Our Land: Dueling Nationalisms and Territorial Disputes in East Asia

A Substantial Research Paper By Samuel A. Ross Submitted to the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs

Faculty Supervisor: _________________ Pek Koon Heng

Semester of Registration: Fall 2011 Course ID: SIS-795-037

Table of Contents
Authors Note ............................................................................................................................................... 1 I. Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 2 Hypothesis................................................................................................................................................. 3 Methodology of Research ......................................................................................................................... 4 II. Literature Review ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Theoretical Perspective ............................................................................................................................ 6 Context of the Disputes .......................................................................................................................... 12 Dokdo/Takeshima/Liancourt Rocks .................................................................................................... 13 Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories ........................................................................................ 16 Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyu-tai/Pinnacle Rocks ...................................................................................... 20 Nationalism and Territorial Disputes ...................................................................................................... 22 III. State-Sponsored Nationalist Associations ........................................................................................... 27 Analysis of State Sponsored Associations and Nationalism ................................................................... 33 IV. Motivating Factors ................................................................................................................................ 37 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) ............................................................................................................ 37 Domestic Socio-Political Issues ............................................................................................................... 42 Historical Biases ...................................................................................................................................... 45 Involvement by Outside Powers/Parties ................................................................................................ 48 Analysis of Motivating Factors ................................................................................................................ 50 V. Grassroots Initiatives ............................................................................................................................. 54 Exploration of Civil Actors ....................................................................................................................... 54 Japan ................................................................................................................................................... 54 China ................................................................................................................................................... 56 Korea ................................................................................................................................................... 39 Russia .................................................................................................................................................. 62 Analysis of Grassroots Initiative in Context ............................................................................................ 64 VI. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 67 Bibliography................................................................................................................................................ 71

Authors Note: Throughout the course of this paper, only one of the multiple names given to each disputed territory will be regularly used when referencing those territories. In the case of Dokdo/Takeshima/Liancourt Rocks, this will be Takeshima, while in the case of Diaoyu/Diaoyu-tai/Senkaku/Pinnacle Islands, Senkaku, and in the case of the Southern Kuril Islands/Kuriles/Northern Territories, Kuril Islands. This is done primarily for efficiencys sake, and (like the rest of this paper) should not be misconstrued as political support for one countrys claim to sovereignty over these territories. The exceptions will be when directly referencing each countrys name for the territories and when the alternative names have been used in quotations from research materials to avoid misrepresentation. In addition, reference to the island of Taiwan makes no judgment on Taiwans political status. Rather, it recognizes Taiwans role in the Senkaku conflict, the implications of possible resolutions and Taiwanese motivations for continued involvement. Finally, all non-English words and names are presented here Romanized (using commonly accepted systems) and italicized, with definitions following in parentheses (if applicable). In regards to referencing Chinese names (i.e. Diaoyu), this paper Romanizes them through the Pinyin system, which is currently accepted in both the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. The only times other systems of Romanization will be employed (i.e. Wade-Giles) is when directly quoting research materials.

I. Introduction

In September of 2010, the collision of a Chinese Trawler with a Japanese Self-Defense Force ship patrolling the disputed Senkaku islands and subsequent arrest of the Chinese crew provoked large scale protests throughout several cities in China and Japan. Thousands took to the street because of the incident.1 In 2011, three Japanese Diet members were also the focus of controversy when they announced plans for a fact-finding mission in connection with the Takeshima islands disputed between Japan and Korea. In response, the Korean government denied them entry into the country once their plane had landed at the Seoul airport, and hundreds of Korean activists gathered in protest at the airport until the lawmakers had returned to Japan.2 Japan is currently involved in three of these kinds of territorial disputes; in addition to China and Korea, it also clashes with Russia over what it calls the Northern Territories and what Russia calls the Kurils. All three cases bear strong similarities to one another. In each case the disputes center on islands to which both respective sides hold significant legal and historical claim. Population varies, ranging from unpopulated (the Senkakus in China) to others maintaining a limited population (the Kurils with 14,0003), but each territory contains a wealth of exploitable resources. Since their inception, all of the disputes have also frequently given rise to powerful nationalist rhetoric, some even going so far as to export that rhetoric to other uninvolved countries. In 2008 and 2009 for example, Korean nationalist groups also paid for

Yoree Koh, "Tokyo Protests Blast China's Response to Collision," Wall Street Journal (Online) (10/03/2010). http://proxyau.wrlc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/756095233?accountid=8285. 2 Global Times, "South Korea Denies Entry to Japanese Lawmakers", People's Online Daily http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/90851/7457557.html (accessed Oct. 28 2011). 3 Brad Williams, Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations, ed. J.A.A. Stockwin et al., Nissan Institute/Routedge Japanese Studies Series (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007). 141

advertisements on their position in their dispute with Japan in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post,4 despite many Americans being completely unaware of the context of the conflict. Although a great deal of books and newspaper/journal articles mention nationalist fervor surrounding these disputes when it becomes explicit, few have delved deeper in looking at the motivations for this nationalism and the relevance to the islands. Therefore, where does this nationalism originate from? Why does it connect a series of tiny islands to the idea of the nation? What are the underlying motivations and what are the implications of the perpetual nature of the disputes, some of which have been ongoing since the end of the Pacific War? Is it all oriented on the societal level, or is it possible that these conflicts are being exploited for state or institutional goals? This paper consolidates those inquiries with the goal of addressing two primary substantial research questions; do East Asian countries (the state or civilians) use territorial disputes to encourage nationalism, and what effect does nationalism have on territorial disputes? Hypothesis Pulling back for a moment then, as an initial hypothesis to these questions, the author predicts that the four states involved in these disputes are exploiting them for the goals of promoting nationalism, but that some nationalism may also arise from outside influences. Whether or not nationalism is encouraged under the states prerogative to accomplish certain goals, it can and has been argued that nationalism is not the sole dominion of the state and may even be beyond state control. Therefore, the secondary hypothesis of this paper predicts that no matter the
4

Associated Press, "N.Y. Times Full-Page Ad Claims Disputed Islets Belong to S. Korea+", Breitbart http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D91QQV600&show_article=1 (accessed Oct. 28 2011).

role of the state in encouraging nationalism, it can have an inhibitive effect on finding a resolution to these disputes. These two questions and the authors hypotheses will be explored through analysis of nationalist displays and rhetoric connected to the disputes within the context of comparative theory. Specifically of interest is the association with the disputed territories as a crucial and undeniable part of the nation and whether incidents that focus around the territories are truly grassroots in origin or representative of a desired goal of the state. It shall also investigate the potential outlying factors, such as historical bias, internal socio-domestic and other additional factors, each of which may affect motivation to see the territories as part of the nation. Methodology of Research To pursue this study of whether East Asian countries use territorial disputes as a way to encourage nationalism, this paper uses what Bruce L. Berg defines in Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences as a descriptive case study methodology in which the investigator presents a descriptive theory, which establishes the overall framework for the investigator to follow throughout the study.5 Therefore, as established above, it will be necessary to delve further into the theoretical construct of the nation within the context of these disputes. This is important because validating or disproving the hypothesis that these particular conflicts are being used by the state to generate nationalism will depend on investigating whether a certain degree of nationalism also forms around these conflicts independently of the state.

Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 7th ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2009). 327

This case study will primarily be performed through unobtrusive methods of gathering data, focusing largely on archival research and a literature review; reviewing the issues through documentation written by researchers in the field and recent developments around the conflicts. It will also allow a glimpse into the international discourse over these topics and to get a macro-view of the issues surrounding them. Both the literature review and archival research are intended to be as diverse and comprehensive as possible over a variety of media (books, journal/newspaper articles/video recordings); exploring a significant breadth of related material to establish reasonable conclusions on the research questions. In addition, the recognition of the importance of incorporating all of the previously mentioned unobtrusive methods in the course of this case study is intended to create as clear a window as possible into continued study and contribution toward the issues by performing an analysis of something that governments in East Asian countries are or are not doing and the role of nationalism in territorial disputes. The case study format will allow a thorough look at that position and re-writing of the hypothesis and methods as necessary based on the results received from the data reviewed.

II. Literature Review Theoretical Perspective Key to establishing the role of nationalism is to understand the nation and the nationstate. To understand the nation, one would be derelict to not first discuss Benedict Andersons definition and explorations, as his book, Imagined Communities, has been used as the groundwork for much of todays national theory. Benedict Anderson defines the Nation as an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.6 This consciousness of the community, Anderson argues, is one that developed naturally when three concepts became less of a dominant focus for world societies:
The first of these was the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseperable part of that truthSecond was the belief that society was naturally organized around and under high centres monarchs who were persons apart from other human beingsThird was a conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essentially identical.
7

Individually, these three ideas are all elements of an imagined community; a shared language, shared traditions, and a shared history. Geertz later defines these elements of the nation as primordialism; congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.8 However, what Anderson argues is that the idea of a shared imagined community arises generally from a greater

Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov, "Asia in Theories of Nationalism and National Identity," in Asian Forms of the Nation, ed. Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov(Surrey: Curzon Press Ltd., 1996). 7 7 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. and extended ed. (London ; New York: Verso, 1991). 36 8 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in The Interpretation of Cultures(Basic Books, 1973). 108

awareness of that community, through the promotion of literacy and a better understanding of the natural and societal based world around oneself. As Max Weber clarifies, the term nation is often mistakenly conflated with that of the state. He argues that A nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own.9 In other words, he suggests, the state (which is largely institutional) is formed naturally out of the imagined community. Properly defining the nationstate, the successful combination of the imagined community and what Walker Connor defines a major political subdivision of the globe,10 is significantly more complex. Tonneson and Antlov define the nation-state as broadlya state which the great majority of the citizens identify with to the extent of seeing it as their own.11 Others, like Wilson and Giddens, take a solely institutional approach by choosing to define the nation-state as an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence. 12 This can lead to conflict because looking back at Geertzs exploration of primordialism, geography can also be an element, based on a perceived common homeland. As Schirmer explains, A key claim of modern systems theory is that territorial borders are first and foremost political borders and that these political borders are often not of major significance for other functioning systems.13

Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology, Routledge Classics in Sociology (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2009). 177 10 Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is A..." in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994). 36 11 Tonnesson and Antlov. 2 12 Sandra Wilson, "Rethinking Nation and Nationalism in Japan," in Nation and Nationalism in Japan, ed. Sandra Wilson(London; New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2002). 2 13 Werner Schirmer, "Addresses in World Societal Conflicts: A Systems Theoretical Contribution to the Theory of the State in International Relations," in Territorial Conflicts in World Society: Modern Systems Theory, International Relations, and Conflict Studies, ed. Stephan Stetter(New York, NY: Routledge). 130

Therefore, the political boundaries of a nation-state may not correspond with the boundaries of the state in the mind of the imagined communitys historical or cultural perspective. This in turn, may have a counter-effect on the acceptance of political boundaries. Beyond Geertzs primordialism, institutions can also promote ideas of the nation in the nation-state; Anderson cites newspapers and official state publications as an example of this. Anderson reflects that we have seen that the very conception of the newspaper implies the refraction of even world events into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers; and also how important to that imagined community is an idea of steady, solid simultaneity through time. 14 Furthermore, he argues, print-capitalism made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.15 In other words, communication institutions go a long way in establishing a framework of what the nation is/looks like and what is important to it. This can also be seen through state-promoted schools, holidays, official writing of history, textbooks, and other official institutions. Whether or not a state-promoted idea of the imagined community is actually the accepted imagined community that corresponds with the nation, the state does try to influence what the nation is defined as, through what Anderson labels as official nationalism. Based off of the commonalities within these theories, it will be presumed that generally, the nation-state serves as a political and geographical entity that self-identifies as representative of the imagined community. The geographical and political natures of the nation-state are also intertwined in the sense that they relate to establishing borders, but these borders are not always agreeable with international beliefs of boundaries.
14 15

Anderson. 63 Ibid. 36

Even with this context, precisely defining nationalism is difficult. Connor, for example, warns that because of the confusion of the terms nation and state, nationalism is often misrepresented as ones identification with the state rather than loyalty to the nation.16 Rather, he argues, nationalism represents and promotes an idea in which nation and state are indistinguishingly linked in popular perception.17 Regardless of this definition, Solt, while citing Hobsbawm, claims that most states promote a nationalist myth that a truly nationalistic individual owes a duty to the state that overrides all other public obligations.18 Anderson also considers this, calling it (as previously mentioned) official nationalism, or an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community.19 This was a survival method by states to address the rise of popular nationalist movements, and Anderson uses czarist Russia as his primary example, citing the Russification of the culturally heterogeneous population by the Czar. Another example would be the modern conception of Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nationality) in China, in which the state sums up all of the 56 disparate ethnic groups collectively as Chinese. It can therefore be recognized that the state has the ability to actively promote or at least influence the idea of what the nation is. As to the theoretical level right now, it may be preferential to simply adopt Tonneson and Antlovs more general definition of nationalism: an ideological movement for attaining or maintaining a nation-state.20 This can

16 17

Connor. 40 Ibid. 42 18 Frederick Solt, "Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride," The Journal of Politics 73, no. 3 (2011) (accessed 09/05/2011). 821 19 Anderson. 101 20 Tonnesson and Antlov. 2

then be adjusted to fit how maintenance of individual nation-states is then represented while accommodating the possibility that Solts nationalist myth may exist. As a result, nationalism can be further qualified within this definition. For example, Anderson considers that the growth of nationalism in Japan was influenced heavily by Japans long isolation and the power of the official-national model during the Meiji era of the mid 1800s.21 He argues that prior to the Pacific War, Japanese nationalism was based on the state and the nationalist myth. Authors like Doak on the other hand, take another angle by exploring how nationalism developed internally in Japan through the terms used for it in the Japanese language. Doak explains that the Japanese language forces a conscious choice in terminology on one who wishes to discourse in nationalism in Japanese:22 One must decide whether the subject is minzokushugi (race-based primordialism), kokuminshugi (allegiance to a political elite) or kokkashugi (placing the state above all else).23 This suggests that the source and definition of nationalism may be more expansive, all-encompassing, and complex in different contexts than the simple English term may allow. Doak and Andersons argument, that nationalism may be oriented around other factors than just the state, finds support on a broader view of nations. George Crane, Solt and others argue that nationalism can be connected to other more tangible things, such as the domestic and international economy, which suggests that production, exchange, consumption and accumulation can strengthen the national community and that state power can be and is used

21 22

Anderson. 96 Kevin Michael Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan : Placing the People, Handbuch Der rientalistik. Nfte Abteilung, Japan ; 13 Bd. (Leiden ; Boston :: Brill, 2007). 3 23 Ibid.

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for such purposes.24 Four separate theories examine the influences of this form of nationalism. Diversionary theory, the most prominent, argues that the state will promote nationalism to divert attention from economic inequality.25 The second, Cohesion theory, leaves the state out of the equation and argues the opposite; that people are more likely to see themselves as part of a single, unified nation when their economic circumstances are indeed more similar.26 Although Cohesion theory still seems to allow the loophole that economic disparity could be obfuscated by the state, both older and modern theorists like Karl Deutch and David Brown respectively argue that this actually ends up highlighting the disparity eventually. As Brown points out, there are a great deal of democratic and industrialized countries where economic disparity leaves the state with a credibility gap between the redistributive social justice promised to subordinate classes and the capacity ofthe state bureaucracies to deliver it and the middle class to pay for it.27 It is within this context that the third, New-nations theory exists, arguing that economic inequality will particularly frustrate rather than spur the states creation of nationalist sentiments among their citizens.28 In this environment, smaller groups and classes may form their own mini-nations based on perceived elements of economic or ethnic based homogeneity. The potential implications here are also that the formation of a new-nation which runs counter or diversionary to the states vision of the nation, can be co-

24

George T. Crane, "Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 27, no. 1 (1998). http://mil.sagepub.com/content/27/1/55.short (accessed March 1, 1998). 55 25 Solt. 822 26 Ibid. 823 27 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism : Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000). 41 28 Solt. 823

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opted by individual elites, or (as Solt describes them) political entrepreneurs who attempt to develop new national identities among disadvantaged members of society. 29 The final, more recent, economic nationalism theory is based on findings by Moses Shayo, and looks at nationalism being perpetuated by a social psychology narrative. Shayo discovered from his models that The poor are more likely than the rich to identify with their nation,30 theorizing that the real or imagined benefits one perceives to acquire by being part of the nation, such as the pursuit of the American dream, makes them more likely to participate in nationalist behavior. By proxy then, wealthier individuals, who have achieved these benefits, have less motivation to consider themselves a part of the nation. As can be reasonably conjectured from above, many of the described theories of nationalism exist within a neorealist and/or neoliberal lens. However, this paper would also like to incorporate the possible application of a constructivist perspective on interpreting these disputed territories. In light of interstate behavior after historical events such as the Pacific war, which had a significant impact on the societies and nationals of all actors involved in these disputes, it seems applicable and appropriate in also helping to distinguish the origin of the nationalism as state or grassroots based. Context of the Disputes Exploring the constructivist model, it is necessary to delve briefly into the historical backgrounds of each dispute. Only with a proper understanding of how sovereignty has been

29 30

Ibid. Moses Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution," American Political Science Review 103, no. 02 (2009). 157

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claimed by the two states involved can some of the narratives surrounding these disputes be addressed. a. Dokdo/Takeshima/Liancourt Rocks Japans dispute with South Korea is over two islets known collectively by the names Dokdo (by South Korea), Takeshima (by Japan) and The Liancourt Rocks (US Government). The two islets are almost equidistant from both the Korean and Japanese mainland at approximately 215km and 211km respectively. Going by distance from established sovereign territory, they are roughly 92km southeast from Koreas Ulleung-do Island and 157 km northwest of the Japanese Oki Islands. The rocks and their reefs extend to an area of 186,121 meters squared.31 The islets and the reefs around them are in a proven abundant supply of gas hydrate, the solid state of the natural gas used for energy production, and large stocks of marine life.32 As reported by the Korea IT Times, the islets also support vegetation and various plant and animal species. Four Korean nationals, Kim Sung-do, his wife Kim Shin-yeol, and two maintenance workers, are the islets only permanent residents. The Kims have been subject to extensive biographical reporting in both national and international news outlets, such as The Korea Times and the Los Angeles Times. As described in articles in both of these publications, the Kims have occupied the islands for roughly forty years33 and are given a stipend of an unrevealed amount by the Korean government every year for their continued residence on the

31

Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific : Divided Territories in the San Francisco System, The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007). 14 32 See Section 4: Exclusive Economic Zones for more information on these resources - Ryan Schuster, "A Territorial Dispute," Korea IT Times (05/06/2010). http://www.koreaittimes.com/story/8603/territorial-dispute (accessed 09/19/2011). 33 Michael Ha, "For Kim and His Wife, Dokdo Debate Hits Home," The Korea Times (08/21/2008). http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/06/251_29785.html (accessed 09/19/2008).

