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UTNIF RLV starter pack 1

Reusable launch vehicle starter aff and neg


Reusable launch vehicle starter aff and neg ............................................................................................1 ***Reusable Launch Vehicle 1AC***........................................................................................................3 1AC Inherency-No RLV .........................................................................................................................5 1AC-ADV1-Economic leadership ..........................................................................................................6 1AC ADV 2-Space Heg.........................................................................................................................13 1AC Solvency .......................................................................................................................................17 ***2AC Add Ons***................................................................................................................................21 2AC Solar Power Satellites Add on ......................................................................................................22 2AC World Peace/Mindsetshift Add On...............................................................................................23 ***2AC Case XTNs***...........................................................................................................................25 RLV solves the Economy .....................................................................................................................27 RLVs reduce launch costs-studies.........................................................................................................29 RLVs lead to space development-tourism .............................................................................................31 RLVS solve Space leadership ...............................................................................................................33 RLV is possible.....................................................................................................................................34 ***DA 2AC***.........................................................................................................................................36 2AC Space weapons DA/Turn...............................................................................................................38 2AC SKFTA Good ...............................................................................................................................41 1AR RLV popular .................................................................................................................................45 ***A2 Counter plans***...........................................................................................................................46 2AC Private Industry Counterplan ........................................................................................................47 A2 other country counterplan................................................................................................................49 ***Neg***................................................................................................................................................51 ***Economy ADV***..............................................................................................................................53 Economy advantage 1NC .....................................................................................................................55 No Solvo-Data.......................................................................................................................................60 No solvo-devlopment expensive ...........................................................................................................62 No solvo-A2 Creates a market to lower costs .......................................................................................64 ***Space Heg***......................................................................................................................................65 Space Heg 1NC ....................................................................................................................................67 No space weponization now .................................................................................................................72 No solvo reconnaissance........................................................................................................................73 No solvo Global Strike..........................................................................................................................75 No Solvo-space control..........................................................................................................................77

UTNIF RLV starter pack 2 Arms Race DA-Link XTN.....................................................................................................................79 Space Weapons Bad Impact XTNS ......................................................................................................81 ***Add Ons*** ........................................................................................................................................83 SPS no solvo..........................................................................................................................................85 No overview effect ...............................................................................................................................86 ***DA Links*** ......................................................................................................................................87 SLV unpopular .....................................................................................................................................89 ***Counterplan***....................................................................................................................................91 Privatization Counterplan 1NC .............................................................................................................93 Solvency XTNS ....................................................................................................................................94

UTNIF RLV starter pack 3

***Reusable Launch Vehicle 1AC***

UTNIF RLV starter pack 4

UTNIF RLV starter pack 5

1AC Inherency-No RLV


The Obama administrations budget offers no funding for a NASA developed reusable launch vehicle-absent a continued commitment to its development there is no hope any commercial space development programs to be effective Money 11 (Stewart, 2-21, .A. in History from Auburn University and a M.A. in Science, Technology and
Public Policy from The George Washington University ,Taking the initiative: SLI and the next generation, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1784/1) From the moment the Obama Administration announced its decision to cancel the controversial Ares booster family and the Constellation program for which it was intended, a vacuum formed concerning what would fulfill the perceived need for a heavy lift space launch system. In the bitter and morbidly entertaining melee which ensued, the three primary playersNASA, the Obama Administration, and the Congressas well as their supporters, appear to have forgotten the concept of reusability altogether. Instead, arguments have raged about the relative benefits
of a particular shuttle-derived heavy-lift rocket configuration, either in-line or sidemount; Ares V boosters; or multiple launches of expendable rockets. Yet each of these proposals, and any new program of exploration beyond low Earth orbit for which they would be used, ignore

the reality behind the painful but simple truth highlighted in the conclusion of the Augustine Committee that no plan compatible with the FY 2010 budget profile permits human exploration to continue in any meaningful way. As it now appears, with even the best-case scenario a five-year freeze at FY 2012 levels, as Jimmy Buffett would
say, theres trouble right here in River City. The Department of Defense, proud owner of the EELV program, has its own problems. Aviation Week reported on January 14th that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated the need to increase the DoD budget for 2012

launch acquisitions by $450 million over previous estimates in part to provide stability for the industrial base. Launches under the ULA contract would increase from three to five per year starting in 2012 essentially to keep the ULA
Atlas and Delta production lines in business. This is a privilege for which the taxpayer is already paying a costly annual subsidy in addition to the per launch price. Increasing the number of DoD launches should lower the average price for all users, but how much is another question. Rising prices from suppliers are fingered as the primary culprit in escalating ULA costs, and this is no doubt an important factor, but then again, that is part of the problem with an expendable system to begin with. Ford is experiencing rising supplier prices (and profits) as well, but that doesnt materially affect the cost of a taxi ride because each fare doesnt require a new Crown Vic. Second Generation: the path not taken While both the Atlas and Delta launchers have compiled an outstanding success record, the rising costs are a serious problem even for NASAs

unmanned space missions, which only pay the per launch cost. Presented with the $187-million price tag for a bare bones Atlas V Mars launch for 2013, one official quoted in the article pondered the implications and asked How do we get out of low Earth orbit on a regular basis? Good question. Ironically, in the first years of the new millennium, NASA was on the way to answering that question until
a dizzying series of priority changes led to the current dead end. In the days before GPS, when you got lost on a diverging path, the only certain alternative was to retrace your steps to the point of departure and start over. Such is now the case with US space launch policy. April 2011 will mark the thirtieth anniversary of Space Shuttle Columbias lift off in the first flight of the National Space Transportation System and our first attempt at lowering the costs of getting to orbit by reusing part of a launch system. As we all know, it came up a little short on that measure. The shuttle system was limited from the outset by a budget environment right out of todays headlines. In 1971, the Nixon administration OMB imposed a five-year freeze on NASAs budget, resulting in a design that offered lower development costs but higher operating costs. Nevertheless, it was a failure brought about by both attempting to achieve too much in one great leap, and betting everything on the outcome of that attempt. That it failed to lower costs says far more about the flawed specific approach taken than about the ultimate viability of reusable launch hardware in general. Acknowledging that failure, as well as disappointing outcomes in subsequent X-33 and X-34 experimental reusable programs, NASA in 2001 established the Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program as part of the Space Launch Initiative. This time, the challenge of lowering launch costs through reusable flight hardware would be met by undertaking several developmental programs, including the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle, as well as the RS-84 reusable engine. The end result would presumably be a fully reusable two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) architecture. While TSTO lacked the cutting edge allure of the single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) approach, it also left behind the truly serious engineering challenges which bedeviled X-33 and left the proposed VentureStar flying in viewgraph form only. Instead, the TSTO path offered steady, linear, almost boring progress from existing technology base, with the absence of an appropriate engine being the biggest challenge. Second Generation started with a review of over 100 possible configurations, and called for following a down select process from 15 to 3 to 2 vehicle concepts, resulting in a development decision by 2006 and a potential operational vehicle in the 2010s. Second Generation was one component of NASAs 1999 Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which was envisioned as living document to ensure that NASAs goals matched its actual requirements. Unfortunately, NASA quickly concluded that, according to this framework, the must have program of the moment was a new crew transfer and return vehicle for the International Space Station, so for FY 2003, the Second Generation RLV program was diverted to the Orbital Space Plane program. For its part, OSP would initially be launched by a human-rated EELV while retaining a possible transition path to a reusable launcher. Following the Columbia disaster, the Orbital Space Plane project gave way to the Crew Exploration Vehicle, as result of the Vision for Space Exploration announced on January 14, 2004. Project Constellation soon followed. Ten years after Second Generation was originally conceived, one cannot help but observe that if policy makers had stayed the course, 2011 might have found the US close to fielding a TSTO reusable system rather than occupying essentially the same position as in 2002or 1961 for that matter. Second Generation was, of course, only one of many projects over time that started with great promise only to be subsequently abandoned or altered beyond recognition. Like much else in life, it is quite easy to consider the path not taken through a gentler light than the harsh reality that comes with actual experience, and this may be the case with Second Generation. Any program can be mismanaged, any opportunity wasted, and one need look no further than current programs for confirmation. Virtually every development program appears to go over budget and take longer than originally scheduled. Nevertheless, disappointment is more easily

Now, in the twilight of the shuttle program and with Constellation cancelled as unaffordable, the challenge the Space Launch Initiative and Second Generation RLV originally sought to resolve still remains. Financial reality suggests it is a challenge that still must be overcome if the US expects to witness a new era of private spaceflight, affordably launch defense payloads, or initiate a return to the Moon or venture to points further beyond. For anyone without a financial or political stake in the status quo, the original goal of the 2001 Second Generation RLV Programdevelopment of flexible, commercially produced reusable launch vehiclesremains both logical and achievable, and absolutely necessary.
avoided by pursuing the right goal in the first place.

UTNIF RLV starter pack 6

1AC-ADV1-Economic leadership
Humanitys current economic condition is unsustainable-no amount of manipulating financial markets are jumpstarting service sectors will change the reality that we need access to more resources to prevent bigger future financial crisisis-space development is key to provide access to those resources Hsu and Cox 09 (Feng, Ph.D. Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, Ken, Ph.D.
Founder & Director Aerospace Technology Working Group, 2-20, Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development - A Unified Strategic Vision, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html? pid=30702) Many of us believe that mankind must solve all our crises on earth before expanding into space can be achieved successfully and peacefully. In fact, humanity isn't going to solve all its problems here on earth, ever. While resolving some of our crises, humanity always creates more. Regardless, mankind goes into space for reasons that our ancestors had historically gone elsewhere: for adventure with unknowns, resources, freedom, and better lives. The recent human history of industrial revolutions, along with the current collapses of the world's economy and energy and financial markets, has taught us a harsh lesson: that merely manipulating financial capital and producing services has failed to build a sustainable global economy for mankind. Instead of fighting over what's limited and restricting human development on this planet, we must now expand our horizons, and look upward and outward for resources, embarking on economic and commercial development into space

UTNIF RLV starter pack 7

Developing a reusable launch vehicle is critical to revitalize space development it would jumpstart vital economic sectors, lift the United States out of its current economic catastrophe and send a signal of Americas economic leadership for decades Hsu and Cox 09 (Feng, Ph.D. Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, Ken, Ph.D.
Founder & Director Aerospace Technology Working Group, 2-20, Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development - A Unified Strategic Vision, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html? pid=30702) Technology innovations have always lifted human society out of the economic gridlocks, and have led mankind from many of the worst economic crises to vast industrialization and enduring prosperity and growth. The history of human civilization has shown that technology innovations and human ingenuity are our best hope to power humanity out of any crisis, and especially a U.S.-lead human economic development into low earth orbit that will not only lift us out of the current acute global depression, but will most certainly bring about the next economic and industrial revolution beyond the confinement of Earth gravity. Commercial aircraft transportation and
operations in the past 100 years since the Wright Brothers' first successful test flight have advanced significantly in all areas, and have contributed tremendously to the world economy and modern civilization. Nonetheless, space access capability and associated LEO infrastructure

has generally not advanced in nearly half a century. Particularly, as elaborated in the previous sections, given the current plans under the Bush VSE for the next generation of human space transportation being pursued by NASA, there exists little hope of making any substantial improvements in safety, affordability, or commercial operations of any LEO transportation infrastructure for another generation. With the impact of the upcoming termination of Space Shuttle operations, as guided by the Bush VSE, it is very clear that the U.S. needs substantially improved crew and cargo space access capabilities, and such improved space access capabilities are largely represented by a two-stage, fully reusable launch vehicle (RLV) system (in the short- to midterm). An evolutionary infrastructure buildup of such a RLV system that is largely based on existing heritage or capabilities should be a key element of a reliable and low-cost cargo/crew space transportation development. Indeed, development and government investment in such an affordable space transportation infrastructure in the Earth-Moon system is of paramount importance; it's all about the crossroads the U.S. is at with the current economic crisis and how Space could be a key part of the answer. A key component of a sound strategic
space vision that was missed almost entirely by the Bush VSE is the vision for space development (VSD), or a space-based economic and commercial expansion into low earth orbit. Such a vision should be to place the highest priority on embarking on a national and international strategic space development goal that will

ensure the technological, and with it, the economical leadership of America for the 21 century and the next few hundred years ahead. Otherwise, we risk continuing on the course of the Bush VSE, allowing it to drift into the back waters of history. Investing in space infrastructure development--such as low-cost RLV systems or fully reusable, two-stage (or ultimately single-stage)
space access system developed as an extension of safe and reliable airplane operations or investing in SBSP (space based solar power) and space tourism infrastructures as a significant part of the national space economy and energy programs--is the choice of a strategic space goal that certainly

will re-ignite the American spirit and jump-start its high-tech manufacturing sector. It will send a profound message to the world: that America is still a nation where great bold endeavors are the order of the day. , Or else, it will be a message that we will allow the nation to continue its drift into obscurity and signal that America's greatest days are in the past. Yes, there may be those who are against any space-based economic development, such as developing a low cost RLV capability, a stepping stone that could enable a whole host of private space industries, such as space tourism and space energy industries. Many of us may also argue that RLV or SBSP are too expensive or too hard to be realized. However, as Americans, we must not forgot what makes a nation and its people thrive and prosper are not based on what they do for easy or short-term gains; it's largely based on what the nation and its people do that most others dare not to do or cannot do!

