on record
conIessions oI seventeen accused and also plethora oI evidence.
It examined 288 witnesses exhibited 1448 documents, marked
Exs.P-1 to P-1448. |p.4|
Jerdict of the Designated Court and the Details of Appeal
'The Designated Court, on consideration oI the material placed
beIore it, Iound all the twenty six accused guilty oI all the charges
Iramed against them and awarded punishment oI Iine oI varying
amounts, rigorous imprisonment oI diIIerent period and
sentenced all oI them to death. The Designated Court reIerred
the case to this Court Ior conIirmation oI death sentence oI al the
the case to this Court Ior conIirmation oI death sentence oI al the
convicts, numbered as Death ReIerence No.1 oI 1998. The
convicts Iiled appeals, Criminal Appeals 321 to 324 oI 1998,
against their conviction Ior various oIIences and the sentence
awarded to them. These cases were heard together.
Mr.Natarajan, learned senior counsel Ior the appellants (except
Appellant No.15), assisted by the team oI able and thoroughly
prepared instructing counsel, Mr.Subramaniam Ior the appellant
No.15 and Mr.AltaI Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General
Ior the Prosecution, assisted by competent and proIicient
advocates and departmental oIIicers, very ably and exhaustively
argued the cases Ior over three months.
Regarding the conviction oI the appellants Ior oIIences mentioned
in Category C` noted above, the learned counsel Ior appellants
submitted that they were not pressing the appeals on that aspect
as all the appellants had served out the sentence thereunder.
|p.4|
1ustice Quadri's Jerdict
'The conviction oI appellants under the provisions oI TADA Act,
noted in category B` above, had been Iound to be unsustainable
by my learned brethren |i.e., Justice Wadhwa and Justice
Thomas| in their separate opinions and I am in respectIul
agreement with the same. |p.4|
Thus, the charge under Category B` was overturned Ior appellants.
The diIIerence oI opinions among Justice Wadhwa, Justice Thomas
and Justice Quadri were related to the charge under Category A`,
Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC. On this issue, Justice
Quadri had recorded his observations, among which, I present the
emphatic ones in numbered sequence.
Observation 1:
'There is no controversy about the horrible occurrence oI human
bomb blast in Sriperumbudur in the night oI May 21, 1991
causing death oI Shri Rajiv Gandhi and eighteen others and
grievous injuries to 43 persons. The controversy is about who are
responsible Ior this horrendous crime? The question is whether
the conviction oI the appellants or any oI them under Section
120-B r/w 302 IPC is sustainable in law and in respect oI whom
the punishment oI death sentence can be conIirmed.
To record conviction under Section 120-B, it is necessary to Iind
the accused guilty oI criminal conspiracy as deIined in Section
120-A oI IPC which reads as under:
120A. Definition of criminal conspiracv When two or more
persons agree to do, or cause to be done (1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement, is designated a criminal conspiracy;
provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an
oIIence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act
besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such
agreement in pursuance thereoI.
Explanation It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the
ultimate object oI such agreement, or is merely incidental to that
object`
The ingredients oI the oIIence oI criminal conspiracy are: (i) an
agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must
related to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or
(b) an act which is not illegal in itselI but is done by illegal means.
The proviso and the explanation are not relevant Ior the present
discussion.
Though the meeting oI minds oI two or more persons Ior
doing/or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal
means is a sine qua non oI the criminal conspiracy yet in the
very nature oI the oIIence which is shrouded with secrecy no
direct evidence oI the common intention oI the conspirators can
normally be produced beIore the Court. Having regard to the
nature oI the oIIence, such a meeting oI minds oI the
conspirators has to be inIerred Irom the circumstances proved by
the prosecution, iI such an inIerence is possible. |p.6|
Observation 2
'The agreement, sine qua non oI conspiracy, may be proved
either by direct evidence which is rarely available in such cases or
it may be inIerred Irom utterances, writings, acts, omissions and
conduct oI the parties to the conspiracy which is usually done. In
view oI Section 10 oI the Evidence Act anything said, done or
written by those who enlist their support to the object oI
conspiracy and those who join later or make their exit beIore
completion oI the object in Iurtherance oI their common intention
will be relevant Iacts to prove that each one oI them can
justiIiably be treated as a conspirator. |p.8|
Observation 3
'To establish the charge oI conspiracy to commit the murder oI
Shri Rajiv Gandhi, reliance is placed mainly on seventeen
conIessional statements made by the accused persons. The
conIessions oI the accused persons have been recorded under
Section 15(1) oI the TADA Act. BeIore adverting to the
conIessional statements, it is necessary to consider the incidental
questions as to whether they can be used against the appellants
Ior the charge under Section 120-B read with Section 302, IPC
when the accused are Iound to be not guilty oI various oIIences
under the TADA Act. |p.9|
Observation 4
'|Justice| Thomas took the view that the conIession oI an
accused is a substantive evidence as against the maker thereoI
but it is not so as against the co-accused, abettor or conspirator
against whom it can be used only as corroborative evidence.
|Justice| Wadhwa took the contrary view; according to him,
conIession oI an accused is a substantive evidence against himselI
as well as against co-accused, abettor or conspirator. |p.11|
Observation 5
'In regard to evidential value oI conIessions both academicians
and Judges have expressed conIlicting opinions. |p.12|
Observation 6
'.I respectIully diIIer Irom the view taken by.brother |Justice|
Thomas in his judgment in this case and in respectIul agreement
with the view expressed by brother |Justice| Wadhwa in his
judgment that a conIession oI an accused under Section 15(1) oI
the TADA Act is substantive evidence against the co-accused,
abettor or conspirator jointly tried with the accused.
But I wish to make it clear that even iI conIession oI an accused
as against co-accused tried with accused in the same case is
treated substantive evidence` understood in the limited sense oI
Iact in issue or relevant Iact, the rule oI prudence requires that
the court should examine the same with great care.in so Iar as
use oI conIession oI an accused against a co-accused is
concerned, rule oI prudence cautions the judicial discretion that it
cannot be relied upon unless corroborated generally by other
evidence on record. |p.19|
Observation 7
'Now adverting to merits oI the appeals, learned brother |Justice|
Thomas, having considered the conIession., meticulously
examined other oral and documentary evidence in support oI
such conIessional statement and Iound A-1 (Nalini), A-2
(Santhan), A-3 (Murugan), A-9 (Robert Payas), A-10
(Santhan), A-3 (Murugan), A-9 (Robert Payas), A-10
(Jayakumar), A-16 (Ravichandran) and A-18 (Arivu) guilty oI
oIIences under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC and
altered death sentence oI A-1, A-9, A-10 and A-16 to liIe
imprisonment while conIirming death sentence oI A-2, A-3 and
A-18.
Brother |Justice| Wadhwa on consideration oI all the
aIorementioned conIessions and other evidence against the
appellants conIirmed conviction oI only A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-18
under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC and conIirmed
death sentence oI all oI them while acquitting all other appellants.
.I consider it appropriate to record my respectIul agreement
with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by |Justice| Thomas
in conIirming the conviction oI A-1, A-2, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-16
and A-8 Ior the aIorementioned oIIences. |pp.19-20|
Observation 8
'On applying the well-settled principles laid down by this Court,
Brother |Justice| Thomas Ielt that the conIirmation oI death
sentence awarded by the Designated Court to A-2, A-3 and A-18
is justiIied whereas brother |Justice| Wadhwa on the same
principles conIirmed the death sentence awarded by the
Designated Court to A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-18. So Iar as the
conIirmation oI death sentence oI A-2, A-3 and A-18 is
concerned both the learned brethren concur and I record my
respectIul agreement with their conclusions. The diIIerence oI
opinion between them is regard to conIirmation oI death sentence
oI A-1. It is now my view which determines the result oI this
issue. |p.22|
Observation 9
'I am convinced that the Iacts oI this case are uncommon. A
crime committed on Indian soil against the popular national
leader, a Iormer Prime Minister oI India, Ior a political decision
taken by him in his capacity as the head oI the executive and
which met with the approval oI the Parliament, by persons
running political organisation in a Ioreign country and their agents
in concert with some Indians Ior the reason that it did not suit
their political objectives and oI their organization, cannot but be a
rarest oI the rare` case.The conspirators including A-1 (Nalini)
had nothing personal against him but he was targeted Ior the
political decision taken by him as the Prime Minister oI India.
For a person like A-1, taking into consideration all the mitigating
circumstances, in my view, there is no room Ior any leniency,
circumstances, in my view, there is no room Ior any leniency,
kindness and beneIicence.ThereIore, with respect I concur with
brother |Justice| Wadhwa in conIirming the death sentence oI
Iirst appellant A-1 (Nalini) awarded by the Designated Court.
|p.24|
Observation 10
'In the result I agree with brother |Justice| Thomas and set aside
the conviction oI all the appellants recorded by the Designated
Court Ior oIIences under the TADA Act mentioned in category
B` and also the conviction A-4 (Shankar Koneswaran), A-5
(D.Vijayanandan Hari Ayya), A-6 (Sivaruban Suresh
Suresh Kumar Ruban), A-7 (S.Kanagasabapathy
Radhayya), A-8 (A.Chandralekha Athirai Sonia Gowri),
A-11 (J.Shanthi), A-12 (S.Vijayan Perumal Vijayan), A-13
(V.Selvaluxmi), A-14 (S.Bhaskaran Velayudam),
A-15 (S.Shanmugavadivelu Thambi Anna), A-17
(M.Suseendram Mahesh), A-19 (S.Irumborai
Duraisingam), A-20 (S.Bhagyanathan), A-21 (S.Padma), A-22
(A.Sundaram), A-23 (K.Dhanasekaran Raju), A-24
(N.Rajasuriya Rangan),
A-25 (T.Vigneswaran Vicky), A-26 (J.Ranganath) Ior the
oIIences under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC. Their
appeals are accordingly allowed.
Agreeing with brother |Justice| Thomas, I conIirm the conviction
oI A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan) and A-3 (Murugan), A-9 (Robert
Payas), A-10 (Jayakumar), A-16 (Ravichandran) and A-18
(Arivu) Iinding them guilty oI oIIences under Section 120-B read
with Section 302 IPC.
On the Iacts and in the circumstances, I am also oI the same
view as expressed by brother |Justice| Thomas, that it is not a Iit
case to conIirm the death sentence awarded to A-9 (Robert
Payas), A-10 (Jayakumar) and A-16 (Ravichandran) and their
death sentence is commuted to liIe imprisonment and their
appeals are allowed to this extent. |pp.24-25|
The merits in Justice Quadris verdict are that it is brief and devoid
of political cant. He had just delivered his opinion, based on the
submitted judicial evidence. Thus, his verdict does not mention
Pirabhakaran`s name even once. This conIirms the Iact that
Pirabhakaran was not under trial between 1992 and 1999 on the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination case. ThereIore, the malicious innuendo made by
the editorialist oI the Island (Dec.15, 2001) about Pirabhakaran being
the editorialist oI the Island (Dec.15, 2001) about Pirabhakaran being
sentenced to death in the Rajiv assassination trial is nothing but
baloney and it deserved the scorn I showed, as presented in the Front
Note` section oI this chapter. (Continued)

Part 29
Sachi Sri Kantha
29 December 2001]
angle of 1ustice K.T.Thomas
1ustice Thomas on corruption in India
In the previous chapter |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part
28|, I had brought to attention oI the readers, the three major
problems, viz. politicization, corruption and system overload, which
has been eroding the worth oI Indian judiciary. I also noted that while
the problem oI system overload was visibly evident Irom the time
taken Ior completion oI the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial, the
problems oI politicization oI judiciary and corruption cannot be
understated. Thus, it is pertinent to cite some recent observations
made by one oI the three Supreme Court Judges, Justice K.T.Thomas
(who heard the appeal on Rajiv assassination trial), on the
intermarriage oI politics and corruption in current India.
On April 1, 2001, Justice Thomas delivered the second D.P.Kohli
Memorial Lecture in Iront oI the law enIorcement oIIicials (Central
Bureau oI Intelligence) in New Delhi. The title oI Justice Thomas`s
lecture was, Anatomv and Epidemic of Corruption. While introducing
the speaker, the director oI CBI, Dr.R.K.Raghavan has noted that
'One cannot dispute the appropriateness oI the theme chosen Ior the
present times. Born in Kottayam, Kerala, Justice Shri Thomas had
his early education in his home town and graduated Irom St.Alberts
College, Cochin. The Madras Law College, which has many brilliant
jurists as its alumni, has one in Justice Thomas also.
Justice Thomas had stated in his lecture,
'.The only solace I had was when I read a news-item that a
society called Transparency International conducted a study oI
corruption level in various countries oI the world. They Iound
India as the 10
th
highest corrupt country in the world. Why I Ielt
it as a solace is, because there are nine other countries in the
world, which are more corrupt than India. I thought then about
the lamentable situation oI those other countries because I myselI
the lamentable situation oI those other countries because I myselI
was lamenting about my own country`s pitiable position.
Politics in India means a very inIluential instrument because
politics can make and unmake Governments. In our constitutional
scheme Government is very powerIul and it has the exchequer at
its command as well authority to create sources Ior augmenting
the Iunds Ior the exchequer. So power brokers could also
become Iinancially powerIul. All will agree that such assets are
the repository oI many corruptly acquired money. There is no
legal provision now to deal with such power brokers.|Source:
India`s Central Bureau oI Intelligence website, accessed on
Nov.5, 2001|
These general observations have pregnant meaning, and it is
anybody`s guess that how the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial itselI
was inIluenced by the politicization oI judiciary and corruption
problems among the law enIorcement personnel, as pointed out by
Justice Thomas. While it is diIIicult to make accusing Iingers directly
at those who were involved in every phase oI the Rajiv assassination
trial, circumstantially one cannot inIer that politicization and corruption
oI law enIorcement and Intelligence personnel in India are non-existent
problems. Otherwise, Justice Thomas wouldn`t have chosen such an
appropriate theme as his lecture!
Towards the latter-halI oI his lecture, Justice Thomas had stated an
anecdote on why Mahatma Gandhi made his last Iasting, aIter India
attained independence, in November 1947, much against the wishes oI
his proteges, who had become politically-minded, like Nehru, Patel
and Gopalaswamy Iyengar. This was on the necessity oI paying 52
crores oI rupees immediately to the newly Iormed state Pakistan as
owelty`. In Justice Thomas`s words, 'Nehru told him |Gandhi| that
we have two years` time to pay that amount but Gandhiji made his
reasoning Ior immediate payment on the ground that he had no hope
that India would pay the amount aIter his death. Then, Justice
Thomas ended his lecture with a sober note,
'When this country oI Mahatma Gandhi was selected, as world`s
10
th
most corrupt nation the only comIort which we can have is
that the Mahatma is not alive to shed tears. But he must be
looking down Irom that celestial terrain and lamenting over the
pathetic level to which his country has plummeted. |ibid|
Now, to Justice Thomas`s verdict on the appeal oI Rajiv assassination
trial.
trial.
Verdict of 1ustice Thomas
The verdict oI Justice Thomas in the Rajiv assassination trial appeal
was 69-pages long |taken as a print-out oI the verdict Irom India`s
Central Bureau oI Intelligence website|. In length, it is in the medium
range, between the verdicts oI Justice D.P.Wadhwa (201 pages) and
Justice Quadri (25 pages). He had summarized the prosecution case`
as Iollows:
'A criminal conspiracy was hatched and developed by the
hardcore LTTE cadre which spread over a long period oI 6 years
commencing Irom July 6, 1987 and stretching over till May 1992.
The main objects oI the conspiracy were: (1) to carry out acts oI
terrorism and disruptive activities in Tamil Nadu and other places
in India during the course oI which to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi
and others, (2) to cause disappearance oI evidence thereoI, (3) to
harbour all the conspirators living in India and (4) to escape Irom
being apprehended and to screen all those who were involved in
the conspiracy Irom legal consequences.|p.5 of his verdict|
On Pirabhakaran`s status in the assassination trial Justice Thomas
had stated,
'On completion oI the investigation the CBI laid charge-sheet
against all the 26 appellants besides Veluppillai Piribhakaran (the
Supremo oI LTTE), Pottu Omman (the ChieI oI intelligence
wing oI LTTE) and Akila (Deputy ChieI oI intelligence) Ior
various oIIences including the main oIIence under Section 302
read with Section 120-B and Sections 3 & 4 oI the TADA.
All steps taken to apprehend three oI the main accused (1)
Veluppillai Piribhakaran (2) Pottu Omman and (3) Akila did not
succeed and hence they were proclaimed as absconding
oIIenders.|p.9 of his verdict|
What is Terrorism, according to TADA of India?
Though the Iollowing extract is legalese and somewhat lengthy, I wish
to reproduce it Ior reasons oI continuing current interest on what is
terrorism`. As it is seen in Indian law under TADA, according to
Justice Thomas,
'Terrorist act` is deIined in Section 2(1) oI the TADA, by giving
the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (1) oI Section 3` and
the expression terrorist` is mandated to be construed
accordingly. It is thereIore necessary to look at Section 3(1) more
closely. We may extract the Iirst three sub-sections oI Section 3:
closely. We may extract the Iirst three sub-sections oI Section 3:
(1) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law
established or to strike terror in people or any section oI the
people or to alienate any section oI the people or to adversely
aIIect the harmony amongst diIIerent sections oI the people does
any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive
substances or inIlammable substances or Iire-arms or other lethal
weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by
any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) oI a
hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to
cause, death oI, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss oI,
or damage to, or destruction oI, property or disruption oI any
supplies or services essential to the liIe oI the community, or
detains any person or threatens to kill or injure such person in
order to compel the Government or any other person to do or
abstain Irom doing any act, commits a terrorist act.
(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall,
(i) iI such act has resulted in the death oI any person, be
punishable with death or imprisonment Ior liIe and shall be
liable to Iine;
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment Ior a
term which shall not be less than Iive years but which may
extend to imprisonment Ior liIe and shall also be liable to Iine.
(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates,
abets, advises or incites or knowingly Iacilitates the commission
oI, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment Ior a term which shall not be less
than Iive years but which may extend to imprisonment Ior liIe
and shall also be liable to Iine.
A reading oI the Iirst sub-section shows that the person who does
any act by using any oI the substances enumerated in the sub-
section in any such manner as are speciIied in the sub-section,
cannot be said to commit a terrorist act unless the act is done
with intent` to do any oI the four things: (1) to overawe the
Government as by law established; or (2) to strike terror in
people or any section oI the people; or (3) to alienate any section
oI the people; or (4) to adversely aIIect the harmony amongst
diIIerent sections oI the people.
When the law requires that the act should have been done with
intent` to cause any oI the above Iour eIIects such requirement
would be satisIied only iI the dominant intention oI the doer is to
cause the aIoresaid eIIect. It is not enough that the act resulted in
cause the aIoresaid eIIect. It is not enough that the act resulted in
any oI the Iour consequences. |pp. 10-11 Justice Thomass
verdict|
As an aside, one wonders whether Rajiv Gandhi himselI could have
been arraigned under the TADA`s subsections 2 and 3 oI Section 3,
Ior acts committed during his prime ministership, not only in the Eelam
territory but also even within India. Though he wouldn`t have
personally committed a terrorist act` in public, certainly documental
prooIs exist that he had advocated, abetted, advised, and knowinglv
facilitated the commission of a terrorist act or anv act preparatorv to
a terrorist act, as described under subsection 3. Or does holding an
elected position as the prime minister oIIers immunity` Irom such
terrorist acts` Ior which ordinary citizens holding no elected positions
can be punished?
Verdict on conviction falling within the charge Under Section 3 of
TADA
I reproduce in Iull (nearly two pages long), Justice Thomas`s verdict
on conviction Ialling within the charge under Section 3 oI TADA. This
excerpt is relevant since it includes details about Pirabhakaran`s views
related to LTTE`s relationship with India.
According to Justice Thomas,
'Learned Additional Solicitor General endeavoured to show that
the intention oI the conspirators was to overawe the Government
oI India. His contention was that assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi
was a Iollow up action Ior restraining the Government Irom
proceeding with the implementation oI India-Sri Lanka Accord.
In other words, the Iocus oI the conspirators was the
Government oI India and Rajiv Gandhi was targeted to deter that
Iocal point, according to learned Additional Solicitor General.
This contention can be examined by a reIerence to the evidence
in this case.
It is true, LTTE leaders were bitterly critical oI India-Sri Lanka
Accord` which was signed on 22-7-1987 |i.e, July 22, 1987. Note.
This is an error. The Accord was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and
J.R.Jayewardene on July 29, 1987.|. Any one criticized the policy oI a
Government could not be dubbed as a terrorist unless he had
done any oI the acts enumerated with the object oI deterring the
Government Irom doing anything or to reIrain Irom doing
anything.
anything.
Veluppillai Piribhakaran addressed a meeting on 4-8-1987 |i.e,
Aug.4, 1987|, the text oI the speech was published which is
marked in this case as Ext.354. In the said speech he used strong
language to criticize India-Sri Lanka accord` and the manner in
which it was made. But no word oI hatred was expressed
towards the Government oI India though he aired his opposition
towards Sri Lankan Government, which he described as Sinhala
racist government`. He also spoke bitterly against the Sri Lankan
Tamil leaders who supported the Accord. About the Indian
Government and its Prime Minister the LTTE supreme said the
Iollowing:
The Indian Prime Minister offered me certain assurances. He
offered a guarantee for the safetv and protection of our people. I
do have faith in the straightforwardness of the Indian Prime
Minister and I do have faith in his assurances. We do believe
that India will not allow the racist Sri Lankan State to take once
again to the road of genocide against the Tamils. It is onlv out
of this faith that we decided to hand over our weapons to the
Indian peace keeping force.`
It must be remembered that political changes which occurred in
India thereaIter had brought a new Government under the
leadership oI V.P.Singh as Prime Minister in 1989. The IPKF
inducted into Sri Lanka was gradually withdrawn in a phased
manner, which process was commenced during the Prime
Ministership oI Rajiv Gandhi himselI and continued during the
Prime Ministership oI V.P.Singh. The attitude oI LTTE towards
Government oI India, during the aIoresaid period, can be seen
Irom what their own oIIicial publication Joice of Tigers had
declared in its editorial column in the issue oI the said journal
dated 19-1-1990 (which is marked as Ext.362). The editorial
reads as Iollows:
In the meantime, the defeat of Rafiv Congress Partv and the
assumption of power of the National Front alliance under
Jishwanath Pratap Singh has given rise to a sense of relief and
hope to the people of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE has alreadv
indicated to the new Indian Government its desire to improve
and consolidate friendlv ties with India. The new Indian
leadership responded positivelv according to Mr.Karunanidhi,
the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, the role and responsibilitv of
mediating with the Tamil Tigers. The LTTE representatives who
had four rounds of talks with the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister in
Madras, are firmlv convinced that the Tamil Nadu Government
Madras, are firmlv convinced that the Tamil Nadu Government
and the new Indian administration are favourablv disposed to
them and the J.P.Singhs government will act in the interests of
the Tamil speaking people bv creating appropriate conditions
for the LTTE to come to political power in the North-Eastern
Province.
The above editorial is a strong piece oI material showing that
LTTE till then did not contemplate any action to overawe the
Government oI India. OI course the top layer oI LTTE did not
conceal their ire against Rajiv Gandhi who was then out oI
power.
In this context it is important to point out what Veluppillai
Piribhakaran, who went underground in Sri Lanka and resurIaced
on 1-4-1990 |i.e, April 1, 1990| aIter a period oI 32 months oI
disappearance had said. (The news about his re-emergence was
published in the newspaper a copy oI which has been marked
as Ext.363). The LTTE supreme had told the newsmen then as
Iollows:
We are not against India or the Indian people but against the
former leadership in India who is against the Tamil liberation
struggle and the LTTE.`
Nothing else is proved in the case either Irom the utterances oI
the top brass LTTE or Irom any writings edited by them that
anyone oI them wanted to strike Iear in the Government either oI
Centre or oI any State.
From the aforesaid circumstances it is difficult for us to
conclude that the conspirators intended, at any time, to
overawe the Government of India as by law established.
Nor can we hold that the conspirators ever entertained an
intention to strike terror in people or any section thereof.
The mere Iact that their action resulted in the killing oI 18
persons which would have struck great terror in the people oI
India has been projected as evidence that they intended to strike
terror in people. We have no doubt that the aItermath oI the
carnage at Sriperumbudur had bubbled up waves oI shock and
terror throughout India. But there is absolutely no evidence that
any one oI the conspirators ever desired the death oI any Indian
other than Rajiv Gandhi. Among the series oI conIessions made
by a record number oI accused in any single case, as in this case,
not even one oI them has stated that anybody had the desire or
intention to murder one more person along with Rajiv Gadhi
except perhaps the murderer herselI. OI course they should have
except perhaps the murderer herselI. OI course they should have
anticipated that in such a dastardly action more lives would be
vulnerable to peril. But that is a diIIerent matter and we cannot
attribute an intention oI the conspirators to kill anyone other than
Rajiv Gandhi and the contemporaneous destruction oI the killer
also.
Alternatively, even iI Sivarasan and the top brass oI LTTE knew
that there was likelihood oI more casualties that cannot be
equated to a situation that they did it with an intention to strike
terror in any section oI the people.
In view oI the paucity oI materials to prove that the conspirators
intended to overawe the Government oI India or to strike terror
in the people oI India we are unable to sustain the conviction oI
oIIences under Section 3 oI TADA.|pp.13-15 of Justice
Thomass verdict|
Verdict on conviction falling within the charge Under Section 4(1)
of TADA
Justice Thomas`s verdict on conviction Ialling within the charge under
Section 4(1) oI TADA was as Iollows:
'The next endeavour is to see whether the conspirators did any
disruptive activities` so as to be caught in the dragnet oI Section
4(1) oI TADA. The subsection reads: Whoever commits or
conspires or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or
knowingly Iacilitates the commission oI, any disruptive activity or
any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable
with imprisonment Ior a term which shall not be less than Iive
years but which may extend to imprisonment Ior liIe and shall
also be liable to Iine.`. |p. 15 of the verdict|
Under this section, Justice Thomas establishes that Rajiv Gandhi, at
the time oI his assassination, was not a public servant.
'The killing oI a public servant or killing oI any other person
bound by oath would be an oIIence under the Indian Penal Code.
But it must be noted that such killing, as such, is not a disruptive
activity. Certain type oI actions which preceded such killing alone
is regarded as a disruptive activity through the legal Iiction
created by sub-section (3). Such actions include advocating,
advising, suggesting, inciting, predicting, prophesying,
pronouncing or prompting the killing oI such persons. In other
words, all the preceding actions directed positively towards killing
oI such persons would amount to disruptive activity, but not the
Iinal result namely, the act oI killing oI such person.
Iinal result namely, the act oI killing oI such person.
II there is any evidence, in this case, to show that any such
preceding act was perpetrated by any oI the appellants towards
killing oI any police oIIicer who was killed at the place oI
occurrence it would, no doubt, amount to disruptive activity. But
there is no such evidence that any such activity was done Ior the
purpose oI killing any police personnel.
However, there is plethora oI evidence Ior establishing that all
such preceding activities were done by many among the accused
arrayed, Ior killing Rajiv Gandhi. But unIortunately Rajiv Gandhi
was not then a person bound by oath under the Constitution to
uphold the sovereignty and integrity oI India`. Even the Lok
Sabha stood dissolved months prior to this incident and hence it
cannot be Iound that he was under an oath as a Member oI
Parliament. The inevitable Iall out oI the above situation is that
none oI the conspirators can be caught in the dragnet oI sub-
section (3) oI Section 4 oI TADA |pp.16-17 of the verdict|
Then, in dismissing the conviction oI appellants under Section 3 or 4
oI TADA, Justice Thomas had inIerred,
'What remains to be considered Ior Section 4(1) oI TADA is
whether any disruptive activity Ialling within the ambit oI the
deIinition in sub-section (2) has been established. The attempt
which prosecution has made in that regard, is to show that the
conspirators intended to disrupt the sovereignty oI India. To
support the said contention, our attention was drawn to the
conIessional statement oI A-3 (Murugan), A-18 (Arivu) and the
photographs proved as M.Os. 256 to 259 |Note: M.O is the
abbreviation Ior Material Objects submitted by the prosecution|,
which were seized Irom the bag oI A-3 (Murugan). The said
items oI evidence show that photos oI Fort St. George, Madras
(which houses the Government Secretariat oI Tamil Nadu and
the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council), Police
Headquarters, Central Jail within Vellore Fort etc. had been taken
and dispatched to the LTTE top brass oI Sri Lanka.
It is too much a strain to enter a Iinding, on such evidence, that
the above activities were unmistakably aimed at disrupting the
sovereignty oI India. The sketch oI Vellore Fort (which houses
the Central Jail) was drawn up, most probably, Ior planning some
operation to rescue the prisoners (belonging to LTTE who have
been interned therein). That oI course would be an oIIence but
not an activity which Ialls within the purview oI Section 4 oI
TADA.
TADA.
We are, thereIore, unable to sustain the conviction oI appellants
Ior oIIences under Section 3 or 4 oI TADA.|p.17 of the verdict|
Concessions made and disputed by the Defence Counsel
Justice Thomas also has summarized clearly the concessions made and
disputed by the DeIence Counsel in the assassination trial. In his
words,
'We may put on record the Iollowing concessions made by the
learned counsel Ior all the appellants at the Bar:
(I) Prosecution has successIully established that Rajiv Gandhi
was assassinated at 10.19 PM on 21-5-1991 at Sriperumbudur by
a girl named Thanu who became a human bomb and got herselI
exploded in the same event; and that altogether 18 persons,
including the above two, died in the said explosion.
(II) There is overwhelming evidence to show that assassination oI
Rajiv Gandhi was resulted Irom a conspiracy to Iinish him.
(III) It is also established by the prosecution beyond doubt that
Sivarasan Raghuvaran who was a top brass oI LTTE was one
oI the kingpins oI the said conspiracy.
We may also record at this stage that the two points which are
seriously disputed by the learned counsel Ior the appellants are
the Iollowing: (1) Assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi was not the only
Iocal point oI the conspiracy. (2) Appellants were participants in
the conspiracy.
In other words, the deIence contended that the conspiracy was
made only to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and that none oI the
appellants had participated in the conspiracy.|pp.17-18 of the
verdict|
My Observation
Upto this point, Justice Thomas had meaningIully restricted his
observations within the judicial terms oI reIerence, based on submitted
evidence by the prosecution. Then, in page 24 oI his verdict, he had
inserted political cant in one sentence by proclaiming, 'There is not
even a speck of doubt in our mind that the criminal conspiracv to
murder Rafiv Gandhi was hatched bv at least 4 persons comprising
of Jeluppillai Piribhakaran, Pottu Omman, Sivarasan and Akila`.
However, he has reIrained Irom providing any supporting evidence Ior
such a blanket statement. Rather than substantiating his inIerence with
such a blanket statement. Rather than substantiating his inIerence with
solid prooI, he had skirted the issue (by engaging in verbal gymnastics)
with the Iollowing observation:
'We have no doubt Irom the circumstantial evidence in this case,
that Thanu, the girl who transIormed into a human bomb, and
her Iriend Suba were unIlinchingly committed commandos oI
LTTE and they were also brought into the conspiracy ring by the
top brass oI LTTE. Circumstances proved in this case regarding
the aIoresaid core points are too many. However, we are spared
Irom the task oI enumerating all such circumstances as learned
counsel Ior the accused have Iairly conceded about the
suIIiciency oI circumstances which have been proved in this case
to establish the aIoresaid points. |p. 24 of the verdict|
In my opinion, the deIence counsel had conceded that Sivarasan was
'one oI the kingpins oI the said conspiracy. But Justice Thomas has
not revealed in his verdict, the presence oI any pre-assassination
document` (in whatever Iorm) which links Sivarasan or Dhanu to
Pirabhakaran.
1ustice Thomas`s categorization of conspirators`
'The conspirators in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination can be
vivisected into Iour broad categories.
First, those who Iormed the hardcore nucleus which took the
decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi.
Second, those who induced others to join the ring and played
active as well as supervisory roles in the conspiracy.
Third, those who joined the conspiracy by inducement whether
through indoctrination or otherwise.
Fourth, those among the conspirators who participated in the
actual commission oI murder.|p.68 of the verdict|
Then, Justice Thomas wrote the vital three sentences, which have
been highlighted and twisted in the mass media to portray
Pirabhakaran as the convicted criminal`.
First, I provide the words oI Justice Thomas, and then I analyze the
meaning oI these three sentences.
'Persons who fall within the first categorv cannot normallv
escape from capital punishment if their case ends in conviction.
Jeluppillai Piribhakaran, Pottu Omman, Akila, Sivarasan and
Trichv Santhan have been described as persons falling within
the radius of the first categorv. As thev were not tried for the
the radius of the first categorv. As thev were not tried for the
offences so far we refrain from observing anvthing concerning
them in the sphere of sentencing exercise.`|p.68 oI Justice
Thomas`s verdict|
My observations on these three sentences
The Iirst sentence is a conditional statement, ending in 'iI their case
ends in conviction. The Colombo hack whom I cited in the Iront note
to the previous chapter |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part
28| had twisted this conditional statement into a Iact.
In the second sentence, Justice Thomas had stated, that Pirabhakaran,
Pottu Amman, Akila, Sivarasan and Trichy Santhan 'have been
described as persons Ialling within the radius oI the Iirst category.
Who described? not Justice Thomas, but the prosecution team oI
SIT.
The third sentence is also interesting in that Justice Thomas conIirms
that Pirabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Akila (they`) 'were not tried Ior
the oIIences so Iar. Then, he also continues the sentence with the
assertion, 'we reIrain Irom observing anything concerning them in the
sphere oI sentencing exercise.
While stating in page 68 |the penultimate page oI his verdict| that
Pirabhakaran, Pottu Amman and Akila 'were not tried Ior the
oIIenses, Justice Thomas |willingly or negligently| had oIIered
political cant in page 24 oI his verdict proclaiming, 'There is not even
a speck of doubt in our mind that the criminal conspiracv to murder
Rafiv Gandhi was hatched bv at least 4 persons comprising of
Jeluppillai Piribhakaran, Pottu Omman, Sivarasan and Akila`. I
Iind this perplexing, unless one allows it as a political piece oI meat`
thrown in to satisIy the lapping instinct oI Indian journalists and
commentators. Also, the recurrent use oI Royal we` (and associated
our`) need to be noted, and I would state that among the three judges
who heard the supreme court appeal, Justice D.P.Wadhwa and Justice
S.S.M.Quadri did not oIIer any comment which is in concordance
with that oI Justice Thomas relating to Pirabhakaran`s role in the
conspiracy.
Additional observations of 1ustice Thomas
I provide below a list oI additional observations made by Justice
Thomas in his verdict.
(1) 'It must be remembered that LTTE had several activities, even
apart Irom murdering Rajiv Gandhi. So merely because a
person is shown to be an active worker oI LTTE that by itselI
person is shown to be an active worker oI LTTE that by itselI
would not catapult him into the orbit oI the conspiracy mesh in
order to murder Rajiv Gandhi.|p. 37 of the verdict|
(2) 'A-8 |i.e, 8
th
accused Athirai| is a girl hailing Irom Sri Lanka.
She was in her teens during the days oI conspiracy. Two oI her
sisters are now in Switzerland living with their husbands. A-8
(Athirai) had a love aIIair with a boy named Anand, but he died
in a raid conducted by IPKF during 1989. She was recruited in
the LTTE at the age oI 16 and she was given a training in
shooting. It was Irom her conIessional statement |Exhibit Ior
Prosecution 97| that we got the idea oI placement oI Thanu
and Suba in the LTTE ranking. The Iormer was a member oI
Black Women Tiger` and the latter was a member oI the Army
Branch oI LTTE. |p. 39 of the verdict|
(3) 'Except A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan), A-3 (Murugan), A-9
(Robert Payas), A-10 (Jayakumar), A-16 (Ravichandran) and
A-18 (Arivu) all the remaining appellants shall be set at liberty
Iorthwith. |p. 65 of the verdict|
(4) 'We can hold with certainty that A-2 (Santhan), A-3
(Murugan) and A-18 (Arivu) belonged to the second category
|oI the conspirators, as mentioned above| even iI they slip out
oI the Iirst. They were not merely carrying out the orders oI the
Iirst category personnel but they made others to work according
to their directions in order to achieve the target. The role played
by them was prominently direct and active. They were in the
leadership layer among the conspirators. We are not able to Iind
out anything extenuating as Ior the said three persons in their
activities Ior implementation oI the decisions oI the cabal. We
thereIore conIirm the extreme penalty imposed by the trial court
on A-2 (Santhan), A-3 (Murugan) and A-18 (Arivu) Ior the
oIIence under Section 302 read with Section 120-B oI the
IPC. |p. 68 of the verdict|
(5) 'A-1 (Nalini) belongs to the Iourth category |oI the
conspirators, as mentioned above|.on an evaluation oI the
plus and minus, pros and cons we persuade ourselves to save
A-1 (Nalini) Irom gallows. Hence the sentence passed on her is
altered to one oI imprisonment Ior liIe.|pp. 68-69 of the
verdict|
(6) 'What remains is the case oI A-9 (Robert Payas), A-10
(Jayakumar) and A-16 (Ravichandran). They do not belong to
the Iirst or even to the second category |oI conspirators, as
mentioned above|. They were LTTE Iollowers and they just
obeyed the commands oI leaders like Sivarasan who had the
obeyed the commands oI leaders like Sivarasan who had the
capacity to dominate over them. We are inclined to alter their
sentence Irom death penalty to imprisonment Ior liIe. We order
so. |p. 69 of the verdict|
In the next chapter, I will analyze the lengthy verdict delivered by
Justic D.P.Wadhwa (Continued).

Part 30
Sachi Sri Kantha
5 1anuary 2002]
angle of 1ustice D.P.Wadhwa
Merit in 1ustice D.P.Wadhwa`s Verdict
In a previous chapter |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 28|,
I had observed that brevity and lack oI political cant are the merits in
Justice S.S.M.Quadri`s verdict on the appeal oI Rajiv Gandhi
assassination trial. Justice Wadhwas lengthv verdict, running into
201 printed pages, has a different merit of its own. Considering that
this particular assassination trial was conducted in secrecy where much
inIormation was suppressed to the public, Justice Wadhwa has made a
quota oI suppressed inIormation available to researchers via his
lengthy verdict. Unlike the newspaper reports, interviews and
commentaries by partisan journalists, this inIormation provided by
Justice Wadhwa is unimpeachable. Also, many oI the newspaper
accounts oI the verdict as well as Subramanian Swamy`s selI-serving
book on Rajiv Gandhi assassination, which I have studied, have
distorted or omitted chunks oI Justice Wadhwa`s verdict which
questions the validity oI the submitted evidence Irom the prosecution
team. Having stated this I would add that, unlike Justice Quadri`s
verdict, Justice Wadhwa`s verdict is not without political cant at
inIrequent locations
Justice Wadhwa`s verdict include the Iollowing details: details oI the
speciIic charges against the 26 accused, the names and designations oI
prosecution witnesses, the dates oI arrest and dates oI conIession
made by the 26 accused who were on trial, some interesting tidbits
culled Irom the conIession oI the accused, unreliability oI the post-
assassination wireless messages submitted by the SIT as evidence to
implicate LTTE in the assassination, and last but not the least
exposure on the incompetence oI the Designated Judge Navaneetham
as an impartial adjudicator oI justice. Also, in speciIic aspects
regarding whether the main accused (such as Sivarasan, Subha, Dhanu
and Santhan the Iirst three were deceased accused, and Santhan was
2
nd
accused under trial) were members oI the conspiracy, Justice
2
nd
accused under trial) were members oI the conspiracy, Justice
Wadhwa had even disagreed with Iellow Justice K.T.Thomas`s
Iindings.
The Prosecution Case
First, I will present the prosecution case as presented Justice Wadhwa.
In one lengthy sentence exceeding 60 words, Justice Wadhwa
introduced the prosecution case as Iollows:
'Prosecution case is that Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, Akila and
Sivarasan master-minded and put into operation the plan to kill
Rajiv Gandhi which was executed by Sivarasan and Dhanu, oI
the two assassins (other being Subha), with the back-up oI other
accused, who conspired and abetted them in the commission oI
the crime which included providing them saIe haven beIore and
aIter the crime. |p.7 of the verdict; in the printout oI the verdict,
available Irom the India`s Central Bureau oI Intelligence website|.
Then, between pages 40 and 43 oI his verdict, Justice Wadhwa stated
the prosecutions view |italics added by me Ior emphasis; hereaIter,
abbreviations PW stands Ior prosecution witness, A stands Ior
Accused, MO stands Ior Material Objects| oI how the conspiracy to
assassinate Rajiv Gandhi progressed. To quote,
'According to prosecution, conspiracy was activated with the
publication oI an interview oI Rajiv Gandhi in Sundav magazine
and how the conspiracy was put into operation. |p.40 of the
verdict|.
Pertaining to this interview, Justice Wadhwa mentioned in the previous
page,
'Aveek Sarkar (PW-255) had an interview with Rajiv Gandhi
which was published in the Sundav magazine issue oI August 12-
19, 1990. The interview is dated July 30/31, 1990. In the
interview, Rajiv Gandhi supported the Accord and criticized
V.P.Singh in withdrawing the IPKF. He said there was no
rationale behind the withdrawal and as things till then had not
stabilized and Accord had not been Iully implemented.
The prosecution view oI how conspirators arrived in India in seven
groups, in Justice Wadhwa`s words, were as Iollows. To quote,
'First group oI conspirators to achieve the object oI conspiracy
arrived in India on September 12, 1990. This group consisted oI
Vijayan (A-12), Selvaluxmi (A-13) and Bhaskaran (A-14).
Bhaskaran (A-14) is Iather oI Selvaluxmi (A-13). They arrived at
Rameshwaram in India like other reIugees Irom Sri Lanka and
Rameshwaram in India like other reIugees Irom Sri Lanka and
got themselves registered. At JaIIna in Sri Lanka they were seen
oII by deceased accused Sivarasan without paying any toll to
LTTE. |p.40 of the verdict|
'Second group comprising Robert Payas (A-9), his wiIe Prema,
his sister Premlatha, Jayakumar (A-10) and his wiIe Shanti (A-
11) came to India Irom Sri Lanka on 20.9.1990 |i.e, Sept.20,
1990| as reIugees and reported at Rameshwaram. |p.41 of the
verdict|
'Third group comprising Ravi (A-16) and Suseendran (A-17)
along with Sivarasan arrived in India Irom Sri Lanka in the end oI
December 1990. Both Ravi (A-16) and Suseendran (A-17) are
Indian Tamils. This group was seen oII at Sri Lanka by Pottu
Amman. |p.41 of the verdict|
'Fourth group comprising Arivu (A-18) and Irumborai (A-19)
came to India in October 1990. They had gone to Sri Lanka in
May 1990 with Baby Subramaniam where they had met
Prabhakaran |p.41 of the verdict|
'In the IiIth group there is only one person Murugan (A-3),
who arrived in India clandestinely in the third week oI January
1991 with the directions Irom Pottu Amman |p.41 of the verdict|
'Sixth group comprising Kanagasabapathy (A-7) and Athirai (A-
8) came to India on 23.4.1991 |i.e, April 23, 1991| and was seen
oII by Pottu Amman with certain speciIic instructions in an
LTTE boat with escort. |p.42 of the verdict|
'Seventh and the last group consisting oI nine persons under the
leadership oI Sivarasan arrived at Kodiakkarai on 1.5.1991 |i.e,
May 1, 1991| in an LTTE boat. This group was seen oII by
Pottu Amman on 27.4.1991 |i.e, April 27, 1991|. The boat in
which they were traveling developed a snag and had to return.
They leIt shore oI Sri Lanka on 30.4.1991 |i.e, April 30, 1991|
when again Pottu Amman was there to see them oII. Nine
persons were Sivarasan, Santhan (A-2), Shankar (A-14),
Vijayanandan (A-5), Ruban (A-6), Subha, Dhanu, Nero and
Keerthi. Last Iour and Sivarasan are deceased accused. |p.43 of
the verdict|
Major Findings of 1ustice Wadhwa
Justice Wadhwa, in pages 161-163 oI his verdict, had oIIered the
Iollowing nine Iindings. I have added italics to certain Iindings, Ior
emphasis. To quote in Iull,
'1. Presence oI LTTE on Indian soil beIore and aIter Indo-Sri
Lankan Accord is undisputed. Its activities went ostensibly
underground aIter the Accord. LTTE was having various
activities in India and some oI these were (1) printing and
publishing oI books and magazines Ior LTTE propaganda, (2)
holding oI camps Ior arms training in India and various other
places in Tamil Nadu (This was done openly till the Indo-Sri
Lankan Accord), (3) collection and raising oI Iunds Ior its war
eIIorts in Sri Lanka, (4) treatment oI injured LTTE cadres in
India, (5) medical assistance and (6) transporting oI goods like
petrol, diesel, lungies, medicines, wireless equipments and
explosives and even provisions to Sri Lanka.
2. Hiring oI houses in Tamil Nadu was Ior various activities oI
the LTTE, which included houses Ior the treatment oI injured
LTTE cadres.
3. Sivarasan was having other activities in Tamil Nadu. He was
to make arrangements Ior Santhan (A-2) to go to Switzerland and
Ior Kanagasabapathy (A-7) and Athirai (A-8) to go to Delhi and
Irom there to Germany. He was to make arrangement to recruit
persons to impart arms training in Sri Lanka through Ravi (A-16)
and Suseendran (A-17) and to arrange houses at Madras through
Robert Payas (A-9), Jayakumar (A-10) and Vijayan (A-12) Ior
the stay oI LTTE cadres not necessarily Ior conspirators. He
Iinanced Vijayanandan (A-5) in Madras Ior purchase oI books
Ior LTTE library in JaIIna. Shanmugham (DA ; i.e, reIerring to
deceased accused) in his conIession (Exhibit Ior Prosecution
1300) stated that Sivarasan with others stayed in a house at
Kodiakkarai and they were arranging to send petrol and diesel oil
by boat to LTTE in Sri Lanka.
4. In case of some of the accused including deceased accused
there is no evidence whatsoever that thev were members of the
conspiracv. Prosecution has been unfair to charge them with
conspiracv.
5. There is no evidence that all the nine persons, who arrived in
India bv boat on 1.5.1991 [i.e, Mav 1, 1991], namelv,
Sivarasan, Subha, Dhanu, Nero, Dixon, Santhan (A-2), Shankar
(A-4), Jifavanandan (A-5) and Ruben (A-6), were members of
the conspiracv. In this group there was Ruben (A-6), who came
to India to have an artiIicial leg Iixed which he had lost in a battle
with Sri Lankan army. Sivarasan, Subha, Dhanu, Nero and
Dixon are deceased accused.
|My observation: OI the nine persons, Justice Thomas in his verdict
had noted that Sivarasan could belong to the Iirst category oI
conspirators, and Santhan as belonging to the second category oI
conspirators even iI he slip out oI the Iirst category; see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 29. Thus, there was divergence in
the views oI two Justices.|
6. Prosecution also named Jamuna Jameela (DA) as a
conspirator, who had also come to India for fixing an artificial
limb, which she had also lost in a battle with Sri Lankan armv.
There is not even a whisper in the whole mass of evidence that
she had even knowledge of anv conspiracv to kill Rafiv Gandhi.
Simplv because she was found dead having committed suicide
along with Sivarasan, Subha and others at Bangalore, could not
make her a member of the conspiracv.
7. From frequent and unexplained meetings of some of the
accused with others, who have been charged with conspiracv, it
cannot be assumed that thev all were members of the
conspiracv. This is particularlv so when LTTE was having
various activities on Indian soil for its war efforts in Sri Lanka.
Notebook (Exhibit Ior Prosecution 1168) seized by the police
gives bio-data oI some LTTE cadre working in India though that
list is not extensive. It also contains the bio-data oI Irumborai (A-
19).
8. All the persons, who came Irom Sri Lanka during the striIe,
did not come through authorized channels. It is also to be seen iI
the accused now charged with conspiracy and alleged to have
come to India in the guise oI reIugees were not in Iact reIugees.
Rather evidence shows that Robert Payas (A-9), Jayakumar (A-
10) and Shanti (A-11) as one group and Vijayan (A-12),
Selvaluxmi (A-13) and Bhaskaran (A-14) as the second group,
were in Iact wanting to come to India due to conditions prevailing
in Sri Lanka. They had no money to pay to LTTE. They were
exempted Irom paying any toll to LTTE on their agreeing to hire
houses in Tamil Nadu Ior stay oI LTTE cadre and on their being
promised help by LTTE. When they so agreed they were not
aware that what was the object behind their hiring the houses.
Evidence regarding providing shelter to the conspirators either
beIore or aIter the object oI the conspiracy has been achieved, is
not conclusive to support the charge oI conspiracy against them.
9. Robert Payas (A-9), Jayakumar (A-10) and Vijayan (A-12)
were hard-core LTTE activists. They were living in Sri Lanka
with their Iamilies and suIIered because oI the turmoil there.
They may be sympathizers oI LTTE having strong Ieelings
They may be sympathizers oI LTTE having strong Ieelings
against IPKF. Consider the background in which they accepted
the oIIer oI LTTE to meet their expenses in India. It could be
that they themselves Ielled into the trap because oI the
circumstances in which their Iamilies were placed in Sri Lanka
and the conditions prevailing there.
Charges against the 26 Accused
In the words oI Justice Wadhwa,
'Including the charge oI conspiracy, which is charge No.1, there
are 251 other charges Iramed against the accused Ior having
committed various oIIences in pursuance to the conspiracy under
Charge No.1. Out oI these Nalini (A-1) has been charged on 121
diIIerent counts. |p.12 of the verdict|
I tabulated the other charges Ior accused other than Nalini, as
presented by Justice Wadhwa. Next to Nalini, Arivu (A-18) was
charged on 63 counts. Next to Arivu, seven accused (A-7, A-8, A-10,
A-11, A-12, A-13, and A-19) were charged on Iour counts each; seven
other accused (A-3, A-14, A-21, A-23, A-24, A-25 and A-26) were
charged on three counts each; six other accused (A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6,
A-20 and A-22) were charged on two counts each; two remaining
accused (A-9 and A-15) were charged on one count each. The charge
No.1, which was common to all 26 accused were the Iollowing seven
items:
120-B read with 302, 326, 324, 201, 212, 216 oI Indian Penal Code.
3,4 and 5 oI Explosives Substances Act, 1908
25 oI Arms Act, 1959
12 oI Passport Act, 1967
14 oI Foreigners Act, 1946
6(1-4) Indian Wireless and Telegraphy Act, 1933
3, 4 & 5 TADA, 1987
The abbreviation TADA stands Ior Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act. The Terrorist Act under Section 3(3) states,
'Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets,
advises or incites or knowingly Iacilitates the commission oI, a terrorist
act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act, shall be punishable with
imprisonment Ior a term which shall not be less than Iive years but
which may extend to imprisonment Ior liIe and shall also be liable to
Iine. |p.25 of the verdict|
The Terrorist Act under Section 3(4) states, 'Whoever harbours or
conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be
conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be
punishable with imprisonment Ior a term which shall not be less than
Iive years but which may extent to imprisonment Ior liIe and shall also
be liable to Iine. |p.25 of the verdict|
OI the 26 accused, eleven (A-7, A-8, A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13, A-14,
A-16, A-17, A-19 and A-23) were charged under both Sections 3(3)
and 3(4) oI TADA; twelve (A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-9, A-15,
A-18, A-20, A-21 and A-22) were charged under Sections 3(3) only;
the remaining three (A-24, A-25 and A-26) were charged under
Sections 3(4) only.
Implying the system overload Iactor which cripples the Indian judiciary
system leading to many accused spending a longer duration under
detention in prison even before they become convicts |see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 28| Justice Wadhwa also recorded
that,
'We may reIer to the preliminary submissions oI
Mr.N.Natarajan, senior advocate, who appeared Ior all the
accused except Shanmugavadivelu Thambi Anna (A-15). He
submitted that he is not challenging the convictions oI various
accused under the Foreigners Act, Passport Act, Explosive
Substances Act, Indian Wireless and Telegraphy Act, Arms Act,
and Sections 212 and 216 IPC. This he said was on account oI
the Iact that Ior oIIences under these Acts accused were awarded
sentence oI imprisonment Ior two years or Ior a period less than
two years which in any case has to be set oII under Section 428
oI the Code as they had been under detention throughout the
period during trial. We are thus leIt to consider oIIences under
Section 120-B IPC, 302/34 IPC, 362/34 IPC, 324/34 IPC and
under Sections 3, 4 and 5 oI TADA. |p. 35 of the verdict; IPC
reIers to Indian Penal Code.|
Purported LTTE links of the Main Accused whose Appeals were
heard
From Justice Wadhwa`s verdict, one can tabulate the purported LTTE
links oI the 26 main accused, whose appeals were heard by the three-
judge bench oI the Indian Supreme Court. Among the 26, the
Iollowing 16 were indicated by Justice Wadhwa, as having had links
with LTTE as activists or helpers or sympathizers. They are namely,
Murugan (3
rd
Accused): a Sri Lankan national and a hard-core LTTE
activist
Vijayanandan (5
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan national and is also a
Vijayanandan (5
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan national and is also a
senior member oI LTTE.
Ruben (6
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan national and is an LTTE militant.
Kanagasabapathy (7
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan Tamil and an LTTE
helper.
Athirai (8
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan and hard-core LTTE militant girl.
Robert Payas (9
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan and hard-core LTTE
activist.
Jayakumar (10
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan and hard-core LTTE
activist.
Vijayan (12
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan Tamil and a helper oI LTTE.
Ravi (16
th
Accused): an Indian Tamil, and LTTE activist.
Suseendran (17
th
Accused): an Indian Tamil, and LTTE activist.
Arivu (18
th
Accused): an Indian Tamil and LTTE propagandist in
India.
Irumborai (19
th
Accused): an Indian Tamil and LTTE sympathizer.
Bhagyanathan (20
th
Accused): an Indian Tamil, who purchased
LTTE press Irom Baby Subramaniam at a very nominal cost.
Suba Sundaram (22
nd
Accused): an Indian Tamil and owner oI
Subha News Photo Service and Subha Studio, a meeting point Ior
LTTE activists.
Rangan (24
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan national and LTTE activist,
who joined the movement in 1983, came to India in 1989 and
running a travel agency without permit.
Vicky (25
th
Accused): a Sri Lankan national, who moved to India in
1990 and assisted the LTTE activist in getting medicines and acted as
his helper.
Among these 16 accused, only two (namely Murugan and Arivu) were
ultimately convicted on the charge oI aiding and abetting the
assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi. Other 14 accused (nine Sri Lankan
nationals and Iive Indian nationals) were acquitted Irom the main
charge. OI the other two convicted Ior their roles in the assassination
oI Rajiv Gandhi, neither Nalini (the 1
st
accused; an Indian national)
nor Santhan (the 2
nd
accused; a Sri Lankan national), were indicated
as LTTE individuals by Justice Wadhwa. But, the status oI Santhan in
LTTE, as depicted by Justice Thomas, in his verdict, is in discordance
to that oI Justice Wadhwa.
In Justice Thomas`s verdict, 'Santhan (A-2) is a Sri Lanka citizen. He
was aged 22 during the relevant time. The evidence shows that he was
a card-holder oI the intelligence wing oI the LTTE. He studied up to
a card-holder oI the intelligence wing oI the LTTE. He studied up to
5
th
standard in a school at JaIIna. He came into contact with Sivarasan
and they eventually became close to each other. In February 1988,
Sivarasan suggested to him to continue his studies at Madras and
LTTE would meet his expenses. Pursuant thereto he came to India in
February 1990 and secured admission at Madras Institute oI
Engineering Technology. His educational expenses were met by
LTTE. |p.31 of Justice Thomass verdict.|
Specific References to Pirabhakaran in the Verdict
The Iollowing speciIic reIerences to Pirabhakaran appeared in Justice
Wadhwa`s verdict. I provide these examples, to substantiate a point
which I note under a later section, Unmentionables in the Verdict` in
this chapter.
'In the night oI 3/4.10.1987 |i.e, Oct.3-4, 1987| when IPKF
convoy was carrying ration it was attacked by LTTE and 11
Indian soldiers were killed. It was the Ilashpoint oI breach
between IPKF and LTTE and active conIrontation between the
two started. Prabhakaran, supreme leader oI LTTE, went
underground.|p. 38 oI the verdict|
'Prabhakaran at one stage even said that it |i.e, LTTE| was
stabbed in the back by agreeing to the accord and had been
betrayed. |p.38 oI the verdict|
'Two volumes oI the book Satanic Force (MO-124 and MO-
125) were published in India at the behest oI LTTE which
contained compilation oI speeches oI Prabhakaran and other
articles and photographs showing the atrocities committed by
IPKF on Tamils in Sri Lanka aIter the Accord and the animosity
which Prabhakaran developed towards Rajiv Gandhi. The book
was compiled by N.Vasantha Kumar (PW-75). He is an artist by
proIession. The printing and publishing oI the book was
authorised and Iinanced by LTTE. It was published in January
1991 and contains inIormation up to March 1990. In his
statement Brig.Vivek Sapatnekar (PW-186), who was earlier in-
charge oI IPKF operations in Sri Lanka, also stated that the
Accord was not having the support oI LTTE. MO-125 (volume 2
oI Satanic Force) contained the news item published in the
Indian Express oI April 1990 which quotes the speech by
Prabhakaran saying that he was against the Iormer leadership in
India and that LTTE was not against India or Indian people.
These two volumes oI Satanic Force contain over 1700 pages.
No article or writing has been pointed out Irom the Satanic Force
Irom which it could be inIerred that it was ever in the
Irom which it could be inIerred that it was ever in the
contemplation oI Prabhakaran or any other Iunctionary oI LTTE
questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity oI India rather
they identiIied Rajiv Gandhi with the Accord and the atrocities
committed by IPKF. |p.39 of the verdict|
'In the writings and articles in the two volumes oI Satanic Force
there were scathing attacks on Shri Rajiv Gandhi, who was
projected as the perpetrator oI the suIIerings oI Tamils in Sri
Lanka by sending IPKF. Prabhakaran when he came out oI his
hiding aIter about two and a halI years he made statement in
April 1990 that he was against the Iormer leadership, Rajiv
Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi stood Ior territorial integrity oI Sri Lanka
and Ior role oI various Tamil organizations in Sri Lanka Ior any
Tamil solution. LTTE on the other hand claimed to be the sole
representative body oI Tamils there. |p.40 of the verdict|
As a reminder, I would like to point out that the prosecution team, in
its Procrustean data-torturing mode and wearing blinders, had
presented the LTTE compilation Satanic Force to support its position
that LTTE had animosity against Rajiv Gandhi. Similar or even worse
level oI animosity against Rajiv Gandhi was existing in the Sinhala
press oI Sri Lanka as well, Irom May 1987 until the day oI his death.
To top it, there was even an assassination attempt |not by LTTE!| on
him in Colombo on July 30, 1987 which was cleanly captured in
camera. Rajiv Gandhi became a saint to the partisan Sri Lankan press,
only Irom May 22, 1991.
To continue, Justice Wadhwa`s observations in page 40 oI his verdict,
'It was on this account, submitted Mr.Natarajan, that there was
conspiracy to eliminate Rajiv Gandhi in order to prevent him
Irom coming back to power. He said LTTE perceived the accord
as object to stop creation oI separate Tamil Elam which went
against the basic objective oI LTTE. Mr.Natarajan said that
motive was not to overawe the Government oI India or to create
terror as was being alleged by the prosecution. Animosity oI
LTTE was only against Rajiv Gandhi who was identiIied with the
Accord. Prabhakaran, the supreme leader oI LTTE, had clearly
stated more than once that he was not against the Indian
Government and the Indian people. |p.40 of the verdict|
Implicating Pirabhakaran through the Confessions of 2
nd
and 3
rd
Accused
The prosecution team had presented conIessions oI 2
nd
Accused
Santhan and 3
rd
Accused Murugan as evidence Ior implicating
Pirabhakaran as one oI the conspirators to the assassination.
Confession of Santhan
According to Justice Wadhwa, 'Santhan (A-2) is a Sri Lankan
national. He knew Sivarasan as they both belonged to same town in
Sri Lanka. According to Santhan (A-2) important decisions like murder
oI anybody could be taken only by Prabhakaran. |p.75 of the
verdict|.
My Comment on Santhan's confession
Santhan`s conIession was taken on Sept.17, 1991 |p.45 of the
verdict|, aIter the death oI Sivarasan. Justice Wadhwa`s speciIic
choice oI words deserve attention. In paraphrasing Santhan`s
conIession, he mentions about, murder of anvbodv and not murder
oI Rajiv Gandhi` in speciIic. Justice Wadhwa also Iails to inIorm
whether Pirabhakaran had speciIically told the 2
nd
accused Santhan
that Rajiv Gandhi would be assassinated. Santhan was identiIied by
him as,
'a Sri Lankan national, in his conIession talks oI his role in the
elimination oI Padmanabhan, EPRLF leader and others in
Madras but that is not the subject matter oI the charge and it is
no terrorist act. Santhan (A-2) was one oI the nine persons, who
came Irom Sri Lanka on a boat arriving at the shore oI India on
1.5.1991 |i.e, May 1, 1991|. His leader was Sivarasan. (pp.
166-167 of the verdict).
The last sentence, His leader was Sivarasan` is also oI interest.
Regarding the mysterious status` oI Sivarasan, I will provide details
released by Ranganath |the 26
th
accused who was acquitted| aIter his
acquittal, in the Iorthcoming Espionage Angle` chapter.
Confession of Murugan
According to Justice Wadhwa`s verdict,
'Murugan (A-3) when asked Sivarasan the reasons Ior killing oI
Rajiv Gandhi he replied that Kasi Anandhan (PW-242) |i.e,
prosecution witness| had met Rajiv Gandhi at Delhi and was told
that the meeting was very cordial there and iI Rajiv Gandhi came
to power he would help LTTE movement. Prabhakaran showed
the letter written by Kasi Anandhan (PW-242) suggesting cordial
relations to Pottu Amman and said that people like Kasi
Anandhan (PW-242) should be removed Irom the movement.
When Sivarasan met Prabhakaran he told him that We must
teach a lesson to Rajiv Gandhi through the girls since IPKF
dishonoured women`. From this Murugan (A-3) understood that
dishonoured women`. From this Murugan (A-3) understood that
decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi was taken by Prabhakaran.
|p.75 of the verdict|
My Comment on Murugan's confession
Murugan`s conIession was recorded by the law enIorcement personnel
on Aug.8, 1991|p.45 of the verdict|. Murugan is identiIied as 'a Sri
Lankan national and a hard-core LTTE activist. He was member oI
the suicide squad oI LTTE which he joined in January 1991. |p. 167
of the verdict|. Even iI one assumes that Murugan was indeed a
member oI the LTTE suicide squad, according to his conIession, he
has not heard directly Irom Pirabhakaran, the LTTE leader, on why
Rajiv Gandhi need to be eliminated. But, Murugan understood that
decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi was taken by Prabhakaran` Irom
Sivarasan`s comment that Pirabhakaran had told him |Sivarasan| that
We must teach a lesson to Rajiv Gandhi through the girls since IPKF
dishonoured women.`
I`m piqued by the interpretation and speciIic meaning by the
prosecution team oI the clause We must teach a lesson`, which had
been uttered by Pirabhakaran. Whether Sivarasan had met
Pirabhakaran has not been proved beyond doubt. Even iI one assumes
that such a meeting would have taken place, it is obvious, that
Pirabhakaran would have naturally spoken to Sivarasan in Tamil
language, and not in English or any other language. I`m not certain
about the Iluency oI Justice Wadhwa in Tamil language, but any native
speaker in Tamil can vouch the clause, teach a lesson` (literal
translation would in all probabilities be, Paadam padippikka vendum)
has a range oI connotations, which need not necessarily mean
assassination`. In my opinion, the validity oI Murugan`s conIession
has some credibility problems indeed.
To support my view, I reproduce an excerpt Irom my column written
under my pen name C.P.Goliard, which appeared in the Tamil Nation
oI June 15, 1992, under the title The Tiger Ban`.
'The May 31
st
issue |i.e, May 31, 1992| oI the India Todav
magazine reported how Prabhakaran`s involvement in the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination has been traced by the Special Investigation
Team (SIT) in India. According to the charge-sheet, the plan to
eliminate the Iormer prime minister was conceived by LTTE
supremo, V.Pirabhakaran, in 1986 when he was detained at
Tamil Nadu House in New Delhi beIore the start oI the SAARC
summit. A telephone conversation between Pirabhakaran and
Anton Balasingham, his political adviser in Madras, which was
taped by the Intelligence Bureau recorded his angry outbursts
taped by the Intelligence Bureau recorded his angry outbursts
against Rajiv Gandhi who, he said, should be Iixed` once he gets
out oI Indian soil.`
What a Ilimsy piece oI evidence Ior the motive attributed to
Prabhakaran`s grouse against Rajiv? II the Intelligence Bureau
had tapped the telephone calls oI all the politicians opposed to
Rajiv Gandhi Irom Kashmir to Kerala, they would have received
adequate angry outbursts against Rajiv Gandhi.
Thus, according to the original charge-sheet prepared by the SIT,
believe it or not, Pirabhakaran had conceived elimination oI Rajiv
Gandhi, well beIore the Indian army landed in Eelam. II so, his
purported quip` to Sivarasan that We must teach a lesson to Rajiv
Gandhi through the girls since IPKF dishonoured women` Irom which
Murugan had understood that the decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi
was taken by Pirabhakaran is somewhat oxymoronic.
Mahathaya Connection in Athirai`s Confession
Justice Wadhwa`s inIormation in p.171 oI his verdict about Athirai, the
8
th
accused, is oI special interest too. Justice Wadhwa had stated,
'Athirai (A-8), a hard core LTTE militant girl, came to India in the last
week oI April 1991 in an LTTE boat Irom Sri Lanka. Athirai (A-8) in
her conIession said that she got specialised training in LTTE camps.
She was assigned the work oI gathering intelligence on the operations
and movements oI Sri Lankan army and other rival organisations like
EPRLF, PLOT, etc. Reports, she prepared, would be handed over by
her to Mathiah, another LTTE leader.
Athirai had made her conIession on Aug.29, 1991 (p.46 of the
verdict). Here is another smoking gun` that the then LTTE deputy
leader, Mahathaya, was intentionally overlooked by the SIT oIIicials,
when charge sheet on Rajiv assassination trial was Iinalized in May
1992.
Verdict of 1ustice Wadhwa
I summarise the verdict oI Justice Wadhwa as Iollows:
(1) 'We acquit Shanti (A-11), Selvaluxmi (A-13) and
Shanmugavadivelu (A-15) oI all charges. Their conviction and
sentence are set aside.
(2) None oI the accused has committed any oIIence under
Section 3, 4 or 5 oI TADA. Their conviction and sentence under
these Sections are set aside.
(3) Conviction and sentence oI the accused except, Nalini (A-1),
Santhan (A-2), Murugan (A-3) and Arivu (A-18) under all other
charges are maintained. Conviction and sentence oI all the
accused under Section 120B IPC read with all other counts as
mentioned in charge No.1 is set aside except conviction oI Nalini
(A-1), Santhan (A-2), Murugan (A-3) and Arivu (A-18) under
Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC.
(4) In view oI these discussions, Shanti (A-11), Selvaluxmi (A-
13) and Shanmugavadivelu (A-15) are to be released Iorthwith.
All other accused except Nalini (A-1), Santhan (A-2), Murugan
(A-3) and Arivu (A-18) would also be entitled to be released
Iorthwith as it was pointed out to us that they have already
undergone imprisonment Ior a period oI more than the sentence
oI imprisonment awarded to them. In case they are not required
to be detained in any other case they shall also be released
Iorthwith.
(5) We conIirm the conviction oI Nalini (A-1), Santhan (A-2),
Murugan (A-3) and Arivu (A-18) under Section 120B read with
Section 302 IPC.
(6) This is a case where all these Nalini (A-1), Santhan (A-2),
Murugan (A-3) and Arivu (A-18) deserve extreme penalty. We
conIirm the award oI sentence oI death on them.
Such a verdict was arrived at by Justice Wadhwa, aIter allowing that
the conIessions made by the accused (1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 8
th
, 9
th
, 10
th
, 12
th
,
15
th
, 16
th
, 17
th
, 18
th
, 19
th
, 20
th
, 21
st
, 23
rd
, 24
th
and 25
th
) Iollowing
their arrests were permissible.
Confessions: a debatable point
Justice Wadhwa, in pp. 47-48 oI his verdict, had included the
Iollowing seven objections made by Mr.N.Natarajan, the leading
deIence counsel who represented all the accused, except 15
th
.
'Mr.Natarajan |said that conIessions oI the accused could not be
taken into consideration. His arguments were:
(1) all these conIessions have been retracted by the accused
having being taken under coercion and under Police inIluence;
(2) suIIicient time was not given to accused beIore recording oI
the conIession. They were given only Iew hours to reIlect iI they
wanted to make any conIession;
(3) under the provisions oI the Code as amended by TADA, the
Police took Iull remand oI the accused Ior 60 days and when a
day or so beIore the remand was to expire the accused were
day or so beIore the remand was to expire the accused were
made to give their conIessions. There is, thus, every possibility oI
the conIessions being extracted. It cannot also be ruled out that
the conIessions were obtained by causing physical harm to the
accused and playing upon their psychology;
(4) conIessions oI Nalini (A-1) and Arivu (A-18) are otherwise
inadmissible as mandatory provisions contained in Sections 15 oI
TADA and Rule 15(3) oI TADA Rules have been violated;
(5) all the accused were kept together in a building called Malagai
|Note: reIerring to Malligai| situated at Green Pass Road, Madras
which were the headquarters oI CBI. Firstly, remand was taken
Ior one month but no conIession came to be recorded. Further
remand oI one month was taken. During this period, Ponamalai
sub-jail was denotiIied as jail and handed over to CBI and
converted into Police Station. All the accused were transIerred
there and again kept together under the control oI special
investigation team oI CBI. Legal principles required that the
accused should have been kept separate and suIIicient time
should have been given to them Ior their minds to reIlect iI they
wanted to make clean breast oI the whole thing;
(6) it is settled law that conIession oI an accused cannot be used
Ior corroboration oI the conIession made by co-accused. The
rule oI prudence so requires; and
(7) all these conIessions are post-arrest conIessions and
conIession oI one accused cannot be used against the other even
with reIerence to Section 10 oI the Evidence Act. It could not be
said that object oI conspiracy was not accomplished by the
assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi and that the conspiracy was still in
existence.
However, Iollowing extensive citation Irom the archives, Justice
Wadhwa asserted that the conIessions oI accused are admissible
evidence`. According to him,
' Admissible` according to Blacks Law Dictionarv means,
pertinent and proper to be considered in reaching a decision.
Used with reIerence to the issues to be decided in any judicial
proceeding.`
It deIines Admissible evidence` as, As applied to evidence, the
term means that the evidence introduced is oI such a character
that the court or judge is bound to receive it; that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial. To be admissible` evidence must be relevant,
and, inter alia, to be relevant` it must tend to establish material
proposition.` II we again reIer to Blacks Law Dictionarv,
proposition.` II we again reIer to Blacks Law Dictionarv,
substantive evidence` means that adduced Ior the purpose oI
proving a Iact in issue, as opposed to evidence given Ior the
purpose oI discrediting a witness (i.e. showing that he is
unworthy oI belieI), or oI corroborating his testimony`.
TADA was enacted to meet extra-ordinary situation existing in
the country. Its departure Irom the law relating to conIession as
contained in Evidence Act is deliberate. Law has to respond to
the reality oI the situation. What is admissible is the evidence.
ConIession oI the accused is admissible with the same Iorce in its
application to the co-accused who is tried in the same case. It is
primary evidence and not corroborative.. |p. 59 of the verdict|
Then, aIter quoting a Iew precedent-setting cases, Justice Wadhwa
inIerred that,
'.we hold the conIessions oI the accused in the present case to
be voluntarily and validly made and under Section 15 oI TADA
conIession oI an accused is admissible against co-accused as a
substantive evidence. Substantive evidence, however, does not
necessarily mean substantial evidence. It is the quality oI
evidence that matters. As to what value is to be attached to a
conIession will Iall within the domain oI appreciation oI evidence.
As a matter oI prudence court may look Ior some corroboration
iI conIession is to be used against a co-accused though that will
again be with the sphere oI appraisal oI evidence. |pp.60-61 of
the verdict|
Next 77 pages oI Justice Wadhwa`s verdict, Irom page 61 to page 137,
described in detail the conIessions oI the accused and the 'evidence
linking the accused with each other as projected by the prosecution.
Then, Justice Wadhwa had summarized the stand oI the leading
deIence counsel, as Iollows:
'Mr.Natarajan said that there was no evidence against any oI the
accused to bring home charge either under Section 3 or Section 4
oI TADA, yet the prosecution wrongly alleged that there was
conspiracy to commit acts oI terrorism and disruptive activities
under TADA and in that process Rajiv Gandhi was killed. He
said apart Irom the killing oI Rajiv Gandhi no other terrorist act
had been shown to have been committed or disruptive activity
shown to have been committed. There is no such act till May
1991 though the prosecution has alleged the period oI conspiracy
being 1987 to 1992. Killing oI Rajiv Gandhi could not be a
terrorist act under Section 3 oI TADA. Also there is no disruptive
activity Ialling under Section 4 oI TADA.. |p. 138 of the
activity Ialling under Section 4 oI TADA.. |p. 138 of the
verdict|
Observation of 1ustice Wadhwa on terrorism
Justice Wadhwa, in page 140 oI his verdict, had inIerred,
'Mr.Natarajan, in our view, is right in his submission that no case
under Section 4 oI TADA has been made out in the case.
Under Section 3 oI TADA in order there is a terrorist act three
essential conditions must be present and these are contained in
sub-section (1) oI Section 3 (1) criminal activity must be
committed with the requisite intention or motive, (2) weapons
must have been used, and (3) consequence must have ensued. It
was contended by Mr. Natarajan that in the present case though
the evidence may show the weapons and consequence as
contemplated by Section 3(1) is there it is lacking so Iar as the
intention is concerned. Prosecution had to prove that the act was
done with the intention to over-awe the Government or to strike
terror in people or any section oI people or to adversely aIIect the
harmony amongst diIIerent sections oI people. There is no
evidence that any oI the accused had such an intention.
Political Cant On Pirabhakaran
In page 143 oI his verdict, Justice Wadhwa, while reiterating that none
oI the accused under trial had any terrorizing intention, added
tangentially his bit oI political cant on Pirabhakaran as well.
'In the present case, . we do not Iind any diIIiculty in
concluding that evidence does not reIlect that any oI the accused
entertained any such intention or had any oI the motive to
overawe the Government or to strike terror among people. No
doubt evidence is there that the absconding accused Prabhakaran,
supreme leader oI LTTE had personal animosity against Rajiv
Gandhi and LTTE cadre developed hatred towards Rajiv Gandhi,
who was identiIied with the atrocities allegedly committed by
IPKF in Sri Lanka. |Note bv me: the speciIic use oI the word,
allegedly` is a pointer to the political cant. II IPKF did not
commit atrocities, how come nearly 6,000 non-combatant Eelam
Tamils died between Oct.1987 and March 1990? | There was no
conspiracy to the indiscriminate killing oI persons. There is no
evidence directly or circumstantially that Rajiv Gandhi was killed
with the intention contemplated under Section 3(1) oI TADA.
State oI Tamil Nadu was notiIied under TADA on 23.6.1991 |i.e,
June 23, 1991| and LTTE was declared an unlawIul association
on 14.5.1992 |i.e, May 14, 1992| under the provisions oI the
UnlawIul Activity (Prevention) Act, 1957. Apart Irom killing oI
UnlawIul Activity (Prevention) Act, 1957. Apart Irom killing oI
Rajiv Gandhi no other terrorist act has been alleged in the State
oI Tamil Nadu. Charge may be there but there is no evidence to
support the charge... Mr.Natarajan said it was the case oI the
prosecution itselI that Prabhakaran had personal animosity
against Rajiv Gandhi developed over a period oI time and had
motive to kill him.
On the prosecution team`s difficulty in proving the charges under
TADA
Justice Wadhwa then observed the diIIiculty Iaced by the prosecution
team in proving the charges under TADA. To quote,
'Mr.AltaI Ahmad |the Additional Solicitor General, leading the
prosecution team| realised the diIIiculty he had to Iace to show that
any oIIence under Sections 3 and/or 4 oI TADA had been committed.
He submitted that charges in the present case showed the dimension oI
the conspiracy and the nature oI the crime committed on 21.5.1991
|i.e, May 21, 1991|. He said the object oI the conspiracy was to
commit terrorist act and use oI bomb, etc. was the means to achieve
that object and that the consequence was to overawe the Government
and to create terror in the minds oI the public and it was with that
object that Rajiv Gandhi and others were killed. He said object oI the
conspiracy was not accomplished on the killing oI Rajiv Gandhi but it
continued even aIter his death as LTTE targeted places and persons
spread across the country. There is no evidence that blasting oI the
buildings like Vellore Fort, police headquarters, was the object oI
conspiracy or that was to be done with intention to overawe the
Government or to create terror among the public. Charge does not
speciIy any such intention or the places. Similar is the position
regarding unspeciIied targets in Delhi. According to him conspiracy
was not abandoned and did not culminate with the assassination oI
Rajiv Gandhi though the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi overshadowed
other activities.
Mr.AltaI Ahmad said that though the approach oI the Designated
Court may have been diIIerent in construing the charge and it
may not accord with the submissions made now beIore us and iI
we construe the charge oI our own it is that the accused had
committed a terrorist act on the soil oI India and in the course oI
that killed Rajiv Gandhi in order to overawe the Government
established by law not to pursue the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. It
was, however, not suggested as to what inquiry or additional
evidence is contemplated by the prosecution. From the arguments
oI Mr.AltaI Ahmad it would appear that he is seeking amendment
oI Mr.AltaI Ahmad it would appear that he is seeking amendment
oI the charge and iI that is done it would require additional
evidence or even retrial may have to be ordered. We do not think
we should adopt any such course.|pp.143-144 of the verdict|
Overturning the judgment of the Designated Court delivered in
1an.28, 1998
In pages 146-148, Justice Wadhwa presented his verdict, overturning
the judgment oI the Designated Court, on the main charge |i.e, 3(3)
and/or 3(4) oI TADA| against all the 26 accused. Though
Pirabhakaran was not under trial, his name also received mention in
some sentences. Thus, I present the complete verdict, though lengthy,
without abridgment. As one would expect, it certainly was tinged with
political Ilavor (probably as a sop to the prosecution team), though the
learned judge was negating the arguments oI prosecution as
unacceptable. But, this is expected, since as I pointed out in a previous
chapter |see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 28|, that the
justice scale in current India is tainted with politicization, corruption
and system overload. To quote Justice Wadhwa |with italics added bv
me, Ior emphasis.|,
'Prosecution case now made out beIore us is that the object oI
conspiracy was to commit terrorist acts during the period 1987 to
1992; that the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi was one oI such acts
with the intention to overawe the Government and to strike
terror; and the assassination was an act which struck terror and
was also a disruptive activity. As to how it was intended to
overawe the Government it was submitted that it was on account
oI Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which the Government oI India was
to honour and that did not suit the aspirations oI LTTE and thus
the conspiracy was hatched to eliminate the person who was the
author oI the Accord and to threaten the successive Governments
not to Iollow the Accord, otherwise that Government would also
meet the same Iate. But then, as noted above that there was a
conspiracy to overawe the Government is nowhere in the charge.
Though it could be said that terror was struck bv assassination
of Rafiv Gandhi but the question is if striking of terror was
intended and for that again there is no evidence. Apart Irom the
assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi no other act which could be termed
as terrorist act has been suggested.
The Designated Court in its impugned judgment does record any
such argument now advanced beIore us. There is no discussion
in the judgment and there is no evidence to which judgment
reIers to hold that there was any terrorist act intended to overawe
the Government or to strike terror. The Designated Court has
the Government or to strike terror. The Designated Court has
clearly held that on the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi object oI
conspiracy was successIully accomplished. Even if thus
examining the proceedings in reference to our decision has to
be made on the basis of evidence on record. When there is no
evidence inference cannot be drawn that act of killing of Rafiv
Gandhi was to overawe the Government. Even though there is
no bar to the examination oI the accused under Section 313 oI
the Code by this Court in these proceedings but then what is
required to be put to the accused is to enable him to personally
explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him
and when there is no evidence, there is no necessity to examine
the accused at this stage as that would be a Iutile exercise. When
the prosecution during the course of the trial, which lasted over
a number of vears, had taken the stand that killing of Rafiv
Gandhi was a terrorist act, it cannot now turn about and sav
that killing itself was not a terrorist act but was committed to
achieve the obfect of conspiracv which was to overawe the
Government. As a matter of fact in the statement of Kasi
Anandhan (PW-242), who was a member of the Central
Committee of LTTE, it has come on record that he met Rafiv
Gandhi in March 1991 when Rafiv Gandhi supported the stand
of LTTE and had admitted that it was his mistake in sending
IPKF to Sri Lanka and wanted LTTE to go ahead with its
agitation. That being the evidence brought on record bv the
prosecution there is no question of it now contending that there
was conspiracv to overawe the Government. Its stand throughout
has been that it was the personal motive oI Prabhakaran and
others to commit terrorist act by killing Rajiv Gandhi. Under
Section 3(1) oI TADA overawing the Government cannot be the
consequence but it has to be the primary object. There is nothing
on record to show that the intention to kill Rafiv Gandhi was to
overawe the Government. ReIerence to the Indo-Sri Lankan
Accord is merely by way oI narration.
Support to the struggle oI LTTE in Sri Lanka was Irom Tamil
Nadu and it does not appeal to reason that LTTE would commit
any act to overawe the Government. It is matter oI common
knowledge that all terrorist acts are publicized and highlighted
which is Iundamental to terrorism. Whenever a terrorist act is
committed some organisation or the other comes Iorward to
claim responsibility Ior that. In the present case LTTE tried to
conceal the fact that it was behind the murder of Rafiv Gandhi.
The object to assassinate was kept a closely guarded secret.
Then, Justice Wadhwa reIers to the two wireless messages transmitted
by Sivarasan to Pottu Amman (dated May 7, 1991, which is denoted
as Exhibit Ior Prosecution - 392) and by Pottu Amman to Sivarasan
(dated May 22, 1991, which is denoted as Exhibit Ior Prosecution
396). Then, Justice Wadhwa reIers to two letters oI Subha and Dhanu
to Akila and Pottu Amman (dated May 9, 1991), and another letter by
Trichy Santhan (deceased accused) to Pirabhakaran (dated Sept.7,
1991, which is denoted as Exhibit Ior Prosecution-129). It appears that
basically, these two wireless messages and three letters where in every
one oI them either the receiving party or sending party has died seems
the submitted documentary evidence by prosecution to implicate
LTTE and Pirabhakaran in the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi.
Justice Wadhwa continued Iurther,
'We accept the argument oI Mr. Natarajan that terrorism is
synonymous with publicity and it was sheer personal animosity oI
Prabhakaran and other LTTE cadre developed against Rajiv
Gandhi which resulted in his assassination. LTTE would not do
any act to overawe the Government in Tamil Nadu or in the
Centre as otherwise their activities in this country in support oI
their struggle in Sri Lanka would have been seriously hampered.
Charge oI disruptive activities under Section 4(3) oI TADA is
against Nalini (A-1) and Arivu (A-18). There is no charge under
Section 3(3) oI TADA against Rangan (A-24), Vicky (A-25) and
Ranganath (A-26). They are charged under Section 3(4) oI
TADA. Charge under Section 3(3) is against A-1 to A-23. II we
examine one such charge, say charge No.235 against A-21 which
says that she in pursuance to the criminal conspiracy reIerred to
in charge No.1 and in course oI same transaction during the
period between January 91 and June 91 at Madras and other
place in Tamil Nadu she had actively associated with and assisted
other conspirators Ior carrying out the object oI criminal
conspiracy and thus she knowingly Iacilitated the commission oI
terrorist act or any act preparatory to terrorist act and which was
committing the terrorist act by detonating the improvised
explosive device concealed in waist belt oI Dhanu and thereby A-
21 committed an oIIence punishable under Section 3(3) oI
TADA. |Note bv me: This lengthy sentence exceeding 100 words,
though Iull oI legalese is humorous indeed, where Justice
Wadhwa exposed the Iallacy oI the prosecution team`s main
argument.|
Designated Court held that hatred which developed in the minds
|sic'| oI Prabhakaran, Iurther developed into animosity against
Rajiv Gandhi in view oI the events which took place aIter IPKF
was inducted in Sri Lanka.
Thus examining the whole aspect of the matter we are of the
opinion that no offense either under Sections 3 or 4 of TADA
has been committed. Since we hold that there is no terrorist act
and no disruptive activitv under Sections 3 and 4 of TADA,
charges under Section 3(3), 3(4) and 4(3) of TADA must also
fail against all the accused.
Unmentionables in the Verdict
Though the verdict oI Justice Wadhwa is 201-pages long, what
intrigued me was the scarcity oI the details (other than the role played
by 18
th
accused Arivu in purchasing the batteries Ior the belt bomb
worn by Dhanu) related to the Iorensic science component oI the
assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi, and the associated suicide oI assassin
Dhanu. However, Justice Wadhwa had identiIied by names the
medical oIIicers who conducted postmortem on the victims oI May
21, 1991 tragedy and the deceased accused in August 1991. Also,
Justice Wadhwa has cavalierly dismissed the arrangements made by
the Congress Party organizers to bring Rajiv Gandhi to
Sriperumbudur, with a statement, ~We are not concerned with the
tour programme of Rajiv Gandhi and the security arrangements
made for him. |p.61 of the verdict| One may pause a minute to
think, why this disregard oI the details oI Rajiv Gandhi`s Iinal 24 hours
oI liIe was made by the guardians oI justice, while analyzing all the
developments relating to LTTE, which occurred in Eelam and Tamil
Nadu aIter the signing oI Indo-Sri Lankan Accord oI 1987. Could it be
that some political operatives belonging to the Congress Party had to
be protected Irom the manacles oI law? Or could it be, that the real
conspirators to the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi deserved an escape
route. (Continued)