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islets.34 The only other people who come to the island are visitors; Korean tourists and a small security force which maintains a rotating presence on and around the islets. In regards to the origin of the dispute, Japan began to annex Takeshima in 1905 to develop the islets as part of their surveillance network during the Russo Japanese war,35 claiming the islets under international law as terra nullius.36 This was done without the consent or awareness of the Korean government, although the islets were then formally and retroactively incorporated into Japan when the government of Korea signed the Protectorate Treaty later that year and the Annexation Treaty of 1910. In both cases, the legality of the treaties has been brought into question, as Japan exercised significant political influence over the Korean peninsula both before and after the Russo-Japanese war, and it has been suggested they were signed under duress.37 The Korean peninsula and all of its territories were then placed under Japanese colonial rule and remained as such until 1945. Hara, Schoenbaum and others argue that much of the conflict arose due to inconsistencies around Korea regaining its independence. Korea originally gained its independence through the Potsdam agreement, which was very general in its description of the state.38 Japan then officially renounced claim to Korea in article 2(a) of the San Francisco Treaty

34

John M. Glionna, "South Korea's Fierce Island Guard," Los Angeles Times (08/01/2011). http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/04/world/la-fg-south-korea-island-20110804 (accessed 09/19/2011). 35 Under Shimane Prefectural notice no. 40 - Chronological Table of Takeshima Department of General Affairs, "Takeshima Is Japanese Territory", Shimane Prefectural Government http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/soumu/takesima_eng/ (accessed Sept. 19 2011). 36 A Latin phrase meaning land without ownersor No-mans land. In international law, it indicates land that has been claimed by no sovereign Arizona Board of Regents, "Terra Nullius", The University of Arizona http://www.uanativenet.com/topicitem/Topics%20In%20Brief/265/ (accessed Sept. 19 2011). 37 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Peace in Northeast Asia : Resolving Japan's Territorial and Maritime Disputes with China, Korea and the Russian Federation (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2008). 53 38 This document, which Japan signed as the terms of the countrys surrender stated that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as [the allied powers] determine. Hara. 17

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of 1951 which stated that Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.39 Although mentioned in previous drafts of the treaty, as Hara points out, noticeably missing in the final draft was any clear reference to demarcation of sovereign territory, particularly in regard to Takeshima. Despite the recommendation by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) that both the Liancourt Rocks and the nearby Ulleung-do should be excluded from Japanese territory in the Peace Treaty, only the former was included in the territorial areas that were specified in the final language of the document.40 Some arguments have been made that it was, in fact, deliberately left vague by the U.S. in the treaty as a safeguard in case the U.S.S.R. expanded into Korea again, like it had a half-century earlier, a wedge against communist expansion into Japan.41 Schoenbaum argues that this exclusion greatly perturbed the Korean government, as it had made a specific request that Dokdo be included in the final wording of the treaty.42 As explained by Hara, this lead the Korean government to claim sovereignty of the islets in 1942 through the self-establishment of the Rhee line as a maritime border, which included Takeshima, in contrast of the now-signed treaty.43 It also occupied the islands in 1954 after extensive disagreement and minor military engagement with Japan, building a lighthouse and a helicopter pad and placing them under the protection of the Korean coast guard. Although a diplomatic treaty was signed between now-South Korea and Japan in 1965, the issues of control

39 40

Ibid. 46 Ibid. 25 41 Ibid. 45 42 Schoenbaum. 52 43 This line was based on the borders defined by the previously applied MacArthur Line, which SCAP had used to identify the border between Japan and Korea. Hara. 47

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over the islands and firm maritime boundaries between the two nations were deliberately left unestablished and have remained a source of contention ever since. b. Southern Kuril Islands/Northern Territories The Southern Kuril Islands dispute is unique compared to the territorial disputes Japan shares with China and South Korea. Significant attachment to the four islands known as the Northern Territories, (by Japan) or the Southern Kuril Islands, (by Russia) not only prevented the official signing of a peace treaty between both countries after the Pacific War, but continues to do so today. Relations have admittedly improved, especially after the CoId War, but as Schoenbaum describes it, these relations are correct but not cordial.44 This is revealed in trade statistics from the cumulative fiscal year in 2010 as reported by the Japanese Ministry of Finance, which show a huge disparity between imports and exports between Japan and Russia versus Japan and China or Japan and South Korea. More specifically, the amount of trade is comparable to slightly more than half of the amount of trade between Japan and Korea, and slightly more than a tenth of that between Japan and China.45 Kimura and Welch cite that the dispute has had a dramatic effect on general international relations as well, noting that securing the return of the Northern Territories has overwhelmed all other considerations for Japan in its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and Russia for more than forty years.46

44 45

Schoenbaum. 117 Ministry of Finance of Japan, "Trade Statistics of Japan - Values by Country, Cumulative Fiscal Year 2010", Ministry of Finance of Japan http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm?M=23&P=1,,,,,,,,,4,1,2010,0,0,0,,,,,,,,,,,,5,105,103,224,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,20 (accessed Oct. 26 2011). 46 Masato Kimura and David A. Welch, "Specifying "Interests": Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory," International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1998). 217

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The basis of this dispute is three islands; Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and a group of islets called the Habomais, which Russia currently occupies and administrates.47 As Hara explains, these four islands, which have a total land area of about 4,996 km 2, are part of a larger chain of Islands known as the Kurils, and are among the worlds best fishing grounds. 48 Like Senkaku, exploring territorial rights through original established ownership is as Kimura describes it: murky and indistinct.49 As Kimura and others explain, much of Japans territorial boundaries had been left undefined until the mid-1850s, when they were clarified through the Treaty of Shimoda written up by the Tokugawa Shogunate and Czarist Russia. Conducted and signed by official representatives of both governments, the treaty marked the official opening of diplomatic relations and, among other things, delineated a territorial border between Etorofu and the northern island of Urup.50 Schoenbaum clarifies that under this treaty, all four northern territory islands were Japanese, while the northern group of 18 Kuril Islands belonged to Russia.51 This changed in 1875, when the Meiji government traded sovereignty with Russia over a larger median maritime landmass known as Sakhalin, for the full Kuril chain, and again in 1905, when Japan took back half of Sakhalin as spoils of the Russo-Japanese war in the Treaty of Portsmouth.52 The current state of administration and ownership of the islands are due to the negotiated terms developed in a number of meetings between the allied powers and Russia in
47 48

Romanized Russian names: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomais respectively See the EEZ section later in this paper for further discussion of economic interests in the dispute. 49 A translation of the original Japanese by Mark Ealey Hiroshi Kimura, The Kurillian Knot, trans., Mark Ealey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 2 50 MoFA Japan, "Japan-Russia Relations - 150th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and Russia", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/150th/index.html (accessed Oct 26 2011). 51 Schoenbaum. 120 52 Hara.73

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World War II. In 1940, the Japanese government proposed a non-aggression pact partially to avoid immediate direct confrontation and also to put a stop to Soviet support for China during the Japanese invasion. Then-Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stipulated that any nonaggression pact would have to involve the return of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Kimura points out that this statement was significant because it established that long before they considered making war on Japan, Soviet leaders such as Stalin and Molotov most likely thought the entire Kurile Archipelago had to be recovered from Japan.53 Eventually the pact was settled in 1941 with the significant Japanese purchase of Northern Sakhalin from the U.S.S.R. (assuring Japanese control over that island) and an agreement that both parties would remain neutral in any conflict involving the other for at least five years. After this period, the language of the pact suggested it would automatically renew for another five barring objection. However, as Kimura, Hara, and Williams explain, when the USSR began strongly advancing against Germany, and the U.S. gaining against Japan in the Pacific, Stalin started indicating to the Allied powers that the U.S.S.R. would be very interested in joining the war against Japan after Germany had been defeated.54 Kimura argues that this suggestion by Stalin directly influenced the explicit 1943 declaration at the Cairo Conference in which the U.S., China and United Kingdom declared that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and their intention to expel Japan from all the territories which she has taken by violence and greed. 55

53

Although Kimura cites a former Japanese minister who claims that Molotov was only speaking about some of the islands, this is not documented otherwise and was not included for that reason. Kimura, The Kurillian Knot.40 54 Hara. 75 55 This is an argument made by Japan in claim of the Southern Kurils as they were originally neither taken by violence or greed or after World War I, but rather peaceably through the 1855 treaty of Shimoda. Kimura, The Kurillian Knot. 42

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Finally, at the Yalta conference in February 1945, a subsequent agreement was drafted and signed between the Allied Powers and the Soviet Union. It stated that the Kurils would be handed over; Sakhalin also being returned to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for Soviet involvement in the war. Hara suggests that this wording was important because it recognized the disparities between the language in the previous Cairo declaration and how Japan had actually acquired those territories.56 This agreement led to the Soviet Union denouncing its neutrality pact with Japan in April that year under the claims that the situation had been altered through Japans material support of Germany and attacks against the Allied Powers who were now allies of the Soviet Union.57 By the time the Soviets declared their intention, the war had begun to wind down and the allies were eager to conclude the war without Soviet involvement. This was notable in the Potsdam agreement of July 1945, in which all parties agreed that The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.58 Neither the terms of the Yalta agreement nor explicit sovereignty of the Kurils were recognized in this agreement, which was the one eventually accepted by the Japanese government as part of their unconditional surrender. Some historians like Williams and Kimura, suggest that the continuing conflict reflects a symbolic importance in the Soviet invasion more than any material value the islands might

56

Kimie Hara, "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan's Territorial Problems," Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001). 364 57 American Ambassador at Moscow, "Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan," in The Avalon Project (New Haven, CT: Lillian Goldman Law Library - Yale University, 04/29/1945). 58 Annex II, Section 8b., U. S. A. The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U. S. S. R., and U. K., "Agreements of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945 " (PBS Online, 07/27/1945).