UTNIF RLV starter pack 8

A U.S. economic collapse leads to global economic depressionWalter Mead, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April, 2004 Americas Sticky Power, Foreign Policy, Proquest
Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S.

economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world.

Global economic collapse causes extinctionThomas Bearden, Association of Distinguished American Scientists and LTC, U.S. Army (Retired), 2000 ("The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly", http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm) )
History bears out that desperate nations

take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released.~ As an example, suppose a
starving North Korea {[7]} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China--whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States--attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch [nukes]on perception of preparations by one's adversary.~ The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself {[8]}. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization

as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

The possibility of extinction requires that we address the issue as if nuclear war is the result, no matter how slight the real risk isSchell 1982 - policy analyst and proliferation expert, 1982 (Schell, Jonathan, The Fate of the Earth, p. 94-5) We are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished.... In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty

UTNIF RLV starter pack 9


that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves.

UTNIF RLV starter pack 10

US Economic leadership is key to economic interdependence, and multilateral cooperation on all global problems. The alternative is competitive mercantilism and fractured international cooperation-ensures global conflict
Posen 09 (deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics Adam, Economic leadership beyond the crisis, http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN %20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf) In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nations military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American
rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there

remain significant risks for the

US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.
In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from overrepresented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic

leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the shortterm by the
nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being

displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at
least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something

with nothing communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart.

UTNIF RLV starter pack 11 That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While
in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexicos continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germanys and Japans obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to

the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis,
the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in USoriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international

financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every countrys detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should
concentrate on the following priority measures.

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UTNIF RLV starter pack 13

1AC ADV 2-Space Heg


US Space dominance is becoming seriously threatened rival nations are rapidly gaining control of space Brown 09 (Trevor, is a Ph.D. candidate at Auburn University with a focus on political, economic, and
military strategy for the medium of space. He has previously written for the Air and Space Power Journal and The Space Review. Author for Air and Space Power Journal, Soft Power and Space Weaponization, Ebsco) Some people speak as if they believe that a country can choose whether to pursue national security through arms or through arms control.10 But Russias interest in banning space weapons is motivated by a desire to stunt the growth of US military space programs in order to buy time for covertly advancing its own space-weapons program and achieving technological parity.11 Russia bases its opposition to space weaponization not on a scrupulous set of principles but on strategic objectives. Two scholars contend that to understand whether Russia could indeed change its position on the weaponization of space, we need to go beyond official statements and discussion among Russian military experts. The course of the military space program in Russia will be determined primarily by the availability of the resources required to support the program and by the ability of the industry and the military to manage development projects for the military use of space.12 despite Chinas repeated calls for a ban on all space weapons, historical evidence suggests that little separates Chinese and Russian motivations for such bans. Because a broad interpretation of space weapons would rule out almost all U.S. missile defense systems, Chinese officials who want to limit U.S. missile defense deployments would advocate a ban that used this interpretation.13 interestingly, after the Clinton administration scrapped the Strategic defense initiative in 1993, China redoubled its efforts in military space and gained ground on the United States.14 By 1999 Chinas test of a spacecraft intended for manned flight demonstrated a low-thrust rocket propulsion system that could be used to make warheads maneuver to defeat a BMD [ballistic missile defense] system.15 Perhaps there remains a belief in the US strategic community that the deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets including commercial communications and broadcast satelliteseven more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.16 Such notions were shattered when China conducted its first successful ASAT test in January 2007, suggesting that it had spent many years developing aSaT capabilities. The United States as well as the rest of the world, for that matter should not allow itself to be duped. The record shows that although officials in the Chinese Communist Party rail against military space as a threat to peace and stability, the Peoples AALiberation Army busies itself with the acquisition of space weapons.

UTNIF RLV starter pack 14

Developing a RLV would guarantee US military leadership well into the future Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm)

The maneuverability of RLV space ships would also make them useful for missions that are more accurately described as denial than destruction. They could mine decisive orbits (as could ELVs), but they could also conduct mine clearing operations, soft landing the cleared mines for storage back on Earth, something an ELV could not. These mine fields could be laid in a crisis and cleared afterward, giving new flexibility to national policy makers. RLVs would also be able to respond to crisis situations with all of these capabilities more quickly than the ELV due to launch preparation times that are forecast to be months shorter. The increased mobility provided by the RLV would enable the United States to move its forces to decisive orbits in space or overhead any trouble spot on Earth more quickly (typically 31,000 feet per second with reference to the Earths surface) than any form of terrestrial military power.
Threatened uses of force or non-lethal inspection of enemy forces (space or terrestrial) could work to achieve policy objectives without firing a shot. As the Presidents National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement puts it, "all nations are immediately accessible from space." It follows that when space itself becomes immediately accessible to the United States, then the United States will have immediate

access to all other nations. This access can mean the ability to observe, or it can mean the ability to influence. We have discussed the movement of space forces to threaten on-orbit force structure, but RLV space ships would also allow the United States to deliver destructive or non-lethal power to any point on Earth less than an hour after launch. Although many of the missions made possible by the RLVs maneuverability discussed to this point are not captured in present
space doctrine, the idea of force application from space is. Although the perception exists that force application from space is prevented by international treaty or US policy, it is not. Joint Pub 314 puts it this way, "international law. . .allows the development, testing, and deployment of force application capabilities that involve non-nuclear, non-ABM weapon systems (i.e., space-toground kinetic energy weapons)." Because it has been difficult to access space, however, it has been difficult to develop any such concept beyond the idea stage. Concepts such as Sandia National Laboratorys Winged Re-entry Vehicle Experiment, a ballistically delivered, non-nuclear, long range, precision guided kinetic energy penetrator flew three times on the front end of ICBMs before it ran out of funds. Many other studies never got past the paper stage. Studies with acronyms such as DAC, PMP, ICE, BRIM, and GPRC spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and produced stacks of reports without really demonstrating any technology. With reusable space ships and routine access to space, however, research payloads can be flown on operational missions without waiting for rare ICBM test launch opportunities. Separation tests would be scheduled much as US Air Force SEEK EAGLE weapons carriage and separation tests are for air

The RLV could also deliver non-lethal payloads such as ground based sensors, radio and television transmissions, and humanitarian relief supplies (via sub-orbital lift into secure areas or via shielded reentry containers in denied areas) to places that may not be accessible even to airpower (due to threat, distance, or overflight
breathers today.

restrictions). If fuel costs for an orbital mission are $360,000 and overall launch costs can fall to $1 million, then sub-orbital missions requiring less D v and therefore less fuel should cost even less. These missions could be cost competitive with military aircraft. A 1991 Air Force regulation says that in FY92, the DOD would have had to charge NASA $403,132 for a 28 hour, 450 knot average speed, 12,500 nm nonstop C-5 mission. In the RLV era, if NASA has priority cargo to transport to its few remaining overseas tracking stations, it might be smarter to pay the same or similar costs and cut the trip time by 27 hours. Such a capability would allow the United States to protect its interests, on

Earth or in orbit, at times and places of its choosing, without having to consider the risk of loss to enemy action. States or other groups with nascent ballistic missile or space programs will soon have primitive ASAT capability in the form
of sounding rockets carrying kinetic energy submunitions (as simple as sixpenny iron nails) launched in the path of an oncoming satellite in a predictable orbit. These ASATs, a threat to any satellite in a predictable low Earth orbit, are of limited utility against

an RLV space ship launched on a sub-orbital or fractional orbital trajectory. There is very little possibility that nonspacefaring nations or groups could detect launches from US sovereign territory (at present, only the United States
has a publicly disclosed missile warning satellite, although the Russians have reconnaissance satellites and are likely to have missile warning satellites left over from the Cold War as well), and if detected, these nations do not have the data processing infrastructure to predict and disseminate sub-orbital trajectories and impact points to space weapon defense forces (while making a case for an independent European satellite reconnaissance capability in the wake of the Gulf War, former French Foreign Minister Pierre Joxe acknowledged the "supremacy of the US space surveillance machine with its range of missile early warning, ocean surveillance, photographic and radar reconnaissance, electronics eavesdropping and weather satellites...with its massive supporting processing and communications chain". Frances and Britains $1 billion investment in military spacecraft could not match the $200 billion US military space machine during the war, and it is not likely that many other nations on Earth could do so in the foreseeable future.

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This level of space dominance would be able to deter all conflict Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm) This leads us to the important advantage of space power over other forms of military power. This advantage is the previously cited corollary of air and space powers elevation: higher energy states. The energy states inherent in orbital and suborbital spacecraft can provide an enormous amount of firepower for a relatively small investment in the size of a
given vehicle or weapon. As Collins notes, Offensive kinetic energy weapons (KEW) plummeting from space to Earth at Mach 12 or more with terrific penetration power have a marked advantage over defensive Earth-to-space counterparts that accelerate slowly while they fight to overcome gravity.138 Space forces will look very much like air forces to those who are at the receiving end of their effects on earth. They will also look very much like air forces at their terrestrial bases. They must, after all, traverse the atmosphere in order to get into space. In this respect, they are much like air forces, vulnerable and useless while on the ground. The compensating factor is their range. American military RLV bases

are likely to be far from the US coastline and secured against terrorist attack. This is beyond the strategic reach of most nations on earth. They will, however, (within the limits of RLV response time and dispersability) be vulnerable to intercontinental,
submarine-launched, or space-launched hypersonic strikes. If such an attack were launched, though, with or without nuclear weapons, the United States would have larger concerns than RLV survivability. The demonstrated ability to strike any target on earth with

precision and discrimination could, in fact, be a potent deterrent to or factor in conflict. This deterrent, unlike nuclear weapons, could be used against nonnuclear powers without the collateral damage and the negative moral and political fallout of nuclear weapons use Independently, space weapons deter all conflict globally
Dolman and Cooper 11 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air
and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligences Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space, Part of Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf, ) Such dire speculations call for enlightened leadership. Such a call is not new, but it is as yet unanswered. For example, in their February 2000 report, the co-chairmen of the Defense Science Board on Space Superiority wrote that: space superiority

is absolutely essential in achieving global awareness on the battlefield, deterrence of potential conflict, and superior combat effectiveness of U.S. and Allied/Coalition military forces. . . . An essential part of the deterrence strategy is development of viable and visible (and perhaps demonstrated) capabilities to protect our space systems and to prevent the space capabilities being available to a potential adversary. . . . The Task Force recommends that improvements be made to our space surveillance system, higher priority and funding be placed on the "protection" of U.S. space systems, and that programs be started to create a viable and visible offensive space control capability .9

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1AC Solvency
Plan The United States federal government should provide all necessary support to fulfill the mandate of the 2001 second generation reusable launch vehicle program If the United States government where to provide the necessary financial support and it make it a top priority the United States could posses a reusable launch vehicle within the decade Money 11 (Stewart, 2-21, .A. in History from Auburn University and a M.A. in Science, Technology and
Public Policy from The George Washington University ,Taking the initiative: SLI and the next generation, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1784/1) Ironically, in the first years of the new millennium, NASA was on the way to answering that question until a dizzying series of priority changes led to the current dead end. In the days before GPS, when you got lost on
a diverging path, the only certain alternative was to retrace your steps to the point of departure and start over. Such is now the case with US space launch policy. April 2011 will mark the thirtieth anniversary of Space Shuttle Columbias lift off in the first flight of the National Space Transportation System and our first attempt at lowering the costs of getting to orbit by reusing part of a launch system. As we all know, it came up a little short on that measure. The shuttle system was limited from the outset by a budget environment right out of todays headlines. In 1971, the Nixon administration OMB imposed a five-year freeze on NASAs budget, resulting

in a design that offered lower development costs but higher operating costs. Nevertheless, it was a failure brought about by both
attempting to achieve too much in one great leap, and betting everything on the outcome of that attempt. That it failed to lower costs says far more about the flawed specific approach taken than about the ultimate viability of reusable launch hardware in general. Acknowledging that failure, as well as disappointing outcomes in subsequent X-33 and X-34 experimental reusable programs, NASA in 2001 established the

Second Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program as part of the Space Launch Initiative. This time, the challenge of
lowering launch costs through reusable flight hardware would be met by undertaking several developmental programs, including the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle, as well as the RS-84 reusable engine. The end result would presumably be a fully reusable two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) architecture. While TSTO lacked the cutting edge allure of the single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) approach, it also left behind the truly serious engineering challenges which bedeviled X-33 and left the proposed VentureStar flying in viewgraph form only. Instead, the TSTO path offered steady, linear, almost boring progress from existing technology base, with the absence of an appropriate engine being the biggest challenge.