Part 31
Sachi Sri Kantha
12 1anuary 2002]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: 1igsaw puzzles
in the judicial angle
In the Computer Age we still live bv the law of the Stone Age.
the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isnt
so. We dont notice or even suspect it whv, surelv our moralitv
progresses together with our civili:ation. Professional
politicians, meanwhile, have deftlv covered certain vices with a
civili:ed veneer.`
- Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, in his 1997 essay Hypocrisy Today`
|Dailv Yomiuri, Aug.7, 1997|
Front Note
Contrary to the previous 30 chapters, this chapter and the Iorthcoming
chapter on the espionage angle oI Rajiv Gandhi assassination do not
contain any direct inIormation on Pirabhakaran. But this does not
mean that the inIormation provided in these chapters are irrelevant to
the theme oI Pirabhakaran Phenomenon.
Anti-Pirabhakaran literature generated by halI-baked analysts (which
includes books by Rohan Gunaratna and commentaries by the
journalists representing the Chicken Little Circuit` Irom Chennai)
beIore May 1999 portray an erroneous view that Pirabhakaran had
killed Rajiv Gandhi. This was strongly based on conjectures and the
news releases Irom the Indian Intelligence agencies. But the presented
evidence by the prosecution team at the assassination trial (as
indicated in the Supreme Court verdicts of Justice Wadhwa, Justice
Thomas and Justice Quadri) shows conspicuous lack oI solid
inIormation linking Pirabhakaran to the assassination. Thus, some oI
the chapters dealing with Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination have to be
without any inIormation on Pirabhakaran.
Defence Lawyer Duraisamy`s Interview
Now that I have presented my analysis on the Supreme Court appeal
verdicts delivered by Justice Quadri, Justice Thomas and Justice
Wadhwa (see, The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon parts 28, 29 and 30),
it is more than appropriate to study the impressions oI deIence lawyer
S.Duraisamy on the Iinal verdict delivered in 1999 almost 8 years
aIter the tragic event.
Duraisamy became the Bill Kunstler oI Tamil Nadu. For those who
don`t know, Bill Kunstler was the Jewish-American attorney who
appeared Ior harassed innocents` (which included Martin Luther King
Jr., Chicago Seven etc.) and gained victories in court against all odds.
Luckily, Duraisamy`s impressions are available Irom an illuminating
interview he granted to A.G.Nadar Ior the RediII On the Net website
and presented on October 13, 1999. It deserves reading (since he
knew better on what aspects were ignored by the adjudicators oI
justice) and I reproduce it below.
The introduction oI Duraisamy mentions,
'.Typical, you can say, oI the man who saw the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination accused in a diIIerent light. When the world
condemned them, Duraisamy was among the Iew who
sympathized at their plight. Unshaken bv a frightening vollev of
hate mail and threats, he stood his ground to defend what
seemed indefensible then. And succeeded. Bv snatching life for
22 of the 26 accused from the faws of death. 19 acquitted and
the sentence of three reduced to life. |Italics added Ior emphasis
by me.| In his modest apartment in Madras, the soIt-spoken
lawyer spoke to A.G.Nadar about his deIence.
Note of explanation: the italics within parentheses are as in the original
interview. Other descriptions within parentheses have been added by
me, Ior clariIication purposes.
Q. Since when vou have been practising law?
A: 1970.
Q. You have alwavs been a criminal defence lawver?
A: Yes.
Q. When did vou become a member of the Dravida Ka:hagam?
A: Since my school days I have been a Iollower oI Periyar
|E.J.Ramasamv Naicker, founder of the Dravida movement|.
Even today I am a Iollower. We have Iormed a separate party
Even today I am a Iollower. We have Iormed a separate party
called Periyar Dravida Kazhagam three years back.
Q. When did vou get involved with the Sri Lanka Tamil issue?
A: Since the issue started we have been involved in it 1983.
AIter the massacres in the northern parts, around JaIIna, all oI
India sympathised with them. We in the Dravida Kazhagam
supported them wholeheartedly.
Q. Before this case [i.e, Rafiv assassination trial], have vou
handled anvthing that involved so much publicitv?
A: During the Emergency |oI 1975-77| there were a lot oI
excesses in jail. I was in jail Ior a year under the MISA
|Maintenance of Internal Securitv Act|. People were tortured,
some were beaten to death. AIter the Emergency a commission
was appointed under Justice Ismail. I represented the victims. We
examined the prison oIIicials, jailers and superintendents. From
their mouth I was able to get the answer that they had exceeded
their authority. That was my Iirst brush with the government.
Q. And then this case.
A: Yes!
Q. When the court sentenced the accused to die, were vou
disappointed?
A: OI course, I was disappointed. The outcome oI the arguments
looked like they were in our Iavour. They should have been
acquitted there |bv the trial court| itselI. Even the Supreme
Court judgment shocked me. I don` think they will hang Iour oI
them. There is no evidence at all.
Q. Do vou expect all of them to be acquitted?
A: DeIinitely. They have not committed any oIIence at all.
Q. Not committed anv offence at all, or not committed anv
offence that can be proved in court?
A: They have not committed any oIIence.
Q. You believe that.
A: Yes!
Q. What were thev doing in Sriperumbudur?
A: Sivarasan and the others?
Q. Yes.
A: They committed |the crime|. These people are innocent.
Q. So vou are not talking about the LTTE. Onlv these accused.
A: Yes! Only these.
Q. You pleaded in the trial court and then vou pleaded in the
Supreme Court. Thev have handed death sentences to four of
vour clients.
A: The Terrorist and Disruptive (Prevention) Act expired in
1996. Now the Supreme Court itselI has said that in this case
TADA is not applicable. They have acquitted the charges under
TADA. Then the proceedings in the TADA court have to go.
The court says there is no terrorist activity in Rajiv Gandhi`s
case. II there is no terrorist activity, then the TADA court has no
jurisdiction. So the proceedings in the TADA court will not be
applicable in this case.
The case has to be reopened. Statements and conIessions
recorded under TADA cannot be, should not be, considered.
When you take away those statements and the conIessions, there
is no case at all. There is no evidence.
Q. You mean thev have to be tried bv a regular court now.
A: Only then should it be relied upon.
Q. What about the photographs retrieved from the dead
photographers camera?
A: Sivarasan, Subha and Dhanu were seen there. We are not
denying that.
Q. Even Nalini was there.
A: We are not denying that. Other than Nalini, there were
thousands oI people there. |now Tamil Rafiv Congress leader|
Vazhapadi |Ramamurthv| was there. |now Tamil Maanila
Congress leader| Karuppaiah Moopanar was there.
Q. Thev were Indians involved in the election campaign. Not
Sri Lankans, who has nothing to do with the election.
A: Nalini is an Indian.
Q. The other three? |reIerring to Sivarasan, Dhanu and Subha|
A: The other three came only Ior killing Rajiv Gandhi.
Q. Not these four accused?
A: No! Not these Iour accused. None oI them were there.
Q. Thev were elsewhere?
A: They were elsewhere. Actually, at that time according to the
police, Perarivalan |18
th
accused| was seeing a cinema at the
Devi theatre.
Q. So vour entire argument is that because the Supreme Court
did not uphold the TADA act in this case, the entire case
becomes invalid?
A: Not only that. There are other certain points.
Q. Please tell us.
A: There are so many contradictory statements in the conIession.
According to one, Sivarasan was taken to Bangalore Irom
Madras on 28
th
June and he was leIt in Bangalore on the 29
th
morning.
Q. Inside a petrol tanker?
A: Yes. This is in the conIession statement oI three accused.
Another statement says that on the 30
th
oI June, Sivarasan asked
Santhan to come over to the Ashok Nagar cinema theatre. They
were staying with a party in Madras. Now which conIession has
to be relied on? The court says we believe both conIessions. This
is not proper or possible. Like this there are so many
contradictions.
Q. There is Ranganath, vour client, coming out with stories that
the Special Investigation Teams D.R.Kartikevan savs he never
told him. In one of the affidavits before the Jain Commission he
had said the same thing. Also, in one of vour petitions before
the trial court, he gave the same facts.
the trial court, he gave the same facts.
A: In this case we used the statement because Ranganath`s
statement said only about this case.
Q. Apart from the LTTE, is there somebodv else involved?
A: Already he has said that in an aIIidavit to the Jain Commission
when he was in Poonamalle jail. We have Iiled many petitions
too. Now he is revealing it to the press that Chandra Swami and
others are involved. We do not know why the Jain Commission
didn`t act.
Q. The Jain Commission did not sav anvthing. It is Karthikevan
who is denving it now.
A: Even beIore, they were told that Sivarasan used to talk about
Chandra Swami and help Irom some other quarters in Delhi.
They were threatened by the investigating authorities and beaten
up by the police. He has lost his Iront teeth because oI that.
Q. Does it look like thev were protecting somebodv?
A: They want to throw the whole accusation against the LTTE
only. They don`t want to see anything beyond that.
Q. Internationallv, did somebodv finance the LTTE?
A: We do not know iI the LTTE was Iinanced or where they
picked up the people. They could have been engaged by the real
conspirators, oI course. That part we do not know.
Q. There are rumours that the LTTE is targeting Sonia Gandhi.
Is there anv substance to it?
A: Even the Supreme Court says the LTTE must have known
that iI they kill an Indian leader in India they will lose support oI
the people. Can we expect that at this stage they will do
something like that? It is a rumour started by the CBI or some
others who are Irustrated because they lost in the Supreme
Court.
Q. Rafiv Gandhi was killed. Seventeen others died. You feel vou
did fustice bv defending the accused?
A: OI course, I Ieel sorry. The real culprits should be punished.
Q. Not these people.
A: DeIinitely not.
Q. What was the public reaction like when vou took up this
case?
A: Everybody was aIraid. All the advocates were scared. I did
not Iind any reason not to appear Ior them. The public reaction
was against me. There were so many threatening calls.
Congressmen attacked my oIIice, my house. Even then I did not
ask Ior protection. Even now I do not ask Ior protection. I
thought I will appear Ior the innocent. I have to deIend the
innocent.
Q. Guiltv or innocent, evervbodv deserves a lawver. What about
vour wife and children? Your child must have been in school
then.
A: My Iamily was proud oI me.
Q. Thev supported vou. So are all the people in vour house
members of the Dravida Ka:hagam?
A: |Laughs|
Q. Do vou think this case will affect vour future?
A: Yes! DeIinitely.
Q. All the wrong cases will come to vou.
A: Wrong cases or right cases, rowdies and goondas will not
come to me. This kind oI political cases will come. In the RSS
oIIice bomb blasts, I am deIending some oI the accused.
Q. We heard that P.Nedumaran of the Tamil Desiva Ivakam
collected Rs. 3.4 crore [Rs.34 million] for this case. How come
vou are living in this house?
A: |Laughs| We did not collect so much. OI course, we had to
spend a lot oI money. The deIence consists oI a team oI lawyers.
We had to stay in Delhi.
Q. For that vou got people. Juniors and seniors?
A: Yes.
Q. So nobodv wanted to be the main defence counsel, but thev
didnt mind assisting vou.
A: AIter two or three years everybody was willing to come out
openly.
Q. Who is the senior advocate in Delhi?
A: N.Natarajan.
Q. Anvthing vou would like to tell us?
A: No. |source: the website oI RediII on the Net, accessed on
Nov.9, 2001|
Justice Wadhwa, towards the end oI his lengthy verdict had identiIied
the other lawyers oI the deIence team as Iollows:
'Mr.Natarajan, senior advocate, led the team Ior all the accused
except one. He was ably assisted by Mr.Sunder Mohan,
Mr.B.Gopikrishnan, Mr.S.Duraisamy, Mr.V.Elangovan,
Mr.N.Chandrasekharan, Mr.T.Ramdass and Mr.R.Jayaseelan. A
heavy burden lay on the shoulders oI Mr.Natarajan. He carried it
with aplomb. His presentation oI the case showed his complete
mastery on Iacts and law. It was a pleasure to hear him, not
losing his poise even Ior once. He was Iair in his submissions
conceding where it was unnecessary to contest. Mr.Siva
Subramanium, senior advocate assisted by Mr.Thanan, who
represented the remaining one accused, rendered his bit to
support Mr.Natarajan. |p.201 of the verdict|
I mention that Mr. Siva Subramanium appeared Ior
Shanmugavadivelu, the 15
th
accused. In his interview, the deIense
lawyer Duraisamy pointed out only one example oI the contradiction,
with an added note, 'Like this, there are so many contradictions.
Having studied the verdicts oI Justice Wadhwa and Justice Thomas, I
present below two contradictions (relating to the arrest records oI
accused Ravi and Nalini) which puzzles me.
Contradiction 1: Puzzling arrest records of Ravi, the 16
th
Accused
Ravi, the 16
th
accused was identiIied as an Indian citizen. First I quote
directly Irom the verdicts oI Justice Wadhwa and Justice Thomas.
Within parenthesis oI each cited date, I cite the appropriate date with
month noted in alphabetical Iorm in italics.
'Ravi (A-16), Suseendran (A-17), Sivarasan, Subha, Kanthan
and Murugesan collected at the seashore to take a boat Ior Sri
and Murugesan collected at the seashore to take a boat Ior Sri
Lanka. That was 10.6.1991 |i.e, June 10, 1991|. A message
was, however received that the boat got hit in the sea near JaIIna
and all 11 persons who were coming to India died. |p.108 of
Wadhwas verdict|
'In his conIession Ravi (A-16) had shown his various attempts
Ior him and others to leave the country and his being in constant
touch with Pottu Amman through wireless set installed at
Dindigul. On 28.7.1991 |i.e, Julv 28, 1991|, Ravi (A-16) along
with Kanthan and Ramanan went to Sri Lanka and met Pottu
Amman. |p.109 of Wadhwas verdict|
'Ultimately Ravi (A-16) stated that he returned to India. He leIt
Sri Lanka on 10.8.1991 |i.e, Aug.10, 1991| with various
weapons, 12 gold biscuits and 15 code sheets. |p.109 of
Wadhwas verdict|
'On 21.8.1991 |i.e, Aug.21, 1991| Ravi (A-16) was arrested by
the police. |p.109 of Wadhwas verdict|
'In the conIession made on 12.12.1991 |i.e, Dec.12, 1991| by
Ravi (A-16) in that case, he said as under:. Then he again went
to Sri Lanka on 23.8.1991 |i.e, Aug.23, 1991| when boat arrived
Irom there. Suseendran (A-17) did not accompany him. He met
Pottu Amman on 28.8.1991 |i.e,Aug.28, 1991|. He gave him
Iurther arms and ammunition and also 12 gold biscuits weighing
10 tolas each. He returned to India on 10.9.1991 |i.e, Sept.10,
1991|.He was arrested on 23.10.1991 |i.e, Oct.23, 1991|
|pp.183-184 of Wadhwas verdict|
However, Justice Thomas in his verdict, makes Ravi as a Sri Lankan
citizen, and records that, 'A-16 (Ravichandran) is a Sri Lankan citizen.
He was arrested on 20-10-1991 |i.e, Oct.20, 1991| in connection with
Rajiv Gandhi murder case. |p.49 of Thomass verdict|. The
diIIerence in this arrest date, Oct.20 or Oct.23, 1991, could be a
legitimate clerical error. But, the table providing the dates oI arrest,
conIession and nationality in Justice Wadhwa`s verdict, state,
'nationality Indian; date oI arrest 6.1.92 |i.e, Jan.6, 1992|; date
oI conIession 14.2.92 |i.e, Feb.14, 1992|. |pp.45-46 of
Wadhwas verdict|.
II these dates are to be believed, Jan.6, 1992 arrest was Ravi`s third
arrest!
To chronologically recapitulate this messy schedule underwent by
Ravi, the 16
th
accused: he leIt Sri Lanka on Aug.10, 1991. He was
Iirst arrested on Aug.21, 1991. Then, he went to Sri Lanka on Aug.23,
1991. He returned to India on Sept.10, 1991. He was arrested Ior the
second time (?) on Oct.20, 1991 |according to Justice Thomas| or
Oct.23, 1991 |according to Justice Wadhwa|. He made a conIession
on Dec.12, 1991.
Then, Ravi was arrested again on Jan.6, 1992. He made a second
conIession on Feb.14, 1992.
My opinion on Ravi`s arrest record
This postulation is derived Irom the travel records, as culled Irom the
verdict oI Justice Wadhwa. One wonders whether Ravi was released
on bail after his first arrest on Aug.21, 1991? If not, how come he
could move to Sri Lanka two davs later on Aug.23, 1991? These two
dates have some significance. Sivarasan, Subha and Iive other
associates were reported committing suicide in Bangalore on Aug.20,
1991 |see below, the statement oI S.B.Chavan, the then Minister oI
Home AIIairs, in Lok Sabha on Aug.21, 1991|. Assuming Ravi was
arrested on the Iollowing day, one can even postulate whether he was
used by the Indian Intelligence wallahs as a reluctant mole` to receive
intelligence` about the activities oI LTTE leadership in JaIIna. Thus,
he could have been requested to travel to JaIIna (with that purpose) on
Aug.23, 1991, Iollowing his Iirst arrest. Then, aIter Ravi`s return to
India on Sept.10, 1991, he was arrested Ior the second time on Oct.20
or Oct.23, 1991. This postulation mav become credible (I repeat,
credible), if the dates of Ravis arrest recorded in the verdict of
Justice Wadhwa are indeed true.
Contradiction 2: Puzzling arrest record of Nalini, the 1
st
accused
Justice Wadhwa`s descriptions on the arrest record oI Nalini in one
page oI his verdict also contradict his own inIormation presented in
two other pages oI his verdict.
In page 73 oI his verdict, Justice Wadhwa has glaringly written as
Iollows:
'There is a wireless message dated 12.6.1991 |i.e, June 12,
1991| sent by Sivarasan Irom Wireless Station 910 to Station 91
oI Pottu Amman which reads the brother oI oIIicer-girl, her
mother were arrested`. ReIerence to oIIice-girl is to Nalini (A-
1).
But Iour pages beIore that, in page 69, Justice Wadhwa has noted in
one sentence,
'It was on 14.6.1991 |i.e, June 14, 1991| when they |reIerring to
Nalini and Murugan| at Saidapet bus stand, Madras they were
arrested.
This inIormation corroborates with the inIormation he has provided in
the table oI arrest and conIession record, in page 45, where it is
recorded the date oI arrest Ior Nalini was 14.6.91 |i.e, June 14, 1991|.
My opinion on Nalini`s arrest record:
If information provided in page 45 and page 69 of Justice Wadhwas
verdict is correct, Nalini was arrested on June 14, 1991. Then, the
purported wireless message dated 12.6.1991 sent bv Sivarasan from
Wireless Station 910 to Pottu Amman in Station 91 has to be a fake.
This purported message itselI reads, the brother oI oIIicer-girl, her
mother were arrested` and Justice Wadhwa had annotated that
'reIerence to oIIice-girl is to Nalini (A-1). Isn`t it Iunny?
II the supreme court verdict itselI is riddled with such consequential
contradictions (unattributable to clerical error, which abounds in the
spelling oI names), what conIidence one could have in the submitted
conIessions oI accused and the recorded evidence during the hearing
oI the trial. My proposal is that, it becomes imperative that the
impressions oI deIence lawyer Duraisamy on the contradictions which
existed in Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial deserve to be recorded in Iull
Ior posterity |in whatever means available such as videotape, audio
tape, transcribed book| beIore his memory Iails.
Untouched 1ig-saw Puzzles
(1) Unusual Death of Shanmugam
II Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial, prosecuted by the SIT personnel
with their Procrustean data-torturing mindset, is Iull oI mysteries, the
disappearance and unusual death oI one oI the deceased accused
N.Shanmugam, aged 40, on the night oI July 19, 1991 deserves an
exceptional ranking. This tragedy occurred beIore the reported suicides
oI Sivarasan and Subha in Bangalore. In the original charge sheet
prepared by the SIT in May 1992, Shanmugam was listed as the 35
th
accused. According to this charge sheet,
'Shanmugam (A-35) with long association with LTTE help to
smuggle arms and explosives between JaIIna and Kodiakkarai. In
smuggle arms and explosives between JaIIna and Kodiakkarai. In
the area around his house he had got buried under the sand 121
cases oI high explosives, wireless communication equipment and
petrol in cans Ior the use oI the conspirators. He arranged Ior the
reception oI the group oI nine persons and other and actively
assisted them in carrying out the object oI the conspiracy. When
he was arrested and recoveries oI the aIoresaid materials were
eIIected at his instance, he escaped Irom custody and committed
suicide. |source: Lanka Guardian, Nov.1, 1992, pp.21-22|
Some kind oI suicide that should have been! Facts pertaining to the
unusual death oI Shanmugam remain hidden. But, Ior record, I would
like to reproduce the impressions expressed by some oI the Indian
MPs in the Iloor oI Lok Sabha, ten days Iollowing this unusual death.
Though every one oI them had their own perceptions and biases
(Some criticising LTTE Ior their activities in the Indian soil), in
retrospect, one can judge that in totality they doubted the credibility oI
the law enIorcement personnel in India, even before the SIT prepared
the original charge-sheet for the Rafiv assassination trial. I provide
excerpts Irom the speeches made by Iour Tamil Nadu MPs in Lok
Sabha on July 29, 1991. Among the Iour, Thangkabalu, Padma and
Tindivanam Ramamurthee belonged to the Congress Party and Raja
Ravivarma was Irom the Anna DMK Party.
Shri.K.J.1hangkabalu (representing Dharmapuri)
'.Today`s discussion is pertaining to the incident which had
taken place in Tamil Nadu. We know that there was an
announcement oI the CBI`s investigation particularly under the
dynamic leadership oI Shri Kartikeyan, a well-known disciplined
and outstanding oIIicer oI the police cadre. AIter his induction
and stewardship, we heard and we are also knowing that
eIIective steps are taken to get the culprits oI the |Rajiv Gandhi|
assassination. What was surprising Madam, with regard to
Shanmugam`s case is that, as many honourable colleague also
has said, a person was in police custody and he was allowed to
go out and the next morning, he was seen hanging near the guest
house where he was interrogated. This is a strange incident.
Madam, I would ask the hon. Home Minister as to how was it
possible Ior him to escape. We want to know whether the
oIIicers who were involved in this incident belong to the CBI or
the State Police. Under whose custody was he able to go out oI
the tourist bungalow?
Secondly, the police and the CBI version say, that in the next 24
hours, they were searching Ior him. He had escaped and they
were searching him. Who was on the search? Who is responsible
Ior this and what was their responsibility? And they are saying
that the next morning, he was Iound hanging near the same
premises oI 50 meters.
This is not only mysterious but the people who were having lot oI
hope in the CBI are now losing hope. That very hope is
destroyed. I would like to know whether such kind oI oIIicers
who were involved in the incident are a party to the conspirators
or the persons who made Shanmugam to be killed. Who was the
real instrumental behind this scenario? This is to be Iound out.
Madam, another point is that, which appeared in the press,
Shanmugam was supposed to go out oI the house to wash his
hands aIter having Iood. When there was a wash basin within the
guest house, where was the necessity Ior him to go out and wash
his hands? It means that somebody, in connivance with the
Police or the oIIicers in charge, allowed him to go out oI the
guest house. This point is very clear. Only the Home Minister
will be knowing as to what happened truly. The investigating
agencies, the vigilance agencies and so many other oIIicers are
also trying to Iind out the truth. But so Iar no inIormation is
known to the public or the people concerned.
Another point is that he went out at night and in the next
morning, he was hanged to death or supposed to be hanging.
Everybody`s understanding is that while one is hanging to death,
his Ieet will certainly be above the ground level. But
Shanmugam`s Ieet was touching the ground. So, certainly he
must not have hanged himselI. Certainly, he was made to die and
aIter he was dead he was brought to the tree and was hanged
down. That must have happened. The common sense says that iI
someone hangs himselI to death then his body will always be
hanging above the earth. But the photo clearly shows that he was
hanging with his Ieet touching the ground. I think the Home
Minister knows it and we wish him to clariIy this point.
Then there is another news in the Tamil Nadu newspaper. I
would like to quote Irom a Tamil Nadu evening daily, the Makkal
Kural. It says that one Superintendent oI Police was not allowed
to go inside the bungalow where the investigation was going on
and also that the police authorities are supposed to help them to
coordinate with the CBI. So, the S.P. was not allowed to go into
the guest house. The CBI authorities now say that the two police
the guest house. The CBI authorities now say that the two police
constables who are now suspended clearly shows that they are
responsible Ior the escape oI Shri Shanmugam. II that is so then
the action is right but the State Police says that the two
constables were responsible to help the CBI and they were not
responsible to guard Shri Shanmugam.
SIT, that is the Special Investigating Team, consisting oI the CBI
oIIicers, the I.B. oIIicer and the State Police. The Hon. Home
Minister may be knowing the composition oI this team exactly.
Contradictory versions are being given to the press and public
and this shows that they are not going in the right direction; that
there is some conIusion and they are thus accusing each other. It
appears that they are not going in the right direction in which they
are assigned to go.
I would like to ask the hon. Home Minister that iI this is the Iate
oI the case oI a leader oI the great stature like Shri Rajiv Gandhi
then what will happen to the case oI an ordinary common man oI
this country. I remember that when Shri Rajiv Gandhi died
everybody in this country wept as iI he was their own brother or
a Iamily member. The way this case is being handled, I very
much doubt whether we will be able to do justice or whether we
will be able to reach to the culprit who was behind his
assassination. Whosoever he may be, whomsoever they may be
supported by, the Government`s duty is to bring them to light and
punish them. This is the duty oI the Government.
Shri B.Raja Ravivarma (representing Pollachi)
'Mr.Chairman, the statement oI the hon. Home Minister made in
the House on the issue oI the death oI Shri Shanmugam is totally
unbelievable. Shanmugam, an accused in the assassination oI the
Iormer Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi and he surrendered
voluntarily to the police on 17-7-1991 |i.e, July 17, 1991|. It was
not that the CBI or SIT caught him. ThereIore, it is not at all
believable that he escaped on 19-7-1991 |i.e, July 19, 1991| and
committed suicide just two days aIter surrender. II he wanted to
escape Irom the issue, there was no question oI his voluntary
surrender and then escaping and committing suicide. So, we want
to know whether it is a suicide or homicide.
When Shanmugam was washing his hands, the constables were
not around him. They were supplying Iood Ior the CBI and SIT
oIIicials. I would like to know that the State Police who had been
posted there were meant to keep a watch on Shanmugam or to
posted there were meant to keep a watch on Shanmugam or to
serve Iood Ior the CBI and SIT oIIicials. The services oI our
State Police had been misused by the CBI and SIT oIIicials.
It is stated that Shanmugam escaped under the cover oI darkness.
The question oI darkness could come only aIter Shanmugam
escaping Irom the building. ThereIore, I strongly suspect the role
played by the CBI and SIT oIIicials behind this issue. The
Tourist Bungalow at Vedaranyam in Thanjavur district where the
accused Shanmugam was under arrest is having all Iacilities like
wash basin and bathrooms within the premises. Then, how had
Shanmugam been allowed to go outside to wash his hands?
We Ieel surprised that how an accused under the custody could
have a 15 Ieet rope with him with which he was reported to have
hanged himselI? By and by, he was not accustomed to wearing
lungi, even then how lungi was Iound at the site? Sir, is it true
that his Ieet were touching the ground while hanging? II so, how
can anybody hang himselI like that? I want to ask the hon. Home
Minister, through you, why the postmortem was done at
Nagapattinam General Hospital instead oI teaching medical
institution at the Tanjavur Medical College which is equidistant
Irom Vedaranyam and where there are latest sophisticated
instruments and Iorensic experts available to pronounce an expert
opinion? Has the postmortem concluded that asphyxiation is due
to hanging or otherwise? Moreover, is it true that the place in
which he was Iound also belongs to a private individual who is in
anyway connected with the smuggling activities? The Home
Minister says that he himselI is not satisIied with the replies and
the reports Iurnished by the oIIicials oI SIT. What is the nature
oI the suspicion? Will you take this House in conIidence by
inIorming the same? The oIIicials who are responsible Ior this
incident should be identiIied and they must be enquired Iirst,
beIore Shivarajan. With this I conclude.
Dr.(Smt) Padma (representing Aagapattinam)
'Mr.Chairman Sir, . As a doctor, I would like to say that it
would have been better iI the body oI Shanmugam would have
been sent to a teaching institution Ior post-mortem. So Iar as the
post-mortem report is concerned, to know whether it is homicide
or suicide, have they taken the X-ray oI the hyoid bone or
preserved the hyoid bone? These are the points on which I would
like to know.
Shri.K.Ramamurthee 1indivanam (representing Tindivanam)
'Sir, I will make a very brieI speech. Shanmugam had
surrendered himselI through a lawyer in the High Court. When he
had surrendered himselI through a lawyer, it means that he
wanted to live and he wanted protection also. The importance oI
Shanmugam was Ielt more by the investigation team than
anybody else because when he was taken to Vedaranyam, he
was not taken by road or rail but he was taken by a helicopter.
And such a person, aIter reaching Vedaranyam, did not have that
much oI protection and was not guarded. He escaped Irom the
place where he had been kept. And aIter the escape, a case was
registered against him Ior escaping Irom police custody. Then
suicide or murder, whatever it may be, came to the notice oI the
investigation team. AIter that, a case was registered against
Shanmugam Ior suicide. But there is no case against the police
Ior having allowed him to escape. There is no case against the
police Ior having allowed him to commit suicide or Ior having
allowed the murder to take place.
When he escaped a very Iew police men were guarding the place
who say that they were not in a position to run aIter him to catch
him or to Iind him out. But immediately aIter he escaped, within
hours, several hundreds oI men were put on duty to search him
out. Wherever the person was kept, whether in Vedaranyam or
Kodikarai, police should have been guarding the bungalow or the
guest house where he was kept. I do not know as to why the
investigation was not pushed in that direction and why action was
not taken in that regard. Shanmugam, as is revealed by the SIT,
was a very well-known smuggler in that very area and the sea
coast is known Ior several smugglers. There must have been a
competition among these smugglers. As my other Iriend had put
it, there are other people in that area who are involved with the
LTTE or the Sri Lankan terrorists who came there.
There was a report in the press also that there may be very many
politicians there who were on the payrolls oI Shanmugam. Who
knows that they were not aIraid oI Shri Shanmugam`s revealing
the Iacts which may give some new clues to Shri Rajiv Gandhi`s
assassination case.
The India Todav magazine oI Aug.15, 1991 carried a grotesque photo
oI Shanmugam`s body hanging by a rope, where his Ieet were almost
touching the ground (page 28). Anirudhya Mitra reporting the story
Irom Madras had observed:
'.The post-mortem was conducted the same day at
Nagapatnam, 40 km Irom Vedaranyam. The report, taking note
oI the saliva, emission oI semen and stools, declared it suicide.
But the SIT story and post-mortem are riddled with loopholes
that militate against Iorensic wisdom:
(a) There was no rope mark or bruise on the victim`s neck which
the rope would have positively leIt iI he was alive at the time oI
hanging.
(b) The tongue wasn`t protruding.
(c) The Iace was not congested with a rush oI blood. And the
eyes had not popped out iI he was hanged.
(d) The saliva, stool and semen discharges could have happened
in the event oI his being strangulated too.
(e) No scratch marks on his thighs Ior in the last minute
struggle and pain, the hands, unless tied, instinctively scratch the
thighs. II Shanmugam was tied up, how could he commit suicide?
Neither were skin particles Iound in his nails.
(I) The only way he could have hanged himselI was by climbing
the tree, putting a noose around his neck and jumping. The
impact would have broken the neck bones or ruptured the
arteries which was not the case.
(g) The rope Irom which he was hanging was 14 Ieet long.
Where did he get it in the dead oI night?
These were clear pointers that Shanmugam`s death did not occur
due to hanging. The evidence suggests the death took place in
custody as even the escape story sounds dubious. |excerpts
Irom the Ieature: Assassination Probe A dubious twist, India
Todav magazine, Aug.15, 1991, pp.27-28|
Even with all these contra-indications presented in the Lok Sabha and
the news magazines oI India within a month oI the tragedy, Ior the
SIT to record in its charge sheet, prepared in May 1992, that
Shanmugam committed suicide was audacious indeed! Subramanian
Swamy, in his 2000 book on Rajiv assassination, has reproduced a
doctored version oI the grotesque photo oI Shanmugam`s body
where the Ieet touching the ground have been clipped oII. II this
doctoring oI the photo was intentional, it provides a prooI Ior
Swamy`s perIidy. On the other hand, iI Swamy had used the photo
unintentionally (without checking the original photo, published in the
India Todav magazine in 1991), then it again proves Swamy`s
lackadaisical research and care-Iree attitude Ior Iacts. Following a six
page description oI Shanmugam`s death, Swamy also evades this issue
with a statement, 'Mr.Shanmugam`s mysterious death, whether by
suicide or murder is immaterial to the SIT`s case especially since even
the LTTE deIence counsel did not make an issue oI it. |Book: The
Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi. Unanswered Questions and Unasked
Queries, p.198|
(2) Unusual Death of Sivarasan
In the original charge sheet prepared by the SIT in May 1992,
S.Packiachandran Raghuvaran Sivarasan was listed as the 4
th
accused. The then Minister oI Home AIIairs, Shri S.B.Chavan,
presented the oIIicial version oI the death oI Sivarasan via a statement
made at the Iloor oI the Lok Sabha on Aug.21, 1991. First, I
reproduce this statement, which was entitled as,
Encounter with L11E militants on 2
th
August 1991 at
Konanakunte near Bangalore
'I rise to apprise this August House on the details oI the incident
at Konanakunte near Bangalore in which Sivarasan, one oI the
main accused in Shri Rajiv Gandhi assassination case and six
others were Iound dead.
In pursuance oI the consent given by the Government oI Tamil
Nadu to investigate the case oI Shri Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination,
a Special Investigation Team was Iormed. The SIT has examined
346 witnesses and conducted searches at 49 places seizing
incriminating material. 14 accused persons were also arrested. As
you are all aware, the most important accused who had remained
to be arrested were Sivarasan and Subha. A nation-wide manhunt
was launched and eIIorts were being made to locate the hide-out
oI these main conspirators.
Suspecting that some LTTE militants were hiding in Muttati and
Beroota villages oI Madya District, raids, in all 12 LTTE cadres
were taken by police on 17/18-8-91 |i.e, Aug.17-18, 1991|. In
these raids, in all, 12 LTTE cadres were Iound dead aIter
committing suicide by consuming cyanide and Iive suspect who
were apprehended were admitted in Bowring Hospital,
Bangalore.
During investigation, it was ascertained that a person by name
Anjanappa oI Puttenhalli had helped the LTTE militants to Iind
houses in Muttati and Beroota. Further, a diary containing a list
oI 26 militants was also Iound at Muttati. Based on this
inIormation, another person by name Ranganath was also
apprehended by Bangalore City Police. This person gave
inIormation about a house in Konanakunte which was arranged
by him Ior six militants. The City Police along with SIT
surrounded this house on the night oI 18-8-1991 |i.e, Aug.18,
1991| and kept a continuous watch on the house. Further, one
person by name Prem Kumar was apprehended at Konanakunte
crossing. He was the man who was supplying Iood etc. to the
LTTE militants hiding in Konanakunte house. Further enquiries
revealed the presence oI LTTE militants including Sivarasan and
perhaps Subha in the above house.
To try and capture Sivarasan and others alive, watch was
continued throughout the 19
th
and the entire area was encircled
and guarded by plain clothes men and NSG commando
positioned strategically. Additional reinIorcement oI NSG
commandos and medical expert with latest anticyanide antidote
were requisitioned Irom Delhi. It was decided not to storm the
place as similar action earlier on several occasions had resulted in
even minor LTTE Iunctionaries committing suicide. On 19
th
,
around 7:00 pm, the LTTE militants holed up inside the house,
opened Iire indiscriminately without any apparent reason. The
NSG returned the Iire. This exchange oI Iire continued Ior about
30 minutes and three police personnel (one oI NSG and two oI
Karnataka Police) sustained injuries. The injured are out oI
danger. The militants opened Iire either because they were
wanting to escape under the cover oI Iire or because oI some
movements close to the house where local residents were trying
to move a broken down lorry. Two militants who came out,
perhaps in a bid to escape ran back inside the house. Later at
around 8:00 pm, about 7-8 more rounds were Iired by the
militants Ior about halI a minute.
AIter the arrival oI the additional reinIorcements and the medical
team with the latest anticyanide antidote Irom Delhi, in the early
house oI 20
th
August, the house was stormed at about 6:30 am.
The NSG commandos blasted the door and entered the house.
They Iound the dead bodies oI 7 LTTE militants. They included
the wanted Sivarasan and a woman who is obviously Subha but
whose identity requires evidential conIirmation. EIIorts are on to
identiIy all the other bodies. One AK 47 riIle and a 9 mm pistol
and several rounds oI ammunition were recovered. Sivarasan was
Iound with a bullet injury in the temple oI his head. All others
obviously died due to cyanide poisoning. It is being ascertained
whether Sivarasan also consumed cyanide capsule. The bodies
were shiIted to Victoria Hospital Ior post-mortem examination.
The whole operation was supervised by CBI Director, SIT ChieI
and the City Police Commissioner oI Bangalore and the NSG
oIIicers.
Meanwhile, the SIT will continue investigation oI case
relentlessly with the objective oI unraveling the entire conspiracy
behind the assassination, identiIying and arresting the remaining
accused person and eventually charge sheeting the case in court.
Criticism of Subramanian Swamy
Subramanian Swamy is not a credible politician in India. However, he
becomes quotable, considering the Iact that he is currently one oI the
voluble anti-LTTE campaigners who barks Irequently to hog the
limelight, and he scores a point Ior LTTE. Even Swamy has raised
doubts about the death oI Sivarasan, in his recent book. To quote,
'Sivarasan, Ior whom a massive manhunt was mounted by SIT,
was Iinally tracked down to a house on the outskirts oI
Bangalore. He was admittedly the leader oI the killer squad and
should have been aware oI the highlights oI the conspiracy. But
the intriguing point was that, while eight others oI the squad were
Iound dead by consuming cyanide (in accordance with the LTTE
dictum) Sivarasan was Iound dead with bullet injuries.
Sivarasan`s mortal remains were quickly cremated, while belt-
bomb girl Dhanu`s remains had been preserved in Chennai as a
prosecution exhibit. Why the diIIerence? |Book: The
Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi. Unanswered Questions and
Unasked Queries, 2000, p.198|
One cannot accuse Swamy to be a sympathizer oI Pirabhakaran.
Thus, even Swamy Iinds it diIIicult to gulp the presented oIIicial
version oI Sivarasan`s death and the quick cremation oI his mortal
remains. Question arises that iI there was no hanky-panky on
Sivarasan`s death, why were his mortal remains were hurriedly
cremated? Rajeev Sharma, the journalist who wrote another book on
the assassination, inIorms that
'Sivarasan and Subha were cremated amid tight security at
Bangalore`s Wilon Garden crematorium on September 3, 1991
Bangalore`s Wilon Garden crematorium on September 3, 1991
|Book: Bevond the Tigers, 1998, p.104|
As inIormed by deIence lawyer Duraisamy, what Sivarasan revealed
to Ranganath, the 26
th
accused who harbored him during the Iinal
three weeks oI Iugitive`s liIe, about his links to controversial Chandra
Swamy Ialls into the espionage angle oI the Rajiv assassination.
|Continued|.

Part 32
Sachi Sri Kantha
26 1anuary 2002]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The
Conspiracy Angle
Pirabhakaran`s denial in an interview to BBC.
To comprehend the conspiracy angle, I think chronologically one
should study the sequence oI events Iollowing the reported deaths oI
Sivarasan, Subha and Iive oI their associates in Bangalore on August
20, 1991. Chris Morris, the then BBC Colombo correspondent
recorded an interview with Pirabhakaran in JaIIna on Sept.1, 1991. I
quote, Pirabhakaran`s answers to three questions asked by Mr.Morris.
Morris. 'Turning to vour relations with India. Thev are
particularlv bad at the moment. Does that worrv vou?
Pirabhakaran: Our organization has had problems with India Ior
quite a long time. The government oI India intervened in the
Tamil problem in 1983 and provided military assistance to
various Tamil groups and created new Tamil militant
organizations. In 1987 the government oI India entered into an
agreement with Sri Lanka and imposed a solution on our people.
We were opposed to the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement, and as a
consequence the war broke out between India and the LTTE. So
for a long time India was acting on its own national interest,
but we were upholding the interests of our people. As a
consequence there have been contradictions between the
LTTE and the government of India. The present hostility is a
product of this long historical bitterness. ThereIore we are
really concerned and to some extent disappointed over the
approach oI the Indian government.
Morris. Can vou tell me more specificallv about the clampdown
on vour activities in Tamil Nadu? What has been the worst
aspect of that clampdown on vour fight in Sri Lanka?
Pirabhakaran: For a long time the LTTE have been used as
pawns in the political chess game in Tamil Nadu. The
government oI India, as well as the Tamil Nadu state
government oI India, as well as the Tamil Nadu state
government, has been making calculated eIIorts to turn the Tamil
Nadu people against our struggle. Deliberate attempts are being
made to undermine the image oI our organization. But we can
say conIidently that there are vast sections oI the people in Tamil
Nadu who support the Tiger movement and the legitimate cause
Ior which we are Iighting. As long as there is this continuing
support I don`t think our struggle will be in any way aIIected.
Morris. Now I know vou have denied anv involvement in the
accusation of Rafiv Gandhi. But the Indian investigators are
convinced that vou are responsible.
Pirabhakaran: Our movement is not in anyway involved in the
killing oI Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. So Iar this accusation has not been
corroborated. It is true that the government oI India has been
engaged in a massive disinIormation campaign against our
movement, based on this Ialse accusation. |Tamil Nation,
Oct.15, 1991, pp.7-8|
To the best oI my knowledge, that was the strongest denial oIIered by
Pirabhakaran to an international news organization pertaining to
LTTE`s role in Rajiv Gandhi assassination. Pirabhakaran or any oI his
oIIicial representatives, Ior the past ten years, has neither oIIered any
revision nor retraction to this 1991 stand.
Hamish McDonald`s report in the Far Eastern Economic Review.
Impressions oI Hamish McDonald, the New Delhi correspondent oI
Far Eastern Economic Review magazine, appeared in mid-September
1991, under the caption, Loose ends throw doubt on Gandhi murder
theories. Stranger than fiction.
Excerpts:
'Working Irom the Iorensic and photographic evidence,
Karthikeyan`s team quickly rolls up the LTTE support network
that aided the assassins. Reports say they also knew Irom radio
intercepts that the group leader, a 30-year old one-eyed man
called Sivarasan, and a back-up woman assassin were still in the
country aIter Iailing to rendezvous with a getaway boat Irom
JaIIna. Finally, on 20 August |1991|, Sivarasan and the woman
are cornered by police in neighbouring Karnataka state. They and
Iive others take cyanide in LTTE Iashion. Sivarasan shoots
himselI in the head as well.
What is missing so Iar is the positive link to the ultimate
instigator, and a clear motive. The involvement oI ethnic Tamils,
the location and the suicide element all point to the LTTE. How
is anyone else going to Iind a Sri Lankan lady willing to blow
herselI up?` said one diplomat. |Note bv Sri Kantha: Journalists
use this common euphemism oI quoting an unnamed diplomat,
when in Iact their source is an intelligence agent`, attached to an
embassy. For comparison, you would never read a journalist
quoting an unnamed LTTE source.|
The plot looks neat almost too neat. Whv would the LTTE take
the risk of hiring a photographer if it proposed to hide its
hand? Whv did Sivarasan and his group not get back to Jaffna
in the four or five davs before the pictures were published? Whv
were so manv LTTE svmpathi:ers involved in such a sensitive
operation? How did thev get through securitv? |Note: Italics
added by me Ior emphasis.| Was it only police carelessness that
allowed Shanmugan to escape Irom custody, to be Iound dead
later an apparent suicide. |Note: As presented in part 31 oI this
series, McDonald was wrong to allude to Shanmugam`s suicide,
when in Iact overwhelming evidence show that he was
murdered.|
Conspiracy theorists have had a Iield day, working back Irom the
question who beneIited?` The most obvious beneIiciary goes
beyond most imaginations: results Irom the Iirst day oI voting on
20 May indicate Congress would have lost seats but Ior the
sympathy Iactor. The Sri Lankan leadership |Note: i.e, the then
President Premadasa| hated Gandhi`s assertion oI an Indian Raj
and has been helped by the backlash against the Tigers. But
Colombo has virtually no ability to operate covertly in Tamil
Nadu.
For its part, the LTTE denies any involvement and proIess not to
know the alleged assassins. Spokesman Anton Balasingham
suggested a host oI Indian groups or aggrieved Sri Lankan
individuals could have done the job. He said the Tigers had twice
sent emissaries to talk with Gandhi in New Delhi in March, and
had Iound him cordial. Many other sources, including rival
Tamils and Ioreign diplomats |Note again: the euphemistic use oI
the word unnamed diplomats`|, believe otherwise. They said the
LTTE could have Ieared Gandhi`s return to power would lead to
renewed Indian meddling in Sri Lankan aIIairs.
Tiger leader V.Prabhakaran is also said to have held a deep
personal grudge against Gandhi Ior having put under arrest while
visiting New Delhi, and over the deaths oI close colleagues during
Iighting with the Indian peacekeeping Iorce. This school oI
Iighting with the Indian peacekeeping Iorce. This school oI
thought assigns a degree oI irrationality` to Prabhakaran. |Far
Eastern Economic Review, Sept.12, 1991, pp.27-28|
My Two Published Comments on McDonald`s Report
AIter reading McDonald`s report on the assassination conspiracy, I
submitted my comments to the Far Eastern Economic Review, which
passed the editorial muster and appeared in print a month later. This
comment elicited a sarcastic note Irom a Sinhalese residing in
Colombo, Ior which I submitted a rebuttal, which also was published
in the same magazine in November 1991. For record, I provide below
these three brieI communications in entirety.
The captions oI the letters were not mine.
Letter 1: Looking for scapegoats
By Sachi Sri Kantha
'I agree with Hamish McDonald`s report on the murder oI Rajiv
Gandhi |12 Sept.|, that though the involvement oI ethnic Tamils,
the location and the suicide element all point to the LTTE`, the
murder theory Iormulated by the Indian investigation team looks
almost too neat` to believe.
In his last interview in The New York Times |22 May| shortly
beIore he was killed, Gandhi stated that India and Indian leaders
could be targets oI outside powers as the country took on a larger
role in the region`. It was also reported that when asked whether
he had the CIA in mind as the outside Iorce, he smirked`.
Gandhi`s reIerence to a larger role in the region` is not too
cryptic a remark to Iathom what he had in mind.
According to news reports released aIter the murder, Khaled el-
Sheikh, the PLO`s chieI envoy in India, said that he gave Gandhi
a warning Irom PLO leader Yasser AraIat about a plot to
assassinate him` some Iive weeks beIore he was killed on 21
May. The warning could have been about the activities oI the
Mossad, the secret service arm oI Israel. And Gandhi`s reIerence
to outside powers could be interpreted as a natural extension oI
his intelligence` received Irom the PLO.
II the LTTE planned to murder Gandhi, how could one explain
that AraIat came to know about this plot? It is ridiculous to
believe that AraIat spied on the LTTE in JaIIna or in jungles oI
the Vanni region oI Sri Lanka.
Mossad`s motives in eliminating Gandhi are not
incomprehensible, since India under Gandhis (both Indira and
Rajiv) has openly supported the causes espoused by the PLO.
Last year, Mossad also suIIered a loss oI Iace when one oI its
Iormer agents, Victor Ostrovsky, exposed its neIarious activities
in his much publicized book, Bv Wav of Deception. So it is not
improbable to expect that Mossad could have been tempted to
redeem its tarnished image among clients, which included the
military establishment oI Sri Lanka.
One wonders why AraIat cannot be contacted and asked in detail
about what kind oI warning he gave Gandhi and whom he had in
mind as the suspects. |Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct.3,
1991|
Letter 2: Candhi's killers
By U.Pethiyagoda
'In reIerence to the letter by Sachi Sri Kantha |Letters, 3 Oct.|, a
smirk` by the late Rajiv Gandhi shortly beIore his brutal murder,
the purported warning` Iive weeks beIore his killing, and a
specious assumption that Mossad had lost Iace` by the
publication oI a book by an ex-Mossad agent`, is apparently
good enough evidence to suspect hands other than those oI the
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Ior Gandhi`s murder.
The painstaking and impressive evidence uncovered by an Indian
investigating team which Iairly points the Iinger at the
perpetrators pales into insigniIicance beIore the novel line oI
reasoning oI your correspondent.
Such impeccable logic oI LTTE apologists is not unIamiliar to Sri
Lankans. Clearly looking Ior scapegoats` continues!. |Far
Eastern Economic Review, Nov.7, 1991|
Letter 3: Backed by the president
by Sachi Sri Kantha
'One Colombo correspondent |Letters, 7 Nov.| Ieels irritated by
my linking oI Israel`s secret service to the murder oI Rajiv
Gandhi. I wish to note that Mossad`s involvement in the politics
oI South Asia has been corroborated by Sri Lankan President
Ranasinghe Premadasa himselI. On 24 September, Premadasa
openly accused Mossad oI trying to topple him.
In his address to the Sri Lankan parliament, he said: You know
that immediately aIter the sending back oI the IPKF |Indian
Peace Keeping Force|, I had the Israeli Interests Section
removed. In such a context there is nothing to be surprised about
the Mossad rising up against me. Please remember that there are
among us traitors |Note bv Sri Kantha: he was indeed reIerring to
his then nemesis Lalith Athulathmudali| who have gone to Israeli
universities and lectured there and earned dirty money. Don`t
Iorget that Ior a moment.
Curiously, when you covered the impeachment crisis Iaced by
Premadasa, this accusation was leIt out in your news reports.
Also one should not Iorget that a serious assassination attempt
was made on Gandhi in Colombo aIter he signed the now
disgraced Gandhi-Jayewardene Peace Accord in mid-1987. Only
the poor targeting by the assassin allowed Gandhi to have an
additional Iour years oI liIe.
Being more inclined to get involved in polemics, the Colombo
correspondent makes Iun oI the warning given to Gandhi Iive
weeks beIore his death. This warning had come not Irom an
ordinary person. It was given by Yasser AraIat.
While some in Sri Lanka may be impressed by the painstaking
evidence uncovered by an Indian investigating team` which
pointed Iingers at the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, the
perIormance oI the Indian sleuths resembled more closely a page
Irom a Marx brothers` comedy script. The Tamil Nadu police,
the Central Bureau oI Intelligence and the Research and Analysis
Wing oI the Indian search team bungled at every step Irom 21
May to 21 August. The so-called impressive evidence` could not
track the personal details oI the Iemale assassin. Nothing is
known about her background. The alleged mastermind Sivarajan
has been identiIied by an investigative journalist |Note bv Sri
Kantha: I was reIerring to D.B.S.Jeyaraj`s report to the Frontline
magazine| as one who belonged to the Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organisation until 1986. It was this rebel group which received
oIIicial patronage Irom the Indian Government between 1983 and
1986. |Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov.28, 1991|
In retrospect, aIter studying the Supreme Court verdicts on the Rajiv
assassination trial, I Ieel relieved that my observations relating to the
perIormance oI the SIT oIIicials and made in November 1991 have
stood the test oI time. The conspiracy angle oI Rajiv assassination
itselI has become more murkier than what I perceived then. Also,
neither Mr.Pethiyagoda nor any other LTTE antagonist could rebut
my views expressed in November 1991. I also became more interested
in studying the John Kennedy assassination to seek parallels. Toward
this goal, in addition to studying some oI the published research papers
this goal, in addition to studying some oI the published research papers
on Kennedy assassination, I also searched, bought and read at least six
oI the available 40-odd recommended books` on JFK assassination.
These were,
1. Report of the Presidents Commission on the Assassination of
President John F.Kennedv, 1964, 888 pp. |popularly known as
Warren Commission Report|
2. The Rubv Cover-Up by Seth Kantor, 1978, 450 pp.
3. On the Trail of the Assassins by Jim Garrison, 1988, 406 pp.
4. JFK. Conspiracv of Silence by Dr.Charles Crenshaw, 1992,
203 pp.
5. The Killing of a President. The Complete Photographic
Record by Robert Gorden, 1993, 223 pp.
6. Official and Confidential. The Secret Life of J.Edgar Hoover
by Anthony Summers, 1993, 621 pp.
I provide the details oI these representative books on JFK
assassination to show, how much inIormation have been suppressed in
Rajiv Gandhi assassination. For instance, there exists a book detailing
the complete photographic record` oI JFK`s Iinal moments and
autopsy details. But, in Rajiv Gandhi`s case, LTTE has been Iramed
by the Indian investigators, based on the 10 Irames Irom a roll oI Hari
Babhu`s camera. But he was not the onlv cameraman present on that
fateful Mav 21, 1991 night in Sriperumbudur. Even as acknowledged
by Mr.Kartikeyan, there were numerous other still photographers and
video photographers who had captured the Iinal moments oI Rajiv
Gandhi`s liIe. What happened to all those photos? Why these photos
have not been placed in public domain? Why none oI the post-mortem
autopsy photos oI Rajiv Gandhi, Dhanu and Sivarasan have been
released to the public?
The Oswald and Ruby of the Rajiv assassination
The secrets behind the assassination oI John Kennedy were held by
his assassin Lee Harvey Oswald, who in turn was assassinated by Jack
Ruby. Oswald died two days Iollowing Kennedy`s assassination and
Ruby was reported dead in January 3, 1967 due to prostrate cancer. In
Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination, the roles oI Oswald and Ruby were
played by Dhanu and Sivarasan. Dhanu died together with Rajiv on
May 21, 1991 and Sivarasan was reported dead` in August 20, 1991 -
three months Iollowing Rajiv`s assassination.
The parallels are remarkable, but with one striking diIIerence. Quite a
Iew books have been written about both Oswald and Ruby by a
number oI independent investigators oI JFK assassination. At least that
much inIormation (veriIied and unveriIied) has been made available.
Contrastingly, though over ten years have passed aIter Rajiv
assassination, not a single book has appeared on either Dhanu or
Sivarasan. Why? I am under the impression that whatever inIormation
available on both Dhanu and Sivarasan have been suppressed by the
Indian intelligence agencies, since iI all the details are revealed, their
Procrustean data-torturing technique linking Pirabhakaran to Rajiv
assassination would crumble.
Another noteworthy issue to ponder is whv during the last 10 vears,
not a single piece of evidence (video or audio or photograph or
letter) had turned up linking Pirabhakaran with either Sivarasan or
Dhanu. II such evidence existed, the SIT oIIicials and Indian
journalists would have exploited that to maximum. In the absence oI
such evidence (contradicting the oIt-repeated hyperbole oI journalists
belonging to the Chicken Little Circuit that LTTE penchantly produces
photographic records Ior posterity) questions arise whether those two
prime assassins linked to Rajiv Gandhi assassination did belong to
LTTE.
This Iorms the nucleus oI the conspiracy angle oI this assassination.
Meager Details on Sivarasan and Dhanu
The India Todav magazine Iirst published meager details on Sivarasan
and Dhanu in its Aug.31, 1991 issue. These details made interesting
reading, and I provide my annotations within parentheses Ior additional
queries.
Key Suspects: Identity Crisis
by Anirudhya Mitra
'The on-going investigations reveal that he is a man with many
names. In the murder oI Rajiv Gandhi he was known to the
police as Sivarasan, Shivaraj and Thurai. In the killing oI EPRLF
leader Padmanabha and 14 others in Madras he gained notoriety
as Raghuvaran and Raghuappa. Apparently, he assumes a
diIIerent name Ior each operation. But his real name is Raja
Arumainayagam. He is currently the most hunted criminal in the
country carrying a reward oI Rs.10 lakh on his head. |Note bv
Sri Kantha: Though the date-line oI the magazine issue stated
Aug.31, 1991, by which time Sivarasan was reported dead on
Aug.20, the magazine was released to the newsstand a Iortnight
Aug.20, the magazine was released to the newsstand a Iortnight
earlier. This explains the discrepancy in this statement.|
Sivarasan, 32, is an employee oI the Sri Lankan Government in
the eastern province. Originally Irom Chavakcherri village in
JaIIna, he graduated in humanities, but it is his other
qualiIications which earned him the trust oI the LTTE. He was
LTTE`s prime hit man, thanks mainly to his ability to speak
Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, and Hindi Iluently. |Note: This
sentence is a gibberish. What is the correlation between good
marksmanship and language Iluency? One is a verbal skill, while
the other one is a practical skill which develops Iollowing rigorous
training!| Contrary to reports, his Tamil is sans a Lankan accent.
|Note: Again, this statement is puzzling. Even though he was
supposed to be JaIIna origin, he was able to mask the Lankan
accent. In combination with the previous statement that Sivarasan
was supposed to be Iluent in Telugu, Malayalam and Hindi
these languages being not used in wider context in Sri Lanka
simple inIerence one can make Irom both these statements is that
Sivarasan was an Indian, and not a JaIIna person. I`m not stating
that this was indeed true, but this could be a matching possibility.
See the next statement also.| He is also Iamiliar with Indian
topography which has served him in good stead in eluding the
slew oI super sleuths who are tailing him. |Note: This statement
reiterates the impression that he could have been an Indian as
well.|
One oI his big advantages is the stark contrast between his side
and Iront proIiles. There is hardly any similarity between
Haribabu`s photograph oI him, which is a side pose, and the Iront
view which appears on his driving license. |Note: It is not clear,
which driving license? Indian or Sri Lankan?|
But today Sivarasan seems to have been discarded by the Tigers.
With most oI his disguises having been publicized, he is no longer
good enough Ior shadow work`. He is also too junior to be
inducted into the LTTE cabinet. |Note: This sentence hides the
Iact that, he was alleged to have belonged` to another Tamil
rebel group, identiIied as TELO, which received oIIicial
patronage Irom the Indian intelligence agencies in mid 1980s. Or
could it be, that he was inserted as a mole` by the Indian
intelligence-wallahs to penetrate LTTE, Iollowing its decimation
oI TELO in 1986? Sivarasan appears as a stranger in pre-1991
LTTE line-up, since he is not mentioned even once in the Broken
Palmvra book (published in 1990), authored by anti-LTTE
activists Rajan Hoole et al., whereas Pirabhakaran`s other leading
associates receive mention.| He lost his only brother, Arumai, 25,
associates receive mention.| He lost his only brother, Arumai, 25,
in an IPKF operation in 1988.
The woman who died while killing Rajiv, Dhanu alias Gayatri, is
Sivarasan`s cousin. But little else is known about her. Aged 24,
she came Irom a village in JaIIna, called Kupukullai. Intelligence
agencies have supplied some oI her old pictures to the
investigators. When one such picture was shown to the Forensic
Science Department, its Director P.Chandra Sekharan said he
was Iairly certain that it was hers, taken Iour years ago in JaIIna.
Shubha or Shalini, who carries a reward oI Rs.5 lakh, is also
Sivarasan`s cousin. Aged 27, Shubha like Sivarasan stayed back
aIter the assassination to complete unIinished business. Like
Dhanu, she too is Irom Kupukullai. She is slightly handicapped,
her right leg being shorter than the leIt. |India Todav magazine,
Aug.31, 1991|
Nine months later, aIter the SIT oIIicials released their initial charge
sheet on Rajiv assassination trial on May, 1992, the India Todav
magazine provided proIiles oI Sivarasan and Dhanu Ior the second
time. These two proIiles, presented by Anirudhya Mitra and Prakash
Swamy, had revised the purported real names` oI two assassins, Irom
the Aug.31, 1991 detail. Sivarasan has been now identiIied as
Packiachandran and not Raja Arumainayagam. Dhanu has been now
identiIied as Kalaivathi and not Gayatri. To quote,
Sivarasan: Born to Kill
'It was, by Iar, the biggest assignment oI his terrorist career. But
Sivarasan, 33, the mastermind behind the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination, had embarked on his hit-and-run course many
years ago. The SIT probe has thrown some light on Sivarasan`s
chequered past.
Indoctrinated by his Iather, a TULF leader, |Note: This is an
exaggeration. His Iather could have been an ardent TULF
supporter| at a very young age, Sivarasan was Iirst arrested in
Batticaloa Ior distributing leaIlets containing pro-Eelam views.
While in custody, he wrote Long Live Tamil Eelam on the walls
oI the lock-up and was severely beaten up Ior it. This, it seems,
marked the beginning oI his extremist career.
In 1983, Sivarasan joined the TELO and leIt Ior India soon aIter.
Here, he received extensive training in handling explosives. |Note:
This is interesting, but hides the signiIicant details. Who gave the
extensive training? RAW personnel oI course!| He also had an
amazing aptitude Ior learning languages, and picked up all the
south Indian languages. A year later, Iactional rivalry Iorced him
to return home and join the LTTE. His new name was Raghu
(Sivarasan whose real name was Packiachandran used many
aliases: Sivarajan, Rajan, Aravinth).
For many years, Sivarasan worked in the LTTE`s political wing
and was responsible Ior collecting Iunds Irom Udupidy, a job at
which he was ruthlessly competent. He played an active role
during the IPKF operation, even Iilling in as commander oI
Vadamarachchi. |Note: These statements do not stand up to
scrutiny, since as I had mentioned already, iI Sivarasan was such
an outstanding LTTE activist, he would have received mention in
the Broken Palmvrah book authored by anti-LTTE activists
Rajan Hoole et al., which was released in 1990.| Still, he was not
promoted and remained a lieutenant. His Iirst real break came
when he was asked to join the Black Tigers commando Iorce
the suicide squad. Heading the nine-member core assassination
team was Iraught with danger. And it eventually cost him his
liIe. |India Todav magazine, May 31, 1992, p.45|
II Sivarasan`s proIile provided by the SIT oIIicials was Iull oI holes,
the same applied to identiIied woman assassin Dhanu`s proIile as well.
Dhanu: An Enigma
' She holds the unhappy distinction oI being the Iirst-ever human
bomb in the country`s history. In LTTE circles, Dhanu, 24,
whose real name was Kalaivathi, is held in some awe. So much
so that at a public Iunction held in JaIIna last year, Pirabhakaran
honoured her Iather posthumously with a gold medal` Ior her
role in the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi. |Note bv Sri Kantha:
This piece oI inIormation is like placing the cart beIore the horse.
Subramanian Swamy records in his Rajiv Gandhi assassination
book, that on June 11, 1991, Pirabhakaran honored Eelam
activist A.Rajaratnam in a public Iunction held in JaIIna. By this,
the Indian investigators oI Rajiv assassination arrived at the
conclusion that Dhanu was the assassin. At that time, Dhanu`s
identity was unclear even to the SIT oIIicials. Evidence Ior this is
revealed by Justice K.T.Thomas, in his supreme court verdict
who recorded that it was from the confession of Athirai, the 8
th
accused in the Rajiv assassination trial, that 'we got the idea oI
placement oI Thanu and Suba in the LTTE ranking. The Iormer
was a member oI Black Women Tiger` and the latter was a
member oI the Army branch oI LTTE. (p. 39 oI Justice
Thomas`s verdict). When did, Athirai oIIer her conIession?
Thomas`s verdict). When did, Athirai oIIer her conIession?
According to Justice D.P.Wadhwa`s supreme court verdict,
Athirai`s conIession was recorded on Aug.29, 1991 nine days
aIter the reported death oI Sivarasan and Subha (p.46 oI Justice
Wadhwa`s verdict.) Thus, the purported link oI Pirabhakaran
honoring Eelam activist Rajaratnam in June 1991 to assassin
Dhanu is tenuous.|
Dhanu, who studied till middle school in Batticaloa, was inspired
by the Tamil liberation movement at a very young age. In Iact,
her Iather, A.Rajaratnam, who is described as Pirabhakaran`s
mentor, played a crucial role in moulding the LTTE chieI`s
thinking during the movement`s Iormative years between 1972
and 1975. His articles were published in pro-LTTE magazines
such as Jeera Jengai and Courageous Tigers. And the SIT is
now producing these articles as evidence to bolster its argument
that Dhanu had been indoctrinated by her Iather and this is what
motivated the crime rather than her reported rape by the IPKF
which, the SIT believes, is part oI a disinIormation campaign
spread by the LTTE.
Dhanu has only one sister, who lives in France. But attempts by
SIT oIIicials to elicit inIormation Irom her have so Iar drawn a
blank. Exactly what prompted Dhanu to undertake her terrible
mission is destined to remain an impenetrable mystery. Perhaps
Iorever. |India Todav magazine, May 31, 1992, p.45|
The Supreme Court verdicts delivered by Justice Wadhwa, Justice
Thomas and Justice Quadri are markedly silent on assassin Dhanu`s
background. No mention was made in these verdicts about the
reported pro-LTTE magazines Jeera Jengai and Courageous Tigers.
Thus, aIter 10 years on the strength oI Supreme Court verdicts, one
can inIer that it was the SIT oIIicials who had spread the
disinIormation campaign to bolster their Procrustean data-torturing
techniques. This is substantiated by J.Ranganath`s (the 26
th
accused in
the assassination trial) revelation in 1999.
Ranganath`s Explosive Revelation on Sivararasan
Despite the smearing campaign conducted by the SIT oIIicial
Kartikeyan and supreme egotist Subramanian Swamy, J.Ranganath
has gained credibility. Though he was charged as the 26
th
accused in
the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial in 1992, he was acquitted by the
Supreme Court verdicts, delivered on May 11, 1999. His interview to
the Indian weekly news magazine The Week oI June 6, 1999 shed
some light on the conspirators, and who aided and abetted the
conspirators. I reproduce in length, Ranganath`s interview to reporter
conspirators. I reproduce in length, Ranganath`s interview to reporter
E.Vijayalakshmi.
'Immediately aIter his release on May 12 |1999|, Ranganath
vanished, apparently somewhere in Bangalore, and on May 23
|1999|, the Tamil Nadu government assigned an armed security
guard Ior him because oI threats to his liIe. He has been
Irequently shiIting residence and says his days are numbered`.
The Week met him at a lodge in Chennai. Excerpts Irom his
explosive account:
I know my days are numbered because I am opposing
Chandraswami, Kartikeyan and a Iew Congress goons. I thank
the government oI Tamil Nadu Ior the security they have given
me.
August 2, 1991 was the darkest day in my liIe. Between 10.45
and 11 pm there was a knock on the door in my house at
Putanhally in Banglore. Thinking it was Iriends, I opened the
door without asking their identity. It was a mistake. A man,
whom I later came to know as Suresh Master, pointed a handgun
at me and told me to get inside. Only my wiIe was there. He said
he wanted to talk. I asked him why then he had the gun. He said
he was aware that members oI my Iamily were staying in
diIIerent parts oI Bangalore. I immediately understood that I was
in a trap. Subha, Sivarasan, a driver anna` and a Nehru were
with him. I had to carry out their orders. I arranged Iood Ior
them. My wiIe and I had a quarrel; she didn`t want to stay with
me with these people around.
On the third day I came to know that I was harbouring Sivarasan.
He was standing in Iront oI the mirror and adjusting his Ialse
eye. Sivarasan told me about the smell oI lotus when he visited
Chandraswami`s ashram, 140 km Irom Delhi on the Haridwar
route, about 40 days beIore the assassination. He went there on a
chartered Ilight that Chandraswami arranged to witness a yagna`
Ior the success oI the mission to kill Rajiv Gandhi.
Chandraswami blessed his guns. That room was Iilled with lotus
Ilowers and the next room was Iilled with lemons. He told that he
didn`t believe in this kind oI superstition, but it clicked.
He said he could have shot Rajiv Gandhi and consumed the
cyanide capsule or vanished in the crowd. But Chandraswami
wanted a mass killing so that he could recover his debt Irom
abroad. And he showed me the suitcase with wheels which was
Iilled with US dollars and travellers` cheques. They said they
wouldn`t use this money Ior Iood. In Iact they would only eat
bread and drink plain tea.
bread and drink plain tea.
Sivarasan said that aIter completing another work, they would be
Ilown to a European country and Irom there he would go to
JaIIna. He said that he belonged to a splinter group oI the LTTE,
his mother tongue was Sinhalese and he was working in a
government Iirm. He was with TELO beIore that. He was
tortured by the Sri Lankan government while writing something
on the wall. Then he joined the LTTE, and aIter some training,
leIt the place. He came to Delhi in order to settle in Europe.
There he met Chandraswami. Sivarasan used to mention
Mamaji` very Irequently.
On Sivarasan`s status and his links to Chandraswami
According to Ranganath, Sivarasan had told him that he belonged to a
splinter group` oI LTTE. To quote,
'Sivarasan said he had never missed an RPG aimed at tanks. He
told me his splinter group had about 15 women in its cadre and
around 35 sympathisers. He had gone to Chandraswami`s ashram
Ior monetary help, and had done two or three jobs Ior him
abroad. As Ior killing Rajiv Gandhi, Sivarasan said his godIather
had told him to do it.
Sivarasan said Chandraswami, who had Iinanced him, had a link
with William Webster, ex-head oI an American intelligence
agency, who had become the head oI the Heritage Foundation
here. Chandraswami, it seems, is very close to him. So money
was not a problem Ior any kind oI work he wanted.
The big suitcase with wheels was missing when the police raided
my Bangalore house where Sivarasan and others stayed Ior 16
days. Until August 18 we were together. On that day I came out,
met DCP Kempayya and surrendered to him. And on August 19
Sivarasan died. I was called to identiIy the bodies aIter they had
raided the place. When I went I could see ash everywhere. The
suitcase was missing. Some people were cleaning the place. I saw
halI-burnt currency in the big sump.
Shielding Chandraswami by bullying and torturing Ranganath
Then, Ranganath pointed his guns (Iiguratively!) on the SIT chieI
D.R.Kartikeyan Ior distorting the evidence and threatening him utter
consequences iI Chandraswami`s links were revealed Iurther. To
quote Ranganath,
'My conscience told me that the police were the real culprits. At
the same time the junior oIIicers were doing their duty well. SIT
chieI D.R.Kartikeyan was knowingly shielding Chandraswami
chieI D.R.Kartikeyan was knowingly shielding Chandraswami
and others. I know Karthikeyan was close to Rajiv Gandhi. But I
don`t know what made him shield Chandraswami. But he did.
I had asked Sivarasan how he had managed to go to
Sriperumbudur though he was not very Iluent in Tamil spoken in
Tamil Nadu. He said he was ready as he had got Rajiv Gandhi`s
tour programme three days beIore the local Congress people
came to know about it. He said he got it Irom his sources in the
oIIice oI a Iormer woman Union Minister. |Note bv Sri Kantha:
This politician was Ms. Margaret Alva. Read below.|
I am ready to appear beIore the Congress Working Committee
and the Youth Congress people to answer their questions. II there
is a trace oI doubt that I had anything to do with Rajiv Gandhi`s
assassination, they can stone me to death. The place I stayed
belonged to E.Anjanayappa, the Karnataka Congress president.
He is the brother oI Ashok Narayana who is like Margaret Alva`s
PA. According to Sivarasan, Alva charted Rajiv`s tour two days
beIore he came to Tamil Nadu.
Indian investigating agencies had a nexus with Chandraswami.
While I was in SIT custody, I was taken to the Kumarakrupa
guest house near the Asoka Hotel in Bangalore by a DIG Irom
Delhi who had settled in Bangalore. There were twin bungalows
there. I was handcuIIed and made to sit on the Iloor. One
gentleman came there and he was wearing a rudraksha mala. He
asked the DIG in Hindi, Yeh sala hai kva?` I had pretended that
I didn`t know Hindi. The DIG told me to stand but I just bowed
my head. This man asked, What is he expecting?` The DIG told
me that I should obey the SIT chieI, I would get less punishment
iI I did, and that I should not tell what I had heard Irom
Sivarasan about Chandraswami. Later on I knew that man was
Mamaji`.
When I was in illegal custody Kartikeyan told somebody in Delhi
on the phone in my presence: Yeh sale ko sabi maloom hoga,
ab kva karna padege? This was at the CBI oIIice in Bangalore.
I was taken to the Jayanagar police station. I met Kartikeyan. I
told them everything. But Kartikeyan told me to be silent about
the Delhi connection and said I could reveal everything at the
CBI oIIice. He asked how I could discuss the matter with the
local police. I told him I couldn`t distinguish between the diIIerent
police.
Karthikeyan asked me how I had come to know about
Chandraswami. I told him I was moving closely with Sivarasan.
He said they must have reIerred to some other name. He became
He said they must have reIerred to some other name. He became
violent and told me not to mention Chandraswami`s name. Are
you aware oI the capacity oI Chandraswami?` he asked me. I
told him I was not bothered about Chandraswami. The police
oIIicers tortured me. You can see my middle Iinger. They
pierced it and passed electricity through it. They told me not to
say anything about this, not to repeat Chandraswami`s name.
|The Week magazine, June 6, 1999|
Credibility of Ranganath
How much one can rely on Ranganath`s inIormation relating to
Sivarasan`s activities need to be assessed critically. From May 1992 to
April 1999, while he was an accused in the Rajiv assassination trial,
Ranganath`s position in the credibility totem pole was low.
Contrastingly, the SIT oIIicial Kartikeyan`s credibility was in zenith.
But on May 11, 1999, tables were turned and Karikeyan`s credibility
sank to nadir, and Ranganath`s credibility rose. Acquitting Ranganath,
Justice Thomas had written in his verdict,
'The trial court at the close oI the discussion oI evidence against
A-26 |i.e, Accused 26| has entered the Iollowing Iinding in
paragraph 2419 oI the Judgment:
From the Ioregoing discussion and analysis oI evidence proved
by the prosecution it has to be concluded that A-26 harboured
Sivarasan and Suba, who were proclaimed oIIenders and the
other accused A-24 Rangan, Nehru, Suresh Master, Driver Anna
and Amman in his house at Puttanahalli and subsequently at
Konanakunte voluntarily and willingly without any Iear to his
liIe.`
The above is the only Iinding on Iacts which the learned trial
Judge |Note bv Sri Kantha: i.e., Navaneetham, whose credibility
also sank abysmally on May 11, 1999| appears to have made
regarding the role oI A-26. ThereaIter no discussion is seen made
about his activities. But learned Judge had held in paragraph
2451, that A-26 is also guilty oI the oIIence under Section 120-B
read with Section 302 IPC and rest oI the oIIences included in
the charge.
But at the same time we have to point out that there is absolutely
no evidence whatsoever Ior connecting A-26 with the conspiracy
to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. In Iact, the prosecution did not even
bother to establish that A-26 had no knowledge that anybody
would be plotting to murder Rajiv Gandhi. It is very unIortunate
that the trial court has convicted A-26 also oI the oIIence under
that the trial court has convicted A-26 also oI the oIIence under
Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to
be hanged. |pp.64-65 of Justice Thomass verdict|
Thus, I tend to believe that Ranganath has gained some credibility.
ThereIore, one tidbit he had stated in his 1999 interview about
Sivarasan`s travels prior to Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination, puzzles me.
He had observed that, Sivarasan had told him that 'he visited
Chandraswami`s ashram, 140 km Irom Delhi on the Hardwar rout,
about 40 days beIore the assassination. He went there on a chartered
Ilight that Chandraswami arranged to witness a yagna` Ior the success
oI the mission to kill Rajiv Gandhi. Chandraswami blessed his guns.
40 days beIore the assassination can be placed to around April 10,
1991. This schedule does not align properlv with the pre-
assassination travel schedule of Sivarasan prepared bv the SIT
officials. According to Justice Wadhwa`s supreme court verdict,
Sivarasan had spent much oI the time between February and end oI
April in Sri Lanka, with only one annotation around April 24, 1991
stating that 'He was at Madras in the house oI Vijayan (A-12)
|pp.42-43 of the verdict|.
The possibility that Sivarasan could have lied about his links with
Chandraswami to Ranganath cannot be denied. II that be the case,
then Kartikeyan also has some explanation to do to convince the public
why he bullied and tortured Ranganath to hide any inIormation
pertaining to Sivarasan`s links to Chandraswami. It could be that, like
Jack Ruby who had links to the FBI, Sivarasan also had deeper links
with the Indian intelligence-wallahs. This is one reason why, as
discussed in chapter 31 oI this series, Sivarasan`s mortal remains was
disposed quickly rather than being exhibited as a precious trophy`
representing a vanquished LTTE activist. |Continued.|

Part 33
Sachi Sri Kantha
02 February 2002]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The Sinhalese
Angle
Front Note
A retraction on the puzzling arrest record of Nalini, the 1st accused
Factual accuracy is important in a critical analysis oI any worthy document. This is
particularly so, when it comes to a document oI the caliber oI lengthy Supreme Court
verdict oI Justice D.P.Wadhwa on the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial. In part 31 oI
this series, I had commented about the puzzling arrest record oI Nalini, the Iirst
accused, as contradiction 2 in Justice Wadhwa`s verdict. Now, aIter re-reading the
relevant passages careIully, I realize that my observation was in error and thus I
retract the sentences presented in that section, which includes the Iirst paragraph
written, under the subsequent section, Mv opinion on Nalinis arrest record. I
tender my sincere apologies to Justice D.P.Wadhwa and to the readers Ior my
carelessness and oversight. I located my error, while trying to tabulate the number oI
times the purported` wireless messages transmitted by Sivarasan was mentioned in
the Supreme Court verdict. |Note: But, I`m still puzzled about the correct arrest date
oI Nalini and Murugan. Kindly read below the observations oI ex-CBI director Vijay
Karan, in this chapter, regarding the arrest date oI Nalini and Murugan, which diIIers
Irom what is recorded in Justice Wadhwa`s verdict.|
I reiterate that the comment on consequential contradictions oI Justice Wadhwa`s
verdict relating to the arrest records oI Ravi, the 16
th
accused (Contradiction 1) still
stands.
Now, to Chapter 33.
Introduction
The Sinhalese angle in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is conspicuously
linked with the conspiracy angle. Quite a Iew observers in India and
elsewhere have commented that Ior peculiar reasons it has been
intentionally ignored by the SIT team led by Mr.Kartikeyan. The Iacts
Ior questions such as, (1) When was the serious, previous
assassination attempt made on Rajiv Gandhi`s liIe in Iull glare oI public
eye? (2) Who was the immediate beneIiciary oI Rajiv`s death in 1991?
eye? (2) Who was the immediate beneIiciary oI Rajiv`s death in 1991?
(3) Did Rajiv have cordial relationship with the then Sri Lankan
political leadership oI Premadasa?, pointedly show that the suspicion
oI critical observers on the manner in which the SIT oIIicials plodded
through their Procrustean data-torturing mode have some validity.
Thus, in this chapter I provide observations made by Messers Vijay
Karan (the chieI oI India`s Central Bureau oI Intelligence at the time
oI Rajiv`s assassination), journalist Rajeev Sharma and anti-LTTE
analyst Rohan Gunaratna related to the above three questions.
Observations of Rohan Gunaratna
Rohan Gunaratna, in his book Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, has
provided some pointed details on the (1) JVP-linked conspiracy behind
the assassination attempt on Rajiv Gandhi, made in Colombo in 1987
and (2) RAW-JVP links.
Failed assassination attempt of 1uly 3, 1987 on Rajiv Candhi
'As Rajiv Gandhi was about to depart Ior India, he was invited
by the commander oI the Navy Ananda Silva to inspect a guard
oI honour. Gandhi obliged. As he was moving past the men,
something totally unexpected happened. Vijithamuni Rohana de
Silva, a naval rating Irom the south, suddenly liIted his riIle and
brought it on to the visiting Prime Minister oI India. Neither
Ananda Silva nor Gandhi`s security men responded Iast enough
either to push Gandhi away Irom the sailor, or to immobilize the
attacker. |Footnote provided bv Gunaratna: Film clip and
photographs taken by the media covering the entire Gandhi visit
clearly show no reaction to save Gandhi or to counter-attack the
sailor.| Fortunately, Rajiv Gandhi`s quick reIlexes something
which he had probably sharpened in his days as a pilot came to
his rescue: he ducked almost instantaneously, averting head
injury which, in the worst case, could have killed him; he was
instead hit and badly bruised around the neck and the shoulders.
The plan within a Navy cell was to kill Rajiv Gandhi. The
nineteen year old naval rating was to hit Gandhi on the head and
make him Iall, and then the two men either side oI the Iirst
attacker were to strike him with their ceremonial bayonets
|Footnote provided bv Gunaratna: Based on a conIession the
naval rating made at the CID headquarters to another detainee.|
But Ior some unknown reason, the other two men reIrained Irom
going into action during the assault iI they did, Gandhi could
have suIIered serious injuries, and could have died. This sinister
plan has hitherto been kept a secret. During the court martial that
Iollowed, Vijithamuni stated that he thought that the (Rajiv
Iollowed, Vijithamuni stated that he thought that the (Rajiv
Gandhi-Jayewardene) Peace Accord would make Prabhakaran
the leader oI the northeast, and he would have to honour
Prabhakaran in the same way he was ordered to honour Rajiv
Gandhi. However, Vijithamuni did not serve his Iull sentence
he was released under a general amnesty aIter Premadasa
became the President. |Book: Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka,
1993, p.193|
Justice Wadhwa in his lengthy Supreme Court verdict had summarized
the events relating to Rajiv Gandhi and LTTE, Irom the year 1987.
For instance, he had mentioned about 'The Indo-Sri Lankan
Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka |was| signed
on 29.7.1987 by Rajiv Gandhi and J.R.Jayewardene in Colombo.
|p.37 oI Justice Wadhwa`s verdict.| But he failed to make anv
mention about what happened to Rafiv Gandhi on the following dav
in Colombo' I cannot think that this omission was an oversight on
Justice Wadhwas diligence. This is because, Justice Wadhwa also
speciIically mentions the incidents relating to LTTE, which Iollowed in
September-October 1987:
'On 15.9.1987 one Dileepan oI LTTE went on hunger strike.
He died Iasting on 26.9.1987 |p.38 oI Justice Wadhwa`s
verdict|
'17 important Iunctionaries oI LTTE were captured by Sri
Lankan Navy in the Iirst week oI October 1987. |ibid|
'In the night oI /.10.1987 when IPKF convoy was carrying
ration it was attacked by LTTE and 11 Indian soldiers were
killed. |ibid|.
ThereIore, the selective regurgitation oI past events and Iailure to
mention and analyze a serious assassination attempt made on Rajiv
Gandhi, by the Sinhalese elements in the Sri Lankan armed Iorces, in
the Supreme Court verdict creates a credibility gap on the erudition oI
Indian judicial authorities.
RAW-1JP link
'Even though the JVP oI the 1980s and the early 1990s is
perceived as an anti-India Iorce, RAW kept in close touch with
the JVP leadership aIter Wijeweera`s death |Note bv Sri Kantha:
which occurred on Nov.13, 1989, during Premadasa`s
presidency.| RAW sources. stated that it was a tactical
necessity. RAW acknowledged that they had established
signiIicant links with the JVP. An Indian diplomat Gurjit Singh
who had established close connections with the JVP, told the
who had established close connections with the JVP, told the
author |i.e., Gunaratna| that the JVP slogan was We are not
against Indians but against India.` Subsequently over 400 JVP
activists, who were being hunted down in Sri Lanka, were given
accommodation in state run/assisted camps in South India.
Subsequently Somawansa Amarasinghe, the new leader oI the
JVP received sanctuary in India. These developments also
reIlected RAW`s dual policy vis-a-vis Sri Lanka. |Book: Indian
Intervention in Sri Lanka, 1993, pp.339-340|
II one believes this menage a trois |Premadasa, JVP and India`s
RAW|, which prevailed Irom 1987 to 1993, one can comprehend the
assassinations oI Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Premadasa in 1993 as the
Iirst one precipitated by Premadasa and the second one as a revenge
act masterminded by the RAW team. It cannot be denied that the
LTTE also had links with RAW and Premadasa. But one should also
note that Pirabhakaran retuned to Eelam in January 1987 to Iree
himselI Irom the tentacles oI the RAW. The links between Premadasa
and LTTE were oI short-term duration |mainly lasting a little more
than an year during1989-90 and tactical in nature|.
Observations of Rajeev Sharma
On Premadasa`s plausible connections to Rajiv Gandhi assassination, I
will present excerpts Irom the book, Bevond the Tigers (1998),
authored by Rajeev Sharma, an Indian journalist. Chapter 10 oI this
book, entitled The Foreign Hand`, Iocuses on Premadasa`s role and
the Israel`s Ioreign intelligence agency Mossad`s involvement in South
Asian politics. Rajeev Sharma also highlights the path taken by the SIT
oIIicials with a statement, 'Several important leads were obtained by
the SIT, but Ior some inexplicable reason, these were not pursued to
their logical conclusion. |p.171| Now to two lengthy excerpts Irom
this chapter.
'There are two ways oI looking at the Premadasa imbroglio.
One, Premadasa took his political hatred towards Rajiv to the
macabre conclusion oI plotting the Indian leader`s assassination.
And once the objective oI eliminating Rajiv was achieved,
Premadasa himselI was bumped oII in a typical LTTE style oI
eliminating the man who knew too much. This theory seems
probable with the assertion oI J.Ranganath, sentenced to death by
the trial court Ior sheltering Rajiv`s assassins, Sivarasan and
Subha. |Note bv Sri Kantha: Sharma`s book was released in
1998, when Ranganath`s status was pending beIore the Supreme
Court appeal. In May 1999, the Supreme Court acquitted
Ranganath.|
Ranganath, who Iiled an aIIidavit beIore the Jain commission
accusing the CBI oI holding key Iacts and shielding several
culprits, said in an interview to Outlook (December 8, 1997) that
Sivarasan wanted to go abroad directly Irom Bangalore`.
Sivarasan Ieared that he might be killed iI he were to go back to
JaIIna, Ranganath told the magazine. He also said Sivarasan,who
regarded controversial Tantrik Chandraswami as his godIather`,
would arrange saIe passage Ior the one-eyed Jack.
UnIortunately, the Jain Commission did not launch any
investigation oI its own into these allegations. The Commission
did not even take cognizance oI Ranganath`s aIIidavit.
The second possible theory about Premadasa`s role could be that
he got Rajiv assassinated through Iormer LTTE cadres, and then
blamed the Tigers. With this masterly move, according to this
theory, Premadasa killed two birds with one stone: a political
adversary in a much bigger neighbouring country was removed
Irom the scene, and the all-important Ioreign support base (Tamil
Nadu) oI enemy at home (the LTTE), smashed Ior years to
come. This may be a good enough reason Ior the LTTE to
eliminate Premadasa. Ironically, Premadasa died in a shockingly
similar manner as Rajiv. |Book: Bevond the Tigers, 1998, pp.
181-182|
Ten pages later, in the same chapter, Rajeev Sharma reinIorced the
shortcomings oI SIT`s investigational strategy. To quote,
'All through, the SIT pursued a single lead the LTTE
involvement in Rajiv`s assassination. But was it so? Was LTTE
so short-sighted so as to invite India`s wrath and lose its only saIe
haven outside Sri Lanka Tamil Nadu as eventually happened?
The LTTE, on the other hand, would Iavour a strong leader in
New Delhi to provide it much needed international backing and
Iunds. The meeting oI LTTE emissaries like Kasi Anandan and
London-based sympathizer, Sitambalam, with Rajiv Gandhi,
viewed in this context, are not at all surprising. These two men
were reportedly negotiating with Rajiv in order to solicit his
support Ior the LTTE. There is no report to suggest that Rajiv
was showing the door to the LTTE.
And the investigators took the RajivLTTE parleys as a
smokescreen on the part oI the Tigers to hide their true intent and
lull their target into a Ialse sense oI complacency. Who gained, or
could have gained, Irom Rajiv`s murder? Obviously, Sri Lanka
government was the direct and the immediate beneIiciary. Sri
Lanka stood to gain iI Rajiv, who was tipped to return to power,
were to be removed Irom the scene. It helped to create chaos in
India and kept a giant weak. It also prevented the new prime
minister Irom trusting the LTTE.
Colombo had its own vested interests in the whole aIIair. II it
could be deIinitely Iixed that the LTTE was in some way
involved, nobody would stand to beneIit more than Colombo as
its main adversary, the LTTE, would then lose the sanctuary in
Tamil Nadu that kept it alive during the most diIIicult periods.
And precisely this happened.
The Iortuitous Iinding oI Hari Babu`s loaded camera Irom the
assassination site with tell-tale photographs would not look all that
chancy iI one looks at the whole aIIair Irom this angle. |Book:
Bevond the Tigers, 1998, pp.191-192|
Observations of Vijay Karan
To Rajeev Sharma`s book, Bevond the Tigers, India`s ex-CBI director
Vijay Karan (during whose tenure the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi
happened) had written a 7-page Foreword. Some oI Karan`s vital
observations deserve reproduction, since he was in charge oI the
immediate inquiry process which Iollowed the assassination. Though
he do not conIirm the inIerences and conjectures made by Rajeev
Sharma outrightly, Vijay Karan also had highlighted with under-
statements quite a number oI gray areas which riddle the assassination.
I reproduce two paragraphs Irom Vijay Karan`s reminiscences.
'On May 30 |1991|, I Ilew to Colombo with S.K.Datta and
Kartikeyan, looking Ior clues, but still not sure that the LTTE had
done it or that Sivarasan and Dhanu were LTTE operatives. All the Sri
Lankan agencies who could help us opened their doors to us, more
than ready to help. But none oI the Sri Lankan intelligence or
investigative agencies could throw any light on whether the LTTE had
actually committed the deed or on the identity oI the two persons in
the Hari Babu pictures. We were loaded with conjectures and
presumptions, but nothing really oI tantalizing use, except one clue.
We had been Iive days in Colombo and everyone was getting
restive in Delhi. What`s new, I was repeatedly asked every day.
Eventually, I was told to return to Delhi and brieI the government
on the progress oI the investigation. On my last day in Colombo,
we got the inIormation, provided by a leader oI a Tamil outIit
other than the LTTE |Note bv Sri Kantha: It would be interesting
to guess, who would have been this non-LTTE leader?| that the
man in one oI Hari Babu`s pictures was one-eyed and that his
name was Pakyaraj. It was in Iact one oI so many leads and
conjectures that we did not know what to make oI it. Leaving
behind Datta and Kartikeyan in Colombo, I Ilew to Madras late
in the evening. The entire SIT was there at the airport to meet
me. I was told that the investigation in Madras had shown that
the unidentiIied man oI the Hari Babu photographs was a one-
eyed LTTE operative called Shivraj Master. |Book: Bevond the
Tigers by Rajeev Sharma, 1998, Foreword|
Vijay Karan also indicated in his Ioreword, 'By June 12 |1991|,
Nalini, her mother, her brother and her LTTE boyIriend |reIerring to
Murugan| had been arrested. The rest, as the cliche goes, is history.
Is this a minor slip oI memory Ior Vijay Karan in 1998? The 1999
Supreme Court verdict oI Justice Wadhwa records, Nalini and her
husband Murugan were arrested on June 14, 1991. This contradiction
in the date oI arrests is not insigniIicant, I believe.
Vijay Karan had also noted cryptically, 'When we were in Colombo in
the Iirst week oI June 1991, we were told in whispers by various
persons that Premadasa could be behind it. There is a lot oI diIIerence
between could be and is. I am not trying to say that there was no
larger conspiracy.
The subtle use of double negatives in the last sentence, coming Irom
the then Director oI the CBI who led the Rajiv assassination inquiries
has some signiIicance. UnIortunately, Vijay Karan also has hidden his
Colombo sources with the phrase whispers by various persons`. Were
they Sinhalese? Or were they Tamils? Were they politicians? Or were
they law enIorcement personnel?
To summarise the Sinhalese angle oI the Rajiv Gandhi assassination,
journalist Rajeev Sharma has presented two theories. One is
Premadasa did it in collusion with LTTE`. The other is Premadasa
did it and pointed the Iingers at LTTE, who in vengeance assassinated
Premadasa two years later in the similar Iashion.` Subramanian
Swamy, an ardent apologist Ior Israel and Mossad in India, in his 2000
book on Rajiv Gandhi assassination, presents his angle with a variant
oI Rajeev Sharma`s Iirst theory: that is, Premadasa and Pirabhakaran
jointly did it to eliminate their common adversary.` But Swamy`s track
record on serious matters have as much credibility as Nixon`s on
integrity. |Continued|

Part 34
Sachi Sri Kantha
17 May 2002]
The Tamil Sentiments and V.P.Singh`s
Views
A Preliminary Note on Resumption of the Series. I resume the Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
series, after a self-imposed suspension of three months. Though since inception, I had managed to
contribute the first 33 parts on a weekly basis, due to pressing demand of time in a new work
environment, I have to lax this pace a little, and I plan to continue the series at fortnightly intervals. I
appreciate the understanding of the readers in this regard.
Introduction
That the Rajiv Gandhi assassination in May 1991 placed
Tamils (living in India, Eelam, Sri Lanka and elsewhere) in a
state oI shock and utter disbelieI is not an exaggeration. As
individuals vary in their physical dimensions and intellectual
capacities, the reaction oI Tamils to this tragic event also
varied.
One could conveniently categorize the Tamil sentiments into
three broad types: naive hearts, karma-believers and
opportunistic tear-shedders cum hypocrites. I provide
examples oI these three types below.
1. Naive Hearts quite a segment oI journalists in India
and elsewhere.
2.
Karma Believers quite a segment oI Tamil
population, who do not express their views openly Ior
reasons oI being tagged as politically incorrect.
3. Opportunistic Tear-Shedders quite a segment oI
politicians and political analysts in Tamil Nadu, anti-
LTTE militant groups in Eelam.
Among these, Naive-Hearts and Opportunistic Tear-
Shedders have been voluble and willingly prattle politically-
correct sentiments. They also lead a symbiotic existence.
correct sentiments. They also lead a symbiotic existence.
Contrastingly, Karma Believers have been mostly silent, due
to shyness in expressing their politically incorrect sentiments.
I should state where I belonged. I`m an unabashed karma-
believer and in the past I had received some Ilak in the
columns oI Lanka Guardian journal Ior stating this position
openly.
Jiews of a Aaive-Heart 1amil and a Karma-Believer
First, I provide an example oI a nave heart editorial in
entirety, presented in the Tamil Times oI London. Then, I
submit my critique Ior this editorial which, though Iorwarded
Ior publication went unpublished.
'An Act of Unvarnished Terrorism
The tragic spectacle oI 20 year old Rahul perIorming
his traditional duty, witnessed by tens oI thousands oI
weeping and wailing mourners including an imposing
array oI international heads oI state and statesmen, oI
igniting the Iuneral pyre putting to rest his Iather, Rajiv
Gandhi, one oI India`s best known and charismatic
leaders, demonstrated the sheer cruelty oI the crime
committed at Sriperumpudur in Tamil Nadu on 21 May.
Seven years ago, Rajiv Gandhi Iound himselI in similar
circumstances presiding at the Iuneral oI his mother, the
much loved Indira Gandhi, who was assassinated in an
act oI gross betrayal by her own bodyguards to whom
she had entrusted her saIety. This time a gang oI
pathological murderous conspirators had goaded a
woman sick in her head to convert herselI into a human
bomb to perIorm the diabolical deed. The news oI the
dastardly assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi sent shock
waves across the world and numbed the entire Indian
nation. The people oI Tamil Nadu were shamed by the
Iact that this act oI unmitigated brutality was carried out
in their midst.
The murder oI Rajiv Gandhi constitutes an act oI
unvarnished terrorism. II non-Indian elements were
involved in the conspiracy and the commission oI this
crime, then it graduates into the realm oI international
terrorism, and those who master-minded it must be
deemed to be and dealt with as international terrorists.
deemed to be and dealt with as international terrorists.
And those who provide post Iacto cover must be
treated as accessories aIter the crime.
The cowardly character oI the perpetrators oI Rajiv`s
muder is demonstrated by the Iact that they have had no
courage to claim responsibility Ior their own act. They
know that they stand condemned beIore the world and
wait in the hope that they would never be Iound. But
when they goaded the woman bomber to wear the belt
packed with lethal explosives around her waist, they
knew that she also would explode into bits. Having thus
helped to kill one oI their own in an act oI odious
savagery, the perpetrators have disowned her in a
display oI characteristic disloyalty and ingratitude Ior
loyalty and gratitude are human values which such evil
minds do not know or understand and her unclaimed
shattered remains lie embalmed in the corner oI an
Indian mortuary. Even her parents have not come
Iorward to claim her remains.
The sophisticated nature oI the technology used, the
method employed and the precision with which the
assassination was carried out provide evidence oI a
sordid plot conceived in secrecy and preparations made
months in advance. The plotters struck when Rajiv
engaged in a nationwide electoral campaign, an essential
activity in a Iunctioning democracy Ior a leader who
wanted to be close to his people. Had he been
concerned with his personal saIety and surrounded
himselI with an impregnable security ring, he would be
alive today. But he paid the supreme price Ior having
chosen to go out among the people. The assassination
oI Rajiv dramatically illustrates the vulnerability oI those
who believe in open politics and democracy. It also
demonstrates the utter contempt terrorists oI the ilk who
conspired to murder him have Ior open politics and
democracy. It is maniIestly clear that those who were
responsible Ior his killing were Irightened at the
prospect oI Rajiv returning to power through the
electoral process and every indication at the time oI his
murder was that he would have become Prime Minister
aIter the elections. By his murder they were desperately
seeking to undermine the electoral process and subvert
seeking to undermine the electoral process and subvert
the democratic verdict oI the people.
Very Iew countries in the third world remain committed
to the ideals oI democracy and democratic processes
and India is an illustrious example. Indian democracy
has been resilient enough to withstand many challenges
and such tragedies in the past. One hopes that India and
its people will emerge Irom their recent traumatic
experience and continue to thrive as a vibrant
democracy by deIeating the dark divisive and evil
Iorces who are seeking to subvert democracy and
destabilize their country.
|Tamil Times (London) editorial, June 15, 1991, p.3|
That this editorial was a knee-jerk reaction oI a naive heart is
amply visible, since it glossed over the imperIections oI
durbar democracy and dark-spots oI Rajiv rule in India,
between 1984 and 1989. Thus, I submitted a critique.
My Critique to the above-editorial
'Regarding your editorial on the assassination oI Rajiv
Gandhi (Tamil Times, June 91), I wish to make the
Iollowing comments. You are correct in condemning
the brutal manner in which Rajiv lost his liIe. But to
eulogize him beyond limits shows that you have
temporarily suIIered Irom a Iatal attack oI naivete.
Though you imply that Rajiv Gandhi believed in open
politics and democracy` and as a consequence met his
tragic death, his Iive year record as the prime minister
oI India (between 1984 and 1989) shows that he did not
come out clean in his adherence to democratic
principles. As Barbara Crossette, the New York Times
correspondent, who was with Rajiv on that IateIul day
oI May 21
st
correctly noted in her analysis oI Rajiv`s
legacy, he in 1987 tampered with the Kashmir state
politics Ior the short term advantage oI the Congress
Party. A rigged election in 1987 drove Ilocks oI young
people into the arms oI separatism in Kashmir` (New
York Times Weeklv, May 27, 1991). Rajiv was similarly
instrumental in the rigging oI Northern-Eastern
provincial council elections oI Sri Lanka which was
provincial council elections oI Sri Lanka which was
held under the supervision oI the IPKF army.
You also admonish the plotters oI Rajiv`s crime Ior
disowning the woman bomber`s body, and imply it as a
display oI characteristic disloyalty and ingratitude`. I
can accept this admonishment. However, how will you
explain Rajiv`s display oI characteristic disloyalty and
ingratitude` to the Tamils oI Sri Lanka, Ior engaging the
IPKF army in the Eelam territory in a preventable war
with the LTTE, which led to the death oI more than
5,000 Tamil civilians. Didn`t Rajiv betray the trust, these
5,000-odd Tamils had in him? Also, the way Rajiv
manipulated to bring out the dismissal oI the duly
elected Tamil Nadu government oI DMK early this year,
also proved that he was no Ilag-holder Ior democracy.
His motives Ior extending support Ior the
Chandrasekhar Iaction oI the Janata Dal to Iorm a
puppet government and then pulling the strings at a
whimsical moment to deny this support also is a
mockery oI democracy. Thus, your assessment that
democratic process in India has Ilourished since 1947 is
a hollow one.
In the article reIerred above, Barbara Crossette has
poignantly noted that, the so-called democracy in India
Ior the past Iour decades has been, essentially one-
party, one-Iamily rule. (with) only Iive brieI periods
when someone outside the Nehru Iamily ran India. The
dynasty has leIt a political culture shaped to its own
requirements.What Indians call the Congress culture
has also meant corruption and criminality in politics.
Both lowly clerks and members oI parliament are
bought and sold with the help oI money Irom industrial
houses seeking privileges and immunities. Public
conIidence in the democratic system is absent.`
I will believe what Barbara Crossette has written than
what you have tried to portray as Rajiv`s contribution
to India.
|Complete text oI the letter dated July 20, 1991,
submitted by Sachi Sri Kantha to the Tamil Times|
Though, the Tamil Times Iailed to publish this letter, another
oI my letter sent on the same theme to the Asahi Evening
News in Tokyo appeared in print. It was carried under the
News in Tokyo appeared in print. It was carried under the
caption Democracy in India, West DiIIer` Ior which the
caption writer oI this newspaper was responsible. The Iull
text is as Iollows:
'Many politicians oI Western nations, such as British
Prime Minister John Major and French Premier Edith
Cresson, have a simplistic notion about democracy in
India (May 22, 1991). II one is willing to accept that a
person perched on a 20-meter totem pole is actually
21.5 meters tall, then I will buy the view that democracy
has thrived in post-independent India.
To the chagrin oI naive Westerners, I wish to state that
the parliamentary democracy system never set roots in
the continents oI Asia and AIrica. In countries with
multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations, the system
oI parliamentary democracy has long been aborted in
preIerence to the durbar system oI kings (and queens)
with a support cast oI ministers, though they pretended
to act within the boundaries oI the parliamentary code
oI ethics. This has been true Ior India, a well as
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Prime Minister Major`s comments about democracy in
India, aIter Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination, shows his
ignorance oI the past and contemporary history oI
India. True, India has held general elections at Irequent
intervals. But does that trumpet the triumph oI
democracy? In the year Rajiv Gandhi was born, his
grandIather Jawaharlal Nehru (then a Ireedom Iighter
against British imperialism) wrote a book called The
Discoverv of India. In it, the Iirst prime minister oI India
wrote,
'.General election does not alwavs lead to the
success of the better man. Sensitive persons, and those
who were not prepared to adopt rough-and-readv
methods to push themselves forward, were at a
disadvantage and preferred to avoid these contests.
Was democracv then to be a close preserve of those
possessing thick skins and loud voices and
accommodating consciences?`
We should also note that, while democracy is now
associated proudly with the United States, as Richard
Shenkman wrote in his book Legend, Lies and
Cherished Mvths of American Historv (1988):
'so controversial was the word democrat that it does
not appear in anv of the famous documents associated
with the birth of the United States not in the
Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution or
anv of the state constitutions.`
Eulogies notwithstanding, Rajiv Gandhi did practice
what his grandIather had Ieared. For historical record,
one should be reminded that Rajiv Gandhi, during his
term as prime minister, did endorse violent election-
rigging in Kashmir (1987) as well as in the northern and
eastern provinces oI Sri Lanka (1988).
The eulogy oI President George Bush to Rajiv Gandhi
also sounds hollow and hypocritical. The politician who
was chieIly responsible Ior the loss oI more than
100,000 lives in Iraq early this year, now shed some
tears Ior the tragedy` and condemns the violence`.
Holy cow. |Asahi Evening News, Tokyo, Jun3 6,
1991, p.8|
Apart Irom the criticism reported by Barbara Crossette, then
covering India Ior the New York Times, my opinion on
Rajiv`s period as prime minister oI India, has been
substantiated by knowledgeable Mark Tully, the then resident
BBC correspondent, who was Iluent in Hindi. In his book
No Full Stops in India, published Iollowing the death oI
Rajiv Gandhi, Tully had observed,
'.His [Rafivs] political apprenticeship lasted onlv
three vears. Then, on 31 October 1984, his mother
was assassinated and he found himself prime minister
of India.
The goodwill with which he started his premiership
was demonstrated bv the record maforitv he won in
the general election two months later. But that was not
goodwill he had won for himself. He had gained it
because of svmpathv for his mother and because he
had plaved on Indians fear that their countrv might
had plaved on Indians fear that their countrv might
breakup a fear he had aroused bv exploiting
hostilitv towards Sikhs after the assassination of his
mother bv two of her Sikh bodvguards. Five vears
later, a humiliating electoral defeat showed that Rafiv
Gandhi had dissipated his stock of goodwill.
Its constitution commits India to socialism, secularism
and democracv. All three had come under
unparalleled pressure bv the time Rafiv Gandhi
stepped down as prime minister.` |Book: No Full
Stops in India, Viking, 1991, pp.330-336|
It should be noted that in this appraisal oI Rajiv`s
perIormance as the prime minister, Mark Tully had not
mentioned a word about the Ioray and Iumbling entanglement
oI Rajiv with J.R.Jayewardene`s war with Tamil Tigers.
Opportunistic 1ear-shedders
Among those belonging to this category, current Tamil Nadu
ChieI Minister Jayalalitha and her on-again oII-again political
pal Subramanian Swamy stand out. In a brieI 1999 proIile
entitled Government-Wrecker` on her political antics,
journalist A.S.Panneerselvan wrote about Jayalalitha as
Iollows,
'.She became chieI minister by riding the sympathy
wave generated by Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination in
Tamil Nadu in 1991. The Iollowing year, she snapped
her ties with Congress saying: Rajiv Gandhi`s killing
has nothing to do with my political ascendancy. I was
voted to power because I am the most popular leader in
the state`. However in 1996, just beIore the national
elections, she rushed to Congress leaders with a
begging bowl and managed to secure an alliance.
|Asiaweek magazine, Hongkong, May 7, 1999|.
In supreme egoist Subramanian Swamy`s dictionary oI
politics, words such as consistency, Iriendship, and loyalty
(as understood by other polite humans) are absent. The
Asiaweek magazine oI Jan.15, 1988 carried a cover story on
Sonia Gandhi. In it, Swamy was quoted as Iollows:
'When she |Sonia| returns Irom abroad she carries not
less than sixteen bags and those sail through customs
less than sixteen bags and those sail through customs
without being checked. India is not the Philippines but
within the constraints oI the situation, she is a
blossoming Imelda to Rajiv`s Marcos.
That was in 1988, when Swamy ridiculed Rajiv and Sonia as
India`s Marcos and Imelda`, when Rajiv was the Prime
Minister oI India. Then, in a recent RediII.com interview
(April 4, 2002) to Tara Shankar Sahay, he has opined as
Iollows:
Question: 'You were said to be a Iriend oI the late
Congress leader Rajiv Gandhi.
Swamy: 'I was a very good Iriend oI Rajiv Gandhi and
I had aIIection Ior Sonia as his wiIe. But then I Iound
that in every action oI hers, she was doing what Rajiv
would never have liked. For instance, take Rajiv
Gandhi`s killer, (insert by the copywriter: Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam leader Jellupillai) Prabhakaran.
Sonia has never once got up in Parliament to ask what
happened to her husband`s killers or allowed any
Congress MP to get up and ask what happened to
Prabhakaran. Why has the government not caught
Prabhakaran?
Swamy`s 'aIIection (whatever that means to him) Ior Sonia
soured Iollowing his perception that she had been, to use the
words oI journalist Sachidananda Murthy, 'soIt towards the
LTTE, especially as she wrote to President K.R.Narayanan
seeking commutation oI the sentence on Nalini in the Rajiv
assassination case. |The Week magazine, April 29, 2001|
That Swamy was a crass opportunist and a pathological liar
is an open secret in India. To quote Murthy again,
'Two years ago |in 1999| Subramanian Swamy was an
admirer and personal Iriend oI Sonia Gandhi. When he
wrote a book on the conspiracies behind the
assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi, Swamy presented the
Iirst copy to Sonia. He told her oI his Iriendship with
Rajiv and how Rajiv preIerred Swamy to become prime
minister in 1990 instead oI Chandra Shekhar. He was
the one who brought Sonia close to AIADMK supreme
Jayalalitha in the summer oI 1999 at a tea party that
brought down the Vajpayee government. But Swamy
brought down the Vajpayee government. But Swamy
was soon angry with both ladies because they did not
support him in the Lok Sabha elections later than year.
|ibid|.
Rajiv Candhi as a karma-believer
I wish to brieIly speculate where did Rajiv Gandhi himselI
stood with respect to his assassination. I`m oI the opinion,
based solelv on his 1984 confession made to his wiIe Sonia
beIore being elevated as the prime minister, that though being
born to a non-Hindu Iather (Feroze Gandhi) and a nominally
Hindu mother (Indira Nehru), Rajiv himselI had subscribed,
at least partiallv, to the theory oI karma. His entry into
politics and then prime ministership was Iorced on him by
the premature deaths oI his younger brother Sanjay in 1980
and his mother Indira in 1984. ProoI oI Rajiv`s Iatalism, or
should one say a cryptic belieI in karma, is presented by his
wiIe Sonia Gandhi, in her coIIee-table book entitled Rafiv
(1992). In it, Sonia has recalled Rajiv`s reaction to her plea
Ior rejecting the primeministership which was Iorced on to
him by the sycophants oI the Congress Party Iollowing
Indira`s assassination. According to Sonia,
'I begged him not to let them do this. I pleaded with
him, with others around him, too. He would be killed as
well. He held my hands, hugged me, tried to soothe my
desperation. He had no choice, he said, he would be
killed anvwav. |Irom the review oI the book by Hasar
Suroor, The Hindu International Edition, Sept.5,
1992, p.7; italics added Ior emphasis.|
What tickles me is that the Rajiv assassination trial provided
so many dubious testimonies oI bigwigs and small Iries in
Indian politics and law enIorcement circles, implicating
LTTE. The learned judges also had compulsively nit-picked
on the validity and probability oI these testimonies. But, they
had conveniently bypassed Rajiv`s premonition oI his
assassination and his conIession to his wiIe. Reliability oI
this premonition is hardly in doubt, unless one suspects (like
Subramanian Swamy Ior instance) that Sonia Gandhi made
up such a comment to boost the sales Ior her book. One
up such a comment to boost the sales Ior her book. One
should also note that Rajiv Gandhi had made his premonition
in 1984, long beIore he became entangled in the trap laid by
the patronizing J.R.Jayewardene and the pundits who
manned the Indian Ioreign policy desk. In sum, I could inIer
that Rajiv Gandhi himselI, Iollowing the tragic deaths oI
Sanjay and his mother, had come to believe in his karma.
J.P.Singh's Jiews on the Assassination
V.P.Singh is not a Tamil. But he is the one who succeeded
Rajiv Gandhi as the Prime Minister oI India. He held the
prime minister rank Irom December 2, 1989 to November 10,
1990 a vital period during which Rajiv Gandhi was in the
Opposition and had repeatedly visited Tamil Nadu without
any recorded threat Ior his liIe Irom LTTE, even though
LTTE was engaged in war with the Indian army, until March
1990. Thus, the views oI V.P.Singh deserve merit and
recognition, in multiple contexts. First, he is privy to
inIormation on the links Rajiv Gandhi wanted to Iorge with
Pirabhakaran via Karunanidhi in 1989, when Indian army was
engaged in Iighting LTTE in Eelam. Secondly, with
persuasive logic and nuance, V.P.Singh alludes that Rajiv
himselI has to take a major share oI blame Ior his tragic
death, which by not-so illogical extrapolation, can be
interpreted as abetted suicide. |see below, Singh`s answer to
the question oI negligence or complicitv.| Thirdly,
V.P.Singh`s inIormation IalsiIies quite a number oI
assumptions made by the prosecution team in the Rajiv
assassination trial, relating to the purported motive oI
Pirabhakaran.
V.P.Singh`s provocative views were presented in the
Frontline magazine |Nov.29-Dec.12, 1997|, as a 'two-hour
long interview given by him to Sukumar Muralidharan and
N.Ram. And the Frontline magazine and its editor N.Ram
are not Iriendly to Pirabhakaran or LTTE by any yardstick.
Because oI its relevance, Iirst I reproduce it in length and
then make my inIerences.
Question: What is vour first reaction to the findings of
the Jain Commission?
V.P.Singh: 'The prooI oI the pudding is in the eating.
During my tenure as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was
saIe, despite the Iact that he visited Tamil Nadu eight
times during my tenure and 11 times during
Karunanidhi`s. Now iI the Prime Minister was
unmindIul and the LTTE was there in Iorce, could Rajiv
have been saIe? It only shows that extra care was taken.
This is my Iinal explanation. Now something happened
seven months aIter I demitted oIIice and when I had no
authority. How can you Iix responsibility when I was
not in authority?
Question: But did the decisions taken in vour tenure
have a bearing on the subsequent course of events?
V.P.Singh: 'You cannot put things that way. That
brings up several other questions. Did the decisions oI
Rajiv Gandhi not have a bearing on us? Let me tell you
oI one case, oI the SPG withdrawal, where we Iollowed
Rajiv`s law. There is no order oI withdrawal under my
signature. II there is, then it is an order oI Rajiv
Gandhi`s expressed in the Iorm oI the SPG Act.
Question: You did not sign that order?
V.P.Singh: 'Rajiv Gandhi made that Act, not me.
There is no order oI withdrawal, because legally a thing
that has lapsed is simply not there it cannot be
withdrawn. Physically we may have assigned the SPG
there, but then there was no legal basis Ior it. But iI
Rajiv`s law was at Iault, as the Congressmen now say,
then they had occasion to amend it when they had a
Iriendly government not only Iriendly, but a
dependent government in oIIice. But Chandra Sekhar
has said that this matter was never brought up by the
Congress Party during his tenure.
And it is not as iI Rajiv never used to speak about his
security. He has issued press statements about his
security. I have pointed out that this claim by
Congressmen that he never used to talk about his
security is belied by the Iacts. A Iurther lapse,
perhaps even the ultimate crime, is that the deadliest oI
the LTTE cadre, the human bomb Dhanu, was taken to
Rajiv by the Congress. The photograph oI her body,
and that oI the Congress lady worker who took her to
Rajiv lying side by side, is evidence oI this.
Rajiv lying side by side, is evidence oI this.
Question: There are some suspicions that she mav
have been staving on the premises owned bv a former
Congress MP.
V.P.Singh: 'She (Dhanu) had connections in the
Congress there is no doubt about that. She could not
have come Irom Sri Lanka and just caught hold oI one
lady worker and got in to the Rajiv Gandhi meeting. So
the Congress is guilty on all counts. The security ring
was tight, because there were nine policemen killed
along with Rajiv. But Dhanu was called by Rajiv
himselI. (Former Union Home Minister) S.B.Chavan
has mentioned this somewhere. Even iI you put the
Army on guard, iI access control is breached by your
own men, or by the protectee himselI how can you
blame the security people? Rajiv was killed by a
proximate assassin and proximity cannot be achieved
without insider help, and here insider help was given by
the Congress. And iI the protectee himselI who is the
highest level oI insider Iails to cooperate, then we
cannot really blame the security agencies.
Question: Are vou making a charge of negligence or
complicitv?
V.P.Singh: 'All I am saying is that somewhere in these
matters, the responsibilities oI the protectee have to be
Iixed. No security cover can work without the
cooperation oI the protectee. When the assassination
took place, there was President`s rule in the State. A
Governor appointed by the Congress was in power and
a Congress-supported government was in place at the
Centre. Whatever the Congress may say, assassinations
have not taken place in States controlled by other
parties. They have always occurred in Congress-
controlled States and they always insist on making a big
political issue out oI it.
Question: Let us come to the other point made bv the
Jain Commission, on the LTTEs activities in Tamil
Nadu during vour regime at the Centre and
Karunanidhis in the State.
V.P.Singh: 'I would like to place certain Iacts beIore
you. In March 1989, Rajiv contacted Karunanidhi and
said that he wanted to meet Prabhakaran. But
Karunanidhi did not act on it because the Congress was
getting closer to Jayalalitha. And he said that iI they are
getting closer, then they will use this against me, I will
be in a quandary. In May perhaps, or June, Rajiv sent
Ior Murasoli Maran Irom Chennai. He told Maran to
convev to Prabhakaran that if he distances himself
from Premadasa, he would see to it that matters are
settled on favourable terms for him which means
that he was virtuallv promising Eelam.
|Note: italics
added by Sri Kantha Ior emphasis.|
Now this was Rajiv`s
personal initiative and was totally against Government
oI India policy.
The situation was like this: twice in that year he is very
much the Prime Minister at the time he aIIirms that he
wants to have the Iriendship and conIidence oI
Prabhakaran. Could he have imagined that while he was
greeting Prabhakaran with open arms, the ChieI Minister
oI Tamil Nadu would shower the LTTE with bullets? II
this is the mind oI the Prime Minister, then
administratively how do you expect the ChieI Minister
to react?
Another point is that the Nag tribunal, which banned the
LTTE,
|Note by Sri Kantha: i.e., in 1992|
said that since early
1989 the situation in the State oI Tamil Nadu became
ominous. Who was Prime Minister then? Rajiv was
there Ior eleven months oI 1989. Why did he not do
something to stop these ominous events? Now no State
government has the power to seal the sea coasts; only
the Centre has that power. There is nothing on record
to suggest that he ever did any such thing during that
period.
The question also arises: When the LTTE was in battle
with the IPKF, why did they not ban it? Unless there
was something going on behind the backs oI the
soldiers, behind the back oI the Government oI India.
Then you should also note that the order issued during
Rajiv`s time against the LTTE was oI search and
seizure oI weapons and wireless sets arrests was
prescribed only when resistance was encountered.
sangam.orgf.fPart3+.htm 1+f17
prescribed only when resistance was encountered.
There was not even the political will to arrest the LTTE
when your men were Iighting them. Why was Kittu
Ireely moving about in Chennai all through those
months oI IPKF hostilities against the LTTE? And now
they say that the State Government did not act. All
these matters were placed beIore Justice Jain, who has
ignored them in his report. This is most unIair, since as
a judge he must consider all the depositions.
Question: If vou are saving that Justice Jain was less
than fair, are vou suggesting that he was working to a
predetermined agenda?
V.P.Singh: 'Jain has just paraphrased the Congress
aIIidavit and returned it duly signed! The aIIidavit that
was Iiled six years back by (Congress counsel)
R.N.Mittal has been signed and released to the public as
a commission report.
Question: The Jain thesis seems to be that until 1986
we armed and trained the LTTE cadre, but this did
not amount to supporting anti-national activities. But
after hostilities broke out with the Indian Armv, the
LTTE became a hostile force and should have been
unequivocallv opposed.
V.P.Singh: 'In which case the point arises, why were
they not arrested or banned? Why were large numbers
oI their cadre sent back to Sri Lanka? And why was the
ChieI Minister oI Tamil Nadu being pressed Ior
contacts with the LTTE, with nobody in the
government, except Ior certain bureaucrats, knowing
about it. The IPKF went with a mandate to maintain
peace. Not only did they have to Iight, they also
became victims oI duplicity. Premadasa Iinally gave an
ultimatum to the IPKF to return, and we got the
impression that he had negotiated with Prabhakaran
also. So we became targets oI both Premadasa and
the Tamils. These are the events leading to the Rajiv
assassination.
I have also pointed out and this is part oI the DMK
deposition also that there are several newspaper
reports Irom that time quoting speeches made by
Jayalalitha, in which she said that the LTTE is Iighting a
just war. Rajiv oIten sat through such meetings and he
never once said that the LTTE is an anti-national Iorce.
What would the people understand Irom this? And then
we say that the Government oI Tamil Nadu is at Iault?
My Inferences on J.P.Singh's Jiews
Lest one think that V.P.Singh is a partisan to either
Pirabhakaran`s or LTTE`s interests, he also has stated in the
same interview to Muralidharan and Ram, 'If ever there was
a time when we did not negotiate with the LTTE, that was
during mv tenure. We knew that even after the IPKF was
withdrawn, there would be a fight between the EPRLF and
the LTTE and between the Sri Lankan armv and all the
rest, and that there would be an influx of refugees into our
soil.` Thus, V.P.Singh`s observations on Rajiv assassination
gains some credibility.
Unlike Subramanian Swamy or Jayalalitha or J.N.Dixit who
had unabashedly asserted that Pirabhakaran 'killed Rajiv
Gandhi, V.P.Singh has not linked Pirabhakaran to Rajiv`s
death. Rather, he has stressed the neglected Iact that no one
has bothered to look into the 'responsibilities oI the
protectee |i.e., Rajiv| and asserted that 'No security cover
can work without the cooperation oI the protectee.
One oI the questionable assumptions in the Rajiv
assassination trial in ascribing the motive Ior the crime was
that Pirabhakaran harbored a hatred Ior Rajiv Gandhi since
he was placed under restriction beIore the announcement oI
Jayewardene-Gandhi Accord in 1987, and this led to Rajiv`s
assassination in 1991. II that is so, as V.P.Singh pointed out,
how come Rajiv was not attacked during the tenure oI
V.P.Singh`s period |between Dec.2, 1989 and Nov.10, 1990|
and that he was able to visit Tamil Nadu eleven times
between Dec.1989 and January 1991 until the State was
placed under President`s rule?
In his interview, V.P.Singh also exposed the selIish mentality
oI Karunanidhi in March 1989, who was most keen on saving
his skin rather than helping Rajiv to 'meet Pirabhakaran.
|Continued.|

Part 35
Sachi Sri Kantha
31 May 2002]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination - International Links
Pirabhakaran - A Moron?
OI course, millions oI Tamils know that Pirabhakaran is not
a moron by any objective criterion. His track record (now
lasting Ior 25 years) in guiding the LTTE into an
internationally recognized army proves that. But, Ior
mediocre analysts and journalists who earn a living by his
name, sticking a moron` label on Pirabhakaran is a
comIortable exercise. One oI the tortured reasonings
presented by the media analysts in attributing a motive to
Pirabhakaran`s alleged decision` to eliminate Rajiv Gandhi
in 1991 was that he Ieared re-induction oI the Indian army in
Eelam, iI the Congress Party Iormed the government in India
Iollowing the general election. As one oI the voluble
proponents oI this motive, Rohan Gunaratna, presents it:
'The assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi was imperative Ior
the LTTE. II the LTTE did not, the IPKF that withdrew
would have returned heralding another period oI bloody
Iighting. Prabhakaran`s calculus was right. As a leader,
he had done his duty by his rank and Iile. By
assassinating Rajiv Gandhi, he prevented the
reintroduction oI the IPKF to Sri Lanka. |presented in
the Sundav Times, Colombo, Jan.19, 1997; as an
excerpt Irom a chapter Irom his book|
That this inIerence is nothing but baloney and based on
deluded thinking can be asserted Irom the actions oI
President J.R.Jayewardene and his nominal deputy in the
1980s, R.Premadasa. The Indian army was brought into Sri
Lanka by Jayewardene in 1987, and this action was
vehemently opposed by Premadasa. By early 1989, when he
assumed power, Premadasa was keen on sending back the
Indian army and reverse the Iaulty step taken by his
predecessor. While he was rightIully boasting this as his
predecessor. While he was rightIully boasting this as his
major contribution to protect the sovereignty oI Sri Lanka,
one should be insane to swallow the logic presented by
analysts like Gunaratna, that Premadasa would have willingly
invited the Indian army again into Sri Lanka, even iI Rajiv
Gandhi and his coterie were inclined to do the same. What
Jayewardene did in 1987 was a consensual act, about which
Premadasa was screaming rape`. One should give the
political devil his due. Whatever his Iaults were, abrasive
Premadasa was a Buddhist moralist to the core, and it is
incredulous to even consider that he would have committed
the same consensual act` in 1991 which would have
tarnished his image Ior which he had labored Ior decades.
Then, it is also laughable to think that Pirabhakaran could be
a moron (like Ior instance V.Perumal oI EPRLF) and could
not comprehend Premadasa`s mind. In my assessment, iI
Pirabhakaran can be Iaulted it could be Ior his penchant Ior
ruthless disciplinarianism, but not Ior being a moron.
A critical look on non-L11E suspects
Just as evading the documentable evidence Ior LTTE
involvement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is
unacceptable, equally detestable is the outright elimination oI
the international links to the assassination, which question the
LTTE did it` hypothesis oI the Indian law enIorcement
personnel. Other than LTTE, identiIiable parties who had
political, economical and Iinancial motives Ior eliminating
Rajiv Gandhi included,
1.