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contain. They claim that Russias capture of the islands at the end of World War II was insult on top of injury of an already defeated country. The Soviet violation of the 1941 Neutrality pact came at a time when Japan was actively seeking peace with its northern neighbor,59 and resulted in the capture and internment of over 60,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians, half of did not survive the Siberian climate until the rest were repatriated in 1948. c. Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyu-tai/Pinnacle Islands Unlike the Kurils and Takeshima, the Senkaku Islands dispute is a comparatively recent dispute, initiated by the Peoples Republic of China in the early 1970s when the U.S. was in the process of returning the kinawa and nearby islands to Japans purview. Another unique aspect to this conflict is that the U.S. has continued to play a significant (albeit secondary) role beyond the original treaty. This is largely due to the fact that the U.S. maintains a political, military, and possibly economic interest in Japan controlling sovereignty of the territory. The Senkaku islands AKA Diaoyu (China), Diaoyu-tai (Taiwan), or the Pinnacle Islands (U.S. Government), are a series of eight relatively small formations; five are volcanic structures with relatively large surface areas and three are rocky outcroppings.60 Roughly equidistant from both the southernmost Japanese island in the Nansei-shoto chain,61 and the island of Taiwan, they also lie within 200km of the Chinese mainland. The islands are currently completely uninhabited by Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese nationals62 and are relatively sparse in vegetation. The islands are considered to include rich marine resources and oil
59 60

Williams. 22 Steven Wei Su, "The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update," Ocean Development and International Law 36(2005). http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Steven%20Wei%20Su-TiaoyuSenkaku%20Dispute.pdf (accessed 09/25/2011). 46 61 Also known as the Ryu-kyu or Okinawan island chain south of the Japanese mainland. 62 Although Japanese nationalists have built several structures on the largest island as a way of staking claim to it; see Section V.

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deposits, the latter in excess of 100 to 200 billion barrels if the wider economic zone is incorporated into consideration.63 The island chain also potentially offers control of several active shipping lanes in the East China Sea. Like Takeshima, the history of which country has a historical claim to the islands is a matter of contention, but was largely ignored in the wake of U.S. assuming administration as part of Article 3 of the San Francisco peace treaty in 1951.64 During this period, Senkaku was not directly identified but presumed to be part of the Nansei-shoto chain. Similarly, during the process of reverting territory to Japanese provenance in 1972, there was tacit acceptance by the U.S. government that the islands were part of the Okinawan chain. This was not directly specified by the Nixon administration however, which refused to take a position on sovereignty while relinquishing administrative rights. This was largely due to the administrations ongoing attempts to not make waves while normalizing relationships with China and maintaining a relationship with the Republic of China in Taiwan, preferring to leave the onus on the Japanese government to settle the matter.65 In 1972, Japan stopped recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign power, which reduced the dispute to one solely between Japan and China.66

63

According to an initial geological study under the purview of the United Nations in 1968, and more recent estimates by the U.S. and Saudi governments. Krista Eileen Wiegand, Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement, ed. Gary K. Bertsch and Howard J. Wiarda, Studies in Security and International Affairs (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011). 106 64 Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) Allied Powers, "Treaty of Peace with Japan", Taiwan Document Project http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm (accessed 09/25 2011). 65 Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific : Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. 180 66 Taiwan does remain an interested party in the dispute, but has significantly less influence in its resolution than China or Japan, thus will not be directly discussed in the context of this paper.

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Although the debate has been ongoing, Japan maintains custodianship and control of the island since the relinquishment by the U.S.67 However, the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, formally put into effect in 1994) has lead to a strong resurgence of interest in the territory as a potential increase in either countrys Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As a result, this has initiated a broader debate over where maritime boundaries between the two states are defined.68 Nationalism and Territorial Disputes In the past, all three of these conflicts have generally been explored within a historical context similar to the one above through books like Kimie Haras Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System and Thomas Schoenbaums Peace in Northeast Asia. Whenever the conflicts flare up, numerous articles appear, discussing the conflicts within the sphere of international relations, primarily with the goal of coming to a conclusion as to which side rightfully controls sovereignty and how to best resolve the issue. Examples include works like Alexander Petersons Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: A Lasting Arrangement and Han-Yi Shaws Revisiting the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute. While nationalism in association with these conflicts is often reported on, for example, as in The Wall Street Journals coverage of Japanese protests during the Senkaku boat ramming incident of 2010,69 its existence is referenced obliquely and without looking at causal relationships of these two elements.

67 68

Wei Su. 47 Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific : Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. 183 69 Koh.

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With that in mind, some work that looks at possible correlations between territorial disputes and nationalism has begun to emerge, although it often solely explores one the three disputes in isolation rather than comparing the three cases as intended in this paper. This includes, for example, Strecker Down and Saunders Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism, Wiegands Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy and Settlement, both of which primarily look at the Senkaku dispute. Strecker Downs approaches the conflict within the lens of Chinese nationalism and hypothesizes that the conflict is representative of that nationalism.70 Wiegand, on the other hand, argues that Chinas confrontations [in regards to the Senkaku] with Japan were only partially a result of promoting Chinese nationalism through domestic nationalism, while it appears that the overall lack of Chinese attempts at sovereignty negotiations or other dispute resolution methods was not due to domestic accountability.71 In other words, there is some suggestion that nationalism and territorial disputes are correlated but the level at which they are and which can be produced as a result of the other are matters of some debate. Looking at news sources, there is a great deal of coverage published in English, Japanese, Chinese, Russian and Korean about the conflicts, ranging from state publications like Chinas Xinhua to private organizations like the Los Angeles Times. While many of these articles report on elements of nationalism present in the disputes, few look directly at its role, perhaps under the goal of appearing to report objectively on the issues. Glionna, Ha and Kingston look at the Korean civilians who live on Takeshima, but only Kingston, in a piece for The Japan Times,
70

Erica and Saunders Strecker Downs, Phillip C., "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands," in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown, International Security Readers (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). 43 71 Wiegand. 140

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looks at the situation within the concept of Korean nationalism. As such, all review of news sources within this conflict have been done with a grain of salt; the understanding that any report on nationalism in regards to these disputes is likely biased (consciously or unconsciously) to some extent. That said, potential bias can be accommodated by drawing from a variety of reporting from different sources, and (where possible) of the same event. Therefore, Japanese nationalism in relation to all three disputes is also explored through national and international sources, such as Kohs and Tomikawas pieces in The Wall Street Journal, collaborative coverage by the AFP and BBC, The Japan Times and The Korea Times. Similar efforts have been made to look at competing coverage of anti-Japanese protests in China. Beyond nationalism, other literature such as Kyong-So Parks Promoting peace and human rights on the Korean peninsula, Jonathan Charneys Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea, and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovskys International Law's Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands, has also suggested that outside motivating factors may be in play for both the nation and the state. Park, for example, cites the increase in Japanese protests about Takeshima in 2004 to be reflective of the Japanese Prime Minister (of the time) Junichiro Koizumis efforts to strengthen a right-wing base in response to a separate internal conflict in Japans Liberal Democratic political party (LDP).72 Likewise, Williams also argues that the conflicts can also be affected by the mindset of politicians, explaining how many Japanese prime ministers have historically looked to draw attention to the disputes in times of low approval ratings.73 Charney, Ramos-Mrosovky and others take it in an economic direction,

72

Kyung-seo Park, Promoting Peace and Human Rights on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul, South Korea: Ewha Womans University Press, Seoul., 2007). 131 73 Williams. 25

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looking at how sovereignty of the territories extends the Exclusive Economic Zone and has a dramatic effect on the distributions and boundaries of the resource-rich zones.74 Therefore, there are a number of practical issues related to territorial disputes which hinge on their conclusion which may not always correlate to nationalism. Like Wiegands book mentioned earlier, analyzing the reasons these disputes continue to perpetuate themselves defines much of the existing research, rather than attempting to reach an understanding of the motivations behind those reasons. M. Taylor ravals Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute and a variety of journal articles also raise the possibility that nationalism and history in relation to the disputes may have a self-perpetuating effect in itself and may limit the role of government to maneuver as a matter of saving face:
Put simply, the leader who offers a compromise will likely be cast as selling out his countrys territory. He may lose political support within his country at the cost of implementing other policy initiatives or even staying in office.
75

Concentrating on these factors can add further depth to any exploration of the role of nationalism in connection with these disputes, but the study of the steps leading up to those desired outcomes has often been avoided in prior research. Instead, much of the documentation presumes these things without looking at how the state may be pursuing them. Aspects of conflict such as saving face, EEZs, and internal political victories are desired

74

That at least some members of the Senkaku group are full islands capable of projecting an EEZ the groups value as base points for Chinese or Japanese maritime claims is evident. Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, "International Law's Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands," University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 29, no. 4 (2008) (accessed 09/05/2011). 75 M. Taylor Fravel, "Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute," in Getting the Triangle Straight : Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis, Ryosei Kokobun, and Jisi Wang(Tokyo ; New York, NY: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2010). 158

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outcomes. As such, they suggest even more motivation as to why nationalism may be connected with these conflicts.

26

III. State-Sponsored Nationalist Associations On February 8th 2011, Japan Real Time, a Wall Street Journal blog, reported on an ad which had been published in all major Japanese newspapers the previous day. The ad displayed a portrait of a young woman with a picture of the Japanese flag on one cheek, a map of Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands on the other, with the caption I too can contribute to the return of the Northern Territories.76 The ad was sponsored by the Japanese Governments Northern Territories Affairs Administrations office and was referencing the Northern Territories Day national holiday. The holiday was established in 1981 and recognizes the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855, which was the first agreement between Russia and Japan and included recognition of an official national border between the two countries that excluded the Southern Kurils.77 In the case of Northern Territories day, the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, as well as members of the opposition parties, always attend national events commemorating the conflict and establishing their support for Japans claim.78 Likewise, the day is also marked by civilian protests in support of Japans claims; small groups of hardcore Japanese extreme rightists [who] take to their signature black vans blaring 1930s military music, protesters gather in front of the Russian embassy, and various events are held throughout Japan.79. At various points, the Japanese government has established Senkaku and Takeshima memorial days as well, although there are disparities in how they were developed and their
76

Yuri Tomikawa, "Northern Territories: Japan-Russia Dispute Simmers," Japan Real Time (02/08/2011). http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/02/08/northern-territories-japan-russia-dispute-simmers/ (accessed 10/07/2011). 77 Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow : The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995). 88 78 Ibid. 88 79 Tomikawa.