Second Generation started with a review of over 100 possible configurations, and called for following a down select process from 15 to 3 to 2 vehicle concepts, resulting in a development decision by 2006 and a
potential operational vehicle in the 2010s. Second Generation was one component of NASAs 1999 Integrated Space Transportation Plan, which was envisioned as living document to ensure that NASAs goals matched its actual requirements. Unfortunately, NASA quickly

concluded that, according to this framework, the must have program of the moment was a new crew transfer and return vehicle for the International Space Station, so for FY 2003, the Second Generation RLV program was diverted to the Orbital Space Plane program. For its part, OSP would initially be launched by a
human-rated EELV while retaining a possible transition path to a reusable launcher. Following the Columbia disaster, the Orbital Space Plane project gave way to the Crew Exploration Vehicle, as result of the Vision for Space Exploration announced on January 14, 2004. Project Constellation soon followed. Ten years after Second Generation was originally conceived, one cannot help

but observe that if policy makers had stayed the course, 2011 might have found the US close to fielding a TSTO reusable system rather than occupying essentially the same position as in 2002or 1961 for that matter. Second Generation was, of course, only one of many projects over time that started with great promise only to be subsequently abandoned or altered beyond recognition. Like much else in life, it is
quite easy to consider the path not taken through a gentler light than the harsh reality that comes with actual experience, and this may be the case with Second Generation. Any program can be mismanaged, any opportunity wasted, and one need look no further than current programs for confirmation. Virtually every development program appears to go over budget and take longer than originally scheduled. Nevertheless, disappointment is more easily avoided by pursuing the right goal in the first place. Now, in the twilight of the shuttle program and with Constellation cancelled as unaffordable, the challenge the Space Launch Initiative and Second Generation RLV originally sought to resolve still remains. Financial reality suggests it is a challenge that still must be overcome if

the US expects to witness a new era of private spaceflight, affordably launch defense payloads, or initiate a return to the Moon or venture to points further beyond. For anyone without a financial or political stake in the status quo, the original goal of the 2001 Second Generation RLV Programdevelopment of flexible, commercially produced reusable launch vehiclesremains both logical and achievable, and absolutely necessary.

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Fulfilling the mandate to build a RLV would provide all the necessary military and commercial needs to solve the advantages and set the stage for future improvements to allow for efficient space development and exploration Henry 03 (Gary N., February, Lt Col, USAF, THE DECISION MAKERS GUIDE TO ROBUST,
RELIABLE AND INEXPENSIVE ACCESS TO SPACE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424927) A two-stage-to-orbit space launch system using a first stage waverider design leveraging combined cycle engine technology is the best and fastest route to R2 ISA. First, it provides a flexible space transportation solution for DoD, NASA, and commercial customers. Second, the core first stage has significant military (reconnaissance/strike) and commercial (package delivery/passenger) potential. Third, the core first stage vehicle can experience the high flight rates necessary for R2 ISA. . Fourth, a horizontal takeoff and land system with fly-back capability provides a wide array of basing/landing options. The use of hydrocarbon fuels keeps vehicle size and dry-weight low (relative to rockets and hydrogen fueled reusables) enabling a vehicle to approach aircraft-like operations. Finally, supporting Xvehicle program can validate combined cycle engine concepts that merit use on the objective system while a sub-scale Y-prototype first stage could be built today using existing propulsion technology (either a rockets, advanced turbine, pulse detonation) until a turbine combined cycle engine was ready. This vehicle would provide the system experience necessary to build a highly maintainable and operationally efficient objective system, possess residual space launch capability, and act as a test bed for sorely needed hypersonic research. The two-stage-to-orbit objective system would deliver up to 20,000 pounds to low earthorbit (100 nm, 28.5 deg inclination) using a Mach 4-6 horizontal take-off / horizontal land waverider powered by hydrocarbon fueled Revolutionary Turbine Accelerator derived turbinecombined-cycle-engine with the capacity to return to its launch site. The second stage would ideally be an airbreathing waverider using hydrogen rocket-based-combined cycle engine but could implement a simpler wing/fuselage rocket design as an alternative if sufficient second stage performance can be demonstrated. Separate DoD and NASA upper-stages could be developed and tailored to accommodate their unique mission requirements. The DoD could develop any combination of a separate Space Maneuver Vehicle for space control and earth/space reconnaissance, a Modular Insertion Stage for affordable space access, or a Common Aero Vehicle to enable prompt global strike. Additional military first stage utility can be explored through tests as a strategic reconnaissance and global strike platform capable of reaching any point on the earth within three hours and returning to its launch location. A commercial first stage variant will enable inexpensive low-earth-orbit satellite insertion, demonstrate global two to three hour package delivery, and serve as a test bed for a potential future passenger vehicle. NASA requirements will likely focus on a second stage maximizing payload delivery to the International Space Station. As rocket and hypersonic propulsion technology continues to mature, one will likely prove superior for incorporation into third generation single-stage-to-orbit launch systems. The knowledge and experience gained through the approach outlined above would prove integral to its future success

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It critical for the government to demonstrate the feasibility of a reusable launch vehicle before the private sector will get on board-only a certain sustained government investment can produce a working RLV Henry 03 (Gary N., February, Lt Col, USAF, THE DECISION MAKERS GUIDE TO ROBUST,
RELIABLE AND INEXPENSIVE ACCESS TO SPACE, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424927) Chapter 3 articulated the technical and economic nature of the barriers to R2 ISA. An understanding of the fundamental metrics commonly used within the space launch arena provides a powerful tool to compare expendable versus reusable launch vehicles as well as to quantify the impact of technological progress. Four main technology areas - to include propulsion, advanced materials, vehicle integration, and thermal protection - represent the major requisite technologies for R2 ISA . These topics in turn explain the challenges with single-stage to-orbit and why it cannot currently
deliver as well as explaining why two-sage-to-orbit vehicles can. This difference can be summed up on a single concept design margin twostageto orbit designs have it, single-stage-to-orbit designs currently do not. The economic side of the equation is dominated by a

market failure in space transportation, making it clear that it is unreasonable for the government to expect or demand a large commercial cash commitment until ISAR2 is demonstrated. The swiftest and most certain solution demands a disciplined and wellconceived government policy backed up by decisive action. RLVS are key to all aspects of space travel
Dr. Patrick Collins Senior Partner, Editorial and Research http://www.spacefuture.com/vehicles/designs.shtml 8/13 /20 11
Dr. Patrick Collins is an exceptionally well known and respected authority on space economics, space tourism, reusable launch vehicles, and space solar power. Dr. Collins joins us again to discuss space tourism, space economics, space solar power and much more. Dr. Collins was the initial guest on The Space Show, the 100th guest, and the 1,000th on The Space Show. He is a professor of economics at Azabu University in Japan, and a Collaborating Researcher with the Institute for Space & Astronautical Science, as well as adviser to a number of companies. The focus of Dr. Collin's research for the past 25 years has been on how to stimulate growth of commercial space activities, the two main opportunities being tourism and energy supply. Dr. Collins performed the first market research on space tourism in Japan in 1993, and in the USA in 1995 and it has been very satisfactory for him to see his results confirmed by Nasa-funded studies performed in last two years. In addition, Dr. Collins is the co-founder of Space Future Consulting, which maintains the Spacefuture.com website among other activities. Space Future Japan recently opened and is making great progress in the country, especially among young people. Dr. Collins will update us on this exciting development. He is closely involved with Japanese work on space tourism and space solar power, subjects which are gradually getting more and more attention. Dr. Collins is widely published, including Aviation Week, he spoke a the AIAA Wright Brothers Centenary Celebration in Dayton Ohio and it is an honor and privilege to have him return to The Space Show.

In order for people to be able to travel economically to space, for space tourism and for other purposes, we need reusable launch vehicles. All commercial transport industries use reusable vehicles - and so will the commercial space transport industry. Luckily research aimed at developing low-cost reusable launch vehicles has increased recently - though total funding is still barely 2% (!) of government funding for space activities.

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***2AC Add Ons***

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2AC Solar Power Satellites Add on


Creating a reusable launch vehicle is key to make solar power satellites economically viable Collins and Taniguchi 97 (Patrick, Azabu university professor, H, Writer for Space Future,
The Promise of Reusable LaunchVehicles for SPS, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/the_promise_of_reusable_launch_vehicles_for_sps.shtml.) The majority of the SPS research performed to date has concerned the technology required for the largescale satellites that are to be used to collect solar energy in space and transmit microwave energy to users on Earth. As a result of this work there is now fairly good understanding of the technological requirements of such systems - at least at the scale of pilot plants of several MW output. However, the main reason why the world electricity industry continues to give little support to SPS research is that the probability of SPS becoming competitive with other sources of energy is considered to be low, because all space activities are very costly. In addition, although the electricity industry is one of the largest industries in the world, it is quite separate from space engineering, and it is understandable that electrical engineers shouldnot understand the great potential for reducing the cost of space activities. The main reason why space activities are so costly today is because launchcosts are very high - more than $10,000 to place 1kg in low Earth orbit. At such launch costs the construction and operation of SPS units with masses of thousands of tons would cost tens of $billions, which is much too expensive to be able to compete with other electricity generation systems. However, with the end of the Cold War, taxpayers' willingness to pay for the activities of government space agencies has been declining, and their budgets are being cut. This has led space agencies to acknowledge that launch costs are too high: Mr Goldin , the administrator of NASA , even stated that the US space industry should "...hang their heads in shame" because they have not developed a new rocket engine for 25 years (1). This revival of interest in developing re-usable launch vehicles with much lower launch costs has created a growing body of opinion that, with appropriate technology development, reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) could be developed with operating costs of 10% of today's costs or less. Some of the more important projects under way are described briefly in the following section.

SPS can prevent all energy wars-avoids great power conflict Rouge 07(Joseph D., Oct. 9, Acting Director of National Security Space Office,2K7 , Space-Based
Solar Power as an Opportunity for Strategic Security, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/finalsbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf) The SBSP Study Group found that SBSP offers a long term route to alleviate the security challenges of energy scarcity, and a hopeful path to avert possible wars and conflicts. If traditional fossil fuel production of peaks sometime this century as the Department of Energys own Energy Information Agency has predicted, a first order effect would be some type of energy scarcity. If alternatives do not come on line fast enough, then prices and resource tensions will increase with a negative effect on the global economy, possibly even pricing some nations out of the competition for minimum requirements. This could increase the potential for failed states, particularly among the less developed and poor nations. It could also increase the chances for great power conflict. To the extent SBSP is successful in tapping an energy source with tremendous growth potential, it offers an alternative in the third dimension to lessen the chance of such conflicts.

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2AC World Peace/Mindsetshift Add On


Space development will fundamentally alter human psychology and society-the overview effect will unite us-creating the conditions for world peace Hsu and Cox 09 (Feng, Ph.D. Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group, Ken, Ph.D.
Founder & Director Aerospace Technology Working Group, 2-20, Sustainable Space Exploration and Space Development - A Unified Strategic Vision, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html? pid=30702) Mankind, in the current stages of our single-planet civilization, may feel compelled or threatened to fight over resources and living spaceon the surface of the earth. However, such an inherent condition and competitive human psychology (deep in our consciousness) will most likely change by expanding the human horizon outward into space. As evidenced by human experience as astronauts, the "overview effect" will be the most profound nature bond for humanity to cherish one another, when we first looked back at our obscure blue home planet from the deep space. We must not underestimate the paramount importance of expanding human habitats outside the earth confinement as a critical benefit contributing to the acceleration of human conscious evolution, and hence bringing about transformed geopolitical governance, and ultimately leading to sustainable and peaceful human development back on earth. Much like a political vacuum existed in the New World some five centuries ago, which allowed early American settlers to experiment with more efficient and just forms of government, there is little doubt that humanity's expansion into space will help us develop healthier and more peaceful societies on earth.

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***2AC Case XTNs***

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RLV solves the Economy


Developing a RLV would be a bigger boom for the US economy than the IT revolution Moore 98 (ROSCOE M., winter, The author is an Astronautical Engineer who received his degree from
the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He left the U.S. Air Force as a Captain after working as a Nuclear Missile Treaty Inspector in Votkinsk, Russia. He is a candidate to receive hisJ.D. from the Georgetown Uni versity Law Center in 1999, RISK ANALYSIS AND THE REGULATION OF REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, 64 J. Air L. & Com. 245) RLVs hold the potential to reduce space launch costs from over $10,000 per pound to orbit to under $1000 per pound to orbit. This reduction in launch costs would allow the United States space launch industry to dominate the global multi-billion dollar satellite launch services market. At present, the Euro pean Arianespace consortium dominates the geostationary earth orbit (GEO) portion of this market.4 Cheaper access to space through RLVs has the potential to give the space and satellite industry the same exponential growth that the microprocessor has given the personal com puter and software industries. Tens of thousands of new high paying jobs in the space industry could be created when new companies take advantage of the ability to launch payloads into orbit for millions of dollars per launch instead of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per launch. Advances in technology that have encouraged RLV development would allow the United States to lead the economic revolution in space just as it has led the economic revolution in information technology.