The Sri Lankan State and Sinhalese chauvinist
elements.
2.

Secessional elements in India such as Khalistan group
and Kashmir group.
3.

Rajiv`s opponents with the Congress Party
4.

International mercenaries, in alignment with the
Intelligence Agencies such as Mossad oI Israel.
Subramanian Swamy, in his book, The Assassination of
Rafiv Gandhi (2000) has inIormed that the CBI sleuths in
India carried out a Probability Analysis` Iollowing Rajiv
Gandhi assassination and by May 31, 1991, had identiIied
the suspects as belonging to the LTTE, Irom a list oI seven.
the suspects as belonging to the LTTE, Irom a list oI seven.
I provide the details oI this probability analysis, courtesy oI
Swamy, and brieIly comment on its reliability.
Eight parameters (identiIied as variants`) had been chosen
and each was scored Irom 1 to 5 in increasing order oI
probability against the 7 targeted suspects. The chosen eight
parameters were,
1.

Intelligence inputs regarding known earlier plans or
level oI antagonism
2.

BeneIiciary analysis probability
3.

Level oI improvised explosive device (IED)
Iabrication expertise known/probable
4.

Accessibility to Materials Used.
5.

Availability oI cadres who can perIorm such a task
6.

Probability on the basis oI modus operandi and
circumstances oI the case
7.

Capability analysis on the basis oI area oI strike
8.

Probability considering unidentiIied (UI) lady as the
prime suspect
Then, the 7 targeted suspects in the books oI CBI sleuths
were,
1.

Sikh terrorists
2.

Kashmiri militants
3.

United Liberation Front oI Assam
4.

People`s War Group (alias Naxalites) in India
5.

Tamil militant groups |non-LTTE|
6.

Sri Lankan government/mercenary
7.

LTTE
So Iar, so good. The scores received by these 7 targeted
suspects Ior each oI the above 8 parameters ranking
consecutively Irom 1 to 8 are given below.
1.

Sikh terrorists: 5 5 4 4 1 2 1 1 23 out oI
40.
2.

Kashmiri militants: 3 4 2 5 1 1 1 0 17 out
oI 40.
3.

United Liberation Front oI Assam: 2 3 1 0 0 0
1 0 07 out oI 40.
4.

Naxalites oI India: 2 3 1 0 2 1 2 2 13 out
oI 40.
5.

non-LTTE Tamil militant groups: 1 1 1 0 1 3
3 3 13 out oI 40.
6.

Sri Lankan government/mercenary: 0 3 4 5 2
3 3 3 23 out oI 40.
7.

LTTE: 2 2 5 5 5 55 4 33 out oI 40.
Thus, in the books oI CBI, the suspect which received the
highest probability score` turned out to be LTTE. That this
arbitrary scale is a flawed one can be shown as Iollows:
First, the designated scores are highly questionable. To cite
one example, Ior the Iirst parameter (i.e, the level oI
antagonism), Sikh terrorists had received the maximum score
oI 5; LTTE received 2 and the Sri Lanka
Government/Mercenary had received a zero score. II the
CBI sleuths have studied the history without blinkers, the Sri
Lanka Government/Mercenary also should have been scored
5, since there was a serious assassination attempt on Rajiv in
July 1987 at Colombo. The anti-Indian speeches oI the then
Sri Lankan President Premadasa, between 1984 and 1991,
make a mockery oI the zero score granted Ior the Iirst
parameter.
Secondly, considering the antagonism Rajiv Iaced within his
Congress Party, anti-Rajiv Iorces within his party or even the
power peddlers (such as Chandra Swamy) should have
Iormed another suspect group. Probability oI their collusion
with shady Eelam Tamil militants who were trained by the
RAW personnel (such as Sivarasan) or with whom RAW
oIIicials developed some aIIinity (such as Mahattaya, the ex-
Deputy Leader oI LTTE) to weaken Pirabhakaran has been
ignored Ior convenience.
Thirdly, by design or ignorance, the probability oI two
suspects |such as the non-LTTE militants and the Sri Lankan
Government/Mercenary| joining hands to achieve their
Government/Mercenary| joining hands to achieve their
mission has not been considered by the CBI sleuths in their
calculation. II this additive probability is calculated, the total
score oI the two suspects could equal or even exceed the
total score oI LTTE.
Fourthly, though the mere mention oI numbers may project
the analysis to be scientiIic, how the observer bias by the
CBI was eliminated or decreased has not been explained.
Ignored Suspects: 1he Sri Lankan Covernment and
1amil mercenaries
How Ilawed is the probability analysis oI the CBI sleuths can
be illustrated by a pungent opinion-piece published in the
The Illustrated Weeklv of India (Aug.22-28, 1992). It was
authored by one Dr.Norman Baker, who was introduced as a
US-based writer. In this highly relevant piece, Baker had
Iocused on elements that were ignored by the Special
Investigation Team (SIT) oIIicials, but deserved notice
relating to the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi.
I have been unable to identiIy who this Norman Baker is,
since I have not read any oI his other published
contributions, prior to or aIter the Rajiv assassination,
though he began his commentary with the sentence, 'As a
student oI the history and politics oI India, the events
Iollowing the assassination oI the Iormer Indian prime
minister, Rajiv Gandhi, have been a subject oI intense interest
to me. A computer search via the Google search engine
generated two candidates with the name Norman Baker. One
is a historian belonging to the University at BuIIalo, The
State University oI New York, who was awarded the
Chancellor`s Award Ior Excellence in Teaching. Another
Norman Baker (b.1957) is currently a Liberal Democrat MP
in Britain, representing Lewes constituency since 1997. His
bio-data states that he was a teacher previously. Recently, his
name has appeared in Indian press related to his queries on
the issue oI British passport in 1999 to business baron
running the Hinduja Group. It is Ieasible that neither oI these
two individuals authored this critical commentary.
Despite this caveat on the identity oI the author, the 1992
opinion-piece published by the Illustrated Weeklv of India
magazine deserves notice Ior its vigor. So as not to distort
magazine deserves notice Ior its vigor. So as not to distort
the case presented by the author, I provide lengthy excerpts
below:
'.In my opinion, the investigation by the SIT was
Ilawed Irom the very beginning. As one looks into
statements made by SIT oIIicials, leaks Irom SIT
sources and the general direction which the investigation
took, it is rather evident that the SIT had started with
the assumption (maybe even the conclusion) that the
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was
responsible Ior the assassination. Instead oI looking Ior
and analyzing evidence in order to Iind who the culprits
behind the assassination were, the SIT seems to have
been looking Ior and analysing evidence to prove their
assumption that the LTTE was guilty. Even when some
pieces oI evidence at hand suggested that the LTTE
might not have anything to do with the assassination,
the SIT tried to Iorce-Iit such evidence to support their
pre-conceived notion that the LTTE was guilty.
The Sri Lankan government under President Premadasa
was as anti-Rajiv as the LTTE. Premadasa opposed the
India-Sri Lanka Peace Accord oI 1987 and the
induction oI Indian troops into Sri Lanka in 1987 Irom
the very beginning. His presidential election campaign
included a pledge to get the Indian troops out oI Sri
Lanka. His Iirst Ioreign policy initiative as the newly
elected president was to request India to withdraw its
troops Irom Sri Lanka. When Rajiv Gandhi
procrastinated, Premadasa did the unexpected and the
unthinkable he secretly supplied large quantities oI
arms to the Sri Lankan government`s long-term enemy,
the LTTE. Finally, the Indian troops were withdrawn in
1990 and the new Indian Prime Minister V.P.Singh,
pursued a hands-oII policy on the Sri Lankan civil war.
Premadasa likened Singh`s hands-oII policy to
Gandhi`s activist policy. Premadasa Ieared the latter`s
return to power. He Ieared that Rajiv Gandhi might
interIere in the Sri Lankan civil war again, possibly in
support oI the LTTE, as he and his mother Indira
Gandhi did until July 1987. Thus, the Sri Lankan
government under President Premadasa had a motive to
see that Rajiv Gandhi did not come to power again. Did
see that Rajiv Gandhi did not come to power again. Did
the Sri Lankan government have the means (the ability)
to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu?
Baker continues Iurther,
'The Sri Lankan government might not have had the
means to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi directly but it had
close relationships with some Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla
groups, namely the EPRLF, the PLOTE and the TELO.
At least two oI these groups (PLOTE and TELO) were
helping the Sri Lankan army in its civil war with the
LTTE. These groups had operatives in Tamil Nadu Ior
many years and thus had the ability to plan and execute
the assassination. These groups also had the necessary
expertise with explosives. Moreover, these groups are
armed militants without a cause. (They had long given
up the cause oI creating a homeland Ior the Sri Lankan
Tamils.) The history oI mercenary operations tells us
that such groups are Iertile grounds Ior mercenaries.
In Iact, a Iew years ago PLOTE was involved in an
unsuccessIul mercenary operation to overthrow the
government oI the tiny island nation, Maldives. In
addition to these Tamil guerrilla groups, it is believed
that the Sri Lankan government also had some Tamils in
its intelligence service and the Sri Lankan government
did not hesitate to use them on Indian soil when
necessary. During the mid-80s, the LTTE`s political
advisor, Balasingham, lived in Madras. A Tamil Sri
Lankan intelligence operative named Kandaswamy
Naidu a Iormer Sri Lankan government employee
allegedly tried to blow up Balasingham`s Madras
residence. A case was Iiled against him in Tamil Nadu
but he escaped to Sri Lanka. Interestingly, Sivarasan,
the mastermind oI the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, was
allegedly a Iormer Sri Lankan government employee.
Baker on Sivarasan:
According to Baker,
'Throughout the investigation, while every piece oI
evidence that could possibly link the LTTE to the
assassination was painstakingly pursued, other evidence
assassination was painstakingly pursued, other evidence
was not given serious attention. One piece oI
inIormation was that Sivarasan was a Iormer Sri Lanka
government employee. Especially in view oI the
Kandaswamy Naidu episode mentioned earlier, the SIT
should have investigated any possible connections
between Sivarasan and Sri Lankan intelligence agencies.
But this was not done. Also, the question remains
unanswered: Why did the Sri Lankan government tell
the SIT in May-June 1991 that Sivarasan was an LTTE
operative but Iailed to mention his Iormer employment
with them? The Sri Lankan government distributed
Sivarasan`s photograph to its oIIices in eastern Sri
Lanka. Why wasn`t his past government employment
revealed? Was it a case oI incompetency or cover-up?
While the SIT was quick to examine the LTTE`s bank
transactions in European banks to uncover any
incriminating Iinancial transactions between the LTTE
and Ioreign governments, it made no such attempt to
investigate iI the Sri Lankan government had any
questionable Iinancial dealings with the EPRLF,
PLOTE, TELO or other mercenaries.
Furthermore, Baker has questioned the validity oI the
assumption that Sivarasan was an LTTE cadre. To quote,
'The SIT had inIormation that Sivarasan smoked
cigarettes and drank alcohol. This does not Iit the
proIile oI an LTTE operative. LTTE militants are
prohibited Irom smoking and drinking. This code oI
conduct is strictly enIorced Irom the very top to the
newest recruit. The Iact that Sivarasan smoked and
drank would seriously undermine the theory that
Sivarasan was an LTTE operative. However, the SIT
simply brushed it aside. Was Sivarasan a Iormer LTTE,
EPRLF, PLOTE or TELO operative? Did he become a
mercenary, using the skills he learned Irom these groups
and the connections he made when he was with these
groups?
In Iact, there was evidence to suggest that Sivarasan
might have been involved in a mercenary operation.
According to the SIT, Sivarasan had visited Sweden,
Singapore, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
Singapore, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
some months beIore the assassination. The LTTE had
representatives in all these countries. II Sivarasan was
planning the assassination on behalI oI the LTTE, there
was no reason Ior him to visit these countries to meet
Ioreign government agencies or collect monies or
secure explosives; the LTTE networks in these
countries are better suited to do these back-up tasks. It
is highly unlikely that the LTTE would send Sivarasan
to Ioreign countries Ior this purpose. Sivarasan`s
Ioreign trips would make sense iI he were a mercenary.
But the SIT chose to go around this piece oI evidence
and tried to Iorce-Iit it to its LTTE is guilty`
hypothesis. What was the SIT`s analysis? It concluded
that Sivarasan, while planning the assassination Ior the
LTTE, was at the same time on the payroll oI (under
contract to) an unidentiIied Ioreign government without
the knowledge oI the LTTE.
Is such a scenario plausible? Highly unlikely. The LTTE
is a well-disciplined, tightly-knit organization and it is
highly unlikely that an operative assigned Ior the most
sensitive and critical operation in the history oI the
LTTE (namely the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi)
would be able to establish contact with a Ioreign
government and travel to many Ioreign countries Ior
weeks without the knowledge oI the LTTE. It is more
likely that Sivarasan was a mercenary than a mercenary
and an LTTE operative at the same time. However, the
SIT chose to propound the latter theory."
Baker on Dhanu:
Baker`s view oI Dhanu, the woman assassin oI Rajiv
Gandhi, was as Iollows:
'An experienced covert operative-whether a Sri Lankan
Tamil guerrilla or a Sri Lankan intelligence operative
could have persuaded` a suitable young Tamil lady
raped by Indian soldiers and thus enraged against Rajiv
Gandhi, to act as a suicide-assassin. (The assassin,
Dhanu, allegedly told her Iriend, Nalini, that Indian
soldiers had raped her. The Iact that Indian soldiers
raped some Tamil women has been established beyond
raped some Tamil women has been established beyond
any doubt; iI Dhanu was a rape victim may never be
known Ior sure).
Baker on the significance of Rajiv-L11E meeting in
March 1991:
Baker attributed this vital meeting as the signal Ior the anti-
LTTE operatives to speed their mission on assassinating
Rajiv. To quote,
'Within days oI the assassination, the Hindu reported
that an LTTE emissary met Rajiv Gandhi earlier in 1991
to re-establish a cordial relationship. The Congress
Party spokesman, Pranab Mukherjee, denied that such a
meeting took place. Later, it became evident that the
meeting in Iact took place on March 5, 1991, at Rajiv
Gandhi`s New Delhi residence. This is a critical piece
oI evidence. II the meeting ended amicably and iI the
LTTE believed that Rajiv Gandhi would not be hostile
to the LTTE, then it would no longer have a motive to
assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. (II the LTTE`s Ioes were to
know oI the meeting, they might have a motive to
assassinate Rajiv.)
By giving Ialse inIormation that no such meeting took
place, the Congress spokesman essentially misled the
investigation until the truth emerged Irom other sources.
Why did the Congress Party spokesman mislead the
investigation? The only one to be adversely aIIected by
the denial is the LTTE. Were the anti-LTTE leaders
within the Congress party and its ally, the AIADMK,
responsible Ior the denial?
The Rajiv-LTTE meeting is an important piece oI
evidence and the gist oI the conversation could be
useIul in assessing the LTTE`s motives. The SIT
simply brushed it aside as a diversive tactic used by the
LTTE. But there is some prima Iacie evidence to
suggest that the Rajiv-LTTE meeting did go well. The
very Iact that Rajiv Gandhi agreed to meet an LTTE
emissary indicates that he had an open mind about the
LTTE.
Furthermore, the June 1, 1991 issue oI the Illustrated
Weeklv of India reported that intelligence sources, on
condition oI anonymity, conIirm this (the meeting) and
are inclined to view that the compromise worked out
between Rajiv and the LTTE could have been the cause
Ior the assassination and that international Iorces who
stood to lose by Rajiv becoming prime minister,
standing by the LTTE`s demand Ior an independent
Tamil Eelam could have been behind the blast
(assassination).` Who has more to lose by a
rapprochement between Rajiv and the LTTE than the
Sri Lankan government?.
Baker, concluded his commentary with the Iollowing note:
'Even iI the LTTE chieI |i.e. Pirabhakaran| is Iound
guilty by an Indian court, there will always be a lingering
doubt about whether the LTTE was really guilty oI
assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. The recent order by Judge
Siddick prohibiting the publication oI the proceedings
oI the court is more cause Ior concern.
1he role of Mossad operatives and Mercenaries
It is not a hyperbole to state that the role oI Mossad
operatives and mercenaries in the Rajiv assassination
conspiracy has been at best under-investigated, and at worst
completely ignored. The Iollowing Iacts need mention in this
regard.
1.

The warning given by the PLO ChieI Yasser AraIat to
Rajiv Gandhi on the possible threat oI latter`s liIe, Iive
weeks beIore the event.
2.

Existence oI records relating to clandestine
proIessional links Iormed by the RAW operatives and
Mossad in the 1980s, while the RAW personnel were
providing training Ior Tamil militants in India. RAW`s
most pampered group was TELO and not LTTE. This
should be linked to the revelation that Sivarasan, the
mastermind oI Rajiv assassination conspiracy, was
identiIied with TELO beIore 1987.
3.

High decibel campaign by Subramanian Swamy, a
noted apologist in India Ior Israel, in implicating onlv
LTTE Ior Rajiv`s assassination.
LTTE Ior Rajiv`s assassination.
4.

Consultancy and services oI Mossad operatives in Sri
Lanka in mid 1984 by the then President Jayewardene
during the incipient stage oI civil war, which continued
until 1989.
5.

President Premadasa`s apprehension oI Mossad Ior
Iishing` in South Asian politics, especially Iollowing
the impeachment campaign initiated by Lalith
Athulathmudali (a noted sympathizer and beneIiciary
Irom Israel), which Iollowed within Iew months aIter
Rajiv`s death.
An erroneous inference by Commissioner 1ain
Justice Milap Chand Jain, in his voluminous Commission
report (1997) on the Rajiv Assassination, has strained hard to
project a nexus among the LTTE, Mossad and CIA, and had
recommended Iurther investigations. His inIerence was
mainly based on the much publicized book Bv Wav of
Deception (1990) by Victor Ostrovsky, an ex-Mossad case
oIIicer. While reviewing this book in 1992, I had doubted the
authenticity oI Ostrovsky`s observations. Excerpts Irom my
review are as Iollows:
'.What shocked the Sinhalese ruling establishment
and the journalists (including the editor oI Lanka
Guardian, Mervyn de Silva) was the revelation oI
Ostrovski that Mossad had trained the Sinhalese military
personnel and a group oI Tamil guerrilla Iactions`
simultaneously. Based on the meager details provided
by Ostrovski, these power-brokers and opinion-makers
had identiIied LTTE as the beneIiciary oI Mossad`s
patronage.
To me, this sounds too premature and incorrect. Let
me repeat what Ostrovski had written on this topic.
Around 1983, a group oI Tamil guerrilla Iactions,
collectively known as the Tamil Tigers, began an armed
struggle to create a Tamil homeland in the north called
Eelam an on-going battle that has claimed thousands
oI lives on both sides.` This is the only sentence in the
book, where a vague reIerence is made to the Tamil
Tigers. The time-Irame Ostrovski had written about was
mid-July 1984`, when he was still a trainee at the
Mossad Academy. He had not mentioned LTTE by
name anywhere in the book. At that time, all the militant
groups Iighting Ior Eelam (LTTE, TELO, EPRLF,
EROS and PLOTE) were identiIied as Tamil Tigers`.
This point need be stressed. The authors oI Broken
Palmvra also clearly state this Iact in page 72 oI their
book: Upto this time (April 1985), the Tamil
population had hardly diIIerentiated between rival
groups. They were all reIerred to as boys and even
Tigers.`
Again the Iact is that as reported in the Economist oI
August 3, 1985, in its coverage on the Iive Tamil
militant groups, LTTE was identiIied as receiving
training Irom the PLO in Lebanon.. |Tamil Nation,
London, March 15, 1992|
My inIerence that LTTE did not have links to the Mossad
was subsequently conIirmed by the Sinhalese sources as
well. Rohan Gunaratna, the pushy anti-LTTE analyst, in his
book Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka (1993), has not dealt
in detail the embarrassing revelations oI Ostrovsky Ior
obvious reasons; the ex-Mossad agent has portrayed the
Sinhalese army team who visited Israel Ior training under
Mossad in pejorative terms such as monkeys`. He does not
even mention Ostrovsky`s book in his list oI reIerences. But,
in one sentence in the text, he has noted in passing, 'Even
though Victor Ostrovsky, a Iormer Mossad agent
sensationalized LTTE relations with Israel, there was virtually
no relationship. |p.409 oI the book|
Furthermore, at the height oI Sri Lankan army`s
embarrassing battle losses in April-May 2000 at the hand oI
LTTE, the Island newspaper published a heavily censored
news report by Keith Warren, with the caption Israelis here
again`. It reiterated my 1992 inIerence. To quote,
'During the Premadasa regime an ex-oIIicer oI the
Mossad intelligence agency accused the Israelis oI
helping the LTTE too and Premadasa appointed a
commission to investigate that allegation. The then
service commanders testiIied to say that it was the PLO
which helped the LTTE and not the Israelis. |Island,
Colombo, May 7, 2000|
Mossad's Links to the Sri Lankan army and RAW
One oI the early reports I have in my Iiles on the Sri Lankan
army`s links to the Mossad was a Ieature by Prema de Mel,
which appeared in the Asian Monitor (New York) weekly oI
June 22, 1984. It was entitled, Lanka and the Mossad
Connection`. I quote a Iew passages Irom this Ieature.
'.It is being said that over 50 Mossad members
(Israeli secret service agents) are training the Sri Lanka
armed services to Iight northern guerrillas who want a
separate state. This claim has been strengthened by the
statement oI President Junius Jayewardene that he
would even seek the help oI the devil` to rid the
country oI the Tamil terrorists. The assistant director oI
the Asia and Oceana division oI the Ministry oI Foreign
AIIairs, Jerusalem, who now heads the Israeli interest
section, said in an interview with Asian Monitor that his
country was ready to help Sri Lanka.
The Tamil United Liberation Front and the Tamil
Congress issued a joint statement. The secretaries oI
both parties, Appapillai Amirthalingam and Kumar
Ponnambalam, said:
TULF and the TC are shocked and alarmed by the
decision to open an Israeli interest section. News
reports state that this decision oI the government is quid
pro quo Ior the services oI Israeli experts to train
military units in ant guerilla warIare and
counterinsurgency operations. We Iurther inIer Irom
news reports, uncontradicted by the government, that
the Israeli secret service, Mossad, is already engaged in
security operations in the north and east. These moves
have caused great alarm and apprehension among the
Tamil-speaking people.
I also cite two additional sentences Irom the previously
quoted Island report by Keith Warren, which provide a
plausible link to Sivarasan (the mercenary, as pointed out by
Norman Baker) with the Sri Lankan army and Mossad.
'The Israelis trained our Special Task Force at Maduru-
Oya during the Jayewardene rule. The Israeli Interest
Section which operated here was directly in contact
with those Israeli personnel involved in planning out war
strategies.
Early this year, Michael Jansen reporting Irom New Delhi,
mused on the precise nature oI Indo-Israeli relations, which
reached a ten year mark this year. Some tidbits mentioned in
this report are relevant Ior digestion.
'.|Since 1980s| cooperation also developed between
India`s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW), and Israel`s Mossad and among senior
armed Iorces oIIicers oI the two countries. One oI the
Iactors promoting this connection on the Indian side
was anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim resentment, particularly
amongst oIIicers whose homes were in areas which Iell
in Pakistan aIter partition. However, the subordination
oI the military to the civilian authority prevented the pro-
Israel sentiments oI those oIIicers Irom surIacing in
Indian policy until Iull diplomatic relations were
established in 1992. |Al-Ahram Weeklv Online,
February 21-27, 2002; Issue No.574|
What is notable is the date oI establishment oI Iull diplomatic
relations between India and Israel. It occurred Iollowing
Rajiv Gandhi`s death. One can postulate that here lies the
motive Ior the role oI Mossad`s hands or Iingers` in
deciding the Iate oI Rajiv Gandhi. Michael Jansen provides a
synopsis on the historical Iactors which could have played a
role. To quote,
'India`s policy oI supporting the Palestinians goes back
to the 1920s and 1930s when Mahatma Gandhi stood
against the Zionist colonization and expropriation oI
Palestine. AIter Independence, India Iollowed Gandhi`s
principled policy out oI selI-interest. India had the
largest Muslim population oI any non-Muslim state,
enjoyed lucrative economic ties with the Arabs, which
are Iurther strengthened by the presence oI millions oI
expatriate Indian workers in the GulI and Saudi Arabia,
and shared with the Arabs a policy oI non-alignment
during the Cold War. |ibid|
Thus, Nehru, his daughter Indira and his grandson Rajiv, Ior
obvious political reasons oI courting the Muslim vote and
minimally Ior paying allegiance to Mahatma Gandhi`s views,
minimally Ior paying allegiance to Mahatma Gandhi`s views,
Iollowed a pro-Arab policy in the international arena until the
1980s. Rajiv Gandhi, iI he would have regained the prime
ministership wouldn`t have deviated much Irom the pro-Arab
stand. But his elimination resulted in the substantial turn-
around in India`s diplomatic policy oI Iavoring Israel.
Though Subramanian Swamy, India`s pro-Israeli voice, has
debunked the warning issued by Yasser AraIat to Rajiv as a
red herring, his cited reason Ior rejection is markedly
humorous. To quote Swamy,
'The whole hullabaloo on AraIat`s warning on RG`s
|i.e., Rajiv Gandhi| possible assassination was so much
Middle East desert hot air, because aIter hearing Irom
AraIat personally, Chandrasekhar had asked the RAW
to Iind out. Accordingly the RAW had sent messages
to all Iield stations abroad to do an in-depth check and
report back. They came up with nothing. |Book: The
Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi, 2000, p.191|
There is a Iallacious assumption here that just because
RAW`s Iield stations couldn`t make head or tail about the
warning by AraIat, this warning was a Middle East desert
hot air`. To prove the eIIiciency (or lack) oI RAW`s Iield
station, one need not look Iurther than the assassination
attempt on Rajiv made in Colombo in July 1987 by the
Sinhala naval rating. II the RAW`s Iield station in Colombo
with all the proximity to India and intelligence links to its Sri
Lankan agents Iailed miserably in protecting Rajiv, what
chances the RAW`s Iield stations in the Middle East and
Europe have oI detecting a conspiracy better than AraIat`s
agents?
Facts on Sivarasan
As an aside, I should also mention that Swamy, while
ridiculing AraIat`s warning, has included in his book, a photo
oI him with AraIat. But nothing is included in the text, why
this photo appears in his book, unless he wished to make
amends Ior his undeserved ridicule. Swamy also asserts in
his book, that it is the LTTE which had made a mountain out
oI mole hill Irom AraIat`s warning to Rajiv. His view may be
reliable, iI the Iollowing documented Iacts are ignored Ior
convenience.
convenience.
Fact 1: It is undeniable that the Mossad cultivated links with
the Sri Lankan army and simultaneously with India`s RAW
since 1984.
Fact 2: LTTE did not have links to the Mossad.
Fact 3: In 1984, the RAW operatives did send some Tamil
militants Ior training under Mossad, and TELO was the
pampered group oI RAW agents.
Fact 4: Sivarasan belonged to the TELO camp in 1984, and
received training by the RAW operatives in India.
Fact 5: Sivarasan also worked Ior the Sri Lankan government
in the Eastern province, during or aIter IPKF`s operations in
Sri Lanka.
Fact 6: Sivarasan also has traveled to Sweden, Singapore,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates some months
beIore the assassination.
Fact 7: Sivarasan also doesn`t appear in the records as a
prominent member oI LTTE. II according to the SIT
oIIicials, Sivarasan organized the hit` against the EPRLF
chieI Padmanabha in 1990 and escaped to JaIIna thus
evading capture, it begs the question why he didn`t do the
same on the day Iollowing Rajiv`s assassination, beIore his
identity was revealed by the photos oI Haribabu. That
Sivarasan was cavalierly dancing around Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka Ior three months, beIore his reported death in
Bangalore, is a bone in the neck oI SIT oIIicials which they
cannot dislodge.
Like the proverbial six blind men who saw the elephant, one
is under the impression that Sivarasan was the elephant` in
the Rajiv Gandhi assassination story. To-date, his links to the
RAW operatives, Sri Lankan army-Mossad operatives,
heavy weights` oI the Congress Party, and TELO remain
hidden. That he was a mole` prepared by the RAW
operatives to penetrate the LTTE is within the realms oI
truth. This may be an embarrassing Iact, even Ior
Pirabhakaran to acknowledge.
In the early decades oI the 20
th
century, when Einstein`s
relativity theory came under attack Ior scientiIic and non-
scientiIic reasons, proIessors belonging to the universities in
Germany issued a signed memorandum elaborating on why
Einstein`s theory was wrong. To this action, Einstein`s
wisecrack was a memorable one. Einstein noted to the eIIect
that, iI his theory is indeed wrong, one proIessor is more
than enough to correctly point out why it is wrong, and one
hundred heads are not needed. In a similar vein, one can
state that iI Pirabhakaran was indeed the main conspirator in
the Rajiv assassination, one clinching evidence is adequate;
that is, an authentic, unadulterated document revealing
Pirabhakarans motive or instruction to Sivarasan to
commit the deed. Though eleven years have passed, this
document has not seen the light oI the day. (Continued)

Part 36
Sachi Sri Kantha
13 1une 2002]
Rajiv Gandhi Assassination
- One Spoke in the South Asian Wheel of Intrigue
A Peep into Dave Barry's Revisionist History
I will conclude my analysis on Rajiv Gandhi assassination at
the end oI this chapter. BeIore I sum up, I wish to discuss
cross-border crimes with links to the Intelligence operatives,
and their relevance to major assassinations oI heads oI state
in South Asia since 1975. As a suitable step to introduce this
theme, I provide a humorous segment Irom the pen oI Dave
Barry, the noted American humorist.
Telling the truth which the name-brand historians reIrain
Irom telling and that too in mocking manner, is an art oI
talented humorists. Dave Barry who has perIected this art
wrote in 1989 what he called a revisionist history` oI the
United Nations. The truth-oozing humor oI Barry allows me
to explain the dilemma oI India`s policy wonks and the
RAW operatives. So, Iirst to an excerpt Irom Berry`s book,
Dave Barrv Slept Here:
'The United Nations consists oI two main bodies.
1.

The General Assembly, which is, in the generous
spirit oI the UN Charter, open to just about every little
dirt bag nation in the world. It has no power. Its
Iunctions are to (a) have Iormal receptions; (b) listen to
the GrateIul Dead on headphones; and (c) denounce
Israel Ior everything, including sunspots.
2.

The Security Council, which is limited to nations
that have mastered the concept oI plumbing. It is very
powerIul. Its Iunctions are to: (a) pass sweeping
resolutions intended to end bloody conIlicts; and then
(b) veto, ignore, or walk out on these resolutions.
Dave Barry`s use oI euphemistic plumbing` Ior notorious
spying is a beauty. India`s dilemma, Ior the past Iive decades
has been, that in UN hierarchy it is grouped into the dirt-bag
nations` without power, though in terms oI its population
size and land mass area, it deserves a place in the Security
Council. China, the only other nation comparable to India, in
terms oI population, heritage and land mass, has a seat in the
UN Security Council.
The ignominy oI being grouped into the dirt-bag nations
pricked the pride oI Indian Prime Ministers, especially Indira
Gandhi (who instituted the RAW Ior Ilexing muscles into the
diplomatic plumbing activities` oI India`s neighbors) and
her son Rajiv Gandhi (who engaged the Indian army Ior
muscle Ilexing purposes with RAW providing a mediocre
side-kick perIormance). It is not an exaggeration to assert
that the assassinations oI Indira and Rajiv have to be viewed
with a karmic mirror, reIlecting the inner dirt oI the plumbing
activities` oI India`s Intelligence operatives. This angle will
hardly be touched by the Indian policy wonks like J.N.Dixit
and pan-handling proIessors oI India`s punditry circuit like
S.D.Muni and V.Suryanarayanan.
Rajiv's Assassination: :1ust One in a Bunch in South
Asia'
To Iully comprehend the motive oI those who were behind
Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination in 1991, in my opinion, it
should not be studied in isolation, since it was just one in a
bunch oI untimely deaths. To repeat, it is one oI many
assassinations/untimely deaths oI nominal heads oI state in
South Asia, which had occurred since 1975 an arbitrary,
but convenient, date in which the Americans had to quit
Vietnam aIter nearly 15 years oI plodding to deIeat
communism in Asia. I provide the Iollowing list.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman oI Bangladesh: assassinated, on
Aug.15, 1975 by military men.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto oI Pakistan: hanged by his successor
Zia ul Haq, on April 4, 1979.
Ziaur Rahman oI Bangladesh: assassinated, on May 30,
1981 by military men.
Indira Candhi oI India: assassinated, on October 31, 1984
by her personal bodyguards.
Zia ul Haq: killed in a mysterious mid-air explosion oI
Pakistani Air Force Plane on August 19, 1988.
Rajiv Candhi: assassinated by a suicide bomber on May
21, 1991.
Ranasinghe Premadasa: assassinated by a suicide bomber
on May 1, 1993.
King Birendra (and his immediate Iamily): reportedly`
assassinated by his son Dipendra, the Crown Prince, who
himselI committed suicide` on June 1, 2001.
In the above list, I have excluded the executions oI nominal
heads oI state Irom AIghanistan, since 1978: Mohammad
Daoud and his Iamily in April 1978, Mohammad Taraki in
October 1979, HaIizullah Amin in December 1979 and Dr.
Mohammad Najibullah in September 1996. The last
mentioned was a Communist head oI state, propped by India
and supported by its RAW operatives, on behalI oI India`s
nominal ally in the political chess board.
In analysing complex issues, I`m a Iollower oI noted science
essayist, Stephen Jay Gould, who died recently on May 20,
2002. In introducing his 7
th
volume oI science essays,
Dinosaur in a Havstack (1996), Gould wrote elegantly, as
Iollows:
'I am an essay machine; cite me a generality, and I will
give you six tidbits oI genuine illustration. A detail, by
itselI, is blind; a concept without a concrete illustration
is empty. The conjunction deIines the essay as a genre,
and I draw connections in a manner that Ieels automatic
to me.
By using Stephen Jay Gould`s measure, I assert two Iacts.
First, a generality: that plumbing` as indicated by Dave
Barry is a passion Ior the Intelligence operatives oI muscle-
Ilexing political powers in South Asia. Second, the details:
Ilexing political powers in South Asia. Second, the details:
that quite a number oI nominal heads oI state (including Rajiv
Gandhi) in South Asia have regularly been eliminated. Other
regions in the global political map have not seen such a
regular harvesting oI heads` is very much undeniable. Thus,
rather than Iocusing on Rajiv`s assassination as an isolated
detail, it is prudent to 'draw connections, as indicated by
Stephen Jay Gould. Why this simple deductive step oI
connecting the dots` is shunned by the government-
controlled (or government-manipulated) media and media
experts oI South Asian nations is not beyond
comprehension.
1he Role of Puppet Masters and the :Local Relays'
That I`m not alone in thinking about the existence oI links
among these assassinations to the plumbing industry` oI
political powers is telling Irom the Iollowing observation
made by Tariq Ali, little more than an year ago, while
discussing the assassinations oI Mujibur Rahman and Indira
Gandhi and the hanging oI ZulIikar Ali Bhutto, all oI which
occurred within a decade oI 1975 and 1984. Excerpts:
'.It may be true that the CIA is no longer as eIIective
a killing machine as Mossad, but the period I was
discussing was at the height oI the Cold War. In 1973,
Nixon and Kissinger had careIully organized and
orchestrated the overthrow oI Salvador Allende. The
CIA took part in this operation, as did the DIA
(DeIense Intelligence Agency), which usually deals
directly with Ioreign military personnel. The death oI
Allende and Chilean democracy haunted |the then| all
three leaders in South Asia. Mrs Gandhi saw in it an
image oI her own Iuture.
It is hardly a secret that the military takeovers in
Pakistan in 1958 and 1977 were approved by the United
States. DIA involvement in the latter was much talked
about at the time. General Alam, a senior Corps
Commander who was against toppling Bhutto, was
shocked to receive a reprimand Irom the US Military
Attache. Soon aIter General Zia gained power it became
obvious that he wanted to get rid oI Bhutto, but iI
Washington had seriously objected to the hanging, it
Washington had seriously objected to the hanging, it
would not have taken place.
BeIore he was assassinated the Bangladeshi leader
|Mujibur Rahman| had just merged his party with the
local pro-Moscow Communists, declared Bangladesh
to be a one-party state and agreed to sign a Treaty oI
Peace and Friendship with Moscow. The US already
regarded him as an enemy in any case, and had done so
ever since Nixon and Kissinger decided to tilt` in
Pakistan`s Iavour during the civil war oI 1971-72.
The US oIten asserts its power through local relays,
Iinding this more eIIective than direct CIA involvement.
Sometimes a combination oI the two strategies
becomes necessary. |London Review of Books,
vol.23, no.10, May 24, 2001|
Tariq Ali`s observations, should be read in association with
a recent, scathing commentary oI Wayne Madsen, a
Washington DC-based investigative journalist on under-
reported news and analysis, which connects the dots
between the local relays` in India and the sole super-
power`s plumbing units`. It provides a plausible cause to
solving the mystery oI the Royal Family massacre in
Kathmandu oI June 1, 2001. Excerpts:
'Apparently, intelligence agencies allied to the United
States, like those oI India (a new strategic partner` oI
the United States in the War on Terrorism` and the
War to Protect Regional U.S. Oil and Natural Gas
Interests`), have decided to take a cue Irom President
Bush`s shoot to kill` order against activists and
independence leaders. On February 11 |2002|, a senior
separatist leader oI the Tripura (northeast India)
independence movement was shot and killed by Indian
security Iorces. The assassinated leader was Benjamin
Hrangkhawl, a senior leader oI the National Liberation
Front oI Tripura (NLFT), a Christian-dominated
separatist group. Hrangkhawl had arrived in Tripura
Irom neighboring Bangladesh.
According to the BBC, the state Police Intelligence
ChieI Kishore Jha, said the killing oI Mr.Hrangkhawl
was a major success`. Indian intelligence is now
pressing Bhutan and Bangladesh to arrest and extradite
separatist reIugees in those countries. The King oI
Bhutan and Prime Minister oI Bangladesh might want to
look at what happened to the entire Royal Family oI
Nepal last June when the late King decided to negotiate
with leItist guerrillas rather than Iight them. According
to unblemished sources in Kathmandu, the king and his
Iamily were quickly dispatched by a Nepali army
commando unit trained at the time by US Special
Operation Iorces sent by US PaciIic Commander in
ChieI Adm.Dennis Blair (he`s the same guy who
propped up Gen.Wiranto with special training while the
good general was committing genocide in East Timor).
What was to become the Pentagon`s OIIice oI Strategic
InIluence (PSYOPs division) prepared a story, with the
assistance oI India`s Research and Analysis Wing
(RAW) intelligence agency, that the King and his Iamily
were murdered as a result oI the Crown Prince going
nuts with automatic weapons aIter being Iorlorn over
his mother`s reIusal to allow him to marry a commoner.
The entire Western media bought that story Iaster than
George Bush nosediving aIter choking on a pretzel. The
media also bought that one. |The News Insider
editorial, with the caption, The CIA`s death squad
body count continues to pile up`, March 29, 2002;
accessed via internet on May 23,2002.|
King Birendra`s assassination and the yarn spun around it by
the mainstream Indian media which served as the Iirst outlet
to the news oI the macabre murders in the Kathmandu palace
is repulsive. In the suppression oI details which challenge the
common sense, I could trace parallels between Rajiv
Gandhi`s assassination and the palatial murders oI King
Birendra and his immediate Iamily. That the assassins in both
examples did not live long also conceals the hand oI the
prime conspirators, enabling the Intelligence operatives in
India to manipulate the pliable media. Here is an excerpt Irom
what the ABC News Online presented in anticipation oI the
Iirst anniversary oI the Royal massacre in Kathmandu:
'.While a commission set up by Gyanendra, |who
succeeded his elder brother King Birendra| laid the Iull
blame Ior the massacre on Dipendra |the then Crown
Prince|, the death oI a king who had reigned Ior nearly
three decades still seems incredible to many Nepalese.
How could one gunman mow down nine people at the
most tightly guarded building in the country? How
could the Iuture queen and crown prince, Komal and
Paras, both survive the bloodbath at Narayanhiti
Palace? And how could the right-handed Dipendra die
Irom a selI-inIlicted bullet to the leIt side oI his head?
The most asked question is the most basic: how could
a prince groomed Irom birth to assume the throne oI
the Shah dynasty suddenly go berserk and kill his own
parents at dinner?
Some say the pressure Irom his mother and Irom
Devyani, who was several years his senior and Ieared
she was passing child-bearing age, pushed him over the
edge. Another, more controversial, explanation is that
the queen did not want her royal son to marry a woman
with roots in India the powerIul neighbor whose
heavy cultural and political inIluence is deeply resented
by Nepal`s elite.|ABC News Online, May 29, 2002|
Some may still naively believe the story that Dipendra`s
romance with Devyani Rana, a daughter Irom a noble Iamily
in India, sealed the Iate oI Nepal`s King Birendra and his
immediate Iamily as plausible. But, more convincing is the
Iact that there has been bad blood` between India and Nepal
since Rajiv Gandhi`s prime ministerial period, due to the
plumbing activities` perpetrated by the muscle-Ilexing
intelligence operatives manned by the RAW agency. During
the hearing oI the M.C.Jain Commission, which investigated
the Rajiv assassination trial, embarrassing evidence
buttressing this Iact was produced Irom an agent`s report oI
RAW`s station reporting an unveriIied source that the then
Queen Aishwarya oI Nepal had negotiated a hit` on Rajiv
Gandhi through one Major General Aditya Shamser Jang
Bahadur Ior 10 crore Indian rupees! |Source: India Todav
magazine, Dec.1, 1997|
I should not be misunderstood. I`m not advocating that
Queen Aishwarya oI Nepal was instrumental in Rajiv
Gandhi`s assassination, and that her assassination was a
return hit` instigated by the Indian operatives. Rather, it is
my contention that Rajiv Gandhi assassination should not be
viewed as an isolated killing oI a member oI a prominent
Indian Iamily, but as a single damaged spoke oI South Asian
wheel oI political intrigue.
However, Ior the over-taxed and constantly blamed law
enIorcement personnel in India, the LTTE sympathizers who
were then domiciled in Tamil Nadu were convenient targets
Ior apprehension. Just to make their case attractive to the
mass media, these Indian oIIicials then tagged the name oI
Pirabhakaran as the Iirst accused in the charge-sheet,
released exactly one year Iollowing Rajiv`s assassination, in
May 1992. Just two weeks Iollowing the tragic event oI
Sriperumbudur, Kondath Mohandas who could read the
mind-set oI the Indian police personnel had predicted this
type oI development. Moses Manoharan, the then Madras
reporter Ior Reuter, had observed the Iollowing:
'He |i.e, Mohandas| said a three-month government
deadline Ior a report on the assassination might put
undue pressure on investigators and tempt them to
make evidence Iit the theory. I know the psychology oI
police in this country. II you set time limits, the police
will come up with an accused. |Asahi Evening News,
Tokyo, June 8, 1991|
Kondath Mohandas was the Tamil Nadu`s chieI police
oIIicer, during MGR`s period as the ChieI Minister oI Tamil
Nadu. It is less than a surprise to note aIter 11 years, that
what he prophesied did happen eventually.
That the role oI puppet masters and their local relays is
neither Tariq Ali`s nor my Iantasy is consolidated by a
provocative opinion-piece by Major Paul Marks oI USA,
which appeared in the Joint Forces Quarterlv (Washington
DC) oI Spring 2000. Advocating a role Ior |only| seven US
military advisors in Sri Lanka to support the Sri Lankan
Armed Forces (SLAF), Major Marks had highlighted the
need Ior intelligence` and inIiltration`.
I quote below the relevant passages Irom the opinion piece
oI Major Marks, since by reading between the lines, one can
sense the extent to which camaraderie existed between the
RAW`s intelligence operatives in India and the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces. According to Major Marks,
'SLAF has weaknesses in doctrine, training, and Iorce
development. While a staII college was recently
established, the majority oI oIIicers have one year or
less oI Iormal training. Foreign training is primarilv
done in India with a small number oI oIIicers going to
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Britain and the United States.
|Note: In this sentence and those Iollowing below,
italics added Ior emphasis, by Sri Kantha.| There are
branch schools, but in-unit training is the norm.
Because oI the rapid growth oI the army, Iew oIIicers
have any expertise in planning and coordinating large
operations. There is no intelligence school. Operational
demands necessitated by war have made training and
education a second priority.
Overall, SLAF is a proIessional military human rights
violations, common in the 1980s, are declining but
aIter 18 years its tactical and operational successes have
come to naught because oI the lack oI an overarching
strategic concept to bring the conIlict to a close.
U.S. military advisors in Sri Lanka should Iocus on
preparation strategy, operational planning, and
assistance in Iunctional skills augmented by instruction
by Special Operations Forces on speciIic tactical skills
such as air assault, naval infiltration, and counternaval
infiltration. There is also a need Ior doctrine
development that ties Iunctional skills into a battle-
Iocused training system. The goal would be defeat of
LTTE in three vears and the withdrawal of advisors
within five. |A cautious Note: In Sri Kantha`s reading,
this could be interpreted as probably an euphemistic
wish-objective Ior elimination oI Pirabhakaran by Ioul
means. Otherwise, on realistic terms, how could anyone
with sense expect that the SLAF which had Iailed Ior 18
years to deIeat LTTE can accomplish the task within
the next 3 years, with the help oI mere seven military
advisors Irom the USA?| Measures oI eIIectiveness
could include:
could include:
- adopting a national security and military strategy within
six months
- developing a combined plan with India to prevent use
oI Tamil Nadu as a rebel base
- reorganizing the chain oI command and theater
geometry within six months
- establishing a training center Ior inIantry battalions and
combined arms teams in a year
- organizing intelligence courses Ior all personnel
serving in intelligence positions
- improving operational level tasks (intelligence, logistics
and Iires) within 18 months
- introducing eIIective combined interdiction operations
with the Indian navy in two years
- denying the insurgents oI re-supply by sea within a
year.
These objectives could be accomplished with a
relatively modest advisory Iorce. The seven military
personnel required Ior this eIIort include:
1. advises joint staII on national security strategy,
national military strategy, operational planning, and
theater geometry.
2. advises joint staII on operational planning.
3. advises joint staII on intelligence collection,
dissemination, and training, and on establishing
intelligence school.
4. advises on operational logistics and reorganization oI
logistics systems.
5. advises air Iorce Ior training and coordination oI
close air support.
6. advises navy on coastal patrolling and interdiction
operations.
7. senior noncommissioned oIIicer advises training
and doctrine command on establishment oI joint unit
training center.
This provocative commentary, dated Spring 2000, by Major
Paul Marks appeared around the time when the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces suIIered their humiliating deIeat in the Elephant
Pass and JaIIna peninsula. It euphemistically indicates the
thinking oI Pirabhakaran`s adversaries in eliminating him.
Above stated point no.3 on intelligence collection,
dissemination and training need special notice.
Few weeks later, on June 7, 2000, the then minister oI
Industrial Development, C.V.Goonaratne died in a bomb
blast while heading a procession Ior the oIIicial Iirst War
Heroes` Day` in his own constituency oI Ratmalana. I wish
to include this untimely death to my analysis on the
assassinations oI nominal heads oI South Asia, solely Ior the
reason that Goonaratne, at the time oI his death, was a Iront
runner to the prime minister stakes in Sri Lanka, according to
the anonymous correspondent to the Economist magazine.
Since the Economist magazine has remained nasty and
condescending to Pirabhakaran and LTTE since mid-1980s,
what it published in reporting Goonaratne`s assassination
cannot be thought oI as Iavoring Pirabhakaran by any stretch
oI imagination. Excerpts:
'.Who set oII the bomb is unclear. The police say it
was the work oI a suicide bomber. Ministers say the
bomber was a Tamil Tiger, since the Tigers have used
suicide bombers in previous attacks in the capital. As
on such occasions in the past, the Tigers have remained
silent. In suspicious-minded Colombo, not everyone is
prepared to believe that the Tigers are the only killers in
a country where political assassination has become a
way oI liIe. But iI the Tigers were not responsible, who
might have killed Mr. Gunaratne in his own stronghold?
Mr. Gunaratne was one oI the Iew ministers whose
loyalty to Mrs. Kumaratunga was beyond question. It
was widely believed that he would soon be made prime
minister, replacing the ailing 84-year-old Sirimavo
Bandaranaike, the president`s mother. Mr.Gunaratna
would have had plenty oI enemies. |June 10, 2000|
The correspondent Ior Economist Iurther stated how the Sri
Lankan army was helped by Israeli operatives in preventing
the complete takeover oI JaIIna by the LTTE`s Iorces in
May 2000. To quote,
'The army`s successes in the north are largely due to
assistance provided by Israel. It has provided arms oI
quality to match the Tigers`. Some reports say that
Israeli oIIicers are now helping to direct the army`s
operations. To pay Ior the arms, Sri Lanka is digging
even deeper into its pockets to increase deIence
spending.
The political cost may be more diIIicult to assess. Israel
now has Iull diplomatic ties with Sri Lanka Ior the Iirst
time, which will not go down well with the Islamist
lobby in Colombo. Moreover, though someone appears
to have put backbone into Sri Lanka`s previously
demoralized troops, it was evidently not the generals.
Pushed aside by the Israelis, they may Ieel almost as
aggrieved as the Tigers. |ibid|
Thus, one could inIer that the Israeli hands which began
Iishing` in the troubled South Asian political waters since
1984, have entrenched strongly in the region including Sri
Lanka. They have been accommodated by Pirabhakaran`s
adversaries, beginning Irom J.R.Jayewardene and Lalith
Athulathmudali, to Chandrika Kumaratunga. The signature oI
Israeli operatives is visible in some oI the slick campaigns
against LTTE in the military and non-military encounters.
That in the early 1980s, while Rajiv Gandhi was learning his
Iirst steps in politics as a rookie, Jayewardene also roped in
Pakistan`s dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq to aid the Sri Lankan
army is an open secret. Thus, it is not out-oI-place to look
back on my brieI obituary note on Pakistan`s General Zia ul
Haq. In that 1988 note, I also had inserted my assessment on
Rajiv Gandhi`s tenure as the Indian prime minister Ior the
Iirst time.
My Obituary Aote on Cen. Zia ul Haq
Excerpts Irom my obituary note on Gen. Zia ul Haq are as
Iollows:
'In mid-August, by a sudden hair-raising trick
resembling that oI a master magician, the Grim Reaper
resembling that oI a master magician, the Grim Reaper
zapped the liIe oI Pakistan`s military dictator Zia ul
Haq. Since 1983 General Zia was one oI the central
Iigures involved in the ethnic turmoil in Sri Lanka. The
military dictator he is, Zia termed up with the
Jayewardene government to suppress political
opposition (both Tamil and Sinhalese) in Sri Lanka.
Most importantly, General Zia provided military help
(armaments, training Iacilities and personnel) to
Jayewardene`s regime Ior use against Tamil civilians
and Tamil rebels. Many Indian journalists had reported
that Pakistan`s military pilots were employed Ior the
aerial bombing in the Tamil regions oI Sri Lanka.
It is an open secret that both, Zia and Jayewardene,
shared a common proIessional enmity to Indira Gandhi.
AIter Indira Gandhi`s tragic death in 1984, her son
Rajiv was irked by the Zia-Jayewardene alliance. It had
been reported in Indian and international press that the
deployment oI Indian military personnel in Sri Lanka
was made to severe the Jayewardene-Zia military ties,
which had created a mess in the southern Iront oI India.
It should be interpreted that, rather than being a savior
oI Sri Lankan Tamils, Rajiv Gandhi was acting more in
concern Ior his own country`s territorial deIence. So
Eelam Tamil issue became a pawn in international
power play between India and Pakistan. Zia`s intrusion
into Sri Lankan military politics was one oI the causes
Ior Rajiv`s Ilexing oI military muscles in the Northern
and Eastern regions oI the island. OI course, I`m not
deIending Rajiv Gandhi`s actions since August 1987.
But, given the situation he Iaced (and importantly, the
inexperience he has had in dealing with the wily
dictators Zia and Jayewardene), one could grasp
Rajiv`s predicament. Rajiv`s mother Indira knew the
tricks oI the trade oI how to keep cunning Ioxes` in
their kennel. But Rajiv acted like a novice in international
politics. And this explains his bungling oI strategy since
Aug. 1987.
Now that the Grim Reaper had played His card in
removing General Zia Irom the scene, one Iervently
hopes that Rajiv Gandhi will come to his senses to
provide some leadership, in which his grandIather and
provide some leadership, in which his grandIather and
mother excelled themselves. |Tamil Times, London,
October 1988, p.15|
Though in this brieI note I had not mentioned Pirabhakaran
by name, I had provided the context Ior Rajiv Gandhi`s
entanglement with LTTE in 1987. I will never claim that
Rajiv Gandhi would have read and listened to my opinion;
but in hindsight, one could see that Rajiv did change his
mind on his relationship towards Pirabhakaran in the Iirst halI
oI 1989, as conIirmed by his successor V.P.Singh in his
interview to the Frontline magazine in 1997. |see,
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 34|
1he Came of Creating a Conspirator from Press Releases
Boris Yeltsin, Sonia Gandhi and Jayalalitha share three
Ieatures in common. First, in 1990s all three had name
recognition in India, Ior being politicians or in the case oI
Sonia Gandhi, a politician in waiting. Secondly, as oI today
in 2002, all three are still living. But, many Tamils are not
aware oI the third Iact, which, in the scheme oI pea-brained
Intelligence operatives in India, all three were targets oI
LTTE assassination plans` in the 1990s. Here is a
chronologically arranged selection oI RAW-supplied news
plants which appeared in the national press oI India.
Item 1: 'LTTE suicide squad in Tamil Nadu. The Hindu
International edition, March 28, 1992.
Item 2: 'LTTE Back in Business: The Hit List
J.Jeyalalitha, D.R.Kartikeyan, V.Ramamurthy, S.Sripal.
news Ieature by Anirudhya Mitra, India Todav, April 15,
1992, pp.28-29.
Item 3: 'Tamil militants tried to kill Yeltsin: aide. The
Hindu International edition, February 27, 1993.
Item 4: 'Threat Irom air to Jayalalitha? The Hindu
International edition, May 15, 1993.
Item 5: 'LTTE car bomb threat to Sonia by a Special
Correspondent, The Hindu, May 25, 1999.
When I analyzed these Iive planted items, I found a marked
correlation with their dates of appearance and some
correlation with their dates of appearance and some
relevant dates in the Rafiv Gandhi assassination trial.
Items 1 and 2 appeared within two months ahead oI the
public release oI SIT`s charge sheet in May 1992, implicating
Pirabhakaran as the Iirst oIIender. Items 3 and 4 appeared
beIore the commencement oI the Rajiv Assassination trial at
the Poonamallee Court Complex in Madras on May 5, 1993.
The item 5 appeared just two weeks aIter the Supreme Court
appeal verdict on May 11, 1999, when 19 oI the 26 accused
punished by the Trial Court verdict were released Irom gaol.
Though all Iive oI these news-plants deserve reproduction
Ior the high absurdity quotient packed in them, I chose Items
3 and 4 Ior critical overview.
In a news brieI dated lined, 'Moscow, Feb.19, 1993, the
smut-selling Hindu newspaper Incorporated inIormed its
readers,
'The Indian security service in coordination with
Russian VIP security department oIIicials Ioiled a plot
by Sri Lankan Tamil militants to assassinate the
President, Mr.Boris Yeltsin, during his visit to India last
month, according to the chieI oI the presidential
security, Lt.Gen.Mikhail Barsukov. He told the
inIluential daily Ne:avisimova Ga:eta in an interview
that the Tamil terrorists had undergone special training
and had had combat experience in Lebanon. The
terrorists had wanted to attract international attention
and Iorce some oI their conditions on India, including
the release oI arrested terrorists, Lt.Gen.Barsukov
said.
Though LTTE was not mentioned by name, other tangential
reIerences such as the use oI terrorist` term in the news
release indicated that the RAW operatives had Ied the story
to plant in the Moscow daily. Only quoted named source
was Lt.Gen.Mikhail Barsukov, who in all probability would
have been a toady to Yeltsin, the then Russian leader. What
was missing in the planted assassination-plot story was,
answers to questions, Who was the assassin?` Where the
assassin was captured` and How the assassin attempted to
kill Yeltsin?`
II the Yeltsin-assassination attempt (Item 3) published in the
Hindu newspaper was a yawn-producing yarn, the
assassination attempt on Jayalalitha (Item 4) published by the
same Hindu newspaper ten weeks later was nothing but
hog`s Iart. I reproduce it in Iull, Ior its humor:
'The reported sighting oI an unidentiIied glider-type
low-noise aircraIt that was said to have made a couple
oI sorties over the Tamil Nadu ChieI Minister,
Ms.Jayalalitha`s residence in Madras in the early hours
oI May 3 |1993| has caused concern to the State
Government and had provided political grist to her
opponents.
According to an oIIicial release, the plane with no lights
was noticed by the men on sentry duty at about 3 am.
They immediately alerted the senior security oIIicers.
Ms.Jayalalitha is a high security VIP` and the State
police has intelligence inIormation that she could be
attacked by the LTTE Irom the air. Airport sources said
there was no aircraIt movement over Madras between 2
am and 4 am that day and no conventional Ilying object
could escape their notice. Also, glider or training
aircraIt are not permitted to Ily during night.
As civil and deIence authorities started checking out
what the Ilying object could be, the State Government
requested the Centre to provide aerial cover, including
anti-aircraIt equipment, Ior Ms.Jayalalitha and also
declare the residential complex where her house is
located as no Ilying zone`. The matter was also raised
in Parliament.
Following the request, the Centre not only decided to
extend aerial cover Ior the residence oI Ms.Jayalalitha,
but banned the Ilying oI radio-controlled planes in all
the metropolitan cities. Such microlite aircraIt are not
manuIactured in India. Even as these decisions were
announced, the State Unit oI the Congress (I) ruling at
the Centre and the DMK dubbed it all a Iabricated
story` and an attempt by the AIADMK to regain its lost
sympathy. To which an AIADMK spokesman replied:
It is not only an attempt to politicize every issue but
most inhuman`. He said that low-Ilying gliders could
not be tracked by radars.
not be tracked by radars.
II I teach an elementary course in journalism, I would use this
news report as a good example oI how to prepare a planted
story` to Iool gullible readers. Not a single mentioned source
in the news report has been identiIied by name and age. Who
provided the oIIicial release`? Who were the men on sentry
duty` at Jayalalitha`s residence? Who were the senior
security oIIicers?` Who were the representatives oI State
police? Who were the Airport sources?` Who were the
civil and deIence authorities?`, Who took decision on
behalI oI the euphemistic Centre` in India? Who were the
Congress (I) and DMK` persons in Tamilnadu who called
the report as the Iabricated story? Who was the AIADMK
spokesman`? The smut-licking Hindu newspaper editors
would have Iooled only themselves by inserting a lame denial
to the news report Irom the Tamil Nadu state`s Congress
Party oIIicial and the DMK party representative within the
news story. But even these persons have not been identiIied
properly.
My Conclusion on Rajiv Candhi Assassination:
It is to explore the multi-Iaceted, inter-connected links oI
political assassinations in South Asia, I delved into the
minute details oI Rajiv Gandhi assassination and the
assassination trial, as well as the crude attempts by the
India`s intelligence operatives to Irame Pirabhakaran as the
prime conspirator. Unlike other journalists and political
analysts in Colombo, Chennai and elsewhere (including
regular commentators on LTTE such as Subramanian
Swamy, T.S.Subramanian, D.B.S.Jeyaraj and Rohan
Gunaratna) who have parrot-mouthed the news-plants Irom
the Indian intelligence operatives, I took the trouble to study
the Supreme Court Appeal verdicts delivered by Justice
Wadhwa, Justice Thomas and Justice Quadri, page by page.
In 1992, I pointed out the similarities between the John F.
Kennedy assassination and that oI Rajiv Gandhi
assassination. Just as a convincing answer to the question
Who killed Kennedy in 1963?` remains elusive even aIter 39
years, a deIinite answer to Who really killed Rajiv in 1991?`
still remains a secret. However, Sinhalese adversaries oI
still remains a secret. However, Sinhalese adversaries oI
Pirabhakaran and LTTE in Sri Lanka, who made a serious
assassination attempt to kill Rajiv in 1987, have harvested
much political mileage without any shame in their own
hypocrisy and perIidy by tagging Pirabhakaran`s name
prominently with Rajiv assassination.
Thus it remains a Iact that, since 1991, Pirabhakaran`s name
and the reputation oI Eelam Tamils have been markedly
tarnished by the halI-baked analyses Irom many selI-serving
politicians, quasi-literate pundits and media hacks in India
and Sri Lanka. One had to wait till May 1999 Ior the delivery
oI the Supreme Court Appeals verdict to study the intricate
details oI how the prosecution team Iormulated its case
against Pirabhakaran, as the prime conspirator. Thus, the
existing pre-1999 literature implicating Pirabhakaran`s role in
the Rajiv Gandhi assassination is strongly biased and devoid
oI Iactual merit. As I have analyzed previously (see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon, parts 28, 29, 30 and 31), the
verdicts oI the three Supreme Court Justices who heard the
appeal on the case, do not convincinglv prove that
Pirabhakaran was the prime conspirator in the Rajiv Gandhi
assassination. Furthermore, contrary to the myth propagated
by his adversaries in the 1990s, Pirabhakaran was not under
trial in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial which concluded
in May 1999.
A Iew sentences on Subramanian Swamy`s book The
Assassination of Rafiv Gandhi. Unanswered Questions and
Unasked Queries (2000) is pertinent here. In presenting his
case against Pirabhakaran to the English-reading public,
Swamy has cited out oI context Irom the verdicts oI the
Supreme Court Justices, Ior his convenience. Even the title
oI his book is a misnomer, since Iirst-third oI the text
describes how he Iunctioned as the Minister oI Commerce
and Law in the short-lived Chandrasekhar Cabinet during
1990-1991, and the last-third oI the text presents polemics on
Swamy`s numerous opponents in Indian politics, judiciary
and journalism. Those who have been speciIically targeted
by Swamy in his book include, Congress Party politicians
Arjun Singh and Mani Shankar Aiyar, other politicians like
Ram Jethmalani, Jayalalitha and Veeramani, bureaucrat-
turned politician T.N.Seshan, Commissioner Milap Chand
turned politician T.N.Seshan, Commissioner Milap Chand
Jain and journalist Vir Sanghvi. Unlike Swamy who indulges
in his pet theory that Pirabhakaran was the chieI conspirator
in the assassination oI Rajiv Gandhi, others who have been
mentioned above have publicly pointed an accusing Iinger on
Mossad operatives rather than Pirabhakaran. The genesis oI
Swamy`s book lies in this diIIerence, and Swamy, a leading
Israeli lobbyist in India, has accused those who diIIer Irom
his view as acolytes oI Pirabhakaran!
II Pirabhakaran is not the prime conspirator, question arises
who then are the real culprits, and I provide clues to who
could Iit into that category (see, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon, parts 32, 33 and 35). How reliable I`m in my
assessment oI who could be the real culprits? I conclude my
analysis by repeating the sentences written by Charles
Darwin, in his conclusion to the historical work, The Descent
of Man (1871):
'Many oI the views which have been advanced are
highly speculative, and some no doubt will prove
erroneous; but I have in every case given the reasons
which have led me to one view rather than to another.
False Iacts are highly injurious to the progress oI
science, Ior they oIten endure long; but Ialse views, iI
supported by some evidence, do little harm, Ior every
one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their Ialseness:
and when this is done, one path towards error is closed
and the road to truth is oIten at the same time opened.
AIter covering the Rajiv Gandhi assassination story in 12
chapters, it is opportune to Iocus on other untouched
aspects oI the Pirabhakaran phenomenon. (Continued)

Part 37
Sachi Sri Kantha
28 1une 2002]
Why is He Loved` by the Tamils?
The Most Abused Four-Letter Word
In my opinion, the most abused Iour-letter word in English is
not the F-word rhyming with luck`, but the L-word love`.
The F-word is abused only by the vocabulary-challenged
comics and teenagers with glands bubbling with sex
hormones. Contrastingly, the word love` is abused not only
by teenagers, but also by creeps oI all sorts including the
malcontented clergy oI all denominations, baby-kissing
politicians, toady journalists, scheming spouses and slothIul
speechwriters.
That love is universal to all cultures is an unchallenged Iact.
But the pointer that markers (or tags) oI love are culture-
speciIic is routinely overlooked. While an open expression
oI love is permissible in the Las Vegas or London airports,
the same act would raise eyebrows and scorn in Chennai or
Tehran airports. Why I mention this is to indicate the
ignorance shown by Ioreign journalists in evaluating whether
Pirabhakaran is loved or not by Tamils in Eelam and
elsewhere. To cite an example, the unsigned editorialist oI the
Economist magazine began an editorial, published beIore the
2000 general election in Sri Lanka, with the Iollowing
sentence:
'In Northern Sri Lanka, the secessionist Tamil Tigers
are Ieared and even respected, but seldom loved.
|Economist, London, Oct.7, 2000; pp.19-20|
What was not mentioned is how did he measure the love`
among the Eelam Tamils Ior Pirabhakaran? It cannot be
measured that easily by a Ily-by night, non-Tamil speaking
journalist, by asking the residents oI JaIIna through a
translator-interpreter whether they love` the Tamil Tigers.
translator-interpreter whether they love` the Tamil Tigers.
Even iI that particular journalist gathered some negative
answers` to his question Irom the Eelam residents, unless he
or she is a behavioral-psychologist or cultural-
anthropologist, the accuracy and validity oI the answers
given to strangers would be oI dubious quality. To
comprehend how love is expressed and shared by Tamil
culture, one should study it in depth investing time, money
and energy. Also wanted Ior this exercise is an unbiased
heart, which seems distinctly lacking in the unsigned pieces
published in the Economist magazine. Luckily Ior Tamils,
there exists one study by Margaret Trawick, the proIessor oI
social anthropology at the Massey University, New Zealand,
who had endured to investigate how love is expressed
among the 20
th
century Tamils.
In this chapter, I will Iirst identiIy the culture-speciIic
markers Ior love in Tamil culture so that one can assess how
much Pirabhakaran is loved in more objective terms rather
than the subjective, halI-baked pronouncements oI culturally
blind-Iolded journalists who dominate the international
newsmedia. Secondly, I will explain whv Pirabhakaran is
loved by the Tamils.
Margaret Trawick`s Study on Tamil Love
In 1993, I reviewed Margaret Trawick`s work, Notes on Love
in a Tamil Familv (1990) Ior the Tamil Nation monthly
|May 1993|. I provide excerpts Irom this review below.
'According to the author, Ior Tamils, anpu (as Tamils
know love` in a broader sense) has the Iollowing nine
properties.
1.

containment (adakkam): Open expression oI love
is to be restrained, even iI it is mother love.
Tamils also do not express love among opposite
sexes openly.
2.

habit (pa:hakkam): Attachment, or a sense oI
oneness with a person or thing or activity, grows
slowly, by habituation.
3.

harshness and cruelty (kadumai and kodumai):
Physical aIIection Ior children is expressed not
through caresses but roughly, in the Iorm oI
painIul pinches, slaps and tweaks. The movie
song, Adikkira kai thaan Anaikkum, Anaikkira
kai thaan adikkum` (Hitting hand will hold, and
holding hand will hit) expresses this sentiment
beautiIully.
4.

dirtiness (a:hukku): DeIiance oI rules or purity
conveyed a message oI union and equality and
was a way oI teaching children and onlookers
where love was`, tells the author. This is
exempliIied by mother`s care oI baby`s bodily
excretions and the host`s cleaning oI guest`s
plate oI Iood (echchil).
5.

humility (panivu): Love is implicated in
expressions oI humility and patience (porumai,
the strength to sustain and endure).
6.

poverty and simplicity (e:humai and elimai): SelI
renunciation oI luxury (such as Iancy clothes and
jewellery) Ior the cause oI a loved one, as
expressed in sentiments like, I don`t want new
clothes.as long as you are sick`.
7.

servitude (adimai): Illustrated as the servant oI
God, who receives the highest respect among the
civilians. Elimination oI the boastIul I` (Naan)
and substituting with the selI deprecating this
slave` (Adiven), exempliIied by Tamil saints oI
the past.
8.

opposition and reversal (ethirttal and puratchi):
Characterized by the use oI very intimate suIIix, -
di (Ior girl) and da (Ior boy) among Iamily
members and close pals. When these intimate
Iorms oI address are used by acquaintances or
strangers, they become derogatory.
9.

mingling and conIusion (kalattal and
mavakkam): Love erases distinction completely
and mingle everyone, typiIied by the adage, We
are all one` (Onrae kulam Oruvane Thevan).
In addition, love leads to dizziness, conIusion,
intoxication and delusion (mavakkam).
All these nine cultural markers oI Tamil love are
indicated in the love Tamils have shown Ior
Pirabhakaran.
1.

containment: One cannot ask a Tamil, like in
Gallup-poll, to Iind out whether he or she loves
Pirabhakaran or not. Prudent Tamils will not
answer in the aIIirmative. It is a very private
issue, like what the Americans consider the
details oI their individual paychecks.
2.

habit: Remember that in the Iirst 10 years oI
Tamil militancy (circa 1975-1985), there were
many who competed Ior the leadership role with
Pirabhakaran. Some who were even trained in the
PLO camps and Israeli camps. They only turned
out to be mercenaries (Ior the arms oI Sri Lankan
and Indian governments) and later
metamorphosed into parliamentary seat-warmers.
Tamils came to accept Pirabhakaran, only aIter
he proved his mettle. Cynics may quip that
Pirabhakaran physically eliminated his rivals to
reach the pinnacle. But Eelam Tamils also came
to be convinced that his rivals Ior leadership had
selI-destructed themselves by ill-judgments, and
also by deviating Irom the path oI Eelam` Ior
which they had pledged to work. It is not an
exaggeration to reiterate that among the 60 plus
million Tamils living today, considering the
impossibility oI the aim oI establishing an army,
none had Iollowed the Edison Iormula Ior
success (constituting three simple elements: hard
work, common sense and stick-to-itìveness
spirit) diligently like Pirabhakaran Ior the past 25
years. Pirabhakaran also shares some oI
Edison`s peculiar background in that he was a
semi-literate` in the Iool`s world oI literacy,
boasting oI preIixes OxIord`, Harvard` and
Sorbonne` linked by a hyphen to the word
educated`, or preIixes Sandhurst` and West
Point` linked by a hyphen to the word trained`.
3.

harshness and crueltv: Loving Pirabhakaran was
(and is) no bed oI roses. The harshness and
cruelty were absorbed as part oI the package, Ior
cruelty were absorbed as part oI the package, Ior
the pride his movement has delivered to the
Tamils.
4.

dirtiness: OI course, that Pirabhakaran was not
Irom the dominant Hindu Vellala caste has been
accepted by the Tamils. The dirtiness` in the
Brahminical world view has been completely
ignored.
5.

humilitv: The pain oI routine ridicule, delivered
Irom the political pulpit and press desks in
Colombo, Chennai, Washington DC and
London, Ior loving Pirabhakaran is tolerated by
Tamils with humility.
6.

povertv and simplicitv: With whatever scale one
measures the quality oI liIe in Eelam during the
past two decades, an apparent economic poverty
and simplicity is visible in the places where
Pirabhakaran is loved. Still the Eelam Tamils
endure this hardship Ior love oI Pirabhakaran and
his ideological goal.
7.

servitude: His adversaries, like the operatives oI
the University Teachers Ior Human Rights
(JaIIna), may ridicule the decorating terms such
as Surivathevan and other word-plays, but
Tamils who love Pirabhakaran serve him in
various Ironts in his army, and as support cast
under much hardship. Servitude is a cultural
marker in Tamil love, which cannot be
understood by culture-challenged academics,
journalists and paid report-writers.
8.

opposition and reversal: This cultural marker
doesn`t need explanation, since there was
opposition to Pirabhakaran Ior his methods,
especially among the older generation. The
opposition was mainly due to generational
conIlict, who were Iamiliar with the Gandhian
path oI non-violence and couldn`t grasp the
post-Gandhian scenario that gun holders dictate
terms in global politics.
9.

mingling and confusion: This cultural marker Ior
love among Tamils, towards Pirabhakaran, is
selI-explanatory iI one observes the existing
pattern in Tamil Nadu.
To continue my review oI Margaret Trawick`s book,
'The author also observes, Within the nuclear Iamily,
Iour relationships seemed to be especially important to
the Tamil people whom I knew. These wee the mother-
daughter, Iather-son, husband-wiIe, and brother-sister
relationships.` The love links between these Iour
relationships are identiIied the author as Iollows:
A man sees his son as a continuation oI himselI: A
woman sees herselI as a continuation oI her mother;
The bond between brother and sister is strong but must
be denied; The bond between husband and wiIe is
conIlictual but diIIicult to sever.`
As an example Ior the sentiments oI sibling love among
Tamils, the author has presented in the book, the
Iollowing duet:
Brother:
You were born to win many battles
With your elephants and armies
You were born to marry your aunt`s daughter
And live in joyIul love!
Sister:
Shall I tell you know my brother
brought me up like a darling daughter,
sheltered me under his wing?
Shall I tell you oI the unimaginable
MisIortune which separated us?
Both:
We were born together,
Joined like the eye and the pupil,
Like the pupil and the image within!
Though the earth and sea and sky
Should come to an end,
We shall not Iorget our love,
Nothing can break our bond!`
This duet is none other than an English translation oI
that touching lullaby, Malarnthum malaraatha paathi
malar pola, penned by poet Kannadasan (whose name
is not mentioned in the book!) Ior the hit movie, Pasa
Malar. The author has stated that this particular movie,
although released in the early 1960s, still enjoy mass
appeal among the Tamils, Ior extolling the sentiments oI
sibling love. OI course, this lullaby duet oI Kannadasan
should be enjoyed in the original (not presented in the
book) since translation does not do merit to the beauty
and cadence oI the poet`s choice oI Tamil words in
expressing sibling love. Kannadasan also made an
elegant use oI the very intimate suIIix, -da (Ior boy) to
express intimacy and love, in this lullaby. In original
(undoubtedly, a vintage Kannadasan), the cited duet
reads like this:
Brother:
Yaanai padai kondu Chenai pala venru
Aala piranthaavada Puvi aala piranthaavada
Aththai mahalai manam kondu ilamai va:hi kandu
Jaa:ha piranthaavada
Sister:
Sirahil enai moodi arumai mahal pole
Jalartha kathai sollava
Kanavil ninaivaatha kaalam idai vanthu
Piriththa kathai sollava
Both:
Kannin mani pola manivil ni:hal pola
kalanthu piranthomada
Intha mannum kadal vaanum
Marainthu mudinthaalum
Marakka mudivaathada Uravai
Pirikka mudivaathada.
Any Tamil who has siblings oI opposite sex Ieel
soothed by the intimacy and love when he or she hums
the lines oI this wonderIul and powerIul lullaby, and Ior
Tamil siblings oI any age who live separated by current
national boundaries, these lines will bring tears in their
eyes Irom the reminiscences oI events shared in love.
Now, the love shown Ior Pirabhakaran by his thousands
oI cadres can be easily explained by the lines oI this
particular lullaby oI Kannadasan extolling sibling love.
particular lullaby oI Kannadasan extolling sibling love.
Even the lines, Yaanai padai kondu Chenai pala
venru Aala piranthaavada, in the lullaby appears to
conIirm the blessings Pirabhakaran has received Irom
Providence. Unless those non-Tamil sociologists,
journalists, quasi human rights activists and politicians
who Iault Pirabhakaran Ior brainwashing` young Tamil
teenagers dip in the sentimental pool extolled by
Kannadasan in the Tamil original, they will miss
comprehending why Pirabhakaran is loved, despite all
the bad mouthing he is served with.
Why Pirabhakaran is loved by Tamils?
In a monthly column I wrote to the Tamil Nation (Nov.15,
1992) under my nom-de-plume C.P.Goliard, I had hinted the
answers Ior this question. Thus, it is more than appropriate I
reproduce this column in entirety, though I have not
mentioned the name Pirabhakaran in it. Here it is, as it
appeared ten years ago. I have not changed the time markers
within the text.
The Status of the Tamil Language
'It was Winston Churchill who once said, The Iarther
backward you can look, the Iarther Iorward you are
likely to see`. So, to learn the Iuture status oI Tamil
language, one should study its past. This column
summarises some salient Ieatures oI the past history oI
Tamils till 1900.
Tamil is the leading member oI the Dravidian Iamily oI
languages, which consists oI over 20 languages spoken
traditionally in the Indian subcontinent. The Cambridge
Encvclopedia of Language (1991), authored by David
Crystal, observes that, Tamil has the oldest written
records oI this Iamily, dating Irom the 3
rd
century BC,
and scholars believe, it to be close to the ancestor
language, known as Proto-Dravidian. But, despite the
historical records and associated reconstruction, there
is little agreement about the origins oI the language, or
its speakers. One tradition speaks oI migration Irom
land to the south, now submerged; other views suggest
a movement Irom Asia, via the north-west, perhaps
around 4,000 BC.There is, however, strong support
around 4,000 BC.There is, however, strong support
Ior the view that Dravidian languages were once spoken
in the north oI India, and were gradually displaced by
the arrival oI the Indo-European invaders.`
Aramaic and Tamil
Recently, the monthly magazine The Middle East
(Aug.1991) reported that Aramaic, the language in
which Jesus would have preached to his Iollowers two
millennia ago, is on the verge oI extinction. ThereIore, it
is appropriate to compare the past development oI
Aramaic and Tamil simultaneously. In terms oI
generational scale, one millennium consists oI only 40
generations (In 25 years, one generation produces its
progeny to continue the cultural traditions.) ThereIore,
only 80 generations separate us Irom the time oI Jesus
and the Apostles.
According to the Encvclopedia Britannica (15
th
Ed,
1990), Aramaic language was the lingua Iranca oI the
Near East around 500 BC (when Buddha was reIorming
Hinduism in India). The Babylonian and Jerusalem
Talmuds as well as portions oI the Old Testament
books oI Daniel and Ezra were written in Aramaic. It
had its greatest inIluence in the Middle East culture Irom
circa 300 BC until circa AD 650, and was supplanted
by Arabic. Now, the western dialect oI Aramaic is
spoken by only 6,000-odd residents oI a mountain
village Maaloula, which lies 50 km north oI Damascus,
Syria. The eastern dialect oI Aramaic survives in a Iew
villages oI Iraq, southern Turkey and the southwestern
Soviet Union.
Two millennia ago, the world population was around
250 million. It is an irony that though the message oI
Jesus Christ had spread all over the world in multitude
oI languages, the mother tongue oI the Messiah is now
struggling to survive. The Tamil language was relatively
lucky to have strong vitality Ior the past 2,000 years. It
has been estimated that at the time oI Jesus, India had a
population oI about 100 million. The Tamil-speaking
population in India and Eelam would have been in the
range oI 8-10 million, two millennia ago. Within 80
generations, Tamil continue to survive, but Aramaic is
generations, Tamil continue to survive, but Aramaic is
now on the verge oI extinction. How did this happen?
Four C` Powers
I can postulate the inIluence oI Iour C` powers, which
enabled Tamil to live and Aramaic to struggle Ior
survival. These are, cerebral (cultural) power,
commercial power, crown (and civil) power and
combat power. It is the combination oI these Iour
powers which had allowed the Tamil language to
survive till now. Let me illustrate the signiIicant roles oI
these Iour C` powers brieIly.
Cerebral (cultural) power
The cerebral power oI approximately 1,000 intellectuals
at the most, during the past 80 generations, was
inIluential in elevating Tamil into a culturally rich
language. The authors oI Tolkappiyam, eight
anthologies oI secular poetry oI the sangam period and
Tirukkural (all written between the 1
st
and 4
th
century
AD), the religious saints collectively called 63 Nayanars,
great poets oI merit (Ilanko, Kamban and Auvayar),
goliards (Kavi Kalameham and Arumuga Navalar),
composers (Arunagirinathar, Arunasala Kavirayar and
Gopalakrishna Bharathy), Iolk physicians collectively
named Chittars and religious hymnodists (Pattinattar,
Thayumanavar and Ramalinga Swamigal) produced
voluminous literary material to enrich the Tamil
language.
Commercial power
Tamils had indulged in commerce with other nations
Irom time immemorial. Till 500 years ago, marine
navigation has been one oI the strong points which
symbolized the Tamil commercial power and combat
power. ProI. Walter Wallbank observed in his book, A
Short Historv of India and Pakistan (1958), In
general, Tamil civilization was very advanced, based as
it was on a Ilourishing sea trade, Tamil rulers, especially
the Cholas, had great Ileets which sailed to Ceylon,
Burma, Java and even the Far East. In 45 AD, the use
oI the monsoon in navigation had been discovered and,
taking advantage oI these prevailing winds, ships could
now cross the Arabian Sea instead oI hugging the
now cross the Arabian Sea instead oI hugging the
coast. The trade oI Tamil Land with Rome was
particularly active, as Europe greatly prized the spices,
perIumes, precious stones and textiles oI south India.
Several Roman colonies were set up in Tamil Land, and
it has been estimated that the annual drain Irom Rome
to India approximated 4 million dollars.
Crown (and Civil) Power
Jawarhalal Nehru, in his Glimpses oI World History,
makes reIerence to the crown (and civil) power Tamils
enjoyed between the 3
rd
century AD and the end oI 12
th
century. Almost 60 years ago, in a letter dated June 23,
1932, to daughter Indira, Nehru wrote,
Farther south and east in India lav the Tamil
countrv. Here from the 3
rd
centurv to the 9
th
, for about
600 vears, the Pallavas ruled.it was these Pallavas
who sent out coloni:ing expeditions to Malavsia and
the Eastern Islands. The capital of the Pallava state
was Kanchi or Confeevaram, a beautiful citv then and
even now remarkable for its wise town-planning.
The Pallavas give place to the aggressive Cholas earlv
in the 10
th
centurv. I have told vou something of the
Chola Empire of Rafarafa and Rafendra, who built
great fleets and went conquering to Cevlon, Burma
and Bengal. More interesting is the information we
have of the elective village panchavat svstem thev had.
This svstem was built up from below, village unions
electing manv committees to look after various kinds of
work, and also electing district unions. Several
districts formed a province.
Then, Nehru describes about the rise oI Pandya
kingdom, with Madura Ior its capital and Kayal as its
port. A Iamous traveler Irom Venice, Marco Polo,
visited Kayal, the port, twice in 1288 and in 1293. He
describes the town as a great and noble city, Iull oI
ships Irom Arabia and China, and humming with
business.`
Combat Power
The combat power, which had been inter-twined with
the crown power and commercial power, hardly needs
the crown power and commercial power, hardly needs
Iurther description. The combat history oI the Pallava,
Chola and Pandya dynasties has been recorded by
many historians, including Nehru.
In the letter quoted above, Nehru succinctly
summarized the Tamil combat power in one paragraph.
The Tamil Pallavas rise on the east coast and the south
and Ior a very long period they hold sway. They
colonize in Malaysia. AIter 600 years oI rule, they give
place to the Cholas, who conquer distant lands and
sweep the seas with their navies. Three hundred years
later they retire Irom the scene, and the Pandyan
kingdom emerges into prominence, and the city oI
Madura becomes a centre oI culture and Kayal a great
and busy port in touch with distant countries.`
Nehru also inIers another interesting point Irom the
observation recorded by Marco Polo on the medieval
Tamil Nadu. The chronicler Irom Venice had written
about the imports oI large number oI horses into south
India by sea Irom Arabia and Persia (currently Iran).
Nehru noted, It is said that one oI the reasons why the
Muslim invaders oI India were better Iighters was their
possession oI the better horses. The best horse-
breeding grounds in Asia were under their control.`
This suggests that the medieval Tamil military strategists
were preparing themselves to stop the Muslim invasion
spreading towards south India, at the time oI Marco
Polo`s visit.
The Past 500 Years
Well, the history oI past Iive centuries (only 20
generations) show the decline oI crown power, combat
power and commercial power among the Tamils in
Tamil Nadu and Eelam. Only the cerebral power
sustained the Tamil language to its current status. The
languages which were relatively late entrants to the
cultural world such as English, French, Spanish and
Arabic gained elevated status because those who spoke
these languages began to dominate the world by crown
power, commercial power and combat power.
The greatness in Pirabhakaran is that he dreamt and
established an army, to reassert the combat power oI Tamils,
and thereby regain the crown (and civil) power oI Tamils.
While tens oI thousands oI other 60 million plus Tamils had
concentrated only on achieving some cerebral power to gain
status (and I am one typical example oI this group), only
Pirabhakaran thought oI establishing the combat power Ior
Tamils. By this, Pirabhakaran brought the mind-set oI the
Tamil ethnics Irom the bullock-cart` age oI the 19
th
century
to at least the bullet-train` age oI the 20
th
century. With all
due respect to Mahatma Gandhi, whether one likes it or not,
guns and bullets have served well in gaining independence,
Ireedom and status Irom the oppressors. Though
handicapped in textbook education, Pirabhakaran chose the
paths oI Washington and Mao rather than Gandhi to liberate
the homeland oI Eelam Tamils. This is why Pirabhakaran is
loved by Tamils.
Mahindapala`s Angle on Pirabhakaran`s greatest
achievement`
For over 10 years, H.L.D. Mahindapala remains as the most
virulent critic oI Pirabhakaran. His bias in twisting the history
oI Ceylon to suit his Sinhala-Buddhist blinders in any debate
eliminates him as an impartial analyst oI multi-cultural
Ceylon. While taking into account these deIiciencies, I still
like to present his angle on Pirabhakaran`s greatest
achievement`, since the issue he Iocuses is one which had
been an Achilles` Heel Ior Eelam Tamils.
In a debate on caste system he engaged with me in 1996,
Mahindapala built up a case that the Prevention oI Social
Disabilities Act, 1957 oI S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike 'stands as a
monumental landmark not only to the liberal spirit oI the
Sinhalese but also to the enlightened and pioneering eIIorts
oI reIorming the dismal and the discriminatory legacy leIt
behind by Iive centuries oI colonial rulers. |Lanka
Guardian, March 15, 1996, pp.3-5|
Mahindapala continued,
'However, the Prevention oI Social Disabilities Act ran
into serious obstacles laid by the all-powerIul upper-
into serious obstacles laid by the all-powerIul upper-
caste in JaIIna to block its implementation. Undeniably,
the greatest achievement oI Mr.Prabhakaran is in the
dismantling oI the obscene and the oppressive caste
system in JaIIna that dehumanized JaIIna society since
the coming oI the Dutch. The act oI Tamil youths
taking up arms was a double-edged weapon (1)
against the Sinhalese, and (2) against the upper-caste
Tamils oI JaIIna who have been their oppressors Ior
generations. |ibid|
In a subsequent passage, Mahindapala observed,
'.The two-pronged machinations oI the JaIIna upper-
caste to retain their traditional supremacy were directed
simultaneously against (1) the Sinhala-Buddhist
governments` and (2) their own sub-castes. They held
on to their precarious positions by pitting (2) against
(1). Naturally, they resented any outside interIerence
that would threaten their prestige, position and power in
JaIIna. This point is illustrated amply in the
obstructionist tactics oI the Chelvanayakams and
Ponnambalams to the Prevention oI Social Disabilities
Act. |ibid|
Mahindapala is an obnoxious polemicist, aIIlicted with
amnesia. II the Social Disabilities Act oI 1957 passed by the
padre Bandaranaike Cabinet was such a boon to the low-
caste Tamils in JaIIna, how come the Sri Lankan armed
Iorces which came directly under the purview oI widow
Sirimavo Bandaranaike Iailed to notice it? Why the Kandyan
Govigama Buddhists (KGB in short) initiated a policy oI
ethnic cleansing in the islands armed forces since 1962,
which in turn Iacilitated the rise oI Pirabhakaran`s army? I
will deal with Mahindapalas writings in a separate essav,
so as not to dilute the Iocus oI this series.
Bruce Hoffman`s erroneous perceptions on
Pirabhakaran and LTTE
The answer to the question Why Pirabhakaran is loved by
the Eelam Tamils` is that he internationalized the Eelam Tamil
campaign Ior Ireedom and independence, unlike anyone who
preceded him as Tamil leaders. The path he took to promote
preceded him as Tamil leaders. The path he took to promote
his cause was untouched by the Tamils Ior the past 500
years. He sharpened the combat power` oI Tamils, which
had been blunted by the manacles oI casteism.
This point surIaces in an article entitled A Nasty Business`,
which appeared in the Atlantic Monthlv magazine oI January
2002. The author oI this article is Bruce HoIIman, who is
identiIied in the magazine as a terrorism analyst at the Rand
Corporation`. For those who are unaware, I wish to note that
the Rand Corporation has extensive links with the Pentagon.
It is also not improper to inIer that Bruce HoIIman`s links to
the Israeli agents are not weak. From his descriptions, he
appears to be one oI the American advisors who have
availed their expertise to the Sri Lankan armed Iorces (since
the days oI Lalith Athulathmudali) to neutralize Pirabhakaran.
Thus, his saniti:ed version of a profect report should be oI
considerable interest to Eelam Tamils.
Some caveat is needed beIore I provide HoIIman`s
impressions in length. On superIicial reading, his description
oI his experience in Colombo presents an uncomplimentary
picture oI the Tamil Tigers. Thus, the readers are advised
Iirst to ignore the pejorative remarks on LTTE, relating to the
reported terrorist acts and assassinations, since HoIIman
uses non-confirming words and phrases like, arguablv,
believed to be and believed to have. Secondly, readers
should Iocus on the proIile oI a Sri Lankan army oIIicer,
identiIied with the pseudonym Thomas. Undoubtedly,
Thomas is a Sinhalese and he cannot be a poster-guy to the
proIessional wing oI the maligned Sri Lankan armed Iorces.
This what HoIIman had observed:
'.I learned this some years ago, on a research trip to
Sri Lanka. The setting a swank oceanIront hotel in
Colombo, a reIreshingly cool breeze coming oII the
ocean, a magniIicent sunset on the horizon could not
have been Iurther removed Irom the carnage and
destruction that have aIIlicted that island country Ior the
past eighteen years and have claimed the lives oI more
than 60,000 people. Arrayed against the democratically
elected Sri Lankan government and its armed Iorces
|Note bv Sri Kantha: Without any criticism, HoIIman
had glossed over the emaciated Iorm oI Sri Lankan
had glossed over the emaciated Iorm oI Sri Lankan
democracy and the racially segregated army akin to the
pre-World War II American army.| is perhaps the most
ruthlessly eIIicient terrorist organization-cum-insurgent
Iorce in the world today: the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil
Eelam, known also by the acronym LTTE or simply as
the Tamil Tigers. The Tigers are unique in the annals oI
terrorism and arguably eclipse even bin Laden`s al
Qaeda in proIessionalism, capability, and determination.
They are believed to be the Iirst nonstate group in
history to stage a chemical-weapons attack when they
deployed poison gas in a 1990 assault on a Sri Lankan
military bases some Iive years beIore the nerve-gas
attack on the Tokyo subway by the apocalyptic
Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. OI greater
relevance, perhaps, is the Iact that at least a decade
beIore the seaborne attack on the USS Cole, in Aden
harbor, the LTTE`s special suicide maritime unit, the
Sea Tigers, had perIected the same tactics against the
Sri Lankan navy. Moreover, the Tamil Tigers are
believed to have developed their own embryonic air
capability designed to carry out attacks similar to
those oI September 11 (though with much smaller,
noncommercial aircraIt). The most Ieared Tiger unit,
however, is the Black Tigers the suicide cadre
composed oI the group`s best-trained, most battle-
hardened, and most zealous Iighters. A partial list oI
their operations includes the assassination oI the Iormer
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at a campaign stop
in the Indian state oI Tamil Nadu, in 1991; the
assassination oI Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe
Premadasa, in 1993; the assassination oI the presidential
candidate Gamini Dissanayake, which also claimed the
lives oI IiIty-Iour bystanders and injured about one
hundred more, in 1994; the suicide truck bombing oI
the Central Bank oI Sri Lanka, in 1996, which killed
eighty-six people and wounded 1,400 others; and the
attempt on the liIe oI the current President oI Sri Lanka,
Chandrika Kumaratunga, in December oI 1999. The
powerIul and much venerated leader oI the LTTE is
Velupillai Prabhakaran, who, like bin Laden, exercises a
charismatic inIluence over his Iighters. The Battle of
Algiers is said to be one oI Prabhakaran`s Iavorite
Algiers is said to be one oI Prabhakaran`s Iavorite
Iilms. |Note bv Sri Kantha: For balance, HoIIman
should have provided 'a partial list oI operations
carried out under the orders oI his identiIied victims`
Rajiv Gandhi, Premadasa, Dissanayake and
Kumaratunga, which had caused the lives and limbs oI
tens oI thousands oI Eelam Tamils since 1981. But he
cannot do it Ior practical reasons, since he had
authored this paragraph to project a cuddly image oI his
Sri Lankan beneIactors, and to show the gullible readers
oI the Atlantic Monthlv that his beneIactors were
Iighting a terrorist Iorce on behalI oI the democratically
elected Sri Lankan government`.|
HoIIman`s description oI the action oI a Iormer Sri Lankan
army oIIicer Thomas, then Iollowed in the next paragraph:
'I sat in that swank hotel drinking tea with a much
decorated, battle-hardened Sri Lankan army oIIicer
charged with Iighting the LTTE and protecting the lives
oI Colombo`s citizens. I cannot use his real name, so I
will call him Thomas. However, I had been told beIore
our meeting, by the mutual Iriend a Iormer Sri Lankan
intelligence oIIicer who had also long Iought the LTTE
who introduced us (and was present at our meeting),
that Thomas had another name, one better known to his
Iriends and enemies alike: Terminator. My Iriend
explained how Thomas had acquired his sobriquet; it
actually owed less to Arnold Schwarzenegger than to
the merciless way in which he discharged his duties as
an intelligence oIIicer. This became clear to me during
our conversation. By going through the process oI
laws`, Thomas patiently explained, as a parent or a
teacher might speak to a bright yet uncomprehending
child, you cannot Iight terrorism`. Terrorism, he
believed, could be Iought only by thoroughly
terrorizing` the terrorists that is, inIlicting on them the
same pain that they inIlict on the innocent. Thomas had
little conIidence that I understood what he was saying. I
was an academic, he said, with no actual experience oI
the liIe-and-death choices and the immense
responsibility borne by those charged with protecting
society Irom attack. Accordingly, he would give me an
example oI the split-second decisions he was called on
example oI the split-second decisions he was called on
to make. At the time, Colombo was on code red`
emergency status, because oI intelligence that the LTTE
was planning to embark on a campaign oI bombing
public gathering places and other civilian targets.
Thomas`s unit had apprehended three terrorists who, it
suspected, |Note bv Sri Kantha: This should be noted
that Thomas`s unit had just suspected! to
comprehend the demented mind oI Thomas and what
he did subsequently on his suspicion.| had recently
planted somewhere in the city a bomb that was then
ticking away, the minutes counting down to
catastrophe. The three men were brought beIore
Thomas. He asked them where the bomb was. The
terrorists highly dedicated and steeled to resist
interrogation remained silent. Thomas asked the
question again, advising them that iI they did not tell him
what he wanted to know, he would kill them. They were
unmoved. So Thomas took his pistol Irom his gun belt,
pointed it at the Iorehead oI one oI them, and shot him
dead. The other two, he said, talked immediately; the
bomb, which had been placed in a crowded railway
station and set to explode during the evening rush hour,
was Iound and deIused, and countless lives were saved.
On other occasions, Thomas said, similarly recalcitrant
terrorists were brought beIore him. It was not
surprising, he said, that they initially reIused to talk; they
were schooled to withstand harsh questioning and
coersive pressure. No matter: a Iew drops oI gasoline
Ilicked into a plastic bag that is then placed over a
terrorist`s head and cinched tight around his neck with a
web belt very quickly prompts a Iull explanation oI the
details oI any planned attack.
I was looking pale and Ieeling a bit shaken as waiters in
starched white jackets smartly cleared the china teapot
and cups Irom the table, and Thomas rose to bid us
good-bye and return to his work. He hadn`t exulted in
his explanations or revealed any joy or even a hint oI
pleasure in what he had to do. He had spoken
throughout in a measured, somber, even reverential
tone. He did not appear to be a sadist, or even
maniIestly homicidal. (And not a year has passed since
maniIestly homicidal. (And not a year has passed since
our meeting when Thomas has Iailed to send me an
unusually kind Christmas card.). |Atlantic Monthlv,
Jan.2002; pp.49-52|
The above description by HoIIman on Pirabhakaran and
LTTE has to be taken in the spirit it was written. This
American expert` was a paid consultant to the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces and he had presented his impressions to the
American readership oI the Atlantic Monthlv, Ior the
payment he and his employer (Rand Corporation) received.
Nevertheless, he also had exposed the activities oI sick-
minded terrorists like Thomas, though HoIIman states
imprudently that 'He |Thomas, that is| did not appear to be
a sadist, or even maniIestly homicidal. From the inIormation
provided by HoIIman, I assembled the Iollowing:
1.