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observance. In all cases, the creation of the day is a reaction to a recent escalation of tension in bilateral politics, recognition of the long-standing nature of the conflict or a combination of both. Similar to Northern Territories day, over 2,000 right-wing Japanese protesters also came out in support of the establishment of Pioneering Day by the municipal assembly of Ishigaki city, which recognized Japans claim to Senkaku in December of 2010.80 Contextually, this took place after a political and social buildup of frustration in response to a heavily debated event two months before when a Chinese trawler attempted to land on Senkaku.81 The prefectural government of Shimanes creation of Takeshima Memorial day in 2005 was reactionary to the Korean authoritys establishment of a Dokdo postal stamp, and an increasingly heated series of exchanges between governments in 2004.82 The impact of the state establishment of this local holiday was explosive. It immediately drew dramatic widespread protests across South Korea, drawing international attention when two protesters publically cut off their fingers in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.83 Two months later, Japanese activists also attempted to land on Takeshima. The Korean government threatened the possibility of military incursion during the attempt, although it was never followed up on, as the activists eventually turned back.84 Domestic nationals attempting to land on the disputed islands is a regular occurrence, and one that often provokes a strong response from opposing states, who view the nationals as symbolically representative of the position of the state. For example, on several occasions,
80

AFP, "Anti-China Protesters Rally in Tokyo", Yahoo News http://sg.finance.yahoo.com/news/Anti-Chinaprotesters-rally-afpsg-284375190.html?x=0 (accessed Oct. 15 2011). 81 See discussion of the Chinese Trawler incident in the following section. 82 Schoenbaum. 109 83 Charles Scanlon, "S Korean Fury over Island Dispute," BBC News (03/14/2005). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/4347851.stm (accessed 10/07/2011). 84 Park. 128

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Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese activists have all attempted to occupy the Senkaku islands between Japan and China. In the early 1970s, as the logistics of the U.S. returning Okinawa and Senkaku to Japan were being settled, two Taiwanese reporters sailed to the island and raised a national flag, prompting nation-wide anti-Japanese protests in Taiwan when they were forcibly evicted.85 Then In 1978, members of the right wing Japanese Youth Federation (JYF) independently sailed to Senkaku and built a lighthouse on the main island as a symbolic claim of Japanese sovereignty. In response, the Chinese government sent a flotilla of more than eighty armed fishing boats that repeatedly circled the island.86 Another area where the state has arguably been connected to nationalism surrounding the disputes has been in establishing the position of the state in the context of education. The Education Ministry of the Japanese government came under fire by both the Chinese and South Korean foreign ministries in March 2011 when it approved 12 new national textbooks, all of which claimed that Takeshima and Senkaku were Japanese territory.87 The move drew at least one protest of around a hundred people outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul who defaced and destroyed a Japanese flag88 and both Chinese and Korean governments made an official request for a retraction of said textbooks. However, as recently as 2010, Koreas Education Minister stressed the need to review the reinforcement of Dokdo education in a revised curriculum for elementary school students, in order for students to develop an understanding

85 86

Strecker Downs. 53 Ibid. 87 English.Chosun, "Japan Approves Textbooks Laying Claim to Dokdo", The Chosunilbo http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/03/31/2011033100601.html (accessed Oct. 15 2011). 88 NTD Television, "South Koreans Protest Japans New Textbooks That Claim Disputed Islets", NTD Television http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/news_asia/2011-03-31/south-koreans-protest-japan-s-new-textbooks-thatclaim-disputed-islets.html (accessed Oct. 15 2011).

29

of the official position of the Korean government at an earlier age. 89 The ministry also provides educational units and resources for educators to use to discuss the dispute in class, including nationally-oriented Korean songs such as Dokdo is our land which are often taught to students at an early age. The Chinese government has also launched patriotic education and spiritual civilization programs since 1996 that stress nationalism and play to anti-Japanese sentiment through films and exhibits recounting Japanese acts of aggression during World War II. Although not explicitly related, a renewed debate about Senkaku flared up during the same year.90 Finally, state actors have also employed economic and military actions to bolster claims to the territories. As mentioned previously, the sole permanent occupants of Takeshima are four Korean nationals. The Korean government also maintains a rotating police presence on the island and there are frequent trips by Korean tourists as well. Recognizing the benefits of having a living presence on the island, the Korean government looked the other way when they first came to the island. In exchange for their continued residence, The Kims are given a stipend of an indeterminate amount by the Korean government every year.91 The South Korean coast guard also regularly patrols around the islands, preventing any perceived threat to sovereignty. In describing the responsibility of the coast guard, Captain Kim Ki Soo was quoted in a 2005 New York Times article as explaining that "If any Japanese ship violates the limit line [of 20 km

89

Do Je-hae, "Children to Be Taught About Dokdo Earlier", The Korea Times http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/117_64132.html (accessed Oct. 16 2011). 90 Strecker Downs. 61 91 Glionna.

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offshore from the islets], we will take action to seize them right away to safeguard our maritime sovereignty."92 The state is not hesitant to aggressively attack any perceived violation of sovereignty. In July 2011, four Japanese lawmakers announced their intentions of visiting Korea for a fact finding mission, part of which might have included a trip to the Dokdo museum on nearby Ulleung Island.93 Upon this announcement, the South Korean government warned the lawmakers not to do so in several speeches made by both President Lee Myung-Bak and Foreign Minister Lee Jae-oh that were heavily publicized in Japan and Korea. During a cabinet meeting, the President warned that *The lawmakers+ safety could not be guaranteed,94 while the oreign Minister said via Twitter that it amounts to the encroachment of Koreas sovereignty. I will block their landing on the island by all means.95 Several days later, the policy committee chairman of the leading Grand National Party political party held a news conference where he called the Japanese lawmakers assassins without swords.96 Perhaps the most extreme reaction however, came from the Special Affairs Minister, who took the occasion to camp out on Ulleung and Takeshima for four days, calling himself Dokdos Protector and tweeting The descendants of war criminals are trying to test Korea. I will clearly show that they have no room to stand in Dokdo from his Twitter account.97 When the Japanese Diet members

92

James Brooke, "A Desolate Rock - and a Focus of Korean Pride", New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/world/asia/05iht-tokdo.html (accessed Oct 16 2011). 93 AFP, "S. Korea Warns Japan against Disputed Island Visit", Google News http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hZ2CTI4v9F4M8frPWIA2cfLNglw?docId=CNG.b870749930eb8bb9bbf7b4aebbaa9dac.1f1 (accessed Oct. 28 2011). 94 Ibid. 95 Sun-Young Lee, "Lee Warns Japan Lawmakers against Visit to Ulleung-Do", The Korea Herald http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20110727000554 (accessed Oct. 28 2011). 96 The Dong-A Ilbo, "Ruling Party Heavyweight Blasts Japanese Lawmakers over Visit", The Dong-A Ilbo http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2011080133818 (accessed Oct 28 2011). 97 Ibid.

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arrived, hundreds of Korean citizens came to the airport to protest and the politicians were not let through immigration. Japan, China, and Russia have adopted similar behavior in regards to perceived breaches of sovereignty over Senkaku and the Kurils respectively. For the past decade, Japan has maintained a military presence over the Senkakus and clashed with Chinese nationals and military interests. The most recent significant incident took place on October 2010 when a civilian patrol boat deliberately rammed into a Japanese coast guard boat patrolling the islands, the result of which the Japanese government detained and arrested the captain, Qixiong Zhan of the said ship. Upon his arrest, the Chinese government made series of statements demanding his return, simultaneously canceling official visits, energy talks and cultural events between the two countries. There were also numerous anti-Japanese protests across China, in which thousands of Chinese nationals marched and (in some cases) committed vandalism against Japanese businesses.98 Zhan was given a hero's welcome after the governmentchartered plane sent to fetch him touched down at Fuzhou on Chinese state television by government officials.99 Likewise, in February 2011, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev became the first Russian president to set foot on the Southern Kurils, it created an international incident that eventually led to the proposed necessity of the Russian military to protect the countrys sovereignty of those islands. Medvedevs visit, which had been strongly opposed by the

98

Cara Anna, "Chinese Protest over Japan Claim to Islands", The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/16/AR2010101602756.html (accessed Oct. 16 2011). 99 AFP, "China Demands Compensation as Skipper Returns", Bangkok Post http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/world/198165/china-demands-compensation-as-skipper-returns (accessed Oct. 16 2011).