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RLVs reduce launch costs-studies


Studies suggest that an RLV would reduce launch costs 100 times Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) The foreign firms are also interested in RLVs. The European Space Agency, with Great Britain in the lead, initiated the Skylon program in the 1980s. This program investigated the viability of developing cheap and easy access to space without the need for the traditional infrastructure or large ground crews. The program centered on a 270-foot long space plane that was capable of carrying 20,000 pounds into low Earth orbit.61 A number of European states continue to have interest in RLVs. Recent study efforts of the European Space Agency included the Ascender project, which is a sub-orbital airplane that is suitable for carrying passengers. It takes off from an ordinary airfield using a turbofan engine, which at 26,000 feet starts a rocket engine and climbs vertically at Mach 2.8 to reach a maximum altitude of over 325,000 feet. Ascender plans to carry two crew and two passengers, making it a possible European entrant for the X-Prize. Follow-on plans include a fully orbital spaceplane that is suitable for small satellite delivery to orbit, which is called the Spacecab, and is designed to be 100 times less expensive than the Space Shuttle. An even larger design, called the Spacebus, is designed to carry 50 people to and from orbit or fly passengers from Europe to Australia in 75 minutes. 62

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RLVs lead to space development-tourism


RLVS will enable space tourism to take off-which will increase there demand and raise public support for future space development projects Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) Commercial Space Tourism. The broad objective of space tourism is to provide access to space for less than $20,000 per round trip. Some market surveys have indicated that this price will open space tourism to enough of the market to assure success.177 The essential capability for RLVs that are used for space tourism includes the ability to operate on a scheduled status, a large payload capability with passenger comforts, and rated to carry passengers. The primary challenges for space tourism are to develop a market for reliable, safe, and affordable space flight. Before people will be interested in touring space, safety must exceed that of current levels Launch failures might be tolerated if these resulted in aborted takeoffs that were followed by safe landings. One reasonable target for reliability might be the standard that applies to commercial airliners, which is clearly higher than that which exists for expendable launches today. With respect to cost, large numbers of flights are essential to amortize the development and production costs rapidly, and as this occurs the dominant factor in cost effectiveness will be the recurring operational costs. If space tourism is to succeed, the reusable system must have an operational efficiency that is 200 times greater than that of the Space Shuttle.178 If space tourism is successful, it might encourage or support other space programs, such as the exploration of Mars. It is conceivable that an industry devoted to commercial space might help to amortize the costs that are associated with the development of RLVs, including the costs for vehicles, operating bases, and on-orbit support, and raise the publics support for space travel.179 Space tourism will only succeed if the cost of space access can be sufficiently reduced. An alternative to space tourism is that of space travel, which includes sub-orbital and even orbital flights

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RLVS solve Space leadership


4 reasons an RLV would solve for US heg in space Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm) RLV will play in this military geography of earth orbital space in four ways. First and foremost, it gives the United States routine access to these orbits for peaceful purposes, for political signaling and other nonlethal propaganda purposes, as well as for military purposes. One of these purposes will be to take unimpeded advantage of one of the corollaries of space powers elevation, superior view. A space-faring powers awareness of what is going on on earth is far superior to that of nonspace-faring nations. A nation with routine access to space will multiply that advantage with the ability to access any orbit at will. Second, as noted above, the RLV will be able to occupy these orbits to prevent others from using them. Third, it will allow the United States to engage adversary space forces at times and places of its choosing from a position of energy advantage. Fourth, it will allow the United States to engage adversary ground, air, and sea forces and political entities at times and places of its choosing from a position of energy advantage. As mentioned above, one of the corollaries to the elevation of air and space power is the energy advantage of superior altitude (what fighter pilots call Gods G). This discussion naturally leads to a concept which may be most useful in understanding the importance of this energy advantage to space doctrine in the RLV era

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RLV is possible
New technologies make it possible to develop an economically efficient RLV Moore 98 (ROSCOE M., winter, The author is an Astronautical Engineer who received his degree from
the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He left the U.S. Air Force as a Captain after working as a Nuclear Missile Treaty Inspector in Votkinsk, Russia. He is a candidate to receive hisJ.D. from the Georgetown Uni versity Law Center in 1999, RISK ANALYSIS AND THE REGULATION OF REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, 64 J. Air L. & Com. 245) The new technologies that enable the development of RLVs are lighter thermal protection systems (TPS), lighter than alumi num composite building materials, higher efficiency liquid rocket engines, and guidance and control (G&C) systems utiliz ing satellite navigation updates. New TPSs will allow RLVs to survive the high temperatures of re-entry that result from fric tion between the atmosphere and the rocket body. Lighter composite building materials will yield lighter weight cryogenic 14 Most companies developing RLVs desire to capture the low earth orbit (LEO) launch market. Lockheed Martin, with its Venture Star RLV design, in tends to compete with Arianspace in the heavy lift GEO launch services market. fuel tanks and lighter rocket bodies, allowing rocket designers to reduce or eliminate the separating stages that make ELVs so complex and expensive. Higher efficiency rocket engines allow RLVs to decrease their fueled weight and increase their payload capacity. New and cheaper guidance systems based on the Global Positioning Satellite System (GPS) allow RLV designers to accurately track and steer their vehicles while the rocket is out of sight or is reentering the atmosphere.

The US could create an RLV in less than a decade if it significantly invested in one Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) For the purposes of this study, RLVs are defined as vehicles that are capable of carrying at least 20,000 pounds into low Earth orbit, returning to Earth for servicing, and then performing another mission within days. A number of concepts for RLVs have been proposed, including single-stage to orbit, two-stage to orbit, and Trans-atmospheric vehicles, all of which seek routine access to space at greatly reduced cost. While none of the concepts for RLVs have reached this elusive goal, it is possible for the United States to produce a reusable launch vehicle within the next ten years if it makes a significant investment in technology. This study does not focus on the performance of RLVs, but examines the more significant military missions and commercial applications for RLVs and their strategic implications.9

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***DA 2AC***

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2AC Space weapons DA/Turn


1) We control Uniqueness-extend our Brown 09 ev-it answers your characterization of Chinas space program as passive they have specifically developed space crafts for the purpose of blowing past current US missile defense efforts and has tested military anti satellite technology-they clearly arent sitting back on securing space dominance-prefer our ev it speaks to the nature of Chinese internal politics 2) Other Nations will inevitably challenge US space dominance-The US must maintain leadership or risk being preemptively attacked-the anarchic nature of the international arena demands that Kueter 07 (Jeff, president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit think tank dedicated to science
and technology in public policy, New Atlantis, China's Space Ambitions -- And Ours, Spring, lexis) On January 11, 2007, a missile was launched from Chinese territory. It arced upwards into space to an altitude of about 537 miles, where it slammed directly into its target, an obsolete Chinese weather satellite. The target was destroyed, reportedly producing some 900 trackable pieces of space debris in orbits from 125 miles to about 2,300 miles and resulting in an increase of 10 percent in the total amount of manmade debris in orbit. This demonstration of an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) was just the latest in a series of tests of China's space weapons program, and was a warning sign the United States should take very seriously. In the decades after the Soviet Union and the United States first designed and deployed so-called space weapons, some observers came to hope it would be possible to turn back history's pages and preserve space as a sanctuary, a pristine place of peace and international cooperation, where terrestrial disputes could be left behind. If these hopes were ever given credence, they have surely been dispelled by China's recent actions in space: vivid demonstrations that the country could threaten essential satellites both directly, by physically destroying them, and indirectly, employing lasers and other jamming techniques to make them unusable. China is now a military space power and space is once again an undeniably contested arena. There are several policy courses the United States could take in responding to this new reality. It could assume that China is not a significant threat to American space assets and determine that inaction is preferable to overreaction. But such a do-nothing approach would expose the United States to the dangers of what has been called a "space Pearl Harbor," a surprise attack on U.S. space capabilities with immediate consequences for the American military and for American interests the world over. Alternatively, American policymakers could conclude that negotiation and diplomacy offer the best path forward. Following this approach, the U.S. would embrace efforts to ban the introduction of weapons into space and negotiate codes of conduct to regulate the behavior of nation-states. But while some good could undoubtedly come from the emergence of international norms and rules, it is unlikely they would be sufficient to preserve security. Instead, the United States should adopt an active defensive posture, invigorating the research and technical base needed to defend or replenish space assets. This posture can complement diplomatic efforts by providing important verification and enforcement capabilities. Such an approach will be expensive and will need to overcome bureaucratic inertia as well as domestic and international opposition--but it is the only option that can ensure the security of American space assets.

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3) Turn Securing space dominance now would prevents a worse space arms race in the future-and will quickly secure international stability Dolman 10 (September, Dr. Everett Carl, Associate, Assoc. Professor of Comparative Military Studies
@ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies The Case for Weapons in Space: A Geopolitical Assessment) Placement of weapons in space by the United States would be perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing American hegemony. Although there is obvious opposition to the current international balance of power, the majority of
states seem to regard it as at least tolerable. A continuation of the status quo is thus minimally acceptable, even to states working toward its demise. As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be bearable initially and grudgingly accepted over time. Mirror-imaging does not apply here. An attempt by China to dominate space would be part of an effort to break the land-sea-air dominance of the United States in preparation for a new international order. Such an action would challenge the status quo, rather than seek to perpetuate it. This would be disconcerting to nations that accept, no matter how grudgingly, the current international orderincluding the venerable institutions of trade, finance, and law that operate within itand intolerable to the United States. As leader of the current system, the United

States could do no less than engage in a perhaps ruinous space arms race, save graciously decide to step aside and accept a diminished world status. Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States is dominant in space infrastructure, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. The enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space and to readily engage and destroy terrestrial anti-satellite capacity would make the possibility of large-scale space war or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of
holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the United States were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage

competing states from fielding opposing systems. It could also set the stage for a new space regime, one that encourages space commerce and development. Should the United States use its advantage to police the heavens
and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global public good. In much the same way the British maintained control of the high seas in the nineteenth century, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights, and against slavery, the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

4) There evidence doesnt take into account how big of an advantage an RLV will give us in control of space. Theyll give the United States the ability to have unparallel mobility in space allowing is to clear enemy defenses and maintain the high ground in any conflict. Moreover it will give the United States unparallel intelligence gathering capabilities. The 1AC Bruner evidence says that the combination of these capabilities would make current anti space weapons like ASATS completely ineffective and discourage other nations from trying to counter the US

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5) RLVS are way to badass for any country to engage in meaningful countermeasures against Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm)
Such a capability would allow the United States to protect its interests, on earth or in orbit, at times and places of its choosing, without having to consider the risk of loss to enemy action. States or other groups with nascent ballistic missile or space programs will soon have primitive ASAT capability in the form of sounding rockets carrying kinetic energy submunitions (as simple as sixpenny iron nails) launched in the path of an oncoming satellite in a predictable orbit.120 These ASATs, a threat to any satellite in a predictable LEO, are of limited utility

against an RLV space ship launched on a suborbital or fractional orbital trajectory. There is very little possibility that nonspace-faring nations or groups could detect launches from US sovereign territory. At present, only the
United States has a publicly disclosed missile warning satellite, although the Russians have reconnaissance satellites and are likely to have missile warning satellites left over from the cold war as well. If these nations detect launchers, they do not have the dataprocessing

infrastructure to predict and disseminate suborbital trajectories and impact points to space weapon defense forces. While making a case for an independent European satellite reconnaissance capability in the wake of the Gulf War, former
French foreign minister Pierre Joxe acknowledged the supremacy of the US space surveillance machine with its range of missile early warning, ocean surveillance, photographic and radar reconnaissance, electronics eavesdropping and weather satellites . . . with its massive supporting processing and communications chain.121 Frances and Britains $1 billion investment in military spacecraft

could not match the $200 billion US military space machine during the war, and it is not likely that many other nations on earth could do so in the foreseeable future.12 That said, it does not take a lot of money to buy sixpenny nails. Low technology ASATs would, however, be difficult to use against an RLV changing its orbit from revolution to revolution. Even the United States would have a great deal of difficulty engaging hypersonic maneuvering reentry vehicles (which would be very similar to the strategic defense problem).