HoIIman had visited Colombo 'some years ago, and
he mentions Iinally that 'Not a year has passed since
our meeting when Thomas has Iailed to send me an
unusually kind Christmas card. Literally this means,
some years have passed by. Could it be that HoIIman
has not met this Thomas again?
2.

LTTE cadres involved in such high-proIile operations,
iI they are caught, are known to swallow the cyanide
capsules. Nothing is mentioned about any one oI the
three suspects in the story trying to ingest cyanide, or
that the interrogators had successIully prevented such
ingestion.
3.

Thus, Thomas may have provided a composite story
linking the shooting oI one innocent suspect in point
blank, and another two being interrogated Ior planting
a bomb in Colombo. Other than the point-blank
shooting, the purported success` oI Thomas could
even be a Iib to impress the American guest, since
other corroborating details are missing. This is
important, since in the previous paragraph, HoIIman
speciIically lists the terrorist acts oI LTTE.` Then,
one wonders why he Iailed to ask Thomas When this
particular terrorist act oI bomb in a crowded railway
station` during rush hour was averted? HoIIman also
does not inIorm the readers whether how he
does not inIorm the readers whether how he
conIirmed the success oI Thomas independently.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is that Eelam Tamils know Ior
the past three decades that Pirabhakaran emerged Irom the
generation oI Eelam Tamils who were at the receiving end oI
the atrocities oI the likes oI Thomas and his predecessors.
Pirabhakaran and LTTE cadres have been repeatedly
criticized Ior their zeal oI puritan ethic, by those who
spuriously cloak themselves with the garb oI human rights`
and as analysts oI terrorism`. But this puritan ethic is
nothing diIIerent Irom the motto oI the Commonwealth oI
Massachusetts, which states Ense petit placidam sub
libertate quietem (By the sword we seek peace, but peace
only under liberty.) It is a pity that only the culture-challenged
journalists, including those who contribute to the magazines
like Economist and the Atlantic Monthlv cannot comprehend
it. I use the term culture-challenged` in double contexts. The
contributors whom I have cited in this chapter are culture-
challenged` in both American and Tamil history.
(Continued).


Part 38
Sachi Sri Kantha
12 1uly 2002]
The Quality of Sinhalese Military
Competition
A Peep on the Power Elites of the Sri Lankan Army
In my chosen proIession, i.e. natural sciences, an
unpublished report or an unnamed source is given the same
degree oI credibility as that oI a lecture by Bill Clinton on the
worth oI monogamy. Thus, I diIIer Irom other Pirabhakaran
analysts in one criterion. Rather than relying heavily on
unnamed` and conIidential` sources which are unveriIiable
by an independent party, I depend strongly on scanning the
published and public sources oI inIormation Ior my analysis,
and assess the merit and weakness oI such published
material accordingly. Thus, it is opportune to present some
published inIormation on (and by) the men who had led the
Sri Lankan army, to assess the quality oI Pirabhakaran`s
Sinhalese military competition.
The Lanka Guardian oI Dec.1, 1993 had a glaring pink-
colored box with black border in its cover. That box carried
the caption: The Tiger War: Why Aren`t We Winning?
Lt.General Denis Perera, Rear Admiral Basil Gunasekera, Air
Vice-Marshal Harry Goonetilleke talk to Mervyn de Silva.
This post-mortem was held to analyze the Pooneryn
|Poonagari| Army camp debacle. To digest the success oI
Pirabhakaran`s army, I provide below a lengthy segment oI
Mervyn de Silva`s questions and the responses oI General
Denis Perera and Air Vice Marshal Harry Goonetilleke:
Jiews of Denis Perera:
|Note: The dots in between the sentences and the bold Iace Ionts are as in the
original text.|
'First oI all, we must be clear in our own minds on
strategy` General Denis Perera said. What are we trying to
achieve? To me, he asked, it is obvious destroy the
achieve? To me, he asked, it is obvious destroy the
military capability oI the LTTE. Some people seem to
believe that this is a law and order problem. That`s
nonsense, oI course. Our navy must be asked to close
the gaps`, iI any at sea; our planes and helicopters must
be spotters` and between the two, the navy and the air
Iorce, we must destroy the weapons coming in, or the
army must destroy the boats on arrival. It can also be
done by air. In this overall strategy, I would suggest a Iull-
time maritime commander.not just a ground commander.
Question: General, are there any other points and
constructive criticisms that you can oIIer.I believe there
was a meeting with Iormer service chieIs to pick their
brains.?
Lt.Gen.Perera: I`d rather put some points in the Iorm oI
questions that need to be probed. Are there overall
planning weaknesses which need to be studied and the
situation corrected? Is there a delay in sending re-
inIorcements? Does the army have contingency plans? Do
long deIence lines lack depth?
Question: General, you haven`t mentioned intelligence.
Answer: I was coming to that, and there too, I have a
question. Is there an intelligence Iailure or is there an
unIortunate neglect oI the intelligence received?
Question: Is there in the army as a matter oI routine,
inquiries into Iailures, lapses etc?
Answer: Good question. There should be. At a high level,
at that. Nothing must be glossed over or covered up.
Every institution learns Irom mistakes.that is part oI
experience.
Question: It is always said that LTTE inIiltration is very
good.
Answer: Yes, we have heard stories.Ogollan mona unit
ekenda? But the accent should betray the inIiltrator,
shouldn`t it?
Question: General, what oI the command structure?.
General Gerry Silva has been placed in charge oI the
North.
Answer: A Iull-time Iield commander is a good idea. But I
would have the ChieI oI StaII concentrate on strategy and
coordination. The work oI the ground commander, the
maritime commander etc needs to be more closely linked.
Question: The heavily guarded camps have been over-run
so easily.
Answer: They have leIt gaps.especially in Pooneryn
which has wide areas.There should be land-mines, trip-
wire and illumination`.as soon as an inIiltrator trips, the
light signals the deIender.these devices are available.
once you have dug in.your FDL |Note: army jargon Ior
Iorward deIence line`| must be strong.good use must
be made oI anti-personnel mines.
Jiews of Air Jice Marshal Coonetilleke
|Note: The dots in between the sentences and the bold-Iace Ionts are as in the
original text.|
'Air Vice Marshal Goonetilleke: We now know the
LTTE has a strong army.quite small but highly
motivated, well trained and tough.aIter all, young women
are on the Irontline. Now the Tigers are quite good at sea
too. But we have a monopoly oI the skies. Why didn`t we
rely on the Air Force when we have total superiority Irom
dawn to dusk.
Question: Precisely because we have a monopoly oI the
skies, don`t you think that Palaly may be an LTTE top
priority? Suicide squads?
Air Vice Marshal Goonetilleke: OI course. They`ll use
every means possible to deny us that monopoly. But the
problems go deeper. I am worried about morale. There is
too much Let me look aIter my liIe.until I can Iind some
other work.the Ieeling that they are cannon Iodder
MUST not spread. We must not allow any demoralization.
We need to inject new conIidence and vitality. We must
have a well-knit Joint Command.reduce extensions to a
minimum.3 commanders and IGP must make almost
ALL the strategic decisions, with least interIerence Irom
non-servicemen. Arms purchases must be strictly
proIessional. There should be a WAR COUNCIL, a
recruitment drive.a campaign to raise morale.
Apart Irom Air Vice Marshal Goonetilleke, the Rear Admiral
Gunasekera also had mentioned in his interview to Mervyn
de Silva, 'I am quite concerned about morale.the will to
Iight. II there is a serious problem, it must be remedied at
once.
My 1993 Letter on Morale: rejected by the Lanka
Cuardian
AIter reading the insipid responses oI Pirabhakaran`s elite
Sinhalese competition, I submitted a brieI sardonic critique
to the Lanka Guardian, which Mervyn de Silva had
discretely rejected Irom publication. I present this rejected
letter, dated Dec.11, 1993 now. I had captioned it as The
Tiger War`.
'Thank you Ior publishing the sermons` oI the three
Iormer Service Commanders Lt.General Denis Perera,
Rear Admiral Basil Gunasekera and Air Vice Marshal
Harry Goonetilleke, on why the Tiger War is not
progressing well, according to the expectations oI the
Services (LG, Dec.1). What I gather Irom the printed
excerpts, the chieI problem among the service
personnel seems to be the lack oI morale. Two oI the
three ex-Service Commanders had lamented about the
morale. II only, some biotechnology or pharmaceutical
company in Japan can produce and market morale-
boosting pills` (like the morning-aIter pills` Ior
unprotected sex) which can be purchased over the
counter, I will supply them with such inIormation. Until
then, one has to manage with what is available.
In the available` category, we should include the
Iront-line experience` oI the Iormer Service
Commanders. Have they got any? II so, how much
percentage oI success they can show? What have they
done on their part to build up morale in their camps?
And how much success they have had in this
campaign? I`m disappointed that you Iailed to ask these
elementary questions.
A 21 Update on Sri Lankan army morale
I should admit that I did not anticipate the sexploiting
ingenuity oI the chicken-hearted chieItains oI the Sri Lankan
army, when I wrote the sardonic letter to Mervyn de Silva
about the need Ior a morale-boosting pill. Many may have
about the need Ior a morale-boosting pill. Many may have
missed last year`s news Irom the rehabilitation research Iront
oI the Sri Lankan army to instil troop morale which captured
the international headlines. Here is a lengthy excerpt Irom
Amal Jayasinghe`s report oI March 28, 2001 to the Agence
France-Presse, captioned Viagra to raise Sri Lanka troop
morale`.
'A year aIter Sri Lankan troops bought multi-barrel
rockets and swing-wing jets to resist a massive
oIIensive by Tamil rebels another key weapon` is
being inducted to Iight a diIIerent battle. The latest
acquisition by the medical corps has the potential to
raise morale to new heights in an army where nearly a
tenth oI troops have been wounded while battling
separatist Tamil Tiger rebels in the North-East.
The army is experimenting with the new sexual arousal
drug, Viagra, in the treatment oI war-wounded as
rehabilitation is given top billing aIter President
Chandrika Kumaratunga placed the country on a war
Iooting`. We have just got the samples oI Viagra` said
Dr.Sriyani Warusawitharana who heads the
rehabilitation oIIensive. We want to start the treatment
on some married soldiers who have recovered Irom
their injuries`. She said the war-wounded oIten suIIered
psychological problems, particularly due to losing limbs
Irom anti-personnel mines. We are looking at the
sexual aspects oI treatment`, she said. We are getting
help Irom a university Ior this program`.
Warusawitharana said the injured soldiers initially suIIer
Iears oI rejection by society, but with the help oI
proIessional counseling and support Irom colleagues
most make remarkable recoveries.
The army set up a separate directorate Ior rehabilitation
in 1989 but the outIit got a new push when the
government announced it was placing the country on a
war-Iooting` Iollowing the abortive rebel oIIensive in
JaIIna in April and May last year. Viagra, which was
approved as a prescription drug in Sri Lanka only Iour
months ago, was introduced at 685 rupees (eight
dollars) Ior the smaller 25 mg pill and considered
expensive by local standards. But money is no object in
this case.
this case.
The army`s rehabilitation outIit is a show-piece centre
Ior the other military units such as the airIorce and the
navy and has provided vocational training Ior about
4,500 wounded troopers. The rehab unit currently has
some 9,000 troopers registered with it and re-deployed
in various branches oI the security Iorces. Masons,
carpenters and even some oI the military drivers are
soldiers who once Iought in the war. About eight
percent oI the Sri Lankan military is oIIicially listed as
disabled` soldiers.
There had been several US medical teams helping the
Sri Lankan army in treating the war-wounded and the
US military has also giIted operating theatres and
provided specialised training on medical evacuation.
But the down side is that the Tigers have not been
sparing soldiers wounded in battle. A recently retired
army general said Tiger rebels killed injured soldiers
because oI Iears they could be re-deployed back in the
army aIter their recovery.
Innovation and Ingenuity of L11E strategy
Sometimes, it is worth waiting Ior the secrets to spill Irom
adversary`s camp to judge the capabilities oI innovation and
military ingenuity shown by Pirabhakaran`s army. Some
details on the Pooneryn and Janakapura debacles Iaced by
the Sri Lankan army have been reported by the Island
newspaper`s analyst C.A.Chandraprema early this year. I
present below a lengthy excerpt Irom his eulogy to Major
General Cecil Waidyaratne, who died on Dec.18, 2001.
Though Pirabhakaran is not mentioned, how his skill in
making a mince-meat oI Waidyaratne`s touted army is
nonetheless glaring. To quote Chandraprema,
'General Waidyaratne was able to handle the JVP`s
second insurrection very successIully. He later became
Commander oI the Sri Lankan Army. But he resigned in
1992 over the Pooneryn and Janakapura attacks. Those
were the two worst attacks ever Iaced by the Sri Lankan
Army while the UNP was in power. The military
debacles which became such a conspicuous Ieature oI
PA rule actually started when the UNP was in power
during the tenure oI Cecil Waidyaratne as Army
during the tenure oI Cecil Waidyaratne as Army
Commander. A lackadaisical attitude appeared to
permeate the Army during the last years oI UNP rule.
There was no reason Ior the Iall oI Janakapura and
Pooneryn except sheer negligence. At Pooneryn,
around 600 soldiers lost their lives but a small group
within the camp held on doggedly until reinIorcements
arrived. The Pooneryn camp was never overrun
completely. The question arises is: II a small group
could hold on so easily why couldn`t the whole camp
hold on?
This was a case oI sheer negligence. The Iorward
deIense lines at Pooneryn had not been inspected and
reconstituted to suit the manpower availability in the
camp. There had been a reIugee camp within the
Iorward deIense lines and LTTE cadres had been living
incognito among the reIugees. Later it was Iound that
the attackers had in their possession, Army rations that
had been given to the wretched reIugees! Access Irom
the sea into the area oI the camp had not been properly
guarded. By the time the attack had started, there had
been around 400 LTTE cadres who had inIiltrated the
Iorward deIense lines through the reIugee camp and via
the sea. II these aspects had been looked aIter,
Pooneryn would never have Iallen. Many soldiers died
in Pooneryn only because oI the conIusion. Where
there was no such conIusion, the soldiers managed to
hold on.
Here, Chandraprema seems to be oblivious to the Iact that
causing conIusion in the enemy camp is an age-old strategy
in warIare, and preventing such conIusion among Ioot
soldiers is an important Iunction oI leadership.
Chandraprema continued,
'A similar story is told about Janakapura. It was in the
Janakapura attack that two battle tanks Iell into the
hands oI the LTTE Ior the Iirst time. Being an
Armoured Corps oIIicer General Waidyaratne has
eloquently told me with many I`s and b`s the rage and
shame he Ielt when he heard about the loss oI the two
battle tanks. Unlike in Pooneryn the loss at Janakapura
was more in terms oI war material than in terms oI lives.
was more in terms oI war material than in terms oI lives.
The LTTE is said to have been able to carry oII over 50
million rupees worth oI war equipment including the
two battle tanks Irom Janakapura. Here too the loss oI
the two battle tanks was due to the men on the spot not
having adhered to the basic precaution oI removing vital
moving parts in armoured vehicles when they are idle.
This is a routine precaution taken in battle zones so that
in case oI a surprise attack, the enemy will not be able
to drive away the armoured vehicles.
General Waidyaratne, with his Ilair Ior writing endless
instructions and signals` (as the Army calls them), had
earlier on issued a circular to all units in the battle zone
that when armoured vehicles are idle, vital moving parts
have to be removed as a saIety precaution. Despite
these written instructions, the troops at Janakapura had
Iailed to take the routine precautions. When the attack
began, armoured corps oIIicers had come running to
get the tanks operational. But by the time they got to the
tanks LTTE cadres had been already in the tanks. Then
these armoured corps men had leIt even their pistols
and other equipment and run oII in the opposite
direction. AIter the attack, two armored corps
personnel had been rescued Irom the well in the camp!
Little wonder that Cecil Waidyaratne was literally beside
himselI with rage and shame. This episode oI the two
battle tanks broke his spirit like nothing else did. This
clinched his decision to resign Irom the Army.
|The
Island newspaper, Colombo, Feb.6, 2002|
II what was described by Chandraprema, as heard directly
Irom General Waidyaratne, was accurate, it tells something
on the quality oI combat spirit oI LTTE cadres and the
leadership oI Pirabhakaran. And as Chandraprema inIormed,
General Waidyaratne was a Sandhurst-trained oIIicer.
General Denis Perera, cited earlier in the Lanka Guardian
Ieature, had gloated to another reporter Hiranthi Fernando in
1999,
'Sandhurst has trained 119 oIIicers and produced
seven Commanders oI the Sri Lanka Army. I was the
Iirst and Gen.Daluwatte, the Iormer Commander was
the last.
|Sundav Times, Colombo, Oct.10, 1999|
the last.
|Sundav Times, Colombo, Oct.10, 1999|
But any sensible person in Sri Lanka knows, that not a single
one oI these 119 Sandhurst-trained military oIIicers can hold
a candle to Pirabhakaran, who is a home-grown talent. Here
is a recent lament Irom the daily tom-tom beater` Ior the
Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism, which emphasizes this point.
'.This country has had many such blundering
generals, who would have been court martialled in any
other country, being appointed to the top most
positions and in some cases even placed in charge oI
joint operations. This is not all! Such generals have even
been sent to countries oI their choice as ambassadors
aIter their retirement Iollowing repeated extensions.
(Lest it should be misunderstood, no mention is here
made to General Janaka Perera, the present Sri Lankan
High Commissioner to Australia, who had done the
military proud).
|Editorial in the newspaper Island, Colombo,
July 8, 2002|
Whether General Janaka Perera`s deeds in the battle Iield are
that exemplary is open to debate. However the editorialist
Gamini Weerakoon tries to make a hero oI General Janaka
Perera, the Iact that he couldn`t stand the heat oI the battle
ground in Sri Lanka Ior long suggests that he might have
Ieared Ior his liIe and personally preIerred the greener
pastures in Australia.
The unidentiIied DeIence Correspondent` oI the Island
newspaper has spilled more beans about the orgy oI power
and greed Ior wealth through corruption among the military
elites. Excerpts:
'.A number oI serving and retired army, navy and air
Iorce chieIs are lobbying hard to be appointed the next
ChieI oI DeIence StaII. The position became vacant
with the appointment oI the last ChieI oI DeIence StaII,
General Rohan de S.Daluwatte, as Sri Lanka
Ambassador to Brazil..
|Air Marshal Jayalath| Weerakoddy`s scandal spotlights
the disgraceIul conduct oI many oI the past and present
service commanders and senior oIIicers, who bend and
break rules and regulations, as well as the country`s
laws, in what can only be described as an orgy oI
power and greed Ior wealth through corruption,
Iorsaking the lives oI all those around them.
One Iormer army commander actually spent millions oI
rupees oI army Iunds in constructing a Hindu kovil to
IulIil a vow he had made. |Note bv Sri Kantha: Who
knows whether this guy could have vowed Ior the
saIety oI his liIe to a Hindu deity!| Another navy
commander did the same with navy Iunds to build a
Buddhist temple. Another army commander has a
palatial mansion in the south Indian city where his guru,
Sai Baba, resides, just so the service commander can
visit him Irom time to time.
The DeIence Ministry is ultimately to blame Ior not
keeping a control over the conduct oI oIIicers in the
Iorces. Yet these oIIicers are not youngsters. They are
those in their Iorties and IiIties, who should know better
about responsibility. It is these same armed Iorces
chieIs who have spent untold millions on themselves,
buying bullet-prooI vehicles and Ileets oI luxury cars
and escort vehicles at the expense oI the public. Yet,
here we Iind a serving air Iorce chieI at the wheel oI a
car, without any escort, driving a young lady air Iorce
oIIicer through the streets oI Colombo at high speed at
4:15 am!.
|The Island newspaper, Colombo, July 7, 2002|
It is not diIIicult to guess what Air Force Commander Air
Marshal Jayalath Weerakoddy was upto with a young lady air
Iorce oIIicer at the wheel oI a car without any escort. At the
time oI his unIortunate mishap, he might have been a
volunteer participant oI the Sri Lankan army`s program oI
Viagra route to morale enhancement.
A scan on the :recent' great military minds:
the national check-list
In the previous chapter |see, Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
part 37| I tried to impress on the readers about the
dominance oI combat power by the European nations and
the USA during the past 500 years. During this same period,
Tamils having lost the crown (civil) power, combat power
and commercial power have lingered on to the 20
th
century
with only the cerebral power.
The Whos Who in Militarv Historv. from 1453 to the
Present Dav |3
rd
edition, 1996; Routledge, London|,
authored by John Keegan and Andrew WheatcroIt is an
authoritative reIerence source which provide pen sketches oI
great military minds who shaped the course oI war and thus
inIluenced the past 500 years oI global history. I have an
aIIinity Ior this book, since it tells the story in brieI
biographical sketches about how combat power came to
inIluence the past 500 years oI global history, and why not a
single Tamil name appears in it. WarIare has been practiced
since the dawn oI humankind in all cultures, but a paradigm
shiIt occurred 550 years ago, when bullets and guns were
introduced. In the preIace oI its second edition (1987),
Keegan and WheatcroIt had noted aptly,
'However stout the heart that beats beneath the braid, it
is brain and nervous system that count when armies
clash. The great panjandrums oI the parade ground are
Irequently Iound to lack both when armies take the
Iield.
Among the 700 great military men who have received
coverage in this source book, the lives oI 270 (38 percent oI
the total) had crossed or commenced in the Iirst halI oI the
20
th
century. Two oI the youngest in this list oI 270 were
born in the 1930s: Gen.Norman SchwarzkopI (born 1934)
and Gen.Colin Powell (born 1937). All others, with the
exception oI Vo Nguyen Giap (born 1910), Gen.William
Westmoreland (born 1914) and Marcel Bigeard (born 1916)
have already died. Those born aIter 1937 have not received
mention - probably Ior reason oI proximity bias.
I venture to predict, that if all obfective criteria are
considered for inclusion, among those born in the second
half of the twentieth centurv, Pirabhakaran has a good
chance oI being included in a Iuture edition oI this source
book, Ior his record in military endeavors. At the same time,
I also predict that not a single one oI Pirabhakaran`s past
and present adversaries in the Sri Lankan army have a chance
oI being considered Ior inclusion in such a source book.
oI being considered Ior inclusion in such a source book.
This is because, as Keegan and WheatcroIt had stated in
their preIace, 'The really signiIicant warriors Iorm a separate
and inner group, whose reputations were made not by the
bureaucratic processes that elevate workaday soldiers up the
ladder oI promotion but by lightning inspirations oI mind and
Ilashing strokes oI action.
To perIorm a statistical analysis oI these 270 great military
minds, I unscrambled the A-Z Iormat oI entries into
respective nationalities. Granting an allowance Ior recorder
bias, since the compilers were British, it revealed a historical
reality: the dominance oI combat power by the European
nations and the USA. 258 oI the recent` great military
minds, who made this list oI 270 came Irom Britain (57),
Germany (53), France (40), USA (33), pre-Lenin Russia (18)
and Soviet Union (11), Japan (12), Italy (6), South AIrica (5),
Austria (4), China (4), Belgium (3), Poland (3), Spain (3),
Ireland (2), Turkey (2) and Yugoslavia (2). A miscellaneous
dozen, consisting one individual Irom a nation, originated
Irom Prussia oI the 19
th
century, Switzerland, Hungary,
Finland, Serbia, Canada, India, Israel, New Zealand,
Vietnam, and Cuba-Argentina.
Why I care Ior this list?
I state the Iollowing Iour reasons why I care Ior this list.
First is to counter the duplicitious propaganda oI (a) the Sri
Lankan and Indian governments, and (b) the terrorism
analysts like Bruce HoIIman and Rohan Gunaratna, that
Pirabhakaran is a terrorist` and not a military leader. II
Pirabhakaran is a terrorist`, bv the same vardstick - the men
who are listed below are also terrorists. Some oI them did
receive this terrorist label while they were engaged in leading
their armies. The game oI shiIting goal posts in assessing
who is a terrorist` and who is a military leader, by the
arbiters and Poo Bahs oI global media deserves a
condemnation. That every military undertaking is based on a
certain degree oI terror is a given. Thus, smearing one party
with the label oI terrorists`, and adoring the other party`s
deeds as national service` and patriotic valor` is nothing
but Iraud and selI-serving sycophancy.
Secondlv, to expose the academic deception and deIiciency
oI partisan journalists and deIence analysts in Colombo and
Chennai who had Iound a niche in the local journals to
analyze the strategies oI LTTE campaigns without even
bothering to study the details oI global military history oI
past 150 years. I should speciIically name some members oI
this tribe: Iqbal Athas, C.A. Chandraprema and Dayan
Jayatilleka (in Colombo) as well as N.Ram, V.Suryanarayan,
V.S.Sambandan and T.S.Subramanian (in Chennai).
Thirdlv, to place Pirabhakaran`s record in military
achievements in proper perspectives with that oI some oI his
illustrious predecessors Irom Asia such as Mao, Subhas
Chandra Bose and Giap the three who had received
recognition in this list Ior establishing an army. The
proIessional worth oI Pirabhakaran can also be evaluated by
studying the proIessional mediocrity (and incompetence) oI
his adversaries in Sri Lanka and India Irom an independent
third source. I would add that even Pakistan`s Generals have
to be considered as Pirabhakaran`s adversaries because
beginning Irom Gen.Zia ul Haq in the early 1980s, they have
given material and moral support to Pirabhakaran`s Sri
Lankan adversaries.
Fourthlv, to educate the Tamils who are still ignorant of the
value of combat power in the 20
th
centurv about the names
oI leaders who by their contributions to combat power
raised the stature oI their nations.
According to Keegan and WheatcroIt, Iour categories oI
men have received recognition in their source book. These
being, (1) great commanders land, sea and air, whose
leadership won the most Iamous victories oI the modern age;
(2) those who, iI not great commanders in the Iield, laid the
ground Ior the victory oI others; (3) military thinkers; and (4)
great military technocrats. I have indicated 50 oI the
popularly known heroes and those who became icons in
politics and other endeavors oI nation building in italics.
Providing a list oI names (even though these names are
reputed!) like a telephone directory does not help the
readers, iI some observations are not made Irom such a list.
Thus, my candid observations Iollow the list. Now to the
names oI 270 military masterminds, whose lives crossed or
commenced in the Iirst halI oI the 20
th
century (1901-1950).
Britain (57)
Alexander, Harold 1891-1969: General and Allied
Commander in ChieI
Allenby, Edmund 1861-1936: Field Marshal
Auchinleck, Sir Claude 1884-1981: Field Marshal
Baden-Powell, Robert 1857-1941: Hero oI MaIeking and
Founder oI Boy Scouts.
Beatty, David 1871-1936: Admiral
BeresIord, Charles 1846-1919: Admiral
Brooke, Alan 1883-1963: Field Marshal
Buller, Sir Redvers 1839-1908: General
Byng, Julian 1862-1935: Field Marshal
Cambridge, George 1819-1904: Field Marshal
ChelmsIord, Frederic 1827-1905: General
Cherwell, Lord 1886-1957: ScientiIic adviser to Winston
Churchill
Coningham, Sir Arthur 1895-1948: Air Marshal
Cradock, Sir Christopher 1862-1914: Admiral
Cunningham, Andrew 1883-1963: Admiral
Dill, Sir John 1881-1944: Field Marshal
Dowding, Hugh 1882-1970: Air Marshal
Fisher, John Arbuthnot 1841-1920: Admiral
French, John 1852-1925: Field Marshal
Fuller, John 1878-1964: General, Military writer and thinker
Gort, John 1886-1946: Field Marshal
Gough, Sir Hubert 1870-1963: General and Mutineer
Haig, Douglas 1861-1928: Field Marshal & Commander in
ChieI (1915-18) in France
Haldane, Richard Burton 1856-1928: Military reIormer
Hamilton, Sir Ian 1853-1947: General
Harris, Sir Arthur (Bomber) 1892-1984: Air Marshal
Ironside, Edmund 1880-1959: Field Marshal
Jellicoe, John 1859-1935: Admiral
Keyes, Roger 1872-1945: Admiral
Kitchener, Horatio 1850-1916: Field Marshal
Lawrence, Thomas Edward 1888-1935: Adventurer
Leigh-Mallory, Sir TraIIord 1892-1944: Air Marshal
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil 1895-1970: Military theorist,
historian & biographer
McCreery, Sir Richard 1898-1967: General
Mannock, Edward 1887-1918: Figher Ace
Methuen, Paul SandIord 1845-1932: Field Marshal
Montgomerv, Bernard Law 1887-1976: Field Marshal
Mountbatten, Louis 1900-1979: Naval OIIicer
O`Connor, Sir Richard 1889-1981: General
Percival, Arthur 1887-1966: General
Plumer, Herbert 1857-1932: Field Marshal
Portal, Charles 1893-1971: Air Marshal
Ramsay, Sir Bertram 1883-1945: Admiral
Rawlinson, Henry 1864-1925: General
Roberts, Frederick 1832-1913: Field Marshal
Robertson, Sir William 1860-1933: Field Marshal
Slim, William 1891-1970: Field Marshal
Somerville, Sir James 1882-1949: Admiral
Sturdee, Sir Frederick 1859-1925: Admiral
Tedder, Arthur 1890-1967: Air Marshal
Tovey, John 1885-1971: Admiral
Townshend, Sir Charles 1861-1924: General
Trenchard, Hugh 1873-1956: Airman
Wavell, Archibald 1883-1950: Field Marshal
Wilson, Sir Henry 1864-1922: Field Marshal
Wingate, Orde 1903-1944: General
Wolseley, Garnet 1833-1913: Field Marshal
Germany (53)
Balck, Hermann 1893-1950: General
Blomberg, Werner von 1878-1943: Field Marshal
Bock, Feodor von 1880-1945: Field Marshal
Boelcke, Oswald 1891-1916: Fighter Ace
Brauchitsch, Walter von 1881-1948: Field Marshal
Braun, Wernher von 1912-1977: Designer oI mlitary rocket
mssiles
mssiles
Canaris, Wilhelm 1888-1945: Admiral & ChieI oI
Intelligence
Donitz, Karl 1891-1980: Admiral & Head oI State
Falkenhayn, Erich von 1861-1922: General
Fritsch, Werner 1880-1939: General
Goltz, Colmar 1843-1916: Field Marshal & mlitary writer
Groener, Wilhelm 1867-1939: General
Guderian, Heinz 1888-1953: General & theorist oI tank
warIare
Halder, Franz 1884-1971: General & ChieI oI StaII
Hindenburg, Paul Ludwig 1847-1934: Field Marshal &
President
Hipper, Franz 1863-1932: Admiral
Hitler, Adolf 1889-1945: Dictator & war leader
Hoepner, Erich 1886-1944: Panzer General
HoIIman, Max 1869-1927: General
Jodl, AlIred 1890-1946: General
Keitel, Wilhelm 1892-1946: Field Marshal
Kesselring, Albert 1885-1960: Field Marshal
Kleist, Paul 1881-1954: Field Marshal
Kluck, Alexander von 1846-1934: General
Kluge, Gunther von 1882-1944: Field Marshal
Leeb, Wilhelm 1876-1956: Field Marshal
Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul 1870-1964: General & colonial
guerrilla leader
Liman von Sanders, Otto 1855-1929: General
List, Wilhelm 1880-1971: Field Marshal
Lossberg, Fritz von 1868-1943: General
LudendorII, Erich 1865-1937: General
Mackensen, August von 1849-1944: Field Marshal
Manstein, Erich von 1887-1973: Field Marshal
Model, Walther 1891-1945: Field Marshal
Paulus, Friedrich 1890-1957: Field Marshal
Raeder, Erich 1876-1960: Admiral
Reichenau, Walter von 1884-1942: Field Marshal
RichthoIen, ManIred 1892-1918: Fighter Ace
Rommel, Erwin 1891-1944: Field Marshal
Rundstedt, Karl 1875-1953: Field Marshal
Rupprecht, Crown Prince oI Bavaria 1869-1955: Soldier
Scheer, Reinhard 1863-1929: Admiral
SchlieIIen, AlIred 1833-1913: Field Marshal
Schorner, Ferdinand 1892-1973: Field Marshal
Seeckt, Hans von 1866-1936: General
Spee, Maximilien 1861-1914: Admiral
Student, Kurt 1890-1978: General
Tirpitz, AlIred 1849-1930: Admiral
Udet, Ernst 1896-1941: Fighter Ace
Waldersee, AlIred 1832-1904: Field Marshal
Weichs, Maximilian 1881-1954: Field Marshal
Witzleben, Erwin 1881-1944: Field Marshal
Zeitzler, Kurt 1895-1963: General
France (40)
Anthoine, Francois Paul 1860-1944: General
Berthelot, Henri Mathias 1861-1931: StaII OIIicer
Bigeard, Marcel 1916- : General
Castelnau, Noel 1851-1944: General
Castries, Christian 1902-1991: General & DeIender oI
Dien Bien Phu
Darlan, Jean 1881-1942: Admiral & Politician
De Gaulle, Charles 1890-1970: General & Head oI State
Drevfus, Alfred 1859-1935: OIIicer & central Iigure oI
the DreyIus aIIair
Fayolle, Marie Emile 1852-1928: Marshal
Foch, Ferdinand 1851-1929: Marshal
Fonck, Rene Paul 1894-1953: Fighter Ace
Franchet DÈsperey, Louis 1856-1942: Marshal
Gallieni, Joseph 1849-1916: General
Gamelin, Maurice 1872-1958: General
Georges, Joseph 1875-1951: General
Giraud, Henri 1879-1949: General
Gouraud, Henri 1867-1946: General
Guillaumat, Marie 1863-1940: General
Guynemer, Georges 1894-1917: Fighter Ace
Jaures, Jean-Leon 1859-1914: Socialist
JoIIre, Joseph 1852-1931: Marshal
Juin, Alphonse Pierre 1888-1967: Marshal
Koenig, Marie 1898-1970: General
Langle de Cary, Fernand 1849-1927: General
Lanrezac, Charles 1852-1925: General
Lattre de Tassigny, Jean 1889-1952: Marshal
Leclerc, Philippe 1902-1947: Marshal
Lyautey, Louis 1854-1934: Marshal
Maginot, Andre 1877-1932: Minister oI War
Mangin, Charles 1866-1925: General
Marchand, Jean 1863-1934: General & Explorer
Maunoury, Michel 1847-1923: Marshal
Navarre, Henri 1898-1993: General
Negrier, Francois 1839-1913: General
Nivelle, Robert 1856-1924: General
Nungesser, Charles 1892-1927: Fighter Ace
Pau, Paul Marie 1848-1932: General
Petain, Henri 1856-1951: Marshal
Sarrail, Maurice 1856-1929: General
Weygand, Maxime 1867-1965: General
America (33)
Arnold, Henrv Harlev (Hap) 1886-1950: AirIorce
Commander
Bradley, Omar 1893-1981: General
Buckner, Simon Bolivar 1823-1914:ConIederate General
Chennault, Claire 1898-1953: Airman
Clark, Mark 1896-1984: General
Dewey, George 1837-1917: Admiral
Doolittle, James 1896-1993: Airman
Eichelberger, Robert 1886-1961: General
Eisenhower, David Dwight 1890-1969: General & US
President
Grierson, Benjamin 1826-1911: Union General
Halsev, William 1882-1959: Admiral
Hodges, Courtney Hicks 1887-1966: General
Joseph, ChieI |Indian| 1831-1904: Indian war leader
King, Ernest 1878-1956: Admiral
Longstreet, James 1821-1904: ConIederate General
MacArthur, Douglas 1880-1964: General
Mahan, AlIred 1840-1914: Admiral, naval historian &
theorist
Marshall, George 1880-1959: General
Miles, Nelson 1839-1925: General
Mitchell, William 1879-1936: Airman
Mitscher, Marc 1887-1947: Admiral
Nimit:, Chester 1885-1966: Admiral
Patch, Alexander 1889-1945: General
Patton, George 1885-1945: General & tank commander
Pershing, John 1860-1948: General
Powell, Colin 1937- : General & Commander oI Joint
ChieI oI StaII
Rickenbacker, Edward 1890-1973: Fighter Ace
Root, Elihu 1845-1937: Military reIormer
Schwar:kopf, Norman 1934- : General
Spaatz, Carl 1891-1974: Airman
Spruance, Raymond 1886-1969: Admiral
Stilwell, Joseph 1883-1946: General
Westmoreland, William 1914- : General & Commander in
Vietnam
Russia of pre-Lenin period (18)
Alekseev, Mikhal 1857-1918: General
Brusilov, Alexei 1853-1926: General
Denikin, Anton 1872-1947: White General
Dragomirov, Mikhail 1830-1905: General & military
theorist
Frunze, Mikhail 1885-1925: General
Gorshkov, Sergei 1910-1988: Admiral
Gourko, Ossip 1828-1901: General
Kolchak, Alexander 1875-1920: Admiral & White leader
Kornilov, Lavrenti 1870-1918: General
Kuropatkin, Alexei 1848-1925: General
Makaraov, Stepan 1848-1904: Admiral
Nicholas Nicholaievich 1856-1929: General
RennenkampI, Paul 1853-1918: General
Rozhdestvenski, Zinovy 1848-1909: Admiral
Samsonov, Alexander 1859-1914: General
Stossel, Anatoli 1848-1915: General
Trotskv, Lev Davidovich 1879-1940: Revolutionary &
military leader
Wrangel, Petr 1878-1928: White General
Soviet Union (11)
Blyukher, Vasilii 1889-1938: Marshal
Budenny, Semen 1883-1973: Marshal
Konev, Ivan 1897-1973: Marshal
Rokossovski, Konstantin 1896-1968: Marshal
Shaposhnikov, Boris 1882-1945: Marshal
Timoshenko, Semen 1895-1970: Marshal
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail 1893-1937: Marshal
Vasilevsky, Aleksander 1895-1977: Marshal
Voroshilov, Kliment 1881-1969: Marshal
Yeremenko, Andrei 1893-1970: Marshal
Zhukov, Georgvi 1895-1974: Marshal
1apan (12)
Kuribayashi, Tadamichi 1885-1945: General
Kuroki, Baron Jamemoto 1844-1923: General
Nagumo, Chuichi 1886-1944: Admiral
Nogi, Maresuke 1849-1912: General
Oku, Yasukata 1846-1930: Field Marshal
Oyama, Iwao 1843-1916: Field Marshal
Terauchi, Count Seiki 1879-1946: General
Togo, Heihachiro 1849-1934: Admiral
Tofo, Hideki 1884-1948: General & Politician
Yamagata, Aritomo 1838-1922: General & creator oI
modern Japanese army
Yamamoto, Isoroku 1884-1943: Admiral
Yamashita, Tomovuki 1888-1946: General
Italy (6)
Badoglio, Pietro 1871-1956: Field Marshal & prime
minister
Baratieri, Oreste 1841-1901: General
Cadona, Count Luigi 1850-1928: General
Diaz,Armando 1861-1928: Field Marshal
Douchet, Giulio 1869-1930: Airman
Graziani, RodolIo 1882-1955: Field Marshal
South AIrica (5)
Botha, Louis 1862-1919: General & statesman
Cronje, Piet 1835-1911: Boer General
de la Rey, Jacobus 1847-1914: General
De Wet, Christiaan 1854-1922: General
Kruger, Stephanus 1825-1904: Boer statesman & war
leader
Austria (4)
Boroevic von Bojna, Svetozar 1856-1920: General
Conrad, von HotzendorI, Franz 1852-1925: Field Marshal
Joseph-Ferdinand, Archduke 1872-1942: General
Straussenberg, Artur 1857-1935: General
China (4)
Chiang Kai-shek 1887-1975: General & (Taiwan) head
oI state
Chu Teh 1886-1976: Marshal
Lin Piao 1908-1971: Marshal
Mao Tse Tung 1893-1976: Guerrilla leader, military
theorist & statesman
Belgium (3)
Albert I 1875-1934: King & war leader
Brialmont, Henry Alexis 1821-1903: Military engineer
Leman, Gerard 1851-1920: General
Poland (3)
Anders, Wladyslaw 1892-1970: General & leader oI army
in exile
Bloch, Ivan 1836-1902: war theorist
Pilsudski, Joseph 1867-1935: Marshal & head oI modern
Poland.
Poland.
Spain (3)
Franco, Franciso 1892-1975: General & head oI state
Mola, Emilio 1887-1937: General
Primo de Rivera, Juan 1870-1930: General & dictator
Ireland (2)
Collins, Michael 1890-1922: Revolutionary
De Jalera, Eamon 1882-1975: Revolutionary &
statesman
Turkey (2)
Enver Pasha 1881-1922: Revolutionary & General
Kemal Ataturk, Mustafa 1881-1938: Statesman
Yugoslavia (2)
Mihailovic, Dra:a 1893-1946: Guerrilla leader
Tito, Josip Bro: 1892-1980: Guerrilla leader & head oI
state
Other 12
Abd el Krim Mahommed ibn 1882-1963: Moroccan
chieItain
Bishop, William 1894-1956: Canadian Fighter Ace
Bose, Subhas Chandra 1897-1945: Indian Ireedom
Iighter
Davan, Moshe 1915-1981: Israeli General
Durant, Jean Henri 1828-1910: Swiss humanitarian &
Iounder oI Red Cross
Freyburg, Bernard 1889-1963: New Zealand soldier
Georgey, Artur 1818-1912: Hungarian General
Giap, Jo Nguven 1910- :Vietnamese General
Guevara, Ernesto Che 1928-1967: Cuban (Argentina-
born) Guerrilla leader
Mannerheim, Carl 1867-1951: Finnish Field Marshal &
Statesman
Putnik, Radomir 1847-1917: Serbian Commander in ChieI
Verdy du Vernois, Julius 1832-1910: Prussian General
My Candid Observations on the List
The list oI recent great military masterminds, assembled Irom
Keegan and WheatcroIt`s source book allow me to make the
Keegan and WheatcroIt`s source book allow me to make the
Iollowing candid observations.
First, other than Subhas Chandra Bose (who was
Pirabhakaran`s role model) and Vo Nguyen Giap, no other
names Irom South and Southeast Asia received mention.
Thus the paper Generals and Marshals` oI India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Indonesia are nothing
more than professional imbeciles and impostors. Names like
Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq, MusharraI, Ne Win,
Kotelawala and Suharto do not appear in this list. Even the
battle Iield record oI Iew Indian Generals (like
K.M.Cariappa, K.S.Thimayya, Sam Manekshaw and K.
Sundarrajan alias Sundarji) who saw military action were oI
mediocre quality, despite the puII pieces written in the Indian
press, to have them included in this list oI great military
heroes. Pirabhakaran`s adversary during LTTE`s campaign
against the Indian army was none other than Sundarji.
Secondly, Japan has produced 12 recent great military
masterminds. That is how it rose to the rank oI a global
contender (the Iirst Asian nation in recent history) between
1890 and 1945. However, aIter its deIeat in the 2
nd
World
War, its combat power has been reduced to zero. Now, even
majority oI the Japan`s university proIessors who were born
in the 1940s do not know the names oI their great military
heroes. Being a resident in Japan, I can see how Japan`s rank
in the global politics have weakened due to its loss oI
combat power. It is now just seen as a vassal state oI the
USA. Thus, it will never be granted entry into the UN
Security Council. OI the Iour types oI powers (cerebral,
civil, commercial and combat) I have presented as needed
Ior the vitality oI a nation, Japan is a good current example to
show how the loss oI combat power saps the strength oI a
nation.
Thirdly, nation`s boundaries are impermanent. The military
heroes oI Soviet Union listed above, iI they happen to return
to their land in a time-travel mode, will be shocked to learn
that the nation Ior which they sacriIiced their blood and tears
has disappeared Irom the geographical maps. The same is
true Ior Marshal JoseI Tito oI the Yugoslavia or Verdy du
Vernois oI Prussia.
Vernois oI Prussia.
Fourthly, it is Ioolish to expect the status quo oI a nation`s
political system to remain constant. None oI the military
minds oI imperial Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and
Japan listed above could have predicted that the executive
system they labored to preserve had evaporated within
decades oI their departure. |Continued.|

Part 39
Sachi Sri Kantha
26 1uly 2002]
The Paradigm Shifter
Cen. Muttukumaru versus Pirabhakaran
While analyzing the proIessional quality oI Sri Lanka`s
paper Generals`, one cannot bypass the name Gen. Anton
Muttukumaru (1908-2001). Comparison between the
proIessional record oI Gen. Muttukumaru and Pirabhakaran
is inevitable to evaluate latter`s success in establishing a
legitimate, albeit small, Tamil army.
Gen. Muttukumaru was an anomaly in the Ceylonese military
history, since Iollowing the ethnic cleansing procedures
instituted in the post-1962 period, he would remain as the
Iirst and the last ethnic Tamil to hold the topmost rank in the
island`s armed Iorces. To cite Irom a published proIile about
him,
'a lawyer by proIession, |he| joined the Ceylon
DeIence Force as a volunteer oIIicer in 1934 and was
commissioned in the Ceylon Light InIantry (CLI). He
was mobilized during World War II, and commanded
one oI the battalions oI the CLI. When the new Ceylon
Army was inaugurated in 1949, he was selected to be
the ChieI oI StaII under the command oI Brigadier the
Earl oI Caithness. He was also entrusted with the
Iormation oI the Army Act. He assumed duties as the
Iirst Sri Lankan Army Commander in February 1955
and served up to December 1959. |Hiranthi
Fernando, in Sundav Times, Colombo, Oct.10, 1999|
What was missing in this puII piece are the clear details oI
Gen. Muttukumaru`s proIessional achievement during the
Second World War. Where did he command the battalion oI
the CLI? What was the strength oI his battalion? Were there
any memorable outcomes oI his battalion`s engagements?
any memorable outcomes oI his battalion`s engagements?
In 1949, the total budget Ior Ceylon was only 557 million Sri
Lankan rupees and the army`s allocation 0.24 percent
amounted to a mere 1.34 million rupees. This number is
nothing but peanuts` compared to the army`s allocation oI
52 billion rupees (approximately US$ 700 million) in 2000. 52
billion is equivalent to 52,000 million. Thus, in 51 years, the
military budget in Sri Lanka had magniIied to nearly 50,000-
Iold in terms oI Sri Lankan currency. OI course, Sri Lankan
rupee has been devalued considerably. In 1949, one US
dollar was worth Ior 3.50 rupees; but in 2000 nearly 90
rupees were needed to purchase the same US dollar. With
these Iigures in background, I quote what Gen.Muttukumaru
had reminisced as his major achievement:
'I consider the greatest contribution I made to the
Army was to establish Field Artillery, an Armoured
Corps and Field Engineers.at the start, our army was
a small Iorce oI about 2,500 men. |ibid|
Considering the human power and quality oI the current
LTTE army, amounting to nearly 10,000 men and women,
one could easily inIer that what Gen. Muttukumaru handled
during his period oI command in the second halI oI 1950s
was nothing but an equivalent oI Chicken Co-operatives.
Thus, Gen. Muttukumaru - with all his touted proIessional
experience in the Iarmer`s league oI the Second World War -
was incapable oI comprehending the Iunctioning oI
Pirabhakaran`s LTTE. Despite this lack oI expertise,
Gen.Muttukumaru made a Iool oI himselI by prattling to his
interviewer in 1999,
'the terrorist Iorces |as he had reIerred to the LTTE|
were not trained or organized to Iight a well prepared
army in the open Iield. That is why, when they lost
JaIIna, they took to the jungles,` he said. |ibid|
It had escaped the senile Gen.Muttukumaru that given the
cumulative strength oI Sri Lankan army (with a cumulative
number oI Active Forces 118,000-123,000 men; Reserves
4,200 men), Pirabhakaran was not Ioolish to waste his
resources with a numerical handicap between 10:1 and 15:1. I
should add that what Pirabhakaran achieved since 1996 in the
military Iront, aIter losing JaIIna, against the Sri Lankan
army, did not merit any response Irom the Iirst paper
General` oI Ceylon. But an anonymous retired General` had
whispered the Iollowing comments:
'.Generals must think oI the country and not only oI
themselves and repeating Yes men` who remain in their
positions doing nothing useIul. Our politicians and top
brass have wrong notions. Whenever there is a rare
success in battle, they take it as winning the war.
Winning a battle is certainly not winning the war. A case
in point is the capture oI JaIIna.
.Yes men are not the answer. The government through
the security Iorces will have to win the hearts and minds
oI Tamils. Whilst doing so they must not lose the
conIidence oI the major ethnic group, the Sinhalese.
This is rather a tall order... |The Island, Colombo,
June 28, 2001|
The Iact that this retired General, undoubtedly a Sinhalese,
who had written such a sermon was spineless to identiIy
himselI openly tells something about the conIidence-
challenged stature oI the top brass oI Sri Lankan armed
Iorces. Cynics may wonder, iI he cannot identiIy himselI to
his prime Sinhalese audience Ior reasons known only to him,
how could he propose an agenda oI winning the hearts and
minds oI Tamils`. I lack military experience oI any kind, but
I had anticipated the thoughts expressed by this retired
General oI the Sri Lankan army on the 1995 capture oI
JaIIna`. Here is a complete text oI my 1995 year-end rebuttal
letter to analyst Mervyn de Silva`s comments on the Iall oI
JaIIna`. The pronoun you` in the letter reIers to the editor oI
Lanka Guardian.
Prabhakaran's Retreat
|Lanka Guardian, Dec.15, 1995|
'I do not want to spoil the party line you have
presented that LTTE received a drubbing in the recent
military oIIensive in JaIIna (LG, Nov.15). Since one oI
the mission statements oI the LG is to present the
other view`, allow me to be the devil`s advocate. Why
is it that when the army hits JaIIna with missiles and
bombs, the suIIering oI commoners is cast aside as
collateral damage` in the international press release, but
when the LTTE retaliates in the East or in Colombo, the
attack is called terror campaign` and Prabhakaran is
projected as a blood-thirsty Dracula? (vide, your co-
authored report with Tony CliIton in Newsweek,
Nov.13, 1995). Is it because the deIinition oI terror is
diIIerent Ior those who hold nominal power and those
who challenge the status quo?
The party line that the LTTE and its senior
commanders Iled |JaIIna| city` may deIinitely give a
morale boost to the battered and accident-prone image
oI the army. It will also probably strengthen President
Kumaratunga`s case` in the political stage. But as the
old adage says, Don`t count your chicken beIore the
eggs are hatched`.
Like how the Army has been able to pursue its own
strategy on its own terms`, as you have stated,
Prabhakaran also is using the war on his own terms. He
was not Ioolish to sacriIice resources in a Irontal
combat, though the spin oI the deIence pundits that
LTTE Iled JaIIna city has the Madison Avenue
trademark. Prabhakaran gave his cadres a Iew weeks oI
Iield experience` and then tactically retreated, by
borrowing a page Irom Mao`s book on the Long
March, to choose his next strategy. The Generals who
celebrated their success over Mao`s retreating Iorces
later lived to lick their wounds.
Since you have mentioned Muhammad Ali in your
commentary, I would add that Prabhakaran also has
proved on numerous occasions his adherence to Ali`s
manthra in the boxing ring: Float like a butterIly and
sting like a bee`. This explains the commando-style
attack on Kolonnawa oil depots, which exposed the
soIt underbelly oI the national security Iorces.
Now a comment about the much-touted army`s
resources`. Can you be more speciIic about these
resources in terms oI cash? I hardly Iind any real Iigures
mentioned about the deIense expenditure related to
military oIIensives in the pages oI LG. Does the Army
generate its own resources? Someone (not the 67 oI
the survey sample who Iavor a military solution, but the
international donors) is paying Ior the army`s resources
and everyone knows that Sri Lanka is not blessed with
gold mines and oil Iields. II you put a moderate guess,
such as one million dollars per day as operational
expenses in JaIIna, then one can easily guess that the
Army`s resources are not unlimited. There lies
Prabhakaran`s strategy.
You may be correct in stating, Just as it administered
JaIIna successIully enough to believe that it had
established a government, the LTTE Ielt it could take
on an army Irontally`. Now Ilip this point to arrive at an
answer to the question you have posed in the cover,
When JaIIna Ialls what next?` Just as they have taken
the LTTE Irontally, can the Army and the President Ieel
comIortable that they can establish a government in
JaIIna? This will be akin to the mental peace oI a guy
who pretends to sleep in the tiger`s den.
I appreciated Mervyn de Silva`s magnanimity in publishing
my letter in Iull, without any deletions or mangling, though
my letter was critical oI his expressed opinion. I guess that
he accepted the merits in my rebuttal. Now aIter a lapse oI
over 6 years, with a deIence-operation budget oI more than
two million dollars per day, Pirabhakaran had taught a lesson
to some oI the decision makers in the Sri Lankan military
ranks and sensible Sinhalese politicians that LTTE cannot be
militarily decimated. This is why I consider him as the
Ioremost paradigm shiIter in the military history oI Tamil
nationalism Ior the past 500 years. This is not a hyperbole
since I have established my evaluation criteria in the previous
chapter (see, Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 38).
1he Paradigm Shifter
First, I wish to introduce the terms paradigms`, paradigm
shiIter` and paradigm pioneers`. In science, the term
paradigm shiIt` gained prominence Iollowing the publication
oI historian Thomas Kuhn`s path-breaking book, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. To quote Irom a
readable brieI commentary on paradigm, paradigm shiIt and
paradigm shiIter authored by physician JeIIrey Schwartz,
'Paradigms are sets oI rules and regulations that
establish boundaries Ior successIul work. As a
paradigm changes, the game itselI changes. New rules
apply. Failure to keep up with change can cause
problems even Iailure. Since change is inevitable, and
paradigms are constantly changing, watching Ior these
changes enables growth. A paradigm shiIt occurs when
a problem is discovered that cannot be solved by the
existing set oI rules. |in Inside Emergencv Consultants
Inc. Newsletter, Winter 2002, vol.4, no.1|
Eelam Tamils Iaced a paradigm shiIt in 1956. For subsequent
two decades, the then Tamil leaders tested the established
rules, regulations and boundaries such as parliamentary
debates, extra-parliamentary agitation by non-violent
methods and pilgrimage to the power-outlets in India to
disastrous consequences. I titled the chapter 11 oI this series
as Paradigm ShiIt in Eelam` reIerring to the year 1987. The
person who shiIted the paradigm in Sri Lanka (and India)
was Pirabhakaran. Three oI his Tamil rivals who led other
Tamil militant groups in the early 1980s - TELO (Sri
Sabaratnam), PLOTE (Uma Maheswaran) and EPRLF
(Padmanabha) having misread the neIarious minds oI Sri
Lankan and Indian manipulators Iailed to click and Iell
victims to their shortsightedness. More about this will Iollow
below, since anti-LTTE propagandists have tried to create
martyrs out oI cowards who deposited their brains to the Sri
Lankan and Indian operatives working against the interests oI
Eelam Tamils. With Ioresight and humility, V.Balakumar - the
leader oI EROS - had joined his group with the LTTE.
To quote JeIIrey Schwartz again,
'A paradigm shiIter is someone who asks you to
Iorsake your investment in the present paradigm to
move towards a new paradigm. They are able to see
new solutions in old problems. Paradigm pioneers are
the Iirst people to Iollow what the shiIters have
uncovered. Paradigm pioneers bring the brains, brawn,
time, eIIort and capital to help create the critical mass
necessary to drive a new paradigm Iorward. |ibid|
Brains, brawn, time, eIIort and capital were the ingredients
Pirabhakaran needed to push a new paradigm. This is how,
Pirabhakaran needed to push a new paradigm. This is how,
the Economist magazine had summarized the growth oI
LTTE in the past 15 years. That the cited unnamed military
analyst` is Rohan Gunaratna is not diIIicult to identiIy.
'Since 1987, when India unwisely intervened to keep a
peace`, the Tigers have evolved Irom a band oI 1,000-
2,000 cadres into a Iorce oI 7,000 capable oI operating
at all Iive spectra oI conIlict`, according to a military
analyst. They have a Iield army equivalent to three
brigades, armed with artillery, armour, radios with
encryption devices and other paraphernalia, which now
Iights on the JaIIna peninsula. They have a 1,000-cadre
guerrilla Iorce in the Eastern Province, which specializes
in ambushes and mortar attacks. They have a terrorist
outIit, which sends suicide bombers to Colombo and
blows up electricity transIormers. They have a global
propaganda network oI websites, broadcasters and
newspapers, and a diplomatic wing. All this is paid Ior
with contributions, mostly Irom expatriate Tamils, and
proIits Irom businesses, such as restaurants and
shipping. The |Sri Lankan| government guesses that the
Tigers take in $80 m|illion| a year. |Economist, Oct.7,
2000; p.26|
A purse of $8 million per annum?
The guestimate Iigure oI $80 million as an annual purse Ior
LTTE operations cannot be veriIied easily. But iI it happens
to be true, it can be inIerred that to maintain an army oI
10,000-strong motivated cadres, on a per head basis, LTTE
spends the equivalent sum drained by the Sri Lankan deIence
establishment (i.e., $850 million deIence budget Ior an army
oI over 100,000 active personnel: according to analyst
Alastair Lawson, BBC News oI Nov.10, 1999). Financing a
war need ingenious strategies. Even iI the Iigure oI $80
million per annum generated by the LTTE is a hyperbole and
the real Iigure is merely one-tenth oI it (i.e. $8 million per
annum), generating such an amount largely Irom a
constituency oI Eelam Tamil Diaspora who are known Ior
their Irugal means deserves credit. And Pirabhakaran and his
advisors are paradigm shiIters in this aspect as well.
To highlight the value oI this angle on economic ingenuity, I
reproduce a lengthy segment oI critical commentary authored
by journalist S.P.Amarasingam in the aItermath oI 1983 riots
against Tamils. In this biting commentary providing a
synopsis oI the period Irom 1900 to 1980, Amarasingam
had faulted the previous generation of politicians and
businessmen among the Eelam Tamils who fattened their
purses bv contributing to the development of the southern
and hill-countrv regions of the island to the detriment of
Eelam region. Amarasingam wrote,
'.The question that has not been answered is why (at
least Irom the time oI Independence and even earlier)
the JaIIna Tamils did not develop the North and the
East. It is not that they did not have the capital Ior such
development. It is not that they did not have skills. But
the Iact is that the kind oI education imparted by the
colonial administration and the missionary societies had
made them prisoners oI a thought-process that Iitted
them only to be cog-wheels in a government
administrative machine. The JaIIna Tamils were taken
by the British as clerks and subordinate oIIicials to
Malaya and elsewhere starting Irom the closing decades
oI the last |19
th
| century.
With the cash they earned, the JaIIna Tamils did nothing
more than establish what has been called a money order
economy in the JaIIna peninsula and also create a
pensioner`s paradise Ior old age residence. With a little
oI this expatriate capital, market gardening was
streamlined and made proIitable in JaIIna. This had
brought good proIit Ior a small coterie oI Iarmers but it
was only a Iraction oI the remittances received. The
bulk oI the population depended on employment in the
public and private sector in Sri Lanka and abroad, and
the only industry was education to Iit them Ior that kind
oI employment. Later, Irom being clerks and pen-
pushers the newer generations went into the proIessions
and the new technocracy.
In the thirties and Iorties oI this |20
th
| century, when
emigration to Malaya had dried up, JaIIna Tamil
agriculture was extended to the Iranamadu Tank area in
Kilinochchi, a part oI the JaIIna district. But the
Kilinochchi, a part oI the JaIIna district. But the
investment was meager and the development was
marginal. With greater private capital investment in
agriculture, agro-industries and even industries, the
Kilinochchi district could have become an economic
miracle a long time ago. But the Jaffna Tamil
considered such investment as risk capital. All the
surplus Jaffna Tamil capital, however, was invested in
Colombo and the alreadv developed parts of South
Cevlon. |Italics, as in the original|.
There was Iurther exodus oI JaIIna Tamils Ior
employment to the developed countries oI the West,
AIrica, Australia and elsewhere aIter Independence and
more especially aIter 1956. AIter the oil boom oI 1973,
many Tamils Iound employment in the GulI States. But
the surplus expatriate capital that Ilowed into JaIIna in
the |nineteen| sixties, seventies and eighties, apart Irom
jacking up the price oI land in the JaIIna Peninsula
(mainly Ior residential purposes) to dizzy heights oI
uneconomic absurdity, it was, like beIore, invested in
the South, mainly in Iixed deposits in State Banks or
Iinance companies. A sizeable portion went into real
estate in Colombo and the suburbs and a smaller
portion into the new tax holiday` industries like
tourism, travel, hotels, export industries and the like.
Very, very little or hardly anything was invested in the
North or the East the so-called traditional homelands
oI the Tamils.
There were no legal or any other restriction to prevent
this investment. Only the inIrastructure in these areas
was less than marginal. No doubt the areas were in
jungle. There was malaria, elephants and snakes. It had
to be a pioneer`s existence a Iar cry Irom the semi-
urban calm oI JaIIna or the Ilesh-pots and urban
amenities oI Colombo. It was also easier to collect
interest on Iixed deposits in arm chair comIort than toil
and sweat in new ventures in the undeveloped areas.
|Tribune, Colombo, Sept.17, 1983, pp.2-3|
I appreciated the above lines Irom Amarasingam. They tell
how much the LTTE cadres had endured in the jungles oI
Eelam to establish the vibrant Tamil army, bv leading a
Eelam to establish the vibrant Tamil army, bv leading a
pioneers existence. The arm-chair critics oI LTTE belonging
to the upper crust oI Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims the
quasi literate scribes, analysts and journalists - live in the
flesh-pots and urban amenities of Colombo. Two additional
paragraphs Irom Amarasingam`s commentary deserve selI
introspection:
'But what has disappointed many is that a JaIIna Tamil
who talks so much about Tamil areas` and who could
have done much to develop them did nothing to switch
his investments Irom the South to these areas in the
North and the East. II this had been done, the
accusation that the JaIIna Tamils were seeking to
swallow up Colombo and other southern areas would
not have come. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan Tamils
could easily have developed agriculture and industry
and homes Ior themselves in the North and East. A very
large number who had obtained lands under various
schemes, especially in the years aIter 1956, Iailed to
make the necessary investment in them to make them
economically viable. Instead the available Tamil capital
was invested and re-invested in Colombo, in the
upcountry and other areas in the South. A tea estate in
Talawakelle or an oil extraction plant in the Coconut
Belt was a more attractive proposition that an
investment in agriculture or industry in the North or the
East.
One does not know whether the present |1983|
holocaust will bring a change in the thinking oI the Sri
Lankan Tamil. Many argue that such investment in the
North and East would be Ieasible only aIter a political
settlement. Those who indulge in such casuistry are
silent when asked whether they did not think that a
political settlement would have been easier iI such
development had taken place. Nor do they have an
answer as to why they put all their investments into one
basket in the South which some oI them regard as alien
territory`. |ibid|
When I re-read these lines now, I could hear the sneering
voice oI Amarasingam which I listened to rapturously in the
voice oI Amarasingam which I listened to rapturously in the
days Iollowing the post-1977 riots, while seated in Iront oI
his desk at the Tribune oIIice in Colombo. He had a visceral
distaste Ior the business entrepreneurship oI
G.G.Ponnambalam and Chelvanayakam. Not only
Ponnambalam and Chelvanayakam, but also Gunaratnams,
Sellamuthus, Thambiaiyahs, Gardiners, Pages and
Maharajahs reaped obscene amount oI capital wealth by
investing and re-investing in the South Ceylon, which hardly
beneIited the Tamil Iolks residing in the North-East regions
oI the island. Viewed in this angle, LTTE`s business
ventures during the past 15 years in the territories beyond Sri
Lanka deserve a pat in the back. It was a paradigm shiIt
indeed.
Critics may carp loud but paradigm shiIting has been a
diIIicult and dirty job. Science has numerous names in its
honor roll to prove it; Galileo, Darwin, Wright brothers and
Einstein suIIered rejection, ridicule and ostracism Ior their
paradigm shiIting eIIorts. Thus Pirabhakaran cannot be an
exception.
Geld, Geld, und nochmals Geld (money, money, and once
more money) was an old slogan in German language extolling
the need Ior money to raise an army and wage war.
Pirabhakaran`s acumen in understanding the double
signiIicance oI this adage has been under-appreciated.
Among his Tamil militant competitors, only Pirabhakaran
established the vital links oI earning money by legitimate
business ventures to support an army. Simultaneously by
exploiting the weaknesses in egos, strategy and
incompetence oI his proIessional rivals, he also made sure
that the deIence expenditure oI his prime adversary to sky
rocket and bite the treasury coIIers. One will be hard-
pressed to deny the label that Pirabhakaran is a shrewd
manipulator. OI course he is. Eelam Tamils badly needed a
commander who cannot be manipulated.
Intransigence trait of a Paradigm Shifter
The word intransigence` is being continually tagged on
Pirabhakaran as a dirty word` by critics like N.Ram. But,
intransigence is a trait oI paradigm shiIters in every sphere oI
expertise. Not losing Iocus oI one`s aim` is a positive
interpretation Ior the word intransigence`. For Iour decades,
interpretation Ior the word intransigence`. For Iour decades,
Mahatma Gandhi was intransigent in his objective oI
eliminating the servile mentality oI Indian nationals to the
white-skinned rulers. He did not Iind the white-skinned
individuals as despicable. In Iact, he had quite a number oI
white-skinned Iriends who treated him as an equal. He
detested only the servile mentality (oI the Indians) and the
dominance attitude (oI the white-skinned rulers). Thus, his
strong-willed personality reIlected an intransigence trait oI a
paradigm shiIter. Only the weak-willed persons who posture
as leaders allow themselves to be manipulated.
In psychological terms, Pirabhakaran leads a cohesive group.
His rivals Ior Tamil militant leadership led only ad hoc
groups. A cohesive group is a close knit group, as deIined
by the sum oI the attractions oI a group to its members.
Contrastingly, an ad hoc group is a group created to perIorm
a single, time-limited Iunction; once this Iunction is
completed, such an ad hoc group dissipates. While LTTE
became a cohesive group, others like TELO, EPRLF and
PLOTE were tuned out to be ad hoc groups by the Indian
Intelligence operatives. When these groups were trained in
the Indian soil, the RAW personnel and the puppeteers
manning the Sri Lankan desk in New Delhi had only a single,
time-limited objective Ior them; to be oI nuisance value to the
then J.R.Jayewardene`s regime so as to elicit responses Irom
Sri Lankan government which were thought to be Iavorable
Ior India`s then policy objectives. Pirabhakaran`s brilliance
was in carving out his own strategy against the designs oI
India`s then policy puppeteers like J.N.Dixit and their
journalist lackeys like N.Ram.
I provide two available records relating to the phoney
leadership qualities oI two oI Pirabhakaran`s rivals who were
assassinated by the LTTE; one is about TELO`s Sri
Sabarattinam and the other is about EPRLF`s Padmanabha.
The Iirst is Irom Narayan Swamy. In the Iinal chapter oI his
book on Tamil Tigers, he had observed,
'When RAW began training Tamil militants in 1983, it
created chasms between the various groups. The LTTE
was sore that RAW was resuscitating groups which
were as good as dead. The TELO, Ior example, was
were as good as dead. The TELO, Ior example, was
encouraged to think that it was the most Iavoured group
in New Delhi. In the process, TELO chieI Sri
Sabarattinam consulted RAW on every military
operation. He would, according to his Iormer
colleagues, even want to know Irom his RAW advisers
the number oI guerrillas needed Ior an attack. But when
the D-day came, the RAW simply washed its hands oII
TELO, letting its members be killed like stray dogs at
the hands oI LTTE. When surviving TELO members
became destitutes in Tamil Nadu, they were not cared
Ior until the time came when the remnants were Iound
useIul to be heaped up to Iorm a proxy militia (TNA) in
1989. |Book: Tigers of Lanka, 2
nd
ed., 1996, p.326|
The second is Irom Dayan Jayatilleka. Ten years aIter the
assassination oI Padmanabha, he had let the secret out that
EPRLF was willing to join the Sri Lankan army and Iight
against the LTTE`. Jayatilleka has spoken as Iollows:
'.Had he |Padmanabha| lived, I am quite convinced
that we would have connected up again because the
|EPRLF`s| Central Committee meeting which was to be
held in Madras was to discuss a particular subject. I
reIer to the Central Committee meeting at which 13 oI
EPRLF leading members were present in Madras, but
the meeting was never held because oI the mass
slaughter carried out by the LTTE. EPRLF MP
Yogasangari Ilew Irom Colombo Ior that meeting. He
had earlier communicated to Pathmanabha a proposal
oI the Sri Lankan Government oI that time the
Premadasa administration that the EPRLF should join
the Sri Lankan Army and Iight against the LTTE. The
LTTE had resumed the war ten days beIore, on the 10
th
oI June 1990. The initial response Irom the EPRLF was
positive in principle, but they had one problem. Ranjan
Wijeratne was insisting that EPRLF Iighters wear Sri
Lankan Army uniIorm and Pathmanabha was reluctant
to allow his cadres to do that. |Cevlon Dailv News,
June 19, 2000|
I repeat the sentence, 'The initial response Irom the EPRLF
was positive in principle. This means that Padmanabha was
was positive in principle. This means that Padmanabha was
willing to turn the EPRLF as a mercenary arm oI the Sri
Lankan army. In the same Ieature, Dayan Jayatilleka
unintentionally exposed the sham oI Padmanabha, as
Iollows:
'We must always remember that in the name oI EPRLF
you do not Iind the term Tamil Eelam` unlike the
LTTE. But the EPRLF stands Ior Eelam People`s
Revolutionary Liberation Front. Nabha deliberately
dropped the term Tamil. Because he wanted to keep
that open. For him the Eelam struggle Iinally meant a
struggle oI the people oI the North and East Ior
liberation. |ibid|
The decision-making qualities, as illustrated by the above
descriptions, show that Sri Sabarattinam and Padmanabha
led only ad hoc groups, as opposed to the LTTE led by
Pirabhakaran. When Sri Sabarattinam was killed in 1986 and
when Padmanabha was killed in 1990, there were much
breast-beating about the ruthlessness` oI LTTE. The
authors oI Broken Palmvra book led this oppari (loudly-
sung Iuneral lament) in 1990. But it takes years Ior the truth
to leak out on the activities oI pimps who postured as Tamil
militant leaders. It is worth to ponder the question, suppose
iI the militant leadership had passed into the hands oI either
TELO`s Sri Sabarattinam or EPRLF`s Padmanabha, what
was the guaranty that they would not have pawned the Iuture
oI Tamils Ior sovereigns or personal privileges. However
agonizing were the assassinations oI Sri Sabarattinam and
Padmanabha, one has to score them as LTTE`s pre-
emptive strikes on behalI oI selI-deIence`. This may not be
convincing to LTTE`s critics, but so was the Truman
deIense Ior the use oI two atomic bombs against innocent
Japanese in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Truman used the
atomic bombs to save the lives oI American soldiers which
he considered more worthy than the deIenceless Japanese
civilians.
Celd, Ceduld, Ceschick und Clck
Kiyoshi Shiga, the discoverer oI Shigella dysenteriae the
dysentery bacteria, while studying in the laboratory oI Paul
Ehrlich (1854-1915), the great German bacteriologist, picked
Ehrlich (1854-1915), the great German bacteriologist, picked
up the motto oI his liIe Irom his mentor: the signiIicance oI
Iour Gs, geld (money), geduld (patience), geschick (skill or
dexterity or aptitude) and glck (luck or good breaks`) Ior
one`s success in research or any worthy activity in liIe.
Herman Pincus, writing in the Science oI Dec.5, 1957,
observed that oI these Iour Gs, the two central Gs (geduld
and geschick) have to be instilled by the person himselI or
herselI while engaged in the worthy activity. To apply these
two Gs, one needs geld, and be in the look out Ior glck.
It is my impression that Pirabhakaran`s rivals Ior militant
leadership (Uma Maheswaran, Sri Sabarattinam,
Padmanabha, Varatharaja Perumal and Douglas Devananda)
were distinctly lacking patience and dexteritv, though they
went aIter monev and luck. I have to state a harsh truth on
another two individuals: Kadirgamar and Neelan
Tiruchelvam. These two were shamelessly paraded as the
Tamil leaders in the second halI oI 1990s by Chandrika
Kumaratunga and the journalists scribbling to the Hindu
group oI Chennai. They had abundant monev and luck; but
were paupers in patience. Also their dexteritv was that oI
pimps and not oI leaders. Contrastingly, Pirabhakaran has
been blessed with patience, dexteritv and luck. His critics
sneer at his eIIorts to earn monev Ior keeping his army in
Iorm. But unlike Gen. Anton Muttukumaru who led a chicken
cooperative equivalent oI a Ceylonese army in the 1950s,
Pirabhakaran`s army has demonstrated itselI as combat
worthy since 1987. (To be continued)

Part 40
Sachi Sri Kantha
9 August 2002]
Valveddithurai`s Gift
From Cowards to Combat Warriors
Twenty Iive years is a short period in the liIe span oI vibrant
Tamil culture, but signiIicantly long in an individual`s journey
oI liIe. To illustrate the impact oI Pirabhakaran on Tamil
attitude to military matters, I provide two observations made
in 1977 (by a Tamil in the aItermath oI anti-Tamil riots) and
2001 (by a Sinhalese in the aItermath oI Katunayake Airport
attack).
Anton Rasiah of Auwara Eliya in 1977:
'.Tamils are essentially peace-loving cowards. How
can they Iight a Liberation War` when a slightest noise
at their doorsteps makes them shudder in Iear and Ilee?
How can they deIend their so-called homeland` iI they
cannot get together to resist a Iew thugs oI their area.
Just imagine them Iighting a liberation war` with an
invading army ha..ha.. The terrain oI their homeland`
does not even aIIord a secure hiding place when their
enemy decides to launch a land, sea and air attack.
Imagine the so-called liberation army` with their verties
tucked up marching on empty stomachs, even beIore
they launch their attack, as they are purely at the mercy
oI their enemy` Ior Iood and Iuel supplies. |a letter
in Tribune weekly, Colombo, Sept.17, 1977, p.15|
Analyst C.A.Chandraprema in 21:
'The attack on the Air Force base and the International
Airport at Katunayake was supposed to be the LTTE`s
way oI commemorating the 1983 July riots. The
Sinhalese public has changed a great deal since the anti-
Tamil riots oI 1983. In 1983, I remember there were
Sinhalese mobs hunting down unarmed Tamils, but
when a rumour went around that some Tigers had come
sangam.orgf.fPart+0.htm 1f13
when a rumour went around that some Tigers had come
to Colombo, there was total panic among the Sinhalese
chandivas. The Tiger cadres were supposed to have
come to Slave Island in Central Colombo, but people
Iled in all directions as Iar away as Padukka and
Avissawella! The only thing in the mind oI the Sinhalese
public was to escape the wrath oI the Tigers.
Since that time however, the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan
society in general, have become remarkably resilient.
The LTTE has in the many years since 1983, grown as
an organization and they have carried out many
spectacular attacks. They have bombed to smithereens
the one and only Central Bank, they have bombed one
and only oil reIinery. In their attacks on military bases,
the number oI Sinhalese casualties are at World War
Two levels. Nowhere else in the world does one Iind
trained soldiers getting wiped out by their thousands in
one go in internal conIlicts. The casualty rates in the Sri
Lankan army are enough to even Irighten India. |in
Island newspaper, Colombo, July 28, 2001|
Both oI the above-cited observations by Rasiah and
Chandraprema are Iaultlessly true. The natural terrain in
Eelam, which Rasiah sarcastically pointed out, has not
changed a bit, barring oI course the environmental insult
caused by the Sri Lankan army during the past 25 years.
Then, who else other than Pirabhakaran`s army can claim
credit Ior the partially listed debacles by Chandraprema?
Observations of a Doubting 1om
Chandraprema has been courteous in acknowledging
LTTE`s combat spirit. But, between 1977 and 2002, there
have been quite a number oI doubting Toms who had to
repeatedly eat crow Ior their errors in analytical skill. One oI
these is V.Suryanarayan oI Chennai, the regular analyst Ior
the Hindu news-group and a consultant to the India`s policy
makers. He is also addicted to peppering his English writing
with horrendous metaphors and pejorative adjectives. A
segment Irom one oI his commentaries, written in mid-1996,
is reproduced below to reveal the inaccuracy oI his analysis.
Wrote Suryanarayan,
'.It deserves highlighting that the Tigers are past
masters in guerilla warIare. But Prabhakaran does not
masters in guerilla warIare. But Prabhakaran does not
have the human and material resources to build a
conventional army.
A Iew signiIicant Ieatures oI the LTTE are worth
recounting. A number oI LTTE veterans have died on
the battle Iield during the three Eelam wars Pulendran,
Kumarappa, Kittu, Victor, Radha, Santhosham, Charles
Anthony, Akila and others. A Iew such as Mahathaya
have been killed by Prabhakaran as traitors`. Like
Saturn which kills its own progeny, the LTTE has
swallowed its own children. Unlike Prabhakaran and
Balraj, most oI the regional commanders Soosai,
Shankar, Jothi, Kapil Amman, Bosco, Sornam and
Karuna joined the movement aIter 1983. Whether the
second generation has the Iighting abilities and
dedication oI its predecessors, only time can tell.
Lacking in manpower, the LTTE is compelled to recruit
boys and girls oI tender age. What is more, this baby
brigade is not given rigorous training beIore being sent
out to the Iront. A lack oI committed and dedicated
cadres could turn out to be the Achilles` heel oI the
LTTE in the days to come.
The element oI surprise, which was the hallmark oI the
LTTE attacks and which enabled it to inIlict
innumerable casualties and great damage on civilians
and the armed Iorces alike, is slowly getting eroded.
The Sri Lankan Army is slowly but steadily emerging as
a proIessional organization, vastly improved in numbers
and equipped with sophisticated weapons.The Army
today is deIinitely more combat-oriented. The Army,
the Navy and the Air Force are better equipped. Arms
purchases have been diversiIied, the major suppliers
being Israel, Russia, France, the United Kingdom,
China, the United States, South Korea, Pakistan and
Indonesia. In contrast to the pre-1987 period, when the
internationalization oI the ethnic conIlict led to severe
strains in Indo-Sri Lanka relations, there is today greater
appreciation in New Delhi oI Colombo`s needs and
compulsions. |Frontline magazine, July 26, 1996|
Even with all such voluble orchestral support Irom Chennai
columnists like Suryanarayan, the Sri Lankan Army has
columnists like Suryanarayan, the Sri Lankan Army has
Iloundered in the battle Iield, and its recruits Iled Irom the
command to become deserters. II, according to the BBC
News oI July 6, 2000, the Sri Lankan security Iorces had to
increase their eIIorts in tracking down 25,000 members oI
their military despite more than a dozen amnesties to turn
themselves in, the second generation oI LTTE`s regional
commanders Soosai, Shankar, Jothi, Kapil Amman,
Bosco, Sornam, Karuna and others who joined the
movement aIter 1983, had disproved the doubts
Suryanarayan expressed in 1996.
While visiting Colombo recently, Pakistan`s dictator-cum-
President Pervez MusharraI, knowingly or unknowingly, had
divulged a secret that 'over 2,000 Sri Lanka military
personnel had received training in Pakistan and this would
continue|source: The Island newspaper, Colombo, Aug.2,
2002; I quote this Iigure in the belieI that there is no error and
that one zero hasn`t been inadvertently added.| He also had
added, 'as a military man he wanted to pay a glowing tribute
to the Sri Lankan armed Iorces. I praise the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces Ior sustaining their eIIort Ior 20 long years. Full
credit should go to them. Whatever one thinks about Pervez
MusharraI`s skills, he seems to be a shrewd businessman,
paying compliments to his best customer who continues to
shop despite shoddy service.
In the aItermath oI the Operation Agni Kheela debacle oI
the Sri Lankan army in April 2001, an anonymous
(undoubtedly a Sinhalese) 'retired Lt. Colonel had oIIered a
stinging rebuttal to the compliments oI dictator MusharraI
and doubting Tom Suryanarayan in 2001. Some interesting
segments oI this rebuttal are reproduced below:
'The advancing Iorces broke out on the 24
th
April 2001
at the auspicious time oI 1.48 hrs selected in Colombo
by a Sil Menivo who is also said to advice on
strategies! But nothing went right Irom the
commencement oI the Operation. Troops were
massacred and Iorced to retreat. Everything was over in
72 hours with troops having withdrawn to their original
positions on the deIense lines.
sangam.orgf.fPart+0.htm +f13
To advance a mere Iour kilometers, it cost the Army
400 men dead including 11 oIIicers |Note bv Sri
Kantha: One wonders, how many oI them were
Pakistan-trained?| and almost 1,450 sustaining injuries
out oI which 500 and over being seriously wounded
and another dozen oIIicers in the seriously wounded
category.
As seen Irom the deIeats inIlicted on us throughout the
recent past, it is clear that the top brass has bungled the
entire war by working against all established principles
oI war. Many holding high ranks cannot do a proper
military appreciation/evaluation oI a military problem
and most are unaware oI the mechanics oI the phases
oI war`. They are conIused about the subtle diIIerences
between strategy and tactics. Most oI them do not have
the basic military degree, without which no oIIicer can
aspire to be promoted beyond the rank oI Colonel in a
proIessional Army. Furthermore, many oI the top brass
have risen to great heights without the experience oI
leading even a jungle patrol. These Generals thereIore
do not know how to plan a simple Operation. For
example, when a tank is said to be blind` by night, they
are used Ior night operations. Then again when tanks
are said to be highly vulnerable in jungles and scrub,
they are employed in such terrain, violating basic
principles. Check on these and you will be surprised.
Many Generals are clever at moving brigades/divisions
on maps and sand models though they are totally
ignorant oI the Iiner points oI the mechanics oI war.
|The Island newspaper, Colombo, June 12, 2001|
Through this reasonable criticism, the anonymous retired Lt.
Colonel` has just paid compliments to Pirabhakaran and his
military advisors. II some Operations turned out to be
miserably handled by the Sri Lankan army, it merely reIlects
how much Pirabhakaran`s army has grasped the Iiner points
oI the mechanics oI war.
From the achieved results in the battle Iront and the bulging
rank oI 25,000 army deserters, one could only inIer that the
quality oI Pakistan`s military training Ior over 2,000
Sinhalese army oIIicers` was nothing but sub-standard.
Since Pirabhakaran`s army could not aIIord such Ioreign-
Since Pirabhakaran`s army could not aIIord such Ioreign-
training`, the expertise needed to neturalize such
disadvantage deserves exceptional talent. I would place this
expertise as one oI Pirabhakaran`s hard-earned giIts.
Ignoring widely circulated snide remarks about
Pirabhakaran`s lack oI higher education as Aesopian sour
grapes`, Tamils have so Iar underestimated the expertise oI
LTTE`s trainers in molding a combat-hardened army.
Essentials in Military Psychology
On April 1, 1953, Frank Geldard (then at the University oI
Virginia) delivered an address under the title ScientiIic
Psychology in a troubled world` at the University oI Texas.
Three months later it was published in the American Journal
of Psvchologv (July 1953; vol.66, pp.335-348) with the
caption, Military Psychology: Science or Technology?`
When I read this lecture sometime ago, considering all the
odds stacked against it, I was nothing but impressed by the
achievement oI LTTE in the battle-Iront Ior the past 20
years. I wondered, iI not Ior Pirabhakaran`s leadership who
else would have contributed to the six major categories
outlined by Geldard, which are vital Ior a successIul army.
1. manpower resources
2. personnel selection and classiIication
3. human engineering
4. military training
5. proIiciency measurement
6. human relations
I reproduce some oI Geldard`s observations with reIerence
to the American army, since these are still highly relevant to
assessing the perIormances oI LTTE and the Sri Lankan
army.
manpower resources: 'The procedure oI screening out not
only those who were maniIestly psychotic but also those
who were suspected oI being emotionally unstable or who
were judged to be capable oI developing psychotic or
neurotic symptoms under the stress oI military service
proved to be a costly one.
personnel selection: '|consisting oI| trait identiIication,
assessment procedures, perIormance criteria, job analysis
assessment procedures, perIormance criteria, job analysis
and work modiIication, and underlying statistical and
mathematical theory.
human engineering: 'It is important that the Iighting man
vent his spleen on the enemy, not on his own equipment and
weapons.We oIten Iorget that machines cannot Iight
alone`, that human operators are necessary and that human
limitations, both sensory and motor, have to be taken into
account in the design oI equipment.
militarv training: 'II sensory-perceptual capacities and
limitations loom large in the picture oI the human engineering
area the other great content oI experimental psychology,
learning, occupies the center oI the canvas in the military
training area. Methods oI warIare and weapon systems,
becoming increasingly automatic and electronic, require
skillIul technicians to service them and skillIul technicians
have to be made that way through a long, expensive, and
painstaking course oI training.
proficiencv measurement: 'In the military setting, as in more
peaceIul pursuits, school grades, instructor`s ratings, Ilights
checks etc. leave much to be desired.wartime and
peacetime demands on behavior are likely to diIIer. The
requirements oI combat are not entirely met by the skills oI
the technical specialist despite the heralding oI push-button
warIare.
human relations: 'There are common problems oI
incentives, leader-Iollower relationships, intra and inter-group
communication, levels oI aspiration, group and individual
attitudes, coherence and homogeneity oI groups, assimilation
phenomena |to be taken care oI.|
Establishing and maintaining a standing army which doesn`t
crumble aIter setbacks deserve the utmost degree oI sacriIice
and diligence. Much publicized recent gripes (some oI them
legitimate, but many hyped by selI-anointed human rights
activists belonging to the spurious University Teachers Ior
Human Rights-JaIIna branch) relating to child combatants
and human rights violations oI LTTE have to be studied
Irom the perspectives oI maintaining a standing army or
militia` in the terminology oI America`s Founding Fathers.
militia` in the terminology oI America`s Founding Fathers.
How did the paragons belonging to the pantheon oI
American democracy conducted themselves? Didn`t they
own slaves while Iighting their revolutionary war
independence against the imperial Britain? As Nobelist
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his eloquent 1997 essay entitled
Hypocrisy today` pointed out, did not the United States
also selI proclaim its independence? Meanwhile, the Kurds
are not allowed even to selI-proclaim.` |The Dailv Yomiuri,
Tokyo, Aug.7, 1997|.
As oI now, it is beyond my means to evaluate how
Pirabhakaran had succeeded in each oI the six major
categories presented by Geldard. But the results produced in
the battle Iield attest Ior the success in Pirabhakaran`s
leadership. Only those who are illogical and those who are
number-challenged can deny the credit he deserves as a
military leader. One oI the claims oI the Indian military
personnel who led the Indian army against its conIrontation
with LTTE was that during the 30- month period (Irom
Oct.1987 to Mar.1990), they had destroyed the second tier
leadership oI LTTE. This claim has some merits. But, it is to
the credit oI Pirabhakaran and the LTTE cadres who
survived the Indo-LTTE war, that they had rebuilt the
damaged pillars oI LTTE army by rejuvenation.
Now, I wish to hypothesize what personal Iactors could have
inIluenced Pirabhakaran to be molded as a military specialist.
Attention should be drawn to two oI these Iactors, which
have been overlooked. One is his place oI birth, and the
other is his birth order.
Jalveddithurai in History
Valveddithurai (VVT), the home-town oI Pirabhakaran, has a
reputation as the smuggler capital` oI Sri Lanka. When one
thinks about it in depth, one Iact becomes clear. The
pejorative monicker to VVT is a recent (post-independent
period) currency, Iollowing the demarcation oI Ceylon as an
independent nation. BeIore February 1948, the island Ceylon
was a part oI British Empire encompassing the current
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma) and Malaya.
Palk Strait and Bay oI Bengal were not considered as
Palk Strait and Bay oI Bengal were not considered as
separating boundaries oI diIIerent countries. BeIore the
colonial era oI Portuguese, Dutch and the British, Tamils
living in the northern part oI the island had their own Ilag and
they wouldn`t have bothered about the dictates originating
Irom Kotte or Kandy rulers. Thus, the legitimate liIe-style oI
generations oI Tamil mariners who lived at VVT Ior a
millennium or more was not thought oI as smuggling`. The
pejorative monicker was more or less a creation oI the Sri
Lankan bureaucrats belonging to the Customs Department.
To emphasize my point, I provide two descriptions about
VVT which appeared in the pre-1948 period and three
descriptions about VVT written in the 1980 and 1990s. VVT
has been a tongue-twister in the English language and authors
have taken liberty with the spelling according to their Iancy.
(1) by Emerson 1ennent (1859)
'.In the evening we drove along the shore oI
Valvettitorre, a village about three miles to the west oI
Point Pedro, containing a much larger population, and
one equally industrious and enterprising. There was a
vessel oI considerable tonnage on the stocks, the Tamil
ship-builders oI this little place being amongst the most
successIul in Ceylon. As we entered the village, we
passed by a large well under a grove oI palms and
tamarind trees, around which, as it was sunset, the
Iemales oI the place were collected, according to the
immemorial custom oI the East, at the time oI the
evening even the time that the women go out to draw
water`. In Iigure and carriage, the Tamil women are
much superior to the Singhalese. This is shown to
advantage in their singularly graceIul and classical
costume, consisting oI a long Iold oI cloth, enveloping
the body below the waist, and brought tasteIully over
the leIt shoulder, leaving the right arm and the bosom
Iree. This, together with the custom oI carrying vases oI
water and other burdens on their heads, gives them an
erect and stately gait, and disposes their limbs in
attitudes so graceIul as to render them, when young and
Iinely Ieatured, the most unadorned models Ior a
sculptor. |in Cevlon, vol.2, pp.535-536|
(2) Mudaliyar C.Rasanayagam (192)
'Casie Chetty, in his Historv of Jaffna says, There can
be no doubt, the commercial intercourse oI the Greeks
and the Romans with Ceylon was conIined to the
Northern and North Western parts` (Journal of Cevlon
Branch of Roval Asiatic Societv, vol.1, 1847-1848,
p.77). The people oI the Coromandel Coast had, Irom
time immemorial, intimate commercial intercourse with
the parts oI North Ceylon. Many came and settled
down at these ports, carrying on a brisk trade, and
Iorming connections with Iamilies oI the same caste as
themselves, as is still the case at Point Pedro and
Velvettythurai. |in Ancient Jaffna, pp.86-87|
(3) W.Robert Holmes (198)
'One oI the important by-products oI Iishing is
manpower which is acquainted with the sea. It was
estimated in a newspaper article in 1979, that 150 men,
especially Irom KKS |i.e., Kankesanthurai| and also
Irom the neighborhood oI Valvettithurai on the northern
tip oI JaIIna peninsula about Iive miles west oI Point
Pedro are seaIaring in ocean-going vessels all over the
globe today.
The previous sentence is one oI the Iew in today`s
newspapers in which anything good is said about the
activities in and around Valvettithurai oI which it is
invariably aIIirmed, VVT is the headquarters oI the
smuggling between India and Ceylon..`|in Jaffna
1980, p.366|
(4) Aarayan Swamy (199)
'VVT, where Prabhakaran spent much oI his early
years, was a small and closely-knit coastal town oI
some 10,000 Tamils with one Catholic church and three
Hindu temples. One oI them, dedicated to Lord Shiva,
was a virtual Iamily property oI the Velupillais, and the
young Prabhakaran would land there to lend a helping
hand during all major Iestivals. VVT`s menIolk were
civil servants, traders, Iishermen or simply smugglers,
thanks to the winding sea coast and the proximity to
India. Boats would sail to Rangoon, Chittagong,
Rameshwaram, Nagapattinam and Cochin laden with
both legitimate cargo and contraband. Smuggling was
considered a way oI liIe in VVT and no one ever
thought there was anything wrong with it. But it did earn
VVT the sobriquet smugglers` paradise` and close
scrutiny Irom the Customs Department. It also
legitimized crime and played a key role in providing a
large number oI volunteers when Tamil politics began
getting sucked into the web oI violence and counter
violence. |in Tigers of Lanka, 1996, 2
nd
ed, p.50|
(5) S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and Jidyamali
Samarasinghe (1998)
'Prabhakaran, Veluppillai (1954 - ): He is the leader oI
the most powerIul oI the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist
groups, the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Youngest oI Iour children in a JaIIna middle-class
Iamily, he came Irom Velvatiturai, a village in the JaIIna
peninsula inhabited largely by people oI the Karaiyar
caste whose traditional occupation is Iishing or
smuggling. Prabhakaran also belongs to the same
caste.. |entry on Pirabhakaran; in Historical
Dictionarv of Sri Lanka, 1998, pp.109-110|
Among the six authors I have quoted above, Tennent (a
reputed British civil authority oI the mid-19
th
century) and
Rasanayagam (a colonial Ceylon`s Tamil civil servant oI
early 20
th
century) did not associate VVT with smuggling.
Rather, they make laudatory comments related to the marine
enterprise and skills oI the VVT natives. However, when
Robert Holmes (an American missionary-teacher in the post-
independent Ceylon), Narayan Swamy (a contemporary
Indian journalist) and Samarasinghes (contemporary
Sinhalese academics) wrote their descriptions in 1980 and
1990s, linking VVT with smuggling` has become the
routine, though erroneous in historical context oI the liIe style
oI its inhabitants. Thus, it is oI relevance that the law-
breaking` |or better, the rebellious spirit against the
domineering Poo Bahs of the government see below Ior
additional details| was a well needed Iertilizer in the Iormation
oI a legitimate Tamil army oI Pirabhakaran. In this context, it
oI a legitimate Tamil army oI Pirabhakaran. In this context, it
also relevant to quote a paragraph Irom another keen
observer oI the JaIIna scene.
() by J.Aavaratnam (1991), former Federal Party MP
for Kayts:
'There were occasions when I addressed small
compact gatherings oI activists at Valvettiturai and
Point Pedro who were campaigning Iro the Tamilar
Suvadchi Ka:hagam candidate at the 1970 General
Election. As was my wont in that campaign, I exhorted
them to work ceaselessly Ior an independent Tamil
State. I asked them to develop and Ioster the
navigational skills oI their ancestors, regardless oI
breaking revenue laws, and to keep alive the seaIaring
tradition oI their towns. Many oI those in the audience
were young lads in their early or mid teens. I still
remember their young eager Iaces and shining eyes
burning with Iire as they listened. In later years I used to
wonder iI some oI them might have been Kuttimani and
Thangadurai and Velupillai Prabhakaran and the many
other heroes oI Vadamaradchy whose names later
became household words throughout Tamil Ceylon.
|in The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation, 1991,
p.322|
1he fact of being :Last Born'
One oI the highly-discussed books in the 1990s was Born to
Rebel (1996), a 653 page tome authored by Frank Sulloway.
In this book, the American psychologist (then aIIiliated to the
Massachusetts Institute oI Technology) aIter analyzing the
biographies oI over 1,000 historical Iigures who contributed
to politics, science, arts and religion came to a simple but
bold Iinding that, even after controlling for all other
variables, the birth order of a person influences the tvpe of
his or her personalitv. I quote one paragraph Irom the
Introduction oI this book. Sulloway had written,
'It is natural Ior Iirstborns to identiIy more strongly
with power and authority. They arrive Iirst within the
Iamily and employ their superior size and strength to
Iamily and employ their superior size and strength to
deIend their special status. Relative to their younger
siblings, Iirstborns are more assertive, socially
dominant, ambitious, jealous oI their status, and
deIensive. As underdogs within the Iamily system,
younger siblings are inclined to question the status quo
and in some cases to develop a revolutionary
personality`. In the name oI revolution, later-borns have
repeatedly challenged the time-honored assumptions oI
their day. From their ranks have come the bold
explorers, the iconoclasts, and the heretics oI history.
Pirabhakaran was a last born (on November 26, 1954) son
among the Iour siblings to Mr.Thiruvengadam Veluppillai
and Parvathi oI Valvettithurai. He has an elder brother
Manoharan and two elder sisters Jegatheswari and Vinothini.
True to Sulloway`s Iindings, Pirabhakaran had turned out to
be a bold explorer, an iconoclast and a heretic oI history`.
Thus it is my inIerence that the cocktail oI a combination oI
being a last born` son and being born in Valvettithurai
brought out a military specialist the Eelam Tamils had wanted
Ior long. (Continued)

