de Vries David de Vries PHIL 4092G Prof. A.

Calcagno 9 March 2012 The Manifestation of Interior Self: An investigation into Michel Henrys life-structures

The works of Michel Henry present a major challenge to anyone who chooses to observe his intellectual conflict with all the great progenitors of the discipline, and ultimately to follow him and his complex arguments to their logical ends. In some ways when reading Henry one might catch a sudden glimpse of a more simple unified theory of life and life-structures intuitively yet this insight is only to be lost when neatness gives over to endlessly rigorous argumentation. An indication and perhaps solace for a greater coherency in his corpus is available in the fact that his major definitions were unvarying in a half-century of work, which is then furthered by an unwavering almost singular preoccupation with his idea of what life means1. The Essence of Manifestation (1973) which is to be considered in the following, is as insinuated very dense and difficult, however, one can be guided by his respected status as phenomenologist par excellence2 and the always significant project of defending a lived-structure of reality as the critique of appearance and a passive-affective self. An attempt will therefore be made to elaborate further on some of these themes by displaying the intent of Henrys argument and its

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Jarvis, Simon. Michel Henrys Concept of Life. International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 17(3), 361375. Moran, Dermot. Introduction to Phenomenology. 1ed. New York, NY: Routledge Publishing, 2000.

de Vries main components, to define auto-affection and manifestation through textual reference, and then reveal their inherent co-dependence. Predominantly there appears in this work a four-fold structure of existence that Henry wishes to examine (not necessarily rediscover) and view in light of their apparent

phenomenal characteristics: Life for the human-being, Being-in-general, a posited way of appearing auto-affection, and the notion of subjectivity resulting. The purpose then, or force behind his inquiry is embedded in the elaboration of this first characteristic. Life for Henry seems to be this obvious and apparent truth that must be constantly reissued in order to show us its most obvious quality: we simply are living. In the here and now we live in such a way as to not have to take account of a world. Yet with the same impetus as most in his tradition Henry asks why it is we scramble about seeking in the world all sorts of evidence to prove us as living beings. In this respect Henry resembles some narrow but popular Heideggerian constructions, specifically the always already structure of life, and also his well-known aphorism about the scandal of philosophy being that proofs of a world are repeated incessantly. The aim of his work then is to separate existence away from the absolute milieu of exteriority[and] draw attention to the subjective character of this existence; we are invited to ask ourselves if it would not be better today to give a new meaning to the concept 'interior life' (Henry, 45). Also, and as said before, his major tool will be phenomenology insofar as he defines its use in presenting an obvious means of bringing close to us the concrete and true essence, the essence of presence, the absolute insofar as it is the Parousia3; but the means is the absolute itself because the 'act of bringing close to us' is the work of the essence insofar as it is the essence of presence" (Henry, 56). Thus we are able to begin separating
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"another term for the Second Coming, literally 'being present'" (OED)

de Vries out firstly the more technical definition of life, namely, that which I may not doubt because it is what I am, the radical passivity of sentience itself in all its various tonalities4, and also in combination with this view, the intent to show our primordial function of affect as more of an ontological passivity function which will construct

subjectivity. In a way this foundational perspective removes him from the tradition as his account becomes a more radical view of appearing which counters all claims to separation and opposition as the structure of appearance or the idea of self, and even more so the accounts including proximity and distancing, self-alienation or the radical Other (Henry, 63, 64). What then is Henrys novel phenomenological approach? He explicitly argues the idea that any method used must be able to take account of both the conditioned objects that appear and the subject for which they appear, and following from this, that every object appearing must strictly be appearing to an autonomous self-manifesting subject. Any method used must show that there is a massive difference between the concept of phenomenality in an object, that is, the quality or state of being perceptible or immediate, and that same phenomenality which constitutes the subjectthere is, in so many words, difference in how objects are manifested and a self is manifested, where inasmuch as the method cannot account for this difference it is fallacious (Henry, 47, 52). This is where a terminological notion of manifestation becomes apparent and is described preliminarily as a sort of function of the receiving of being where being is manifest as affect thus providing impressions. However, there is in some way a dual nature of

Jarvis, Simon. Michel Henrys Concept of Life. International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 17(3), 361375.