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2AC SKFTA Good


1) Non Unique. Fears of expanding the deficit will block bipartisanship on SKFTA The Washington Post 6-15 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/deal-near-ontrade-agreements-worker-aid/2011/06/15/AGHg3XWH_story.html) The Obama administration and congressional leaders are nearing consensus on three pending trade agreements and the renewal of support for workers who have been displaced by global trade, ending a standoff that some feared would put U.S. exports at risk, said business, administration and congressional officials close to the discussions. Free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia and Panama have become a centerpiece of the Obama administrations efforts to boost U.S. sales overseas, a foray into trade politics by a president who, as a candidate, expressed skepticism about the benefits of prior free trade pacts. The Korea deal is expected to generate more than $10 billion in additional annual sales for U.S. companies. But the controversy over the U.S. deficit has stalled
the deals, with Republicans opposing renewal of the billion-dollar-a-year Trade Adjustment Assistance program. The Obama administration has said it would not submit the trade pacts unless the assistance program is reauthorized to help workers hurt by outsourcing or increased imports.

2) Current controversies will derail a vote on the agreement into the election cycle-that dooms it Time 6-15 (U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Foot-Dragging: Will Washington Welch On the Deal?,
http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/06/15/u-s-colombia-free-trade-foot-dragging-will-washingtonwelch-on-the-deal/.) Not so fast. Just because Bogot has gotten its act together doesn't mean Washington has. Although both the Obama Administration and congressional Republicans favor the three agreements, which together could increase U.S. exports by more than $10 billion, there is still a monkey wrench in the works: Trade Adjustment Assistance, a Kennedy-era program that aids hundreds of thousands of U.S. workers adversely affected by global trade each year, and which needs to renewed. Democrats insist that should precede a vote on the Colombia, Panama and South Korea pacts; Republicans want to ratify the agreements now and tend to the renewal of TAA, whose billion-dollar annual cost they'd love to chop, later. That could be a serious enough roadblock to scuttle a vote on the agreements this summer which would then most likely force a delay until after the 2012 elections, since politicians are loath to wave free trade pacts in American workers' faces during an election year. Each party of course accuses the other for the wait the Democrats say the GOP wants to push the agreements through without ensuring proper protections for U.S. laborers; Republicans say the Dems are holding the agreements hostage by making TAA renewal a condition and since partisan deadlock is the is the favorite sport on Capitol Hill these days, there's a real chance we won't see a vote this year.

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3) Theres no internal link threshold-they have no evidence that that plan would be so unpopular in congress as to derail a free trade agreement 4) Turn the plans popular A)Theres a growing political consensus in favor of developing a RLV Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm)
Political, economic, and technological forces may be converging at this point in history, however, to provide the United States with a way to realistically pursue its national purposes in space. With respect to political forces, there seems to be a growing

awareness in the US government that something has to be done to lower the cost of space access. Most of the national reports on space over the past decade either say something like a coherent national effort to improve launch capabilities is desperately needed, or, above all, it is imperative that the United States maintain a continuous capability to put both humans and cargo in orbit.6 Part of the reason for this new awareness is the high operating costs of the current space launch fleet. As overall space budgets fall, operating costs for old-technology
space launchers grow as a percentage of total costs. In fact, space shuttle operations presently consume about one-third of the total NASA budget.7 This is one of the economic forces that is providing incentives to lower the barriers to space access. The other is the growing commercial space business ($5 billion in 1992 sales and growing at a double digit annual rate) and the possibility that new technology will make space access for profit-making enterprises economical for the first time.8 Underpinning these new political and fiscal realities is the maturation of technologies that, together, can solve some of the engineering problems that have traditionally forced spacefaring nations to throw away the largest part of their space vehicles. These new technologies: Lightweight materials from the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) and National Launch System (NLS) programs, advanced propulsion from the shuttle program and from Russia (in fact, the NASA Access to Space Study bases the propulsion system for its reference reusable launch vehicle on the Russian tripropellant RD-704 engine) as well as new computing techniques from the commercial sector have combined to offer the potential for an order of magnitude reduction in the cost of getting into orbit.9

B) Empirically RLV funding has strong congressional backing Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm)
This project is not intended as a study in bureaucratic decision making, it is simply intended to serve as a tool for understanding how bureaucratic forces inside NASA and DOD drove the president to a two-track policy, when there were strong political trends favoring one track over the other. In fact, a senior administration official has noted strong congressional interest in the RLV.46

Congress was also willing to back this preference up by voting more money for the RLV subscale demonstrator in the FY95 Defense Appropriations Bill than for initial work on the EELV. 47 The EELVs chances for survival, given
the unfortunate precedent of ALS, NLS, and Spacelifter, would not be very good in the best of circumstances, but given the real or perceived competition between an old-technology ELV and a flying RLV advanced technology demonstrator four years hence, Congress is even more likely to cancel the EELV. NASA has scheduled the advanced technology demonstrator RLV to fly no later than July 1999 (the 30th anniversary of the first moon landing, a coincidence to be sure). 48 DODs EELV, on the other hand, is projected to fly for the first time in 2000.49 In todays resourceconstrained environment, an expendable launch system on the drawing board will find it very difficult to compete for dollars with a flying prototype RLV. The EELVs first flight may very well be a year late and a couple of billion dollars short. As Luis Zea says in the December 1993 issue of Final Frontier, Recycling ideas like the National Launch System and the more recently proposed Spacelifter family of expendable boosters appears to be politically dead.50 EELV program managers are working hard to prove him wrong, but the weight of history is against them.

5) POLITICAL CAPITAL IS IRRELEVANT -- EMPIRICALLY PROVEN. Bond & Fleisher 96. (Jon R. and Richard, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in
Political Science. Fordham - 1996. "The President in Legislation) In sum, the evidence presented in this chapter provides little support for the theory that the president's perceived leadership, skills are associated with success on roll call votes in Congress. Presidents reputed as highly skilled do not win consistently more often than should be expected. Even the effects of the partisan balanced Congress, the president's popularity, and, the cycle of decreasing influence over the course of his term. Presidents reputed as unskilled do not win consistently less often relative to. Moreover, skilled presidents do not win significantly more often than unskilled presidents on either important votes or close votes, in which skills have the greatest potential to affect the outcome. Because of the difficulty of establishing a definitive
test of the skills theory, some may argue that it is premature to reject this explanation of presidential success based on the tests reported in this chapter. It might be argued that these findings by themselves do not deny that leadership skill is an important component of presidential-

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congressional relations. Failure to find systematic effects in general does not necessarily refute the anecdotes and case studies demonstrating the importance of skills.

6) Winners Win-Controversy helps obama pass his agenda Singer 09 (Jonathan, senior writer for the popular progressive blog MyDD, By Expending Capital,
Obama Grows His Capital, March 3, p. http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428) Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq.

7) All their impacts are overstated A) The economy- the idea that a free trade agreement with South Korea-a country with such a small share of the worlds GDP and who we already trade with is key to the survival of the global economy is silly. The magnitude of the affs link to the economy is far greater. Space offers the global economy access to unrivaled resources and would stimulate multiple industries like manufacturing and transportation thats the 1AC Hsu evidence B) War with north Korea-South Korea depends on the United States for deterrence no way they would abadon the United States if a trade agreement fell through and no way that north Korea would escalate tensions with a US protected ally. Also the aff solves having space dominance would deter any rouge state from provoking the United States

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1AR RLV popular


Congress is more likely to prefer winning the launch vehicle race than fear taking a risk on RLVS Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm) The second question is whether the two conclusions were driven by differences in the risk tolerances of the two institutions. Perhaps so. The DOD argues, correctly, that the stakes are higher in the national security arena, and that the nation can ill afford another launch hiatus caused by exclusive reliance on high-risk technology (as it suffered after the Challenger explosion). NASA argues, also correctly, that risk has been reduced by recent advances in lightweight materials, thermal protection, high speed computing, the attendant flight control and systems integration software, and other technolo gies. Even though these advances do not reduce the risk of the reusable launch vehicle to zero, NASA, it seems, is willing to take some programmatic risk to protect US competitiveness in the international launch vehicle technology race. Congress is likely to be more sensitive to this concern than to DODs national security concerns in the wake of the cold war

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***A2 Counter plans***

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2AC Private Industry Counterplan


1) Extend the 1AC Henry evidence the launch industry is perceived as so risky and requires so mutch up front capital that the private sector wont get involved unless its already been demonstrated that the technology for RLVS is feasible which requires the government front the cash and take the first step 2) Private space development is likely to cause a development bubble that would set back space exploration decades PR Web 11 (2-19, Renowned NASA Space Flight Risk Expert Dr. Feng Hsu Now Assessing Private
Space Flight Risks ,http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/2/prweb8144899.htm.)
With more than 90 books published and worldwide recognition for his expertise as technical advisor and leading expert of Risk and Safety Assessment and Management at several NASA centers and Brookhaven National Lab, Dr. Feng Hsu recently shared his assessment

of the risks in getting the new civilian space travel industry off to a safe, successful liftoff. The time of this futuristic business is not quite here yet, and it could be another year or two. Even if SpaceShipTwo and Lynx tests of their spacecrafts will be on schedule successfully in the summer of 2011, there could still be some tough challenges ahead from a profitable commercial operation since there are far too many risk factors that must be overcome, Hsu said. A single system anomaly or mishap during test flights or even in private space flights could potentially kill the entire industry in its infancy. It is not so much of the real system risk or failure, it is all about the publics perceived high risk of space travel. Mitchell J. Schultz, managing director of
Xtraordinary Adventures, said hes pleased to have the collaboration and support from Dr. Hsu on risk evaluation of suborbital space flight and space tourism: Dr. Hsu adds a new level of expertise and connections that will not only help our company, but also help the entire private space tourism industry for taking a more realistic view and achieve some of its objectives much sooner. His whole-hearted support will also enable Xtraordinary Adventures to expand into international markets around the globe.

3) It would be anti profitable for shuttle manufactures to create RLVs Collins and Taniguchi 97 (Patrick, Azabu university professor, H, Writer for Space Future,
The Promise of Reusable LaunchVehicles for SPS, http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/the_promise_of_reusable_launch_vehicles_for_sps.shtml.)
Although there are plans for several "constellations" of LEO satellites (66 in the Iridium system, and 288 in the Teledesic system) these will be launched at lower cost due to their large volume, and there is no likelihood of many such systems being built, due to saturation of demand. In addition, govern-ment budgets for launch are not expected to increase, but rather may be expected to decrease with a fall in launch prices. In the

face of such a limited market, the development of reusable launchvehicles creates a severe problem for manufacturers - the "50:50 Pinch" - illustrated in Table 2. In round figures, manufacturers of expendable rockets throughout the world make about 50 rockets per year, which are used to launch about 50 satellites, earning revenues of
some $3-4 billion per year worldwide (see Table 2 (a)). Although this business is quite small (for example, in car manufacturing, many individual companies earn more than $30 billion per year) it is relatively stable. However, if a single reusable launch vehicle is

made which can launch one satellite per week, expendable launch vehicle makers' business would fall to zero (see Table 2 (b)). There is no other way to escape from this "Pinch" than to find a new launch market that will grow many times larger than the existinglaunch market (see Table 2 (c)). Seen from this economic perspective, in the absence of major new launchmarkets, it is clearly against the corporate interests of existing makers to develop a reusable launch vehicle. For example, a company such asLockheed-Martin , which currently earns $billions from expendable launchvehicle sales, faces a real conflict of interest working on " X-33 " and a possible follow-on launch vehicle. If successful, its own business will decline substantially.