Part 41
Sachi Sri Kantha
23 August 2002]
BIOGRAPHER`S INTERLUDE
:If [a person'sj achievements amount to 7 percent of
the whole and his shortcomings to only 3 percent
then his work should in the main be approved.'
- Mao Ze Dong, on Leadership;
cited in Edgar Snow:
The Other Side of the River Red China Todav (1962), p.114.
What made me to write this biography?
Despite all the accusations peddled against him by the
pompous and non-Tamil commentators like Dayan
Jayatilleka, C.A. Chandraprema, H.L.D. Mahindapala and
Gamini Weerakoon (the editor oI Colombo Island
newspaper), majority among the Tamils would say that
Pirabhakaran passes the Mao`s scale oI leadership approval.
Like Mao, he has an incomparable 25 year-long track record
as a guerrilla leader oI repute. Nevertheless, Jayatillekas,
Mahindapalas and Weerakoons continue to squeal the sour
grape` tune loudly in the Colombo`s Island newspaper like
the paranoid Aesopian Ioxes.
In relative terms, none among the more than one billion
people living in South Asia now can parallel Pirabhakaran`s
achievement in competence to be tagged as a second
successor oI Mao in military aIIairs, aIter the Vietnamese
General Giap. This is not an exaggeration. Tamils have
produced in the 20th century hundreds oI eminent lawyers,
scientists, businessmen, musicians, sportsmen, actors and
writers oI international acclaim; but a military hero none,
until Pirabhakaran appeared on the scene. It is
preposterously Iunny that those Sri Lankan army men who
pitted against him and lost Iair and square (Gen. Denzil
Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne killed in
Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne killed in
August 1992) or those who retired Ior saIer pastures without
completing the assignment in hand (Gen. Janaka Perera) are
being propped as military greats` by the Sinhala press oI
Colombo. This phenomenon is illustrated by the well known
Tamil proverb, Aalai illa oorukku illuppai poo sarkarai. In
English translation, it reads as In a village without a sugar
mill, the Ilower oI Indian bitter tree is the sugar.` Illuppai
plant`s botanical name is Bassia longifolia and is used in the
traditional medicine oI Tamil culture.
Now that I have completed 40 chapters oI this biography on
Pirabhakaran, I wish to present my thoughts on why I write
this biography and how some Iactors pulled me into this
task. The Iirst sentence in chapter 1, dated May 2, 2001,
stated: 'It`s time that the Pirabhakaran phenomenon be
studied somewhat in depth. When I wrote that sentence, I
was under the impression that I would write a two-part or
three-part sketch on the unIorgotten Iacts oI Pirabhakaran`s
past, and move on to another weekly topic which capture my
interest Ior a commentary. I had titled the column,
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon` and emailed it to Nadesan
Satyendra Ior posting in the Tamil Nation website he then
maintained.
I was pushed to reconsider my decision oI concluding my
three-part Ieature on Pirabhakaran, by one particular
oIIending piece which appeared in the Island (Colombo)
newspaper on May 16, 2001 under the caption Palavering
with Prabhakaran` and signed with a pseudonym, Leo
Panthera. This critic had taken it upon himselI (or herselI?) to
deliver a ten-point hostile tirade on what he (or she)
considered as 'a Iew psychoactive` characteristics that
proIile the man and his method. There is something in stuIIy
Colombo`s hot air which breeds spineless, anonymous
critics like malarial mosquitoes proliIerating Irom bad air.
This particular analyst with the pseudonym Leo Panthera,
knowinglv or unknowinglv had scribed as his (or her) IiIth
point, the very two words I had chosen to caption my
commentary Ior the TamilNation website. To repeat the
words,
'The cult oI the cyanide capsule` is an astonishing by-
product oI the Pirapaharan Phenomenon. II the man is a
product oI the Pirapaharan Phenomenon. II the man is a
blood-thirsty crank how can he have this willing army oI
human robots prepared to die Ior the cause?
This particular commentary by Leo Panthera made me to
convert my three-part commentary on Pirabhakaran into a
Iull-length biography oI the leader oI LTTE. And I have
Iiguratively lived with Pirabhakaran Ior the past IiIteen
months. But instinctively Ior the past 12 years, I had Ielt that
Pirabhakaran and Eelam Tamils deserved an extensive
biography oI the leader who had commanded the interests oI
the Asian region and beyond Ior the past 25 years.
Initially I checked my own merits and disadvantages oI
authoring such a laborious endeavor. Merits, I had a Iew.
Disadvantages were equally bothersome, especially the lack
oI proximity to the subject oI my Iocus. Three motives
which propelled me to write this biography are as Iollows:
(A) A 1hanksgiving
As disadvantaged as I am to the lack oI proximity to the
subject, I mourn the loss oI two opportunities in the past
which would have placed me at the University oI JaIIna. But
both opportunities were compounded with once in a liIe-
time` chances so that I couldn`t reject the alternate choice oI
not being in JaIIna. First came in April 1981, when I was
chosen Ior the permanent assistant lecturer position at the
Department oI Biochemistry, Faculty oI Medicine, University
oI JaIIna. Simultaneously, I had an oIIer Ior postgraduate
studies at the University oI Illinois, with a graduate research
assistantship stipend. It was an Either This or That` option.
My attempt to negotiate a solution to the dilemma I Iaced
with ProI. S. Vithiananthan, the then Vice Chancellor Ior the
University oI JaIIna, was not IruitIul. As I had labored as a
temporary assistant lecturer at the Dept. oI Biochemistry,
Faculty oI Medicine, University oI Peradeniya Ior more than
two years, I was eager to grasp the University oI Illinois
stipend and did so.
Five years later, in November 1986, when I visited JaIIna,
aIter completing my Ph.D., my mentor at the University oI
Colombo, ProI. K. Balasubramaniam (who was then the
Head oI the Dept. oI Biochemistry, at the Faculty oI
Medicine, University oI JaIIna) invited me to join the
Medicine, University oI JaIIna) invited me to join the
department as a lecturer. Again, I was placed in an either
this or that` situation and Ior selIish reasons was keen on
continuing the postdoctoral research at the University oI
Tokyo, to climb the proIessional ladder. Thus, with heavy
heart I had to choose against joining the University oI JaIIna.
II I would have returned to JaIIna then, that would have
coincided with Pirabhakaran`s return to Eelam Irom Tamil
Nadu.
Thus, I consider that writing this biography on Pirabhakaran
is my thanksgiving to the sacriIices oI more than 17,000
youths who had believed in his leadership. These young men
and women were no human robots prepared to die Ior the
cause` as the mean-spirited Leo Panthera had tagged them.
They were intelligent and courageous human beings who
stayed in the island to Iight against state oppression and eco-
vandalism oI pristine Tamil homeland. Among them would
have been talented tacticians, technicians, teachers,
musicians, engineers and artists. Though their voices have
been stilled, I Ielt that I had to write on their behalI.
(B) Inspiration from a Bargain Book
For me, the inspiration to write a biography on Pirabhakaran
was Iirst kindled as a small Ilame when he was in the middle
oI Indo-LTTE war, and his premature obituary had appeared
in the Hindu newspaper |see, Part 1 oI this series.| In the Iall
oI 1989, when I was living in Philadelphia, I visited New
York Ior a weekend. At the bargain pit oI the Koch`s &
Brentano`s Bookstore, I picked up an unusual book, War
Zones. Joices from the Worlds Killing Grounds (1988) by
Jon Lee Anderson and Scott Anderson Ior $2.98, originally
priced at $21.95. It contained a chapter on Sri Lanka.
The sibling authors, oI whom Jon Lee Anderson had turned
out to be a recognized war correspondent lately, had traveled
Ior an year in 1986 to gather material Ior this book in the then
Iive war zones oI the globe: Northern Ireland, El Salvador,
Uganda, Sri Lanka and Israel. The Sri Lankan chapter carried
42 snippets oI interviews (undoubtedly mangled versions).
The 42 individuals whose interviews had appeared in this
book covered a wide spectrum; some well known and some
unknown; some aged as high as 79 and one not even a teen
and all others in between; some Sinhalese, some Tamils, one
and all others in between; some Sinhalese, some Tamils, one
Muslim and even one British mercenary; some Buddhist
priests and one Christian priest; some who met untimely
deaths beIore the end oI the 1980s and some who are still
living.
I provide below the list oI 42 individuals (in the order oI
appearance, and with the introductory words about them)
whose comments appear in the War Zones book. Some were
active participants in the war. Some, willingly and unwillingly,
contributed to the war by their words and deeds. Some were
mere by-standers and victims. To preserve the originality oI
the authors oI the book, I have not altered their idiosyncratic
spelling oI some names oI the interviewees.
1.
|unnamed and then| Senior Sri Lankan government
oIIicial, in his IiIties.
2.
Gunewardene; a Sinhalese civil engineer Irom
Colombo.
3.
Balachandra; 43, a JaIIna Iisherman in Madras.
4.
Kala; a large, smiling Tamil woman in Batticaloa.
5.
Appapillai Amirthalingam; 59, chieI oI TULF, in
Madras.
6.
Ven.Madihe Pannasiha Thero; 73 and Irail, chieI prelate
oI Amarapura or Burmese sect oI Buddhism, in
Colombo.
7.
Ven.Piyadassi Thero; 72 and youthIul and energetic.
8.
Ratika Kumarasame; in her thirties, JaIIna Tamil in
Colombo.
9.
Naranja`; 26, thin, quiet man, recruiter and Iund
raiser` oI LTTE.
10.
G.G.Tilak; 21, tall, slender Sinhalese in Anuradhapura.
11.
G.G.Piyaratna; 39, member oI Anuradhapura`s
paramilitary Home Guard.
12.
K.Alvis; 34, heavily tattooed man, operating a small
kiosk in Anuradhapura.
13.
E.A.Somalata; 28, wiIe oI K.Alvis, short, smiling
woman.
14.
Ven.Nanaratana Thero; 75, custodian oI sacred Bodhi
(or Bo) Tree oI Anuradhapura.
15.
Karu; a Iormer military policeman, in Anuradhapura.
16.
George`: a devoutly Catholic Tamil lawyer.
17.
R.N.Kamarawathi; 39, sister oI Karu (#15), whose
husband was one oI the people gunned down in
husband was one oI the people gunned down in
Anuradhapura |killing by LTTE|.
18.
Madame Sirimavo Bandaranaike; world`s Iirst elected
woman head oI state.
19.
Subramaniam Sivanayagam; chain-smoking, dapper
Tamil running the Tamil InIormation Center in Madras.
20.
Bernadine Silva; leIt wing Sinhalese Catholic and
middle-aged social activist.
21.
Anton Balasingham; 48, enigmatic theoretician` oI the
LTTE in Madras.
22.
Longanathan Ketheeswaran; a skinny, pockmarked man
in his thirties and spokesman Ior the EPRLF in Madras.
23.
Kumar`; a middle-aged Tamil businessman in
Batticaloa.
24.
Balraj; member oI the Central Committee oI EROS, in
Batticaloa.
25.
Gamini Gunewardene; tall and hale, deputy Inspector
General oI Police, in Kandy.
26.
Tim; a deeply tanned Briton, a mercenary pilot Iighting
with the Sri Lankan Army in the southern reaches oI
JaIIna peninsula.
27.
Nassim; a tiny, cheerIul Muslim in his IiIties, near
Kandy.
28.
Rasih; 34, the Tamil school principal, in Norwood tea
plantation.
29.
Talava`; a Tamil labor Ioreman oI a tea estate in
Norwood.
30.
S.M.Tennakoon; government agent in Kandy, 51-year
old political appointee.
31.
Tony` |Marianpillai Anthonimuthu|; government agent
in Batticaloa.
32.
Christopher Romesh; 30, a thin, Irail Tamil Irom
Batticaloa, living in Madras.
33.
Bobby Wickremasinghe; a westernized Sinhalese and
Deputy Commissioner oI Prisons.
34.
Chandra Kumash; 26, Irom Trincomalee and an inmate
oI Pelwatta rehabilitation transit camp.
35.
Marimuthu Shanmugam; 27, laborer Irom Trincomalee
and an inmate oI Pelwatta rehabilitation transit camp.
36.
Sam Thambimuttu; Tamil lawyer and secretary oI the
ad-hoc Batticaloa Citizen`s Committee.
37.
Fr.Chandra; 44, Tamil Catholic priest in Batticaloa.
38.
|Mrs| Sellathamby Kamalanathan; mother oI a 17-year
old student slained by the Special Task Force |STF|.
39.
Kumarappa; 27, Tiger commander oI Eastern Province.
40.
Shankar; 12-year old Tiger, youngest cadre in
Kumarappa`s band.
41.
Sumith Silva; STF`s Coordinating OIIicer oI Batticaloa
district.
42.
S.M.Lena; 79, retired high school teacher and member
oI Batticaloa Citizen`s Committee.
Among these 42 interviewees, I was most interested in the
interview oI Kumarappa, one oI Pirabhakaran`s trusted
lieutenants. His photo also appears in the book, with one
woman tagged as a woman spy` Kangaratnam Athuma
Kirikith. By 1988, when the War Zones appeared in print, he
had committed suicide (in October 1987), which was widely
reported in the news media. But Andersons had written the
Iollowing comment:
'It can be assumed that Athuma was executed within a
Iew days oI the interview. Attempts to intercede on her
behalI with Tiger supporters in Batticaloa were Iutile.
Eleven days later, the STF launched a massive raid on
Kumarappa`s base. In the battle, at least twenty one oI
the Tigers were reported killed, including Kumarappa.
The Batticaloa Citizen`s Committee, however, charged
the STF with executing twenty seven people at the
nearby shrimp hatchery and estimated the attack`s
overall death toll at nearly two hundred, mostly
civilians.
This inIormation in the War Zones book stated that
Kumarappa had been killed in action in 1986. This type oI
misinIormation especially on the deaths - some deliberately
intentional like Pirabhakaran`s in 1989, some due to
carelessness - is replete in the published literature on Tamil
Tigers.
For me, the material presented by Anderson brothers was
appealing and important, but just raw meat`. Can anyone
Ieast and Ieel contented on raw meat and uncooked rice,
however appealing it is to the eyes? Jon Lee Anderson may
be a ranking war correspondent, but Iact-checking appeared
not his Iorte, Irom the manner he reported the death oI
not his Iorte, Irom the manner he reported the death oI
Kumarappa. Nevertheless, the work oI Anderson brothers
inspired me to collect as much as inIormation on
Pirabhakaran and his army. Twelve years I kept on collecting
materials Irom newspapers, magazines and books.
(C) Rejections and Wanton Omissions by the Print Media
Editors
In the early 1990s, I was also an ardent letter writer to
journals like Lanka Guardian, Tamil Times and Asiaweek
on topics related to LTTE and Eelam. While quite a number
oI what I sent were published in these journals, an equal
number went unpublished, or were mangled in print, though I
kept the letters brieI to the point oI not exceeding 250-300
words. To prick the partisanship and pomposity oI the print
editors, sometimes I used sarcasm (and inIrequently shock
phrases` also) in these letters, relating to Pirabhakaran and
his environs. Two letters I provide as examples.
The Iirst was a completely rejected letter, sent to the Lanka
Guardian on March 22, 1991; it dealt with the Valvettithurai
bombing oI the Sri Lankan army in January 1991, at the
height oI Persian GulI War. By then, I have moved Irom
Philadelphia to Osaka.
Jalvettiturai Bombing
'While I perused the 72 cumulative pages oI the
three issues oI the LG (Feb.1, Feb.15 and Mar.1, 1991)
I received lately, I could not Iind any reIerence to the
Valvettiturai bombing carried out by the Government`s
Air Force between Jan.20 and 23 oI this year. None oI
the regular columns mentioned about this bombing
which occurred in the Northern region. However the 72
pages I read were replete with what I label as
intellectual masturbation` on Trotsky (by Regie
Siriwardene and S.Pathiravitana) and on the GulI War
(by Robert O`Neill, Bertram Bastiampillai and Izeth
Hussain).
The LG also published a Iour page account on the
destruction and damage to Iraq between Feb.2 and 8,
as seen through the eyes oI Ramsey Clark, a Iormer
Attorney General oI the USA. I wonder why none oI
this type oI reporting has been published on
Valvettiturai bombing. Is damage to Valvettiturai, oI less
Valvettiturai bombing. Is damage to Valvettiturai, oI less
topical interest to the LG and its readers than Iraq and
Trotsky?
The second letter was a response to a particularly slimy
editorial on terrorism and truth by the Asiaweek magazine in
late 1994, in which Pirabhakaran was particularly named as a
terrorist` along with Yasser AraIat and Gerry Adams. Here
is the mangled letter oI mine, which appeared in print in the
Asiaweek magazine.
:1ruth'
[Asiaweek, Hong Kong, Jan.6, 1995]
'In my opinion your sermon In the War against
Terrorists, Truth is the Best Weapon` belongs to the
world oI Iairies and angels |Keeping the Lid On`,
Editorial, Nov.30|. I live in a real world where the truth
is always hidden or restrained Irom revealing its naked
beauty.
Truth is massaged and masked by the media in
many countries. Truth is also decorated by almost
every practising politician on this globe according to his
or her Iancy. It is an open secret that the intelligence
services oI many countries manuIacture or clone truths
according to their whims. So you have the alphabet
soup oI CIA, (Iormerly the ) KGB, MI6, Mossad,
RAW and ISI working overtime to manipulate the
political, ethnic and religious Irictions prevailing in many
countries. I Iind it perplexing that in your sermon, you
have not bothered to mention these creators oI cloned
truths`.
What was deleted from print were the following passages.
'Truth is massaged and masked by the media in many
countries, oI which Singapore is an extreme example.
To sell a thousand copies in Singapore, many
competing international journals would compromise real
truth Ior massaged truth`. Have you Iorgotten that
recently your sister magazine, Time, received a
reprimand and apologized Ior shading the truth in its
depiction oI Iootball great O.J.Simpson in its cover.
Even Asiaweek sometimes twists the truth to suit its
stand. For example, in a Ioot-note to my |previously|
stand. For example, in a Ioot-note to my |previously|
published letter (Letters, Nov.23, 1994), you have
stated that you did not include the name oI JVP leader
Rohana Wijeweera in the list oI Sri Lanka`s prominent
assassination victims, because that list was conIined to
political, civic and military leaders`. The massaged truth
in your explanation is easily recognizable to all Sri
Lankans, since Rohana Wijeweera was a politician and
he even contested the 1982 Presidential election.
Show me a politician who trumpets the truth in its naked
beauty and I will show you a saint. Even the reputation
oI a living saint like Mother Teresa has come under
attack recently due to her past cozying with politicians
who have had a penchant Ior truths oI dubious variety.
You have identiIied Yasser AraIat, Gerry Adams and
Velupillai Prabhakaran as representatives oI terrorists`.
But why have you not written a word about the types oI
truths the CIA and Mossad had spread in the past
about Mr.AraIat, or how the truth-manuIacturing
department oI MI 6 works round the clock to slander
the IRA or how the RAW released a truth about the
violent death oI Prabhakaran in the jungles oI Vanni Iive
years ago. II you have a sincere campaign to abolish all
the Intelligence agencies in the world to save the real
truths Irom their cloned creations oI truths`, you can
count on me to raise my hand.
These type oI rejections and wanton omissions instilled in
me a conviction that my views should reach the audience via
a medium which can by-pass the peevish print editors. There
is a bit oI surliness in my part in that I`m playing the gotcha
game` at Mervyn de Silva (the editor oI Lanka Guardian,
who had died) or at the editors oI the Asiaweek magazine,
which has Iolded now. But I Ieel that this is within the
boundaries oI peer review as practiced in science and what
has been rejected discourteously need to be presented to a
wider audience Ior proper evaluation; and internet is a
godsend Ior writers like me.
:1he Difficult Art of Biography'
Thus, to transIorm the three-part Ieature on Pirabhakaran
which I had in mind in May 2001 into a lengthy biography, I
pumped up myselI aIter reading a wonderIul essay by
Wilmarth Lewis on The DiIIicult Art oI Biography` which
appeared two months beIore Pirabhakaran was born |Yale
Review, Sept.1954, vol.44(1): pp.33-40|. Some segments oI
this essay captivated me. To reproduce the Iirst two
paragraphs oI what Lewis had stated:
'Just about everyone likes biography. The reason Ior
this is not hard to Iind. It is the pleasure we get in
identiIying ourselves with real people who have attained
eminence oI some sort. By the magic oI biography we
are transported out oI ourselves into kings and queens,
generals, poets, lovers and bankers; we become Eleanor
oI Aquitaine or George Washington or Babe Ruth.
Such being the power oI biography, it is remarkable that
oI all the Iorms oI the literary art it has had the Iewest
successes: there has been composed in our language
only one liIe that everybody agrees is a masterpiece.
Writing on biography recently Sir Harold Nicolson gave
the Oxford English Dictionarv`s deIinition oI it: the
history oI the lives oI individual men, as a branch oI
literature`. This excellent deIinition`, he goes on,
contains within itselI three principles that any serious
biographer should observe. A biography must be
history`, in the sense that it must be accurate and
depict a person in relation to his times. It must describe
an individual`, with all the gradations oI human
character, and not merely present a type oI virtue or oI
vice. And it must be composed as a branch oI
literature`, in that it must be written in grammatical
English and with an adequate Ieeling Ior style.
As Lewis noted in the Iirst paragraph oI his essay, 'It is the
pleasure we get in identiIying ourselves with real people who
have attained eminence oI some sort. Tamils can identiIy
with Pirabhakaran. He is a real man, who have attained
eminence of some sort (or notoriety in the minds oI his
adversaries). Again, by his deeds he has transIormed himselI
into the George Washington oI Eelam and also equally the
Babe Ruth oI South Asian military games.
Lewis also wrote, 'In collecting his materials the author who
is writing the liIe oI a contemporary has certain obvious
advantages: he can interview his man and his Iamily, Iriends
and enemies. He can get answers that a biographer writing in
the Iuture will perhaps have to search many books to Iind,
and which he may not Iind in the end. The contemporary has
the additional advantage oI knowing how his subject dressed
and walked and ate; above all, how he spoke. The
contemporary biographer has a still Iurther advantage which
is so obvious that it might be overlooked: the advantage oI
living in the same time as his subject.
These lines oI Lewis inspired me to invest my time on writing
this biography now. By providence, Pirabhakaran and I share
the same Tamil heritage, same native locality in
Vadamarachchy region oI JaIIna and same generational
match up. I`m only 18 months older than him. Also, my
younger sibling was born two days beIore him. OI course,
due to lack oI proximity, as oI now, I haven`t interviewed
him or his Iamily or Iriends; but I have gathered assiduously
documentary materials (Ior the past 20 years) generated by
those who have interviewed him in person. I also have
gathered arduously materials scribed by his enemies`. The
internet revolution since mid 1990s had enabled me to collect
useIul inIormation on Pirabhakaran, which would have been
impossible when Lewis`s essay appeared in print two
months beIore Pirabhakaran`s birth.
Lewis concluded his essay with a cautionary paragraph as
Iollows:
'Biography demands much oI its practitioners: study,
accuracy, insight and artistry. Its power and
responsibility are immense. The subject`s liIe, his many
thousand hours, may be set aside by posterity iI his
biographer is careless or Irivolous, idolatrous, or unjust.
Immortality on earth is the giIt the biographer has to
conIer. II in the verdict oI the best judges in his own
and succeeding ages he has made the giIt, he will have
won, as his reward, immortality Ior himselI.
How competent am I as a biographer of Pirabhakaran?
As I scan the slate oI Eelam Tamil writers, I can list at least
nine who are competent to write a good biography on
Pirabhakaran in English. These are, in alphabetical order,
1. Balasinghams (Anton and Adele): the best to provide an
insider view oI Pirabhakaran`s mind. Adele Balasingham has
authored an autobiography, The Will to Freedom (2001).
2. M.K.Eelaventhan: Eelam activist, with long-term residency
in Chennai, currently living in Colombo. As one with
personal links with the old Federal Party leaders and the
Eelam militants, I consider him as the under-rated talent who
can describe best the generational switch in Tamil militancy.
3. D.B.S.Jeyaraj: leading journalist oI current generation with
contacts in Colombo, Chennai and elsewhere. He possesses
investigative talent, but has gained a limy image oI servicing
Iew masters who are hostile to Tamil interests.
4. K.T.Rajasingham: journalist with decades oI experience in
covering the politics oI Ceylon. He is currently serializing the
un-told political history oI the island, in a wider canvas.
5. T.Sabaratnam: elder Lake House` journalist with contacts
in Colombo, and author oI staid biographies on A.
Amirthalingam and S. Thondaman.
6. Nadesan Satyendra: respected attorney with decades oI
insider knowledge in Sri Lankan politics, law and Tamil
activism.
7. S.Sivanayagam: elder journalist with an intimate knowledge
oI events in Ceylon, India and mastery oI English language.
8. D.P.Sivaram (Taraki): journalist with good analytical skill
and insider knowledge oI recent past.
Each one oI the above-mentioned individuals possesses
merits which are distinctly lacking in me to write a biography
on Pirabhakaran in English. However, they also as I view
have some burdens: advancing age, lack oI motivation (iI that
is the appropriate word!), unsettled` liIe and ravage oI
indiIIerent health, uncertainty` oI surrounding mileau and
inaccessibility oI reIerence materials are some oI these. Not
to be condescending, I have one merit over these individuals,
to be condescending, I have one merit over these individuals,
in that I have had a tough apprenticeship in biography writing
in 1990s.
In the inter-Olympic period between Barcelona and Atlanta, I
Iiguratively lived with Einstein to write my Einstein
Dictionarv (1996), the Iirst oI its kind in science reIerence
books. It has received critical acclaim among my peers Ior
its unusual treatment oI the scientist, who was chosen by the
Time magazine as the person oI the |20
th
| century. Since
there are dozens oI biographies on Einstein, I Ielt that I have
to stand out Irom the crowd by authoring a dictionary-style
biography. While laboring to make my work a success, by
reading more than 100 books on the physics, philosophy and
political activism oI Einstein, I learnt the skill oI (a)
excavating concealed, covered-up or overlooked Iacts and
weaving it into interesting story; and also (b) siIting gems
Irom the piles oI published muck.
But on Pirabhakaran, with the exception oI Narayan
Swamy`s Tigers of Lanka From Bovs to Guerrillas,
biographies are lacking. Some published works provide
signiIicant mention about his (and LTTE) activities. Thus, as
oI now, I couldn`t adopt the dictionary-style biography on
him. Rather, I had to Iocus on a Iull length conventional
biography.
1ypes of Biographies
Biographies, depending on the Iocus oI the biographer, can
be oI many types. These include,
1.
Acquaintance biography (Memography)
2.
Analytical biography (Psychobiography)
3.
Devotional biography (Hagiography)
4.
Dismantling biography (Pathobiography)
5.
Recording biography (Chronobiography)
6.
Autobiography
Rajan Hoole et al`s Broken Palmvra (1990) and Rohan
Gunaratna`s Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka (1993) were
recording biographies on the origin and development oI
LTTE in general. Adele Balasingham`s The Will to Freedom
(2001) was an autobiography with noticeable snippets on
sangam.orgf.fPart+1.htm 1+f18
(2001) was an autobiography with noticeable snippets on
Pirabhakaran`s mind. Dixit`s Assignment Colombo (1998)
was a crude type oI acquaintance biography on
Pirabhakaran.
In contrast to these works, I have chosen to write an
analytical biography on Pirabhakaran, which is a cross
between Erik Erikson`s Gandhis Truth (1969) and any oI
James Michener`s non-Iiction work. The three ingredients
enumerated by Sir Harold Nicolson Ior a biography, namely
history`, description oI an individual` and a branch oI
literature with an adequate Ieeling Ior style`, also merited my
earnest attention. Either The Broken Palmvra or Indian
Intervention in Sri Lanka cannot qualiIy as a biography on
Pirabhakaran since in both the last two ingredients were
missing.
Though it is customary to provide a list oI consulted sources
at the end oI the work, Ior pragmatic reasons on inIormation,
I have opted to provide a list oI sources which have been
consulted in the writing oI the past 40 chapters. Only the
books and book chapters are mentioned. Journal and
periodical articles are too numerous to be mentioned now.
Consulted Sources
|Note. Rather than the conventional alphabetical listing bv
the authors, I have preferred the chronological listing bv
the publication date.|
The sources have been categorized into three types: (A)
Works with details on Pirabhakaran (B) Works on
Ceylon/Sri Lanka (C) Works on Military history.
(A) Works with details on Pirabhakaran
1.
George Rosie: The Directorv of International
Terrorism, Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1986,
pp. 176-177.
2.
Chelvadurai Manogaran: Ethnic Conflict and
Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, University oI Hawaii
Press, Honolulu, 1987, 232 pp.
3.
A.Jayararatnam Wilson: The Break-Up of Sri Lanka
The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict, C.Hurst & Co.,
London, 1988, 240 pp.
4.
Jon Lee Anderson and Scott Anderson: War Zones-
Joices from the Worlds Killing Grounds, Dodd,
Mead & Co, New York, 1988, chapter 4: pp.173-233.
5.
Attar Chand: M.G.Ramachandran Mv Blood
Brother, Gian Publishing House, Delhi, 1988, 229 pp.
6.
Ravi Kant Dubey: Indo-Sri Lankan Relations, with
Special Reference to the Tamil Problem, Deep & Deep
Publications, New Delhi, 1989, 216 pp.
7.
Rajesh Kadian: Indias Sri Lanka Fiasco Peace
Keepers at War, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1990, 184
pp.
8.
Rajan Hoole, Daya Somasundaram, K.Sritharan and
Rajani Thiranagama: The Broken Palmvra, The Sri
Lanka Studies Institute, Claremont, CA, 1990 revised
version, 464 pp.
9.
K.Mohandas: MGR The Man and the Mvth, Panther
Publishers, Bangalore, 1992, 181 pp.
10.
Rohan Gunaratna: Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka
The Role of Indias Intelligence Agencies, South Asian
Network on ConIlict Research, Colombo, 1993, 500
pp.
11.
KoIi Buenor Hadjor: Dictionarv of Third World Terms,
Penguin Books, London, 1993, pp.282-283.
12.
K.M.de Silva and Howard Wriggins: J.R.Javewardene
of Sri Lanka A Political Biographv. Jol.II. From
1956 to His Retirement 1989, Leo Cooper/ Pen &
Sword Books Ltd., London, 1994, 754 pp.
13.
Human Rights Watch: Slaughter among Neighbors
The Political Origins of Communal Jiolence, Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1995, chapter 6: Sri
Lanka, pp. 85-100.
14.
M.R.Narayan Swamy: Tigers of Lanka From Bovs to
Guerrillas, Vijitha Yapa Bookshop, Colombo, 2
nd
edition with Epilogue, 1996, 358 pp.
15.
T.Sabaratnam: The Murder of a Moderate Political
Biographv of Appapillai Amirthalingam, Nivetha
Publishers, Dehiwela, 1996, 426 pp.
16.
J.N.Dixit: Assignment Colombo, Vijitha Yapa
Bookshop, Colombo, 1998, 393 pp.
17.
S.W.R.de A.Samarasinghe and Vidyamali
Samarasinghe: Historical Dictionarv of Sri Lanka,
Scarecrow Press, Lanham, MD, 1998, pp. 96-97 &
109-110.
18.
Rajeev Sharma: Bevond the Tigers Tracking Rafiv
Gandhi Assassination, Kaveri Books, New Delhi,
1998, 278 pp.
19.
Subramanian Swamy: The Assassination of Rafiv
Gandhi Unanswered Questions and Unasked
Queries, Konark Publishers, Delhi, 2000, 316 pp.
20.
Adele Balasingham: The Will to Freedom An Inside
Jiew of Tamil Resistance, Fairmax Publishing Ltd.,
Mitcham, 2001, 380 pp.
21.
S.Sivanayagam: The Pen and the Gun Selected
Writings 1977-2001, Tamil InIormation Centre,
London, 2001, 292 pp.
(B) Works on Tamils/Ceylon/Sri Lanka
1.
James Emerson Tennent: Cevlon An Account of the
Island Phvsical, Historical and Topographical with
Notices of its Natural Historv, Antiquities and
Production, 2 vols., 1859 (1999 reprint), Longman,
Green, Longman & Roberts, London, 619 pp & 690
pp.
2.
Richard Nyrop et al.: Area Handbook for Cevlon,
Foreign Area Studies (FAS), U.S. Government Printing
OIIice, Washington DC, 1971, 525 pp.
3.
W.Robert Holmes: Jaffna (Sri Lanka) 1980, The
Christian Institute Ior the Study oI Religion and
Society, JaIIna College, JaIIna, 1980, 542 pp.
4.
K.M.de Silva: A Historv of Sri Lanka, C.Hurst & Co,
London, 1981, 603 pp.
5.
Margaret Trawick: Notes on Love in a Tamil Familv,
University oI CaliIornia Press, Berkeley, 1992, 299 pp.
(C) Works on Military History
1.
Nathan Leites and Charles WolI Jr.: Rebellion and
Authoritv An Analvtic Essav on Insurgent Conflicts,
Markham Publishing, Chicago, 1971, 174 pp.
2.
Robert Thompson and John Keegan (eds.):
Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare since 1945,
Crown Publishers, New York, 1985, 336 pp.
3.
John S.Bowman (ed). The Jietnam War Dav bv
Dav, Mallard Press, New York, 1989, 224 pp.
4.
John Keegan and Andrew WheatcroIt: Whos Who in
Militarv Historv from 1453 to the Present Dav,
Routledge, London, 1996, 3
rd
edition, 340 pp.
5.
Jeremy Black: War and the World Militarv Power
and the Fate of Continents 1450-2000, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1998, 334 pp.

Part 42
Sachi Sri Kantha
6 September 2002]
EVEN THE GRASS IS A WEAPON
FOR THE COURAGEOUS

Pirabhakaran on his childhood and formative influences
Pirabhakaran has been inIrequently Ieatured and interviewed
in non-Sri Lankan newspapers, and news magazines since
1984. When he was residing in Tamil Nadu, between 1983
and 1986, Iew interviewers like N. Ram and Anita Pratap
were able to bring out some oI the little known Iacts about
his juvenile phase, by their penetrating questions. During that
period, Pirabhakaran made him relatively accessible to
journalists covering the international magazines like
Newsweek and Asiaweek as well.
However, aIter mid-1987, he had curtailed his access to
name-brand scribes and run-oI-the mill` wordsmiths who
were keen on establishing their career rather than covering the
Eelam Tamil issue with Iairness. This has led to the spread oI
untruths and halI-truths in the international newsmedia about
Pirabhakaran, draIted by Irustrated journalists who were
unable to meet him Iace to Iace. To compound this issue, the
news-peddlers Irom the Colombo press (especially the likes
oI Mahindapala, Jayatilleka and Weerakoon) conveniently
mixed their racist prejudices into the newsIeeds they had
easy access. Thus, it is pertinent to present inIormation on
his juvenile period, as Pirabhakaran has expressed himself
in his mid-1980s interviews.
I had tabulated the Iollowing partial (chronological) list oI
Pirabhakaran interviews which had appeared in the non-Sri
Lankan newsmedia. These contain vital personal details and
views provided by him, and thus Iorm the primary sources
on his liIe.
on his liIe.
1.

to Anita Pratap. Sundav magazine, March 11-17,
1984.
2.

to Anita Pratap. Sundav magazine, Sept. 29-
Oct. 5, 1985
3.

to India Todav magazine, June 30, 1986.
4.

to Sudip Mazumdar. Newsweek magazine,
August 11, 1986.
5.

to N. Ram. The Hindu, Madras, Sept. 4 and
Sept. 5, 1986.
6.

to Bhagwan R. Singh. The Week magazine, Dec.
7-13, 1986.
7.

to India Todav magazine, Aug. 15, 1987.
8.

to T. S. Subramanian, Frontline magazine, Aug.
22-Sept. 4, 1987.
9.

to Anita Pratap. Time International Edition, April
9, 1990.
10.

to the Sri Lankan correspondent. Economist
magazine, March 6, 1993.
11.

to Anita Pratap. Time International Edition,
December 19, 1994.
12.

to Ananthi Sooriyapiragasam, B. B. C. Tamil
Service, April 27, 1995.

Responses to Anita Pratap:
Anita Pratap was one oI the Indian journalists who gained
early access to Pirabhakaran. She had Iirst interviewed him
Ior the Sundav magazine in 1984, when Pirabhakaran was
not yet 30. A Iew oI the questions by Pratap elicited the
responses related to his unusual development as a rebel.
Pratap: 'Could vou elaborate on some of vour
personal experiences that compelled vou to believe
that an armed struggle was the onlv solution for the
Tamils of Sri Lanka. Were vou, vour familv members
and friends, directlv victimi:ed bv the discriminatorv
policv of the Sri Lankan government?
policv of the Sri Lankan government?
Pirabhakaran: The shocking events oI the 1958 racial
riots had a proIound impact on me when I was a
schoolboy. I heard oI horriIying incidents oI how our
people had been mercilessly and brutally put to death
by Sinhala racists. Once I met a widowed mother, a
Iriend oI my Iamily, who related to me her agonizing
personal experience oI this racial holocaust. During the
riots a Sinhala mob attacked her house in Colombo.
The rioters set Iire to the house and murdered her
husband. She and her children escaped with severe
burn injuries. I was deeply shocked when I saw the
scars on her body. I also heard such stories oI cruelty.
I Ielt a deep sense oI sympathy and love Ior my people.
A great passion overwhelmed me to redeem my people
Irom this racist system. I strongly Ielt that armed
struggle was the only way to conIront a system which
employs armed might against unarmed, innocent
people.
Pratap: At what point of time did vou lose faith in the
parliamentarv svstem? What precipitated this
disillusionment?
Pirabhakaran: I entered politics at a time in the early
|nineteen| Seventies when the younger generation had
already lost Iaith in parliamentary politics. I entered
politics as an armed revolutionary. What precipitated
the disillusionment in parliamentary politics was the total
disregard and callousness oI the successive
governments towards the pathetic plight oI our people.
Pratap: How did vou come to start the Liberation
Tiger movement?
Pirabhakaran: I originally Iormed the movement with a
group oI dedicated youths who sincerely believed that
armed struggle was the only way to liberate our people.
Pratap: What was the reason for identifving
vourselves as Tigers?
Pirabhakaran: I named the movement Liberation
Tigers`, since the tiger emblem had deep roots in the
political history oI Tamils, symbolizing Tamil patriotic
resurgence. The tiger symbol also depicts the mode oI
resurgence. The tiger symbol also depicts the mode oI
our guerrilla warIare.
Pratap: When vou decided to form the Liberation
Tigers, what was the reaction of vour familv members
and those close to vou?
Pirabhakaran: As soon as the Tiger movement was
Iormed, I went underground and lost contact with my
Iamily.
Pratap: When did vou last meet vour familv members?
Are thev reconciled to vour outlawed existence?
Pirabhakaran: I have not seen my Iamily members Ior
the last 11 years. I do not think they regard me as an
ordinary person leading an ordinary liIe. They are
reconciled to my existence as a guerrilla Iighter.
Responses to A. Ram:
Two questions posed by N. Ram, then an associate editor oI
the Hindu newspaper in 1986, brought out Irom
Pirabhakaran, the Iormative inIluences on his character. His
responses to these two questions are reproduced in Iull.
N. Ram: 'Could vou give us an idea of vour personal
heroes in revolutionarv struggles or liberation
movements or in anv sphere of life. people and
experiences that have inspired vou? And perhaps
therebv give us some insight into vour own political
evolution from the time vou were a schoolbov?`
Pirabhakaran: 'From my boyhood, the struggle that
attracted me most was the Indian Ireedom struggle. The
role oI Netaji attracted me very much. I was brought up
in an environment oI strict discipline Irom childhood. I
was not permitted to mingle Ireely with outsiders. I used
to Ieel shy oI girls. Great store was laid by personal
rectitude and discipline. My Iather set an example
through his own personal conduct. He would not even
chew betel leaves. I modeled my conduct on his. he
was a government oIIicer, a district land oIIicer. A very
straightIorward man. People say in our area: When he
walks, he does not hurt even the grass under his Ieet,
but his son is so.`
but his son is so.`
Even while criticising me, they marvel at the Iact that
such a son was born to such a Iather! He was strict,
yes, but also soIt and persuasive. In my own case, he
reasoned rather than regimented and his attitude was
that oI a Iriend. He would give me certain pieces oI
advice and discuss things with me. As I said, I grew up
as a shy boy. especially in the matter oI mingling with
girls.
The liIe oI Subhas Chandra Bose attracted me
specially. Even as a boy, I would delve into Gandhiji`s
books on Experiments with Truth, on celibacy and so
on. Subhas attracted me particularly since even as a boy
he went in search oI spiritualism and, Iinding the liIe oI
a recluse dissatisIying, returned (laughs). Yet
repeatedly, he retreated into spiritualism. during
moments oI great diIIiculty and crisis. I Iollowed this
history and these stories with Iascination. He became
my special hero and some oI his orations gripped me.
For example. I shall fight for the freedom of mv land
until I shed mv last drop of blood. These words used
to thrill me whenever they came to me. Then the story
oI Bhagat Singh Iascinated me.
In other words, the biographies and histories oI those
who hit back at the perpetrators oI injustice, those who
counterattacked (the unjust Ioe) were my special
Iavourite. Because in our land, the Sinhalese behaved so
cruelly towards us. we would hear stories about this
and read about these cruel acts in books and
newspapers. Later I read about this particular episode
that took place during the 1958 attacks on Tamils.
They broke into a temple, Panadura, Iound a Brahmin
priest sleeping, tied him to his cot, poured petrol over
him and burnt him alive. Ours was a god-Iearing society
and the people were religious minded. The widespread
Ieeling was: when a priest like him was burnt alive, why
did we not have the capability to hit back? That was
one atrocity that made people think deeply. In another
episode, they threw a child into a drum oI boiling tar.
This leIt a very deep imprint on my mind and in the
minds oI those around me. II such innocent lives could
be destroyed, why could we not strike back?
be destroyed, why could we not strike back?
In such moments, these heroic examples and models
Irom the Indian Ireedom struggle came to me.
Magazines retold these stories on special occasions
such as India`s Independence Day celebrations. This
practice continues. Consider another example oI
Tiruppur Kumaran in his ahimsa there was a steely
determination. II I was attracted by the experience oI
armed struggle against injustice, I was drawn by the
moral Iorce oI ahimsa as well. I was inspired by
examples oI grit and determination. I began to think
along these lines early in liIe. Why can`t we Iollow their
examples? Why can`t we start an armed struggle?
I used to read books on the rise oI Napoleon and his
exploits. This kind oI history held special appeal. In
the Mahabharata, the roles oI Bhima and Karna were
specially attractive to me. the spirit oI sacriIice
appeared crucial. People respond to characters in the
Mahabharata in various ways. I value the character and
role oI Karna the most, on account oI his readiness to
make the ultimate sacriIice. I read some oI
Vivekananda`s sayings and the urge grew in me to work
towards a strong youth Iorce. I plunged into this line oI
thinking. At what age? These Ieelings and ideas began
to take shape when I was 16 approximately.
I used to listen to the religious discourses oI
Kripanantha Variar. I used to go to all these events.
those connected with religion. I would go and observe
political meetings. attend dramatic perIormances. In
my place, they used to enact plays on Socrates and so
on.
So quite early on, we absorbed all these inIluences and
the Ieeling grew in us that we must do something!
Looking at our historical background, we had to take
up arms to Iight Ior our rights. The lesson was that they
could do all this because we were deIenceless and
disarmed. Why should be remain so? We should take
up violence to counter and overthrow their violence.
Only aIter that did I engage in this movement.
N. Ram: 'The impression among outsiders who have
observed the development of the LTTE is that vou as
observed the development of the LTTE is that vou as
its leader have onlv recentlv begun to take a deeper
or more detailed interest in politics.whereas earlier,
vou used to live in mainlv in the realm of militarv
ideas. You were considered shv and did not meet
people easilv, which would make it difficult in politics.
Now thev find vou speaking out on a number of
political issues.`
Pirabhakaran: 'In reality, it has always been clear to
me that an armed struggle takes shape only against a
political background. II I had been a man without
political clarity. I went underground around 1973 and
you know that leading an underground liIe is a very
diIIicult proposition. I have led an underground liIe Ior
a long time. between 1973 and 1983, it was a very
diIIicult period Ior us, with the army on the rampage.
to escape their net was very diIIicult. II we were able to
go through this experience and are able to stand Iirm
today, then surely you will concede that we could not
have been political innocents or carried on without a
political background!
But one thing is true, despite this political background.
My natural inclination makes me lay less emphasis on
words. In serious politics, it won`t do to concentrate on
talking; you must grow through action and then talk!
You would have observed that only as we grew in our
activities, in our activities in the Iield, did we come up
to a position oI meeting various people and explaining
our ideas only then did our words carry some value.
Words must be matched and indeed preceded by
content. This is crucial Ior our relations with our
people.
II people respect our Iighters more, it is because oI this
extra discipline. Certain exemplary personal attributes, a
certain personal rectitude; that is why our people are
attracted to LTTE Iighters. When you speak oI a
political outlook, people will respect you only iI you
prove yourselI in action. Action gives your programme
a political content. When we say during this period,
They will use the army to attack us, we will resist and
counterattack and we will protect you`, well. only
when we actually do it, do we establish our political
when we actually do it, do we establish our political
credibility and role.
That is why we have given due attention to military
aIIairs in our organization. You know the character oI
your struggle. In a situation where the Sri Lankan state
Ieeds its army on racism and chauvinism and through
that army and through Iorced colonization, tries to
displace and subjugate us. Only a political organization
with military strength is capable oI eIIective resistance.
Look all around the world. any real struggle has had a
military background. Even iI the Indian Ireedom
struggle was conducted on the basis oI ahimsa, Netaji`s
Indian National Army had a special place.There is
deIinitely a place today in Indian history Ior Subhas!
His was an action-oriented political approach.
And take the Indian state today. II India is able to stand
up in the community oI nations, it is in no small
measure due to the strength oI the Indian armed Iorces;
else, the Chinese would bring their Irontiers up to Delhi.
! |The Hindu, Madras, Sept. 5, 1986|
What is notable about this interview oI Pirabhakaran by N.
Ram Ior the Hindu newspaper is that, it appeared nearly
three weeks aIter the now-Iamous Newsweek magazine`s
interview oI the LTTE leader. Once Pirabhakaran became
news-worthy Ior international audience, he became
respectable Ior an interview in the eyes oI the managers oI
the Hindu newspaper. It was to Sudeep Mazumdar, the
Newsweek interviewer, Pirabhakaran oIIered his celebrated
answer oI Clint Eastwood being a vicarious trainer Ior his
military skills.
1he 198 Aewsweek magazine interview
Though Iew oI the answers to the 13 questions posed by
Sudip Mazumdar to Pirabhakaran have lost their value with
the passage oI time and later unanticipated political
developments, still this 1986 Newsweek magazine interview
retains its glamor Ior the responses delivered and the
expressed wishes oI LTTE`s leader, then aged 31. Since he
was living in Madras then, he had been courteous to his host
country. But in his responses Pirabhakaran had shown that
he is one who would not bend his knees to dance to the
tunes oI his host country. This interview is reproduced in Iull
to show that, unlike the then parading Eelam militant
leadership oI other groups, Pirabhakaran has matched his
words with deeds.
1he Eye of the 1iger
|Newsweek International Edition, Aug. 11, 1986, p.
48|
For the past 14 years Velupillai Pirabhakaran has led an
armed struggle to create a separate Tamil state in Sri
Lanka`s volatile northeastern region. Pirabhakaran, 32,
commands the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), the strongest oI Sri Lanka`s numerous Tamil
separatist groups. It is generally acknowledged that
peace negotiations with Colombo are unlikely to prove
eIIective without LTTE`s involvement. Last week,
shortly beIore his group rejected Colombo`s latest
proposal Ior peace talks, Pirabhakaran spoke with
Newsweek`s Sudip Mazumdar in Madras. Excerpts:
Mazumdar: Your opponents charge that innocent
civilians are often killed in vour militarv offensives.
How do vou respond?
Pirabhakaran: The LTTE has never killed any
civilians. We condemn such acts oI violence. There
were occasions when we had to kill homeguards. But
they are not civilians. They are trained |non-combat
draItees who| carry guns.
Mazumdar: How manv troops do vou have under
vour command and where do thev train?
Pirabhakaran: That`s a secret. I can tell you we are
strong enough to take on the 51,000 strong Sri Lankan
military and well enough equipped to carry on
protracted guerrilla warIare.
Mazumdar: Whv do vou think LTTE has taken the
lead among other guerrilla groups?
Pirabhakaran: Discipline and order are most
important. We emphasize personal morality and a sense
oI patriotism. Our cadres carry cyanide pills with them
to avoid Ialling into enemy hands. Most oI all, the
people are behind us.
people are behind us.
Mazumdar: Critics charge that vou relv on drug
trafficking to raise monev for vour militarv activities.
How do vou respond?
Pirabhakaran: Our people support us Iinancially. We
capture arms and ammunition Irom the enemy and also
buy them on the international market. We don`t get
support Irom any other country. Here in India we are
living as political reIugees and the government oI India
extends moral support to our existence here. We have
imposed a strict moral code on ourselves, not to use
even liquor. How can one suspect us oI drug traIIicking
which we condemn?
Mazumdar: Press reports sav that vou received
militarv training in Cuba. How did vou manage to
acquire vour know-how?
Pirabhakaran: Through sheer personal training. I use
my natural instincts and I watch war Iilms and westerns
by |American movie actor| Clint Eastwood. II I were
trained in Cuba, I would have been a better Iighter.
Mazumdar: What is vour assessment of the latest
round of negotiations between moderate Tamils and
the Sri Lankan government on devolution of power to
Tamils?
Pirabhakaran: The proposals |put Iorward by
Colombo| are insuIIicient even to start negotiations. We
have enunciated Iour principles as the basis Ior talks;
the traditional homeland oI the Tamils must be
recognized; Tamils should be |oIIicially| recognized as
a |separate| nationality; their rights to selI-determination
should be recognized, and the civil rights oI stateless
Tamils should be recognized. A Iramework should be
worked out incorporating these principles. Then we will
consider |negotiations|.
Mazumdar: How serious do vou think President
Junius Javewardene is in solving the Tamil problem?
Pirabhakaran: This so-called peace initiative by
Jayewardene is an attempt to hoodwink the world. That
these negotiations are eyewash is clear Irom the Iact that
these negotiations are eyewash is clear Irom the Iact that
even while the talks were on the military killed nearly
150 innocent Tamils. Talks with Jayewardene? Possible,
but only on the question oI demarcation oI our
boundaries |as two separate nations|.
Mazumdar: Whv do vou think India allows vou to
operate from here?
Pirabhakaran: Purely on humanitarian grounds. There is
genocide going on in Sri Lanka. India knows we are
Iighting against genocide and trying to protect our
people.
Mazumdar: Opponents charge that India is abetting
terrorists bv giving vou sanctuarv, while New Delhi
blames Pakistan for training Sikh terrorists? What is
vour view?
Pirabhakaran: There is a Iundamental diIIerence here.
Our people are Iacing genocide whereas the Indian
Army is not committing genocide in
Mazumdar: India favors a negotiated settlement of the
ethnic problem and opposes vour goal of a separate
Tamil state. What is vour view?
Pirabhakaran: The world is constantly changing; so is
politics. We rely on the hope that changing
circumstances will Iinally lead to India`s recognition oI
our struggle. India has recognized various liberation
movements. At a later stage India may be compelled to
recognize us as it did the PLO and SWAPO.
Mazumdar: What do vou expect from the United
States?
Pirabhakaran: We want to appeal to the American
people to realize that we are a nation oI people Iacing
genocide. And we appeal to the U. S. government to
stop all aid to the Sri Lankan government which will be
used Ior the destruction oI our people.
Mazumdar: What kind of a political svstem do vou
envisage for an independent Tamil state?
Pirabhakaran: We want to establish a socialist
society. Ours will be a unique socialist model, neither
Soviet nor Chinese nor any other.
Soviet nor Chinese nor any other.
Mazumdar: Have vou ever considered calling for
Indias militarv intervention to stop what vou call
genocide?
Pirabhakaran: India`s military intervention is not
necessary because we have a Iighting Iorce capable oI
Iacing the military. In Iact, India`s intervention may
allow other international Iorces to meddle in Sri Lanka
and create |chaos|.
In retrospect, one can inIer that Pirabhakaran`s answer to the
second question that, 'We are strong enough to take on the
51,000 strong Sri Lankan military and well enough equipped
to carry on protracted guerrilla warIare had stood the test of
time. Even quite a segment oI LTTE`s non-combat
sympathizers then would have Ielt that, without India`s
covert assistance, the chances oI LTTE being neutralized by
the Sri Lankan army (which had been receiving overt help
Irom Pakistan and Israel) were considerable. But, as he had
revealed in his 1986 interview with N. Ram a Iew weeks later,
Pirabhakaran had made his actions speak louder than words.
For reality check, here is the latest statistics Irom the Sri
Lankan army`s causalities since 1983. According to Gnana
Balagalle, the Chairperson oI the |Sri Lankan| Army Seva
Vanita Sanvidhanaya, 'In Sri Lanka, we have over 16,000
disabled soldiers due to the two decades oI ethnic conIlict.
The number oI missing soldiers amounted to over 3,000
while over 18,000 have sacriIiced their lives Iighting the war.
|The Island, Colombo, Aug. 29, 2002|. This newsreport
by Sanjeevi Jayasuriya also mentioned that though over 3,300
are listed as missing in action`, 'the LTTE claims it holds
only seven security Iorces personnel as prisoners oI the
conIlict. Thus, the 3,300 MIAs have to be added to the tally
oI 18,000 killed personnel.
Responses to 1. S. Subramanian:
Subramanian, the reporter Ior the Frontline magazine
interviewed Pirabhakaran in JaIIna, immediately Iollowing the
Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Peace Accord in August 1987,
Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Peace Accord in August 1987,
and beIore the commencement oI Indo-LTTE war. Two
questions which elicited revealing responses Irom
Pirabhakaran were the Iollowing:
Subramanian: 'What happens to the cvanide
capsules that vour men wear round their necks? Are
thev necessarv when there are no arms?
Pirabhakaran: I think the capsules are needed most.
They are indispensable now. They are the only weapons
Ior the cadres to protect themselves in the Eastern
Province Irom hoodlums, the rival groups and the
Sinhala army. Not only that; they would continue to
wear them in remembrance oI those comrades who
Iought along with them and sacriIiced their lives.
|Note bv Sri Kantha: This response was practically demonstrated by
twelve oI LTTE`s cadres on October 5, 1987; Lt. Col. Kumarappa,
Lt. Col. Pulendran, Maj. Abdullah, Capt. Nalan, Capt. Ragu, 2nd Lt.
Ananthakumar, Lt. Thavakumar, Lt. Anbalagan, Capt. Karan, Capt.
Miresh, 2nd Lt. Reginald and Capt. Palani. |
Subramanian: What are the shaping influences on
vour life?
Pirabhakaran: Ra. Su. Nallaperumal`s serial Kallukkul
Eeram (Its`s wet inside the stone) published in Kalki
magazine. I have read it Iive times. It revolves round the
Indian Ireedom struggle. Mr. Nallaperumal balances the
ahimsaic struggle and the armed struggle. Generally, I
read anything on any Ireedom movement. I used to read
books on Joan oI Arc, Napoleon and so on. I was
always interested in history. Shivaji was the Iirst guerrilla
to have Iought against the Mughal rule. When I was
young, I always had a picture oI Netaji Subhas Chandra
Bose. I used to keep his picture on my table when I
used to study. I had written on my table, I will Iight till
the last drop oI my blood Ior the liberation oI my
mother-land`.
1he canard of being a Hitler fan
Pirabhakaran`s Iascination with Subhas Chandra Bose has
been mischievously projected as he being a Ian oI Hitler, by
extension. In the aItermath oI the JaIIna oIIensive by the
extension. In the aItermath oI the JaIIna oIIensive by the
LTTE in 2000, Ian MacKinnon reported Ior the Newsweek
magazine as Iollows:
'How has Prabhakaran, 46, a soIt-spoken Ian oI Clint
Eastwood movies who likes to quote the thoughts oI
Mao Zedong, outmaneuvered the Sri Lankan Iorces? He
seems to hold almost cult-like powers over his
Iollowers. Prabhakaran Iounded the Tamil Tigers in
1976 when he was 22, in response to government
discrimination against the country`s Tamil minority. His
rebels have been Iighting a Iull-Iledged was with
Colombo Ior 17 years; about 60,000 people have been
killed. Prabhakaran, a socialist who has said he is
inspired by such disparate leaders as Hitler, Napoleon
and Che Guevara, gets Iunding Ior and weapons Irom
the Tamil diaspora. |Newsweek International, May
29, 2000|
It appears that reporter Ian MacKinnon`s passing mention oI
Pirabhakaran being inspired by Hitler, is based on the LTTE
leader`s expressed Iascination with the career oI Subhas
Chandra Bose, who linked with Hitler Ior a Iew years in the
early 1940s, as part oI his anti-British activism. That
Pirabhakaran himselI gained inspiration Irom Hitler is baloney
and not based on any Iactual record.
MacKinnon has hidden the real Iacts that colonial Ceylon
produced its share oI Sinhala Aryan Hitler-imitators such as
A. E. Goonesinghe (1891-1967) and S. W. R. D.
Bandaranaike (1899-1959) who dreamt oI conquering power
in the 1930s by spell binding oratory and using goon-squads
to target the skulls oI opponents. Both oI them even
competed with each other in the Colombo Municipality
elections in 1920s. Another Iact deserves notice; both
Bandaranaike and Goonesinghe became household names
when Hitler was at his prime in the 1930s, and both exploited
the Aryan` shrill oI Hitler in the local politics oI the island.
While Goonesinghe`s star Iaded in the early 1950s,
Bandaranaike exploited the Heil Sinhala demagoguery to
reach the pinnacle oI prime-ministership in mid 1950s. Then
Federal Party militant Amirthalingam was a notable victim oI
Heil Sinhala goon-squad attack when Bandaranaike gained
power in 1956. Even Sinhalese journalist Tarzie Vittachi who
power in 1956. Even Sinhalese journalist Tarzie Vittachi who
courageously penned the acclaimed Emergencv 58 book
had to escape Irom the island Ior Iear oI his liIe and limb
Irom such goon squad threat.
The 1980s decade saw the second generation oI Sinhala
Aryan Hitler-Mussolini imitators in power, who made a
mockery oI parliamentary democracy, aIter being voted into
power in 1977. These two became the target oI derision Ior
Pirabhakaran. II J. R. Jayewardene (1906-1996) postured as
the Mussolini-clone in Asia, Ranasinghe Premadasa (1924-
1993) the erstwhile protege oI A. E. Goonesinghe played
the role oI Hitler-imitator with better proIessional success
than his mentor. But Jayewardene and Premadasa the
tweedledum and tweedledee oI the 1980s decade were
cunning politicos who could mask their Hitler-Mussolini act
with supple democratic Iaade such as reIerendum and by-
elections. To top their act, they also buttressed their Hitler-
Mussolini act with Morarji Desai-style oI ascetic Gandhism
(donned by Jayewardene) and Marcos-brand oI populism
(paraded by Premadasa and his partner in liIe - Hema). This
detail is needed to comprehend Pirabhakaran`s revulsion oI
Sinhalese parliamentary leadership oI the 1970s and 1980s,
as he has stated in his 1984 interview with Anita Pratap. The
current crop oI pulp history writers, in particular H. L. D.
Mahindapala and Dayan Jayatilleka, who were servile
Ilatterers oI Premadasa are involved in the game oI upgrading
the image oI their master as a cross between JeIIerson and
Lincoln, while exhibiting their name-calling talent on
Pirabhakaran. Thus, MacKinnon`s mention oI Pirabhakaran
being inspired by Hitler can also be inIerred as nothing but a
plant` by media-savvy Jayatilleka to mask the despotism oI
Premadasa.
:Even the Crass is a Weapon for the Courageous'
Some Sinhalese analysts, especially Jayatilleka, are Iond oI
quoting a Iew idioms and proverbs in Tamil (which they have
learnt casually Irom their Tamil contacts) to critique
Pirabhakaran`s thoughts and actions. One which has been
used in the past is the proverb, Puli pasithaalum pullai
thinnaaathu |in translation: Tiger will not eat grass even in
hunger.| In my reading, a better Tamil proverb Ieaturing
hunger.| In my reading, a better Tamil proverb Ieaturing
grass to describe Pirabhakaran`s action is Jallavanukku
Pullum Aavutham |in translation: Even the grass is a weapon
Ior the courageous.| Only a talented person Iully drenched
with an attitude depicted by this proverb could lead an army,
using the video cassettes oI Clint Eastwood`s westerns as
inspiration. Unbelievable to the ordinary souls in 1986. But
Pirabhakaran is not an ordinary individual.
Pirabhakaran`s remark to the Newsweek magazine about his
Iascination with Clint Eastwood`s movies elicited a
humorous commentary Irom a journalist, then living in Japan.
I reproduce his thoughts, since though it appears patronizing
to Pirabhakaran, the joke was on the Poo Bahs oI American
culture. Wrote Jared Lubarsky,
'Make Mv Dav Department: The leader oI a Tamil
separatist group in Sri Lanka, dear Iriends, was asked in
a magazine interview last week iI he had received any
military training in Cuba. He denied it. I use my natural
instincts`, he said, and I watch war Iilms and Westerns
by Clint Eastwood.`
Think oI all the people who devote whole careers to
bringing the representative best oI their own cultures to
audiences in other lands. Goethe Institute, British
Council, USIA thousands oI Iolks on the public
payroll, and earning every penny oI it. Cultural agencies
work hard; they take their role seriously because they
know it can have real political consequences. That`s
one thing they all have to disavow, oI course: politics.
But anything a culture in transition puts on display Irom
another and all cultures are in transition changes the
way people see and think. An exhibition, a lecture, a
Iestival; somewhere down the line, these things are
going to alter the very shape oI the host country and the
way it behaves in the world community: cultural
bureaucrats give a lot oI thought to the images they
send abroad. It must make the people at the USIA Ieel a
little low, I suppose, to think that they come in behind
Dirty Harry as a Iorce Ior social change in the Third
World.
Lubarsky continued:
'I Iind it a little disconcerting myselI, that this particular
Ireedom Iighter learned his notions oI warIare Irom
Eastwood sphagetti Westerns. As Iar as I can tell,
Eastwood`s loItiest strategy in these movies is to shoot
the shit out oI anything that moves. That doesn`t bode
well Ior the Iuture oI Sri Lanka.
Then again, why should we expect things to be
otherwise? II the president oI the United States |Note bv
Sri Kantha: Then, Reagan was the President| can
derive his whole outlook on liIe Irom the movies, why
shouldn`t a Tamil Tiger? Matter oI Iact, why should he
be the only one? . |Mainichi Dailv News, Tokyo,
Aug. 8, 1986|
Lubarsky`s humor aside, serious students oI history will not
deny that Clint Eastwood and his use oI gun is the most
potent svmbol of American culture; Iar more potent than the
creations oI Americans like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Emily
Dickinson, Henry Ford, Ansel Adams and Andy Warhol. II
one scans the American history Irom 1620, when the
Pilgrims landed in Plymouth aboard Mavflower ship, the gun
helped the European immigrants to deIend, conquer and
establish their thriving vibrant culture. Ballads, Iolk poetry
and art in the earlier centuries, as well as novels and movies
in the 20
th
century extolled the virtue oI the gun. II not Ior the
gun, Washington and his gang couldn`t have bested the rule
oI King George III. Thus, Pirabhakaran was not wrong in
identiIying Eastwood`s gun as his guiding light to liberate
Eelam Tamils Irom Sinhalese oppression.
Though Lubarsky wrote this humorous piece in 1986, in the
aItermath oI Clint Eastwood`s critical success oI his movie
Unforgiven in 1993, the Time magazine provided a proIile oI
the Hollywood icon to Ielicitate his oeuvre, with a caption
Go Ahead, Make My Career`. Some points made by Paul
Witteman who penned this proIile are interesting to note.
According to this proIile,
'|Clint| Eastwood plans his productions like military
campaigns and compares his role to that oI an oIIicer in
combat. Making a Iilm takes on a liIe oI its own`, he
says, You guide that liIe along like a platoon leader,
getting everybody kind oI enthused to charge the hill`.
|Time International edition, April 5, 1993, pp. 44-45|
I Iound this comment Irom Clint Eastwood somewhat
Iascinating. Come to think oI it, there appears a symmetry
between the movie idol (Eastwood) and the Ian
(Pirabhakaran), which had gone unnoticed. While Eastwood
prepared his movies like military campaigns, Pirabhakaran
gained inspiration Ior his military campaigns Irom
Eastwood`s Westerns. Also the character traits which came
to identiIy Clint Eastwood`s phenomenal success
prudence, intelligent shyness, selI reliance, suspicion oI the
intentions oI strangers and dogged determination are the
identiIied virtues oI a pioneer American. These same traits
also have some resonance in Pirabhakaran`s success as a
Tamil leader.
One quote oI Clint Eastwood mentioned in the Time
magazine`s 1993 proIile is also a memorable one.
'Hollywood pays too much attention to home runs. Singles
and doubles can win the game when longevity is the goal.
Besides, iI all I ever did was hit one home run, the only thing
I`d be now a celebrity has-been. Even Pirabhakaran`s
record in the Iield attests to the Iact that, like his idol, he also
concentrated on singles and doubles in the 1980s. In
contrast, some oI his rivals to the leadership like Uma
Maheswaran and Padmanabha were Iooling themselves by
aiming Ior home runs` with the never-materialised support
Irom the Sinhalese peasants and masses. |Continued.|

Part 43
Sachi Sri Kantha
20 September 2002]
PRIME ANTAGONIST TO BROWN-
SKINNED BUDDHIST ARYANISM
Russell Baker on Historians
It is not an exaggeration to claim that Pirabhakaran has been
responsible Ior making Sri Lanka, a paradise Ior low grade
historians - both native and non-native types. When it comes
to the quality oI contemporary historians, many would agree
with the observations oI reputed humorist Russell Baker. In a
delightIul syndicated commentary with the title OverIlowing
History`, written in 1994, Baker characterized the scene in
America where historian glut was making a mince-meat oI
past evaluations.
Since it has relevance to the contemporary South Asian
history in wider context and also as a link to Pirabhakaran`s
revulsion oI Sinhalese parliamentary leadership, I provide
excerpts Irom this Baker`s commentary Iirst.
Overflowing History
'History is constantly being revised these days. It`s
because there is a glut oI historians. Revising history is
the only way to keep them busy. The historian glut
results Irom the government`s Vietnam War policy oI
granting draIt deIerments Ior staying in college. Young
men who would happily have leIt the campus and gone
into honest work were naturally tempted to stay on, and
on, and on.
This required them to study something. They studied
history. What do you study, aIter all, when you Iace a
long sentence to college, but lack a head Ior science or
mathematics, go to sleep the instant somebody says
economics`, aren`t built Ior proIessional sports, were
never any good at Latin or French, and Iind out they
never any good at Latin or French, and Iind out they
aren`t giving doctorates Ior daydreaming? You study
history.
Somebody has to pay Ior the mess history has made oI
liIe. Why not take it out on the historians who wrote it,
show they were all wrong about practically everything
and, iI they hadn`t been, the world wouldn`t be in the
mess it`s in today.
Ordinarily a country manages to get by with 10 or 12
historians per generation. With the historian explosion
created by Vietnam, however, thousands were suddenly
coming down the pipeline. How could they be kept
busy? Newspaper editors could print only a limited
number oI letters about Benedict Arnold and Mary,
Queen oI Scots.
With the Vietnam War over, students no longer needed
to study history; college thereIore no longer needed
history proIessors in boxcar lots. The obvious solution
Ior excess historians: revising the history they had been
taught. Now they are going at it with gusto. No
reputation is saIe anymore. Not even AdolI Hitler`s.
Scarcely a day passes now without some reviser oI the
past announcing that Hitler wasn`t such a bad chap
aIter all. That he probably didn`t even know people
were being exterminated, poor misunderstood guy.
Mussolini`s reputation is bound to be revised upward
now that the revival oI Iascist politics in Italy invites the
attention oI historians desperate Ior something to revise.
Thomas JeIIerson has been revised so Iar down that I
recently read a newspaper columnist a newspaper
columnist! asserting her own moral superiority to him.
Even the once-sainted Abraham Lincoln can no longer
be spoken oI admiringly without issuance oI the
preIatory apology. |Asahi Evening News, Tokyo,
April 20, 1994|
When one substitutes the Vietnam context to the emergence
oI LTTE in Russell Baker`s text and shiIt the Iocus to South
Asia, one can see how the historian avalanche in India and
Sri Lanka is playing havoc since mid-1980s. Colombo,
Kandy, Chennai and New Delhi have generated sweat-shop
Centers` where proIessional and amateur historian
wannabes have been burning midnight-oil to gobble, digest,
and regurgitate censored and semi-censored news as well as
gossips emanating Irom the Intelligence operatives to predict
the behavior oI Pirabhakaran`s mind and mood.
History writing is tough, even Ior proIessionals who receive
years oI training under the guidance oI academic peers. But
in contemporary Sri Lanka and India, Pirabhakaran`s actions
had turned quite a number oI semi-literate proIessionals and
proIessional cross-dressers into authentic` or near-authentic
historians. Third degree mathematicians, a la Hooles and
Sritharans, have become Iourth grade historians. Slimy
journalists, a la Rams and Jayatillekas, have turned into slick
historians. Gossip-raking diplomats, a la Dixits and
Godages, have Iound a route to historians` lounge by
garbing themselves as seers who can read Pirabhakaran`s
mind.
Sinhala Maha Sabha and the Brown-skinned Buddhist
Aryanism
In this chapter, I wish to Iocus on an aspect which has been
shunned by many oI these proIessional cross-dressers. This
is relating to Pirabhakaran`s task in tackling the viles oI
brown-skinned Buddhist Aryan violence in Sri Lanka. Prior
to this, I provide a simple example on the pitIalls oI history
writing, pertaining to Sri Lanka. The precursor oI the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was the Sinhala Maha Sabha
Iounded by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, whom I identiIied as
the Iirst generation oI Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryan
advocates in the previous chapter. When did Bandaranaike
Iound this Sabha? In the 1930s? Six oI the sources I
checked, authored by proIessional historians, provide Iour
answers. K.M. de Silva |A Historv of Sri Lanka, 1981,
p.445| and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson |The Break-Up of Sri
Lanka, 1988, p.56| mention the year 1937. S.J. Tambiah
|Buddhism Betraved?, 1992, p.13| records the year 1935.
Calvin Woodward |The Growth of a Partv Svstem in
Cevlon, 1969, p.34| and Richard Nyrop et al. |Area
Handbook for Cevlon, 1971, p.504| list the year 1934. Most
recently, S.W.R.de A. Samarasinghe and Vidyamali
Samarasinghe |Historical Dictionarv of Sri Lanka, 1998,
p.120| point the year 1932.
II proIessional historians disagree on such an open and vital
event relating to the colonial history oI Ceylon which set Iire
to the ethnic harmony in the succeeding seven decades, one
wonders how much reliance one can have on the writings
about Pirabhakaran and LTTE by proIessional cross-
dressers, who mix ingredients oI hearsay, gossip and
innuendo to their cocktail oI commentaries. Here is a recent
example oI such a tripe Irom Dayan Jayatilleka:
'Ernest Gold did the haunting soundtrack Ior the movie
Exodus, starring Paul Newman and Eva Marie Saint.
Prabhakaran loved the book. D.B.S. Jeyaraj related the
tale in his version oI the portrait oI the separatist leader
as a young man, penned as a birthday tribute in the
Sundav Leader. (What Jeyaraj does not add is
something he can check with ivekkam oldsters such as
the Nithyanandans, namely that Mein Kampf was also
on Prabhakaran`s short list oI Iavourite texts). Be that
as it may, the key lies in the latter`s deep identiIication
with the Zionist experience and achievement. |The
Island newspaper, Colombo, May 26, 2002|
Exodus, Paul Newman, Prabhakaran, ivekkam (i.e., an
endearing Tamil word Ior the Movement`), Mein Kampf
and Zionist experience phew! Jayatilleka is a spin-meister
who can drop names like bullets Irom a machine gun in a Iew
sentences and simultaneously pass innuendo on Pirabhakaran
by noting that Mein Kampf, Hitler`s book, is in his 'short
list oI Iavourite texts. His source oI inIormation are the
Nithyanandan couple |wiIe Nirmala, being the sister oI Rajani
Thiranagama|, who were once members oI LTTE. Jayatilleka
does not reveal under what context Nithyanandans blurted
this tidbit on Pirabhakaran. He also Iails to mention whether
he cross-checked this tidbit with any other conIidants oI
Pirabhakaran.
Even iI Mein Kampf was in the short list oI Iavourite texts`
oI Pirabhakaran, what harm could it have done? Millions oI
non-Germans have read that book in translation to
understand Hitler`s mind, as akin to millions oI non-Germans
|including Jayatilleka, iI I believe so| who read Das Kapital
oI Marx in translation. Nirmala Nithyanandan, who had lived
in USA Ior a while, would probably have learnt that Senator
Alan Cranston took the trouble to translate that book Irom
German to English, word to word, and he was sued by Hitler
Ior copyright inIringement. Just because Cranston took the
trouble to translate Mein Kampf, should one castigate him as
an admirer oI Hitler`s policies? Jayatilleka has become the
Ioremost proponent oI Iallacious logic. In addition, it
appears that Jayatilleka also has mastered the deception oI
what Hitler described in his Mein Kampf as Iollows:
'The masses are poorly acquainted with abstract ideas,
their reactions lie more in the domain oI Ieelings.
Whoever wishes to win over the masses must know the
key to open the door to their hearts.The masses`
receptive powers are very restricted and their
understanding Ieeble.EIIective propaganda must be
conIined to a Iew bare necessities expressed in a Iew
stereotyped Iormulas. |cited in, Nigel Rodgers -Hitler.
A Beginners Guide, London, 2001, p.18|
This is because the same passage oI Jayatilleka on Exodus,
Pirabhakaran and Mein Kampf quoted above, has appeared
verbatim, in his previous commentary, The Time oI the
Tiger: ReIlections` |The Weekend Express, Colombo,
Dec.11-12, 1999|. Like Hitler contributing his cerebral vomit
Irequently to Jolkischer Beobachter |People`s Observer|
the Nazi mouthpiece oI the early 1920s, Jayatilleka also
spews his venom in the Island newspaper the mouthpiece
oI Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism in Sri Lanka.
1he founder and foremost practitioners of Brown-
skinned Buddhist Aryanism
While Jayatilleka continuously smears Pirabhakaran as a
practitioner oI Aryan Nazi methods, it is oI interest to revisit,
who had admired Hitler`s message and practised it with
vengeance against Tamils in Sri Lanka.
Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933), the pre-eminent
Buddhist reIormer, is one oI the now-revered names oI
colonial Ceylon. He was a generation ahead oI S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike and he died in the year oI Hitler`s ascent to
power. Gananath Obeyesekere, anthropology proIessor at
Princeton University, had identiIied Dharmapala as the
Iounder oI Buddhist Aryanism in the island, in his essay
Iounder oI Buddhist Aryanism in the island, in his essay
entitled Buddhism and Conscience`. Wrote Obeyesekere, in
the penultimate paragraph oI this essay:
'Through his Iamiliarity with Bengali intellectuals,
Dharmapala also used the term Aryan, not in its
traditional meaning oI noble` but in its racist sense. It
is Dharmapala who identiIied non-Sinhala civilian
populations Ior verbal attack: the Muslims, Borah
merchants, and especially Tamils, whom he reIerred to
as hadi demalu (Iilthy Tamils). The Tamil issue was
just beginning to be a serious social and political
problem owing to the introduction by the British oI
South Indian Tamil labor into the plantations and the
creation in the central highlands oI a new Tamil
community hemmed in by Sinhala populations.
|Daedalus, summer 1991; v.120, no.3; pp.219-238|
Then in the concluding paragraph consisting oI two
sentences, Obeyesekere summed up as Iollows:
'Dharmapala himselI never encouraged violence against
minority ethnic groups, but he Iramed the ethnic issue in
terms oI a modern Buddhist nationalism and paved the
way Ior the emergence oI a speciIic modern Sinhala
Buddhist national consciousness laying bare Ior many
especially Ior those who live in modern overcrowded
cities the dark underside oI Buddhism without the
mitigating humanism oI the Buddhist conscience.
Without that conscience and humanism, Buddhism
must become a religion that has betrayed the heritage oI
its Iounder. |ibid|
While Anagarika Dharmapala preached the Aryan doctrine
and Ioul-mouthed other ethnic groups, his nominal adherents
like Bandaranaike and A.E. Goonesinghe gained inspiration
Irom Hitler`s oral pyrotechnics and goon squads
respectively. The second generation oI Brown-skinned
Buddhist Aryanism |Jayewardene, Premadasa and his Iellow
rivals Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake oI the
1980s| adopted lock stock and barrel the Nazi treatment
methods on Eelam Tamils.
While Jayatilleka continues to sling mud on Pirabhakaran, his
Iather Mervyn de Silva, blessed with little more wisdom, had
occasionally allowed records oI Nazi-type harassments
meted out to Eelam Tamils in the 1980s to appear in his
journal. Here is a vivid example, penned by S. Velupillai Irom
Vadamaradchy region. Excerpts:
'.Operation Liberation commenced on May 26
|1987|, ended on May 31, and resulted in over 1,000
deaths and 2,000 arrests in Vadamaradchy on its
liberation Irom the LTTE. On the last day oI the
oIIensive I was arrested Irom one oI the 16 temples
speciIied as havens by the Forces in a notice dropped
Irom the air across Vadamaradchy. We, the captives,
were chained and shipped to a makeshiIt detention
camp in Galle, though our destination, according to our
papers, was to be the notorious Boosa Detention
Camp. Later, we came to know that Boosa was already
Iull.
We were conIined to a warehouse turned into a
detention camp, adjacent to the port oI Galle, about 200
metres long, and 20 metres wide. There were 6 latrines,
outside the camp. At a time 6 detainees would be led
out at gun point to spend 6 minutes in the latrines. Most
oI us had no option other than deIecating and urinating
into a gutter deep inside the camp. The gutter
overIlowed. We wallowed in our own Iaeces and urine
that Ilowed Irom the gutter, under our Ieet, towards the
centre oI the camp which teemed with worms and Ilies,
vomit and spittle. There were no baths. None oI us had
bathed or changed Ior days. Both the camp and the
inmates stank.
The camp was packed to capacity. The detainees were
split into over 50 groups, with 50 in each, each headed
by one oI its members. I headed group 52. A barbed-
wire Ience divided the head and the body oI the
camp.. |Lanka Guardian, Colombo, Oct.1, 1993;
p.20|
Considering my personal experience with submissions to the
Lanka Guardian journal, I cannot veriIy how much oI
Velupillai`s original descriptions oI 1987 experience would
Velupillai`s original descriptions oI 1987 experience would
have been edited Ior legal as well as cosmetic reasons. But, it
is not an exaggeration to state that the suIIerings oI Eelam
Tamils in the torture camps oI Sri Lanka in 1990s, have been
on par with the Nazi treatment meted to the hapless Jews and
Gypsies in the Iirst halI oI 1940s. As conIirmation, I provide
the Iollowing excerpts Irom a report by Peel, Mahtani,
Hinshelwood and Forrest, published in the Lancet medical
journal in 2000.
'We reviewed records oI all Sri Lankan men who had
been reIerred to the Medical Foundation Ior the Care oI
Victims oI Torture between January 1997 and
December 1998..Medico-legal reports were written
by 17 doctors that supported the allegations oI torture
in Sri Lanka made by 184 Tamil men who had been
reIerred during this period..74 (40) were aged
between 25 and 30 at the time oI the analysis, so they
would have been several years younger when they were
detained and tortured by the Sri Lankan authorities,
principally the army. 25(13) were younger than 25
when they were Iirst seen at the Medical Foundation, 71
(38) were aged 30-40 years, and 14 (6) were older
than 40..
OI the 184 men, 38 (21) said they had been sexually
abused during their detention. Three (7) oI the 38
said they had been given electric shocks to their
genitals, 26 (68) had been assaulted on their genitals,
and Iour (9) had sticks pushed through the anus,
usually with chillies rubbed on the stick Iirst. One said
he had been Iorced to masturbate soldiers orally, and
one had been Iorced with his Iriends to rape each other
in Iront oI soldiers Ior their entertainment`.
OI the men who said they had been sexually abused, 11
reported being raped as part oI that sexual abuse; this
represents 5 oI the total number oI men on whom
reports were written. The men who had been raped
were much younger, on average, than the men who said
they had not been raped. This suggests that the soldiers
choose the younger and more vulnerable men to rape.
OI the 38 men who had been sexually abused, only Iour
(10) had scarring oI the genitals, and none oI them
were Iound to have signiIicant scarring around the anus.
Since there are very rarely any physical signs caused by
acute sexual assault oI men, it is not surprising that
there were so Iew men with physical signs oI their
sexual abuse. The injuries were: thickening and
tenderness oI Iinal 1-2 cm on urethra oI a man who
described a soldier pushing an object inside his penis; a
scar on the base oI shaIt oI penis oI a man who said
that soldiers had repeatedly slapped a heavy desk
drawer shut on it; an irregularly deIined deIect in the
Ioreskin oI a man who said that soldiers had tied some
string around his penis and pulled, tearing oII a piece oI
his Ioreskin; and a cigarette burn on the scrotum oI a
man who said that soliders had stubbed cigarettes out
on his genitals.. |Lancet, June 10, 2000; vol.355,
pp.2069-2070|
In his classic work Roots, Alex Haley agonised about how
his slave ancestor would have Ielt when given the option oI
castration and leg amputation, his ancestor chose to lose his
legs so that at least he could pass his genes to his progeny.
The above-cited descriptions oI Peel and colleagues on the
torture and victimisation suIIered, especially in the genital
region, by Eelam Tamil detainees at the hands oI Sri Lankan
army suggest that practising adherents oI Hitler`s genocide
techniques are not absent among the Brown-skinned
Buddhist Aryan enthusiasts serving the Sri Lankan army.
Few months aIter the appearance oI this shocking report in
the Lancet, Sri Lanka had its general election on October 10,
2000. This election witnessed the third generation oI brown-
skinned Buddhist Aryan racists coming to the stage, under
the label Sihala Urumava |Sinhala Heritage|. This party`s
national organizer Champika Ranawaka became a member oI
parliament, aIter a tussle Ior nomination among the party
members. G.Senaratne and Deepal Jayasekera, contributing a
commentary to the World Socialist Web Site, had noted the
mind-set oI Ranawaka as Iollows:
'The Ranawaka Iaction, backed by the Buddhist clergy,
represents a more overtly Iascistic layer, comprising
gangster elements drawn Irom students, younger small-
scale businessmen in Colombo and Buddhist monks,
and a handIul oI army men. Ranawaka commented
during the election that the movement would treat
Tamils in the way that Hitler treated the Jewish masses.
The comment is not a mistaken slip oI the tongue. One
oI the underlying themes oI Sinhala chauvinism is the
superiority oI the Aryan Sinhalese over the southern
Indian Dravidians or Tamils. In the 1930s, leading
Iigures in the Sinhala Buddhist movement were open
admirers oI the Aryan supremacist philosophy oI the
German Nazis and their policies. Ranawaka was a JVP
student leader in the late 1980s when the JVP carried
out murderous attacks on the working class and its
organisations. He has repeatedly called Ior the
Iormation oI what amounts to Iascist shock troops..
|World Socialist Web Site, News & Analysis;
December 4, 2000|
:Out-Cestapoing' the original Cestapo in Book Burning
Geheime Staatspoli:ei (Secret State Police) or Gestapo in
abbreviation, was the notorious Nazi contribution established
by Hermann Goring Irom a section oI the Prussian police
Iorce. In the Iirst halI oI 1980s, the Sri Lankan version oI
Gestapo goon squads created history in book burning to a
degree which quantitatively exceeded the vandalism which
occurred under Nazi Germany in the 1930s. This aspect oI
recent history has been glossed over by authentic historians
like K.M.de Silva and pretending historians like Rajan Hoole,
as indicated below:
'These Councils |i.e. District Development Councils|
were ill-Iated Irom the start, when the Council elections
in July 1981 resulted in such untoward incidents as the
burning oI the JaIIna Public Library by government
Iorces. |Book: The Broken Palmvra by R.Hoole et al.,
1990, p.27|
'.To meet the threat posed by this mounting violence
the police Iorce was strengthened by a large contingent
oI policemen and police reservists sent Irom Colombo.
These reinIorcements checked the violence temporarily,
but became themselves the target oI violence. On th eve
oI the |District Development Council| elections, a
terrorist group shot and killed some policemen who
were on election duty. This incident provoked just the
response the perpetrators oI this violent act had
anticipated and desired: the unIocused anger oI the
police and one oI the worst incidents oI police reprisals
in the encounter between them and the young political
activists in JaIIna. The violence was inIlicted on
property more than persons, culminating in a mindless
act oI barbarism, the burning oI the JaIIna Municipal
Library. |Book: J.R.Javewardene of Sri Lanka, vol.2,
by K.M.de Silva and Howard Wriggins, 1994, p.445|
While de Silva and Wriggins correctly describe this shocking
event as mindless act oI barbarism`, they as well as the
authors oI Broken Palmvra previously - conveniently
smoothened the vandalism by not even quantitating the loss
oI historical documents and books. de Silva and Wriggins
also present an unconvincing opinion that the June 1, 1981
book burning oI JaIIna Municipal Library was an unIortunate
one-time retaliation event. This opinion is inaccurate since
book burning was a continuing event in the 1980s, as
indicated below. Where was Pirabhakaran when the JaIIna
Municipal Library burnt? According to Narayan Swamy,
'One oI the hundreds who saw the monument oI Tamil
glory burn down with its invaluable collections was
Prabhakaran. But Prabhakaran`s main worry was then
to escape |to India| |Book: Tigers of Lanka, 1996,
2nd edition, p.73|
Even Narayan Swamy had Iailed to mention the number oI
volumes which was engulIed in Iire. The then head oI state,
J.R. Jayewardene was interviewed by the Indian journalist S.
Venkat Narayan a couple oI months later, and was asked
about the JaIIna book burning. His responses, as typical oI
the Ioxy politician, were nothing but dismissive and
condescending to the sentiments oI book lovers. To quote,
'Question: In JaIIna people are very upset. The
policemen set Iire to the 50 year old library and burnt
97,000 valuable books. They also set Iire to a TULF
MP`s house.
MP`s house.
Answer: That`s because they think he is in touch with
the terrorists.
Question: It seems they were trying to catch him so
they could kill him.
Answer: Terrorists do that too. |India Todav, Sept.1-
15, 1981, pp.18-19|
Michael Kauman Irom the New York Times who visited
JaIIna around the same time also published a report on
Sept.11, 1981, inIorming the readers 'Mr.Yogeswaran`s |the
TULF MP unnamed in Venkat Narayan`s interview| anger
was very personal. Three months ago his house was burned
by what many JaIIna people say were Sinhalese policemen.
On the same night, the large library with its collection oI
97,000 books and Tamil manuscripts was burned and
destroyed. KauIman`s report appeared under the caption,
Harassed Sri Lanka Minority Hears call to Arms`. Quantity-
wise, 97, 000 books and manuscripts were more than Iour
Iold higher than the inIamous May 10, 1933 book burning
event Iirst held under the Nazi regime. According to
Rodgers,
'On 10 May 1933 the Iirst book burning took place,
when, in scenes that looked spontaneous but were
actually highly organized, students, academics and
others took books Irom libraries, bookshops and
schools and burnt them in squares throughout
Germany, incinerating about 20,000 volumes. |Book:
Hitler-A Beginners Guide, 2001, p.49|
It need to be reiterated that the June 1, 1981 book burning oI
JaIIna Municipal Library was not an isolated event, as opined
by the biographers oI J.R.Jayewardene. The books located
in Pirabhakaran`s birth zone were specially targeted and
suIIered similar Iate in 1984. The library oI Hartley College-
Point Pedro, containing 6,690 books were burnt by the
armed Iorce personnel who occupied the buildings closer to
the school. Furthermore, in August oI that year, the local
library oI Valvettithurai was set ablaze by the armed troops,
as inIormed by S.P.Raju, a Iormer school teacher and a
as inIormed by S.P.Raju, a Iormer school teacher and a
secretary oI the Valvettithurai Citizen`s Council, to Sanjoy
Hazarika, the reporter Ior New York Times (Aug.22, 1984,
p.A4).
Apart Irom books available in institutions oI learning and
public service, even private book collections oI Tamil
individuals were not spared by the goon squads oI Brown-
skinned Buddhist Aryanism. To my personal knowledge, in
Colombo itselI, the then TULF (Colombo branch) leader
M.K.Eeelaventhan`s book collection and TULF President
M.Sivasithamparam` book collection were speciIically
targeted and destroyed in the 1977 and 1983 ethnic riots
respectively. In an unsigned Ieature in 1990, the Asiaweek
magazine captured the agony oI an Eelam Tamil bibliophile
as Iollows:
' My 30-year library`, sobbed Villararajah
Thiagalingam, his shaking Iinger pointing at the ashes oI
what once was his study at 261 Dyke St. in Trincomalee
late last week. All my books and 30 years oI research`.
In nearby streets in the Northeastern Sri Lankan port
town, police kicked doors and Iired indiscriminately at
the Iew Tamil houses and shops that remained standing.
On the outskirts oI town sounds oI government shelling
added to the tension. We were hiding in the shed and
we could hear them shouting`, said Thiagalingam,
reIerring to the Sinhalese mob that had burned his
house. They were carrying knives and swords`..
|Asiaweek, Hongkong, June 29, 1990, p.24|
It should be stressed that Thiagalingam is just one oI
thousands oI Eelam Tamils who lost their personal
collections oI books to mob vandalism Ied on Brown-
skinned Buddhist Aryanism. In sum, despite all the image-
tarnishing tactics employed by Pirabhakaran critics like
Jayatilleka and abetted by amnesic proIessional cross-
dressers, iI Hitler`s brand oI genocide has ardent adherents
in Sri Lanka, they can be traced along generations linking
Anagarika Dharmapala, Bandaranaike Iamily (husband-wiIe-
daughter), Jayewardene, Premadasa, Athulathmudali,
Dissanayake and Ranawaka. Pirabhakaran`s ascent was the
ultimate Tamil reaction to such Brown-skinned Buddhist
Aryanism. This has been reiterated by none other than
Mervyn de Silva in 1991, as Iollows:
'The two-party game which helped to aggravate the
Tamil problem (some analysts say the problem was in
Iact a by-product oI that two-party contest Ior power
and the opportunism it promoted.) still goes on. But the
constitutional changes that Mr.J.R.Jayewardene
introduced in order to centralise power in an executive
presidency at the expense oI parliament, the extension
oI the UNP-dominated parliament`s 6 year term to 12
years, the deep divisions in the Opposition, the
dramatic decline oI the Old LeIt`, the chaos and bitter
squabbles in the SLFP aIter Mrs.Bandaranaike was
deprived oI her civic rights, have all taken quite a toll.
While these developments were altering, oIten
imperceptibly, the traditional structure oI politics in Sri
Lanka, two other parallel processes were under way.
The Tamil agitation moved out oI parliament, the
traditional Tamil leadership was soon marginalised with
whatever token gains they had made through parliament
becoming more and more meaningless. In that area, the
DDC |District Development Council| polls in JaIIna
|held in 1981| and the manner in which these were
conducted, together with the campaign oI terror
unleashed by UNP goon squads`, stand out as the
turning point. |Lanka Guardian, Colombo, Sept.1,
1991; pp.3-4|
Mervyn de Silva has a pleasing style oI describing the
paradigmatic shiIts in Iew sentences, devoid oI verbosity.
Though he did not mention the name Pirabhakaran in this
passage, it was obvious to everyone that Pirabhakaran was
the individual who moved the Tamil agitation out oI
parliament. Why? Though the TULF, then prime
representatives oI Tamils, were Gandhians in practice their
strategies were hardly producing any dividends Ior the
Tamils in terms oI preventing the state-aided colonisation
occurring in the Eastern province, while at the same time the
Iorces oI Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism were harassing
the younger generation in multiple Ironts.
Aehru on Candhi's greatest message
Between pages 51 and 66, the October 1963 issue oI the
Plavbov magazine carried a historically interesting Ieature. It
was an interview with Jawaharlal Nehru, with the subtitle: a
candid conversation with the architect oI modern India`.
Unlike other interviews which had appeared in the Plavbov
magazine, the interviewer`s name was peculiarly missing. I
wish to quote Iew passages Irom this interview Ior its
relevance in multiple contexts, including that oI
Pirabhakaran`s contribution to Eelam Tamil liberation
campaign.
Plavbov. '.What in Gandhi`s thinking most
impressed you and your countrymen?
Nehru. 'Mahatma Gandhi, in a sense, burst upon the
Indian scene.And there was magic about the message
he gave. It was very simple. His analysis oI the situation
in India was essentially that we were suIIering terribly
Irom Iear, so he just went about telling us. Don`t be
aIraid. Why are you aIraid? What can happen to you?`
OI course, when he talked in these terms he was
thinking oI our political Iears. II we did something that
the British Government did not like, well, we`d be
punished, We`d be sent to prison, We might be shot.
And so a general sense oI Iear pervaded the land. It
would take hold oI the poorest peasant, the lowliest oI
all our people, whose produce or nearly all oI it went to
his landlord and who hardly had enough Iood to eat.
This poor man was kicked and cuIIed by everybody
by his landlord, by his landlord`s agent, by the police,
by the moneylender.
Plavbov. 'Why was Gandhi so dramatically eIIective in
dispelling this sense oI Iear?
Nehru. 'Whether there was something in the
atmosphere or some magic in Gandhi`s voice, I do not
know. Anyhow, this very simple lesson Don`t be
aIraid` caught on and we realized, with a tremendous
liIting oI hearts, that there was nothing to Iear. Even the
poor peasant straightened his back a little and began to
look people in the Iace and there was a ray oI hope in
his sunken eyes..We were poor stuII. Again and
his sunken eyes..We were poor stuII. Again and
again, he gave us the strength and the vision to achieve
our goal. For 30 years or more, we took shelter under
his shadow and under his guidance.
Plavbov. 'A proIoundly important pat oI his teaching
was, oI course, the commitment to nonviolence. Do
you consider nonviolence to be an eIIective tool oI
international diplomacy today?
Nehru. 'The eIIicacy oI nonviolence is not entirely
convincing. None oI us would dare, in the present state
oI the world, to do away with the instruments oI
organized violence.
In these three answers oI Nehru, Pirabhakaran`s route to the
liberation campaign come into Iocus. By the end oI 1963,
Iollowing 16 years at the helm and absorbing a deIeat in
battle Iront against China in 1962, even Nehru Gandhi`s
closest associate - had become convinced that the eIIicacy
oI nonviolence as a vehicle is very much limited in the ever-
changing world. The strategy oI TULF leadership, parrot-
mouthing the nonviolence vehicle Ior liberation oI homeland
in the late 1970s was a non-starter. Either they were ignorant
oI realities oI the Asian mileau or they were IearIul oI voter
rejection Ior their bombast. By any stretch oI imagination
one cannot argue that Amirthalingam or Sivasithamparam
were ignorant oI the limitations oI nonviolence. Thus, it
could only be inIerred that they were clueless on how to
tackle the Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism within the
boundaries oI parliamentary politics. The genius oI
Pirabhakaran was in countering the threat posed by the
adversaries oI Eelam Tamils by authentic militancy.
There is a post-script to this Plavbov interview given by
Nehru, which deserves mention. A Iew months aIter the
publication oI this interview, there appeared an editorial
conIession in the Plavbov magazine (a rare occurrence by
Plavbov`s standard), that the purported interviewer, who had
not been identiIied by name, did not exclusively interview the
then India`s prime minister Ior the magazine. Rather, the
interviewer had done a cut and paste` job oI answers Irom
previously available Nehru material and submitted it to the
Plavbov. Nehru died in May 1964. That the published views
Plavbov. Nehru died in May 1964. That the published views
belonged to Nehru were not in question. But that they were
not exclusively oIIered to the Plavbov showed that even Iour
decades ago, Iakery by Indian journalists was a sport adeptly
played on the gullibles. That even an American icon like
Hugh HeIner was Iooled by the journalist version oI Indian
rope-trick produced amusement to some observers. The Iact
that quite a number oI Eelam Tamil politicians and public,
other than Pirabhakaran, were made gullible by many Indian
journalists in the pre-1987 period is also diIIicult to digest
even now. |Continued|

Part 44
Sachi Sri Kantha
4 October 2002]
COUNTERING THE FANGS OF
BROWN-SKINNED BUDDHIST
ARYANISM
'When of two adfoining tribes one becomes less
numerous and less powerful than the other, the
contest is soon settled bv war, slaughter,
cannibalism, slaverv, and absorption. Even when a
weaker tribe is not thus abruptlv swept awav, if it
once begins to decrease, it generallv goes on
decreasing until it becomes extinct.
Darwin, in The Descent of Man (1871).