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Japanese government beforehand, prompted a statement from then Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan that the Russian visit was an outrage, provoking nationalist rallies on both sides. 100 Medvedev then proceeded to go on national television in Russia, giving defense officials instructions to bolster military installations on the island, with one official citing the announcement as a response to "anti-Russian hysteria" in Japan. Analysis of State Associated Initiatives and Nationalism In all of the cases discussed in this section, the state has played an instrumental role in employing nationalism in relation to these conflicts. The state has a variety of political and economic interests that benefit from manipulating discourse defining the nation. As shown by the events above, one way they attempt to do so is actively encouraging an association with disputed territories as inherent to the nation. Solt cites Tillys argument that states often desire to promote nationalism in their citizens as a way to maintain cultural control, through the invention and perpetuation of national flags, symbols, anthems, holidays, rituals, and traditions.101 This institutionalization of cultural centralization frequently comes into play with the three disputed territories. For example, one of the commonalities between all three cases has been the establishment of Memorial days, such as the Northern Territory Day cited above. Memorial day-type holidays are traditionally holidays encouraging remembrance and awareness of an issue of national importance or nationalist myth perpetuation, such as the commemoration of armed services members lost in wars. In this context, the holiday references a particular day when the state is
100

James Brooke, "Russia, Japan Trade Insults over Islands", Voice of America http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Talks-between-Russia-Japan-Fail-to-Resolve-Islands-Dispute115903564.html (accessed Oct. 16 2011). 101 Solt. 821

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encouraging the recognition that the nation-state has lost a part of itself which is now being held captive by the other. As a federal observance, it also directs the individual in the imagined community that is the nation-state to recognize this as a personal loss. Admittedly, in the case of Takeshima day, and Pioneering Day, these were holidays established by local government in Japan, not federal. However, the local government is also representative of the state. In addition, the state that is pushing the holiday is not the only one that can draw nationalist gains from it; Chinas Communist Party has already exploited Pioneering Day in their domestic national media as an existential threat to Chinese territory. The day after the establishment of the holiday, the Chinese foreign ministry gave a statement to the national Xinhua news agency, stating that any scheme to infringe on China's territorial sovereignty is nothing but fruitless labor.102 No matter how insignificant the level of authority, an opposing state can add legitimacy to it to push domestic nationalist gains. Why should a state want to do this? Although specific benefits for controlling these territories shall be discussed in Section IV, key reasons can include promoting the legitimacy of the state, and economic stability. In the case of China, Strecker-Downs notes that Japan continues to provide a useful target that allows Chinese leaders to define Chinas national identity in opposition to *historical+ Japanese aggression and imperialism, and that appeals to anti-Japanese sentiment still pay domestic political dividends.103 The CCP also benefits from using distractions like this to draw attention away from significant economic disparity in China,

102

Japan Times, "Senkaku Memorial Day Riles China", The Japan Times http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20101218x1.html (accessed Oct. 17 2011). 103 Strecker Downs. 46

34

where economic reforms have had differential impacts in rural and urban areasresulting in a rapid increase in economic inequality.104 In this mode, China fits neatly into what Solt described as Diversionary theory, the state feeding into primordial and instrumental aspects of the nation to distract from domestic economic inequality.105 Furthermore, the Chinese state is associating itself with national primordialist sentiment, developing the nationalist myth that the state and the nation in regards to this conflict are the same. The latter statement is reflected in the patriotic education programs in China, Japan, Russia and Korea; the state provides the narrative and pushes it on the youngest in society to associate its interests in their concept of the nation from an early age. As shall be explored in the Section V, this is a tricky line to walk, as establishing a stateassociation with nationalism can lead to problems when the state then fails to live up to nationalist expectations. Pulling back from the China-Japan Senkaku conflict, one also sees these arguments come into play in regards to Takeshima and the Kurils. In the case of Takeshima, the government has explicitly promoted nationalism through providing stipends to the Kims who live on the island. Like China, Korea has a history of Japanese occupation, and anti-Japanese sentiment is an easy way to promote legitimacy and supremacy of the state. In addition, if we look at the recent dispute with the Japanese lawmakers visiting the South Korea, there are several key aspects of the states behavior that intended to assert sovereignty through stoking anti-Japanese sentiment. The first is Foreign Minister Lee Jae-ohs preemptive tweet: If their visit is intended to back up their countrys groundless territorial claim on Dokdo, it amounts to
104 105

Ibid. Solt. 822

35

the encroachment of Koreas sovereignty. I will block their landing on the island by all means.106 This was an incendiary thing to say, because the Japanese lawmakers had no intention of setting foot on Takeshima, just nearby Ulleung. However, without providing the exact details of what the Japanese lawmakers actually intended to do, the oreign Ministers tweet suggests that the lawmakers were planning a symbolic invasion. After other politicians started getting into the act by holding news conferences with additional inflammatory rhetoric, a civil protest was almost guaranteed. In the case of the Kurils, Russia admittedly does not have the same historical influences but the State does maintain primordialist ties with the Russian nationals and soldiers who inhabit the islands. urthermore, as Williams notes, over 40 years of Soviet indoctrination was reflected in public opinion polls of the disputed islands Russian inhabitants, and there are frequent in Russian school textbooks.107 As will be developed in Section IV, all four countries involved in the various territorial disputes have additional interests in promoting national interest in the disputes.

106 107

Lee. Williams. 134

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IV. Motivating Factors Why would the state seek to promote nationalism through these disputes, and why does nationalism around these conflicts attract the public? There are several outlying elements to the conflict that are greatly balanced on the success of any of the four nation-states to declare sovereignty over the disputed territories. The four most cited are economic, socio-political, historical bias and role of foreign powers in the region. By looking at these factors, an explanation about what is at stake for all parties involved in these disputes is established, as well as a greater understanding of how nationalism is potentially advantageous to all of the actors involved. Exclusive Economic Zones On November 16th, 1994, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of which Japan, Russia, China, and South Korea were all signatories, came into effect. UNCLOS established a number of commonly agreed upon rules that member states would use in defining and resolving jurisdiction over parts of the ocean. The basic principle, as RamosMrosovsky summarizes, is that a coastal states authority over adjacent seas should be at a maximum close to shore, but diminish farther out to sea.108 Specifically, UNCLOS allows states to claim internal and archipelagic waters, a territorial seabed of 12 nautical miles and 12 contiguous miles beyond the territorial sea.109 Within the territorial seabed, the state has full authority over all aspects of the geographical area, although it has to allow for the safe passage

108 109

Ramos-Mrosovsky. 908 Jonathan I. Charney, "Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea," American Journal of International Law 89, no. 4 (1995) (accessed 09/05/2011). 743

37

of ships from all member states of the convention.110 In addition, the convention establishes a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending from the territorial baseline. Within the EEZ, states have:
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
111

The state also maintains jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial structures, scientific research and preservation of the marine environment within the EEZ. The EEZ can also theoretically be constrained by a continental shelf of less distance, or expanded up to 350 nautical miles with the permission of the U.N. Commission.112 However, as Charney points out, The recent international cases, however, have discarded geology and geomorphology, and the continental shelf has played a limited role in disputes over the EEZ.113 In practice in East Asia, defining the EEZ becomes tricky because as Ramos-Mrosovsky explains, in any sea less than 400 nautical miles across, areas of maritime jurisdiction will overlap, and points out that the East China Sea (in which Senkaku exists) is only 360 nautical miles across at its widest point.114 Likewise, Takeshima and the Kurils also lie within this 200 nautical mile distance from the established territorial baselines of all the states involved in

110

Part 2, Section 3: Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea - United_Nations, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part Xi of the Convention" http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed Oct. 23 2011). 111 Part V, Article 56 Ibid. 112 Ramos-Mrosovsky. 910 113 Charney. 739,740 114 Ramos-Mrosovsky. 911

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those respective conflicts.115 Also of contention is whether the disputed territories are actually islands or rocks. While islands are accepted as part of a states territorial border and EEZ, smaller formations or Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, as defined by UNCL S, shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Establishing the extent of the EEZ is significant because the inclusion of the various islands influences control of significant economic resources in each case. or example, as Weigand explains, sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands could provide access to 20,750 square nautical miles and all resources in that area.116 This includes rich deposits of natural gas and suspected potential for large oil deposits. In 1968, a geophysical survey conducted by the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECA E) a high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.117 Shortly afterwards, a Japanese study estimated that there were well over 94.5 billion barrels of quality oil trapped in the shallow waters to the northwest and south of the [main Senkaku] island.118 More recently, a 2005 analysis by the Woodrow Wilson Center found that Foreign estimates of potential oil reserves on the shelf have gone as high as 100 billion barrels. (Saudi Arabia has proven and probable oil reserves of 261.7 billion barrels and the United States 22 billion)119

115 116

Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific : Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. 14 Wiegand. 106 117 Selig H. Harrison, ed. Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005). 32 118 Ibid. 6 119 Ibid. 5

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None of these values for petroleum have been fully proven because both the Japanese and Chinese governments will not risk giving the impression that they are putting aside the question of sovereignty in order to perform a joint survey. This also comes into play with natural gas harvesting rights. According to an official Chinese study, the area of the Okinawa trough contains nearly 17.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and has already built several platforms in their undisputed section of sovereignty in the East China Sea.120 According to Wiegand, following this development and after a dozen rounds of negotiations over a two year period in 2008, China and Japan signed an agreement to jointly develop natural gas resources in areas that crossed the median line of the disputed waters.121 Although those areas were not ones near the islands, officials in both states immediately assured their people that neither state had abandoned their territorial positions and claims on the island.122 As for Takeshima, a 1974 Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf treaty signed by both Japan and Korea before the establishment of UNCL S complicates the role that the U.N. Convention plays in the dispute. The treaty delineates an equidistant maritime boundary between both countries two closest points, but deliberately stops 70 nautical miles from Takeshima because neither side wanted to broach the conflict in territory.123 Another issue raised is whether Takeshima is an island or a rock, which would have to be solved simultaneously as sovereignty was decided, due to its implications for both countries' EEZs. This holds true for China and some of the Southern Kurils as well. As Pak
120

U.S. Energy Information Administration, "The East China Sea Is Abundant in Natural Resources Such as Oil and Natural Gas.", U.S. Department of Energy http://www.eia.gov/cabs/East_China_Sea/Full.html (accessed Oct. 24 2011). 121 Wiegand. 106 122 Ibid. 107 123 Hi-gwn Pak, The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia : A Challenge for Cooperation (The Hague ; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 101