4) The Counterplan would link to politics-not only would Obama have to push it through a crowded legislative agenda but it would also be controversial with high budget pressures to abandon billions in potential tax revenue

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5) The market sucks no entrepreneurs would invest Smith 03 (Marcia S, 2-3, Resources, Science, and Industry Division for congressional research service,
Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17353.pdf.) One difficulty facing entrepreneurial companies attempting to develop new launch vehicles, and existing launch service providers, is dramatically changed market forecasts for launch services. In the mid- to late-1990s when many of the entrepreneurial companies emerged, a very large market was predicted for placing satellites into low Earth orbit (LEO), particularly for satellite systems to provide mobile satellite telephony services. Many of the entrepreneurial companies targeted the LEO market, but it has shrunk markedly in the intervening years. Three satellite mobile telephone companies (Iridium, ICO, and Globalstar), and a company that offered data services using LEO satellites (Orbcomm), all declared bankruptcy. Though Iridium and ICO were later brought out of bankruptcy, and Orbcomm was purchased by another company at auction, many investors remain skeptical about the prospects for such systems. Another factor is that technological advances permit longer satellite lifetimes and enlarge capacity, reducing the need for new satellites in established markets. Declining launch forecasts published by FAA (available at [http://ast.faa.gov]) reflect the changing market conditions. The constricting market affects existing launch service providers, both here and abroad, as well as companies planning to introduce new vehicles

6) Insurance would be to high Moore 98 (ROSCOE M., winter, The author is an Astronautical Engineer who received his degree from
the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He left the U.S. Air Force as a Captain after working as a Nuclear Missile Treaty Inspector in Votkinsk, Russia. He is a candidate to receive hisJ.D. from the Georgetown Uni versity Law Center in 1999, RISK ANALYSIS AND THE REGULATION OF REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, 64 J. Air L. & Com. 245) There is a possibility that RLV insurance costs will increase over ELV insurance costs because a RLV should receive four sep arate MPLs (as opposed to two for an ELV) to insure the vehicle over both the launch and re-entry portions of flight. If insur ance costs for RLVs are to remain comparable to contemporary insurance costs for ELVs,
either the design or operation of RLVs has to be superior to that of comparable performance ELVs. A company launching RLVs over land and then recovering those RLVs over land must understand that the costs and the number of failure scenarios used in the calculation of the aggre gate MPL have increased. The only way to keep insurance costs from escalating in line with the costs and number of possible failure scenarios is to design a RLV that is less likely to fail than a comparable ELV. If RLVs are designed with the same fault tol erances as ELVs, then RLV operators should expect to pay higher total insurance costs for the combined launch and re entry portions of flight. If RLV operators launch and recover their vehicles in ways that ELVs have avoided, they should not be surprised by aggregate MPLs that are much higher than those given to ELV operators. The keys to low RLV insurance liability are conservative ELV-like operations and vehicle designs that are more reliable than ELVs. Risk analysis is the technical process for identifying, character izing, quantifying and evaluating hazards."' The Office bases its safety review and financial responsibility requirements on a risk based analysis because it needs an objective and technical pro cess to evaluate the probability and consequences of undesirable events happening in licensed launch activities. This evaluation allows the Office and launch license applicants to answer the two most fundamental questions concerning the regulation of commercial space launch vehicles: (i) is the launch vehicle safe to fly, and (ii) can it be insured at a reasonable price? The unique technical and operational characteristics of RLVs compared to ELVs will change the results of the risk-based analy sis defining the safety and financial responsibility requirements for licensed launch activities. The laws that regulate the U.S. commercial space launch industry will not change dramatically with the advent of RLVs, but changes in the results of the analy sis behind these regulations will change how these laws are ap plied to RLVs. The risk assessment for RLVs will extend from the launch por tion of flight to both the launch and reentry portions of flight. This extension will cause an increase in the total potential risk of RLV operations.

This potential increase may make RLVs un safe to operate or too risky to insure, unless potential RLV oper ators take appropriate action before they approach AST for a license.

7) This Counterplan cant solve the economy advantage-if the United States cant tax the revenue generated from RLVS then that United States wont be able bring down the massive unsustainable deficit which is a vital internal link to our Posen and Mead ev

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A2 other country counterplan


United States export controls block the ability of other countries to develop launch vehicles Behrens 06 (Carl E, 3-20, Resources, Science, and Industry Division at Congressional Research
Service, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/IB93062.pdf) Europe, China, Russia, Ukraine, India, and Japan offer commercial launch services in competition with U.S. companies. Most satellites are manufactured by U.S. companies or include U.S. components and hence require export licenses, giving the United States considerable influence over how other countries participate in the commercial launch services market. The United States negotiated bilateral trade agreements with China, Russia, and Ukraine on rules of the road for participating in the market to ensure they did not offer unfair competition because of their non-market economies. Launch quotas were set in each of the agreements. However, President Clinton terminated the quotas for Russia and Ukraine in 2000, and the agreement with China expired at the end of 2001

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***Neg***

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***Economy ADV***

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Economy advantage 1NC


1) It takes to long to solve-it will take decades to research a new space craft it cant solve the current economic crisis 2) Nasa is already giving incentives for the private sector to develop RLV Manufacturing.Net 5-26 (NASA Calls for Commercial Suborbital Flight Services Proposals,
http://www.manufacturing.net/News/Feeds/2011/05/mnet-mnet-market-sectors-aerospace-nasa-calls-forcommercial-suborbital-flight-servic/?menuid=38) NASA is seeking proposals for services from commercial suborbital flight providers and payload integrators to support the agency's Flight Opportunities Program, which is part of NASA's Office of the Chief Technologist. NASA will award contracts to multiple vendors capable of providing payload integration and flight services on commercial suborbital reusable launch vehicles. The flights will carry a variety of payloads to help meet the agency's technology and innovation goals enabling future missions and benefiting America's commercial aerospace industries. "Partnering with U.S. suborbital reusable launch vehicle providers for integration of technology payloads and launch services is an effective way to use the innovations of American industry while meeting the technology development needs of the nation's space program," said NASA Chief Technologist Bobby Braun at the agency's headquarters in Washington. NASA's Office of Chief Technologist intends to mature crosscutting technologies to flight readiness status for future space missions. As part of this strategy, NASA will provide frequent flight opportunities for payloads on suborbital reusable launch vehicles capable of flying to various altitudes, including above 62 miles, but not reaching low-Earth orbit.

3) An RLV wont make space development cheaper A) Theres demand for high launch rates into space Rand 06 (National Security Space Launch Report,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG503.pdf) Because of the significant cost of launch vehicles, there has been a long-term desire on the part of policymakers to build a reusable launch vehicle that would spread launch vehicle costs over a number of missions. Reusable launch vehicles require unique technological performance (high vehicle massfraction and thrust-to-weight ratio) and operational systems (reusable thermal protection systems) not required for expendable vehicles. To offset the increased cost of these technology and operational requirements for a reusable vehicle, a high flight rate needs to exist to justify the investment. To date, the Panel has not been presented the requirements for high launch rates that justify the case for reusability. With the lack of definitive mission needs and the currently projected technology investment, the Panel finds that any operational reusable launch vehicle falls beyond the time frame of this study.

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B) Hidden Development Costs dramatically reduce the economic viability of RLVs Wertz 00 (James R, 10-6, an Adjunct Professor of Astronautics at USC, a Fellow of both the British
Interplanetary Society and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, ECONOMIC MODEL OF REUSABLE VS. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, http://www.smad.com/analysis/IAFPaper.pdf.) Cflight ops is modeled as a theoretical first unit cost reduced by a learning curve for both expendables and reusables. In general, flight operations are expected to be more expensive for reusable vehicles due to added launch complexity. The vehicle itself is more complex and goes through more operations in that it must be recovered and returned and all of these systems must be checked prior to launch. Therefore, with comparable amounts of development, we would expect that the operations cost would be less for an expendable vehicle. For expendables, the flight operations cost is typically $0.5 million to $1.0 million per mission after the procedures have been fully established. It is much more difficult to estimate the flight operations for reusable vehicles since the only example available is the Space Shuttle, which is not only reusable but also manned, and the latter characteristic is clearly a major cost driver. Orbiter flight operations cost estimates vary widely, but probably fall in the range of $200 million to $400 million per launch, excluding refurbishment costs. Clearly this is far too expensive for any competitive reusable vehicle in the future. Therefore, the economic model should assume a range of costs for flight operations. Generally, operations costs are reduced by a higher level of spending in nonrecurring development in order to create a vehicle which does not require repetitive operations. However, most launch vehicle development programs have suffered higher than projected nonrecurring development cost. Consequently, historically high operations costs have come about, in part, in an effort to hold down the initial nonrecurring development cost. (See London [1994].) While most launch vehicle manufacturers would argue that they are developing vehicles which will have a very low operations cost, there is also very little evidence that they are willing to accept additional nonrecurring development expenses to achieve this. Indeed, the marketplace for launch vehicle development has not been strong in terms of the capacity of new vehicle manufacturers to raise money. It is important to note that in traditional space system cost models operations and maintenance cost includes the cost of buying potential replacement vehicles at the end of life of the current fleet. This cost is not included in the current model. This implies that we may need to set aside some money to cover both development and production cost of follow-on units at the end of the useful life for the fleet of either expendable or reusable vehicles.

And Spending money on development wont resolve this Wertz 00 (James R, 10-6, an Adjunct Professor of Astronautics at USC, a Fellow of both the British
Interplanetary Society and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, ECONOMIC MODEL OF REUSABLE VS. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, http://www.smad.com/analysis/IAFPaper.pdf.) generally, operations costs are reduced by a higher level of spending in nonrecurring development in order to create a vehicle which does not require repetitive operations. However, most launch vehicle development programs have suffered higher than projected nonrecurring development cost. Consequently, historically high operations costs have come about, in part, in an effort to hold down the initial nonrecurring development cost. (See London [1994].) While most launch vehicle manufacturers would argue that they are developing vehicles which will have a very low operations cost, there is also very little evidence that they are willing to accept additional nonrecurring development expenses to achieve this. Indeed, the marketplace for launch vehicle development has not been strong in terms of the capacity of new vehicle manufacturers to raise money

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4) Theres no reason US economic leadership is key to anything-other countries like China can get the resources from space and become the anchors of the global economy 5) Historically economic decline doesnt cause war Ferguson 06 (Niall , Professor of History at Harvard University. September/October. The Next War of
the World. Foreign Affairs. New York: Sep/Oct 2006. Vol. 85, Iss. 5; pg. 61. Proquest. Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

6) The global economy is sustainable and wont collapse into protectionism as a result of a decline in US economic leadership Ikenson 9 (Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, A
Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived, March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651) Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the
International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all

WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their
tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is

not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United
States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional

temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or

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location of the other parties, they

can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

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No Solvo-Data
Theres no reliable data that indicates a RLV will make space development significantly more commercially viable Wertz 00 (James R, 10-6, an Adjunct Professor of Astronautics at USC, a Fellow of both the British
Interplanetary Society and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, ECONOMIC MODEL OF REUSABLE VS. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, http://www.smad.com/analysis/IAFPaper.pdf.) It is generally assumed by the community that reusable launch vehicles will dramatically reduce launch costs because you dont throw away the vehicle every time it is used. However, this is usually taken as an element of faith, without any substantive analysis to support the conclusion. The example of the Space Shuttle, originally sold to Congress on the basis of dramatically cutting launch costs, suggests that this conclusion might not be accurate under realistic conditions of development and operations

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No solvo-devlopment expensive
Developing a new generation rlv is almost certainly doomed to fail-the chances of it being successful dont outweigh its severe economic costs Behrens 06 (Carl E, 3-20, Resources, Science, and Industry Division at Congressional Research
Service, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/IB93062.pdf) Proponents believe that RLV technology can dramatically lower the cost of accessing space. NASAs efforts to develop a 2 nd generation RLV to replace the shuttle have not fared well, however. Starting in 1995, NASA pursued two X (for experimental) flight test programs: X-33 and X-34. X-33 was a joint program with Lockheed Martin to build a subscale prototype of a large RLV based on singlestage-to-orbit (SSTO) technology. The SSTO concept involves a rocket that can attain orbit with only one stage (instead of two or more as is common today) carrying people or cargo. X-34 was a small RLV testbed to demonstrate reusable two-stage-to-orbit technologies, which was being built under a traditional contract with Orbital Sciences Corporation. NASA terminated X-33 and X-34 in March 2001 because the cost to complete them was too high relative to the benefits. NASA spent $1.2 billion on X-33, and Lockheed Martin said that it spent $356 million of its own funding. NASA spent $205 million on X34. NASA restructured its RLV program in 2000 (as part of its FY2001 budget request) and initiated the Space Launch Initiative (SLI). It then restructured the SLI program in 2002, and terminated it following President Bushs announcement of the Vision in January 2004. The goal was to develop RLV technology that would be 10 times safer and crew survivability 100 times greater, all at one-tenth the cost of todays space launch systems. The failure of the X-33 and X-34 programs, and of the National AeroSpace Plane (NASP) program before them, made some observers skeptical about NASAs ability to develop a 2 nd generation RLV. In documentation accompanying a November 2002 budget amendment, NASA conceded that a new RLV lacked economic justification. SLI was restructured into two components: building an Orbital Space Plane (OSP), a spacecraft (not a launch vehicle) to take crews to and from the space station, and developing Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT). Concurrent with President Bushs announcement of the Vision, NASA terminated S

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No solvo-A2 Creates a market to lower costs


The Launch vehicle market is highly inelastic-it will take decades RLVS would have to astronomically lower costs which wont happen because theres not enough demand for launches and other countries will resist adopting them Wertz 00 (James R, 10-6, an Adjunct Professor of Astronautics at USC, a Fellow of both the British
Interplanetary Society and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of the International Academy of Astronautics, ECONOMIC MODEL OF REUSABLE VS. EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES, http://www.smad.com/analysis/IAFPaper.pdf.) Generally we will use launch vehicle demand, i.e. the projected number of launches per year for a specific new vehicle over the next 15 years as the independent variable in the launch vehicle cost model. Our general assumption is that with a sufficiently large demand, the cost per launch of a reusable vehicle will become less than expendable vehicles. We would like to evaluate numerically what level of business is necessary for this to occur. The general assumption in most reusable models is that significantly lower cost per launch will create new demand and, therefore, increase the number of launches. However, this process does not occur instantaneously. First, a new vehicle must be created with significantly lower costs. This new vehicle must then establish a reliability history and, finally, some change in demand may occur over time. Consequently, the starting point for all launch vehicle economic models should be the current projected launch forecast. Current launch forecasts call for 1,500 to 2,000 launches worldwide between 2001 and 2010 [Satellite Finance, 2000]. This represents a moderate increase over the launch vehicle activity that has been maintained since the early 1970s [Wertz, 1996]. Most models indicate that this market is relatively inelastic until after a significant cost reduction takes place. Thus, higher demand will result from lower costs after the lower costs and associated reliability record have been established. Unfortunately, the total launch vehicle market of 150 to 200 launches per year does not represent the addressable market for any given new launch vehicle. First, launches to orbit are currently available from seven countries: the United States, Russia, France, Japan, China, India, and Israel. In addition, the United States and Russia have multiple launch vehicles and vehicle suppliers. More supply is also being created by an internationally mixed breed in which, for example, Russian vehicles are modified and launched in the United States. These multiple sources significantly reduce the potential launch market since government sponsored launches will generally make use of national vehicles, irrespective of cost. This is generally the case, however, only for government programs. Commercial programs in the United States, for example, often launch on foreign vehicles in a true cost competition.