Darwin`s message on the Survival oI the Fittest` provides a
glaring prediction on the impending Iate oI Eelam Tamils in
the island. Sinhalese and Tamils have been two adjoining
tribes in the island Ior centuries, minding their own
business`. That the Tamils in the island are less numerous is
a given. On top oI that, iI the Tamils become less powerIul,
their survival is in question has been best understood by
Pirabhakaran than other Tamils oI his generation or earlier
generations, even though he would not have read a line Irom
Darwin. Among the inIluencing processes (war, slaughter,
cannibalism, slavery and absorption) mentioned by Darwin,
Tamil-speaking Colombo Chetties oI the 18th and 19th
centuries have turned into Sinhalese` by the absorption
process. Slaughter at regular intervals since mid-1950s had
depleted the Tamil population. Slavery also plays its
insidious role oI turning some born Tamils (Names need not
be mentioned) into hiding` Sinhalese. Thus, it is not a
surprise that Pirabhakaran`s call Ior a war against the Ianatics
oI Buddhist Aryanism did elicit Iavorable response among
sangam.orgf.fPart++.htm 1f19
oI Buddhist Aryanism did elicit Iavorable response among
the younger generation oI Eelam Tamils in the early 1980s.
Strategies adopted by Pirabhakaran
To counter the Iangs oI Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism,
the Iollowing strategies were adopted by Pirabhakaran`s
Tamil Tigers. First, severing the complete reliance oI Tamils
on parliamentary politics. Secondly, establishing a truly
viable Tamil guerrilla army as opposed to the logorrheal
pyrotechnics oI Iringe LeItists oI previous generation, like
N.Sanmugathasan. Thirdly, adopting a Hit where it Hurts`
strategy in military conIrontations. Despite the choleric
outburst oI selI-anointed, partisan human rights activists, in
each oI these strategies, time has proved that Pirabhakaran`s
choices were not inappropriate Ior the occasion.
One can wonder how many Tamils would have chuckled on
the observation made by Vipul Boteju, one oI the retired
army brigadier generals, to Amal Jayasinghe, prior to the
recently held Sattahip negotiations between the Government
oI Sri Lanka and the LTTE. According to the Agence
France-Presse report,
'Retired army brigadier general Vipul Boteju believes it
is the military strength oI the Tigers that Iorced the
government to talk with them with the help oI
Norwegian peace brokers. II the |Sri Lankan| army
was even halI an inch taller than the Tigers, the talks
would not have been necessary`, Boteju said. It is the
corruption in the army, and conversely, the dedication
among the Tigers that brought about this situation.`
|Sept.15, 2002|
This candid appreciation Irom a Iormer battle Iield opponent
oI Pirabhakaran deserves merit and proves that the second
and third strategies I have listed above did succeed to a
signiIicant level, against domineering odds. While
knowledgeable combatants like Vipul Boteju had
complimented the dedication among the Tigers` Ior their
stupendous Ieat, Tamil Tigers have hardly lacked doom-
sayers as well. Here is an example, penned in 1990, by the
Tamil Tiger-loathing amateur historians:
'The Tigers` history, their theoretical vacuum, lack oI
political creativity, intolerance and Ianatical dedication
political creativity, intolerance and Ianatical dedication
will be the ultimate cause oI their own break-up. The
legendary Tigers will go to their demise with their
legends smeared with the blood and tears oI victims oI
their own misdoings. A new Tiger will not emerge Irom
their ashes. |Rajan Hoole et al. in The Broken
Palmvra, 1990, p.367|
Candhi on Prostitutes and the Parliament
Eelam Tamils have produced quite a number oI
proIessionals who have enriched the parliamentary debates
oI colonial and post-independent Sri Lanka. Among those
who have passed Irom the current scene,
G.G.Ponnambalam, C.Suntheralingam,
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, C.Vanniasingham, A.Amirthalingam,
V.N.Navaratnam, E.M.V.Naganathan and
M.Sivasithamparam were leading debaters with conviction,
who were chosen by the Tamil-speaking population to
represent them at the parliament between 1930s and late
1970s. All oI them adhered valiantly to the Gandhian concept
oI non-violence to Iight Ior the rights oI Tamils, but ignored
the admonition of Gandhi on the barren state of parliament
controlled bv the hands of wilv adversaries.
Einstein once remarked sarcastically that It`s oI no use iI the
wrapper is oI better quality than the meat it covers`.
Parliamentary democracy as inherited Irom the British
imperialists was nothing but the wrapper` oI Einstein`s
description and the meat` |the rights oI Tamils| it was
supposed to protect has begun to stink even beIore
D.S.Senanayake, the Iirst prime minister oI then Ceylon, died
in 1952. Gandhi had warned about the Ilaws oI parliamentary
politics in 1909, and among all the Eelam Tamil leaders, it is
now evident that only Pirabhakaran took serious note oI
Gandhi`s warning.
What was Gandhi`s warning? I will quote Irom Erik
Erikson`s classic work:
'In 1909, on his return Irom a most discouraging trip to
England, where he had Iound that the Imperial
Government was halI helpless and halI unwilling to
support Indian selI-respect either in South AIrica or in
support Indian selI-respect either in South AIrica or in
India, Gandhi wrote Hind Swaraf or Indian Home
Rule, a rather incendiary maniIesto Ior a man oI peace.
Written on a steamer in less than a week, it staked out a
sphere oI leadership reaching Irom utterly personal and
local concerns to the very limits oI India. The motto is:
Home Rule equals SelI Rule and SelI Rule equals SelI-
Control. Only he who is master oI himselI can be
master oI his house`, and only a people in command
oI itselI can command respect and Ireedom. |Book:
Gandhis Truth On the Origins of Militant
Nonviolence, 1969, p.217|
Erikson continues on Gandhi`s opinion:
'There Iollow sweeping denigrations oI the British
Parliament and oI the Iree` press, oI civilization in
general and the railways in particular, oI lawyers and
doctors, all oI whom are said to prostitute, inIect,
weaken, and cheapen the Indian people, who enjoyed
Home Rule in the ancient past.
Prostitution` is a word used rather oIten in this
document; .the British Parliament is Iirst reIerred to as
the Mother oI Parliaments and then derided as no better
than a prostitute or an otherwise sterile woman`. To
justiIy such a comparison the pamphleteer uses rather
strange metaphors. The Parliament, he says, is like a
prostitute under the control oI ministers who change
Irom time to time`. The word under` appears again and
again in what is in all probability not a conscious pun:
Today it is under Mr.Asquith, tomorrow, under
Mr.BalIour, and the day aIter it will be somebody else`.
Rather than being under one master all the time`, then,
Parliament is used by a series oI prime ministers who
exploit this institution Ior their purposes without making
it Iertile, with the result that its movement is not steady
but it is buIIeted about like a prostitute`.. |ibid,
pp.219-220|
What Erikson did not stress on Gandhi`s attitude to the
British parliament also is notable. Though a trained lawyer,
Gandhi was not a parliamentarian. Period. As an activist,
who concentrated on deeds and not words, Gandhi would
sangam.orgf.fPart++.htm +f19
have Ielt that the parliament set-up prostituted the words
which need to be used sparingly. Demagoguery by tub-
thumping oratory became the norm since the parliamentary
tradition rooted in India and Sri Lanka. Keen observers have
recorded how S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, the brown-skinned
Hitler-imitator, exploited such oratorical technique to pour
scorn on his opponents in the 1950s. Two examples are
given below:
'I heard Bandaranaike speak at a mass rally near the
Kandy market, a shortwhile beIore they killed him. It
was a classic discourse in Sinhala. He poured sarcasm
on his UNP adversaries, quite eIIortlessly. One had to
hear him pour vitriol through the microphone to
comprehend the contempt he reserved Ior the ancien
regime. He intonated in the most ironical oI voices.
People listened to him with rapt attention. He knew he
was giving a command perIormance. |A.Jeyaratnam
Wilson, in Lanka Guardian, Aug.1, 1993, pp.9-10|
'S.W.R.D.|Bandaranaike| used, in his usual
contemptuous style, to liIt his IoreIinger when speaking,
and harangue the crowd, telling them that when a
Bandaranaike` liIts his IoreIinger, there is not a single
man in the country who could liIt his own IoreIinger
above that oI the Bandaranaikes. |S.Jayaweera, in
Lanka Guardian, Feb.15, 1997, pp.13-14|
While Jeyaratnam Wilson`s observation on padre
Bandaranaike was made in 1959, two decades ahead oI this
observation, the tart-tongued 37 year-old young Tamil leader
G.G.Ponnambalam had pulled the populist mask oI
Bandaranaike and aptly prophesied him as pocket Fuehrer`.
This has been noted by Jane Russell in her book, Communal
Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution 1931-1947
(1982, p.157) as Iollows:
'In January 1939 at a meeting in Balapitiya,
Bandaranaike appealed to the electors in this vein:
I am prepared to sacriIice my liIe Ior the sake oI my
community, the Sinhalese. II anybody were to try to
hinder our progress, I am determined to see that he is
taught a lesson he will never Iorget.`
At the conclusion oI the meeting, a lady in the audience,
Mrs.Srimathie Abeygunawardene likened
Mr.Bandaranaike to Hitler and appealed to the Sinhalese
community to give him every possible assistance to
reach the goal oI Ireedom. (Hindu Organ, January 26,
1939). This reported remark caused G.G.Ponnambalam
to term Bandaranaike the pocket Fuehrer` (Hindu
Organ, May 24, 1939).
In the same page, ahead oI this passage, Jane Russell also
had cited Ponnambalam`s speech at the then State Council in
1939, as a member oI Point Pedro constituency, with a
Iootnote that the young Tamil leader had visited Nazi
Germany in 1938:
'This is our home. We are inhabitants oI this country
and we have as much right to claim to have permanent
and vested interests in this country, politically and
otherwise, as the Sinhalese people. We do not propose
to be treated as undesirable aliens. We will not tolerate
being segregated into ghettos and treated like Semites in
the Nazi states. (Hansard Parliamentarv Debates,
1939, col.890)
The problem Iaced by the Eelam Tamils was diIIerent in
plane Irom the problem Iaced by the Jews in Nazi Germany.
Hitler did not have a wiIe and a daughter who came to be
elected Iollowing the demise oI the Fuehrer. His mistress had
committed suicide with him. But in Sri Lanka, Iollowing the
assassination oI pocket Fuehrer` in 1959, the Sinhalese
public chose pocket Fuehrer`s Frau (Leader`s WiIe) as the
weeping widow` Sirimavo, who carried out the Iirst ethnic
cleansing in the armed Iorces oI the island and held power
Irom 1960 to 1977, with an intermittent 1965-70 period as the
Leader oI the Opposition.
Following pocket Fuehrer`s Frau, 1994 saw the rise oI
Tochter Fuehrer (Daughter Leader) replacing her mother.
The despicable assassination oI a noted sympathiser oI
LTTE who had tussled openly with Tochter Fuehrer in the
1990s, G.G. (Kumar) Ponnambalam Jr. - the son oI
G.G.Ponnambalam - in January 2000, by the Gestapo-style
agents in Colombo exposed the Iangs oI Buddhist Aryanism
agents in Colombo exposed the Iangs oI Buddhist Aryanism
prominently. It may not even be a hyperbole to think whether
Tochter Fuehrer was taking a revenge on the son oI
Ponnambalam who had aptly tagged her Iather with the
mischievous monicker pocket Fuehrer`.
This is because, the British academic Jane Russell, who had
described the political antics oI the pocket Fuehrer oI
colonial Ceylon in her 1982 book, was also unceremoniously
deported Irom the island in 1996 on Ilimsy grounds, though
she has been a resident in Sri Lanka Ior 23 years. Reports
and letters on this issue had appeared in the Colombo press.
|Shelani de Silva, Britain takes up Russel issue with Lanka`,
Sundav Times, April 21, 1996; Mangalika De Silva, Jane
Russell: that inIamous deportation, Sundav Times, May 11,
1997; Preethi Jayaratne, Jane Russell Iorgotten`, Sundav
Times, April 25, 1999|.
While pocket Fuehrer`s Frau could distinguish herselI as a
grand practitioner oI tub-thumping oratory, since early 1970s
Ior two decades, Premadasa who can be tagged as
Schatten Fuehrer (shadow Fuehrer) - hijacked pocket
Fuehrer`s oratorical scorn and harangue eIIortlessly. His
parliamentary speech during the Motion to deprive the civic
rights oI none other than Fuehrer`s Frau in 1980 was a
landmark in such despicable oratory. When one heard that
speech, one could have wondered whether Premadasa was
avenging the deIeat oI his mentor |A.E.Goonesinghe| by
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in the early 1930s, by pouring scorn
on Bandaranaike`s widow in 1980.
Pirabhakaran on the Sri Lankan parliament
It is revealing that in one oI his earliest interviews to Anita
Pratap in 1984, Pirabhakaran had expressed similar
sentiments to Gandhi`s on the parliamentary system oI Sri
Lanka.
Interviewer: What made you opt out oI a conventional
system and spearhead a liberation movement which you
knew would be outlawed?`
Pirabhakaran: The democratic parliamentary system,
or what you reIer to as the conventional political system
or what you reIer to as the conventional political system
in Sri Lanka, has always tried to impose the will oI the
majority on the minority. This system not only Iailed to
solve the basic problems oI our people but, in Iact,
aggravated our plight. For decades, the repression by
the State has made the liIe oI our people miserable. The
non-violent democratic struggles oI our people were
met with military repression. Our just demands were
totally ignored, and the oppression continued on such a
scale as to threaten the very survival oI the Tamils in Sri
Lanka. It was these circumstances which led me to
Iorm our liberation movement. I Ielt that an armed
struggle was the only alternative leIt to our people, not
only to ensure our survival but ultimately to Iree
ourselves Irom the Sinhala oppression. I have always
been aware that our movement would be outlawed. It is
Ior this reason that we organised our movement as a
clandestine underground structure Irom its inception.`
|Sundav Magazine, March 11-17, 1984|
That Pirabhakaran is not imperIect in his 1984 assessment oI
the parliamentary democracy as practised by the Sinhalese
politicians is proved by the later observations made by non-
Tamil natives oI the island. In 1992, ex-diplomat Izeth
Hussain tagged the prevailing system as nonsense
democracy`. To quote,
'.Sri Lankan democracy was made nonsensical by the
1977 Government. It will be remembered that under that
Government we were deluged by an unrelenting torrent
oI rot about Sri Lanka`s Iar-Iamed Iive-star democracy,
a perIormance that was vastly impressive Ior its sheer
zaniness. The more appropriate term might thereIore be
nonsense democracy` |Lanka Guardian, July 15,
1992, pp.11-13|
Recently, another ex-diplomat K.Godage (who is a voluble
Pirabhakaran critic nonetheless) had labeled it as deIormed
democracy` |see his commentarv: MPs disgrace the
country`, The Island newspaper, Colombo, July 29, 2002|.
Godage even reiterated Pirabhakaran`s viewpoint, iI not by
word but in spirit, as Iollows:
'Sri Lankan democracy has a Iorm all its own. It is
deIormed. For many years we conIused Majoritarianism
with democracy. Most politicians understood
democracy to mean the vulgar business oI majority rule;
a situation where the Opposition has no role whatsoever
in the governance oI the country. This simplistic and
vulgar understanding oI democracy prevails seventy
years aIter universal suIIrage was introduced and IiIty
three years aIter we started to govern ourselves.
Thus, Pirabhakaran`s Iirst strategy oI severing the complete
reliance oI Tamils on parliamentary politics to deIang the
Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism is not without merit.
Following the footsteps of Mao in preference to Candhi
I provide below, excerpts Irom my past writings, in 1988 and
2001, originally written as a deIence on Pirabhakaran`s
strategy to LTTE`s critics, namely David Selbourne (an
OxIord University academic cum journalist) and the authors
oI the Broken Palmvra (1990) book.
In a rebuttal to David Selbourne, written at the height oI
LTTE-Indian army conIrontation, I had superIicially pointed
out the reasons why the Gandhian method oI non-violence
agitation Iailed in Sri Lanka. I was Iorced to write this
rebuttal since Selbourne had expressed some condescending
sentiments on the Eelam Tamil leadership oI the past. To
reproduce excerpts oI my thoughts:
'Selbourne also sarcastically observed that the
Gandhian way is not available, since the Tamils have no
Gandhi`. I raise objection to this statement. When he
was leading the struggle against the British rulers, the
great Gandhi was also ridiculed Irom many corners.
Leo Rosten reminisced; They called him (Gandhi) a
crackpot, a hypocrite, a mystic. To the rajahs and
maharajahs in their palaces, he was a preposterous
rabble rouser. To the Indian politicians struggling Ior
home rule, he was a deluded demagogue. To an
incredulous Parliament in London, he was a trouble
maker in a nappie.` |reIer, Readers Digest, July 1983|.
Look at the Whos Who annual reIerence books,
published by A.C.Black oI London Ior the years 1930
or 1931. You cannot locate an entry on Gandhi. He was
a non-entity to the British rulers even in 1930.
To be Iair by the Sri Lankan political leaders oI yester
year, Tamils had a Gandhi, in S.J.V.Chelvanayakam. He
was an exception among the politicians oI Indian
subcontinent Ior two reasons. First, in a region known
Ior religious bigotry, though being a Christian, he
commanded the respect oI majority Hindu Tamils Ior
two decades. Former prime minister oI Ceylon,
S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, who was born a Christian, had
to become an adopted Buddhist to lead the Sinhalese.
Secondly, Chelvanayakam (like Mahatmaji) was not
recognized Ior tub-thumping oratory. Instead, he was a
man oI action. Chelvanayakam organized Gandhian-
style satyagraha campaigns and other non-violent
resistance movements in the mid 1950s and early 1960s.
But unIortunately, Gandhian methods couldn`t perIorm
any trick Ior Tamils in Sri Lanka. There are many
reasons Ior the Iailure oI Gandhi`s techniques in Sri
Lankan atmosphere.
(1) Mahatmaji was lucky to have the British as his
opponents. He himselI had acknowledged that his
tactics could not have worked against any other enemy,
who is less civic-minded. Praise the British rulers Ior
being good sports.
(2) Gandhi was Iighting an oppressor who was living
and planning his moves, thousands oI miles away Irom
the battle scene. But Chelvanayakam had to Iight an
oppressor who was (and is) living next door.
(3) Gandhi and his Iollowers could enter and leave the
jails under British rule without much physical agony and
with no threat to liIe. No one denies that they suIIered
mental torture. In Sri Lanka, considering what happened
to the 52 Tamils in Welikade jail in 1983, one`s liIe was
(and is) in jeopardy when incarcerated even Ior political
reasons.
.The Westminster model oI parliamentary democracy
could work in the United Kingdom to cater to a single
ethnic and single religious constituency. It has Iailed to
take Iirm root in other countries with multi-ethnic and
multi-religious constituencies. So, the younger
multi-religious constituencies. So, the younger
generation oI Tamilians driIted towards the military
ideology oI Mao Tse Tung, since 1977. One may label
it as a reckless move. But it remained as a practical
alternative. And among Tamils oI Sri Lanka, a small
Iaction led by trade unionist N.Sanmugathasan had
espoused this cause, though not with much popular
support. |Tamil Times, London, March 1988,
pp.14-15|
In my commentary |originally written to commemorate
Gandhi`s 53
rd
anniversary oI death| which appeared in the
now-closed Tamil Nation website, on January 31, 2001, I
have mentioned the shiIting oI Gandhi`s thoughts Irom non-
violence agitation to recognizing the value in violence
agitation along the decades, and the reason whv such a shift
occurred. I wrote this commentary to negate the argument oI
the authors oI The Broken Palmvra (1990), who had blindly
extolled the virtues oI non-violence, in chapter 7 oI their
book entitled A Perspective on Nonviolence` (pp.376-385).
Expressed opinions oI Rajan Hoole and colleagues in this
chapter have completely ignored Gandhi`s as well as
Nehru`s caveat on the limitations oI non-violence strategy.
Excerpts Irom my commentary are as Iollows:
Fuel from a Freedom Fighter
'Though non-violence was his chosen method oI
agitation, Gandhi did not underestimate the need Ior
violent methods to overcome aggression oI the
demonic State and its authorities. This is because,
especiallv during the last decade of his life, he
recognized the limitations oI non-violent methods
against adversaries who were rabid, reckless and not
given to reason. It could be inIerred that though he
developed the non-violent conIrontation with his
oppressors |British imperialists| in the late 19
th
century
in South AIrica, the events oI Second World War as
well as the parallel liberational war conducted by Mao
Ze Dong in China, made Gandhi to realize that his non-
violent methods oI agitation had limits.
However, selective regurgitation oI Gandhi`s thoughts
on overcoming Iear by the politicians and pundits (who
had their own axes to grind) had made it diIIicult Ior
had their own axes to grind) had made it diIIicult Ior
millions to agitate against oppression. One possible
reason Ior this occurrence is because the popular
autobiography oI Gandhi, The Storv of Mv Experiment
with Truth, comes to a close in the year 1921. But he
lived Ior another Iull 26 eventIul years, during which he
continued to write passionately and modiIied his belieIs
according to the new developments in India and the
world.
Let me oIIer six quotes oI Gandhi |between 1940 and
1947, when the Aryan Nazi oppression peaked and was
vanquished by the Allies| on the use oI violence, as
culled Irom the book, The Wav to Communal
Harmonv a Gandhi anthologv, compiled and edited
by U.R.Rao |Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad,
1963|. The original dates oI these quotes Irom the
Harifan newspaper are mentioned at the end within
parentheses.
Every Indian, be he Hindu or any other, must learn the
act oI protecting himselI. It is the condition oI real
democracy. The State has a duty. But no State can
protect those who will not share with it the duty oI
protecting themselves.` |Harifan, Feb.10, 1940|
SelI-deIence can be violent or non-violent. I have
always advised and insisted on non-violent deIence. But
I recognize that it has to be learnt like violent deIence. It
requires a diIIerent training Irom that which is required
Ior violent deIence. ThereIore, iI the capacity Ior non-
violent selI-deIence is lacking, there need be no
hesitation in using violent means.` |Harifan, Mar.2,
1940; suggestion to Manoranjan Babu and other Iriends
Irom Noakhali, regarding the diIIicult situation Iaced
there by the Hindus.|
I have said that Ior those who do not believe in non-
violence, armed deIence is the only remedy. But iI I am
asked to advise how it can be done, I can only say, I
don`t know.` |Harifan, Oct.16, 1940; in the context oI
terrorization oI Sindh Hindus by Muslims, Gandhi
received a letter Irom Shamlal Gidwani holding
Gandhi`s advice oI non-violence as contrary to the
teachings oI Lord Krishna.|
teachings oI Lord Krishna.|
Cowardice is impotence worse than violence. The
coward desires revenge but being aIraid to die, he looks
to others, may be the Government oI the day, to do the
work oI deIence Ior him. A coward is less than man.
He does not deserve to be a member oI a society oI
men and women.` |Harifan, Sept.15, 1946|
What I saw and heard showed me that people are apt
to Iorget selI-respect in order to save themselves. There
is no Swadeshi and Swaraj Ior persons who will not
sacriIice themselves or their belongings Ior their
honour.` |Harifan, Jan.5, 1947|
My Ahimsa Iorbids me Irom denying credit where it is
due, even though the creditor is a believer in violence.
Thus, though I did not accept Subhas Bose`s belieI in
violence and his consequent action, I have not reIrained
Irom giving unstinted praise to his patriotism,
resourceIulness and bravery.` |Harifan, Nov.16, 1947|
It is interesting to ask why Gandhi, towards the end oI
his liIe, came to acknowledge the need Ior violence
against oppressors. I think that he came to understand
that the arsenal oI oppressors were becoming more
powerIul. When he began non-violent agitation in South
AIrica, Gandhi`s adversary was not using aerial bombs.
But in the 1930s and 1940s, air-attack became a chosen
arsenal Ior aggressors against their opponents and non-
combatant civilians. This could have made Gandhi to
reluctantly revise his complete reliance on non-violent
agitational methods.
Then, I commented on the quasi-pundits who have critiqued
Pirabhakaran Ior his use oI suicide warriors using the
cyanide pill.
'The quasi-pundits |including the Indian Tamil opinion
makers such as N.Ram, Cho Ramaswamy and
Subramanian Swamy as well as the scribes belonging to
the spurious University Teachers Ior Human Rights-
JaIIna| in their sermons, show revulsion to
Pirabhakaran`s addiction to cyanide pill. But Mahatma
Gandhi has endorsed such a mode oI action Ior
Ireedom Iighters. Here is one oI his quotes in late 1947,
Ireedom Iighters. Here is one oI his quotes in late 1947,
written after Indian independence.
Man does not live but to escape death. II he does so,
he is advised not to do so. He is advised to learn to
love death as well as liIe, iI not more so. A hard saying,
harder to act up to, one may say. Every worthy act is
diIIicult. Ascent is always diIIicult. Descent is easy and
oIten slippery. LiIe becomes livable only to the extent
that death is treated as a Iriend, never as an enemy. To
conquer liIe`s temptations, summon death to your aid.
In order to postpone death a coward surrenders
honour, wiIe, daughter and all. A courageous man
preIers death to the surrender oI selI-respect. When the
time comes, as it conceivably can, I would not leave my
advice to be inIerred, but it will be given in precise
language. That today my advice might be Iollowed only
by one or none does not detract Irom its value. A
beginning is always made by a Iew, even one.
|Harifan, Nov.30, 1947|
Exactly two months aIter this passage appeared in print,
the Great Man met his death peaceIully at the age oI 78
years and 120 days.
It should be stressed that Gandhi was not alone in shiIting
his belieI on the limitations oI non-violence vehicle during the
1940s. His equally talented contemporaries like Bertrand
Russell and Einstein, who were ardent paciIists during the
First World War, also shiIted their stance to support
aggression against Hitler`s Aryanism during the Second
World War. Bertrand Russell had reminisced as Iollows:
'Even during the First War I had maintained publicly
that some wars are justiIiable. But I had allowed a larger
sphere to the method oI non-resistance or, rather non-
violent resistance than later experience seemed to
warrant. It certainly has an important sphere; as against
the British in India, Gandhi led it to triumph. But it
depends upon the existence oI certain virtues in those
against whom it is employed. When Indians lay down
on railways, and challenged the authorities to crush
them under trains, the British Iound such cruelty
intolerable. But the Nazis had no scruples in analogous
situations. The doctrine which Tolstoy preached with
sangam.orgf.fPart++.htm 1+f19
situations. The doctrine which Tolstoy preached with
great persuasive Iorce, that the holders oI power could
be morally regenerated iI met by non-resistance, was
obviously untrue in Germany aIter 1933. Clearly
Tolstoy was right only when the holders oI power were
not ruthless beyond a point, and clearly the Nazis went
beyond this point. |in Autobiographv, 1975, Unwin
Paperbacks, London, ch.12, p.431|
Einstein, as is typical oI him, was brieI to the point. In a letter
to a paciIist student, dated July 14, 1941, he had stated,
'Organized power can be opposed only by organized
power. Much as I regret this, there is no other way. |in,
O.Nathan and H.Norden eds. Einstein on Peace, Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1960, p.319|.
Thus, it is nothing but ignorance and hot air on the part oI
the authors oI The Broken Palmvra (who have had nominal
tertiary education) and the pseudo-Gandhian commentators
in India to project a view that Pirabhakaran, without the
beneIit oI tertiary education, was Ioolhardy and irrational to
reject the path oI non-violence Ior his objectives.
1he Strategy of :Hit Where it Hurts'
That Pirabhakaran`s adopted strategy oI Hit Where it Hurts`
to de-Iang the Brown-skinned Buddhist Aryanism was
beginning to show results by 1992 was revealed by the
Iollowing realistic appraisal oI the situation by Mervyn de
Silva. Wrote the editor oI Lanka Guardian,
'.The unwinnable war goes on, with each massacre
not underlying that selI evident Iact but strengthening
the conviction oI wannabe` winners oI the Glory Boys
Club that only more men, weapons and a Sinhalese
Patton` or Sharon`, is needed to storm JaIIna, Ily the
Ilag and bury Prabhakaran.
The irony is that the enemy` Prabhakaran, is one oI
these giIted and daring guerrilla commanders whose
mindset is totally, unalterably militarist. Unless he is
captured, he cannot be converted. And capture you
can`t, since he has anticipated the possibility and carries
his cyanide capsule with him. It is the selI-same cyanide
which also denies intelligence` to the security Iorces.
which also denies intelligence` to the security Iorces.
Without intelligence` the war cannot be carried deep
into enemy territory. Since all Iront-line Iighters are
armed with the capsule, the chances oI gathering
productive intelligence are slim.
No great reader, Prabhakaran knows the truisms
instinctively. The army cannot be everywhere while the
guerrilla can be anywhere. II the guerrilla is not losing,
he`s winning; iI the army is not winning, it is losing.
Your armchair pundit will say recruit more, double the
strength oI the army, buy the most modern weapons
and equipment`. All that means money, and the
willingness oI Sinhala youth to join the army. But
recruitment has become exceedingly diIIicult, while
desertions multiply. Where does that leave the gung-ho
militarist?
Second, our budget is controlled by the IMF and the
World Bank, the Aid Consortium. They have placed
limits on arms spending, and the limits have narrowed,
with the threat oI an aid squeeze` Ior non-compliance
with such percentages on deIence, more and more
serious. So one doesn`t have the money to recruit the
soldiers Irom the queues that aren`t there; or Iar too
short to recruit enough to meet your target. |Lanka
Guardian, Nov.1, 1992; pp.3-4 & 7|
Compared to this realistic appraisal oI the Sri Lankan
situation in 1992, the Iollowing Iallacious pontiIication by the
authors oI The Broken Palmvra made in 1990 expose their
myopic overlook. Wrote Rajan Hoole and his colleagues, in
their Final Thoughts` Ior this book:
'The LTTE`s political line, its obstinacy and
shortsightedness leIt us without any substantive
achievement. Even at present, their moves pave the way
Ior total subjugation to Indian domination. For example
their recent warning to boycott the civil administration,
iI heeded, will remove Irom people the little control they
have over civil structures, thereby creating conditions
Ior Indian authority to encroach Iully into the society.
Thus the move is counter-productive and would signal
doom, as control oI the civil liIe oI the community slips
by deIault into Indian hands. |p.400|
This viewpoint when read 12 years later proves
unequivocally how Iar these authors oI The Broken Palmvra
allowed their minds to wander Irom reality in assessing
Pirabhakaran`s strategy. But one should admit that Mervyn
de Silva, though with a liberal Sinhala bias, could read well
the mind oI LTTE leader, as he opined as Iollows:
'An incredibly giIted and unrepentant militarist,
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE supremo, has no
great Iaith in democracy but he appreciates the
importance oI popular opinion. He knows that the
armed struggle that he launched well over a decade ago
is all about land and people. He is not impressed with
power` or authority in the abstract. From the very
beginning, he has grasped the geo-political the crucial
role oI the East, and externally, the vital importance oI
Tamil Nadu. Both dominate his strategic thinking,
except that one Iactor becomes more crucial than the
other in a political-military struggle, which he does not,
and cannot, control. What the LTTE leader Iears most
is a closely coordinated Delhi-Colombo policy.
|Lanka Guardian, Feb.15, 1994, pp.1-2|
One should qualiIy Mervyn de Silva`s opinion that
Pirabhakaran 'has no great Iaith in democracy. Like
Gandhi, who tagged the British Parliament with the
prostitutes, Pirabhakaran lost Iaith not in democracy per se,
but only in the version oI prostituted democracv as
practised in Sri Lanka since Independence.
Postscript on the Origin of Sinhala Maha Sabha
In part 43 oI this series, I had mentioned that six oI the
sources I checked Ior the origin oI Sinhala Maha Sabha
provide Iour answers: 1937 |K.M.de Silva; A.Jeyaratnam
Wilson|, 1935 |S.J.Tambiah|, 1934 |C.Woodward; R.Nyrop
et al.| and 1932 |Samarasinghe and Samarasinghe|. To this,
should be added the year 1936 as the IiIth answer, as
indicated by Jane Russell in her book, Communal Politics
under the Donoughmore Constitution 1931-1947,
published in 1982. This is not an issue oI nit-picking on
years. I wanted to know, how much Hitler`s rise to power in
years. I wanted to know, how much Hitler`s rise to power in
1933 inIluenced the rise oI brown-skinned Buddhist
Aryanism in colonial Ceylon.
It appears that Jane Russell may be correct, since she
mentions the month oI the year as well. The relevant chapter
is provided below to identiIy the individuals who were active
in this caucus and to demonstrate the waIIling behavior oI
padre Bandaranaike on issues. To quote Jane Russell:
'The Sinhala Maha Sabha was Iounded in November
1936. Its inaugural meeting consisted oI a
heterogeneous collection oI the more radical young
Sinhalese politicians, including S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike,
R.S.S.Gunawardena and Dudley Senanayake. A
number oI teaching Iigures Irom the Sinhala literary
world, including Piyadasa Sirisena and Munidasa
Cumaratunga, and a number oI lesser Iigures involved
in local politics, and men interested in the culture and
religion oI the Sinhalese community were also present.
Sirisena proposed Sinhala Maha Sabha as the name oI
the society; Bandaranaike countered this with a
suggestion that the name adopted be Swadeshiya Maha
Sabha, or the Greater Congress oI the Indigenous
Peoples`. This latter suggestion was opposed by
Cumaratunga and others, including Abeygunasekera, the
State Council member Ior Nuwara Eliya and Sirisena`s
suggested name was adopted. At this point several
participants at the meeting, including Dudley
Senanayake leIt the newly-Iormed society. |pp.141-
142|
Then, in the Iollowing page Jane Russell continues to
mention how Bandaranaike came to lead the Sinhala Maha
Sabha and in two Ioot-notes include G.G.Ponnambalam`s
the then rising star oI Tamil politics representing the Point
Pedro constituency in the State Council - observations,
which are worth reproducing.
'By the late 1930s, Sirisena and Cumaratunga had
severed their connection with it, and the Sinhala Maha
Sabha had developed into a very eIIective political
organisation under the leadership oI Bandaranaike. In
State Council it was nominally the largest oI the political
groupings in 1939 |Foot-note: According to
G.G.Ponnambalam, the Sinhala Maha Sabha had thirty
Members in Council. This was a gross exaggeration on
Ponnambalam`s behalI; in my estimation there were at
the most IiIteen Sinhala Maha Sabha Members in
Council, oI which only the handIul on Bandaranaike`s
Executive Committee were eIIectively uniIied. Hansard,
1939, Col.959.|, and it had a very substantial Iollowing
among the electors in the Sinhalese provinces. The
Ceylon Tamil political leaders cited the existence oI the
Sinhala Maha Sabha as a dire threat to their continuance
as a diIIerentiated community in Ceylon. |Foot-note:
For example, G.G.Ponnambalam`s speech (The
Sinhala Maha Sabha caucus is of verv deep, sinister
significance..(as e.g.).the Sinhala Maha Sabha
meeting at Anuradhapura when the Tamils were
called usurpers and there was an infunction issued
that a Dutugemunu should arise and throw these
usurpers out. Hansard, 1939, 890II.)"
In sum, Hitler`s rise to power in 1933 inIluenced strongly the
Buddhist Aryan demagoguery in colonial Ceylon and
Bandaranaike exploited it via his Sinhala Maha Sabha vehicle.
As revealed, originally he preIerred the name oI Swadeshiya
Maha Sabha in place oI Sinhala Maha Sabha. He lost out at
Iirst to the literati. Then, aIter the departure oI literati Sirisena
and Cumaratunga who stood Ior the name Sinhala Maha
Sabha, Bandaranaike captured the leadership; but continued
the activities oI his caucus under the name Sinhala Maha
Sabha which was more expedient politically. Hitler gave a
bad name to the Aryan` cause. Thus, Iollowing Hitler`s
demise in 1945, Bandaranaike muIIled his Aryan` voice Ior
a while and joined the UNP with his clique when it was
Iormed in 1947. In September 1951, the Sinhala Maha Sabha
was reborn as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, whose
leadership has remained within the pocket Fuehrer`s Iamily
Ior the past 51 years. |Continued|

Part 47
Sachi Sri Kantha
15 November 2002]
Auda Jeritas on
THE MUSLIM FACTOR
Nuda Jeritas, Ior those who are unaware, is the Latin
expression Ior naked truth` |nudus naked; veritas
truth|. There are quite a number oI analysts, among whom
rank the prattling authors oI the Broken Palmvra book, who
pretend to provide unvarnished naked truth` on aIIairs
related to Eelam Tamils and Muslims. The holes in their
cloak oI naked truth` need to be exposed and this chapter
provides an aliquot oI it.
Three inter-twined ingredients which contributed noticeably
to Pirabhakaran`s agenda in conIronting the Sinhalese
government in the Eastern Front, since mid-1980s, were the
land (state-aided colonization which increased the Sinhalese
population signiIicantly), the Special Task Force (STF)
operatives (who were established as the Sri Lankan version
oI the Gestapo-gang in the early 1980s) , and the resident
Muslim population. In the previous two chapters, I had
introduced two oI these three ingredients, namely the land
issue and the STF operatives. In this chapter, I will analyze
the issue oI Muslim Iactor and their circumstantial link to the
STF operations. This is undoubtedly an explosive issue,
even in the currently prevailing sustained peace-dialogue
atmosphere. But, I adhere to the spirit that historical Iacts
need to be discussed and cannot be glossed over Ior
reasons oI political correctness.
1he Muslim politics of playing the :Eating the Cake and
Having It' Came
In a commentary I wrote to the Tamil Times (London) in
1983, beIore Pirabhakaran`s ascendancy, I had made the
Iollowing observations on the Tamil-speaking Muslims oI Sri
Lanka, incorporating an open secret which Michael Roberts
(then at the University oI Peradeniya) was brave enough to
(then at the University oI Peradeniya) was brave enough to
write. Excerpts:
'.The pattern adopted by the Muslim leaders in the
post-Independent era oI Sri Lanka had been succinctly
described by academic Michael Roberts, as Iollows:
The Moor elites initially leaned towards an alliance with
the Tamils and other minorities so as to extract political
concessions Irom the British, but Irom the 1940s they
have tended to ally with the Sinhalese against the
Tamils; with wings in both the SLFP and UNP, they
have revealed the buoyancy oI a cork and a Talleyrand
an ability to stay vigorously aIloat at every political
overturn; and they are entrenched in the commercial
sector.` |Modern Asian Studies, 1978, vol.12, no.3,
pp.353-376|
.It is my opinion that the reasons Ior the political
alliance oI Muslims with Sinhalese rather than Tamils
can be listed as Iollows:
(1) Minoritv within the minoritv complex: Muslims,
being the second largest minority group, Ieel that there
is nothing to gain by standing with the Tamils politically,
since they Iear that this would result in their community
ending up as minority within a minority, in especially the
Tamil speaking areas.
(2) Urban-based political leadership: Although the
Muslims Iorm approximately 35 oI the population in
the Batticaloa district and more than 25 in the districts
oI Mannar, Trincomalee and Puttalam, their political
leadership had emerged mainly Irom those residing in
the Sinhalese areas. For example, the political leaders oI
yester generation, T.B.Jayah, Razik Fareed,
A.C.M.Kaleel were Colombo-based; and Badiuddin
Mahmud also belonged to this category, though he was
a native oI rural Sinhalese area. Even the present
political leadership oI Muslims exhibits this trend.
Hence, these leaders do not identiIy themselves with the
ideals and emotions oI the Muslim peasants who reside
in the traditional Tamil areas.
(3) Economic rivalrv: Generally Muslims engage
themselves in minor commercial pursuits, though a
signiIicant proportion oI those living in the East coast
are cultivators, herdsmen and Iishermen. Hence there
had developed a measure oI economic rivalry between
the Muslims and the Ceylon Tamils, who also possess
business brain`. This rivalry is somewhat inevitable.
. Even under the present UNP regime, intermittent
ethnic Iriction in the bazaars`, as mentioned by Michael
Roberts, is not very uncommon... A quote Irom Lanka
Guardian, illustrates this point.
In the land oI gems, a young Buddhist monk is in
hospital. According to his Iriends, he was dragged out
oI his temple, assaulted and marched down the road.
His books were strewn about. The day beIore this
incident a meeting was held to protest, among other
things, against separatism. But what were the motive oI
the ostensible sponsors and their patrons? Was it really
against Tamil separatism or against the Moslem gem
boys? Two radical groups distributed leaIlets and news-
sheets condemning the racialism oI the selI-styled
Sinhala patriots. One newspaper Desha Jimukti was
lucky. The entire stock oI papers was bought up by a
couple oI mudalalis, but not because they appreciated
the Sinhala prose! A bonIire Iollowed.` |Sept.1, 1979,
p.1|
And as recent as last year, in July 1982, ethnic Iriction
between Sinhalese and Muslims Ilared up in the Galle
district. Even other towns, such as Kalutara, Alutgama
and Panadura, had witnessed this sort oI Sinhalese-
Muslim clashes during the last Iew years. |Tamil
Times, May 1983, pp.16-17|
Badiuddin Mahmud - the servile bucket carrier to the
Bandaranaikes
In the anti-LTTE tract The Broken Palmvra (1990), Iour
authors led by Rajan Hoole announced their mission in the
Author`s PreIace as, 'We Ielt strongly that the community
must revive, and to do so we must Iace the truth in all its
nakedness, both about ourselves and about all those who
purported to be our saviours. In this sentence, it is
nominally understood that the word ourselves` stood Ior
Tamils, and our saviours` reIerred to the LTTE.
However, quite a number oI unmentionables relating to the
recent Eelam Tamil history have been glossed over by Rajan
Hoole and his collaborators. These include the Iirst cyanide-
based suicide oI Ponnuthurai Sivakumaran in June 5, 1974
and the abduction oI Ohio newly-wed couple Allens (Stanley
and Mary) in JaIIna by the EPRLF cadres in May 10, 1984,
which almost created an international Iuror involving USA,
India and Sri Lanka, and sullied the image oI Eelam Tamils
as hostage-takers.
Another glaring omission in The Broken Palmvra book is
the name oI Badiuddin Mahmud, the prominent Muslim
politician Ior decades. His political antics alienated young
Eelam Tamils who Iaced admission to Sri Lanka`s
universities in the post-1970 period, Irom the Sri Lankan
mainstream. Among all the Muslim politicians, as a servile
bucket carrier to the Bandaranaikes, Badiuddin Mahmud
played with Iire and lived to see its aIter-eIIects. Thus it is
not irrelevant to proIile the career oI this bucket carrier to the
Bandaranaikes Irom Iour angles, in chronological order;
viewed by a Sinhalese political rival (N.M.Perera), a Tamil
youth who suIIered in the early 1970s Irom the adopted
policy oI Badiuddin Mahmud (none other than myselI,
belonging to Pirabhakaran`s age cohort) and two Muslims.
A.M.Perera's view, as told in 1975:
I have previously recorded the political peccadilloes oI padre
Senanayake and padre Bandaranaike in pandering the
Buddhist Aryan sentiments in colonial and post-colonial
Ceylon. |see, The Pirabhakakaran Phenomenon, parts 44 and
45| Here I add a primary source oI evidence on the
Iunctioning oI the Sinhala Maha Sabha and on the
manipulations oI D.S.Senanayake and padre Bandraranaike
recorded by Badiuddin Mahmud, and retold bv Trotskvist
Partv leader N.M.Perera, in his statement delivered on
Sept.3, 1975 in the parliament, following removal from the
post of Minister of Finance. This I consider is a vital piece
oI document originating Irom a leading Sinhalese political
Iigure, excerpts oI which deserves inclusion. In
N.M.Perera`s words,
'.It is in connection with the pre-Hartal |Note bv Sri
Kantha: i.e., pre-1953| political movement that Mr.
Bandaranaike`s name comes in. I reIerred to the Iact
that the history oI the country could have been diIIerent
had Mr. Bandaranaike accepted the oIIer made by the
Opposition aIter the Yamuna meeting. Yamuna was the
name oI the house where Mr. Sri Nissanka lived. All
those in the Opposition to Mr. D.S. Senanayake met at
Yamuna. We had prolonged discussions at that place
and we decided to oIIer the Premiership in 1947 to Mr.
Bandaranaike because we realised that he could with
our help command a majority in the Parliament. I believe
Mr. Sri Nissanka was our spokesman. I never said that I
oIIered the Premiership. It was an oIIer made by those
who were in opposition to Mr. D.S. Senanayake.
Mr. Bandaranaike reIused the oIIer Ior very good
reasons Irom his point oI view. I set out the two
reasons that were commonly talked about at that time. II
anybody cares to read the newspapers oI that period,
he or she will Iind that what I said was the common
prevailing thought at the time.
What are the two reasons? First oI all, his expectation
that he will be the next Prime Minister aIter Mr. D.S.
Senanayake, and, secondly, since he was not in political
alignment with the LeIt parties, he was not prepared to
take a plunge into the political unknown associated with
the Marxists. This is a historical Iact. He never accepted
the Socialist ideology as we Marxists accepted it then
and even later. He preIerred to accept a Ministerial post
in Mr. D.S. Senanayake`s Cabinet. II he was a
convinced and conIirmed Socialist, he would never
have joined the UNP Cabinet. Is this historically wrong?
I have been IaithIul to history. I am sorry iI history hurts
people. But I regret I cannot be guilty oI distorting the
history oI this country to suit any Iamily prestige.
Now let me quote somebody who was very close to
Mr. Bandaranaike. He was the Secretary oI the SLFP at
its inception and Ior a number oI years thereaIter. I have
here the booklet that was published. It was printed and
widely distributed. I quote Irom page 8: |Note bv Sri
Kantha: Here, N.M. Perera introduces the description
by Badiuddin Mahmud.|
Those days I |i.e., Mahmud| asked him |i.e.,
Bandaranaike| why the Lake House Press is continuing
a campaign against him. Thereupon, he spoke to me
and said alright iI you want to know the secret about
that I will tell you` and he gave me the details oI that
matter. In 1947, there was no party called the UNP. In
the 1947 elections, the strongest party that went beIore
the people was not the UNP but the Sinhala Maha
Sabha. Dudley Senanayake, Sir John Kotelawela, E.A.
Nugawela, A. Ratnayake, C.W.W. Kannnangara and
such others were all members oI the Sinhala Maha
Sabha. On that occasion, this party obtained about 40
seats. Mr. Bandaranaike could then have become the
Prime Minister. In 1947, most people requested him to
accept the prime ministership, but displaying his good
qualities and expressing his sense oI justice, he rejected
the request. Let the old gentleman Mr. D.S.
Senanayake be the Prime Minister. I have still time. I
can consider it aIterwards`; were the explanations that
he then trotted out. Mr. D.S. Senanayake met Mr.
Bandaranaike and told him, Banda this time give me the
opportunity to become the prime minister. AIter me,
you will have that opportunity. Ask me Ior any
ministerial oIIice, I will give that to you.` That is the
promise that Mr. Senanayake gave on that occasion to
Mr. Bandaranaike. In this way, Mr. Bandaranaike
deprived himselI oI the opportunity he had to become
the prime minister oI this country. Nevertheless, as Mr.
Bandaranaike himselI expressed to me, what did Mr.
D.S. Senanayake do? He summoned the Proprietor oI
the Lake House institution and told him, Irom now on
work towards the destruction oI Mr. Bandaranaike.` I
must mention that this is the biggest political crime in
the history oI Lanka`s politics. In some ways, the
occurrence oI a crime in this way may be treated as the
good Iortune Ior this country. When you contemplate,
this, we cannot help Ieeling this because, iI not Ior that
crime, perhaps Mr. Bandaranaike might not have gone
along the socialist path as he did.` |Note bv Sri Kantha:
Thus ends, N.M. Perera reproducing Badiuddin
Mahmud`s recollections on his talks with padre
Bandaranaike. Then, N.M. Perera continued Iurther as
Iollows:
Iollows:
This is a Government publication published in
September 1973 on the occasion oI the Bandaranaike
Commemoration Day. This was culled out oI a speech
made by Mr. Badiuddin Mahmud beIore the Buddhist
Society oI the Education Ministry. What is the
diIIerence between what I stated and the statement oI
Mr. Mahmud, who was so close to Mr. Bandaranaike?
He has said precisely what I said in diIIerent language.
Is it a crime when I say this? Is it quite acceptable when
a member oI the SLFP says it? Is there one law Ior the
SLFP members and another law Ior the LSSP
members? This is like the laws oI the Iamous King
Kekille.. |Source: NM Explains Statement on
Removal Irom Government, an undated 32 page
pamphlet published as A Sama Samaja Publication`,
pp.18-20|
Sachi Sri Kantha's views, as written in 1977 and 1983:
'|In the 1977 General Election, contesting in Batticaloa
constituency|, Ex-Education Minister, Dr.Badiuddin
Mahmud, the selI-claimed, undisputed leader oI the
Muslims, who contested a seat Ior the Iirst time in his
so-called 50-year span oI political career, was pushed
to 4
th
place and suIIered a humiliating deIeat. |Tribune,
Colombo, Aug.27, 1977.|
'.It is also noteworthy to cite at this juncture, one
Iolly oI the so-called undisputed leader oI the Muslim
community` (who had never been elected to
parliament), Badiuddin Mahmud, who was the Minister
oI Education between 1960-64 and 1970-77. Though he
was successIul moderately in upliIting Muslim interests,
he could not succeed completely. The master tactician
Badiuddin was, he requested the Muslim youth to study
in the Sinhala medium, raising hopes that by switching
to the language oI the majority community they would
be better positioned to have their share oI government
teaching posts. However, the eIIort oI Badiuddin
backIired in the 1970s, when the Muslims, educated in
Sinhala medium entered the schools in Sinhala districts.
They were greeted by the racist slogan, Thambila apita
eppa. Then only, Badiuddin wisely learnt the Iolly oI
eppa. Then only, Badiuddin wisely learnt the Iolly oI
courting the Sinhala language. |Tamil Times, May
1983, pp.16-17|
Jiews of two Sri Lankan Muslims in 21-22
'.It was the Muslim leaders like Sir Razik Fareed and
Badiuddin Mahmud who Iervently campaigned Ior the
Sinhala Only` policy which sought to make Sinhala the
sole oIIicial language oI the country, replacing English.
|AsiII Hussein; The Obvious Link`, Sundav Observer,
Colombo, June 10, 2001|
'.The provisions provided Ior in the Memorandum oI
Understanding between the Government and the LTTE
have taken absolutely no account oI them |i.e.,
Muslims| although they account Ior a third oI the
Eastern Province, and, together with the Sinhalese
constitute two thirds oI the population. It has to be
understood and recognized that the era commencing
Irom the 1978 Constitution had been a distinct
disadvantageous one to the Muslims. During this period
President J.R. Jayewardene chose to wash his hands oII
the problems that had been created Ior the Muslims.
The beleaguered Muslims were asked then to negotiate
their Iuture with the LTTE and seek the solution
themselves; Ior the Muslims it was a position in many
ways similar to the position they are in today.
The situation then resulted in a cross-party Muslim
conglomerate led by Dr. Badiuddin Mahmud to travel to
Madras, run Irom pillar to post, and conduct talks with
the LTTE and others to extract some accommodation.
But today unIortunately neither is there an overwhelming
personality like Dr. Mahmud nor an Eastern leader with
the commitment and capacity oI M.H.M. AshraII.
|Dr.H.M.MaurooI, President, National Muslim
Movement and ex-MP, SLFP; The ethnic tangle and the
dilemma Ior the Muslims, Dailv News, Colombo,
Aug.13, 2002|
An Analysis on Badiuddin Mahmud's politics
Analyzing the above-quoted passages Irom Iour observers,
spanning almost three decades Irom 1973 to 2002, the
Iollowing are apparent: (1) Badiuddin Mahmud was a Muslim
politician who aligned himselI with the SLFP since its
politician who aligned himselI with the SLFP since its
inception and he Iervently campaigned Ior the Sinhala Only`
policy. (2) Immense political power he wielded, especially
between 1970 and 1977, beneIited the Muslim community at
the expense oI the younger generation oI Eelam Tamils. (3)
Though he was an unabashed pro-Sinhalese politician Ior
decades, when it came to the 1977 general election, rather
than contesting Irom Sinhala-dominated constituencies like
Beruwela or Gampola, he came carpet-bagging` to
Batticaloa to contest the election, and he lost in that too. (4)
When LTTE gained ascendancy by extra-parliamentary
means and came to dictate terms, Badiuddin had to travel to
Madras, run Irom pillar to post, and conduct talks with the
LTTE and others to extract some accommodation, in the
words oI MaurooI. Whether LTTE had to accede to
Mahmud`s political requests, in terms oI inter-ethnic
harmony, is a moot point. But, contemporary Muslim
analysts never bother to question the morality oI what their
political leaders like Badiuddin Mahmud did Ior Iour decades
(between 1947 and 1987) in suIIocating the human rights oI
Tamils, through the power they gained in the parliament as
Ience-sitters and moolah worshippers.
As M.A. Nuhman, a recognized Tamil language poet and
Muslim academic, noted perspectively, 'During the post-
independence period Eastern province Muslims seriously
engaged in political battles Ior seats in parliament. Political
opportunism, coupled with the scarcity oI land, and
economic competition created a mood oI suspicion and
hostility between Muslims and Tamils in the region and led
even to some violent clashes in the 1950s and 60s. Later
developments resulted in ethnic segregation oI these
communities to a certain extent. |Essay: Ethnic Identity,
Religious Fundamentalism and Muslim Women in Sri Lanka,
Dossier 21; Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Sept.1988;
accessed via internet.| It is a given that opportunism is a key
element in the proIessional politician oI any land. But the
Muslim politicians oI Sri Lanka belong to a breed apart and
deserve the tag Cunningly Enterprising Opportunists`
(CEOs).
I qualiIy my tag with the Iollowing observation, which I
recorded in 1977. Relating to what Nuhman mentioned in
recorded in 1977. Relating to what Nuhman mentioned in
passing as per political battles Ior seats in parliament` in the
Eastern province, I had observed:
'Regarding the Tamil speaking Muslims oI the EP |i.e.,
Eastern Province|, in the past it had been a sad
spectacle, that the Muslim MPs elected on the FP |i.e.,
Federal Party ticket|, Ior example, (Mr.M.S.Kariapper
Kalmunai; Mr.M.M.Mustapha Pottuvil;
Mr.M.C.Ahamed Kalmunai; and Mr.M.E.H.Mohamed
Ali Mutur) jumped on to the bandwagon oI UNP or
SLFP, aIter they entered the portals oI parliament. It is
my humble opinion that this jumping over the Ience`
attitude practiced by the EP Tamil-speaking Muslim
politicos might have had a considerable impact on the
Muslim voters this time. They would have thought,
(with due apologies to the TULF- Muslim candidates)
Why vote Ior a TULF Muslim candidate, who most
probably will jump to UNP/SLFP later? It is better to
cast the vote Ior the Muslim candidate who is wearing
the green label earlier itselI?` |A Reply to
Fr.T.Balasuriya`, Tribune, Colombo, Dec.31, 1977|
I do not disagree with the assessment oI M.A. Nuhman on
Badiuddin Mahmud, that indeed Mahmud was the '.widely
accepted Muslim political leader who contributed much to
the development oI Muslim education in this country (i.e., Sri
Lanka), introduced the concept oI Islamic music and dance
and appointed Muslim women to teach these aesthetic
subjects in Muslim schools. |Essay: Ethnic Identity,
Religious Fundamentalism and Muslim Women in Sri Lanka,
Dossier 21; Women Living Under Muslim Laws, Sept.1988;
accessed via internet.|
But the vital question is, at whose expense?` the answer
is: at the expense oI Eelam Tamils. Nuhman has recorded as
Iollows:
'In 1974 the Sri Lankan government introduced a
system oI standardisation Ior the university entrance
examination (that is G.C.E.A/L) and a special quota
for the backward districts bv which the Eastern
province vouths, both Tamils and Muslims, were
greatlv benefited while the Jaffna Tamil vouths were
badlv affected. |Italics added by Sri Kantha Ior
emphasis.| The introduction oI this new system paved
the way Ior better opportunities in higher education Ior
Muslims and created a new proIessional class and an
educated elite among them. They are the more ethnically
sensitive and opinion making social groups. These
groups were the base Ior the new Muslim political
leadership in the East and they Iormed a Muslim
political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
in 1980. |ibid|
The Iirst sentence needs clariIication. The then newly elected
SLFP-dominated government, Ior which Badiuddin Mahmud
served as the Minister oI Education, introduced the
ethnicallv profiled, crude standardisation scheme from
1971. I speak with authority, since I entered the University
oI Colombo Irom the Colombo district in January 1972, aIter
sitting Ior the G.C.E. Advanced Level exam in Dec.1970, as
the second batch which passed this ethnically proIiled, crude
standardisation scheme. Even Tamil ethnic students who
studied and sat the university entrance exam Irom Colombo
were badly bruised by this racist discriminatory treatment. I
should also add that the university entrance exam held in
Dec.1970 was the last one, in which students sitting Ior the
natural science subjects (Chemistry, Physics, Botany and
Zoology) were examined with both the theory and practical
components. Following an uproar by the Tamil Student
Federation (Tamil Maanavar Peravai) largely emanating
Irom the JaIIna peninsula, Mrs. Bandaranaike`s Cabinet led
by Badiuddin Mahmud tampered and reIined` (iI that is the
appropriate word!) the then executed university admission
criteria to what Nuhman mentions as and a special quota for
the backward districts bv which the Eastern province
vouths, both Tamils and Muslims, were greatlv benefited.
The Tamil Student Federation was the incubator Ior the
Tamil militant movement which eventually led to the birth oI
LTTE.
In sum, Badiuddin Mahmud contributed immensely to the
Muslim community Iirst and Ioremost, and by his bucket-
carrying servility contributed markedly to the Sinhalese
leadership as well. II in 1988, his conciliatory approach to
the LTTE was rebuIIed indirectly, the reasons are selI-
explanatory.
1he Loyalty dilemma of Muslims
Pirabhakaran`s LTTE has had the distinction oI engaging Sri
Lankan armed Iorces and India`s army. But an overlooked
Iact is that LTTE also has to wage a covert war against the
plans oI Pakistan`s Generals and Intelligence operatives, who
were major backers oI the Sri Lankan establishment in
arsenal and technical help. This is a 20 year-old history,
beginning Irom 1982, even beIore the active Indian interest
on the Eelam Tamil issue. Given the ever-volatile nature oI
the Indo-Pakistan political brinkmanship, it may not be even
wrong to inIer that Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister oI
India, became strongly interested in the political issue oI
Eelam, only because Zia ul Haq, the then dictator oI
Pakistan, had already planted his boots into the Colombo
camp.
It takes years Ior truth to show its appearance. But, it
eventually appear in bits and pieces aIter the departure oI
the leading actors oI that period, namely Indira Gandhi, Zia
ul Haq and J.R.Jayewardene. To quote a passage Irom the
book The Dilemma of an Island by Meril Gunaratne, the ex-
Director General oI Intelligence & Security,
'.The Special Task Force comprising oI policemen,
and versed in paramilitary skills, should be the ideal
organisation to release a body oI troops to the umbrella
organisation. I recall General Tissa Weeratunga, Iormer
Army Commander, narrating a discussion he had with
late President Zia ul Haq in Pakistan in 1982.
AIter listening to General Weeratunga concerning the
situation in JaIIna, the President oI Pakistan had said,
General, your problem is that you do not have anything
between the Army and the Police.` The President oI
Pakistan was trying to drive home the point that a
paramilitary Police, rather than the Army, should be
mobilised in the early stages oI terrorism. The STF was
yet to be born at the time General Zia ul Haq made this
comment.
It may be possible that the STF is deployed excessively
in the north and east today. |Book excerpt entitled,
in the north and east today. |Book excerpt entitled,
Combating Terrorism in Colombo`, Dailv News,
Colombo, August 31, 2001|
It is pertinent to think about what has been the stand oI the
Muslim leaders in Sri Lanka since 1983? Though linked by
the common language oI Tamil, while Eelam Tamils have an
emotional identity with India Ior cultural reasons, Muslim
politicians in Sri Lanka have shown a strong emotional bond
with Pakistan in preIerence to India, on the basis oI religion.
How many Muslims in Sri Lanka can speak the languages oI
Pakistan (Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu, Siraki, Urdu and Balochi)?
Did any one oI the Muslim leaders (M.H. Mohamed, A.C.S.
Hameed, Badiuddin Mahmud, Alavi Moulana, M.H.M.
AshraII) make a moral representation to Pakistan`s Generals
and Intelligence operatives - on behalI oI Tamils to reIrain
Irom supplying military hardware and soItware to the Sri
Lankan government because the actions oI STF are hurting
the Tamils badly in the Eastern Front. From the political
platIorms, the Muslim leaders in Sri Lanka had praised the
deeds oI M.A. Jinnah, the Iounder oI Pakistan, in separating
Irom India. But why they have not bothered to support the
same demand, when it was made by Chelvanayakam or
Amirthalingam or Pirabhakaran, is not a mystery.
The perIidy oI the Muslim political leaders belonging to the
Sinhalese ruling parties in arranging military support Irom
Pakistan Ior the Sri Lankan armed Iorces has remained an
unmentionable theme in the anti-LTTE tracts oI the cluster oI
quasi human rights activists, who Iault the LTTE Ior its anti-
Muslim activities. The J.R. Jayewardene regime did
implement the 1982 suggestions on dictator Zia ul Haq and
established the dreaded Special Task Force section in 1983.
Here is a selI-laudatory passage Irom the website oI Sri
Lankan Police, which appears under the sub-heading The
Birth oI the Special Task Force`. To quote,
'The nucleus oI the Special Task Force (STF) was
Iormed in 1983, drawing on policemen already in
service and having them trained by the Army in the
handling oI InIantry weapons and given basic training in
jungle operations. The Iirst Iew Platoons Iormed were
deployed mainly to provide support Ior police stations
in the North oI Sri Lanka.
The level oI the STF was considerably enhanced in
1983 with the introduction oI crack Iormer Special Air
Service (SAS) teams to provide specialized training in
all aspects oI counter insurgency and counter terrorist
operations. By the year 1987, the STF had taken over
the control oI the Batticaloa division Irom Kiran, right
down to Potuvil in the South and were deployed in
Company Iormation in no less than 15 camps. When
the Indian Peace Keeping Force was introduced into Sri
Lanka, the STF was dominating the ground in the
Batticaloa division, having scored several successes
against the terrorist groups. Normalcy was restored with
the liIe oI the citizen proceeding without interruption,
trains and buses running as usual and having the proud
record oI not having a single STF camp come under
attack Irom the LTTE Irom 1983 right up to the time
that the IPKF moved into the Batticaloa division.
|source: website www.police.lk|
1ale of two American 1esuit Priests in Batticaloa
Despite the unspeciIied several successes` recorded in the
above blurb until 1987, Anderson brothers in their book,
War Zones (1988) had described the trauma caused by the
STF operations to the Tamils in the Eastern Front. |see, The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon part 46| The several
successes` oI STF caused the loss and disappearance oI
thousands oI Tamil civilians.
One particular disappearance was that oI Eugene J. Hebert,
an American Jesuit priest stationed in Batticaloa. It became
internationally known via the Insight magazine (Washington
DC), only because his brother-in-law J. Hubert Dumesnil oI
LaIayette, Lousiana, contributed a letter to this magazine,
incorporating the last letter written by this disappeared priest
Hebert to one oI his Iriends. I provide below this published
letter by J.Hubert Dumesnil, under the caption: Missing
Priest`s Own View oI Sri Lanka`. |Insight magazine, Dec.10,
1990|
'Your cover story oI Oct.22 on Sri Lanka, describing
the vicious conIlict between the Sinhalese and the rebel
Tamil Tigers, is excellent.
The American Jesuit, the Rev.Eugene J.Hebert, reported
missing in the Eastern Province, is my brother-in-law.
Father Hebert has been in Sri Lanka 42 years. He is well
regarded and respected by Tamils and Sinhalese alike.
He is nonpolitical and possibly best known Ior his
talents as a basketball coach.
Father Hebert is originally Irom Jennings, La., and is the
Iirst American Jesuit missing in the Sri Lankan conIlict.
It is now over 3 and a halI months since he was
reported missing, and we have received no Iactual
explanation. The police Iorce in Batticaloa has initiated
a special investigation. I appeal to the governments oI
the United States and Sri Lanka to insist that this crime
not go unsolved. His last letter, to a Iellow Jesuit in New
Orleans, Tom Clancey, is below.
J.Hubert Dumesnil,
LaIayette, La.

Though Fr.Hebert`s brother-in-law had wished that this
crime not go unsolved` it still remains unsolved. The last
agony-Iilled letter oI disappeared Fr.Hebert, as printed in the
Insight magazine, with his photo, read as Iollows |BrieI
descriptions within parentheses, are as in the originally
published version|:
'Batticaloa, Sri Lanka
August 4, 1990
Dear Tom,
It was good to hear Irom you. In Iact this was the Iirst
letter I received in over two months. As you must know
we are in the middle oI a civil war. During the past
seven years we have been taken over by the special
police, the Indian Army, some oI the Tamil militant
groups, the Tamil Tigers and now the Sri Lanka Army.
Every one oI our conquerors have made the population
oI Batticaloa suIIer. We are cut oII Irom the rest oI the
island and the world. We listen to the radio distortions
oI what is really happening to us. The only transport out
is a convoy oI buses that take a select Iew every week
or sometimes two weeks. Electricity is sporadic. We
have been without Ior the last three days. Water is
gotten Irom wells with a bucket and rope.
gotten Irom wells with a bucket and rope.
When the army Iirst came in on June 25 no shot was
Iired as the Tamil Tigers had withdrawn to Iight Iirst in
JaIIna. But then began arrests oI innocent citizens,
looting, killings and burning on public roads to terrorize
the people, etc. I had to supervise the burial oI two, a
man and a woman, who had been killed, put into a sack
and thrown oII the bridge into the lagoon just in Iront oI
St. Sebastian`s Church. They had been in the water
three days beIore we were able to get the army to let us
bury them.
There has been some improvement lately. The Peace
committee, a group oI citizens oI which Harry Miller |a
Iellow Jesuit in Batticaloa| is a very active member, has
made many representations to the Army authorities.
Their eIIorts have stopped the burning oI bodies on the
public roads and there has not been any persons thrown
oII the bridge Ior two weeks now. But the arrests oI
boys, mostly innocent, continue.
Two past presidents oI the Citizens Ior Peace
Committee have been shot and killed, including the
parish priest oI the Cathedral. But Harry Miller, using
his American citizenship as a partial protection, does
what he can to alleviate the suIIerings oI the poor
people. Father Selvaraj, a young diocesan priest, was
killed a month ago because he was a Tamil. Another
young priest, Father Ambrose, was stoned by the
Muslims as he passed through their village taking a boy
to the hospital. He is in intensive care in Colombo. He
was Ilown there by air Iorce helicopter. He is just
beginning to recognize people and can now take Iood
through the mouth.
Enough oI our trials. The Lord continues to take care oI
us. Batticaloa is better oII than the other sections oI the
Eastern and Northern provinces. To get to the
inIormation you requested, the Iiscal year oI the ETI
|the Eastern Technical Institute, a trade school that was
then run by Father Hebert| ends on March 31. I had
really planned to write to U.S. AID |the Agency Ior
International Development| Ior another grant. We are
running rehabilitation courses Ior ex-militants and other
running rehabilitation courses Ior ex-militants and other
youth. Every Iour months we train 20 boys in welding,
20 in reIrigeration repairs and 25 in house wiring. Every
six months we train 15 in radio and TV repair. These
courses are being Iunded by Norad and a Canadian
group. This is in addition to our regular three-year
course in general mechanical trades. So we are short on
space and I had hoped to get U.S. AID to Iund the
extension oI our buildings. But it is impossible to get
estimates or do anything now. There is very little
activity in the town now. Only in the last Iew days have
a Iew oI the shops opened. Even the ETI, which was
able to Iunction in the worst days, is hardly working
now. We open part oI the morning only. Only the staII
comes. None oI the boys dare to come on the streets
until conditions improve.
Pray Ior us. God willing, things will be changed by the
time I write again. We are used to vast Iluctuations in
Iortune.
Sincerely in Christ,
Eugene J.Hebert, S.J.
|Handwritten| Don`t know when you will receive this
letter.

Father Eugene Hebert was 63, when he disappeared in 1990.
He was the Iirst and only American to suIIer this Iate in
Eelam territory, and now aIter 12 years, it can be reasonably
assumed that he had been killed but not bv the LTTE.
Who killed Father Hebert? In his last letter, Fr. Hebert had
noted the killing oI Father Selvaraj around July 1990
because he was a Tamil` and that Father Ambrose was
stoned` by the Muslims. Father Hebert also mentioned
about Iellow Jesuit Rev. Harry Miller in his letter. Fr. Miller is
still living, and he was met by Edward Gargan, the New York
Times correspondent an year later, whose report appeared in
1991, with the caption, Tracking Death in Sri Lanka: A
Priest chronicles the Civil War`s Tragic Consequences.` I
reproduce it in Iull Ior record, since reIerence was also made
about Fr.Hebert`s disappearance.
'Batticaloa, Sri Lanka - The other day, the Reverend
Harry Miller walked into the parched scrub land outside
this war-weary town. He walked until a couple oI young
men with automatic riIles materialized Irom the
landscape to escort him to their camp. It was the local
headquarters oI the guerrilla army oI ethnic Tamils the
so-called Tamil Tigers who are Iighting to establish a
separate state on this island.
They had kidnapped this guy,` said Father Miller, 65,
his native Louisiana lilt skewed by a South Asian
cadence nurtured over the last 43 years here. They
wanted him to provide them with 75,000 rupees`, about
$1,875. He`s a pensioner working on our Peace
Committee. I told them, You`re not going to get any
money Irom him even iI you kill him.` Finally, I gave
them 10,000 rupees and he`s back.` For Father Miller, it
was a routine day, perhaps a bit better than routine
because Ior the Iirst time in a while he had saved a liIe.
More oIten in the last year, though, it has been
chronicling the deaths and disappearances oI thousands
oI local people that has consumed the New Orleans
Jesuit.
In a corner turret oI the high school he once ran, Father
Miller records each death, each disappearance, each
buried body, each pile oI ashes, all the Iinal product, he
says, oI arrests and roundups oI Tamils by the Sri
Lankan Army and police. He tells the tale oI what
happened to Kockkadicholai village in July. There was
this army tractor going along hauling some things and
the Tigers blew it up and killed the soldiers,` he said.
The army came back and massacred the people oI this
village, 123 dead and 40 in the hospital. They burned
350 kadjan houses, coconut-leaI houses. They just shot
the people. FiIty-six oI the bodies were burned, 67 were
buried. It was the army. No doubt about it.
They Ieel Iree to burn bodies at the roadside because
nobody will testiIy against them. They Ieel Iree to throw
boys in wells because nobody will testiIy against them.
They Ieel Iree to kick boys in the head because nobody
will testiIy against them. They Ieel Iree to dispose oI
2,700 citizens oI Batticaloa.`
Behind his battered wooden desk, Father Miller Ilips
through page aIter page listing the names oI people who
are no longer Iound in Batticaloa, names that the Peace
Committee has compiled and sent to the local army and
police commanders seeking inIormation. The
committee, a group oI local people put together by
Father Miller, badgers the authorities Ior explanations.
Rarely do they get any; more oIten than not, it is subtle
threats oI violence that Iilter their way. Already, two
presidents oI the Peace Committee have resigned,`
Father Miller said. They were aIraid Ior their Iamilies.`
For nearly a decade the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan
armed Iorces have battled Ior control oI the eastern part
oI this island. The Tigers say they Iight Ior the rights oI
the Tamil ethnic minority, Ior years discriminated
against by the majority Sinhalese; the Sri Lankan Iorces
battle to preserve national unity. In daylight hours, the
army controls the single 80-kilometer (50-mile) stretch
oI road between Batticaloa and government-controlled
areas to the west. But when the sun settles into the
mountains, the countryside and the road return to the
Tigers.
When Father Miller came here in 1948 as a Iresh-Iaced
missionary, Sri Lanka was a drowsy place oI Iarmers
and Iishermen. It was like 1890s America, like the
Louisiana my grandIather grew up in,` he said. It`s
changed a bit and changed Ior the worse. In those days,
there was never any violence, except on the Iootball
Iield.` Last year, a Iellow Jesuit Irom Louisiana, Eugene
J. Hebert, disappeared while riding his scooter back to
Batticaloa Irom an outlying convent. I went to the army
and the police,` Father Miller said, and no investigation
was ever done.`
Last year, he said, the killing reached a climax and the
work oI the Peace Committee began in earnest. Last
July, we started to keep a record oI the people taken
into custody by the army. As oI this month, we have
2,700 disappeared people. Some came back. Most oI
those who didn`t come back are probably dead. In the
early days last year, we saw piles oI burning bodies.
People continue to disappear.`
So gruesome has the situation become that the local
police chieI talks oI his police camp as Belsen, a
reIerence to the Nazi death camp. That`s where they
take young boys to question them,` Father Miller said.
They tie them up, drop them in a well. Are you a
Tiger? No.` Drop them again. Are you a Tiger?`
No`. Eventually they get a conIession.` Father Miller
shook his head. There`s no resolution. Neither side has
lost. Neither side can win.` |source: International
Herald Tribune, Sept.4, 1991, p.6|
The 1990-1991 scenario in the Eastern Front, as presented
by Jesuit Fathers Irom Louisiana, Eugene Hebert and Harry
Miller, was revealing Ior the torture received by young
Tamils. One notable Ieature in both documents (the last letter
oI Fr. Hebert and the interview oI Fr. Miller with
correspondent Edward Gargan) is that the suIIerings oI
Muslims at the hands of Tamil Tigers have not been even
passingly indicated. Could it be inIerred that these two
American Jesuit priests were partial to the LTTE and were
oblivious about the alleged torture oI Muslims by the Tamil
Tigers? Not by objective reasoning, since Fr. Miller had
inIormed correspondent Gargan about the kidnapping oI a
member oI the Citizen`s Committee by the Tamil Tigers.
Evidence oI torture as presented by Fr. Hebert and Fr. Miller
was tilted towards the Sri Lankan army and police (inclusive
oI the STF operatives). It should be noted that the STF
operatives were recruited exclusivelv from the Sinhalese and
Muslim ethnic groups.
One statement which appears in Fr. Hebert`s last letter that
'Battiacaloa is better oII than the other sections oI the
Eastern and Northern provinces. received independent
conIirmation Irom Newsweek`s correspondents Tony
Emerson and Steve Le Vine in March 1991, reporting Irom
Trincomalee. It carried the caption Black Shirts in Sri
Lanka`. Excerpts are given below:
Black Shirts in Sri Lanka: Rise of :disappearances'
'In the beautiIul harbor oI Trincomalee, capital oI Sri
Lanka`s northeastern province, ethnic Tamils whisper
oI security men who come at night, wearing black shirts
oI security men who come at night, wearing black shirts
and pants, and announce that you are wanted Ior
questioning`. No one knows how many Tamils have
disappeared Irom Trincomalee, apparent casualties oI a
new phase in Sri Lanka`s eight-year-old civil war. The
Sri Lankan Army is pressing a campaign to purge
civilian areas oI rebels Irom the Liberation Tigers oI
Tamil Eelam, who are Iighting Ior an independent state
in the northern and eastern regions. From Batticaloa,
south oI Trincomalee, human rights observers report
that in the last nine months, 2,000 Tamil youths have
been arrested on unknown charges and have not been
seen since.
It will be diIIicult to count the missing in Trincomalee,
an increasingly silent and empty city. Last June the
Liberation Tigers broke a 13-month truce bv
massacring scores of police officers. |Italics added Ior
emphasis by Sri Kantha, Ior a later analysis on the 600-
700 missing policemen` killed by the LTTE.| The
Colombo government responded by dropping barrel
bombs`, oil drums Iilled with burning liquid, in civilian
neighborhoods to smoke out the rebels. Nationwide,
more than 4,000 people have died in rebel ambushes
and Army reprisals since that time; in Trincomalee, an
estimated one Iourth oI the 350,000 residents have Iled
the Iighting and Army manhunts not always to saIety.
Soldiers have searched Ior rebel suspects in some oI
the 30 reIugee camps that now ring Trincomalee. A
leader oI one camp, near the village oI Nilaveli north oI
Trincomalee, said that 84 men were detained in a series
oI Army sweeps last year. One reIugee who returned
said he was locked in a prison that held about 350 men.
They tied my hands behind my back and kept a
blindIold around my eyes. I hardly ate Ior two weeks,`
he said. I was Iinally released with 15 (men). We don`t
know what happened to the others.` The camp leader,
who requested anonymity, said only 45 oI the 84
detainees are accounted Ior. The others disappeared or
have been killed. We don`t know.`
The apparent Army crackdown on civilians has not
improved its position on the battleIield. The rebels still
hold sway over much oI the northern and eastern
hold sway over much oI the northern and eastern
provinces, except in big cities where government Iorces
guard roadblocks by day and usually retreat to barracks
by night. Diplomats in Colombo say President
Ranasinghe Premadasa, considered pragmatic but
occasionally ruthless, has given Army hard-liners until
June to gain the upper hand, or he may attempt to
reopen peace talks. An Army surge seems unlikely, but
so is a Tiger victory. In the Trincomalee district, the
army estimates that the rebels are outnumbered by at
least 10,000 to 800.
Most Tamils in Trincomalee won`t discuss the
disappearances, even under the cloak oI anonymity.
I`ve stopped working in human rights because it`s not
wise anymore,` says a Iormerly outspoken advocate. A
local relieI oIIicial said he seeks an escort Irom
international organizations just to deliver medicine to the
reIugee camps. Another adds, We don`t get involved
with human-rights issues. Our lives literally depend on
it.` A citizens committee set up by the military to
represent reIugees directs inquiries about missing
persons back to the Army. Brig. Siri Pieris, Army
commander in the Trincomalee district, said he had
received no oIIicial complaints oI disappearances, but
was investigating the reports nonetheless. |Newsweek
International edition, March 25, 1991, p.39|
One can guess that Brig. Siri Pieris should have some
oblique sense oI humor. Also oI note is the date oI this
report`s publication March 25, 1991. This was nearly two
months beIore Rajiv Gandhi`s assassination in Sri
Perumbudur. The passing remark by Emerson and Le Vine
regarding President Premadasa giving the 'Army hard-liners
until June to gain the upper hand, or he may attempt to
reopen peace talks, when linked with the torture and killing
oI Tamils in the Eastern Province by the STF operatives (as
recorded by Father Hebert, Father Miller and correspondents
Emerson and Le Vine) might have been oI some signiIicance
which has gone un-noticed, aIter Rajiv Gandhi`s
assassination on May 21, 1991. |To be continued.|