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explains, the entry into force of UNCL S has brought more substantial changes to fisheries relations among Northeast Asian states.124 The Southern Kurils represent a potentially large extension of an EEZ; over 196,000 square kilometers that contain extensive marine resources.125 Specifically, it is home to several types of commercially viable fish species, and may (but has not yet been proven to definitively) contain exploitable deposits of titanium, magnetite, nickel, copper, chromium, vanadium, and niobium.126 Overall, despite the dispute over the zone, harvesting of these resources has generally not been a major source of contention between the two states. For example, in 1998, Japan signed an agreement with Russia on some matters of cooperation in the field of fishing operations for marine living resources, that allowed for Japanese fishing off the coast of the islands and mutual collaboration between the two countries fishing industries.127 However, this continued dispute has lead to some flare-ups in tensions. Despite the agreement, the limits Russia placed on where Japanese nationals could fish within the disputed EEZ has never been formally established, which may have led to the death of a Japanese crab fisherman in 2006. The ship that the fisherman in question was shot on had been fishing around Kaijima Island which is within the Southern Kurils waters, but the Russian government claimed that the ship had been poaching in Russian territorial waters.128 On several occasions, the

124 125

Ibid. 49 Williams. 21 126 Kimura and Welch, "Specifying "Interests": Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory." 219 127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "2. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation on Some Matters of Cooperation in the Field of Fishing Operations for Marine Living Resources", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition01/agreement.html (accessed Oct. 25 2011). 128 John McCurry, "Japanese Fisherman Killed in Kuril Dispute", The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/16/japan.russia (accessed Oct. 25 2011).

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continued dispute also led to trouble with external actors for violating supposed EEZ limits. One example was in August 2001, when Russia allowed South Korean fishing vessels around the islands.129 Japan protested and eventually settled the issue peaceably by allowing South Korean fishing boats limited fishing rights within Japans (established) EEZ in exchange for fisherman no longer using the waters around the Kurils. Domestic Social-Political issues As discussed briefly in Section III, states may also employ nationalism for political gain. This especially holds true in regards to Japan, whose politics frequently fluctuate. Kimura points out that the tenure of most Japanese prime ministers has been extremely shortthe same applies to Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and heads of the defense agency, who change so frequently that it is hardly worth the bother of remembering their names.130 Diet politicians also are voted out of office frequently, and remain in a constant campaign mode while attempting to appeal to their base. As a result, any move that can be construed as encouraging the view that they are fighting for the nation may allow a Diet member to stay in power longer. Another significant aspect of this political affiliation of convenience is that simply expressing a desire to re-unite the territories with the Japanese mainland does not have to equate to the politician actually doing anything to back it up. As Kimura points out:
While Japanese prime ministers call vociferously for the return of the four Northern Islands, just how serious are they? For example, only rarely do they ever visit the Nomuro area where the movement for

129

Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda : Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 214 130 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot. 145

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the return of the Northern Territories originated. One reason for this is that local people harbor excessive expectations.
131

In other words, state actors do not actually have to commit to taking action on these disputes. They just have to appear to be interested in the disputes to get what they want; more power and attention to develop their own political campaigns. In the case of Senkaku in particular China has also become a useful boogeyman since Tiananmen; anti-Japanese protests in response to Senkaku, and Japanese prime minister visits to Yasukuni shrine are played up as evidence of the importance of the state to protect the nation from the Chinese threat. 132 This tactic often holds true with Chinese government officials as well. As briefly discussed earlier, Chinese officials have a delicate balancing act *which+ depends on the ability to manage the contradictions between their domestic legitimation strategies while maintaining access to the international economy.133 After the liberalization of CCP policies in the late 70s/early 80s, two significant issues placed the legitimacy of the state in question; the political challenge of the Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989 and when the governments austerity programs failed in 1990, leading to massive economic losses. The CCPs response was to mount a major propaganda campaign to appeal to nationalism, during which the government-sponsored Anti-Japanese Aggression War Memorial Hall in Beijing hosted an exhibition and film on Chinese resistance during the Pacific War.134 The same year, it drew on the same branch of nationalism when right-wing Japanese activists sailed to the largest island

131 132

Ibid. 146 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 139 133 Strecker Downs. 50 134 Ibid. 54

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of Senkaku, where they planted a Japanese flag and built a lighthouse. Senkaku has become the new representation of Japanese aggression towards China. Anti-Japanese sentiment has served as a strong distraction from domestic economic difficulties as well. While China has now grown into an economic powerhouse internationally, its GDP per Capita is less than half of the worlds average, and there is a major income disparity issue between the rich and poor.135 This dramatic difference in domestic and non-domestic needs highlights where the Chinese government still encounters resistance to its legitimacy and is concerned about a public uprising. For example, in 2011, many European countries, due to the ongoing debt crisis in that region, have begun to turn to China for local investment. In fact, the Chinese government has a strong self-interest in investing, to counter-balance the struggling U.S. market and to offload some of its excess of $3.2 trillion in foreign reserves on the international market to decrease inflation. As The New York Times reports however, Chinese citizens have also been venting anger on the Internet about the possibility of government investments in Europe that have turned out to be anything but profitable, and party politicians could face a popular outcry by investing abroad rather than locally.136 So by drawing the publics attention with the territorial disputes, the CCP can avoid having to deal with public disapproval of these decisions by redirecting that anger onto Japan. Historical biases

135

World Bank, "World Bank, World Development Indicators Visualization > China", Google http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&idim=country:CHN&dl =en&hl=en&q=china+gdp+per+capita#ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&scale_y=lin &ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:CHN&ifdim=country&tdim=true&hl=en&dl=en (accessed Oct 29 2011). 136 Liz and David Barboza Alderman, "Europe Tries to Lure Chinese Cash to Back Rescue of Euro", New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/world/asia/europe-seeks-chinese-investment-in-euro-rescue.html (accessed Oct. 29 2011).

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Historical biases play a strong role in each territorial dispute, due to the involvement and role of each country in various wars, particularly focused on the events leading up to and during World War II. The memories of Japanese annexation and colonization of China and Korea remain a key part of how both those countries define themselves as a nation. In China, casualties numbered anywhere from several million to 15 million civilian deaths at the hands of Japanese soldiers, numerous victims of wartime atrocities, and some of which died as result of devastation of food and lack of medical sources.137 In Korea, the number of dead is less clear, but generally estimated between 270,000-810,000 dead, and like China, millions were forced into labor and service for the Japanese army,138 including the infamous Comfort Women. On the institutional level, this has been reflected by continued requests for apologies for wartime atrocities by both governments. Although Japan has repeatedly apologized through various parties, including the current Emperor Akihito, over a dozen prime ministers, and many government officials for its role in the Second World War, nearly 90% of Chinese polled in a 2005 survey believed that Japan had not atoned sufficiently for its history. 139 Another survey in 2005 by the Mansfield Foundation found similar results among Koreans; when asked whether Japan had sufficiently compensated victims of the colonial era and otherwise settled historical matters, over 95.2% responded not yet.140 However, when the Yomiuri Shimbun

137

John W. Dower and American Council of Learned Societies., "War without Mercy Race and Power in the Pacific War," (New York: Pantheon Books,, 1993). 296 138 Rudolph J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 (Charlottesville, VA: Center for National Security Law - University of Virginia, 1997). 33 139 Samuels. 139 140 31. Do you think that Japan already compensated for victims of the colonial era and that the issue was settled? Or has the issue of compensation not yet been settled? The Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database, "Dong-a Ilbo Opinion Poll on South Korean Attitudes toward Japan and Other Nations," (Dong-A Ilbo, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 2005).

45

and Hankook Ilbo141 conducted a survey of over 1000 Japanese and 1000 Korean respondents in 2010, only 41% of the Japanese polled believed that Japan had not sufficiently apologized for the colonization of Korea, while 43% believed the country had. 71% of Japanese respondents believed that the solution to the Takeshima issue was to convey Japanese claims in a precise manner, but only 1% of Korean respondents said they would consider them.142 Likewise a 1997 survey of youth in China found that 95.9 percent of respondents believed that the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands lies in China and that 91.5 percent believed that the 1996 erecting of a new lighthouse on the islands by Japanese right-wing group was a grave challenge of the revived Japanese militarism against China.143 This can be taken to mean that nationals in China and Korea still associate Japan with its imperialistic past, while many Japanese have put the issue to bed. Putting aside for the moment how this image may be perpetuated in nationalist products of the state, it does allow the Chinese and Korean states to promote nationalist rhetoric to create connections between Japans past colonial behavior and its present claims to the islands. As an example of this, take the behavior of the Korean Special Affairs Minister discussed in Section III, who tweeted The descendants of war criminals are trying to test Korea. I will clearly show that they have no room to stand in Dokdo from his Twitter account when the four Japanese lawmakers announced their intention to come to Korea on a fact-finding mission about Takeshima.144 With this statement and others made by officials in both China and Korea, an analogy is regularly drawn
141 142

A Japanese and Korean Newspaper, respectively. Yomiuri Shimbun and Hankook Ilbo, "Yomiurii Shimbun April 2010 Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (P10-10)", The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2010/poll10-10.htm (accessed Oct. 31 2011). 143 Zhongqi Pan, "Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective," Journal of Chinese Political Science 12, no. 1 (2007). 86 144 Ilbo, "Ruling Party Heavyweight Blasts Japanese Lawmakers over Visit".