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***Space Heg***

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Space Heg 1NC


There is no ongoing war with china in space-their capabilities arent even close to ours and they wouldnt risk sparking a conflict with the United States-its against their self interest Moore 09 (Mike, 1-12,research fellow at the Independent Institute. , An Agenda for Obama: End
America's Counterproductive Pursuit of Space Dominance, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics_online/0029.html.)
Over the past ten years, Russia and China in particular have expressed deep suspicion of America's drive toward space dominance, and they have repeatedly warned in diplomatic circles that they would not stand idly by as the United States builds a space-dominance capability. Will

America's pursuit of space dominance trigger a space-related arms race? The conventional hard-line answer is that one is already underway, although evidence for this is weak. It centers on China's ASAT test in January 2007. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, China has been regularly identified in military circles and in certain influential think
tanks as the Next Great Threat. To hardliners, the ASAT test proves that the Chinese talk peace while preparing for possible armed conflict. And yet,

the Chinese test was of a relatively primitive "kinetic-kill" device, similar to one the United States tested in 1985 and then abandoned. China's test was more likely a shot across the bow. The United States had been dismissing Chinese efforts to get PAROS negotiations underway for years; the Chinese test may have been a warning: Get on with treaty talks or we will challenge you in space. In fact, the assertion that China seeks to challenge the United States in national-security spaceor in any military fielddoesn't pass the smell test. China learned a lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: In a direct arms competition with the United States, the United States wins. Moreover, manufacturing consumer goods for export to the West drives China's economy and provides employment for tens of millions in a nation in which systemic unemployment is at dangerously high levels. A Cold War-style confrontation would sap China's economic vitality by diverting huge amounts of capital from manufacturing to China's arms industries, thus threatening China's main business, the Wal-Marting of America. A quid pro quo relationship exists between Washington and Beijing. Washington is generally comfortable with the idea that China will continue to supply inexpensive products to U.S. consumers; in turn, China continues to help finance the growing U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of low-interest U.S. Treasury notes and bonds.

2) Your evidence is from 1996 it cant reliably speak to how an RLV would improve our capabilities vis--vis rival powers in 96 China was barely breaking out a century of isolation and the Berlin wall was still up 3) AN RLV wont secure US space leadership A) They wont improve our current global power projection options Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) Another factor is the range of the RLV. As examples, the air-launched cruise missile, AGM-86B, has a range of 1,500-plus miles, the AGM-86Cs range is 600-plus miles.116 The submarine or ship-launched land attack cruise missile, Tomahawk, has a nominal range of 1,000 miles.117 These ranges allow U.S. forces to strike land targets worldwide without the need for the launch platform to violate a nations sovereign territory, with few exceptions. For these target exceptions, other strike options exist, such as penetrating specialty strike aircraft (e.g., B-2, F-22, F-117). The response times for cruise missiles launched by deployed forces are measured in hours, which is essentially the same as the response time that is postulated for RLVs performing global strikes.118

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B) There are multiple barriers to them providing the US with any intelligence advantages or deploying them for military use Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) A challenging barrier to reconnaissance with RLVs is the operational implication of improving national collection systems and timelines. One of the major reasons for developing a reconnaissance mission for reusable lauch
vehicles is to improve the timeliness of intelligence information for the operational community. In the past, there were many reasons for delay, but substantial progress has been made in national intelligence collection and delivery timelines, and further improvements are planned.103 When the U.S. is at war or in a crisis, all national resources, including national intelligence assets, will be available to the regional Commander in Chief (CINC). Most recently, the combat experience in December 1998 against Iraq raises questions about the need for major improvements in combat intelligence support from space-based reconnaissance systems. While intelligence timeliness and products can be

improved, it is clear that national intelligence data can provide timely support to the combatant commanders. If weather precludes national systems collecting data, other space assets are not likely to perform any better. In the case of being
out of position, this will be resolved in some finite time given the geographic location of the target and the orbits of national assets. It is likely that in some instances national assets will be able to image the target before a satellite that is deployed by a RLV. If the RLV could deploy

numerous reconnaissance sensors, this could improve the overall coverage and revisit rate for specific areas. The associated cost, however, is an increased demand for command and control of these newly deployed assets. Furthermore, command and control challenges involve more than just traditional telemetry, tracking, and commanding, and include deciding who owns, operates, and tasks these assets as well as who gives the launch command. None of these challenges are insurmountable, but they highlight the fact that implementing reconnaissance missions with RLVs is a formidable task. One major hurdle to developing a
reconnaissance capability with RLVs is that the regional CINC must define a requirement for this capability. While the regional CINCs have clearly articulated intelligence requirements, they also have substantial intelligence systems at their disposal. Their historical preference is for organic systems that are under their exclusive control. The fact that the CINCs will demand regular opportunities to train and deploy with the systems they will employ in war means that the concept of SOVdeployed reconnaissance satellites must include routine deployment and training with military forces.

4) Turn arms races A) RLVs will cause countries to adopt offensive countermeasures spurring a rapid arms race in space Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) The development of a military RLV may detract from U.S. national security if it drives other states to engage in an arms race.123 Given the high cost of developing, procuring, and operating RLVs, it is unlikely that another nation will obtain an offensive capability with RLVs capability in the foreseeable future.124 But other states may pursue countermeasures to RLVs in order to erode or nullify the U.S advantage. While it is a less likely response, other countries may develop their own orbital or suborbital space bombers in response to U.S. deployments, which could spur the weaponization of space.

That would cause nuclear confrontations in space, massive space debris and shutting down of global satellite systems Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) The United States needs to protect its space interests, but what is perceived as the weaponization of space may trigger international hostility or an arms race.148 Another challenge for space control would occur if an adversary intentionally destroyed a satellite and the resulting debris cloud harms other satellites.149 This is particularly troublesome in the increasingly populated low-earth orbits that contain many constellations of satellites. And a nuclear explosion in space could affect the near-earth space radiation environment for months, and wreak havoc on the electronics in all satellites in particular orbits

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Rapid space militarization causes accidental nuclear war with China Lewis 04 (Jeffery Lewis, March 11, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf, What if space were
weaponized?) Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is extremely worried about possible Chinese ASATs, and threat that such weapons would pose to U.S. military superiority. The most recent Pentagon report on Chinese military power warns that China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an active Chinese ASAT capability.22 The report also warns that, at the outset of a conflict, the PLA would attempt to weaken U.S. or other third partys re-solve by demonstrating the capability to hold at risk or actually striking high-value assets. The PLA would seek to leverage emerging asymmetric capabilities to counter or negate an adver-sarys superiorities. 23 These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the commu-nications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. If the United States were to deploy space-based missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard a space maneuver vehicle like NASAs X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as well. This situation would essentially put the United States on a hair trigger in space. A Chinese military exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise at-tack. With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack

5) Their heg good impact card is nonsense-conservative hacks have been claiming that US leadership would prevent conflict for decades-but all that has happened is other nations building up their military capabilities and the United States getting involved in multiple wars in different theaters why would a rocket ship make any difference?

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No space weponization now


Any Chinese military space program is centered around deterrence Hagt 07 (Eric , director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, in Washington, D.C. and
Beijing; China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 31 51, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_3.pdf.)
The above discussion indicates that the militarys actions to develop space weapons during Chinas diplomatic offensive were a separate and perhaps independent hedging track rather than a deliberate design to develop space weapons. The opposite has been suggested by some: that diplomacy was nothing more than a smokescreen to buy time for the military to achieve an ASAT capability.45 These accusations simply do not square with Chinas interests or its past behavior. First, outside of purely military interests, as a vastly inferior power in space,

China has no conceivable interest in blindly pursuing an all-out space weapons program (let alone conducting a test). Such a move would not only launch China into a costly space race with the United States but would threaten Chinas delicate strategic balance with nearly all its neighbors (both potentially adversarial, such as Japan and India, as well as others in Southeast Asia) and even with Europe. Such behavior by China is also inconsistent with history. The military has frequently been subordinated to greater diplomatic and national interests. Chinas highly restrained development of its nuclear weapons program in the face of direct nuclear threat by both the Soviet Union and the United States in the past is an instructive example.46 The tight control over military program spending during the first decades of its opening up and reform is another case in point.47 Second, implicit in this charge is also that
the diplomatic effort was colluding with the military to pursue a space weapons program. Undermining years of Chinas reputation and hard work for dubious military gains fraught with high risk is utterly inconsistent with Chinas otherwise patient international diplomacy.48 Similarly, the test could not reasonably be a ploy particularly by Chinas Foreign Ministry to force the United States back to the negotiating table. Nations do not respond to threats by acquiescing, particularly when threatened by a weaker state. It would smack of appeasement, or worse, cowardly surrender, neither of which would be an option in any countrys domestic political environment. There is no historical U.S. behavioral precedent that would lead China to believe the United States would respond constructively to such an egregious act. It is conceivable that the MFA acquiesced in light of the failure to sway the U.S. through diplomacy or, at worst, the MFA wasnt

the principal driving force behind the decision to test was uncomplicated. It was a deliberate and strategic, but also defensive, act. Facing the inevitability of space weaponization and U.S. plans to dominate space, China voiced its opposition in a most strident way: that is, to emonstrate a deterrent capability. First of all, Chinas doctrine of deterrence is highly defensive in nature.50 That is, deterrence aims to negate others ability to coerce China. China felt the need to demonstrate its resolve to counter potential U.S. coercion in space. This conclusion is also reinforced by the nature of the test itself. It was indeed a spectacular
fully informed.49 From this perspective,

demonstration of capability, creating a large amount of debris and endangering over 125 satellites as a result.51 But despite the international outcry over the test, it was a response calculated not to overstep technical and moral boundaries vis--vis previous ASAT testing by the United States and the former Soviet Union.52 The ASAT technology represented by this particular test did not appreciably surpass that of the U.S. ALMV (AirLaunched Miniature Vehicle) System test in 1985.53 Nor did it greatly exceed the Soviet Co-orbital System tests from 1963 to the early 1980s.54 As such, the Chinese ASAT test did not constitute a challenge to the United States in a technological sense. The testing of a kinetic energy ASAT into geostationary orbit or the use of a killer satellite would have caused far greater disquiet among U.S. military planners as a challenge to American power.55 In the end, China just basically did what the United States and the Soviet Union did decades ago. Without any international law on banning weapons in space, the test was calculated to keep China on morally safe ground.56 In addition, the test was also limited in light of Chinas probable ASAT capabilities. With uncertain evidence of Chinas work on other types of ASAT technology and also its reported blinding of an American satellite using laser technology several months ago,57 it is reasonable to assume that China did not display its full capability through this test.