Part 48
Sachi Sri Kantha
27 November 2002]
Projecting Tamil Power
Learn to plav the piano. In plaving the piano all ten fingers are in
motion, it wont do to move some fingers onlv and no others. But if all
ten fingers press down all at once, there is no melodv.
Mao Tse Tungon Leadership. InThe Other Side of the River Red
China Todav, by Edgar Snow, 1962, p.113.
The curse of the Eelam Tamils, especially during the post-
independence period, was that , all ten fingers` which Mao
admonished should not press down all at once` were in play in the
political field. In the pre-militant period from 1950s to the beginning of
1970s, one could literally count these ten fingers`: Ponnambalam`s
band, Chelvanayakam`s band, Trotsky admirers` band, Stalin
apologists` band, Mao Leftist`s vocal-only band, Suntheralingam`s
high caste solo, UNP loyalists` band, local Independents` (likes of
Duraiappah, P.R.Selvanayakam) band, fence-sitting Muslim band and
Thondaman`s separate solo. One could gloat in paper about this
situation as democracy at best, but pragmatically it was the coffin nail
for Tamil rights in the island. At every election from 1947 to 1970, all
these groups produced a cacophony of discordant noise on Tamil
rights. Some semblance of political unity was achieved in 1972. But it
was of no avail.
The same history was repeated when the next generation of Tamils
came of age and turned towards militancy. Mao`s ten fingers` maxim
was again demonstrated in the mid-1980s and Indian Intelligence
operatives exploited the Eelam scene to sow discord among the Tamil
militants. What was sadly missing was the melody of freedom
struggle. It was to the credit of Pirabhakaran that he decimated the
cacophonous screamers (especially the TELO and EPRLF) to fine-
tune the military arm of Tamil power. It was a heart-rending
operation. Nevertheless, the outcome was the need of the times. The
sole representatives` claim of LTTE is currently discussed in
pejorative sense by analysts and editorialists from Colombo and
sangam.orgf.fPart+8.html 1f13
pejorative sense by analysts and editorialists from Colombo and
Chennai. But, those who fault Pirabhakaran for his high-handedness
(including Mr. Ashley Wills, the current US ambassador in Sri Lanka)
seem oblivious to the facts relating to the American Independence
War, where the Patriots more or less behaved like the LTTE cadres.
If one has to be fair, though there exists a time gap of nearly two
centuries, one cannot approve one set of morals for George
Washington`s army and demand another set of morals from
Pirabhakaran`s liberation army.
In 1983, Pirabhakaran embarked on a dauntless mission of projecting
the Tamil military power. If he could count on an outside alley in his
mission, it was only the former Tamil Nadu chief minister
M.G.Ramachandran. And MGR also passed from the scene in
December 1987. Since then, LTTE has stood all alone. Now, with the
passage of 15 years, the performance of LTTE in the Eastern Front
can be reviewed in selected yearly frames - 1990, 1993, 1997 and
2002.
Proof of the Pudding
The proof of the pudding is in the eating, says the old adage. I provide
below few analyses, spanning twelve years, to assess the level of
success Pirabhakaran`s LTTE had achieved in eroding the legitimacy
of Sri Lanka`s unitary state.
(1) 1ournalist 1ohn Colmey and Rohan Gunaratna on the events of
1une- 1uly 1990
Following the final departure of India`s army from Eelam in March
1990, President Premadasa`s government, soft-pedalled and even
double-crossed on the understood positions` taken during the year-
long negotiations held between LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
This led to the beginning of Eelam War II in 1une 1990. LTTE`s views
were presented by its chief spokesman Anton Balasingham in his
interview with 1ohn Colmey, the Asiaweek`s correspondent. To
quote,
~Q: Why did fighting break out again?
A: We had been talking for one year and two months. During that
time, there was a political void in the north and east. The provincial
council administration had collapsed. We were preparing ourselves for
a provincial election and were preparing ourselves to take over the
provincial council. But we suddenly realised there was a stalemate - a
delay on the part of the government to take concrete actions even
though they were saying they were going to do this and that.
Mr.Premadasa would say something positive while Mr.Ranjan
Mr.Premadasa would say something positive while Mr.Ranjan
Wijeratne would give negative answers. For example, on the question
of arms Ranjan insisted that the LTTE not be allowed to participate in
an election without laying down arms, which was not agreeable to us.
There were contradictions.
Then there were elements within the armed forces which were
opposed to a negotiated settlement. Because of that there was a build-
up of the army in the north and east and that worried us. There were
quite a lot of incidents between soldiers and LTTE guerillas. The
Sinhalese police in the east were creating a lot of problems, coming
out of the police stations, beating up Tamil people. There were
elements within the armed forces that wanted to create a
confrontational situation.
Q: Are you saying the government was never sincere?
A: They could say we are negotiating with the LTTE and everything
will be rosy` and thereby get foreign aid. All the while they were
building up their forces.We thought they were sincere early on.
Later, when the Indians left, the situation changed. They held talks
with the EPRLF (a rival Tamil group). That disillusioned us because
the EPRLF backed Indian occupation. We were talking with 1ustice
Minister Shahul] Hameed and the president, while Ranjan Wijeratne
was talking with other groups.
Q: But the Tigers also contributed to the tensions.
A: That is how the government is trying to portray it, the LTTE was
doing this and that and from a small incident started everything. But
for a long time the army was not very happy to be confined to
barracks - they always wanted free mobility, wanted to come out from
their camps.
Q: Is there a chance for a ceasefire, new talks?
A: It depends on the government. The government has declared that
there cannot be negotiations unless we lay down arms. This was said
by Ranjan Wijeratne. This is totally unacceptable to us. If the
government insists on that condition, there will be no negotiations.
There will be a protracted war.
Q: The government says the conflict is between the army and the
Tigers and not with the Tamil people.
A: This is an ethnic war. The government is mobilising the Sinhalese
population. The aerial bombardment of the north, the calculated
economic embargo on the north, where they are not allowing food
supplies, medical supplies or fuel to come in - it`s a collective
supplies, medical supplies or fuel to come in - it`s a collective
punishment against our people. Asiaweek, Hongkong, 1uly 20, 1990,
p.26]
1ohn Colmey also recorded the following: ~The army`s strategy is to
gain control of the east, where fighting first broke out, by surrounding
guerillas in the jungles and cutting off their supply lines, and then push
north and repeat the process. He also quoted the original source of
this strategy, the gung-ho spirited Ranjan Wijeratne who was
overseeing the operations. To quote, Once they`re cornered in the
jungles and their supply lines are cut off, it`s only a matter of time`,
says Wijeratne. We`ll finish them off.` ibid]
Anton Balasingham`s answers to the first two questions had been
corroborated by Rohan Gunaratna subsequently in his book, Indian
Intervention in Sri Lanka (1993, ch.13, pp.434-438). Minister
Wijeratne was in a hurry, even in 1990, to establish his credentials for
the Presidential sweepstakes, in competition with other two UNPers -
Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake. And he wanted to do
that by claiming Pirabhakaran`s scalp, figuratively if not literally.
According to Rohan Gunaratna, ~Wijeratne`s intention was to crush
the LTTE in the same manner that he had dealt with the 1VP. This
would have assured him honour and even the subsequent presidency
of Sri Lanka. ibid] Gunaratna has stated in a foot-note that this was
revealed to him by minister Wijeratne two days before his
assassination in an interview, the validity of which has to be assumed
in good faith.
Following is a chronological synopsis of ten-day events in 1une 1990
which opened the Eelam War II, as culled from Gunaratna`s tract.
1une 10, 1990: a Muslim youth found with a Sinhala woman inside a
refugee camp in Batticaloa town, assaulted by the husband of the
woman.This youth was a tailor in the services of LTTE. They were
taken to the police station at Batticaloa.
1une 11, 1990: 250 LTTE cadres surrounded the police station at
Batticaloa town, and took control of the station.. LTTE captured 9
police stations in the Eastern province, abducted 650 policemen and
initially shot and killed 135 of them.
1une 13, 1990: A ceasefire between LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces
was arranged over the phone at mid day. An LTTE press release
issued from London claimed that the government did not maintain the
ceasefire.
1une 14, 1990: LTTE captured Odduchudan and Mankulam police
stations.
sangam.orgf.fPart+8.html +f13
stations.
1une 15, 1990: 1ustice Minister Hameed flew to 1affna and met with
LTTE leaders led by Anton Balasingham in Nallur.
1une 16, 1990: 1ustice Minister Hameed returned to Palaly to confer
with LTTE, but was unable to meet them on that day or thereafter.
1une 19, 1990: an LTTE assassination squad on the orders of Pottu
Amman, the LTTE Chief of Intelligence, murdered EPRLF leader
Padmanabha, parliamentarian Yogasangari, North-East Provincial
Council Minister Kirubakaran and 12 others in Madras.
By design, Gunaratna had failed to suggest the motive behind LTTE`s
attack on the EPRLF. It was left to Dayan 1ayatilleka, another anti-
LTTE commentator and an insider in the Premadasa administration,
to let the cat out of the bag, ten years later, in his eulogy to
K.Padmanabha. I have indicated this previously see, Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon, part 39]. But, it is worth a repetition. To quote,
~EPRLF MP Yogasangari flew from Colombo for that Central
Committee] meeting. He had earlier communicated to Pathmanabha a
proposal of the Sri Lankan Government of that time - the Premadasa
administration - that the EPRLF should join the Sri Lankan Army and
fight against the LTTE. The LTTE had resumed the war ten days
before, on the 10
th
of 1une 1990. The initial response from the EPRLF
was positive in principle, but they had one problem. Ranjan Wijeratne
was insisting that EPRLF fighters wear Sri Lankan Army uniform.
Daily News, Colombo, 1une 19, 2000]
Here was one instance, where LTTE, due to prevailing circumstances,
employed the classic fast draw` of Clint Eastwood`s movie genre to
protect its organization. Many Tamils, no doubt, had qualms about
the decimation of EPRLF`s lead members. In hindsight, this fast
draw` can be reconciled as a survival, military strategy which worked
at that instance. Few months later, this deed was set in perspective by
Anton Balasingham to Deanna Hodgin as follows:
Of course, in Colombo, they will say that these fellows are wiping out
all the opposition` says Tamil Tiger spokesman Balasingam. But this
is a life-and-death struggle for us, for our people. We are facing
genocide. We can`t tolerate traitors, informants; otherwise we will
perish.` Insight magazine, Oct.22, 1990, p.13]
(2) 1ournalist and commentator Mervyn de Silva in 1990
Respected political commentator Mervyn de Silva captured superbly
the then Eastern Front scene, incorporating the multiple elements who
had planted their feet to tangle with the LTTE. Though relatively
had planted their feet to tangle with the LTTE. Though relatively
objective in analysis, I reiterate that even an erudite de Silva has to
cater for his Sinhalese readership. Thus, some of his assertions are
tinged with subtle anti-LTTE bias. Nevertheless, he is worth quoting:
~.There is no logical basis for a North-East merger today than the
linguistic link between the Tamils and the Muslims - the Muslims
being Tamil speakers. (Many Muslims also speak Sinhala but it is
NOT their main mode of communication. Sinhala, indisputably is for
the Muslim in the seven Sinhala-dominated provinces. Violence: A
Fragmentation Bomb`, Lanka Guardian, Aug.15, 1990, pp.3-4]
Then, Mervyn de Silva presented accurately the Muslim thinking as
follows:
~Simple arithmetic (a third of the province) has already made the
Muslim, the smallest group nationwide, conscious of its strength AND
weakness. The strength lay in the numbers game of parliamentary or
provincial polls. Or the simplest numbers game of all, after the Indo-
Sri Lanka Peace Accord, a referendum in the East after one year to
decide the fate of the temporarily merged North-East. Does the
Muslim use his unique position as the decisive, balancing factor to
extract political concessions (i.e. sharing of power and perks) and, if
so, from whom - the Tamils or the Sinhalese? Who will give the better
deal? Perhaps the Sinhalese, the smallest of the three communities
and thus likely to offer more, with the additional advantage of
exercising power at the Centre, Colombo. ibid]
Following this, Mervyn de Silva also semi-cryptically identified the
multiple players who sowed discord in the Eastern Front in mid 1990.
To quote,
~The East, the main battlefield, gets redder. The East is militarised,
with all the counter-insurgency expertise` concentrated in the East -
new State militia such as the STF assisted by international expertise.
In the run-up to the Accord and the IPKF (1983-87) the following
trends become increasingly evident and assertive: the re-shaping of
the Muslim identity with Islam as the instrument, the advent of new
political and politico-military formations, the 1IHAD, the Muslim
Congress, more East-based than national, the spread of weapons, and
intensified militarisation, and a more complex, confusing pattern of
alignments, more shadowy than recognisable.
Enter the IPKF. Its sheer weight begins to tell in the North, and the
Tigers flee into the jungles, with the IPKF transforming itself from
peace-keeper to army of occupation. In a more complex East
however, the IPKF itself has to adjust itself to a different political-
military challenge. The Indians quickly spot the relative autonomy of
the Muslim factor -a Muslim Brigadier becomes the IPKF`s
operational head in the East. ibid]
Pirabhakaran`s LTTE had to adjust to all these continuously changing
variables. Some of the massacres` attributed to LTTE in the Eastern
front has to be understood from this perspective. What has been
under-stated by LTTE`s critics (Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims) was
the nefarious deeds planned and executed by the India`s policy
operatives in fomenting friction between the Tamils and the Muslims
in the Eastern front. Covert evidence for this is present in a document
entitled Afghanistan and Sri Lanka: A Comparison of Operational
Styles`, which appeared in the Annual Report of the Indian Defence
Review, which Mervyn de Silva republished in his Lanka Guardian
magazine Aug.1, 1990, pp.11-21]. This document was authored by
IDR Research Team`, with IDR obviously standing for Indian
Defence Review. From the cited pegs to political events, I presume
that this Annual Report was for the year 1989, when LTTE was
engaged in confrontation with the Indian army. Presented opinion is
revealing for its bile (filled with sickening cliches), cocksureness on
the Indian military power and what the Indian panjandrums had
predicted for Pirabhakaran. Excerpts:
~The LTTE had become a brutal and fascist organization. Lamp post
killings, tyre treatment and cyanide capsules had come to symbolize a
killers` cult of surprising viciousness. The key question was that since
the LTTE had emerged (by natural selection) as the strongest Tamil
group should India (as the patron of the Tamils) have come to terms
with it? Had the LTTE turned completely renegade and unresponsive
to Indian interests?.The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs` mission
of keeping international public opinion favourable has been achieved
but at considerable military and economic cost. Time alone will tell if
the domestic cost of placating world opinion were justified..
Then, the Indian pundits had pontificated why Pirabhakaran was not
eliminated at the early stages of the Indian army`s confrontation with
the LTTE by comparing Pirabhakaran with Hafizulla Amin (1929-
1979) of Afghanistan during Soviet invasion in 1979. To quote,
~If we had come to the clear and unambiguous conclusion that
Prabhakaran had become a Hafizulla Amin, our response should have
been as ruthless and straightforward as the Soviets. They carefully
bided their time, completed methodical preparations and then stunned
the world with a swift and decisive blow. One air assault and five
motor rifle divisions were thrown in. Result: Hafizulla Amin`s
presidential palace was attacked, Amin himself was killed and
Barbrak Karmal of the rival Parcham faction came riding in on Soviet
tanks. All of Afghanistan lay prostrate in five days.
tanks. All of Afghanistan lay prostrate in five days.
Hafizullah Amin was the nominal leader of Afghanistan for two
months, between September and December 1979. He was perceived
by the Soviets as an American implant`, though he is now labeled as
one who displayed independent nationalism who refused to take
Soviet advice. Hafizullah Amin lived in USA during the 1950s and
received a Masters degree from the Columbia University in 1957 and
he returned to Afghanistan in 1965. Thus, comparing Pirabhakaran to
Hafizulla Amin is like comparing cheese and chalk, though
Pirabhakaran is an Eelam nationalist. Nevertheless the Indian pundits
had wished for Pirabhakaran`s elimination by the Indian army and the
anointment of Eelam leadership with a Babrak Karmal, who turned
out to be Varadarajah Perumal of EPRLF. The Indian pundits also
lamented on the lack of quality intelligence on the LTTE as follows:
~One is not aware of the quality of intelligence input regarding the
strength, armament pattern and motivation of the LTTE but surely
external intelligence-gathering agencies such as RAW should have
been able to give us this information? Indian military leaders freely
admitted in the media that there had been a major intelligence
assessment failure.
Thus, it can be inferred that the Indian panjandrums wished for a
scenario of repeating the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Eelam
in 1987. But everything misfired, probably due to the nimble mind of
Pirabhakaran and his advisors. How much of Clint Eastwood`s movie
cassettes helped Pirabhakaran in developing his nimble mind is
difficult to assess. But it is self-evident that Pirabhakaran did absorb
the spirit and significance of fast draw of a gun-fighter` from the
Eastwood manthra and used it for his survival skillfully. Not only that,
what distinguished him from his other Tamil militant contemporaries,
was the persisting fire in the belly` to project the Tamil power.
(3) Analyst 1ayanath Rajepakse in 1993
By late 1993, Premadasa as well as Ranjan Wijeratne had lost their
lives. In the following passage, Rajepakse ( a Sinhalese Foreign
Ministry official, in charge of the South Asia desk) had correctly
deciphered the ground-reality of the situation, as it stood in 1993
under D.B.Wijetunge`s leadership. To quote,
If the LTTE`s challenge is to be withstood successfully, their military
capability has to be blunted to the point where they themselves stand
denied a military option. But, for such an endeavour to make any
sense, let alone be realised, it has to go hand-in-hand with negotiation
of a settlement that can command Tamil support across the board.
For, it is only to the extent if any that the Tamils in the state`s (that
For, it is only to the extent if any that the Tamils in the state`s (that
means Government and Opposition) sincerity of purpose about a fair
settlement, that they could be persuaded to move out from under the
LTTE`s shadow. And, unless and until that happens, any talk of a
Government military option is pie in the sky.
Even at the level of military action per se to blunt the LTTE`s
capability, two conditions need to be met, of which there has been no
evidence yet; first, our forces have to be provided with the resources
in men and requisite types of weaponry which would enable them to
wrest and hold the military initiative long enough; and second, they
need to have this available simultaneously in the north and east. For
the Government`s strategy of first clearing and securing the east is
doubly flawed; at the theoretical leel, it is a non sequitur given the
LTTE`s aim to establish a contiguous Tamil domain in north and east;
so, at the very least, the state`s forces need to be able to wrest and
hold the military initiative simultaneously in north and east. But even
granted that they are given these resources, one still needs the back-
up of para-military forces to defend, and civilian cadres to administer
cleared areas, to enable the forces to extend the frontier of
clearance. source: The LTTE military challenge`, Lanka
Guardian, Dec.15, 1993, p.7]
(4) American journalist 1ohn Cramer in 1997
1ournalist 1ohn D. Cramer visited Batticaloa, while Chandrika
Kumaratunga, the President, and her kin Anuruddha Ratwatte were
waging their War for Peace` against the LTTE. The nominal prime
minister then was the figuratively comatose mother of
Mrs.Kumaratunga. Excerpts from Cramer`s on-the spot report to the
Washington Post are as follows: Note: Words within the parentheses
are as in the original.]
~.But the government still does not control vast areas of the country
and has been forced twice to extend amnesty to tens of thousands of
deserters who fled after being thrust into combat with scant training
against a hardened guerrilla force.
For their part, the Tigers also claim the upper hand, but they have lost
their northern stronghold on the 1affna Peninsula, increasingly are
sending adolescent boys and girls to fight and are attacking foreign
ships carrying food and other suppliesin Sri Lankan waters.Most
Tamils, who make up about 20 percent of the island`s population and
are predominantly Hindu, call the Tiges freedom fighters. Some
Tamils, however, oppose the LTTE, but do not say so openly,` a
Batticaloa man says, using the separatist group`s initials. The Tigers
come and extort money, and if you refuse, you are in trouble.` The
Tamils, he says, are caught in the middle. They are detained,
Tamils, he says, are caught in the middle. They are detained,
tortured, killed by both sides because each thinks they support the
other.`.
In Batticaloa district, a rural area dominated by Tamils and rice
paddies, life revolves around the rice planting and harvest seasons as
it has for centuries. The army controls the town itself, a battered,
dusty and impoverished place along a lagoon, as well as the crumbling
roads connecting it with outside areas, but it is a fragile control. At
night, the soldiers hunker down behind sandbags as the Tigers
sporadically attack outlying areas with rifle fire, mortars and rocket-
propelled grenades before returning to the jungle at dawn.
In nearby villages, many Tamil civilians - who live in dirt-floor shacks
without electricity or running water, wear threadbare clothing and ride
dilapidated bicycles and ox carts - say they give money, food and
other supplies willingly to support the rebels, who are neatly dressed,
disciplined and well-fed, and ride expensive motorcycles up and down
the dirt roads. They ask politely, lovingly, for what we can give,` an
old woman says. The rich Tamils do not support the LTTE, but the
poor do, and these (Tiger) boys and girls are only trying to get us what
is rightfully ours.`
One Tamil man says the war has biblical overtones. The Sinhalese
are like the Egyptians and the Tamils like the Israelites, and our
people believe (Tiger leader Velupillai) Prabhakaran is like Moses
leading his people from slavery to a promised land,` he says. The
only difference is we already know where our promised land is - it is
right here.`
But some Tamils, even in the heart of Tiger territory, privately say
they oppose or are neutral to the rebel force, and many able-bodied
men in their twenties and thirties are content to leave the fighting to
Tamil teenagers. Feature: War Without End`, Washington Post
National Weekly edition, Aug.11, 1997, p.18]
This feature appeared few weeks before the American government
designated the LTTE as one of the foreign terrorist organizations.
(5) The Sinhalese editorialist of Sunday Leader (Colombo) in Nov.
2002
Five years later, still Chandrika Kumaratunga remains as the lame
duck President of a rump Sri Lankan state. Ranil Wickremasinghe of
the UNP now occupies the Prime Minister`s slot. The Sinhalese
editorialist presents a back-handed compliment to Pirabhakaran`s
tenacity in the following paragraphs.
~.The situation in the north and east is far from acceptable, by any
yardstick. The LTTE continues to do most things it used to do even
before the MoU and ceasefire came into place. It extorts money,
levies taxes, operates a police force and has even established courts
of law. None of these things are new; they represent a status quo that
evolved over two decades. They reflect the fact that there was indeed
a de facto Eelam at the time hostilities ceased. It is not entirely
intelligent to insist that all this should be dismantled forthwith, and
that the writ of the government must run equally everywhere in Sri
Lanka. Even as Ranil Wickremesinghe speaks of regaining Sri
Lanka`, the challenge before him is not so much to regain the nation
but the north and east, and by peaceful means, to boot.
There is no questioning that the situation today is heaps better than it
was a year ago. That this tends to vex the likes of the Venerable
Maduluwawe Sobitha Thero of this world is simply tough luck. They
had two whole decades in which to put their courage where their
mouths are: volunteer for the army, take a gun and go to 1affna to
fight for their cause. They didn`t, and Sri Lanka was left with an un-
winnable war. For the warmongers to pontificate today, from the
security they enjoy thanks to the peace process, is easy. But it still
begs the question, where were they all these years? Certainly not on
the front lines!
The LTTE are not saints; they are in large measure a band of blood-
thirsty terrorists. But what other choice do we have than to negotiate
a settlement in the hope, the LTTE will eventually embarace
democracy in the long run. So deep is the abyss into which our nation
had sunk. Editorial: The Painful Path to Peace`, Sunday Leader,
Colombo, Nov.24, 2002]
While nearing the end of 2002, even the LTTE un-friendly Sinhalese
journalists like the editor of Sunday Leader had come to state the
reality that a de facto Eelam` had been established by the LTTE.
That Pirabhakaran`s army achieved this without a vital air-power is an
achievement of gigantic proportions.
Always Cornered` and Still Standing in the Ring
Among the more than one hundred profiles, sketches, inside-stories`
which I have read on Pirabhakaran for the past 15 years or so, one
stands out for its timeless sheen. It appeared in mid 1987 at the height
of the Vadamarachchi Operation by the Sri Lankan army. It was
penned by K.P.Sunil, for the Illustrated Weekly of India magazine.
Now that, Pirabhakaran had reached 48 years, this profile is worthy of
a review. Sunil`s one-page profile had highlighted incidents of
Pirabhakaran`s early life, which all Tamils are now well aware of, and
carried some worn-out cliches like whose strategic brilliance is
matched only by his ruthlessness`.
I reproduce snippets from Sunil`s description which are relevant to
this chapter. First was the caption: In the News: Cornered`, with the
single word Cornered` between two black borders. In sports lingo, the
word Cornered` is a boxing as well as hunting metaphor. It was apt
for Pirabhakaran then, during the 1987 Vadamarachchi Operation.
Sunil wrote as follows:
~While the LTTE was consolidating its position in the early 1980s],
several other militant groups like the Eelam People`s Revolutionary
Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
(EROS), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), the Tamil Eelam
Army (TEA) and several other minor groups with similar goals and
objectives, but with marginal differences in ideology, had sprung up.
With the proliferation in the number of militant groups, the Eelam
movement started losing its identity and Pirabhakaran probably
encouraged by his superior military strength and strike power,
decided to assimilate lesser groups through military action rather than
through a process of dialogue. Illustrated Weekly of India, 1une 7,
1987, p.61]
Sunil was indeed correct in mentioning that by 1986, with the
proliferation in the number of militant groups the Eelam movement
started losing its identity` and recording the course of action
Pirabhakaran took to deal with the TELO and EPRLF. But being an
Indian journalist, he tactfully omitted mentioning Indian names and
pointing fingers at the RAW operatives who were responsible for this.
Also it should be noted that, by 1990, Pirabhakaran was successful in
incorporating the EROS group into his fold by non-military means.
Subsequently Sunil ended his profile with the following five sentences,
consisting of three questions:
~It remains to be seen what will happen to Pirabhakaran. Will he
survive the present crisis? Will he retreat to friendly Tamil Nadu to
direct further campaigns in the future? Or will he buckle down under
the sustained Sri Lankan assault and take recourse to the cyanide
vial? Whatever happens, his fate could well decide the future of
Eelam. ibid]
Now, after 15 years all know that Pirabhakaran survived the
Vadamarachchi crisis`. He did not retreat to friendly Tamil Nadu` for
his future campaigns. Rather he stayed put in the Eelam territory.
Also, he never buckled down under the sustained Sri Lankan assault
and took recourse to the cyanide vial.`
But Pirabhakaran had been continuously cornered`. He was cornered
by the Indian army from late 1987 to early 1990. He was cornered by
the Indian government in 1992 with the ban on LTTE and a court
summons for the Rajiv Gandhi assassination. He was cornered by the
Sri Lankan army in 1995 for the Battle of 1affna`. He was cornered
by the Americans with a dubious label of leading a foreign terrorist
organization` in 1997. The applied definition of such a foreign
terrorist organization` itself was vague, with one criterion being It
should be foreign in origin.` If that is so, what is the status of an
American organization like the CIA, which has its headquarters in
Langley, Virginia, but perform field operations - not indistinguishable
from terrorism - in boundaries beyond America?] Pirabhakaran was
cornered by the Sri Lankan army (assisted by the mercenary Western
consultants, Israeli operatives, Pakistan operatives and other arms
suppliers) from 1997 to 1999. So, Pirabhakaran has been always
Cornered` (with the large case C), but he is still standing in the ring
with his conviction of projecting the Tamil power. To be continued.]

Part 49
Sachi Sri Kantha
11 December, 2002]

Analyzing the Tamil Victims of LTTE`s Power

In one oI his recent syndicated columns, humorist Dave
Barry wrote a spooI oI conservative columnist and language
maven William SaIire, as Iollows:
'.Today we regret that we must begin our column with this:
TERRORIST THREAT WARNING. We have received
some alarming inIormation Irom very high sources in the
Iederal government.
Q: How high were they?
A: They were wearing their underpants on their heads.
According to these sources, terrorists may be planning an
attack on America`s linguistic inIrastructure. The targets will
be critical strategic phrases without which this nation cannot
Iunction. |International Herald Tribune, Aug.31, 2002|
Dave Barry will be delighted to know, how many simple
English words have been twisted and roasted beyond the
dictionary meaning by the editorialists and analysts (aka
linguistic terrorists) in Colombo and Chennai. For example,
opportunists who don`t have a Iollowing are pronounced as
leaders`. DeIeats were embellished as a victories`. Retreat
was reIerred to as Adjusting the Forward DeIence Line`.
Pakistan`s dictator and Osama bin Laden`s back-alley pal is
gloatingly addressed with the phrase a Iriend in need`.
Thugs who had never seen a real battle Iield are tagged as
ex-militants`. Sense-challenged peeping toms are anointed
with the accolade human rights warriors`. Similarly, the
word victim` is a gut wrenching blanket word Ior an
individual iI he or she had an unnatural death at the hands oI
individual iI he or she had an unnatural death at the hands oI
LTTE, irrespective oI his or her neIarious deeds oI
vainglory. But hapless Tamil citizens who lost their lives to
indiscriminate bombing and torture by the Sri Lankan army
were called as terrorists`.
Categories of LTTE`s Main Victims
That LTTE`s growth, in terms oI power, since 1986
produced quite a Iew categories oI victims oI diIIerent
shades is undeniable. This is expected, since the power
balance equation shows that one party has to lose power
simultaneously Ior the other party to gain power. The parties
that lost power totally or partially came to be identiIied as
victims. Segments which lost power due to LTTE`s
assertion oI military clout include the Iollowing:
(1) Post-Independent Sri Lanka`s unitary state, controlled by
the power wielding Buddhist Aryan elements.
(2) Sri Lanka`s Buddhist-dominated military establishment
(3) India`s military establishment
(4) Tamil-speaking Muslims
(5) Political and societal power wielders among Tamils
That the Iirst Iour categories were lording it over the Eelam
Tamils Ior the past Iour decades is a given. Since I have
analyzed the Iirst Iour categories in the previous chapters, I
will discuss the IiIth category in this chapter.
LTTE Victims among the Tamil political and societal
power wielders
According to a list assembled by G.H.Peiris, a proIessor oI
geography at the University oI Peradeniya, in 2000, LTTE
was responsible Ior the death oI 47 'Tamil leaders and
important political activists. To protect his dubious
credibility, Peiris has used the clause 'believed to have been
killed by the LTTE. This is the one oI the comprehensive
list on the LTTE victims, until January 2000. Thus, it
deserves analysis, since this list (in various permutations and
combinations) has been prominently displayed in the internet
combinations) has been prominently displayed in the internet
by the racist Sri Lankan Buddhist websites and even in the
South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) maintained by India`s
mandarins oI Intelligence aIIairs. Another list, prepared by
Walter Liyanarachchi, which added Iew more names oI
LTTE victims appeared in the Cevlon Dailv News oI June 1,
2001.
I should add that I have previously discussed the
circumstances surrounding the killings oI some Tamils
included in the two lists provided by Peiris and
Liyanarachchi; Ior example, Duraiappah |part 13|,
Amirthalingam |part 22|, Yogeswaran |part 22|,
Dharmalingam |part 23|, Alalasundaram |part 23|, Rajani
Thiranagama |part 24|, Sri Sabaratnam |part 39| and
Padmanabha |part 39| who held political and societal
positions.
For record, Iirst I provide the complete list oI victims
(names, positions and date oI killing) prepared by the
Sinhalese academic Peiris, as it appeared in the parochial
Island (Colombo) newspaper oI Dec.27, 2000. This list
include a Iew noticeable Iabrications, since Peiris in turn has
relied on another anti-LTTE polemicist Rohan Gunaratna Ior
assembled list. Secondly, I assess the relevance oI the
attributed leadership criterion` by which the victims` names
gained attention. I have (a) corrected the idiosyncratic
spelling and errors in spelling oI some names, Irom the
original list; (b) noted the Iactual Iabrications within
parentheses.
1.

A.T.Duraiappah : Mayor, JaIIna; 27 July 1975
2.

A.Thiagarajah : UNP organiser, Vaddukoddai; 24 April
1981 |This killing has been identified with PLOTE bv
other observers.|
3.

K.T.Pulendran : UNP organiser, Vavuniya; 19 January
1983
4.

Mala Ramachandran : MMC, Batticaloa; 1 Sept. 1983
5.

R.J.Rajasooriar : UNP organiser, JaIIna; 12 August 1983
6.

S.Gnanachandran : Govt. Agent, Mullaitivu; 24 February
1985
7.

C.E.Anandarajah : School principal; 26 June 1985
8.

B.K.Thambipillai : Chairman, Citizen`s Committee; 22
August 1985
9.

M.Alalasundaram: TULF MP (Kopay); 3 Sept. 1985
|This killing has been identified with TELO bv other
observers.|
10.

K.Rajalingam: TULF MP (Udupiddy); 3 Sept. 1985
|Mr.Rafalingam had a natural death.|
11.

V.Dharmalingam : TULF MP (Manipay); Sept. 1985
|This killing has been identified with TELO bv other
observers.|
12.

K.Thurairatnam : TULF MP (Point Pedro); Sept. 1985
|Mr.Thurairatnam had a natural death.|
13.

P.K.Kirubakaran : Judge, Primary Court; 11 March 1986
14.

Sri Sabaratnam : TELO leader; April/May 1986
15.

K.Padmanabha : EPRLF General Secretary; mid 1986
|The listed date of death is erroneous.|
16.

S.Kathiramalai : NGO social worker; 26 Sept. 1986
17.

P.Vignarajah : Assistant Government Agent,
Sammanthurai; 15 September 1987
18.

P.Anthonimuttu : Government Agent, Batticaloa; 8
October 1987
19.

S.S.Jeganathan : Assistant Government Agent, Batticaloa;
8 October 1987
20.

P.Sinnadurai : Assistant Government Agent, Trincomalee;
26 November 1987
21.

M.E.Kandasamy : School principal; 14 December 1987
22.

S.Sithamparanathan : School principal; 31 January 1988
23.

S.Wijayanandan : District secretary, Communist Party; 8
March 1988
24.

M.Velmurugu : TULF organiser; 20 March 1988
25.

S.Rajshanker : President, Citizen`s Committee; 27
October 1988
26.

S.Sambandamoorthy : TULF, District Development
Council Chairman; 7 March 1989
27.

V.M.Panchalingam : Government Agent, JaIIna; 1 May
1989
28.

K.Pulendran : Assistant Government Agent, Kopay; 28
June 1989
29.

A.Amirthalingam : Leader oI the TULF; 13 July 1989
30.

V.Yogeswaran : TULF MP |JaIIna|; 13 July 1989
31.

Rajani Thiranagama: University teacher political activist;
25 Sept. 1989
32.

P.Ganeshalingam : EPRLF provincial minister; 28 January
1990
33.

S.Thambimuthu : EPRLF MP; 7 May 1990
34.

Mrs. Thambimuthu : Social worker; 7 May 1990
35.

K.Padmanabha : Leader oI the EPRLF; 19 June 1990
|This is the same individual listed as no.15. Thus, a
redundant addition.|
36.

V.Yogasangari : EPRLF MP; 19 June 1990
37.

K.Kanagaratnam : MP, Eastern Province; 15 July 1990
38.

K.Kandasamy : Vice President, DPLF; January 1995
39.

A.Thangathurai : TULF MP; 7 July 1997
40.

S.Nadarajah : Chairman, JaIIna Development Council;
1997
41.

M.Sambandamoorthy : Chairman, Batticaloa
Development Council; 1997 |Again, this is the same
individual listed as no.26|
42.

S.P.Tharmalingam : SLFP organiser, JaIIna; 3 October
1997
43.

Sarojini Yogeswaran : Mayor, JaIIna; 17 May 1998
44.

P.Sivapalan : Mayor, JaIIna; 11 Sept. 1998
45.

P.Mathimugarajah : MMC, JaIIna; 24 December 1998
46.

Neelan Tiruchelvam : TULF MP; 29 July 1999
47.

Vadivelu Wijeratnam : Chairman, Point Pedro Urban
Council; 14 January 2000.
My General Observations on the List of LTTE Victims
It is evident that, when it comes to anti-LTTE propaganda,
the task oI Iact-checking at the editorial desk oI parochial
Island newspaper receives an abysmally low priority. Among
the 47 listed above, two names |that oI K.Padmanabha and
S.Sambandamoorthy| had appeared twice in the list. Two
recognizable names, that oI K.Thurairatnam MP and
K.Rajalingam MP, also do not belong in this list, since both
died oI natural causes. In addition, by consensus, the
assassinations oI three more Iormer Tamil MPs
(A.Thiyagarajah, V.Dharmalingam and M.Alalasundaram)
have been strongly attributed to the cadres oI PLOTE and
TELO. Thus, seven listings have to be deleted Irom the
above list. This reduces the number oI LTTE victims
between July 1975 and January 2000 to 40. For analytical
purposes, one needs to assume in good Iaith that all 40 were
in Iact killed by the LTTE cadres, despite the Iact that there
were other armed mercenary gangs who could have done the
killing at the instigation oI the armies and intelligence
operatives oI Sri Lanka and India, to tarnish the LTTE`s
reputation.
All the 40 Tamil victims are not equal in ranks other than one
criterion that they were believed to have been killed by the
LTTE`. The key-word as stated by ProI. Peiris is believed`.
Among these 40 individuals, apart Irom a Iew like
Among these 40 individuals, apart Irom a Iew like
A.Amirthalingam, V.Yogeswaran and A.Thangathurai, the
identiIication oI all and sundry as Tamil leaders and
important political activists` by blind-sighted Peiris is also
erroneous. Majority oI them were simply power wielders or
power brokers or power peddlers and clearly not leaders.
Also, not all oI them were innocent wall Ilowers. As in any
society, some were selIish turn-coats who looked only Ior
their personal interests in political intrigues. Quite a Iew were
undoubtedly hostages oI the situation` - unIortunate victims,
positioned in the wrong place and at the wrong time
willingly or unwillingly in consultation with the military
adversaries oI the LTTE.
When studying the above list, one pattern is markedly visible.
SigniIicant majority (33 Tamils, Irom A.Thiagarajah`s killing
in April 1981 to K.Kanagaratnam`s assassination in July 1990
in the above list) lost their lives during the period when
J.R.Jayewardene and Premadasa were the heads oI
government. Two related (and probably contributing) Iactors
should be highlighted. It was the decade, when the then
prevailing democratic norms in the island was tossed out by
the Jayewardene-Premadasa cabal which controlled the
island. Also, it was the decade that the Eelam society was
physically and mentally abused by the Indian army between
1987 and 1990.
While LTTE`s opponents had cavalierly tagged the words
Iascism and dictatorship to Pirabhakaran, the real
demonstration oI Iascism, dictatorship and anarchy prevailed
in the 1980s decade. None other than Bertrand Russell had
provided a spitting image oI Jayewardene and Premadasa, in
his classic book Power, Iour decades earlier. Only the words
dead` or death` need to be altered with replaced` or
replacement` in the Iollowing passages. To quote Russell,
'The most successful of democratic politicians are those
who succeed in abolishing democracv and becoming
dictators. This, of course, is onlv possible in certain
circumstances, no one could have achieved it in nineteenth-
centurv England. But when it is possible, it requires onlv a
high degree of the same qualities as are required bv
democratic politicians in general, at anv rate in excited
times. Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler owed their rise to
democracv.
When once a dictatorship has been established, the
qualities bv which a man succeeds a dead dictator are
totallv different from those bv which the dictatorship was
originallv crated. Wire-pulling, intrigue and Court favour
are the most important methods when hereditv is discarded.
For this reason, a dictatorship is sure to change its
character verv considerablv after the death of its founder.
And since the qualities bv which a man succeeds to a
dictatorship are less generallv impressive than those bv
which the regime was created, there is a likelihood of
instabilitv, palace revolutions, and ultimate reversion to
some different svstem.` |Book: Power, George Allen &
Unwin, 1938.|
Russell`s descriptions oI the techniques such as wire-
pulling, intrigue and Court Iavour` by which petty political
turn-coats and middle level administration employees curry
Iavor with the ruling dictatorship is relevant to the
understanding oI the Iate oI the 40 Tamil victims oI LTTE.
Also, what Russell had anticipated in 1938 did occur in Sri
Lankan South Iollowing Premadasa`s ascension oI power,
between 1990 and 1994; 'instability, palace revolutions and
ultimate reversion to some diIIerent system. Among the
LTTE`s political victims, the Iates oI Sam Tambimuttu
(nominally identiIied with EPRLF) and Neelan Tiruchelvam
(nominally identiIied TULF) deserve Iurther analysis.
I do not wish to create an impression that I condone the
killings oI the Tamils by the LTTE. Rather, I provide a
personal point oI view why` they suIIered their Iates. Here,
I use the term Iate` as implied in the Hinduism`s world view,
attributed to the Law oI Karma |Action with Inevitable
Consequences|, which in brieI states, Good is rewarded
with good, evil is rewarded with evil, and the rewarding of
good and evil is onlv a matter of time. This is a delicate
proposition and pliable to twist and abuse by those who are
semi-literate on the karmic belieI, but I subscribe to it.
Pirabhakaran; a leader and power wielder
A distinction between the leader` and power wielder` is
needed Iirst to sort the LTTE victims, many oI whom have
been mis-labeled as leaders` in the Indian and Sri Lankan
press. For this I reIer to James MacGregor Burns. In his
Presidential address entitled, Wellsprings oI Political
Leadership` to the American Political Science Association in
1976, he had deIined the meaning oI power`, and
demarcated the diIIerence between the leader` and power
wielder`. I provide relevant paragraphs:
'Power over human beings is exercised when potential
power wielders, motivated to achieve certain goals oI their
own, marshall capabilities in their power base, such as
economic, institutional and skill resources, that enable them
to inIluence the behavior oI respondents by activating their
motives wants and needs, expectations and values
relevant to those capabilities. This is done in order to realize
the goals oI the power wielders, whether or not these are also
the goals oI the respondents. Power wielders also exercise
inIluence over respondents by mobilizing their own power
base in such a way as to establish direct physical control
over the respondents` behavior, as in a war oI conquest, or
through direct psychological control, as in hypnosis, but
these are relatively restricted exercises oI power, dependent
on certain times, cultures and personalities.. |American
Political Science Review, March 1977, vol.81, pp.266-275|
Then, Burns explains the much misunderstood concept oI
what is leadership?
'Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons
with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition
or conIlict with others, their own institutional, political,
psychological and other resources in such a manner as to
arouse, engage, and satisIy the motives oI Iollowers. This is
done in order to satisIy similar needs and values held by
both leaders and Iollowers. In brieI, leaders with motive and
power bases tap Iollowers` motive bases in order to realize
the purposes oI both leaders and Iollowers. Leadership is
exercised especially in a condition oI conIlict or competition
in which other leaders compete in appealing to the motive-
bases oI potential Iollowers. |ibid|
In the subsequent paragraph, Burns distinguishes the
diIIerence between the leader and the power wielder.
'Thus, leaders constitute a particular kind oI power wielder.
Like power, leadership is relational, purposeIul and
collective. Leadership shares with power the central Iunction
oI achieving purpose. But the reach and domain oI
leadership is, in the short range at least, more limited than
that oI power. Leaders do not obliterate Iollowers` motives
even iI they wish to do so. They lead only other creatures,
not things (and lead animals only to the degree that they
recognize animal motives i.e., leading cattle to shelter rather
than to slaughter). To control things tools, mineral
resources, money, energy is an act oI power, not
leadership, Ior things have no motives; power wielders, but
not leaders, may treat people as things. And unlike the power
holder, who may operate in a closed system, leaders act in a
context oI conIlict and competition. All leaders are actual or
potential power wielders, but not all power wielders are
leaders. Conceptually, leadership is a subset oI power.
|ibid|
The fate of EPRLF Power Wielders
The distinction provided by Burns between the leader and
the power wielder provides relevance to the list oI LTTE`s
believed to be` victims. In aligning the date oI killing in
relation to which party controlled the axle oI political power
in the island |the SLFP, the UNP or India`s mandarins|, the
designations oI quite a Iew individuals Iunctioning as UNP
organiser`, SLFP organiser`, EPRLF MP or EPRLF
provincial minister reveal that who Iell victims oI the LTTE
were power wielders and power peddlers oI certain rank.
Some additional quotes Irom the policy paper published in
the Annual Report of the Indian Defence Review 1989, cited
in the previous chapter |The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
part 48|, reveals the circumstances clearly on why quite a
Iew leading members oI the EPRLF became the victims oI
LTTE in 1990. India`s policy mandarins had the nerve to
pontiIicate the Iollowing:
'.In purely military terms, India had ensured the emergence
oI a Tamil leadership more amenable to her interests. This
oI a Tamil leadership more amenable to her interests. This
alarmed both the Sri Lanka and the LTTE. In yet another
volte-Iace the Sinhalas and the LTTE joined hands to
demand an ouster oI the IPKF in July 1989. In very stark
terms the matrix oI Indian options was as Iollows:
(a)

Nativi:e the conflict. India had succeeded in installing a
pro-Indian Tamil group in power. This now had to be
strengthened militarily so that the conIlict could be
nativized. This implied raising an EPRLF/ENDLF armed
Iorce that would progressively take over the burden oI
Iighting the LTTE. The pertinent point was that this could
not be achieved overnight. The Soviets had taken almost
nine years to bring the AIghan Army to Iull Iighting
potential, so that it could hold its own against the
Mujahideen. This implied that India would have to
maintain her present level oI Iorce commitment Ior at least
two to three years more while the EPRLF Iorce Iound its
military legs and completed its period oI probation
Iighting.
(b)

Come to Terms with the LTTE. The pertinent military
diIIerence between the AIghan-Sri Lankan scenarios was
that by a brutal process oI natural selection` the LTTE
had emerged as the most powerIul Tamil resistance
group. To that extent an Indian decision to come to Iinal
terms with it by giving its due share in the democratic set-
up in the North-est would be a most logical one. The Sri
Lankan conIlict had seen too many mind-boggling about-
Iaces, U-turns and changes oI alignments that one more
would make little diIIerence. II the Sri Lankans and the
LTTE could sink their diIIerences, why couldn`t the
Indian leadership also alter course? Nations have no
permanent Iriends, only permanent interests. This was
ideal. But was this still possible? Much blood had been
split on both sides and resumption oI such a dialogue
would need a major political initiative Irom the very top.
With the change in political leadership aIter the elections
|Note bv Sri Kantha: This was in reIerence to the 1989
elections, in which Rajiv Gandhi lost the prime
ministership to V.P.Singh| this has become a very viable
and attractive option. It would be relatively much easier
Ior the new Indian administration to come to terms with
Ior the new Indian administration to come to terms with
the LTTE.
(c)

The third, somewhat extreme option, was for the Indians
to come to a clear-cut decision that the LTTE had
turned renegade and had to be destroved militarilv
whatever the costs. This would have called Ior the
induction oI minimum oI say two more divisions and the
unrestricted employment oI oIIensive air support to act as
a Iorce multiplier to oIIset the lack oI adequate ground
troops.
Both options (a) and (c) would involve India in a long
politico-military haemorrhage. However, beyond a particular
point it becomes a question oI loss oI Iace` and such a loss
may not be palatable to a regional superpower. |Lanka
Guardian, Aug.1, 1990, pp.11-21|
It is apparent now that though India`s policy mandarins
opined that both options (a) and (c) would result in a long
politico-military hemorrhage` in this 1989 policy paper, they
eventually opted Ior these two options. Option (a) was
pursued as described above by their purported nativization
oI the conIlict` through propping up the EPRLF and
establishing the Tamil National Army, both turning out to be
Ilops. And when the Indian army was Iorced to leave by the
end oI March 1990, the Option (c) was modiIied to a mole
operation` to destroy the LTTE leadership.
The Tragedy of Sam Tambimuttu - an Eastern Front
Tamil Activist
Among the many LTTE victims, the Iate oI Sam Tambimuttu
(a noted politician and a reputable contact source Ior
inIormation` on the Eastern Front, according to journalist
Mervyn de Silva`s eulogy) had puzzled me a lot. Thus, I
provide two descriptions Ieaturing Tambimuttu`s activities in
late 1980s. These were penned by the Anderson brothers Ior
their War Zones (1988) book and William McGowan`s
memoirs Ior his Onlv Man is Jile. The Tragedv of Sri
Lanka (1992). Since these authors are Americans, one can
accept a reasonable degree oI neutrality in the recorded
activities oI Tambimuttu. One distinction between the two
books may provide some clues to the Iate oI Tambimuttu.
books may provide some clues to the Iate oI Tambimuttu.
To the Anderson brothers who interviewed him in 1987, he
presented the Iace oI a notable human rights activist. He
became a member oI parliament representing EPRLF (then
Iunctioning as India`s puppets) in early 1989. McGowan also
presents him as a shrewd businessman engaged in shady
deals. In May 1990, Tambimuttu was killed.
Tambimuttu, as interviewed bv Anderson brothers in 1987
I present Tambimuttu`s story, as interviewed by Anderson
brothers, in entirety two and a half pages in the book],
since he describes the mind-boggling notorious activities oI
the Sri Lankan government`s antiterrorist Special Task Force
(STF) in torturing and ethnic cleansing oI Tamils oI all ages
in the Eastern Front. It was an important published
document, condemning the Nazi-style torture meted out to
Eelam Tamils by the Jayewardene-Premadasa cabal who
ruled in the 1980s. Please note that the numbers oI Tamil
victims Tambimuttu quoted in his interview are in not tens or
hundreds but thousands.
Andersons also identiIied Tambimuttu as a bearish Tamil
lawyer turned shrimp Iarmer`. McGowan provides
inIormation in his book that this shrimp Iarming activity
caused the downIall oI Tambimuttu. First I reproduce
Tambimuttu`s recorded interview to the Andersons. Words
within parentheses, and elliptical dots (Ior omission) are as in
the original.
'You must Iirst understand the attitude oI the STF. They are
all young chaps in their teens. II you watch them going out
on their vehicles, they go like you would expect a person
going on a saIari to go. When you go on a saIari, big-game
hunting, you get on top oI the hood with guns pointed out.
Here, this has become a saIari Ior the young Iellows, but the
game are human beings. They go around the streets; iI they
see somebody running, they Iire at him! The only
provocation is that a man is running!
Now, there was a land-mine incident just down the road.
Following that, the STF indiscriminately opened Iire
everywhere. Thirteen persons were oIIicially reported killed.
About twenty-eight persons were missing subsequently; we
About twenty-eight persons were missing subsequently; we
don`t know what happened to them, but we know, we have
evidence, that some oI them were killed and their bodies
taken away. Here, once the Force shoots a person the body
is taken away, old tires are heaped, and the body burned.
ThereaIter, there is absolutely no evidence that the person
ever existed! It`s very easy Ior the state to turn around and
say, X, who is missing Irom his home, has become a
terrorist. He is hiding in England or he is hiding in
Germany.`
They must have learnt the lesson aIter the last |world| war.
Germany made the mistake oI leaving skeletons behind
(smiles); in concentration camps, you Iound millions oI
skeletons. So these people are not going to leave any
evidence behind. That`s why they burn all the bodies. Here,
they are legally entitled to burn the bodies in their camp.
They are allowed to; it`s not written into a law, but, under the
emergency regulations, the Coordinating OIIicer is permitted
to dispose oI the body however he thinks Iit.
What we do is, when a person comes to us and tells us that
so-and-so has been arrested by the Iorces, we do not take
any step immediately; we wait Ior three days, because a large
number oI persons who have been arrested are released
subsequently. But aIter three days, iI he is not released, we
immediately write to the Coordinating OIIicer.
We have a system with the CO.. You see, when a person is
arrested and taken to these camps, the state does not provide
him with any clothes whatsoever. So, even iI he is kept there
Ior one or two years, he has only the clothes that he has been
wearing, nothing else. So we request that the next oI kin be
permitted to give them clothes. So, aIter about three days,
the next oI kin take a change oI clothes to the camp and they
hand over the clothes, and iI they accept the clothes, we
know that the person is alive and in the camp. But iI
somebody comes back and tells us, I went to the camp;
they reIused to accept his clothes,` then we know that
something is wrong and immediately we write to the CO
asking Ior his whereabouts. Invariably, the reply comes in
that he has not been arrested.
(Thambimuttu opens a loose-leaI binder.) In all these cases,
we have aIIidavits by persons who saw the person being
taken away by the STF. We prepared this list in May oI `86,
oI persons arrested by the STF Iorces whose whereabouts
are not known. This list gives the name oI the person, his
address, age, place where he was arrested, and by whom he
was arrested. We sent this list to the Coordinating OIIicer. I
sent 359 names and asked him Ior the whereabouts oI these
persons. I received a letter Irom him in September 1986; I
have it here. It says there is only one person who had been
sent to Boose |detention camp|. The reply to everybody else
was, not arrested`. That means they have killed them. Now,
the number oI people who have disappeared in this district is
roughly about seven hundred.
According to the Prevention oI Terrorism Act, any person
can be taken into custody on suspicion oI being a terrorist; it
says, any person`. But it is not merely a person who is
being taken into custody; they are taking entire villages!
Which certainly is not the intention oI the law, but there is
nothing we can do about it.
Say in one oI their cordon-and-search operations, they round
up a thousand people. They are kept there, and people like
government servants and old people are released, and so
maybe Iive hundred will be taken to the camp. There, they
pass beIore a hooded inIormant. II he nods his head, it
means that person stays in the camp and goes through the
Iull range oI torture. The others are released. This takes a
period oI three, Iour days. Along the way, a Iew chaps may
get bumped oII. Or there at the camp, in the helicopter
training` |torture|, one or two may die. These are the cases
that become missing`.
This maltreatment is virtually throwing the local people into
the militants` camps, because iI they join the militants they
are saIe. II they remain at home, they are invariably caught
and taken and killed or sent to Boosa. So, the only way to
escape is to join the militants, and once you do, you know
how to avoid these chaps!
Now the biggest problem we have here is that about thirty-
Iive hundred breadwinners oI Iamilies have been either
arrested, are in detention camps, or in Boosa, or missing, or
arrested, are in detention camps, or in Boosa, or missing, or
are dead. These thirty-Iive hundred Iamilies are destitute,
with absolutely no means oI sustenance. We are also worried
whenever an advanced-level or university student is picked
up; invariably, they never come back.
You know, this area is essentially an agricultural and Iishing
area, but because oI constant raids and constant harassing,
these people now reIuse to go into the Iields. So much so
that |rice| paddy cultivation in this area has decreased by as
much as Iorty percent. This has been going on Ior the past
three years. Batticaloa was a surplus rice-producing area, but
now we have to get our rice down Irom elsewhere. This
aIIects others, too; you see, the entire community exists on
the income oI paddy. You have the paddy miller, you have
the paddy trader, you have the man who pounds the paddy
and sells the rice. So the throwback, as Iar as employment is
concerned, is vast.
In Batticaloa, we live Ior the evening, not even the next day.
LiIe has become so uncertain. Everything is so uncertain that
in the morning you only think oI the evening and nothing
beyond that. All our actions are based on the immediate
necessities, rather than on thinking oI the morrow. We don`t
go out aIter six. You see, in Batticaloa, by six o`clock, liIe is
over. There`s absolutely no social contact between people.
This is also aIIecting children. You see, iI you hear a noise,
you immediately think that there is a blast somewhere. II
you`re on the streets and you hear a sound, you think there`s
a blast and you`re running Ior shelter somewhere.
Now, every parent who can aIIord to, sends his child out oI
the country.You know, one Iear that we have is, iI this
goes on, we may lose the Ilower oI our youth! That may be
the end oI the community. I suppose that is what the
government wants also. |Book: War Zones, Dodd, Mead &
C, New York, 1988, pp.217-219|
It is puzzling to understand that the same Sam Tambimuttu
who condemned the activities oI Sri Lanka`s Gestapo-gang
in 1987 to Anderson brothers, became an inIormant to the
same Gestapo-gang, one or two years later. This is revealed
in William McGowan`s book, which appeared two years
Iollowing Tambimuttu`s killing.
Iollowing Tambimuttu`s killing.
Complex Persona of Tambimuttu, as presented bv William
McGowan in 1992
Like the Anderson brothers, McGowan also had visited
Batticaloa in late 1980s and met Tambimuttu. He presented
the story about Tambimuttu, as Iollows:
'I spent a little time Iollowing up on the rumors oI the prawn
Iarm massacre. Sam Tambimuttu, the very man who had
brieIed us the year beIore on the details oI the massacre,
had, according to reports, played a role in that incident.
According to the American who was managing the Iarm at
the time, the Iarm`s directors, oI whom Sam was one, had
been divided about continuing operations amid the prevailing
political chaos. The Tigers had also set up camp right next
door, which made it appear as though the Iarm had close ties
to the rebels. Sam, it was said, saw an opportunity to proIit
Irom the predicament. II the Iarm ceased operations, he
could buy it Irom the current owners at a very cheap price
and could let it lie Iallow Ior a Iew years until the conIlict was
over, at which point he would be the sole owner oI a very
proIitable enterprise. To induce the owners to quit, he had
allegedly inIormed the Special Task Force that the Iarm was
a nest oI Tigers, thinking they would close it down. Instead,
they had wiped out the entire staII in a Irenzy oI retribution
Ior the soldiers killed in the nearby landmine blast.
Sam had dismissed the whole story as Tiger propaganda.
According to Rajah |Note bv Sri Kantha. whom McGowan
has identiIied in a previous page as retired accountant
S.R.Rajah|, with whom I had a tea later that day, Sam had all
along used his position to enrich himselI. How did he get
the money to build his two houses?` Rajah wanted to know.
These haven`t exactly been boom times Ior lawyers, you
know`. And wasn`t it suspicious that the man who had
replaced Sam doing the human rights work in Batti had been
imprisoned by the Indians?
Father Hebert |Note bv Sri Kantha: the same Louisiana-born
Father Hebert, whose disappearance I had described in part
47 oI this series|, who ran the technical institute Irom which
47 oI this series|, who ran the technical institute Irom which
several oI the massacred workers had graduated, made the
most convincing case. Hebert believed Sam was still angling
to assume ownership oI the potentially lucrative prawn Iar.
He gave inIormation to the Special Task Force to better his
position, but it wound up boomeranging on him. It backIired
much bigger than anyone could have imagined, and made
him a hunted man.`
I didn`t know what to believe. Most oI the rumors I
dismissed as disinIormation. But iI Sam had collaborated`
with the Iorces in the prawn Iarm incident, he wouldn`t be
the Iirst to put selI-interest ahead oI Tamil solidarity. Many
oI the inIormants were members oI other militant groups
who were oIIering their services to the Indians in return Ior
protection and advantage at a later date. Others were lone
operators. |Book: Onlv Man is Jile. The Tragedv of Sri
Lanka, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1992, pp.243-
244|
Towards the end oI his book, in the Epilogue, McGowan
also recorded the disappearance oI Fr. Eugene Hebert with
the words, 'It was strongly suspected that the army and the
police had a hand in Hebert`s death. He had made insistent
protests over unjust detentions and other human rights
abuses in Batticaloa.
The prawn Iarm massacre, which McGowan reIers to in the
Iirst sentence oI the quoted passage reIers to the Iirst
Kokkaddichcholai Massacre |which happened at the adjacent
Mahilattivu village oI January 27, 1987| in Eelam history. In a
presentation made at the International ConIerence on Tamil
Nationhood and Search Ior Peace in Sri Lanka |Carleton
University, Ottawa, Ontario, May 21-22, 1999|
anthropologist Margaret Trawick had shed more light on the
shady deal oI Sam Tambimuttu, by interviewing one oI the
Tamil victims' siblings and incorporating the Iacts into her
paper. I quote the segment relating to Tambimuttu`s deal,
Irom ProI. Trawick`s paper, since the minor details were
missing Irom McGowan`s description.
'The Prawn Project was an American scheme. Earlier, an
EPRLF MP, whose name was Sam Tambimuttu, had a
business partnership with an American. While Sam
business partnership with an American. While Sam
Tambimuttu was working in this partnership, the partners
bought some paddy Iields Ior ready cash`, cleared the
bush, and put a prawn pond there. They bought those Iields
Irom poor people. They paid Rs. 2,500 per acre. Out oI
each 2,500, the poor people got 500, and Tambimuttu
secretly took 2,000. At that time, the people did not know.
They were poor people they took the 500. A couple oI
months later, the people somehow Iound out, and went and
told the American partner. Then, that American asked
(Tambimuttu). When he asked, Sam Tambimuttu denied it.
Sam Tambimuttu was ousted Irom the partnership. Then
Sam Tambimuttu got angry. Out oI anger, he had two
laborers plant a bomb in the pump that was used to Iill the
prawn pond with water.
AIter that, Irom the American scheme, the LTTE bought
kerosene, diesel oil, petroleum. Sam Tambimuttu told the
police headquarters in Colombo that there was a connection
between the prawn project and the LTTE. Sam Tambimuttu
drew a map oI the project Ior them. AIter that, the STF came
here on November 2, 1986..
In sum, when aligning the killing oI Sam Tambimuttu in May
1990, Fr.Hebert`s view oI Tambimuttu`s role as an inIormant
to the STF and the subsequent disappearance and death oI
Fr. Hebert in late 1990, one can reasonably inIer that
Tambimuttu`s Iate was sealed when, in the words oI
McGowan, he put selI-interest ahead oI Tamil solidarity.`
|To be Continued.|


Part 50
Sachi Sri Kantha
28 December, 2002]

Thwarting the Careers of Closet Tamil
Operatives
LTTE has been condemned strongly Ior the assassinations
oI Sam Tambimuttu and Neelan Tiruchelvam, as well as the
execution oI its one-time deputy leader, Mahendrarajah (aka
Mahattaya). As expected, condemnations came Irom those
circles (in Colombo, Chennai, New Delhi and Washington,
DC) who had close links to these three Tamils, whom one
can label as Closet Tamil Operatives (CTOs). Expressed
eulogies to these CTOs deserve dissection to reveal the cant
implied in them.
Mervyn de Silva`s eulogy to Tambimuttu
The dictionary deIines eulogy as, (1) a spoken or written
piece oI high praise, esp. when delivered publicly. (2) great
praise. The word eulogy` is derived Irom, two Greek
words; eu | good, well, easy, agreeable| and |legein to
speak|. I quote excerpts Irom Mervyn de Silva`s eulogy to
Sam Tambimuttu, written within the black-border lines
symbolizing sorrow:
'.Right through the war` in the east, beIore and aIter the
arrival oI the IPKF, Sam Thambimuttu was the reporter`s
Iirst choice Ior what in the proIessional patois is called a
check` and a double check`.There was the more exacting
proIessional demand rooted in the very character oI a highly
competitive proIession. Beat your rival. Get the story out
Iirst.
For the Ioreign correspondent` (the Ioreign-Ioreign, or the
local stringer) the source is vital. So is the ready access to
the source. But most oI all, reliability. And credibility. Since
this is not a personal, but a proIessional`s tribute to Sam
this is not a personal, but a proIessional`s tribute to Sam
Thambimuttu, I have had to break an old established rule not
to reveal the source. In this case, however, Sam`s assistance
to the International press, particularly to the BBC, was hardly
a secret. His name has been mentioned a hundred times.

Nothing reveals the man better than his role as a regular news
source. And since there are no real secrets in this little island,
Batticaloa or Colombo, certainly the English-educated
Sinhala-Tamil-Muslim community, knew all about Sam`s
work as chairman oI the Citizens Committee. In Iact,
Everyman`s Mouthpiece, Lawyer, the Community`s PR
man, Batticaloa`s link to the world.
And why Sam, not somebody else? He was independent.
though he sported a party label. He was outspoken, perhaps
too outspoken. He respected the press, and understood its
role, recognised its role, recognised its needs and its
importance. He realised that the best service to his own
people` was to let the world know what was going on.
|Lanka Guardian, May 15, 1990, p.3|
Hardly any Sri Lankan will doubt that Mervyn de Silva is an
excellent writer. What he projects and what he omits have
proIound meanings. In his brieI, but touching eulogy,
Mervyn de Silva, while mentioning the many caps worn by
Tambimuttu, had willingly omitted one role oI his valuable
source` - that oI a wily shrimp Iarmer. And Mervyn de Silva
had not deviated Irom the spirit oI eulogy i.e, speak only
the good, well, easy and agreeable`. Kindly note that the
meaning oI eulogy does not have any roots linking to truth`.

Even when American correspondent William McGowan
published his brieI expose on Tambimuttu`s shady deals
with shrimp Iarming subsequently, as presented in the
previous chapter |see, Part 49|, Mervyn de Silva Iailed to
amend his eulogy on his once vital news source` Irom the
East.
Eulogies to Neelan Tiruchelvam
II the eulogies oIIered Ior Sam Tambimuttu`s killing in 1990
amounted to pound equivalents, the killing oI Neelakandan
Tiruchelvam (hereaIter abbreviated as Neelan) on July 29,
Tiruchelvam (hereaIter abbreviated as Neelan) on July 29,
1999, elicited eulogies at ton equivalents Irom diverse
quarters, who beneIited Irom Neelan`s expertise as an
inIormant. At the time oI his death, Neelan held the nominal
position as one oI the Vice Presidents oI the Tamil United
Liberation Front, and was a nominated member oI the Sri
Lankan parliament. Despite this relatively low-proIile ranking,
the then American President Bill Clinton oIIered an eulogy.
The US State Department mourned the loss oI one oI its
ranking sources` |in positive as well as negative contexts|
on Sri Lanka. KoIi Annan, the Secretary General oI the UN,
condemned the LTTE in not so uncertain terms. Quite a
number oI SelI indulgent Obscurantist Rights Evangelists
(SOREs) in Sri Lanka and India sobbed with words
uncontrollably in the news media. It is oI relevance to note
that Neelan`s proIessional career has a precedence in the
American War oI Independence that oI despicable social
climber and scientist Benjamin Thompson (better known Ior
scientists as Count RumIord). Thompson, was a colonial
American who spied on the American colonies Ior the
British, and was later knighted by King George III.
The unusual high-octane eulogy oIIered Ior any Sri Lankan
was received Irom the US State Department on July 29,
1999. For record, I provide this somber text couched in
diplomatic lingo and euphemism - in Iull:
'US Department oI State
OIIice oI the Spokesman
July 29, 1999.
Statement by Philip T.Decker, Acting Spokesman
Sri Lanka. Assassination of Dr.Tiruchelvam
It is with proIound regret that we learned oI the murder today
oI Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam on the streets oI Colombo, the
capital oI Sri Lanka. Dr.Tiruchelvam was a respected
academic and constitutional law expert, the Director oI the
International Centre Ior Ethnic Studies and a member oI
parliament representing the Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF), a moderate Tamil political party. He was killed by a
suicide bomber on his way to work. Several bystanders were
suicide bomber on his way to work. Several bystanders were
also injured.
The attack appears to be the work oI the terrorist LTTE,
Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam, who have been waging a
separatist war in Sri Lanka`s north and east Ior more than 16
years. The United States has long urged the LTTE to cease
its terrorist activities, to stop immediately the killing oI non-
combatants and civilians and to seek peaceIul means oI
pursuing its political ends. We designated the LTTE as a
Ioreign terrorist organization in 1997.
The United States has always supported, and continues to
support, a peaceIul resolution to the conIlict through
negotiations among all parties. We believe the Government
oI Sri Lanka has put Iorward realistic and sincere proposals
Ior constitutional reIorm that could help toward this end.
The United States extends its sincere condolences to
Dr.Tiruchelvam`s Iamily, Iriends and associates, and to the
other victims oI this bombing and condemns in the strongest
possible terms this outrage.
Dr.Tiruchelvam had many Iriends and colleagues in the
United States. He Ireely shared his knowledge and
conviction oI the possibility Ior a peaceIul resolution to Sri
Lanka`s ethnic conIlict. He had taught at Harvard and was
scheduled to teach there again this autumn. So, we in the
United States also share the terrible sense oI loss oI his
Iamily and country.
It is my assessment that the last four sentences, couched in
euphemism, reveal to some extent Neelans closet links to
American officials and Intelligence operatives and exposes
the motive of such a high-octane eulogv offered bv the US
Department of State.
On July 30, 1999, the day Iollowing Neelan`s killing,
President Bill Clinton extended his 'deepest condolences
Irom Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina where he was visiting.
The Iull text, as released by the US State Department is as
Iollows:
'THE WHITE HOUSE
OIIice oI the Press Secretary
(Sarajevo-Bosnia-Herzegovina)
July 30, 1999
Statement bv the President
Hillary and I were shocked and saddened by the tragic death
oI Neelan Tiruchelvam at the hands oI terrorists in Sri Lanka
today. We extend our deepest condolences to his wiIe and
Iamily.
Neelan Tiruchelvam was a constitutional lawyer and human
rights advocate who was well-known and well-respected Iar
beyond his country. He devoted himselI to seeking a
peaceIul and just solution to the tragic conIlict that has
caused so much bloodshed in Sri Lanka.
Hillary was deeply moved by her meeting with
Mr.Tiruchelvam during her 1995 visit to Sri Lanka. With his
death, a powerIul voice Ior reconciliation in Sri Lanka has
been silenced. I hope that this tragedy will spur eIIorts to
Iind an end to the Iighting and to build a lasting peace in Sri
Lanka.
At the end oI Clinton presidency, Americans as well as non-
Americans have come to learn that President Clinton`s errors
oI judgement both personal and proIessional - are
monumental. Monica Lewinsky scandal and the presidential
pardons oI Clinton are two best examples. Thus, Clinton`s
special condolence on the killing oI Neelan, issued Irom
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina could also be attributed as
none other than another minor error oI judgement. Or could
it be, that President Clinton was sincere in oIIering the
condolence, as the US State oIIicials and Intelligence
operatives lost a loyal inIormant, who worked Ior them under
cover? And LTTE`s assassination oI Neelan eliminated one
vital Colombo source, who had close links to the dictators
oI power in Sri Lanka.
Evaluating the eulogies delivered for Neelan
Tiruchelvam
It is oI relevance to dissect the essence oI eulogies delivered
Ior Neelan, Irom the side oI Eelam Tamils. The openly
expressed views oI three contemporary Eelam Tamils, oI
which one is mine, is presented below.
(1) bv S.Sivanavagam, the fournalist.
'.This man who held no oIIice, wielded no ostensible
power, not a man oI the people by any means, and what is
worse, a Tamil by birth in a country where Tamils as a
people have long been reduced to second class citizenship,
has now emerged in death, (iI not in liIe), as a seemingly
more deserving Iigure than the rest oI them Ior public
lionizing. How does one account Ior this paradox?
Even President Clinton and his good First Lady Hillary
thought it Iit to come down Irom superpower perch and
brush aside all norms oI protocol to say how saddened and
shocked` they were to learn the death oI a man whom hardly
any American citizen would have heard oI, or even oI the
little country that he came Irom. UN chieI KoIi Annan, not to
be leIt behind, showed prooI that the world was indeed a
global village with hardly any distance separating Manhattan
Irom Rosmead Place in Colombo 7.
Condolences and condemnatory messages came Irom the
Foreign Ministers oI Canada and Australia. The Times
(London), The Guardian, The Independent, The New York
Times, Toronto`s Globe & Mail (who usually run long
obituaries oI people whom most readers are not even sure
whether such people were alive) gave more space Ior this
man`s death than to report the death oI 60,000 civilian
killings in Sri Lanka..
There is no questioning the many personal virtues ascribed
to Neelan as a man, as a scholar, as a jurist and as an
academic and constitutional pundit. But all that do not add
up to the motivations behind the adulatory postures struck
by many oI his obituary writers. The reason is not Iar to
seek. Every man who enters public liIe chooses his own
Iavourable constituency and builds on it, which is a Iact oI
liIe; and some obituary writers have their own private
agendas.
One can assert with certainty that had poor Neelan died oI
natural causes, halI those obituaries would not have been
written and whatever written would not have had the Iire`
that characterised those eulogies. To put it in plain language,
many oI them exploited the assassination at the hands oI a
suspected Tiger suicide bomber to use the opportunity to
indulge in Tiger-bashing. What a pity, even in death, he had
played into the hands oI those whose only motive was to
discredit the LTTE.
Copious reIerences were made to Neelan being a
moderate`, a democrat`, and so on, but surely he was not
killed Ior being any oI this? The one writer who came closest
to Iinding the right word to describe the victim in the eyes oI
the assassin AND INDEED IN THE EYES OF THE
WIDER TAMIL COMMUNITY, was Lakshman
Gunasekera (Sunday Observer, August 1). That word was
COLLABORATOR.
Collaborators, as anyone who knows the history oI peoples
Iighting Ior justice and Ireedom know, end up by being
executed by their own people, status notwithstanding. In
war-time phraseology the word collaborator` (with the
enemy) invokes in people a sense oI shame and anger. II
what is happening in Sri Lanka is not war, what else is it?.
|Hot Spring magazine, London, Aug-Sept. 1999, pp.1 & 3|
(2) by G.G.(Kumar) Ponnambalam Jr., Iellow lawyer and
politician:
Kumar Ponnambalam`s lengthy assessment on the
assassination oI Neelan appeared in the Sundav Times
(Colombo) oI Sept.19, 1999. But in this published version,
as one would expect Irom the servile Colombo press, almost
halI oI the Ieature, containing quite a number oI unIlattering
paragraphs, was deleted. I provide only excerpts oI Kumar
Ponnambalam`s assessment, and the deleted paragraphs
Irom the Sundav Times are shown in italics.
'..I wish to place on record the Ieelings oI a preponderant
section oI the Tamils on the matter oI Dr. Tiruchelvam`
death. Eulogies have come in Irom abroad and locally. From
Ioreigners and Irom Sinhalese. Indeed, at this time, it is the
done thing to say all the good things about a dead person.
But there has been hardly a good word Ior him Irom some oI
the Tamils, whether Irom abroad or locally. Why this glaring
dichotomy?..
In 1997 October when President Kumaratunga, at a
weeklv meeting of financial officials on Fridavs, blurted she
would get onto the streets and attack Tamils if the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked
Buddhist places of worship and this leaked out and there
was a hue and crv from the Tamil quarter, Tiruchelvam
feigned anothers signature in an irrelevant and
disgraceful letter to the President which sought,
dishonestlv, to bale the President out of a verv difficult
position. To sav that Tiruchelvam is a paragon of virtue,
even after this notorious act, is nothing but midsummer
madness. The Tamils have not forgotten this.
Tiruchelvam is described as a crusader for peace and a
tireless worker towards resolution of conflicts. After
Tiruchelvams death, it has surfaced that he was
abandoning Parliament and the Peace Package for
pastures new and that he was going to take up a teaching
assignment in America on 1
st
September 1999. Some
interested parties want the people to accept the Peace
Package as this would be the least that thev could do in
the memorv of Tiruchelvam. But if D.B.S.Jevarafs eulogv
at page 10 of The Hindu of 7-8-99 [Note bv Sri Kantha.
Aug.7, 1999] is anvthing to go bv, Tiruchelvam obviouslv
did not tell Jevaraf, even as late as 35 minutes before his
death, that he was leaving the shores in a matter of davs.
On the contrarv, Tiruchelvam had - even minutes before
this death -wanted a little more time in Parliament to
accomplish his goal of achieving a political settlement. It
will not be easv unravalling this strange situation, more so
if we take into consideration what the President has said
about presenting the Peace Package to Parliament bv the
end of August 1999. This, too, has raised Tamil evebrows
and all sorts of questions are being asked in Tamil circles.
Was Tiruchelvam decamping after ensuring his pension?
Where is his commitment to the Peace Cause, leave alone
the Tamils? The Tamils have not forgotten this.
Tiruchelvam is described as an international Iigure`. OI
particular interest to Tamils was the Iact that he was
Chairman oI the Minority Rights Group International. This
organization did a study oI Sri Lanka aIter the present
Government came into power and brought out a report in
February 1996 with special reIerence to the Tamils. It was an
indictment against his Iriend the Sinhalese Government.
The Report had many recommendations. Some Tamil
organizations had written to Tiruchelvam during his
stewardship requesting him to use his good oIIices with the
Government to which he was so close (as has been now
made out by representatives oI this Government) and
alleviate the distress oI the Tamils. He just would not move
in the matter. The Tamils have not forgotten this.
In Julv 1998 when President Kumaratunga went to distant
South Africa and came out with the bloomer that the
Tamils are not the original people of this island and there
was a mass protest from Tamils, here and abroad, there
was not a whimper from the international personalitv that
Tiruchelvam was. He could have used his good offices as
an international figure that he was held out to be, to
neutrali:e this statement, more so, when he had the
opportunitv to do so as he was in South Africa soon after
the Presidents characteristicallv ill-conceived outburst. He
did nothing. The Tamils have not forgotten this.
To make matters worse, Foreign Minister Lucky Kadirigama
who, incidentally, was suddenly catapulted into the political
arena Irom nowhere, due largely to a typical Tiruchelvam
machination, completely let down his Iriend by calling a
press conIerence on 2-8-99 |Note bv Sri Kantha: Aug.2,
1999| and announcing, with pompous Iinality, that
Tiruchelvam was a virtual consultant to the Foreign Ministry.
This has opened the eves of the Tamils who now charge
that Tiruchelvam, with his international connections as
was evidenced bv the outpourings that came from abroad
and specificallv from America, had a hand in the
designation of the LTTE [as a terrorist organi:ation] and
that Tiruchelvam was indeed a CIA agent. A greater dis-
service Kadirigama could not have done to Tiruchelvam.
In spite of the fact that the President had done nothing
about Tiruchelvams Peace Package for three vears, that
he should have thought that she was still the best bet for
the Tamils when the whole Tamil Nation was arraigned
against the President for vears showed not onlv
Tiruchelvams political acumen but also the distance he
occupied from the Tamil Nation.
Friends oI Tiruchelvam have said that the Tamils have kept
their distance Irom Tiruchelvam because oI Iear oI the LTTE
and as the Indian Express has said mortgaged its soul to
the LTTE. I do not think the LTTE would ever think oI
videoing those who attended the Tiruchelvam Iuneral in order
to take it out oI those Tamils. Such modus operandi are
onlv carried out bv a despotic Sinhala Government to
intimidate and harass Tamils who attend Tamil political
meetings in the vastlv predominant Sinhala
Colombo..|Hot Spring magazine, London, Sept-Oct.1999,
pp.15-18|
(3) bv Sachi Sri Kantha, an academic:
I Iocused on one particular point G.G.Ponnambalam Jr. had
expressed in his assessment that oI Neelan being a CIA
agent in my letter to the Hot Spring magazine. Excerpts:
'The allegation oI being a CIA agent in Sri Lanka is a serious
one to tag to any individual. Thus, one sentence in
G.G.Ponnambalam (Jr.)`s excellent commentary on the
political career oI late Neelan Tiruchelvam deserves Iurther
analysis. (Hot Spring, Aug-Sept.`99). This particular
sentence states, .Tamils who now charge that
Tiruchelvam, with his international connections` as was
evidenced by the outpourings that came Irom abroad and
speciIically Irom America, had a hand in the designation oI
the LTTE |as a terrorist organization`| and that Tiruchelvam
was indeed a CIA agent.` Is there any proverbial smoking
gun` Ior the charge that Neelan could have been a CIA
agent?
BeIore I read G.G.Ponnambalam (Jr.)`s commentary in the
Hot Spring, I was intrigued by a couple oI tid-bits which
appeared in the eulogy oI Celia Dugger to Neelan, published
in the New York Times oI Aug.24. In it she had written as
in the New York Times oI Aug.24. In it she had written as
Iollows:
Tiruchelvam`s elder son, Nirgunan, 26, an investment
banker in Singapore, became almost obsessed with his
Iather`s security. He begged his Iather to stay inside their
house, or to wear a bullet prooI vest and travel in a bomb-
prooI car. The son tracked down an aging bomb-prooI
Jaguar that had carried the Queen oI England when she
visited Sri Lanka in the early oI 1980s. But when his Iather
used the car, it broke down. The one garage that could Iix it
always seemed to be busy.`
I Ieel that some vital inIormation is missing in the above
passage. How Nirgunan was able to locate the bomb-prooI
Jaguar which carried the Queen oI England Ior his dad? Did
he receive any extraordinary help Irom Ioreign hands` to
purchase this car? Why only one garage` could Iix this
bullet-prooI car? Why this one garage` was always busy`?
How many months (or years) did Neelan use this car?.
Unless evidence to the contrary is revealed publicly,
messages oI condolences oIIered by KoIi Annan as well as
President Bill Clinton on Neelan`s untimely death have to be
taken as a circumstantial evidence oI a link between Neelan
Tiruchelvam and CIA. |Hot Spring magazine, London,
Oct.-Nov.1999, p.14|
When this letter oI mine was published in November 1999,
neither me nor G.G.Ponnambalam Jr. would know that the
circumstantial evidence` oI a kind which I was alluding to
would present itselI within three months. On January 5, 2000,
G.G.Ponnambalam Jr. was assassinated in Colombo now
believed to be - by the Gestapo-gang aIIiliated to the current
Sri Lankan President`s Security Guard. In the eyes oI Eelam
Tamils, by birth pedigree, by age, by proIessional merits and
even strangely by death, both Neelan and
G.G.Ponnambalam Jr. Iormed identical mirror images. The
only diIIerence was that, while G.G.Ponnambalam Jr. had
turned into an open LTTE sympathizer in the 1990s, Neelan
was content to be the closet Tamil operative in the corridors
oI power. For the eulogy oIIered to Neelan in July 1999, to
be counted as comIorting the Eelam Tamils, a similar eulogy
Irom the American as well as Indian Pooh-Bahs would have
Irom the American as well as Indian Pooh-Bahs would have
been Iorthcoming six months later as well. But
G.G.Ponnambalam Jr.`s killing did not elicit any eulogies
Irom President Clinton and the US Department oI State
proving that Neelan was indeed a valuable closet operative in
the services oI American interests.
Mahattaya -the Benedict Arnold of LTTE
II Neelan Tiruchelvam was the Count RumIord Ior Eelam
Tamils, Mahattaya the ex-deputy leader oI the LTTE -
became the Benedict Arnold oI the LTTE. On the perIidy
and pathos oI the LTTE`s ex-deputy leader, I concluded
part 24 oI this series, penned 13 months ago, as Iollows: 'I
leave it Ior those such as Anton Balasingham, who had
known both Pirabhakaran and Mahattaya, to shed more light
on the Mahattaya episode, at appropriate time.
To my relieI, some light has been thrown on the Mahattaya
episode, by Anton Balasingham`s wiIe, Adele, who is also
privy to the inside details on the LTTE. Thus, I provide
relevant details, appearing in her autobiography, published in
2001.
'..|Around April 1993|, Mathaya and some oI his close
associates were arrested by the LTTE`s intelligence wing Ior
conspiring to assassinate Mr.Pirabhakaran. In a massive
cordon and search oI his camp in Manipay supervised by
senior commanders oI the LTTE Mathaya was taken into
custody along with his Iriends. We were shocked and
surprised by this sudden turn oI events. Mr.Pirabakarn, who
visited our residence that day, told us brieIly oI a plot
hatched by the Indian external intelligence agency the
RAW involving Mathaya as the chieI conspirator to
assassinate him and to take-over the leadership oI the LTTE.
He also said that Iurther investigations were needed to
unravel the Iull scope oI the conspiracy.
The investigation took several months to complete. Mathaya,
his close associates involved in the conspiracy, and several
other cadres who Iunctioned directly under him, were
thoroughly investigated. Finally, the complete story oI a plot
emerged. ConIessions by all the main actors were tape-
recorded and video Iilmed. The leadership also arranged a
recorded and video Iilmed. The leadership also arranged a
series oI meetings Ior all the LTTE cadres to explain the
aims and objectives behind the plot. Apart Irom Mathaya,
other senior cadres who were involved in the conspiracy
were allowed to make public conIessions during those
meetings conIirming their involvement. It was a complicated
and bizarre story oI the Indian intelligence agency
establishing secret contacts with Mathaya through his close
associates, with the promise oI huge Iunds and political
backing Irom India iI the plot succeeded and the LTTE
leadership was eliminated. A Iormer body-guard oI
Mr.Pirabakaran was secretly released Irom an Indian jail in
Tamil Nadu and trained as the main assassin. He was sent to
JaIIna with an intriguing story oI a successIul jail break as
cover. His assignment was to plant a time bomb in
Pirabakaran`s bed room as a part oI an overall plot planned
by Mathaya. This young man, as soon as he landed in JaIIna,
was once again included amongst Mr.Pirabakaran`s
bodyguards. Surprisingly, just a Iew days beIore his arrest,
he visited our residence to tell us Iabulous stories about his
jail break. The investigation established, without doubt, that
Mathaya was the chieI conspirator. The plot was to
assassinate Mr.Pirabakaran and some senior commanders
loyal to him and assume the leadership oI the organisation.
On 28
th
December 1994, Mathaya and a Iew oI his Iellow
conspirators were executed on charges oI conspiracy to
eliminate the leadership. |Book: The Will to Freedom An
Inside Jiew of Tamil Resistance, 2001, pp.296-298|
Naturally, Pirabhakaran`s opponents as well as those who
were close to Mahattaya and those who stood to beneIit
Irom Mahattaya`s ascendancy would not accept the insider-
account presented by Adele Balasingham. But, one should
note that Adele Balasingham has a special standing. She is
peculiar mix oI insider-outsider`. She is privy to
Pirabhakaran`s conIidence, and at the same time the only
non-Tamil who had seen Pirabhakaran`s rise as a Tamil
military leader in close circuit. Her link is similar to that which
Edgar G.Snow had with Mao Ze Dong.
The demerit oI Pirabhakaran`s critics in Sri Lanka, India and
elsewhere is that, unlike Adele Balasingham, none had an
opportunity oI watching in close circuit the growth oI a
opportunity oI watching in close circuit the growth oI a
guerrilla movement, which transIormed into a military Iorce.
Discipline is to the military, as rhythm is to music. Thus, as a
military leader, it is within Pirabhakaran`s parish to execute
those who betray his conIidence. And Pirabhakaran was
Iollowing the military traditions oI Washington, Mao and
Castro. Critics oI Pirabhakaran, including the Pooh-Bahs
Irom the US diplomat corps, ignore the historical Iacts oI
how Washington reinIorced discipline. To quote Allan
Nevins,
'One element oI Washington`s strength was his sternness as
a disciplinarian. The |Patriots`| army was continually
dwindling and reIilling; politics largely governed the selection
oI oIIicers by Congress and the states; and the ill-Ied, ill-
clothed, ill-paid Iorces were oIten halI-prostrated by
sickness and ripe Ior mutiny. Troops Irom each oI the three
sections, New England, the middle states, and the South,
showed a deplorable jealousy oI the others. Washington was
rigorous in breaking cowardly, ineIIicient, and dishonest men
and boasted in Iront oI Boston that he had made a pretty
good sort oI slam among such kind oI oIIicers`. Deserters
and plunderers were Ilogged, and Washington once erected a
gallows 40 Ieet high, writing that I am determined iI I can be
justiIied in the proceeding, to hang two or three on it, as an
example to others`. At the same time, the commander in
chieI won the devotion oI many oI his men by his
earnestness in demanding better treatment Ior them Irom
Congress. |entry on George Washington, Encvclopedia
Britannica, Macropedia, vol.29, 15
th
ed., 1990, pp.699-
706|
It is debatable whether Pirabhakaran and LTTE has the moral
right to short-circuit the careers oI a handIul oI Closet Tamil
Operatives. In spirit and execution, LTTE`s assassinations
do not diIIer Irom both the currently employed American
policy oI bring to justice` those who have extinguished
American lives and Israel`s payback principle` oI targeted
killing. I quote Irom a recent Ieature by David Margolick
entitled, Israel`s Payback Principle`:
'.For Israel, targeted killings` are as old as the Talmud. II
he comes to kill you, kill him Iirst,` it states. Sprinkled
he comes to kill you, kill him Iirst,` it states. Sprinkled
throughout the nation`s 54 years are many such actions,
oIten Iilled with James Bond-like tales oI ingenuity and
derring-do. The Israelis have always been quietly proud oI
them, while also asking themselves whether they want to be,
or should be, doing such things.
In 1955 the Israeli philosopher Yishayahu Leibowitz
complained in a letter to Ben-Gurion, Israel`s Iirst prime
minister, about innocent Palestinians killed in Israeli
operations. I received your letter and I do not agree with
you,` Ben-Gurion replied. Were all the human ideals to be
given to me on the one hand and Israeli security on the other,
I would choose Israeli security, because while it is good that
there be a world Iull oI peace, Iraternity, justice and honesty,
it is even more important that we be in it.`
Last July, Israel`s most respected political columnist, Nahum
Barnea, oI the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, showed Ben-
Gurion`s letter to Prime Minister Sharon, who said he agreed
with every word oI it.
Traditionally, such operations have been conducted in strict
secrecy and steadIastly denied. |Janitv Fair magazine,
Jan.2003, pp.40-47|
Israel`s area oI 20,770 sq.km is almost identical to the area
oI the traditional Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. Israel`s
political leaders Irom Ben Gurion to Ariel Sharon had learnt
the value oI the security oI their land, and the means oI
protecting its security. It is not an exaggeration to state that
in idea and execution, Pirabhakaran`s policy oI protecting
the Tamil homeland was not in variance Irom that employed
by the military minds (Begin, Shamir, Rabin, Barak and
Sharon) who later became the political leaders oI Israel. |To
be Continued.|

Part 51
Sachi Sri Kantha
15 1anuary, 2003]

Is Pirabhakaran a deviant and a merchant of death?

Is Pirabhakaran a deviant and a merchant oI death, as projected by his
adversaries? I consider this chapter as the most important oI this series, as
I demolish the widely circulated opinions presented by Pirabhakaran`s
adversaries ( Buddhist Sinhalese press, India`s Poo Bahs and a semi-
literate international circle oI analysts), by making use oI historical,
criminological, anthropological studies on assassinations and deaths oI
power elites in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. I make use oI (a) two cross-
sectional surveys on political assassinations in the 20
th
century at the
international level and (b) a longitudinal survey oI political assassinations
in pre-colonial and post-colonial Sri Lanka.
Based on these uninterpreted (as oI now!) historical data, I assert that the
karmic theorv of death for power holders should gain credence. To put it
simply, my take on the karmic theory oI death Ior power holders is as
Iollows: Excessive abuse of power bv power holders leads to homicide
attempts on them which largelv succeed, irrespective of higher level of
surrounding securitv. It is based on the degree oI abuse oI power. I`m
sure that millions oI pious Hindus and Buddhists subscribe to this karmic
theory. But Ior reasons oI political correctness and expediency not many
are willing to articulate it publicly and thus it is not given adequate
academic scrutiny.
For this analysis, I should record that I beneIited Irom the lecture notes oI
a valuable summer course taught by ProI. Barbara Sirvis (currently,
President oI the Southern Vermont College) two decades ago at the
University oI Illinois. The title oI that course was Death Education`.
God bless the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
Suppose a zoologist walks along a jungle tract, and comes across two toe
nails oI a tiger. She then tries to present her Iinding and its implications to
biology to her colleagues in a proIessional meeting. She provides her
analysis relating to the age oI the tiger (based on the size oI two toe nails
03f02f2009 !s Pirabhakaran a deviant and a mer.
analysis relating to the age oI the tiger (based on the size oI two toe nails
Iound), and the prey oI the tiger (based on the remnants oI Ilesh entangled
in the toe nails). To this extent, her interpretations would be gladly
accepted by her colleagues. Suppose, based from her finding of two toe
nails, iI this zoologist exaggerates her inIerences beyond reasonable
limits, to quantiIy the heart beat oI the tiger or the blood proteins oI the
tiger or the number oI progeny oI the tiger which lost its two toe nails,
then she would be laughed oII the podium. This is how new Iindings are
scrutinized in my proIessional parish. But, in the world oI Tamil Tiger
observers, scrutiny oI Iacts in context has been a missing element relating
to the political assassinations. Thus, much muck is mixed with kernels oI
truth. In this chapter, I present an analysis oI LTTE`s political
assassinations as viewed in a world-wide Irame.
In the above-cited example, I chose the gender oI the zoologist with a
reason, since two oI the ranking culprits oI such exaggeration on LTTE
activities were women, namely Rajani Thiranagama (a medical doctor by
training) and Radhika Coomarasamy (a legal scholar by training). Both
were human rights activists oI a certain caliber, but it is evident Irom their
published pronouncements that their blanket denunciation on LTTE
activism is Ilawed with gullibility in topics which were beyond their
understanding. Their Ilawed literature had served as easy copies Ior
Ioreign` area specialists (who do not bother to check the original sources
in Tamil language) Irom USA and elsewhere. Here is an example.
While web-surIing Ior research materials on Pirabhakaran a Iew months
ago, I came across a document entitled, The Sociologv and Psvchologv
of Terrorism. Who Becomes a Terrorist and Whv?, prepared by the
Federal Research Division, Library oI Congress, Washington DC, with a
date-line September 1999. Author oI this document is identiIied as Rex
A.Hudson, and editor as Marilyn Majeska. Even the Iirst paragraph under
the sub-head Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is riddled with
errors in Iacts and prejudiced opinions, as indicated below by me within
parentheses in italics:
'The LTTE is widely regarded as the world`s deadliest and Iiercest
guerrilla/terrorist group and the most Ierocious guerrilla organization in
South Asia. It is the only terrorist group to have assassinated three (sic)
heads oI government Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, Sri
Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, and Iormer Prime
Minister Dissanayake (sic) in 1994. It has also assassinated several
prominent political and military Iigures. The LTTE`s ill-conceived Gandhi
assassination, however, resulted in the LTTE`s loss oI a substantial
logistical inIrastructure, and also the loss oI popular support Ior the LTTE
among mainstream Indian Tamils. In 1999 the LTTE made two threats on
the liIe oI Sonia Gandhi (Anv convincing evidence in support of this
blatant lie is not divulged. But the author had the temeritv to mention
not one but two threats'), who has nevertheless continued to campaign
Ior a seat in parliament.
II the readers (which may include American Poo Bahs and politicians) oI
this report prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library oI
Congress, Washington DC` show ignorance on recent South Asian
aIIairs, it is not easy to blame them since blind regurgitators oI mangled
Iacts such as Rex A.Hudson behave like the zoologist I reIerred to at the
beginning oI this chapter.
Assassination is an Act with Two Lead Players and Two
Frames
An assassination is a violent act with two lead players (the assassin and
the victim) and two Irames. Immediately aIter the assassination act, in the
shorter Irame, it appears to the onlookers and listeners oI the news that
the assassin was the powerIul among the two, while the victim was the
powerless individual - to either suIIer and succumb or miraculously
escape. This is the scenario which is presented to the society by the
media. However, the hidden longer Irame which incorporates vital Iacts
(which in turn led to the assassination event) where the victim is the
powerIul bully while the assassin and his or her cohorts were the
powerless suIIerers is conveniently obscured and neglected in non-critical
appraisals oI the assassination event. This scenario remains true since the
most Iamous political assassination oI Julius Caesar on March 15, 44 B.C.
at the hands oI Brutus and Cassius.
Presenting LTTE assassinations, beginning Irom Pirabhakaran`s
conIessional on the killing oI JaIIna Mayor AlIred Duraiappah in 1975, as
acts oI societal deviants gained currency Irom the much-hyped book The
Broken Palmvra (1990). Though this book has gained an iconic status,
none so Iar has bothered to scrutinize the proIessional credentials oI the
Iour authors Hoole, Sritharan, Somasundaram and Thiranagama to
pose as anthropologists oI Tamil culture. In the preIace to their book, the
Iour authors modestly claimed ignorance oI history. Simple ignorance is
excusable. But ignorance garbed with academic arrogance is inexcusable.

In this respect, I wish to bring to light an interesting research paper
published by Joseph Westermeyer oI University oI Minnesota in 1973. It
was entitled, Assassination and ConIlict Resolution in Laos`. The ideas
presented by Westermeyer in this paper are vital to the understanding oI
the Iact how, Ilawed analyses by human rights activists (a la Rajani
Thiranagama and Radhika Coomarasamy) can distort the established
societal norms. Westermeyer`s anthropological study is pertinent to the
Sri Lankan scene in more than one context. His study was conducted in
Laos (an Asian country, not diIIerent Irom Sri Lanka in cultural norms,
with a majority practising Buddhism.). Also, Pirabhakaran`s
acknowledged Iirst assassination (that oI JaIIna Mayor AlIred Duraiappah)
occurred in July 1975. The abstract oI Westermeyer`s study is as Iollows:

'Ten cases oI political homicide in Laos were intensively studied, with
particular attention to the assassin, the victim, the homicidal event, the
provocation, and the social context. Each assassination provided a
resolution Ior a social dilemma which had proven reIractory to other
means oI social problem solving. Certain demographic characteristics and
psycho-social correlates oI political homicide in Laos resemble those oI
other cultures. |American Anthropologist, 1973, vol.75; pp. 123-131|
For thoughtIul digestion, I provide excerpts Irom Westermeyer`s nine-
page anthropological research paper under the subheadings he had
identiIied in his abstract.
1he Assassin
'These men were viewed as responsible citizens in their various
communities. None was known to be particularly troublesome to his
village, nor had they shown the erratic behavior or bizarre mentation oI
phi baa (insane) people. In no case were any oI the men incarcerated Ior
their deed, nor was any indemnity paid to the Iamily oI the victim.
1he Jictim
'None oI these people had ever been psychotic; however, the primary
victims in cases one through six all had demonstrated deviant social
behavior. Victim one had robbed and murdered on multiple occasions to
obtain material goods; social sanctions in his village had Iailed to
rehabilitate him.
In their role as leaders, however, each had exercised poor judgment in
discharging his responsibilities to his Iollowership..
1he Provocation
'Assassination was preceded by months or years oI dyssocial behavior
by the victim. In the three cases involving criminal recidivism, the threat to
the group consisted oI direct violation against person or property. Social
pressure and traditional village law (a private law) had not ameliorated their
antisocial habits..
1he Social Context
.Victims in each case held authority over the group to which the assassin
belonged. Furthermore, the positions occupied by all Iour victims were
appointed rather than elected ones. Thus, popular vote was not an
available means Ior exerting pressure against the victim, and political
means have not evolved Ior the removal oI appointed oIIicials who prove
to be incompetent.
Now, I present the interesting section oI Westermeyer`s analysis which
negates the psychological and psychiatric projections on LTTE, made by
the authors oI The Broken Palmvra. It should be reiterated that oI the
Iour who authored the Broken Palmvra book, two (Thiranagama and
Somasunderam) were nominally medical scientists and the other two
(Hoole and Sritharan) had degrees in mathematics. Among the two with
medical qualiIications, Somasunderam identiIies himselI as a psychiatrist.
Excerpts oI Westermeyer`s analysis under three sub-categories |Assassin
as Deviant, Political homicide as societal deviance, and Victim as Deviant|
are given below. I have only omitted the reIerence sources Ior reasons oI
brevity.
Assassin as Deviant
Westermeyer had observed:
'Much has been made oI assassins as deviants in the historical and
psychiatric literature, where they are variously described as neIarious,
Ianatic, lunatic, retarded, sociopathic, unstable, and/or mentally ill. Less oI
the deviant interpretation appears in the anthropological literature
however.. DiIIerences between the historical-psychiatric and
anthropological viewpoints may in part be accounted Ior by the reliance oI
the Iormer studies on incarcerated assassins; the stress oI incarceration
might accentuate the observed psychopathology. Or assassins in the
complex societies studied by historians and psychiatrists may perIorce be
more deviant with reIerence to their Iellow citizens than in societies
studied by anthropologists.
The subsequent paragraph is vital to Pirabhakaran`s much projected role
as an assassin. To quote Westermeyer again,
'On the other hand, inIormants in societies where assassins remain at
large may gloss over their assassins` deviant behavior, since in most cases
they do not view the assassination itselI as a criminal or deviant act. Quite
the contrary, it is oIten viewed as a responsible or courageous action.
Since the assassins continue their lives as beIore (perhaps with enhanced
prestige), psychopathology may not be so likely to emerge or be noted.
Westermeyer ends his section on Assassin as Deviant` with a quote Irom
Hyams, who had authored a book Killing No Murder, A Studv of
Assassination as a Political Means |1969, London: Nelson and Sons|.
'From a social perspective, Hyams assumes neither the condemning nor
absolving stance in describing the assassin. Instead, he emphasizes the
social Iunction served by the assassin: So the assassin the genuine
assassin, not the murderous lunatic is, as it were, that particularlv
sensitive cell of the social bodv which reacts first and most quicklv to
preserve the social bodv.
The authors oI Broken Palmvra presented the image oI Eelam Tamil
society as having become pathological and undergoing stress due to the
emergence oI LTTE as a lead player in the 1980s. Westermeyer again
negates such a view.
Political Homicide as Societal Deviance
To quote Westermeyer again,
'Some investigators implicate assassination as a sign oI a pathological
society, a society in transition, or a society undergoing stress.Work by
Dole and Friedrich, as well as these Laotian data, suggest that this need
not be so: political homicide can be a Iunctional part oI a stable
society..In sum, the assassination/social disorganization relationship
does not appear to be a simplistic one based on the cross-cultural data
presently available.
I consider the third sub-category in the analysis oI Westermeyer entitled
|Assassination| Victim as Deviant` is the most revealing to understand
|Assassination| Victim as Deviant` is the most revealing to understand
Pirabhakaran`s projected role as an assassin oI Duraiappah. And it is this
sub-category which has been completelv ignored or hidden for reasons of
convenience in the publications oI individuals belonging to the Sri Lanka`s
human rights industry, who proliIerated in the 1990s. Thus, what
Westermeyer Iound in his 1973 study on Laotian assassinations is highly
pertinent to the assassinations in Eelam and Sri Lanka oI 1980s and 1990s
as well.
Jictim as Deviant
'The evidence here is perhaps not so ambiguous as it is Ior assassins and
Ior political homicide.Friedrich (1962) posits tyrannical use oI power,
struggle Ior power, or kinship revenge as motivating most assassinations
among the Tarascans oI Acan.
Among the Laotian cases, halI oI these instances oI social peer
assassination involved criminal recidivism. Where the usual methods Ior
modiIying antisocial behavior Iail, however, there has traditionally been no
recourse to state imposed sanctions. Since traditional law has been
exclusively a private law, the community would tolerate destructive or
dangerous behavior ad nauseum, i.e., until some person or persons
became motivated enough to do away with the recidivist. For this
category oI social problem, then, political homicide has served as a Iinal
solution to the problem oI social deviants whose dangerous behavior has
proven reIractory to ordinary means oI rectiIication.
..The victims served in a particular kind oI leadership role; they were
appointed Irom Iurther up the governmental hierarchy, rather than
popularly chosen by a constituency. These Iour leaders, ordinary men in
other respects, had erred in the same way: they had inordinately abused
their power vis-a-vis their subordinate group. By excessive corruption,
seduction, disrespect, or indolence, they Iailed in their responsibilities
toward their Iollowers. Since these men wielded considerable power and
occupied authoritative positions important to the welIare oI their
subordinates, their behavior gradually became intolerable to the
subordinate group. Eventually, one oI their subordinates executed them,
and received the approval (and protection) oI the subordinate group in
doing so.
Westermeyer`s conclusion (as well as caveat) oI his Iindings is worth
recording, to highlight the context oI assassinations oI political leaders
such as AlIred Duraiappah, Sam Tambimuttu, Neelan Tirchelvam and
such as AlIred Duraiappah, Sam Tambimuttu, Neelan Tirchelvam and
rival militant leaders belonging to TELO and EPRLF by LTTE. He wrote,

'Regarding assassination oI political leaders, this small Laotian sample
does not lend itselI to expansive theorizing. Nonetheless, a common
theme prevails: the victim leaders have taken inordinate liberties with the
power available to them, or have Iailed to discharge their leadership
obligations. Such leaders appear not to comprehend the traditional
responsibilities oI their positions: while the elite have always exercised
considerable dominion over peasants, such authority is not unlimited.the
leader must also commit himselI to the well-being and the dignity oI the
governed. Should the leader ignore these responsibilities, the situation is
Iraught with danger.Slow, indirect politicking may prove eIIective given
suIIicient time. II too slow or inept, politicking may give way to
assassination as a means Ior social problem solving.
In sum, problems which may lead to assassination are oI such magnitude
that they threaten the existence oI the community. Other means oI social
problem solving either have been exhausted without eIIect or are not
available. Under such circumstances political homicide serves as a court
oI last resort` in social conIlict resolution.
Since Westermeyer`s study sample was restricted to ten cases oI
political homicide in Laos`, to analyze in depth the anthropological
context oI political assassinations by the LTTE, I reIer to two additional
studies with extensive world-wide samples. But, prior to that, I provide
some general Iacts on assassinations.
General Facts on Assassinations
Four modes oI death exist Ior humans. These are, natural death, accident,
suicide and homicide. For convenience oI remembering, they are
identiIied in abbreviation as NASH. One oI the subcategories oI homicide
is assassination. The English word assassin` (deIined as, one who kills,
especially one who murders a political Iigure) is derived Irom the Arabic
word hashshashin, relating to users oI hashish. Political assassination is a
sub-subcategory oI homicide.
II one checks the relative percentages oI the modes oI death in a nation`s
population per annum, natural deaths exceeds 90 percent. Other three
modes oI death contribute at the maximum 8 or 9 percent oI total deaths.
For illustration, I will provide recent Iigures Ior USA and Japan, where
statistics on the Iour modes oI death are available. 2 million and 322,421
statistics on the Iour modes oI death are available. 2 million and 322,421
individuals died in USA Ior the year 1996. Among these, 2 million and
177,447 individuals (93.76 percent) died a natural death; 93,874
individuals (4.04 percent) died in accidents; 30,862 individuals (1.33
percent) died by suicide; and, 20,738 individuals (0.89 percent) were
victims oI homicide. The pattern is similar in Japan as well. Among the
896,211 individuals died in 1996, 824,192 individuals (91.96 percent) died
a natural death. Accidental deaths amounted to another 4.3 percent.
Suicide victims constituted around 3.5 percent and about 0.15 percent oI
the total deaths were homicide victims. The notable diIIerence between the
suicide and homicide percentages between the American and Japanese
populations can be chieIly attributed to cultural tolerance oI suicide in
Japan and societal acceptance oI non-restricted use oI hand guns in USA.
These Iigures taken together reveal that deaths due to homicide in an year
among the larger public in a population with relative social stability
comprises less than one percent oI total deaths.
Surprisingly, this pattern does not hold Ior nominal political power
holders, power sharers and power peddlers (among which are to be
included inIormants, spies, collaborators). However, viliIying
Pirabhakaran is a cottage industry oI the Colombo press since 1985. Here
is a short passage oI vitriol penned by one W.T.Singha in mid 2002,
under the title, Prabhakaran Is he Goethe`s daemon?`
'. Is this that person who was responsible Ior savagely murdering oI a
democratically elected President oI Sri Lanka, Ior the suicide bombing oI
the much loved Prime Minister oI India the grandson oI Nehru, and the
creme de la creme oI Singhalese Presidential candidates and eminent
politicians Ior butchering leading Tamil politicians who did not tow the
line oI Prabhakaran`s racism and Ior the bomb attacks on internationally
recognised Tamil intellects who opposed his sanguinary mania? Did
Premadasa, Rajiv, Ranjan, Gamini, Amirthalingam, Lalith, Tiruchelvam,
Doraiswami and others deserved such brutal extermination? A single
assassination oI a high ranking politician is in itselI vicious but to arrogate
to himselI the right to kill leading politicians and eminent people in such
great number, mostly Ior Ilimsy disagreement or political dissension,
could be the perpetration oI an evil incarnate or megalomania. |The
Island newspaper, Colombo, July 10, 2002.|
While (1) paying due allowance the Iact that W.T.Singha appears
completely ignorant oI the classic analytical study oI Westermeyer in Laos
(60 percent Buddhist) relating to political assassinations in an Asian
society not diIIerent Irom Sri Lanka, (2) asserting that as oI now,
Pirabhakaran had not been convicted in a court oI law Ior the
assassinations oI all the individuals mentioned in the above passage, (3)
strongly doubting that all these named individuals in their ranks as
politicians did not abuse power, and also (4) recognizing the
unmentionable Iacts that Iour oI the named individuals had been
previously targets oI assassins (Premadasa - JVP in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi
JVP in 1987 and Sikh militants in 1991, Amirthalingam Sinhalese mob in
1956, Lalith Athulathmudali JVP in 1987) other than LTTE, I now reIer
to the two published studies to reIute the views held by correspondents
and journalists (not necessarily Sri Lankan) like W.T.Singha and Gamini
Weerakoon, the editor oI Colombo`s Island newspaper.
The assassinations of politically powerful persons
Both studies which deserve attention (but have been conveniently ignored
by LTTE`s critics) originate Irom USA, and are Irom two institutions with
rather impeccable credentials- namely, the New York Times and the CIA.
These are as Iollows:
1.