de Vries manifestation, it is at once a sort of ekstatic5 manifestation allowing the human being transcendence, but also, there is this previously mentioned self-revelatory component which shows the immanence of humanity (Henry, 91). In a more general way, Henry

proclaims Being manifests itself prior to any clarification (Henry, 138) to eliminate the concept as a construction of philosophical wanderings. He further states that consciousness has an effective relationship with a being because the relationship is present, because Being manifests itselfthe reality of the relationship is consciousness (Henry, 138); conversely, Consciousness is itself and as such the manifestation of being (Henry, 139). Rigorously, Henry takes these definitions and constructs an argument for reducing world or worldliness exclusively to this self-revelatory manifestation and definition of life, thus cementing its importance insofar as the immanence becomes the essence of the ekstatic aspect and the essence of selfrevelation becomes affectivity (Henry, 289-314). So far it should be somewhat evident that there is a fundamental co-dependency in the structures of interiority that compose a subject. However, the constant and unrelenting difficulty of this work presents a challenge in precisely encapsulating this subjectivity as a whole. Subjectivity, Henry reminds us at an early stage, is not the essence, it is a particular life and, because of this, profoundly real. The unjustifiable identification of it with the essence cannot make such a life unreal or rather destroy it (Henry, 23). Therefore, the notion of affectivity is as equally complex and relational as the compartments of manifestation that allow him immanence and transcendence. Suffice to say, affects are the very core of life though different from average mental states or

from ecstacy, etymological configuration from Ancient Greek ekstasis (mysticism, philosophy) the state of being beside one's self or rapt out of one's self (OED).
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de Vries intentional states because they are self-referential and possess self-feeling (Henry, 234,235) exemplified trivially with the adage, there is nothing to fear but fear itself. The usage of affectivity is broadened as the world in general is said to be a milieu of affection, it is rather a world which affects us[and] that which is felt without the

intermediary of any sense whatsoever is in its essence affectivity (Henry, 460, 461). In a more poetic fashion, Henry proclaims because affectivity has ever accomplished its work when the world arises, affectivity, as that which makes the world possible in its foundation, is united in a necessary way to everything which presents itself in the world and is presupposed by it (Henry, 483). This can be taken to mean that affects, not sensations, have determinable interior consequences for the subject insofar as they are like intuitive and primordial feelings embedded in the very notion of a world. Therefore, in light of this more dynamic view of affectivity, Henry uses the term autoaffectivity which is essentially an amalgam of these mentioned features with the added attention to temporality, more specifically, the movement of temporality and perhaps notions of becoming: time is affected by time itself under the form of the pure horizon of Being (Henry, 187). Besides this, the point remains that Henry wishes to put forward this view of the individuals remarkable propensity for a primordial selfawareness/realization and also a special connectedness to a world, time, and the manifestation of Being. The link is pieced together from auto-affection via the event of manifestationAuto-affection is generally described as the event of the manifestation of the essence to itself (Henry, 234)plus the reminder that affectivity is phenomenologically self-feeling by self(Henry, 463), or in another way, primordial self-referential feeling simply becomes the feeling of a self. The only substantial quote

de Vries from Henry to validate this however comes extremely late in the work: That which, in this way, is charged by itself, for being itself once and for all, is solely what may be rightly described as a self (Henry, 590). Despite the difficulties of the work any reading of Michel Henrys Essence is immediately fruitful because it exemplifies the struggle of thought in philosophy. Any critique of the work would in turn require an obvious mastery of Henrys idiosyncratic

phenomenology that is not necessarily available to a patron of this single work alone. It is also evident in the literature, and perhaps intuitively, that what is being forwarded in this work and in others is a theological phenomenology resulting from the passivity of the human for dynamic and primordial impressions. In a singular example, this notion of Parousia as well which, as defined, is clearly a biblical derivative but must also be further clarified and defined. This example presents a microcosm of the argument some secular theorists may forward as a sort of experiential block to a full reception or understanding of the nature of ontological passivity, manifestation, and ultimately the affectivity inherent in an inner life. Besides this it is a useful and stimulating experience to imagine this intense and vibrant, or in the words of Henry, immanent and transcendent lived-experience from a phenomenological perspective.

de Vries Works Cited

Henry, Michel. The essence of manifestation. 1. Brussels, BE: Springer Publishing, 1973. 760. Print.