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No solvo reconnaissance
Existing commercial vehicles solve reconnaissance e missions Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) There are numerous alternatives to relying on SOV-deployed sensors to provide combat units with critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data. Those alternatives include commercially available information, relying on national assets, and the use of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In the future, the proliferation of imagery systems by numerous commercial companies and nations virtually ensures that we will have regular access to global imagery. The proliferation and capabilities of these commercial systems will be so significant that many believe U.S. adversaries will be able to exploit these commercial products. If these commercially available products would be operationally significant to an adversary, it is likely that they could be operationally significant for U.S. forces. The USAF acknowledges that commercial satellite imagery is rapidly becoming a key source of information for current USAF operations. As an example, commercial imagery is used to support mission planning, including the selection of landing and drop zones. The USAF uses commercially procured imagery today to meet regularly unfulfilled imagery requirements that are caused by gaps in coverage or competition for scarce national resources. The Air Force further predicts that the next generation of U.S. and foreign commercial satellites will provide a significant military value that is comparable to government sources.107 While the military is unlikely to rely on commercial sources as the principal method for obtaining imagery, this remains a viable and inexpensive source that complements other capabilities, such as national reconnaissance and theater organic assets

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No solvo Global Strike


RLVS small payload capacity means they couldnt carry enough missiles to be effective Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) One final challenge for global strike with RLVs is their capacity. In the December 1998 combat action against Iraq, U.S. forces launched 425 cruise missiles.120 If one assumes that RLVs carry ten Common Aero Vehicles, each of which carries one 1,000 pound precision guided munitions,121 the ten weapons per sortie would be half the capacity of a B-52 bomber. This means that more than 42 sorties would be necessary to match the current delivery means. Assuming RLVs based in the continental United States are capable of one sortie per day for each vehicle,122 and given a four-day campaign goal, a minimum fleet of ten vehicles is necessary. Given the training and maintenance to support a posture for major theater wars, a squadron of at least fifteen or more RLVs will be necessary for global strike missions.

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No Solvo-space control
The benefits of RLVS in space control are wildly exaggerated Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) In the end, political and legal issues will remain the most significant challenge to space control. While this does not negate the need for space control, the United States should carefully consider these issues before it pursues this capability. As to what is the best role for RLVs in space control, the answer is the traditional spaceiift for sensors and emitters. For the purposes of this study, space control may be important, but RLVs have at best a limited role, which is principally to provide spacelift. Thus, space control does not appear sufficiently compelling reason for pursuing RLVs

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Arms Race DA-Link XTN


The perception of space capability deficit will force other nations to respond by aggressively weaponizing space Ward 00 (John E., May, Lt Colonel, USAF, Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat12.pdf.) Regardless of whether RLVs are employed, the two primary concerns for performing space control are preventing the escalation of space warfare, and denying adversaries access to commercial satellites that have operational significance (e.g, imagery, communications). 150 While the United States must protect access to space and its vital satellites, it must do so without these tensions escalating into a war in space. Using RLVs to pursue space control objectives is not by itself escalatory. However, an adversary may perceive U.S. space control with RLVs as so superior that these capabilities become destabilizing

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Space Weapons Bad Impact XTNS


Weaponization of space would fill space with debris and make space exploration impossible Primack 02 (JOEL BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, PELTED BY PAINT, DOWNED BY
DEBRIS SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER ER, RETRIEVED August 17, 2004 http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/so02/so02primack.html) Weaponization of space would make the debris problem much worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes. The nickname Star Wars for missile defense all too accurately reflects the popular fantasy about how things work in space. In the Star Wars movies and in hundreds of other popular science fiction films, we see things blow up in space and the fragments quickly dissipate, leaving empty space behind. But in reality, space does not clear after an explosion near our planet. The fragments continue circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of exploded rocketsall have already become tiny satellites, traveling at about 27,000 kilometers per hour, 10 times faster than a high-powered rifle bullet. A marble traveling at such speed would hit with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a three-story building. Anything it strikes will be destroyed and only increase the debris. With enough orbiting debris, pieces will begin to hit other pieces, fragmenting them into more pieces, which will in turn hit more pieces, setting off a chain reaction of destruction that will leave a lethal halo around the Earth. To operate a satellite within this cloud of millions of tiny missiles would be impossible: no more Hubble Space Telescopes or International Space Stations. Even communications and GPS satellites in higher orbits would be endangered. Every person who cares about the human future in space should also realize that weaponizing space will jeopardize the possibility of space exploration.

Space weaponization would collapse international cooperation collapses the economic the WOT and antiproliferation efforts Krepon and Clary 03 (Michael and Christopher, Henry L. Stimson Center,
http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/space4.pdf, accessed October 2, 2004) While the challenges in pulling together the cooperative measures required for space assurance are significant, they pale in comparison to the national security challenges that would result from the flighttesting and deployment of space weaponry. As discussed earlier, these pursuits would result in significant political, diplomatic, commercial, and national security costs.1 In domestic U.S. politics, they would pit the military programs favored by some directly against the negotiating pursuits favored by othersa circumstance that usually produces an outcome disappointing to all. The avid pursuit of flighttesting and the deployment of space weaponry by the United States would also likely create deeper fissures in alliance ties and relations between major powers. Such initiatives would further complicate U.S. efforts to build coalitions of the willing to counter proliferation and terrorism. They are also likely to cause perturbations in global commerce.

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***Add Ons***

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SPS no solvo
SPS is not technologically or economically feasible Geoffrey A. Landis, February 04, scientist at the NASA Glenn Research Center, Reinventing the Solar Power Satellite, NASA, http://gltrs.grc.nasa.gov/reports/2004/TM-2004-212743.pdf
Power distribution is a general problem with all conventional solar power system designs: as a design scales up to high power levels, the mass of wire required to link the power generation system to the microwave transmitter becomes a showstopper. A design is required in which the solar power can be used directly at the solar array, rather than being sent over wires to a separate transmitter. (The "solar sandwich" design of the late 70's solved this problem, but only with the addition of an unwieldy steering mirror, which complicates the design to an impractical extent). In addition to technical difficulties, the baseline concept does not meet economic goals. As shown in table 6-4 of the "Fresh Look" final report [1], even with extremely optimistic assumptions of system cost, solar cell efficiency, and launch cost, each design analyzed results in a cost which is either immediately too expensive, or else yields a cost marginally competitive (but not significantly better) than terrestrial power technologies, with an internal rate of return (IRR) too low for investment to make money. Only if an "externality surcharge" is added to non-space power sources to account for the economic impact of fossil-fuels did space solar power options make economic sense. While "externality" factors are quite real, and represent a true cost impact of fossil-fuel generation, it is unlikely that the world community will artificially impose such charges merely to make space solar power economically feasible.

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No overview effect
Space doesnt cause international cooperation Oberg 10 (James,6-28, NBC News space analyst, The right and wrong stuff for space cooperation,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37986760/ns/technology_and_science-space/) One of the most persistent and pernicious mythical benefits of international space partnerships is that it promotes peace on Earth. That is, embarking on a complex and expensive joint space project actually tames the governments of unfriendly nations. The Apollo-Soyuz linkup in 1975 is often portrayed as inspiring politicians in Moscow and Washington to end the Cold War. The space shuttle dockings with Russia's Mir in the late 1990s, and the subsequent Russian amalgamation into the International Space Station, were likewise portrayed as forcing earthside diplomats to be nicer to each other. Top NASA astronaut Charlie Precourt proclaimed in 1998 that the partnership would force politicians to resolve disputes "that otherwise they wouldn't." "Theyll look up there and say, Well, we have an investment in that, too. We have to keep this relationship going in a proper direction, rather than doing something rash, Precourt predicted. In reality, joint space projects actually follow rather than cause relaxations of tensions. They are often performed to illustrate the new and improved diplomatic climate. A rooster may think its crowing brings the sunrise, but its performance is the consequence of a larger phenomenon, and not the cause. The same goes for the bird's fellow fliers in the astronaut and cosmonaut corps

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***DA Links***

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SLV unpopular
Theres strong opposition in Congress to increase funding for NASA to create a shuttle replacement Orlando Sentinel 11 (1-12,NASA says it needs more cash, time to build rocket to replace shuttle,
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-12/news/os-nasa-cant-afford-rocket-20110112_1_heavy-liftrocket-rocket-and-capsule-constellation-moon-rocket-program.) Top NASA officials told lawmakers this week that they cannot build the replacement for the space shuttle that Congress wants on the budget and deadline they were given. "These [spacecraft] systems must be affordable, sustainable, and realistic," the agency said in a remarkably candid 22-page report. Congress' plan would not "meet these goals." "None of the design options studied thus far appeared to be affordable in our present fiscal conditions, based upon existing cost models, historical data, and traditional acquisition approaches," the report says, adding: "Any [spacecraft] designs selected must meet the test of being realistic not relying on assumptions of increased funding or other 'miracles' for attainment The bombshell is a major blow to hopes for the quick development of a new heavy-lift rocket and Apollo-like capsule capable of taking humans to the moon and beyond. It is also a major setback for Kennedy Space Center, which is set to lose at least 6,000 jobs during the next year as NASA retires the space shuttle. The center is expected to languish with no follow-on program imminent. In addition, a planned five-year, $2 billion program to modernize KSC's aging infrastructure could well be cut or eliminated to find more money for the new rocket. The report prompted a sharply worded response from the Senate Commerce Committee, including U.S. Sens. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., and Kay Bailey Hutchison, R- Texas, who were the principal authors of the plan passed by Congress last year. "[T]he production of a heavy-lift rocket and capsule is not optional. It's the law," they said. "NASA must use its decades of space know-how and billions of dollars in previous investments to come up with a concept that works. We believe it can be done affordably and efficiently and, it must be a priority." Nelson himself issued a two-sentence statement: "I talked to [NASA Administrator] Charlie Bolden yesterday and told him he has to follow the law, which requires a new rocket by 2016. And, NASA has to do it within the budget the law requires." Under the plan signed into law by President Barack Obama in October, NASA was supposed to get $11 billion during the next three years to start building a rocket and capsule that could as a first step fly to the International Space Station by Dec. 31, 2016. But new pressure in Congress to slash federal spending means that NASA is unlikely to get even that much

RLVS are such a big financial risk that they would be tremendously contraversal Bruner 96 (William W., Masters from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies,
National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Acces, http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/bruner.htm) The DOD Space Lift Modernization Plan: the Case for and against Expendables. The DOD study, the SLMP, concluded that pursuing new reusable launch vehicle technology was controversial due in part to the risk.26 DOD recommended, therefore, that it remain committed to the evolutionary development of its present stable of aged Atlas, Delta, and Titan launchers, while investing in incremental technology improvements. The SLMP itself admits that this would deliver little or no per launch or per pound to orbit cost savings.27

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***Counterplan***

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Privatization Counterplan 1NC


The United States federal government should extend the research and development tax credit to companies with projects seeking to develop a second generation reusable launch vehicle Providing tax credits will jumpstart the private sector into developing a new RLV Cordes and Hertzfeld 97 (Joseph, professor of economics at the George Washington University,
Henry, Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the George Washington University, Federal tax incentives and financing for the reusable launch vehicle, Space Policy 1997 13 (2) 125-137) The production of a reusable launch vehicle (RLV) is a big investment. The government used to fund, own, and operate such ventures. Although it currently justs secures the services of RLV program, it still needs to invest in research and development. Private companies will assume the risk of manufacturing and managing RLVs. An incentive, through taxation, is necessary for businesses to consider the activity as a profitable business venture.

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Solvency XTNS
Tax breaks can be the decisive factor encouraging the private sector to develop RLVs Cordes and Hertzfeld 97 (Joseph, professor of economics at the George Washington University,
Henry, Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the George Washington University, Federal tax incentives and financing for the reusable launch vehicle, Space Policy 1997 13 (2) 125-137) Tax policy is only one of many criteria that are factored into an investment decision. Good investments are made on the basis of the best alternative options. Therefore, tax policy as it now exists, or changes in tax policy to stimulate a particular type of investment or industry, will be considered by industry only on the margin. If the project is borderline for an investment, then tax policy changes may be the deciding factor. Of course, a decision will depend on the size of the funding and the size of the tax incentive needed. The following discussion assumes that all the world is taxes. Other variables are held constant in the model and the parameters are varied to isolate and illustrate the potential role of tax policy in financing an RLV. The eventual outcome of this program will hinge on a wide variety of factors, with the whole menu of tax and other government incentives available for negotiating an attractive package that will, hopefully, balance the needs of the government with the appropriate business decision criteria to initiate a shared-risk partnership between the government and industry.

The counterplans tax incentives are ideal to cause the commercialization of the RLV industry Cordes and Hertzfeld 97 (Joseph, professor of economics at the George Washington University,
Henry, Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at the George Washington University, Federal tax incentives and financing for the reusable launch vehicle, Space Policy 1997 13 (2) 125-137) Our results suggest that a relatively favorable environment for commercialization of the RLV would be made up of the following elements. First and foremost, the projected profile of revenue and cost associated with commercialization needs to be at least as favorable as that which is assumed in the MSFC, and which is shown in Figure 1. This is because the profitability of commercializing the RLV rests on economic fundamentals which can be improved only up to some point by providing tax incentives. Given the revenue and cost streams that are projected in the MSFC model, the combination of expensing for costs of DDT&E plus the current tax credit for research and experimentation seems to offer the contractor an after-tax return from investing in the RLV that would be adequate to support commercialization for the RLV. In effect, the combined result of these two tax provisions is to introduce a significant element of cost- and risk-sharing by the government through the tax system, that helps make commercializing the RLV financially attractive on an after-tax basis. This result, however, requires that several conditions be met.

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