James F.Kirkham, Sheldon G.Levy and William J.Crotty:
Assassination and Political Jiolence. A Report to the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Jiolence, New York
Times - Bantam Books, New York, 1970, 752 pages. Especially oI
value Ior the current discussion is the Appendix A oI this report
(pp.301-325), which provides data on assassination events from
November 1918 to October 1968. This extensive data was collected
by Carl Leiden, Murray Havens, Karl Schmitt and James Soukup
belonging to the Department oI Government, University oI Texas,
Austin, in 1968.
2.

Leslie R.Pyenson, Laurence A.Cove and Francic X.BrickIield: Patterns
oI death in world leaders. Militarv Medicine, Dec.1998, vol.163,
no.12, pp.797-800. Especially oI interest is the proIessional aIIiliation
oI the authors, namely CIA, Washington DC. In this interesting
analysis, Pyenson and his colleagues have reviewed the deaths of all
political leaders, who died between 1anuary 1, 1965 and
December 31, 1996.
Leiden and colleagues (1968) had identiIied the assassination victims into
six ranks. To the rank no.1 was assigned, Head oI State, head oI
government, or dictator; Iormer head oI state or head oI state-elect, e.g:
presidents, kings, premiers.` Pyenson and colleagues (1998) deIined their
assassination victims (world leaders) as those who at any time during
their careers were a country`s principal decision-maker, exercising Iinal
authority Ior Iormulation and execution oI national government policies.
The positions they held included monarch, president, prime minister, party
secretary or chairman, supreme religious authority or head oI junta.` Thus
the data assembled by Leiden`s group and Pyenson`s group are more or
less compatible but not identical. Subtle diIIerences need notice. First,
while Leiden`s group had pooled the heads oI state and Iormer heads oI
state into a single list, Pyenson`s group had separated the heads oI state
and Iormer heads oI state into two separate lists. Secondly, while
Leiden`s group had identiIied each oI the assassination victim by name,
country, date oI assassination and also included unsuccessIul
assassination attempts, Pyenson`s group belonging to CIA have not
provided such complete details. Thus, the summarised inIormation in the
paper oI Pyenson`s group has to be believed in good Iaith. Thirdly,
Pyenson`s group had indicated that their study population was non-U.S.
world leaders` since CIA regulations prohibit the study oI U.S. citizens.`
This partly explains why their study period begins Irom January 1, 1965
because by this choice they could conveniently exclude the assassination
oI President John F.Kennedy Irom the study population.
Since the time Irame studied by both groups overlap between January
1965 and October 1968, six heads oI state and Iormer heads oI state who
died during this overlapping period would have been counted in both
studies. Taking this into consideration, Irom the extensive tabulated listing
oI Leiden`s group, I counted 63 heads oI state and Iormer heads oI state
as assassination victims between November 1918 and December 1964.
|Leiden group`s data on heads oI state and ex head oI state is presented
below as Appendix 1.| The study presented by Pyenson`s group, inIorms
that between January 1965 and December 1996, 52 heads oI state and 16
Iormer heads oI state died by violent means.
Thus, between November 1918 and December 1996 (a turbulent 78
year period of the 20
th
century which saw the ascension and decline
of communism, vanishing of overt colonialism, world war and
regional wars, genocides, dominance of weapon industry and
proliferation of nations), based on the assembled statistics of
Leiden`s group and Pyenson`s group, a total of 131 (63 + 52 + 16)
heads of state and former heads of state had died violently. This is
certainly an under-count, since Pyenson`s group also excluded
~countries - essentially a score of island states - with populations
less than 250,000. Furthermore, some reported accidents` to
leaders which resulted in mortality could have really been
leaders which resulted in mortality could have really been
homicides.
I wish to Iurther identiIy the signiIicance oI the Iindings Pyenson`s group
which Iocused on the violent deaths oI political leaders who died between
1965 and 1996, since two oI the attributed victims oI Pirabhakaran`s
deeds namely Rajiv Gandhi (in 1991) and R.Premadasa (in 1993)
would have been counted in this study. The Iindings oI Pyenson`s group
are as Iollows:
(1)

261 world leaders died between 1965 and 1996.
(2)

OI these 261 world leaders, 118 died while in oIIice; only 66 (56
percent) died by natural causes. Remaining 52 died by violent
(unnatural) causes, oI which 35 died by assassination. To reiterate, 30
percent oI titular heads oI state died by assassination during their terms
oI oIIice. R.Premadasa was one oI the 35 heads oI state to die during
this study period.
(3)

Among the 143 world leaders who died aIter leaving oIIice, 16 died by
violent (unnatural) causes, oI which 10 were by assassination. Rajiv
Gandhi was one oI the 10 ex heads-oI state to die during this study
period.
What is revealing Irom this statistic provided by the CIA researchers is
that, percentage wise, there is a marked diIIerence between the
assassination deaths among larger public and the assassination deaths oI
heads oI state and ex heads oI state. In the discussion section oI their
paper, the CIA researchers inIerred as Iollows:
'Our Iirst impressions, nevertheless, do call into question some prevalent
belieIs or intuitive assumptions, which, in turn, may have practical
planning implications.
(1)

World leaders are not superhuman. By all accounts, they receive the
best medicines, technology and proIessional services their country can
oIIer or import, and generally they can travel to the best institutions in
the world when required.
(2)

It is not at all unusual Ior leaders to die violently, especially while in
oIIice. Death Irom assassination or other external means occurs
commonly among world leaders, oIten wile they are in oIIice. Almost
halI oI those leaders who died were still in oIIice, and almost halI oI
that group died violently. Overall, violent deaths accounted Ior a
surprisingly large proportion oI the totals in both the mortality analysis
group (26) and the 1980 cohort (40 through 1996). By
comparison, although it represented only a single year`s experience, in
1993, violent death constituted less than 7 oI deaths among the U.S.
population.
UnIortunately, unlike Leiden`s group, CIA`s Pyenson`s group has not
provided the individual details oI the deaths oI 261 world leaders between
1965 and 1996. A letter sent to Dr.Pyenson`s address in Washington DC.
by me, dated Dec.12, 2002, requesting such individual details Ior research
has gone unanswered as oI now. Thus, I cannot Iurther comment on the
signiIicance oI the reported Iindings. But in their study, Pyenson`s group
had stated that their data was gathered 'using unclassiIied inIormation
Irom readily available English-language or translated newspapers, books,
periodicals.
Also to be noted is that, in their Iirst Iinding reproduced above,
Pyenson`s group use an all-encompassing clause 'technology and
proIessional services their country can oIIer or import which include
medical service as well as security service. Despite all the top-level
securitv thev are surrounded with, if such a high number of heads of
state or ex heads of state succumb to assassination, I would consider
that here is a circumstantial proof for the karma theorv in action. As a
nominal believer in the karma theorv, I have never come across a studv
like that of Pvensons group to provide some statistical support for the
karma theorv of death for power holders.
In sum, it is my contention that the statistical data on the assassinations oI
politicians at international level between 1918 and 1996 convincingly
demonstrate that the assassination events oI heads oI state such as Rajiv
Gandhi and Premadasa lie within the probability range oI the observed
pattern oI assassination deaths oI power-holding politicians, irrespective
oI whether LTTE and Pirabhakaran had a direct or indirect hand in them
or not. The assassination issue is Iurther muddled with the Iacts that both
Rajiv Gandhi (at the hands oI Sinhalese in 1987 and Sikhs in 1991) and
Premadasa (at the hand oI JVP radicals in 1987) were assassination targets
prior to their eventual deaths.
The oIt-repeated claim by LTTE watchers like Rohan Gunaratna that
'LTTE is the only terrorist group to have assassinated two heads oI
government is also tenuous by omission and deception. It is an open
secret that Intelligence agencies like CIA, Mossad and RAW which Ior all
practical purposes technically operate as under-cover terrorist groups` in
the soils oI adversarial nations and territories have successIully planned
the soils oI adversarial nations and territories have successIully planned
and executed the assassinations oI numerous heads oI state who were
counted in the studies oI Leyden`s group and Pyenson`s group.
Regicides in pre-colonial Buddhist Ceylon
'The more powerIul and prestigious the oIIice, the greater likelihood oI
assassination. was the Iirst conclusion derived by Kirkham, Levy and
Crotty (1970), based on the analysis oI 81 oI the recorded political
assassinations or attempted assassinations between 1835 (beginning Irom
President Andrew Jackson) and 1968 (ending with Presidential aspirant
Robert Kennedy) in USA. As I know oI, such a statistical analysis
covering a span oI over 100 years on assassinations and attempted
assassinations on politicians is hardly available in either Sri Lanka or India,
Ior the equivalent period oI 19
th
and 20
th
centuries. In the absence oI such
an exhaustive study, the projection oI LTTE`s and Pirabhakaran`s role as
assassins or social deviants has a proIound bias. However, it should also
be exposed that the much-vaunted, pre-colonial Sinhala monarchic
traditions oI Ceylon accomodated assassinations as a practical tool in the
change oI regimes.
British colonial authority Sir James Emerson Tennent`s 1859 work on
Ceylon still stands as an exhaustive source book on the despotic and wild
Iorm oI Buddhist monarchic tradition which prevailed in the pre-colonial
Lanka Ior 2,000 years. I reproduce two paragraphs (with two extensive
Ioot-notes providing statistics on regicides and successions) Irom
Tennent`s observations, which appears under the chapter 6 entitled, The
InIluence oI Buddhism on Civilisation`. To quote Tennent,
'The long line oI sovereigns is divided into two distinct classes; the kings
oI Maha-wanse or superior dynasty` oI the uncontaminated blood oI
Wijayo, who occupied the throne Irom his death, B.C. 505, to that oI
Maha Sen, A.D.302; and the Sulu-wanse or inIerior race`, whose
descent was less pure, but who, amidst invasions, revolutions, and
decline, continued, with unsteady hand, to hold the government down to
the occupation oI the island by Europeans in the beginning oI the sixteenth
century.
'..Neither the piety oI the kings nor their muniIicence suIIiced to
conciliate the personal attachment oI their subjects, or to strengthen their
throne by national attachment such as would have IortiIied its occupant
against the Iatalities incident to despotism. OI IiIty one sovereigns who
Iormed the pure Wijayan dynasty, two were disposed by their subjects,
Iormed the pure Wijayan dynasty, two were disposed by their subjects,
and nineteen put to death by their successors. |Foot-note bv Tennent:
There is something very striking in the Iacility with which aspirants to the
throne obtained the instant acquiescense oI the people, as soon as
assassination had put them in possession oI power. And this is the more
remarkable, where the usurpers were oI the lower grade, as in the instance
oI Subho, a gate porter, who murdered King Yasa Silo, A.D. 60, and
reigned Ior six years (Mahawamsa, ch.xxxv.p.218). A carpenter, and a
carrier oI Iire-wood, were each accepted in succession oI sovereigns,
A.D. 47; whilst the great dvnastv was still in the plenitude oI its
popularity. The mystery is perhaps reIerable to the dominant necessity oI
securing tranquility at any cost, in the state oI society where the means oI
cultivation were directly dependent on the village organisation..|
Tennent continues Iurther and provides an interesting statistic oI Sinhalese
regicides as Iollows:
'Excepting the rare instances in which a reign was marked by some
occurrence, such as an invasion and repulse oI the Malabars, there is
hardly a sovereign oI the Solar race` whose name is associated with a
higher achievement than erection oI a dagoba or the Iormation oI a tank,
nor one whose story is enlivened by an event more exciting than the
murder through which he mounted the throne or the conspiracy by which
he was driven Irom it. |Foot-note bv Tennent: In theory the Singhalese
monarchy was elective in the descendants oI the Solar race; in practice,
primogeniture had a preIerence and the crown was either hereditary or
became the prize oI those who claimed to be oI royal lineage. On viewing
the succession oI kings Irom B.C. 307 to A.D. 1815, thirty nine eldest
sons (or nearly one Iourth), succeeded to their Iathers; and twenty nine
kings (or more than one IiIth) were succeeded by brothers. FiIteen reigned
Ior a period less than one year, and thirty Ior more than one year and less
than Iour. OI the Singhalese kings who died by violence, twenty two were
murdered by their successors; six were killed by other individuals; thirteen
Iell in Ieuds and war, and Iour committed suicide; eleven were dethroned,
and their subsequent Iate is unknown. Not more than two-thirds oI the
Singhalese kings retained sovereign authority to their decease, or reached
the Iuneral pile without a violent death. See also, Mahawanso, ch.xxiii,
p.201. |Book: Cevlon, vol.1, 1859 Iacsimile print in 1999, pp.360-361.|
The statistics presented by Tennent on the Sinhalese monarchs who were
homicide victims |a total of 22 sovereigns among 153 - in a period of
2,000 vears - murdered bv their immediate successors| is astounding and
parallels the Iinding oI CIA`s Pyenson`s group on the Iate oI non-USA
heads oI state between 1965 and 1996. In a subsequent page, Tennent had
provided the Iollowing statistic:
'OI the sixty two sovereigns who reigned Irom the death oI Maha Sen,
A.D. 301, to the accession oI Parakrama Bahu, A.D. 1153, nine met a
violent death at the hands oI their relatives or subjects, two ended their
days in exile, one was slain by the Malabars and Iour committed suicide.
|ibid, p.385|
This means, during a period spanning 852 years, ten oI the 62 sovereigns
nearly one in every six were eliminated by violent deaths. In the post-
Parakrama Bahu period, between A.D. 1153 and A.D. 1527, according to
Tennent, Iates oI seven sovereigns were decided by homicides. |see,
Appendix 2 below Ior a complete listing oI sovereigns who were victims
oI homicide.| In sum, a total of 32 of the 153 sovereigns one in five
who ascended to the throne were homicide victims, during the 2,000
years oI recorded despotic monarchic tradition oI the island.
A Synopsis on the fates of post-colonial Sri Lankan heads of
state
The pattern oI death seen Ior the pre-colonial Buddhist monarchs oI the
island seems to prevail even in the post-colonial Sri Lanka, lasting only 55
years. The labeling oI post-colonial Sri Lanka as a democracy by the
international press is a misrepresentation oI serious proportions
committed by reporters and analysts who do not bother to do their home
work. The pre-colonial monarchic tradition continues to hold, so that the
Sri Lankan version oI democracy is in reality a despotic nepocracv (Ieudal
nepotism laced with bells and whistles oI democracy) , with seven oI the
heads oI state emerging Irom only two Iamilies : Senanayakes (Iather and
son) and Bandaranaikes (husband, wiIe and daughter). Two other heads
oI state, namely Kotelawala and Jayewardene, were related to these two
Iamilies by lineage and marriage.
OI the ten heads oI state, two died by assassinations and one died by
accident. In addition, there were assassination and devious dethroning
attempts on another three heads oI state. The data is as Iollows:
1.

Don Stephen Senanayake died by horse-riding accident in March
1952.
2.

Dudley Senanayake |son oI #1| natural death in 1973.
3.

John Kotelawala |nephew oI #1| natural death in 1980.
4.

Solomon W.R.D.Bandaranaike died by assassination in Sept. 1959
by a cabal oI disgruntled Buddhist monks.
5.

W.Dahanayake natural death in 1996.
6.

Sirimavo Bandaranaike |wiIe oI #4; escaped coup dè-tat in 1962 by
state`s armed Iorces and unconstitutional dethroning in 1971 by
Sinhalese JVP| natural death in 2000.
7.

J.R.Jayewardene |escaped assassination on Aug.18, 1987 by JVP|
natural death in 1996.
8.

R.Premadasa |escaped assassination on Aug.18, 1987 by JVP while
serving as prime minister and beIore his own ascension as head oI
state| - died by assassination in May 1993 attributed to LTTE, when
the country was under a state oI war. Belonging to an inIerior caste
group, Premadasa also escaped a devious dethroning attempt in 1991
by competitors within his own party who belonged to the higher
Govigama caste.
9.

D.B.Wijetunge still living.
10.

Chandrika Kumartunga |daughter oI #4 and #6| - escaped
assassination on Dec.20, 1999 by LTTE, when the country was under
a state oI war. Still living.
Among the ten post-colonial Sri Lankan heads oI state, two outsiders
|Dahanayake and Wijetunge| were stop-gap ascensions, Iollowing
successIul assassinations. LTTE is implicated with the dethroning
attempts oI Premadasa (#8) and Chandrika Kumaratunga (#10), oI which
that oI Premadasa was successIul. Technically, when LTTE`s dethroning
attempts occurred in 1993 and 1999 respectively, LTTE was in war with
its adversary - the Sri Lankan government, and the Sri Lankan head-oI-
state was the nominal Commander in ChieI.
The despotic nepocracy oI post-colonial Sri Lanka reached its zenith,
between 1994 and 1999, when the quartet who made vital decisions on
behalI oI the state consisted oI President Chandrika Kumaratunga (a
proIessional neophyte), President`s mother and prime minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike (then a senile proIessional invalid), President`s uncle and
Deputy DeIense Minister Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte (a proIessional
imbecile) and the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar (a proIessional
sin-eater). That the seeds Ior despotic nepocracy were sown with the two
sin-eater). That the seeds Ior despotic nepocracy were sown with the two
dethroning attempts on Sirimavo Bandaranaike made by the state`s armed
Iorces in 1962 and the Sinhalese youth insurrection oI 1971 should not be
overlooked. That the despotic nepocracy had reached a level oI troubling
concern by the end oI 1975 (when the general elections due in 1975 were
postponed Ior the Iirst time by two years) was evident by the Iamous
expose by the Time magazine in its graphic Ieature, All in the Family`,
which showed eleven members oI the then ruling clan who were kin oI the
then prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Even the current President
Chandrika was Ieatured in this Ruling clan` Iamily tree as the Director,
Land ReIorm Commission`. The Iirst paragraph oI Time`s brieI
commentary said it all:
' The last word in Iamily planning` is how Britain`s Guardian described
it. The paper was reIerring to the Bandaranaike clan oI Sri Lanka (Iormerly
Ceylon), who have managed to turn government into something oI a
Iamily aIIair. At the head oI the Indian Ocean republic is Mrs. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister and widow oI S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike,
who held this post Irom 1956 until he was assassinated by a Buddhist
monk in 1959. Since Mrs. Bandaranaike was last elected in 1970, an
imposing number oI her relatives both Irom her own Iamily, the Ieudal
Ratwatte clan, and her in-laws, the equally aristocratic Bandaranaikes
have assumed high oIIice. |Time magazine, Asian edition, Dec.15, 1975,
p.36|
Thus, even the assassination oI the then JaIIna mayor AlIred Duraiappah
in July 1975, a loyal retainer oI the despotic Bandaranaike clan, by
Pirabhakaran has to be viewed Irom such an anthropological context
presented by Joseph Westermeyer.
To comprehend LTTE`s viewpoint on its unsuccessIul dethroning
attempt made on President Chandrika Kumaratunga, I present the
currently prevailing view oI American executive (Presidential) wing oI
power, as it appeared in a news report originating Irom Washington DC,
relating to AIghanistan campaign.
'.A presidential order Irom 1976 bars political assassinations. The
president can waive the order, as has been done Ior Osama bin Laden.
But Ior Mullah Omar |the supreme leader oI Taliban| the Bush
administration has invoked a old principle oI warIare to overcome that
restriction. The commander oI an enemy army is Iair game, and strikes
against him are not an assassination but an attack on the adversary`s
command and control. Even beIore the United States unleashed its air
strikes, President George W. Bush had made it clear that the mullah was a
strikes, President George W. Bush had made it clear that the mullah was a
potential target. |news report: U.S. admits it`s trying to kill Taliban
Leader`, by Michael Gordon and Tim Weiner, International Herald
Tribune, Oct.17, 2001, p.2|
II Bush administration can adhere to the old principle oI warIare that The
commander of an enemv armv is fair game, there is nothing illogical to
advance a claim that the LTTE`s past attempts on two Sri Lankan heads
oI state also Iall within the boundaries oI the old principle oI warIare.
What`s good Ior the goose is good Ior the gander as well, isn`t it? I
should add that I`m not validating LTTE`s assassination attempts on the
two Sri Lankan heads oI state. Rather, I have presented an answer to the
why` on the assassination attempts oI 1993 and 1999 Irom LTTE`s point
oI view. It should not be Iorgotten that in the context oI war-time
strategy, attacks on the adversary`s command and control is not a
deviant measure, especially iI one like Pirabhakaran was Iacing such a
measure Irom his adversary. Only an ignoramus and one who is inadept in
military tactics could label it as terrorism`.
Thus, based on the available anthropological, historical and
criminological evidences relating to assassinations - assembled in this
chapter, I would infer that Pirabhakaran is not a deviant or a merchant
of death, as viewed bv his adversaries. The contrary point oI view will be
proved true, only when suIIicient data on political assassinations Irom Sri
Lanka and elsewhere can be presented to dismantle the established Iacts
assembled in this chapter. |To be Continued.|

Appendix 1
Successful Assassinations of Heads of State between
Nov.1918 and Oct.1968
|source: James F.Kirkham, Sheldon G.Levy and William J.Crotty, 1970,
pp.301-325|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name oI Head oI State Country Date oI Assassination
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Paes Sidonia Portugal Dec.16, 1918
2. 2.Habibullah Khan AIghanistan May 17, 1919
3. Carranza, V. Mexico May 21, 1920
4. Droubi Pasha Syria Aug.23, 1920
5. Dato Eduardo Spain Mar.9, 1921
6. Dos Santos Machado Portugal Oct.21, 1921
7. Granjo Antonio Portugal Oct.21, 1921
8. Hara Takashi Japan Nov.5, 1921
9. Narutowicz Gabriel Poland Dec.16, 1922
10. Stambuliski Alexander Bulgaria 1923
11. Petlura Simon Poland May 25,1926
12. Obregon Alvaro Mexico Jul.17, 1928
13. Hamaguchi Yuko Japan Nov.14, 1930
14. Doumer Paul France May 7, 1932
15. Tsuyoshi Inukai Japan May 16, 1932
16. Sanchez Cerro, L.M. Peru Apr.30, 1933
17. Nadir Shah AIghanistan Nov.8, 1933
18. Duca Ion G. Rumania Dec.30, 1933
19. Sandino, A.C. Nicaragua Feb.23, 1934
20. von Schleicher, K. Germany Jun. 1934
21. DollIus Engelbert Austria Jul.25, 1934
22. Okada, Admiral Japan Feb.26, 1936
23. Saito, Viscount Japan Feb.26, 1936
24. Sidki Bakr Iraq Aug.12, 1937
25. Calinescu Armad Rumania Sep.21, 1939
26. Iorga, Nicolas Rumania Nov.29, 1940
27. Enriquez, General A. Ecuador May 31, 1942
28. Boris Bulgaria Aug.24, 1943
29. Maher Pasha Ahmed Egypt Feb. 24, 1945
30. Mahidol Ananda Siam (Thailand) Jun.11, 1946
31. Villaroel Gualberto Bolivia Jul.21, 1946
32. San U Aung Burma Jul.19, 1947
33. Yahya ibn Mohammed Yemen Feb.17, 1948
34. Gaitan Jorge E. Columbia Apr. 9, 1948
35. Nukrashy Pasha Mahmoud/Egypt Dec. 28, 1948
36. Arana Francisco Javier Guatemala Jul.19, 1948
37. Al-Barazi Muhsin Syria Aug.14, 1949
38. Zaim Husni Syria Aug.14, 1949
39. Hazhir Abdul-Hysayn Iran 1950
40. Al Hinnawi, Col. Sami Lebanon Oct.31, 1950
41. Delgado Chalbaud Carlos Venezuela Nov.13, 1950
42. Razmara Ali Iran Mar.8, 1951
43. Al Sulh Riad Jordan Jul.16, 1951
44. Abdullah Jordan Jul.20, 1951
45. Liaquat Ali Khan Pakistan Oct.16, 1951
46. Remon Jose Antonio Panama Jan.2, 1955
47. Al Malki, Lt.Col. Adnan Syria Apr.22, 1955
48. Somoza Anastasio Nicaragua Sep.21,1956
49. Castillo Armas Carlos Guatemala Jul.26,1957
50. Adul Ilah Iraq Jul.14,1958
51. Faisal II Iraq Jul. 14,1958
52. Nuri Al-Said Iraq Jul.16,1958
53. Bandaranaike Solomon Ceylon Sep. 25,1959
54. Majali Hazza Jordan Aug.29, 1960
55. Lumumba Patrice Congo Jan.17, 1961 56.
Yrujillo Molina RaIael Dominican Rep. May 30, 1961
57. Rivagasore Louis Burundi Oct. 1961
58. Olympio Sylvanus Togo Jan. 13, 1963
59. Kassem Abdul Karim Iraq Feb. 9, 1963
60. Ngo Dinh Diem South Vietnam Nov.2, 1963
61. Kennedy, John F. U.S.A. Nov. 22, 1963
62. Dorji Jigme P. Bhutan Apr.27, 1964
63. Al-Shishakli, Gen. Adib Brazil Sep.27, 1964 64.
Ngendandumwe Pierre Burundi Jan.15, 1965 65.
Mansour Hassan Ali Iran Jan.21, 1965
66. Mendez Montenegro Mario Guatemala Oct.31, 1965
67. Balewa Sir Abubakar Nigeria Jan.15, 1966
68. Ironsi Aguiyi, J.T.V. Nigeria Jul.30, 1966
69. Verwoerd Hendrik F. South AIrica Sep.6, 1966
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix 2
Unnatural Deaths of pre-colonial Ceylonese Buddhist Sovereigns
|source: James Emerson Tennent, 1859, pp.320-324|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chronological Name oI Sovereign Date oI Ascension
order as sovereign and mode oI death
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Suratissa put to death 247 BC
11 Sena and Guttika (horse traders) put to death 237 BC
13 Elala killed in battle 205 BC
18 Khallatanaga put to death 109 BC
20 Panca-Dravida put to death 103 BC
23 Coranaga put to death 63 BC
24 Kuda Tissa poisoned by his wiIe 51 BC
29 Amanda Gamani Abhaya put to death AD 19
32 Queen Singhawalli (Sivali) put to death 33
35 Yasalaka Tissa put to death 52
36 Sabha (Subha) put to death 60
43 Chudda Naga murdered 186
46 Wairatissa (Vera Tissa) murdered 209
49 Vijaya Kumara put to death 242
50 Sangha Tissa I poisoned 243
60 Sotthi Sena poisoned 432
62 Mitta Sena or Karal Sora put to death 433
64 Dhatu Sena (Dasenkelleya) put to death 459
65 Sigiri Kasyapa committed suicide 477
67 Kumara Dhatu Sena selI immolation 513
68 Kirti Sena murdered 522
69 Maidi Siwu (Siwaka) murdered 531
72 Datthapa Bhodi (Dapalu 1
st
) committed suicide 547
74 Kirtisri Megavana put to death 567
78 Sangha Tissa decapitated 633
79 Buna Mugalan (Laimini Bunaya) put to death 633
82 Kaluna Detu Tissa committed suicide 648
83 Dhatthopa Tissa (Dalupia Tissa) killed in battle 665
89 Hatthadatha (Hununaru Riandalu) decapitated 720
120 Wejayabahu 2
nd
murdered 1186
121 Mihindu 5
th
put to death 1187
122 Wirabahu put to death 1196
123 Wikramabahu 2
nd
put to death 1196
129 Nayaanga (Nikanga) put to death 1209
148 Jayabahu 2
nd
put to death 1462
153 Wejeya Bahu 6
th
murdered 1527
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Part 52
Sachi Sri Kantha
3 February 2003]
Eelam`s Karma - The Good, The Bad and the Ugly

A Story by Buddy Hackett and its relevance
I once watched actor-comedian Buddy Hackett (1924- )
telling a Iunny story in Johnny Carson`s Tonight Show`
TV, and since it has metaphorical relevance to what I write in
this chapter, I will Iirst re-tell the gist oI this story.
A hunter shot a bird and Iollowed its path. The bird Iluttered
and Iell into a Iarm. When the hunter tried to gather his
trophy, the Iarmer came out oI his house and shouted: Hey!
Stop Will`ya? That bird Iell inside my Iarm, and you cannot
just retrieve it like that.` Then, both the hunter and the Iarmer
had a vocal argument and settled on a compromise. Each will
give a kick to other in the butt, and the last person standing
will get the bird. Then, the problem arose on who will deliver
the Iirst kick. The Iarmer said: I go Iirst since the bird Iell
into my Iarm`, Ior which the hunter agreed. The Iarmer gave
a hard blow on the butt oI the hunter and the latter slumped.
When the hunter regained his stance and prepared to kick the
Iarmer, the latter retorted: I don`t need the bird. Get away
Irom my place.`
I should admit that in writing, the story doesn`t shine well, as
one would hear it Irom the inimitable delivery oI Buddy
Hackett`s mouth. I still remember that, Ior the kicking butt
act oI the story, Hackett got oII Irom the guest`s couch in
the show and acted it in the Iloor, which brought belly laugh
Irom normally cool and unIlappable Johnny Carson.
Why I retell this story now is that there are metaphorical
equivalents to this story. I believe that I represent the Iarmer
03f02f2009 The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
equivalents to this story. I believe that I represent the Iarmer
in the story. I see Pirabhakaran`s virulent critics (especially
the authors oI the Broken Palmvra book) as the hunter in the
story. I equate the bird in the story to the Broken Palmvra
book That book (considered as a trophy by the hunters) Iell
into my yard, and I will continuously kick the authors oI that
book Ior their exaggerated scribblings and cheapening oI the
Tamil-Hindu belieIs. Among the Iour authors oI that book,
two were born Christians and two had selI-garlanded
themselves as Marxists. Then, they had the temerity to
comment and critique some Hindu rituals and belieIs
(including karma) in that book, which is springled with subtle
anti-Hindu drivel.
Lest I`m thought oI as a Hindu partisan, I add that I`m not
criticising Christians at large since Pirabhakaran and LTTE
- as a viable Movement - are beneIiciaries oI dedicated
Christians in Eelam and elsewhere, who see the worthiness in
Pirabhakaran`s ideals. But, I remain as a critic oI the
thoughts oI closed minded, dogmatic Christians represented
by the two authors oI the Broken Palmvra book, namely
Rajani Thiranagama and Rajan Hoole, who couldn`t grasp
how Christianity as a religion originated, survived under trials
and tribulations during its Iirst Iour centuries, and ascended
with time. Martyrdom against oppression was a signiIicant
contribution oI early Christianity to the global culture and
those who show contempt Ior martyrdom in the 20
th
century
cannot be contemplated as true Christians. Among some
Christian scholars, there even exists a belieI that the death oI
Jesus Christ by cruciIixion was a voluntary suicide.
Karma in the words of the Broken Palmyra
authors
First, I present a paragraph which appear in the Broken
Palmvra book, in which the karma theory was added as a
tool to support the view oI the authors.
'Another incident which inIluenced the local mind was the
landmine attack by the LTTE on an army patrol on 25 March
1987. Subsequently the severed Ioot oI a Sri Lankan soldier
with a boot on it was exhibited successively at the
Maviddapuram temple and Tellipallai junction. For its part
Maviddapuram temple and Tellipallai junction. For its part
the Sri Lankan army shelled these two places on successive
nights. On the Iirst night a temple priest lost his leg. At
Tellipallai junction, Mr.Venugopal was killed. On the 31
March |1987|, the LTTE`s JaIIna leader Mr.Kittu lost a leg in
a grenade attack. Many oI the Hindu Iolk at Maviddapuram,
steeped in a belieI in karma, Iormed their own conclusions.
Nevertheless, the exhibition oI gore had attracted sizeable
crowds. This Iollowed the exhibition oI the dead bodies oI
nine Sri Lankan soldiers at Kandasamy Kovil Iour months
beIore. There was taking place a transIormation oI
sensibilities. Many Hindus were disgusted, but silent.
|Book: The Broken Palmvra, 1990, pp.105-106|
In this paragraph, the authors oI the book made selective use
oI the karma theory to their arsenal oI criticism on LTTE in a
circumspective manner (through the Hindu Iolk at
Maviddapuram) that Kiddu lost his leg a week later, because
the severed Ioot oI a Sri Lankan soldier with a boot on it
was exhibited successively at the Maviddapuram temple`. II
one accepts this logic, then other violent deaths among
Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese attributed to LTTE (such as
that oI Duraiappah, Sri Sabaratnam, Padmanabha and TULF
leadership) should be also accepted on the same belieI in
karma. But this would have been not to the liking oI the
authors oI the Broken Palmvra. This devious omission and
selective use oI karma theory by Rajan Hoole and his
colleagues in 1990 stimulated my interest on the karma
theory.
My push on the Karma theory
In 1994, when an opening appeared Ior a comment in the
Lanka Guardian magazine, I expressed my opinion on
karma theory candidly and was criticised by a Iellow Eelam
Tamil and two Muslims. I reproduce my original
contribution, and the subsequent communications on the
karma theme.
In a short letter written in halI-jest to swipe at the cant oI
Mr.Izeth Hussain (a Sri Lankan diplomat Poo-Bah who had
served as ambassador to Philippines and then Russia and
was also an academic pretender, with whom I clashed on the
was also an academic pretender, with whom I clashed on the
ethnic issue in the Lanka Guardian), I contributed the
Iollowing letter, entitled A Hindu Perspective on Bosnia`.
Excerpt:
'As a Hindu, who believe in (a) Brahman, the creator,
preserver or transIormer and reabsorber oI everything; and
(b) theory oI karma, it is my belieI that the current Iate oI
Muslims in Bosnia is related to the historical plundering oI
the Serb land by the Ottoman Turks (read as, Muslims),
which began in 1389 at the Battle oI Kosvo and continued
Ior almost Iive centuries Iollowing that. In 1459, Ottoman
Sultan Mehmed II achieves complete annexation oI Serbia.
The Turks rule Ior the next 400 years, oIten ruthlessly. They
impress Serbian youth into military service, exterminate the
nobles, burden the people with heavy taxes and subject the
Serbian Orthodox Church to the control oI hated Greek
patriarchs`, according to the historical synopsis, published in
the Newsweek oI April 19, 1993.
In the Holywood western movies, the heroes wore white and
rode in white horses. The villains had to wear the black and
ride on black horses. In the current Bosnian conIlict,
Muslims are being portrayed by Izeth Hussain as pitiable
heroes. But, history shows they also acted as villains Ior
centuries in the same battle-grounds. So, the theory oI karma
holds that the current generation oI Muslims are reaping what
their IoreIathers sowed. |Lanka Guardian, May 1, 1994,
p.20|
As I expected, I received criticism Ior this contribution Irom
V.T.Saravanapavan (Irom Canada) and M.A.Nuhman (a
Muslim Tamil poet Irom the University oI Peradeniya, about
whose analysis I had already reIerred to in part 47 oI this
series under the Muslim Factor ), and oI course Irom the
diplomat-turned-political commentator Hussain. Since
Hussain`s bombastic diatribe (as is his wont) is nothing but
personal bleating, I leave out his contribution, and provide
other two Ior observations.
M.A.Nuhman indicated his objections as Iollows:
'According to the Karma theory oI Sri Kantha, the current
generation oI (Bosnian) Muslims are reaping what their
generation oI (Bosnian) Muslims are reaping what their
IoreIathers sowed. I wonder whether Sri Kantha tries to
justiIy the suIIerings oI Bosnians or to explain the courses oI
the suIIerings. II it is a justiIication, then it reveals the cruelty
oI the intellectual mind. II it is an explanation then it is not an
explanation oI a scientist but oI a layman.
Everyone who reads history and has a common sense knows
that the historical IoreIathers oI any race had committed
some kind oI sin` to the other`. However, a rational
intellectual can`t relate the contemporary political turmoils
and suIIerings oI a later generation to the sin oI their
IoreIathers. Can Sri Kantha justiIy or explain the tremendous
suIIerings oI Sri Lankan Tamils using his theory oI Karma? It
will be mere absurdity. Even some orthodox or Ianatic
Muslims may justiIy the Bosnian suIIerings as it is the
punishment oI Allah because they didn`t practice Isam in
their day to day liIe. Rational intellectuals can`t entertain
these type oI irrational religious ideology in contemporary
political discourse. |Lanka Guardian, May 15, 1994, p.18|

V.T.Saravanapavan communicated his views on the theory
oI karma as Iollows:
'I was surprised and shocked to read Dr.Sachi Sri Kantha`s
A Hindu Perspective on Bosnia` (LG, May 1
st
1994). I
always admired and agreed on what Sachi Sri Kantha wrote
on the ethnic (Tamil) problem oI Sri Lanka. But on Bosnia
Muslims he is 100 wrong and the theory oI karma does not
hold good in modern context. Imaginative theories oI karma
and re-birth were expounded/created to instil Iear so that
people do not commit sins and crimes.II the theory oI
karma is to be believed, are we Hindu/Tamils should also
believe that the current generation oI Sri Lankan Tamils are
suIIering in many ways because oI some unknown or
imaginary sins committed by our IoreIathers?.|Lanka
Guardian, Colombo, June 15, 1994, p.20|
I brieIly responded to Mr.Saravanapavan`s criticism as
Iollows:
'.Saravanapavan is entitled to his opinion that the theory oI
karma does not hold good in a modern context`. But he
karma does not hold good in a modern context`. But he
should also not Iorget that millions oI Hindus will disagree
with him. I also hold the view that many Hindus in Sri Lanka
still believe that the Iates oI S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike,
Amirthalingam, Premadasa, Athulathmudali, Sri Sabaratnam,
Uma Maheswaran, Padmanabha, Kiddu and Mahathaya can
be explained by the theory oI karma. The Tamil proverb
One who sows millet reaps millet; one who sows misery
reaps misery` reIlect the theory oI karma lucidly. |Lanka
Guardian, Colombo, July 15, 1994, p.20|
At that time, by personal experience oI previous
submissions, I knew that to get into the print, my letter had
to escape the editorial scissors oI Mervyn de Silva. Thus, the
above rebuttal suIIered Irom Iew limitations. First, I had to
measure my words and limit the examples oI Iallen victims oI
karma theory to Sri Lanka alone so that it gets carried in the
slim 20 page Iortnightly magazine. Secondly, even with the
Sri Lankan examples, I did not include other names like
Rohana Wijeweera and his deputy who suIIered violent
deaths. Thirdly, in the above-cited examples oI names, I
overlooked the Iact that Kiddu`s death was diIIerent Irom
that oI others, in that he died on his own volition iI the
released records are to be believed, whereas others
mentioned were assassinated or (in the case oI Mahathaya)
executed. Fourthly, I also reIrained Irom answering
Mr.Saravanapavan`s poser whether current generation oI
Tamils are suIIering because oI some unknown or imaginary
sins committed by our IoreIathers?`. Now, aIter 8 years, in
this chapter I will provide my extended response to this
raised question.
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Karma
Unabashedly, the caption The Good, the Bad and the
Uglv is borrowed Irom Clint Eastwood`s 1966 movie. In
my opinion, karma is all encompassing. But, it receives
highlight only when something bad ocurs in one`s liIe. Thus,
for sake of convenience onlv, I divide the karma types into
the Good, the Bad and the Ugly.
(a) Ugly Karma
To reiterate the question posed by my two critics
(M.A.Nuhman and Saravanapavan) to me in 1994, could it
be true that the current generation oI Tamil are suIIering
because oI some unknown or imaginary sins committed by
our IoreIathers?` In deIense oI the karma theory, I would
state that the sins committed bv our (Hindu/Tamils)
forefathers is neither unknown nor imaginarv. These are
well known and real. I will list a Iew recognized sins oI our
IoreIathers.
1.

cowardice against oppression by adversaries (going all
the way to the 14
th
century), leading to intrusion by
Muslims into the Indian subcontinent
2.

tolerating the practise oI casteism which led to nasty
consequences oI Brahmin - Vellala dominance in the
Hindu society and concurrent conversion oI low caste
Hindus into Muslims and Christians in the Indian
subcontinent (between the 13
th
century and 19
th
century).
3.

In the 20
th
century Tamil Nadu and Eelam, political
naivete oI parliament-prone vocalists, leading to loss oI
Tamil rights at the national level in every subsequent
decade since 1930s.
4.

In the post-Independent era, retaining the slavish mentality
reinIorced by halI-baked scholarship, leading to a Ilawed
sense oI superiority to Western thoughts (whether it is
Karl Marx or moribund Magi oI UN) while cavalierly
ignoring the views oI notables who critiqued the same. I
point out that Bernard Shaw, Mahatma Gandhi, Bertrand
Russell, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Nelson Mandela are
Iew notables who pricked the Western values` valiantly.
Who can top Gandhi`s classic humorous scorn |It`s a
good idea`| to the asked question, |What do you think
oI the Western civilization?`|
(b) Bad Karma
In my view, the bad karma oI Eelam campaign are the two
losses it Iaced in the mid 1980s (in a span oI 38 months),
when Pirabhakaran was emerging as the leader. I reIer to the
assassination oI then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi in
Oct.31, 1984 and the natural death oI then Tamil Nadu ChieI
Minister M.G.Ramachandran in Dec.24, 1987. Both were
inevitable oI sorts.
Indira Gandhi and Eelam
II one believes Inder Malhotra (Indira`s biographer, who
quotes Cuban leader Fidel Castro), the then Indian prime
minister had had a premonition oI her assassination even
eleven years beIore her death when she heard the news oI
unnatural death oI Salvador Allende, the Chilean leader, in
1973. This is how Malhotra states his case:
'.On November 11
th
, 1973 Castro was in New Delhi, on
his way to Vietnam. An extremely pleasant banquet Indira
gave in his honour was rudely interrupted by the stunning
news` Irom Iar-oII Chile where it was still morning` that
Salvador Allende had been killed in a coup dètat.
At that dramatic moment`, recorded the Cuban leader
twelve years later, Indira Gandhi, in a prooI oI her intimacy
and conIidence, said to me: What they have done to Allende
they want to do to me also. There are people here,
connected with the same Ioreign Iorces that acted in Chile,
who would like to eliminate me.`
ThereaIter, time and again she was to repeat publicly a
sanitised version oI what she had told Castro privately. As
constant as her warnings against the Ioreign hand` which,
according to sneerin critics, was home-made` was her
reIrain that they` wanted to do her in. She took care never
speciIically to identiIy who they` were. But, by innuendo
and insinuation, she leIt little doubt that the accusing Iinger
pointed to the CIA, iI not to the government oI the United
States. |Book: Indira Gandhi, Coronet edition, Kent, 1990,
p.291|.
One can question whether Indira was paranoid about her
intended Iate. But one should also not Iorget that in 1973,
America was under the regime oI neIarious President Nixon
and his Rasputin-like impressario Kissinger whose
implemented un-democratic policies in Asia, AIrica and
South America as well as domestic policies oI pathological
lying and burglary could make Indira as a prophet in
comparison. About the death oI Chilean leader Salvador
Allende in 1973, existing literature is conIusing; some report
that he was killed, and some report that he committed
suicide`. Even iI the latter version is accepted, it is
undeniable that the proximate cause oI his suicide was the
CIA-aided successIul coup dètat in Chile. |Note: In
Appendix 1, I provide an incomplete list oI Heads oI State
and ex-Heads oI State who met violent deaths since 1967.
Having not heard Irom Leslie Pyenson oI CIA to whose
research study I reIerred to in part 51 oI this series, I
prepared this list Irom open reIerence sources, to
supplement the Appendix 1 which appeared with part 51.|
Now, I present a Iew paragraphs oI what Malhotra wrote
about Indira`s policy on the Eelam issue:
'In dealing with the crisis arising Irom the ethnic conIlict in
Sri Lanka, however, Indira did not waver in the least and
Iirmly took control oI a highly explosive situation.
Sri Lanka`s Tamil minority, Iorming about a tenth oI the total
population and concentrated in the north and the east oI the
island, having despaired oI getting justice Irom the Sinhalese
majority, had started clamouring Ior Tamil Eelam
(independence). Moderate groups, which might have settled
Ior less, were quickly marginalised and the leadership oI the
Tamil movement passed to a Ierociously separatist
organisation called the Liberation Tigers oI Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) which was heavily armed and never reluctant to take
on the Sri Lankan Army, oIten getting the better oI the
government troops in combat. In sheer Irustration, the
security Iorces killed unarmed Tamil civilians.
Unsurprisingly, the LTTE enjoyed wide support in Tamil
Nadu, the Southern Indian state whose people had ties oI
blood, kinship and culture with the Tamils oI Sri Lanka. The
state`s phenomenally popular chieI minister,
M.G.Ramachandran (MGR) was the LTTE`s patron saint
and gave the Tigers` sanctuary, arms and cash on a
generous scale. This was obviously embarrassing to Indira,
then busy denouncing Pakistan Ior its aid and assistance to
then busy denouncing Pakistan Ior its aid and assistance to
Sikh terrorists in Punjab, but she could do nothing about it,
Ior a tidal wave oI Tamil opinion was supporting the actions
oI MGR who was, moreover, Indira`s only political ally in
the whole oI South India, now ruled by non-Congress (I)
parties. In any case, she herselI was not averse to using
MGR`s support oI the LTTE as leverage on the Sri Lankan
government.
At the same time she was not prepared to countenance the
demand Ior Tamil Eelam or that Ior converting Sri Lanka into
another Cyprus, partitioning it de facto rather than de fure.
What she wanted was that within the Iramework oI a united
Sri Lanka, the Tamil minority should have equal status with
the Sinhalese majority as well as adequate autonomy. |ibid,
pp.285-286|
Given the developing tension in her Southern back-yard,
whether Indira Gandhi wouldn`t have repeated a Bangladesh
operation` in Sri Lanka in the 1980s is now only oI academic
interest. The TULF leadership believed that Indira (iI her
nerves were pulled irritatingly by the then Sri Lankan
leadership Jayewardene-Premadasa duo) was capable oI
carrying out such an operation. But, with her assassination in
1984 such a belieI evaporated into thin air since Indira`s
successors (including her son Rajiv Gandhi) lacked the nerve
and gumption to even think along those terms. And thus,
Indira`s departure was a bad karma Ior the Eelam hope.
MGR and Eelam
Since I had cited above Inder Malhotra`s view on the then
Tamil Nadu chieI minister MGR`s role as the patron oI
LTTE and Pirabhakaran, I provide my own impressions on
MGR`s contribution to the Eelam campaign. To quote Irom
a commemorative Ieature I wrote in 1992:
'Call it a mere coincidence or the destiny oI Eelam Tamils,
when the liberation struggle began earnestly in 1977, MGR
would become the chieI minister oI the Tamil Nadu. Though
his interest on the problems oI Eelam Tamils remained
passive till 1982, the ethnic holocaust oI 1983 kindled his
support Ior the Eelam cause. 1983 also saw the change in
guard among the political leaders oI the Eelam Tamils. MGR
guard among the political leaders oI the Eelam Tamils. MGR
had never Ielt comIortable with the TULF leadership since he
had perceived them as emotionally more close to the DMK
leadership.
When the leadership mantle in the struggle Ior Eelam needed
a change and a boost, MGR became the godIather oI the
LTTE and made sure that the new born baby` would not
suIIer a premature death in the hands oI wily
J.R.Jayewardene, the central government oI India and the
Intelligence Agency oI India.
Even to his allies in politics, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi,
the links MGR had with the LTTE was too embarrassing.
But they simply had to ignore it Ior their own political
survival in the south India. For all this moral support to the
Tamil Eelam cause, MGR became the arch enemy oI the
Sinhalese power brokers Irom 1983 till his death in
December 1987.
Many Eelam Tamils also did not expect much Irom MGR
aIter his skirmish with the TULF leadership at the 1981
Madurai Tamil International ConIerence. But, now in
hindsight, one can see how much vital was the support oI
MGR Ior the Eelam cause Irom 1983 till his death. |The
Man Irom Maruthur and Malai Nadu`, Tamil Nation
(London), Jan.15, 1992, p.4|
MGR`s death in December 1987, at a relatively senile` age
oI almost 71, was the second bad blow Ior the Eelam,
Iollowing Indira Gandhi`s assassination. For better or worse,
some oI the leading Tamil Nadu politicians had lived and
(even marginally) inIluenced policy well into their eighties.
C.Rajagopalachari (Rajaji), E.V.Ramasamy Naicker,
C.Subramaniam are Iew who reached 90 years oI age.
Among the still living, Iormer President R.Venkatraman had
passed 90; DMK chieI Karunanidhi is nearing 80. Thus
MGR`s death, while he was holding the inIluential chieI
ministership oI Tamil Nadu, in 1987 was indeed a bad karma
Ior Eelam.
I believe that MGR`s role as a mentor to Pirabhakaran and
LTTE has been still under-appreciated by Tamils, partly due
to the publications and selI-righteous posturing oI Tamil
to the publications and selI-righteous posturing oI Tamil
academics steeped in the Marxist LeItist tradition
(ProI.K.Sivathamby and ProI. S.Sivasegaram, to name a
Iew) who poured scorn on MGR`s modus operandi. Being a
successIul stage and movie actor Ior decades beIore he
became the ChieI Minister oI Tamil Nadu in 1977, MGR had
the advantage oI using three skills he learnt in his primary
proIession and used them eIIectively to counter his Ioes and
Iriends equally. These are as Iollows:
1.

his impeccable sense oI stage presence (a la Muhamad
Ali and President Ronald Reagan) and intuitional
decision-making skill. Only proIessional artistes actors,
musicians and dancers oI high caliber, and not the arm
chair critics, can grasp this sense oI stage presence well
enough to act and react to the developing events and not
Iollowing the pre-prepared script like a Iool. Since events
are always in a state oI Ilux, this intuitional decision
making skill is oI high relevance Ior success in politics
and all other endevors.
2.

his virtuoso ability to not allow virtuallv anvone Irom
stealing a scene. MGR demonstrated this ability
repeatedly against all whom he had to interact with. This
included Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Karunanidhi,
Jayalalitha, J.R.Jayewardene, Amirthalingam, India`s
Intelligence gumshoes and policy pundits, and last but not
the least - political upstarts belonging to the RAW-
supported Eelam militant groups.
3.

his acting background helped him again in the last three
years oI his liIe, Iollowing his debilitation with stroke in
1984 which resulted in speech impediment. MGR could
use mime and hands to express his thoughts to his
conIidants, while ignoring and deIlecting unwanted pleas
and noise Irom distractors within his party as well as
those in outer circle.
This last ability has been aptly described by one oI MGR`s
conIidants, K.Mohandas the Deputy Inspector General oI
Police who served as MGR`s ears and hands`. Mohandas
had recorded,
'|in the post-1984 period| Since I had been keeping MGR
inIormed about the activities oI these |i.e., many Eelam
Tamil| militant groups and the training given to them, he
expressed at one stage, that he would like to get in touch
with all the leaders oI various groups particularly those oI
LTTE..The discussion was general in nature..MGR
listened patiently but it was apparent that an instant rapport
was established between MGR and Prabhakaran, the LTTE
supremo. MGR, with his uncanny insight could easily make
out the diIIerence between the LTTE and the rest oI the
groups. It was a widely known Iact that, as a consequence,
MGR used to extend Iinancial assistance at various stages in
later years, both Irom his personal Iunds and sometimes
Irom government Iunds. |Book: MGR The Man and
Mvth, Panther Publishers, Bangalore, 1992, pp.78-79|
In a subsequent chapter, Mohandas had Iurther noted,
'When I inIormed MGR that the developing situation was
dangerous Irom the point oI view oI law and order, he asked
me to warn the leaders oI all the groups and also to inIorm
the Centre. MGR was, on his part, gradually getting in touch
with the militant groups particularly the LTTE, through
sources other than the CID. His idea seemed to be to
impress on the Central Government his hold over the militant
groups and use it as a card to be used iI and when the need
arose. This was a dangerous game, but as MGR once told
me, liIe was not worth it without risks. |ibid, p.113|
That LTTE and Pirabhakaran recovered Irom the death oI
MGR is indeed a miracle`. And I consider this is one oI the
good karmas Ior Eelam.
(c) Good karma
The ascension and dominance oI Pirabhakaran as the military
leader Ior Eelam Tamils since 1986 was a good karma in my
assessment. Now that Japan is very much in the news relating
to aid and development oI war-torn Eelam, Sri Lankans as
well as Indians are also getting Iamiliarized with Japanese
names like Yasushi Akashi and Mieko Nishimizu both
proIessionals oI a caliber.
I will use an analogy to a still not-well recognized Japanese
inventor in explaining Pirabhakaran`s contribution to Eelam.
That I have been living, researching and working in Japan
since 1986 (with the exception oI two years which I spent in
Philadelphia) allows me to make a strong claim about myselI
as someone who have studied a little more than quite many
pundits who contribute to Indian, Sri Lankan and even
American newsmedia on Japan. This includes even the
passing caravan oI journalists who report Ior international
magazines like Time, Newsweek and the Economist. I make
these observations Iirst to present my credibility as a Japan
watcher.
In mid-1999, I was working at a medium-size Iood company
in central Japan, and as is the practice, I had to deliver once-
a year morning cheer speech` (called chorei in Japanese) Ior
about 5 minutes in Japanese, to the Iellow workers
numbering over 100. For this speech, I chose to Iocus on
the contributions oI a Japanese engineer-inventor about
whom none oI the Iellow workers would know but had
used his invention regularly. Here are excerpts Irom my
speech.
'America`s Time magazine have picked 100 people who
inIluenced the world greatly in the 20
th
century. Only one
Japanese Sony`s Akio Morita has made it into this top
100, in international ranking. All oI us have heard about
Morita and his transistor story. But in my opinion, better than
Morita, it was Hideo Shima, who made a greater contribution
to the liIe oI Japanese in this century.
Who is Shima? Until last year, when he died at the age oI 96,
I didn`t know his name. Even now many Japanese don`t
know much about him; though everyone would have used his
product. Shima`s product was introduced in 1964. It was
called the bullet express train (shinkansen). From my school
days in Sri Lanka, I had wanted to learn about the principles
oI the success oI this bullet express train. Only aIter Shima`s
death, I learnt about his original idea, and the unique design.
What is unique about the bullet express train? it is speed
and saIety.
Engineer Shima wanted to increase the speed oI the regular
express train. He did it by three steps.
1.

by building a separate bullet-train express` onlv track.
2.

by making the this track, as straight as possible.
3.

by closing the windows and doors, like air plane, to
decrease friction.
Then, engineer Shima wanted saIety, at high speed. He did it
in two steps.
1.

by having an electric motor to pull each car oI the train.
This is quite diIIerent Irom having an engine, in Iront oI
all the cars.
2.

by the most ingenous step oI having the electric motor in
each car Iunction simultaneouslv as brakes.
Until 40 years ago, no one in Japan or in Europe or America
believed in Shima`s idea. But Shima made his dream come
true, against all opposition Irom politicians, bankers and
pseudo-pundits in his proIession. And when the opening
ceremony Ior the bullet express train came, Shima was not
there. He had resigned Irom his job Ior the politicians to strut
in Iront oI limelight. |Irom my original text, dated July 5,
1999|
Each oI the Iive simpliIied steps I had outlined above which
resulted in the successIul operation oI bullet express train
can be metaphorically tagged to Pirabhakaran`s success with
LTTE and Eelam.
First, Pirabhakaran built a separate express` track Irom the
worn-out parliamentary track. Even in engineer Shima`s
conceptualization, this was the most signiIicant contribution
to the development oI the bullet express train; i.e., to think
that the already used path or track has to be given up Ior a
new track. Secondly, Pirabhakaran made this separate track
as straight as an arrow` rather than giving into de-tours or
bendings. Thirdly, he closed the windows and doors to
unwanted Iriction without hesitation by coercion and even
silencing. Fourthly, he made the LTTE express train Iunction
eIIectively by delegating responsibilities to diIIerent regional
leaders. FiIthly, he also developed a strategy to put brakes`
on the running express train at appropriate intervals. (To be
continued).

Appendix 1

Unnatural Deaths of Heads of State and ex-Heads of
State (since 1967)
source: Sri Kantha - an incomplete list, compiled from open
reference sources]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------
Name oI Head oI State Country Date oI Unnatural
Death
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------
1. Humberto Branco Brazil 1967
2. R.Barrientos Ortuno Bolivia
Apr.27,1969
3. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke Somalia Oct.15,
1969
4. Salvador Allende Chile Sept.11,
1973
5. Richard Ratsimandrava Madagascar Feb.11,
1975
6. Faysal ibn Abdal Aziz Saudi Arabia Mar.25,
1975
7. Francois Tombalbaye Chad Apr.13,
1975
8. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Bangladesh Aug.15,
1975
9. Murtala Mohammed Nigeria Feb.13,
1976
10. Juan Jose Gonzalez Bolivia 1976
11. Juscelino K.de Oliveira Brazil 1976
12. Mohammad Daud Khan AIghanistan Apr.27,
1978
13. Ali Mtsashiwa Comoros May 13,
1978
14. ZulIicar Ali Bhutto Pakistan Apr.4,
1979
15. Nur Mohammad Taraki AIghanistan Sept.16,
1979
16. Park Chung Hee South Korea Oct.26,
1979
17. HaIizullah Amin AIghanistan Dec.27,
1979
18. William R.Tolbert Jr. Liberia Apr.12,
1980
19. Anastasio Somoza Jr. Nicaragua Sept.17,
1980
20. Ziaur Rahman Bangladesh May 30,
1981
21. Omar Torrijos Panama Aug.1,
1981
22. Mohammad Ali Rajai Iran Aug.30,
1981
23. Anwar Sadat Egypt Oct.6,
1981
24. Maurice Bishop Grenada Oct.19,
1983
25. Indira Gandhi India Oct.31,
1984
26. OloI Palme Sweden Feb.28,
1986
27. Samora Machel Mozambique Oct.19,
1986
28. Thomas Sankara Burkino Faso Oct.15,
1987
29. Zia ul Haq Pakistan Aug.17,
1988
30. Ahmed Abderemane Comoros Nov.26,
1989
31. NicolaeCeausescu Romania Dec.22,
1989
32. Samuel K.Doe Liberia Sept.9,
1990
33. Rajiv Gandhi India May 21,
1991
34. Ranasinghe Premadasa Sri Lanka May 1,
1993
35. Zviad Gamsakhurdia Georgia Dec.31,
1993
36. Melchior Ndadaye Burundi Oct.21,
1993
37. Cyprien Ntaryamira Burundi Apr.6,
1994
38. Gen.J.Habyarimana Rwanda Apr.6,
1994
39. Muhammad Farah Hassan Somalia Aug.1,
1996
40. Mohammad Najibullah AIghanistan Sept.27,
1996
41. Ibrahim Barre Mainassara Niger Apr.11,
1999
42. Laurent Kabila Congo Jan.16,
2001
43. King Birendra Nepal Jun.1,
2001


Part 53
Sachi Sri Kantha
19 February 2003]
Being a Tamil Hero

Andrea: Unhappy is the land that breeds no heroes.`
Galileo: No Andrea. Unhappy is the land that needs a hero.`
- Bertolt Brecht, in his play Leben des Galilei
|The LiIe oI Galileo|, 1943.

Apart Irom the word love`, in my opinion, the word hero`
is another oI those much abused Iour letter words. When I
was young, I learnt in my primary school English grammar
book that hero` is masculine and heroine` is Ieminine.
Now, primarily due to Hollywood hacks, the Ieminine
version oI the word had been obliterated and the hero` had
been turned into a gender-neuter word. Hero` also has
suIIered Irom status deIlation by constant exposure and
hype by the media hacks.
In January 2000, I requested ,and received, a reprint Irom Dr.
Russell Travis oI his 1999 presidential address to the
American Association oI Neurological Surgeons. It was
entitled, Is the age oI heroes gone?` |Journal of
Neurosurgerv, Oct.1999; vol.91, pp.531-537|. In developing
his address, Dr.Travis had used timing to his advantage,
Iollowing the year oI the President Clinton-Monica Lewinsky
scandal. To quote,
'AIter the past year`s worth oI political antics, I began to
wonder what is a hero?` Who, other than athletes, like John
Elway or Michael Jordan, or country or rock singers, are
Elway or Michael Jordan, or country or rock singers, are
today`s candidates Ior the title hero`? Who today would be
labeled as the great man?` Do we still have heroes?
Then, he presented six examples oI inIluential heroes:
Galileo, Thomas JeIIerson, John Quincy Adams, Abraham
Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony and John F. Kennedy. While
many would agree with the Iirst Iive names, thousands oI
Americans would have diIIiculty in identiIying J.F.Kennedy
as their hero. This address oI Dr. Travis' prompted me to
turn my attention to the Eelam Tamil heroes.
To place Pirabhakaran`s status as a Tamil hero in context,
Iirst one has to deIine the word hero`. The well-thumped
dictionary in my table Funk & Wagnalls Standard
Dictionarv (1980) provides the Iollowing descriptions Ior
the word hero`.
1.

a man distinguished Ior exceptional courage, Iortitude or
bold enterprise.
2.

one idealized Ior superior qualities or deeds oI any kind
3.

the principal male character in a drama, Iictional work,
etc.
4.

in classical mythology and legend, a man oI great nobility
or physical prowess.
Considering his track record Ior the past two decades, it is
not an exaggeration iI one states that Pirabhakaran`s deeds
can Iit into Iirst three oI the above descriptions. On the
remaining Iourth description, while still living, Pirabhakaran`s
deeds also have been tagged with the legendary` appellation
and his creation, viz. the LTTE, has demonstrated physical
prowess` in a Iigurative sense.
Orrin Klapp`s classification of heroes
It is not inappropriate to identiIy the various types oI
legitimate heroes who were (and are) Pirabhakaran`s
contemporaries in Tamil society. Pirabhakaran cannot be
studied in isolation and, thus, the heroic deeds oI his Eelam
Tamil contemporaries in various arenas are identiIied Iirst.
Orrin Klapp, the proIessor oI sociology at San Diego State
University Ior two decades (1949-69), who had researched
on social types, developed a taxonomy oI heroes in 1962.
on social types, developed a taxonomy oI heroes in 1962.
Klapp`s classiIication oI heroes consists oI Iive types, and
within each type there are 3 or 4 sub-categories. Altogether,
Klapp recognized 17 types oI heroes, as Iollows:
1.

Winners: Getting what you wanted, beating everyone and
being a champion.
(a)

Strong man
(b)

The brain
(c)

The smart operator
(d)

The great lover
2.

Splendid PerIormers: Shining beIore an audience.
(a)

Showmen
(b)

Heroes oI play
(c)

Playboy
3.

Heroes oI Social Acceptability: Being liked, attractive and
good.
(a)

The pin-up model
(b)

The charmer
(c)

The good Iellow
(d)

ConIorming heroes
4.

Independent Spirits: Standing alone, making one`s way
by oneselI.
(a)

Bohemian
(b)

Jester
(c)

Angry commentator
5.

Group Servants: Helping people, cooperation selI-
sacriIice, group service and solidarity.
(a)

DeIender
(b)

Martyr
(c)

BeneIactor
These types have been outlined by Gordon Russell in his
book, The Social Psvchologv of Sport (Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1993, pp.126-128).
Tamil Heroes of Eelam
In 20
th
century Eelam many heroes emerged by popular
recognition and public adoration. Among them were artistes,
educators, legislators, public deIenders, and icons oI protest
and valor. Some had academic exposure to cultures beyond
Ceylon, due to privilege oI birth and aIIluence. Some did not
Ceylon, due to privilege oI birth and aIIluence. Some did not
even enter the universities oI the island. But, all were
intelligent in their own right. Thus, comparing each one with
another is like comparing an apple and orange. But, Irom my
vintage perspective as a keen observer oI Tamil society Ior
the past three decades, I provide below examples for each of
the above 17 categories of legitimate heroes, who
experienced one-of-a- kind life and contributed to the
Eelam societv in unparalleled fashion. The majority oI
these heroes (those born beIore 1950) have received
recognition in the reIerence work, A Dictionarv of
Biographv of Cevlon Tamils (1996), compiled by
S.Arumugam, and are seniors to Pirabhakaran in age. The
Iollowing list may seem biased to some, but it is biased
against some names (such as phony Mother Teresa
wannabes and sin eaters in the services oI borderline-
demented politicians) who are pampered by the Colombo
and Chennai media hype.
1.

Winners
(a)

Strong man: S.Thondaman (in the local political arena
since 1947 until his death in 1999)
(b)

The brain: Swami Vipulananda, Fr. Xavier
Thaninayagam, ProI. Christie J. Eliezer, ProI. A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson
(c)

The smart operator: ProI. S. Vithiananthan, Col.
Kiddu (both as unconventional organizers oI the
JaIIna society in the 1970s and 1980s respectively)
(d)

The great lover: James T.Rutnam (eminent
bibliophile)
2.

Splendid PerIormers
(a)

Showmen: G.G.Ponnambalam (both in legal and
political arenas), musician Thavil Thatchinamoorthy,
endurance athlete V.S.Kumar Anandan
(b)

Heroes of plav: cricketer Muttiah Muralitharan
(c)

Plavbov: cricketer Mahadeva Sathasivam
3.

Heroes oI Social Acceptability
(a)

The pin-up model: poet Kasi Ananthan (in the Iirst
halI oI 1970s)
(b)

The charmer: A.Amirthalingam, C.Rajadurai (Irom
1956 to 1980 as orators)
(c)

The good fellow: M.Sivasithamparam
(d)

Conforming hero: S.J.V.Chelvanayakam (Ior the
Tamil masses Irom 1956 until his death in 1977)
4.

Independent Spirits
(a)

Bohemian: ProI.C.Suntheralingam
(b)

Jester: satirist Sivagnanasuntharam (editor oI
Sirithiran humor magazine and creator oI JaIIna`s
cynical, wise old man character, Savari Thambar)
(c)

Angrv commentator: journalist S.Sivanayagam,
M.K.Eelaventhan (both heroes oI non-violence against
the high-handedness oI Indian Poo Bahs)
5.

Group Servants
(a)

Defender: Senator S.Nadesan, Kumar Ponnambalam
(both as legal deIenders against State oppression oI
human rights)
(b)

Martvr: Pon.Sivakumaran, physician Gandhiyam` S.
Rajasundaram, Capt. Wasanthan (Miller), Second
Lieutenant Malathy, Lieutenant Col.Thileepan
(c)

Benefactor: Dr.Siva Chinnathamby (as pioneer
campaigner oI women`s health), Milk White
Industries' entrepreneur K.Kanagarajah
Among the 31 individuals whom I have identiIied above, with
the exception oI Swami Vipulananda, all others are
Pirabhakaran`s contemporaries. Many, though
chronologically older, were Pirabhakaran`s admirers; some,
chronologically younger, were his junior associates. Thus,
Pirabhakaran`s stature as a Tamil hero is hardly in doubt.
In my view, despite the sneering oI his critics who suIIer
Irom sour grape syndrome`, Pirabhakaran became a hero to
Tamils in the old Iashioned way; he earned it Ior three oI his
deeds. First, he established an authentic, vibrant and
successful (I use only these three appropriate adjectives to
distinguish the LTTE Irom other Iakes) Tamil army a deed
which had not been perIormed Ior his ethnic group in the
past 400-500 years. In this deed, Pirabhakaran is on par with
George Washington who perIormed a similar Ieat Ior the
colonial settlers in America. Secondly, Pirabharan stood up
against the imperial intentions oI Indian army and
administrative Poo Bahs, while his Iellow Tamil rivals Iolded
their tents in subservience. Thirdly, his LTTE army stood up
and scored against the aggression oI the Sri Lankan state`s
armed Iorces and para-military elements Ior more than 15
years, despite heavy odds.
Heroism in the Battle of Poonagari (1993)
In 1993, writing under my pen-name C.P.Goliard, I identiIied
Pirabhakaran`s heroism in a commentary using poet
Kannadasan`s (1927-1981) lines, Iollowing the historic Battle
oI Poonagari. Excerpts:
Uvir Mel Aasai (Love in LiIe) is a mediocre Tamil movie
which was released in the mid 1960s. It was one oI Jai
Shankar`s early movies. The only redeeming Ieature oI that
movie, as Iar as I can remember, was the Paapa |child| song
oI poet Kannadasan, which was sung by Carnatic diva
K.B.Sundarambal. Kannadasan`s verse and Sundarambal`s
voice! splendid, is the only adjective one can use Ior that
super combination. Kannadasan wrote,
Kelu Paapaa Kelu Paapaa - Kelvigal aaviram Kelu
Paapaa
Ketaal kidaipathu pothu arivu intha Kelvivil valarvathu
pahutharivu.
|Ask child ask child Ask thousand questions child
General knowledge you`ll gain and listening will make one
rational.|
In the subsequent lines, the poet laureate wrote,
Kadalukku pavanthavan karaivil ninran athai padahinil
kadanthavan ulagai kandaan
Pavanthavan thanakke pahaivaavan enrum
thuninthavan ulagirku olivaavan.
|The one who Ieared the sea stood in the shore the one
who rowed it in a boat discovered the world;
The coward becomes an enemy to himselI; the ever
courageous will become the beacon to the world.|
The cowards and the courageous Tamils have played the
political game in both these positions in recent times. The
recent Battle oI Poonagari can be appreciated well when we
comprehend that not long ago, Tamils were a laughing stock
among the Sinhalese Ior their cowardice.. |Tamil Nation,
London, Dec.1993, p.4|
I continued:
'On the Battle oI Poonagari, the Economist magazine oI
November 13
th
|1993| had presented the verdict succinctly
to the world: A Sri Lankan government oIIicial was honest
enough to describe the military setback on the JaIIna
peninsula on November 11
th
as a disaster. AIter an attack by
500-or-so Tamil Tiger separatist guerrillas, the army seems to
have withdrawn Irom Poonareen |Pooneryn|, its last base on
the peninsula apart Irom the airport. This deIeat, the worst
single loss Ior years, is doubly worrying Ior the government
that seemed set on shooting its way to a solution to a decade
oI Iighting against Tamil guerrillas`. One should also note
that the Economist is no Iriend oI the Eelam campaign.
Kannadasan`s lines, Kadalukku pavanthavan karaivil
ninran athai padahinil kadanthavan ulagai kandaan, is
meaningIul in two planes. First, scientiIically speaking, they
praise the determination and courage oI explorers like
Colombus, Vasco da Gama and Magellan who discovered
the New World` by their bold adventures. Secondly, in
historical terms, these lines also chronicle the Iall oI Tamils
Irom their pedestal as explorers oI new land due to an
inward-looking mentality, which became dominant Iive
centuries ago (at the same time when Europeans were
beginning to explore the sea). This bad trait, caused by caste
consciousness, relegated the Iishermen to the secondary role
in a society which came to be dominated by the Brahmin
doctrines.
So, one can visualize that Kannadasan challenged the Tamils
with the words: Paynthavan thanakke pahaiyaavaan enrum
thuninthavan ulagirku oliyaavaan. II he is alive, the poet will
be pleased that quite a number oI lads and lasses oI Eelam
do take his verses seriously and put them into action. |ibid|
Continuous Successes in the Battlefield
That the Battle oI Poonagari (1993) was no Ilash in the pan
was demonstrated by Pirabhakaran`s army which kept
mauling the Sri Lankan armed Iorces repeatedly at will.
Excerpts Irom Iour notable newsreports, between 1999 and
2002, would suIIice.
(1) Arjuna Ranawana to the Asiaweek magazine
' It didn`t take long. First a 100-man Tamil Tiger commando
unit slipped through the thinly deIended government lines.
Then three other groups attacked Irom diIIerent directions,
putting the deIenders to Ilight. The government`s military
base at Oddusudan had Iallen. Within a week oI the Nov.2
|1999| assault, up to 10 positions in the northeastern Wanni
region had met a similar Iate. Thousands oI government
soldiers were Ialling back, and 18 months oI hard-Iought
advances were largely undone...
|President| Kumaratunga put a brave Iace on the military
setbacks. While conceding that considerable terrain had been
lost, she said media reports oI government military losses
had been grossly exaggerated`. Nevertheless, Unceasing
Waves 3, as Tamil Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran has
dubbed the oIIensive, has rattled the government and dented
military morale. Kumaratunga ordered a shakeup in the
northern command and imposed censorship on local news
organizations. The army chieI, Gen. Sri Lal Weerasooriya,
took personal command oI the garrison town oI Vavuniya,
took personal command oI the garrison town oI Vavuniya,
just south oI the government Iorces` redrawn deIensive line.
He also ordered an inquiry into the deIeats.
The Wanni region is the last signiIicant area oI Sri Lanka still
in Tamil Tiger hands. For about a year and a halI,
government Iorces had been pushing the rebels back,
sometimes with unexpected ease. But in the end, say military
analysts, the advancing troops had become too thinly
spread, even with the injection oI naval and air units into the
inIantry lines. When Prabhakaran`s men punched through a
gap between navy and army positions, there was no
organized resistance. |In: Attack and Counter-Attack`,
Asiaweek magazine, Nov.19, 1999, p.40|
(2) Anthony Spaeth in the 1ime magazine
'.On April 22 |2000|, the Tigers managed to capture a
military garrison at Elephant Pass, an isthmus that connects
the northern JaIIna peninsula to the rest oI Sri
Lanka..Kumaratunga begged Ior weapons and ammunition
Irom abroad, and arms dealers Irom China, Israel, Iran,
Russia and Ukraine Ilew into Colombo, the country`s
capital, to strike deals.
At mid-week, Sri Lanka also begged neighbor India to
provide military aid, including ships to evacuate troops Irom
JaIIna and Iighter planes to provide air cover. The last time
India got involved in the Sri Lanka war the results proved
catastrophic Ior both sides.Not surprisingly, India this time
has Ilatly reIused to help evacuate the Sri Lankan soldiers..
The army seems inept and almost certainly unable to win the
war. The LTTE, having overrun so many military bases, is
now considered better armed than the government. Thanks
to Kumaratunga`s press censorship, the majority oI Sri
Lankans didn`t even know oI the three-week battle at
Elephant Pass until the rout was complete. Now they`re
scared. I am wondering whether we can ever get over this.`,
says a security guard working in Colombo. Tiger supremo
Velupillai Prabhakaran told his IaithIul last November that
2000 would be the Year oI War`. He has kept his promise.
|In: Tigers Triumphant`, Time magazine, International
edition, May 15, 2000, p.25|
edition, May 15, 2000, p.25|
(3) Anonymous reporter in the Economist magazine
' An attacking Iorce always sustains more casualties`, said
a Sri Lankan army commander, seeking to dismiss the
army`s large losses in an attack on Tamil Tiger rebels. The
army said 157 oI its soldiers and 190 rebels had been killed.
The Tigers said it had killed 300 soldiers Ior the loss oI 48 oI
its own Iighters. Whatever the true Iigure, it was a Ierocious
battle. Worse, the army appeared to have gained nothing
Irom it.
It had apparently aimed to capture the town oI Pallai as a
prelude to retaking the more important Elephant Pass, a
causeway linking the JaIIna peninsula to the southern
mainland. Last year the army lost control oI the pass in its
worst deIeat in the 18-year civil war. Without this land route,
the government can supply its troops in the Tamil-dominated
peninsula only by sea or by air. An oIIensive, named Rod oI
Fire, started on April 25
th
immediately aIter the Tigers had
ended a unilateral truce. The Tigers put up strong resistance,
Iorcing the troops, drawn mainly Irom the majority Sinhalese
population, to retreat to their original positions in Nagar
Kovil, Eluthumadduval and the Kilaly lagoon. On April 28
th
,
it was all over and both sides were disposing oI their dead.
The debacle has panicked the government. The stalling oI a
major oIIensive led by the cream oI its recently modernised
armed Iorces has exposed the precariousness oI its grip on
the peninsula, which was wrested Irom the Tigers only in
1996. The government`s earlier claim that the Tigers had
called their ceaseIire out oI military weakness is looking
increasingly hollow. |In: Tiger teeth`, Economist
magazine, May 5, 2001, pp.25-26|
(4) Steve Percy in the Far Eastern Economic Review
magazine
'.The |JaIIna| town`s most noticeable residents are 30,000
troops, who man IortiIied camps and bunkers at every
intersection. At the 51
st
Battalion headquarters, in one oI the
town`s two big 1960s-style hotels, a high ranking oIIicer
town`s two big 1960s-style hotels, a high ranking oIIicer
concedes the Tigers have won the war`. He cites their
unhindered passage to the town under the peace accord and
how they move among the people showing videos Ior
political and recruitment purposes, while extracting taxes
Irom shopkeepers and traders. The army won`t stand in their
way, he says. They`ll be back in their barracks by the end oI
the year, he adds.
That`s the demand oI the Tigers` local political oIIicer near
Temple Road. Sympathizers come and go. On the wall
hangs a portrait oI Prabhakaran in jungle Iatigues with a
suicide capsule looped around his neck. A world map Iorms
a backdrop with a yellow Eelam the promised Tiger
homeland jutting out oI the Indian Ocean like a crab with
an enormous claw. It appears to be unattached to Sri
Lanka.. |In: Highway oI Hope`, Far Eastern Economic
Review magazine, Aug.22, 2002.|
Russell Travis, in his above-cited presidential address, drew
attention to two components oI heroism: courage and
Iortitude. ReIerences to Pirabhakaran, appearing as sound
bites, by Ranawana, Spaeth, Percy and the anonymous
Economist correspondent in the above-cited passages tell
without embellishment the courage component oI the LTTE
leader as the Tamil hero. Travis also stresses the Iortitude
component; i.e., the willingness oI an individual to suIIer
personal anguish Ior the sake oI the moral good.
A Iew authentic heroes living amongst us now were blessed
with both these components. I can state that Nelson Mandela
and champion Mohammad Ali (both bona-Iide boxers)
showed the traits oI courage and Iortitude in their campaigns
against political arrogance and racism. Among the Tamils,
Pirabhakaran`s deeds is on par with that oI boxers Ali and
Mandela.
An unorthodox Economist Measure of Pirabhakaran`s
fortitude
I provide below an unusual measure oI Pirabhakaran`s
Iortitude. For almost two decades, political decision-making
in Sri Lanka and to an extent even in neighboring India had
been revolving around Pirabhakaran`s thoughts and deeds.
been revolving around Pirabhakaran`s thoughts and deeds.
No heads oI state have inIluenced the events in South Asia
Ior such a lengthy period in the post 1975 period like
Pirabhakaran.
As a review, I have assembled, Irom my personal collection,
over 100 news reports and commentaries on Sri Lanka which
appeared in London Economist magazine since July 1983 in
chronological order. To this, I have added the reports which
are currently available in the website oI Economist magazine
(details oI news reports since June 1997). I provide only the
captions (sometimes cynical, patronizing, and semi-
incomprehensible, as is the style oI Economist) and the
dates oI issue oI these news reports. When the caption is too
incomprehensible, I provide within parentheses the speciIic
detail relating to that caption. I have divided the reports
according to the time-span oI Iour Sri Lankan heads oI state
who had to conIront Pirabhakaran. Why did I choose the
Economist Ieatures Ior this illustration? First, compared to
Time and Newsweek magazines, the Economist had provided
constant coverage on the South Asian scene, probably due
to the colonial baggage and readership captured in its
homeland. Secondly, compared to Time and Newsweek, the
Economist is a great-grand daddy oI journalism, having
entered the scene in September 1847, when the British were
ascending as the biggest and condescending bullies in the
Asian, AIrican and Oceanian continents. Thirdly, in its
succinct reports it provides a distinct stvle of caricature in
prose which is amusing, biting but less than real.
Two notes oI caveat are in order. That the journalists
practising their trade Ior the Economist magazine still hide
behind a cloak oI anonymity, bordering on the Victorian era
prudery on sex should be noted. Also, those hiding behind
such a cloak oI anonymity have loose pens spitting venom
and bile against named individuals also reveals the spineless
cowardice and contempt to decency. Despite these
deIiciencies, I chose reports Irom the Economist magazine
since they cannot be tagged as pro-Pirabhakaran literature by
any stretch oI imagination.
1ayewardene period
Week oI the tiger. July 30, 1983, pp.14-15 (editorial)
Call in the proIessionals. Sept.15, 1984, p.41
Rajiv`s Iar horizons. Nov.10, 1984
Back-door and Iront-door. June 1, 1985. |on reIugee
immigration|
A small and solvable war. Aug.3, 1985, pp.35-36
Tigers at bay. Feb.28, 1987, pp.28-29.
The push on JaIIna. May 30, 1987, p.30
The Tiger hunt and the Iailed armada. June 6, 1987, pp.27-28
& 31
When peace became possible. Aug.1, 1987, p.20 & 25-26
Tiger, Tiger, losing Iight. Aug.1, 1987, p.13 (editorial)
Still in the balance. Aug.8, 1987, pp.18-19
Non-Tiger terror. Aug.22, 1987, pp.44-45
Not all the guns were handed in. Sept.19, 1987, pp.30-31
It`s war again. Oct.10, 1987, pp.29 & 32
The other side is just as bloody. Nov.14, 1987, pp.24-25 |on
JVP rioting|
The other Tamils. Nov.14, 1987, p.25
Costly campaign. Nov.28, 1987, p.28
Bad day at Batticaloa. Jan.23, 1988, pp.20 & 22
All over bar the shooting. Feb.6, 1988, p.22
Tamil Nadu: Get a move on, soldier. Apr.23, 1988, pp.35-36
The Tigers dig their claws in. July 30, 1988, pp.33-34
It still looks like no change. Aug.20, 1988, pp.23-24
Marching orders. Oct.8, 1988, p.32
Rajiv gets lost on a Tiger hunt. Oct.22, 1988, pp.25-26
The Tamils deIy the Tigers. Nov.26, 1988, pp.26 & 29
Enter Hydra. Dec.3, 1988, p.28
Democracy`s day oI courage. Dec.24, 1988, p.33
Premadasa period
Whose revolution will it be? Feb.11, 1989, pp.34 & 36
Mathematics Ior beginners. Feb.25, 1989, pp.32 & 34
Imperial India. Apr.15, 1989, pp.14 & 17 (editorial)
II India leaves. Apr.22, 1989, p.36
Slip sliding away. May 27, 1989, pp.38 & 40
Blood, toil, tears and onions. June 10, 1989, p.32
Riding the Tiger. July 1, 1989, p.29
On with the hunt. July 8, 1989, p.31
Too bad to print. July 15, 1989, p.36
Towards midnight. July 22, 1989, p.31
Time Ior tea. Aug.5, 1989, p.33
Do or die. Aug.26, 1989, pp.25-26
Agreed on a phoney peace. Sept.16, 1989, p.32
Uncivil wars. Oct.7, 1989, p.38
A catastrophe in the making. Nov.11, 1989, pp.41-42
Shades oI Che. Nov.18, 1989, p.40 |on the death oI Rohana
Wijeweera|
Tigers on the prowl again. Jan.20, 1990, p.38
Old Tigers in new skins. Mar.31, 1990, p.35
Tigers again, Iresh Irom their sleep. June 16, 1990, pp.36-37
Back to the jungle. June 23, 1990, p.31
And don`t come back. July 7, 1990, pp.37-38
Solid Dutch. Aug.11, 1990, pp.37-38
The relieI oI JaIIna. Sept.22, 1990, pp.38-40
II they get bored with the war. Nov.3, 1990, p.42
Another round. Jan.19, 1991, p.34
Death oI a hawk. Mar.9, 1991, p.28 |on the death oI Ranjan
Wijeratne|
It is not all war. May 18, 1991, p.40
Death among the blossoms. May 25, 1991, pp.27-28 & 35
|on the death oI Rajiv Gandhi|
India`s trial. May 25, 1991, pp.15-16 (editorial)
A warning? July 6, 1991, p.35
The battle Ior Elephant Pass. Aug.3, 1991, p.32
Elephantine mistake. Aug.17, 1991, p.24
The end oI One-Eyed Jack. Aug.24, 1991, pp.33-34 |on the
death oI Sivarasan|
HimselI surprised. Sept.7, 1991, p.28 |on Premadasa
impeachment crisis|
Under the stones oI Sri Lanka. Sept.14, 1991, p.34
Our allies, the Tigers. Sept.28, 1991, pp.36-37
II only. Nov.23, 1991, p.34
Sailing home. Jan.18, 1992, pp.24-25
Mars, not Venus. Apr.18, 1992, p.28
English lessons. Apr.25, 1992, pp.25-26
Taming the Tigers. June 6, 1992, pp.28-29
Term oI trial. Sept.5, 1992, p.33
Tea party. Nov.7, 1992, pp.27-28
Birthday present. Nov.21, 1992, pp.26 & 28 |on the death oI
Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando|
Let`s Iederate. Dec.5, 1992, pp.28-29
Top Tiger talks about talks. Mar.6, 1993 |Pirabhakaran`s
interview; an exclusive!|
Who killed Lalith? May 1, 1993, p.27 |on the death oI
Athulathmudali|
Wijetunga period
The Tigers pounce. Nov.13, 1993, p.34
All in the Iamily. Jan.8, 1994, pp.26-27 |on the Bandaranaike
clan|
In the Tiger`s den. Mar.5, 1994, pp.32-33
No kite Ilying in JaIIna. July 2, 1994, p.31
Election leapIrog. July 2, 1994, pp.31-32
Sri Lanka tilts to the leIt. Aug.20, 1994, pp.23-24
Missing money. Aug.27, 1994, pp.23-26
Murder and mystery in Sri Lanka. Oct.29, 1994, pp.29-30
|on the death oI Gamini Dissanayake|
Women and children Iirst. Oct.29, 1994, p.30 |on the
political nepotism in South Asia|
Chandrika Kumaratunga period
Some peace. Jan.21, 1995, pp.31-32
Out oI the ashes. Apr.15, 1995, pp.28-29
The victory still to come. Dec.9, 1995, pp.27-28 |on the
capture oI JaIIna by the government Iorces|
Terror in Sri Lanka. Feb.10, 1996, p.16 (editorial)
AIter the bomb. Feb.10, 1996, pp.30-31
A Iight over the ruins. July 13, 1996, p.30
Back to the Tiger`s old lair. Aug.31, 1996, p.24
Junius Jayewardene. Nov.23, 1996, p.121 (obituary)
Local diIIiculty. Mar.27, 1997,
Another bomb. Oct.16, 1997,
A tooth Ior a tooth. Jan.29, 1998,
Sri Lanka`s unhappy birthday. Feb.7, 1998, pp.27-28
Blood and money. Oct.8, 1998,
Civil war without end. Dec.5, 1998, pp.32 & 37
So that`s democracy. Jan.28, 1999,
Kalashnikov kids. July 10, 1999,
Cries oI battle. Sept.23, 1999,
Four terrible days. Nov.11, 1999,
Sri Lanka wants peace, perhaps. Dec.18, 1999, pp.23-24
Victory and war in Sri Lanka. Dec.23, 1999,
Sri Lanka`s new killings. Jan.8, 2000,
A prize Irom Norway. Feb.24, 2000,
City slaughter. Mar.16, 2000,
The worst deIeat. Apr.29, 2000, pp.26 & 29
Sri Lanka`s Dunkirk. May 6, 2000, p.33
The Tamil Tigers close in. May 13, 2000, pp.27-28
Another bomb in the war. June 10, 2000, p.27 |on the death oI
minister C.V.Goonaratne|
The growing cost oI war. July 13, 2000,
Sri Lanka backs away Irom devolution. Aug.12, 2000, p.24
Blood beIore the ballot. Sept.9, 2000, pp.34-35
The war the world is missing. Oct.5, 2000,
Sri Lanka votes and hopes. Oct.5, 2000,
A double-barreled verdict. Oct.14, 2000, pp.38-39
Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Oct.21, 2000, p.115 (obituary)
Lynch law. Oct.26, 2000,
Tiger tamed? Nov.30, 2000,
Poker game. Jan.13, 2001, p.29
Hitting the Tigers in their pockets. Mar.8, 2001,
Tiger teeth. May 5, 2001, pp.25-26.
The Tigers pounce. July 26, 2001, |on the Katunayake
Airport attack|
No reconciliation. Sept.1, 2001, p.28
Start again. Oct.20, 2001,
Voting in blood. Dec.1, 2001,
A vote Ior peace? Dec.8, 2001, pp.31-32
The wounded Tigers. Jan.10, 2002,
Viking rule. Feb.28, 2002,
The peace oI desperation. Mar.27, 2002,
The Tiger comes out oI his lair. Apr.11, 2002,
Meet the new democratic Tigers. Apr.11, 2002,
Smiles that conceal the worries. July 18, 2002,
To Thailand in hope. Sept.5, 2002,
A world oI exiles. Jan.4, 2003,
As one could inIer, the caption writers to the Economist
magazine are nothing but lobotomized transplants Irom the
tabloid journalism, whose paychecks seem scored solely on
the scale oI oIIending good etiquette. Their irreverence is not
limited to the citizens oI Ior Iormer British colonies in Asia
limited to the citizens oI Ior Iormer British colonies in Asia
and AIrica. Even the aging Pope doesn`t get any respect
Irom the Economist magazine`s lobotomized slobs who
once tagged him with a photo caption - just stating Don`t
mention the pill`.
II Pirabhakaran, by naming his organization with reIerence to
Tiger, had handed an easy whip to these caption writers Ior
splashing their Ieline metaphors, by his endurance and
Iortitude he also made sure that the same caption writers eat
crow on some oI their hasty captions such as Tigers at bay
(1987)`, Tiger, Tiger, losing Iight (1987)`, Back to the
jungle` (1990) and Elephantine mistake (1991)`. The soppy
eulogist oI Sirimavo Bandaranaike, writing Ior the Economist
even hurled an insult on Pirabhakaran, through the lips oI
Sirimavo`s daughter, as Iollows:
'Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader oI the Tamil Tigers
guerrilla group, who, says Mrs Kumaratunga, probably
correctly, is mentally ill. Why so many Tamils are willing to
be led by an apparent madman may perhaps be explained by
their deep and unshiIting suspicion oI the Sinhalese, even
though Mrs. Kumaratunga has long rejected Sinhala
nationalism. |Economist magazine, Oct.21, 2000, p.115|
Within the subsequent two years, majority oI Sri Lankans
have become convinced by the political and theatrical antics
oI their Head oI State that it is not Pirabhakaran, but
President Kumaratunga who suIIers Irom arrogance,
borderline mental derangement and megalomania.
A rare Pirabhakaran interview to the Economist
magazine
What is currently unavailable in the website oI Economist
magazine, I`m interested in placing in the electronic database
Ior researchers. This is a rare Pirabhakaran interview to the
Economist magazine, which was published almost ten years
ago. Even in the current context, it remains signiIicantly (and
even eerily!) relevant iI one overlooks the inserted time
markers like the years oI war, age oI Pirabhakaran and the
name oI the incumbent President oI Sri Lanka. There is also
a passing reIerence to him as a hero`, based on his then
physical Ieatures but not on his deeds. So, I reproduce it
physical Ieatures but not on his deeds. So, I reproduce it
in Iull without any deletions.
Top Tiger talks about talks
|Economist, March 6, 1993|
Irom our Sri Lanka correspondent in JaIIna
The leader oI the Tamil Tigers, Vellupillai Prabhakaran,
does not oIten give an interview to a journalist. So why now?
During about three hours oI talk with Mr. Prabhakaran, what
emerged was a desire to negotiate once again with the
government. He rejected any suggestion that this arose out oI
weakness. Victory, he insisted, was his Ior the taking.
Yet all is not well within the rebel group. The Tigers are
Iinding it hard to recruit more Iighters. Teenagers quickly
become veterans. In January ten tigers were reported to have
died when a ship said to be carrying arms was interrupted by
the Indian navy. Among the dead was Sathasivam
Krishnakumar, the Tigers` number-two and a close Iriend oI
the leader. Mr. Prabhakaran says he is too upset to talk about
the loss. The JaIIna peninsula, the Tamil area where the
Tigers have their stronghold, is a ruined place aIter ten years
oI Iighting. There is no electricity and not much Iood.
Thousands oI people have Iled. Those too poor to leave
appear exhausted.
But the Tigers have been up against it beIore. The Indian
peacekeepers invited to Sri Lanka in 1987 suppressed them
Ior a time. A new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, got rid
oI the Indians in 1990 and, in return, the Tigers talked peace.
Nothing came oI this talk, and many in the government
believed that the Tigers used the pause in the civil war to
rearm. They will be suspicious that this is what the Tigers
have in mind now.
Even his enemies concede that Mr. Prabhakaran is a
Iormidable leader. Despite the toll oI the civil war, he appears
to retain the support oI the majority oI Tamils in northern
and eastern Sri Lanka, the area which the Tigers claim as the
Tamil homeland. He is 37, on the small side, and a bit
overweight. With his black hair and moustache and large
eyes, he looks a little like the hero that turns up regularly in
eyes, he looks a little like the hero that turns up regularly in
Tamil Iilms. He dresses in army Iatigues, and carries a gun.
Around his neck is a black cord at the end oI which is a
capsule, presumably containing the cyanide which Tigers are
supposed to swallow rather than be taken prisoner.
His house at least, the house where he gave his interview
is small and modern, and a bit oI a drive Irom the town oI
JaIIna. There are maps on the walls, but no radio or
television or books, although Mr. Prabhakaran appears well
inIormed about aIIairs outside Sri Lanka, especially wars, in
AIghanistan, or in Indochina. Much oI the talk was over
dinner: noodles and a soIt drink. Mr. Prabhakaran`s
portliness does not seem to arise Irom over-eating. He
appears to speak only Tamil. Interpreting was done by
Anton Balasingham, a much-traveled man he lived Ior a
time in London who has been the Tigers` principal
negotiator in the past.
Is there anything the Tigers might oIIer than would
encourage the government to open negotiations? The Tigers`
demand has been Ior an independent Tamil state covering a
third oI the country and holding much oI the coastline, a
proposal that the government rejects totally. Some politicians
in Colombo believe the way to peace is to turn Sri Lanka into
a Iederal state.
The government is considering the idea, although the
majority Sinhalese, who have dominated the government and
army since independence in 1948, are believed to be against
Iederalism. It would give the Tamils too much power, some
believe. The Tamils would want a high degree oI autonomy,
particularly over law and order, land and education, all
controversial themes. The size oI a possible Tamil state
within a Iederation is matter Ior endless argument. Although
Tamils are in the majority in the north, there are sizeable other
groups, including Muslims, in the east.
Mr. Prabhakaran talks oI the possibility oI a reasonable`
compromise, although it is unclear what compromise he
would make. He did say, though:
If a proposal which gives autonomv and satisfies the
expectations of the Tamil people is put forward, we are
prepared to consider it.
However, he talks oI extremists` in the government.
President Premadasa, who has always Iavoured negotiation,
might be willing to try it again, but the army, a growing Iorce
in Sri Lankan politics, would probably object. II its view
prevails, the Tigers will Iight on. Mr. Prabhakaran said:
Jictorv in a war does not depend on manpower or
weapons. Firm determination, valour and love of freedom
are the factors that decide victorv in a war. Our fighters
and our people are full of these.
Sri Lanka`s civil war could continue Ior a while yet.`
The Iirst oI the two above-mentioned quotes Irom
Pirabhakaran in his 1993 interview disproves unequivocally
the views expressed by Colombo, Chennai, London and
New York pundits that he had down-graded his demand Ior
separate state as a result oI post September 11`
developments. The second oI the two above-mentioned
quotes shows his courageous and uncompromising stand,
which has not wavered Ior the past ten years. This interview
appeared in the Economist when the current Sri Lankan
president Kumaratunga and her advisor` Kadirgamar were
non-entities in Sri Lankan politics, and the current Sri Lankan
prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe was an understudy to
his current post.
One thing is still unclear Ior me. Who was this anonymous
interviewer, who talked with Pirabhakaran Ior nearly three
hours? The Economist, as is its wont, has not identiIied the
journalist. Pirabhakaran and Balasingham would deIinitely
can identiIy this journalist at an appropriate time. II this
journalist is a Sri Lankan, I have a hunch that it could have
been Mervyn de Silva. I may be right or inaccurate. But the
Iact that the Lanka Guardian editor had served as
Economists correspondent Ior Sri Lanka and the
circumstantial evidence presented in the previous chapters oI
this series on Mervyn de Silva`s sympathetic observations
on Pirabhakaran lead me to inIer that he could have been the
interviewer. But this inIerence needs veriIication Irom the
interviewee. |To be continued.|

interviewee. |To be continued.|


The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

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The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

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Velupillai Pirabakaran

The Pirabakaran Phenomenon

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