46

on both the societal and state level between Japans claim to Senkaku and Takeshima and that Japans past policy of expansionism. Japanese nationals though dont seem to draw the same association with China and Korea. Japanese civilians and the state do find a similar sense of victimization though in connection with the loss of the Kuril Islands to Russia. In Japan, this event is seen as a particularly significant moment of World War II in which the country was ambushed and assaulted; that the islands were unfairly captured at the closing moments of the war in breach of an established neutrality pact. Japan maintained sovereignty over the whole Kuril chain from after the Russo-Japanese war until August 1945, when the Soviet Forces invaded and occupied the island territories.145 Not only was this a breach of the 1941 Non-Aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, but it was also a death sentence for 60,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians who died after being captured on the islands and interred in Siberian prison camps.146 Japan also specifically argues that the four southern Kuril Islands in dispute were, and always had been before the Soviet invasion, part of the Japanese nation never an element of the lands represented in the San Francisco Peace treaty.147 For this reason, although the general Japanese public lacks personal experience with this particular territorial dispute, Kimura and Welch argue that the issue retains salience: The Japanese sense of identity includes the Northern Territories. Japan will not be complete.148 Because of this denial of the Japanese identity, and Soviet involvement in various incidents like as the shooting down of Flight KAL

145 146

Williams. 22 Ibid. 23 147 Which were based on the islands in the chain conquered by Japan during the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Kimura and Welch, "Specifying "Interests": Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory." 231 148 Ibid. 232

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007149, up until the end of the cold war, the Soviet Union was consistently the country most disliked in Japanese public opinion, according to Kimura.150 What this suggests, is that the mental scars from World War II, whether for stateinspired or genuinely primordialist reasons, still play an active role in how Chinese, Japanese and Koreans approach their various disputes. The idea that Russia or Japan would place any type of claim on the disputed territories in essence, rubs salt in the wound, and brings back strong memories of invasion and imperialism. This may be one of the harder issues to overcome in the search for a resolution. Involvement of Outside Powers/Parties In each of these disputes, various outside parties have maintained a stake in the conflict for economic and political reasons. The chief representative of this would be the United States, which maintains a mutual security treaty with Japan and pursues its own interests in the region. Others include (but are not limited to) North Korea, and Taiwan. Grassroots elements also have a role to play, but will be discussed more in-depth in Section V, as they are non-state actors. One significant action taken by the U.S. was in 2010, when China and Japans dispute over Senkaku escalated over Japans arrest of a fishing boat captain.151 Two weeks after the arrest, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton clarified to her Japanese counter-part at a jointconference in Hawaii that the Senkaku Islands were protected by the U.S. under the U.S.-Japan

149

KAL 007 was a Korean Airlines civilian plane that was shot down when it deviated into Soviet airspace over Sakhalin in 1983. All passengers, primarily from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan were lost. The U.S.S.R. originally denied involvement, only to admit responsibility a few days after. See the following for more information on the incident: Marilyn J. and Michael K. Launer Young, Flights of Fancy, Flights of Doom: K. A. L. 007 and SovietAmerican Rhetoric (Tallahassee, FL: Rowman & Littlefield, 1989). 150 Kimura, The Kurillian Knot. 94 151 See Section III or Section V of this paper for further details on this incident

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Security Treaty of 1960,152 specifically under Article V which allows the U.S. to act to meet a common danger in the event of an armed attack "in the territories under the administration of Japan."153 This was something that had never been explicitly clarified after the U.S. placed the territory within Japanese administration in 1972, and doing so indicated that the U.S. supported Japans claim that Senkaku was under Japanese sovereignty. In 2011, the U.S. stepped in again to support Japans claim to the Southern Kuril Islands under the same article of the security treaty.154 This move brought immediate condemnation by a representative of the Russian foreign ministry who accused the U.S. of meddling in a bilateral affair.155 Unlike the Senkaku and Kuril conflicts however, the U.S. has made efforts not to take a position on Takeshima. According to The Korea Times, the U.S. State Department noted that the U.S. intends to stay out of the dispute since the United State is an ally of both Korea as well as Japan, and officially changed the Takeshimas U.S. recognition status as being under undesignated sovereignty.156 North Korea however, has announced their support for the South Korean position on sovereignty of the islands, most recently slamming the actions of the Japanese lawmakers who attempted to enter South Korea on a fact-finding mission.157 In a commentary on their official website, the North called Takeshima a treasure of the Korean people and that they were determined to take 1,000 times our people's revenge for Japan's

152

Associated Press, "Clinton Tells Maehara Senkaku Subject to Japan-U.S. Security Pact", Breitbart http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9IDOG4O0 (accessed Oct. 30 2011). 153 The Governments of the United States and Japan, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America," (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1960). 154 BNO News, "Russia Says U.S. Intervention in Kuril Islands Dispute with Japan Is Unacceptable", WireUpdate Breaking News http://wireupdate.com/wires/15409/russia-says-u-s-intervention-in-kuril-islands-dispute-withjapan-is-unacceptable/ (accessed Oct. 30 2011). 155 Ibid. 156 Michael Ha, "US Office No Longer Regards Dokdo as Korean Territory", The Korea Times http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/07/116_28279.html (accessed Oct. 31 2011). 157 Times, "South Korea Denies Entry to Japanese Lawmakers".

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reactionary moves, which, far from apologizing or compensating for the immeasurable unhappiness and pain inflicted upon our people, only scheme to take away our land."158 North Korea, despite its still ongoing war with South Korea, maintains a reasonable selfinterest in its support of South Korea in this conflict. Both states have expressed an interest in eventual reconsolidation of the two Koreas, and both were under Japanese occupation before and during the events of the Pacific war. Beyond drawing on the shared history, the North sees an interest in encouraging the South Korean economy especially in light of the amount of aid the South has given the North (even if official aid is currently suspended). A similar role is played by Taiwan in relation to the Senkaku islands conflict between China and Japan. Taiwan has maintained an independent claim over the islands since 1971.159 Like North Korea, Taiwan chooses to ignore its conflict of independence from mainland China for what it sees as beneficial for the Taiwanese economy and (in some scenarios) a closer relationship with China. It should be noted however, that its declaration has been the Taiwanese governments sole involvement in the dispute. Analysis of Additional Motivating Factors The state has numerous internal and external reasons for claiming sovereignty over disputed territories, with the chief realist argument being for the expansion of its own economic muscle. Each of the disputed territories offers significant potential for new resources, many of which still remain untapped due to the perpetual nature of the disputes. Each state stands to benefit dramatically from a favorable ruling on the Exclusive Economic Zone, because
158

Yonhap News Agency, "N. Korea Blasts Japan for Fresh Provocation over Dokdo", Yonhap News Agency http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/07/20/96/0301000000AEN20110720009200315F.HTML (accessed Oct. 31 2011). 159 Frank Yee Wang, "Senkakus Part of China, Not Japan", The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/senkakus-part-of-china-not-japan/ (accessed Oct. 31 2011).

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in addition to the economic resources, states would be able to increase their influence in the region. However, it is unlikely that any such deciding ruling will be coming soon. Although it would settle these individual disputes, it could potentially dramatically change the situation for all of the other signatory members of UNCLOS by adding exploitable loopholes. As shown by the existence of the EEZ conflicts in East Asia, no one-size fits all legislation works for all nation-states. What we also begin to see with the concurrence of domestic socio-political issues during these disputes are several examples of the utilization of these disputes in concert with some of the theories of economic nationalism discussed by Solt. The first evidence of this is related to the Diversionary theory of nationalism, in which the government employs nationalism as a way to distract from economic inequality;160 the CCPs manipulation of anti-Japanese sentiment in relation to Japan while undergoing an economic crisis in 1990 was a prime example of this behavior. Beyond this, we see that it can be used as a way to distract from problems of legitimacy and public disapproval as well, as in Japan. This bears closer resemblance to the New-Nations theory, in which political elites will establish their own nation within the nation, attracting those who are disaffected with the abilities of the state to improve their situation. 161 Considering that Japan has been struggling with an economic crisis since the early 1990s, it is not unexpected that a politician or bureaucrat would stoke nationalist sentiment about territorial disputes as a way to distract from that situation which theyre incapable of addressing independently.

160 161

Solt. 822 Ibid. 823

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This is also made possible across nations by drawing on primordialist elements of the communitys shared history, in this case, the Pacific war. Chinese and Koreans being victimized by Japan during the events of that war is a shared history that each national of those imagined communities connects to their idea of the nation. Japanese nationals have the same association with the Russia invading right after the atomic bombs had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also now key places in the collective memory. To these nationals, sovereignty over the disputed territories is less significant for the resources or status that they offer than for what they represent: a defining part of the nation, the loss of which would be comparable to the loss of a limb. It makes for rich support for any elite or government organization that tries to harvest it, but it is also independently a powerful driving force for members of the nation, and independent actors who may then take on a more active role. On that note, the U.S., Taiwan and North Korea taking an active role in the various territorial disputes suggests that nationalism can be co-opted and used for the benefit of outside nation-states. By promoting a Japanese position on extra-nationalist issues, the U.S. is really just leveraging Japan to serve as an indirect bulwark against China, Russia, and those countries interests in the region. Like the U.S.s attitude towards negotiating with Stalin for Russian involvement against Japan towards the end of the war, the U.S. government sees a danger in allowing further Chinese and Russian expansion in Asia. Through Secretary Clintons announcement about Senkaku and the display of support for the Kurils, the U.S. was pushing its own national goals of maintaining an active presence in Asia and pursuing a security agenda. Russia essentially called them out on this; Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich

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stating that Russia considers it totally unacceptable to attempt to meddle in this matter, which is bilateral.162 On the other hand, this and the other motivating factors reflect that territorial disputes are complicated and multi-faceted in a way that ripples over into other relations. They have the potential to greatly influence the political and economic borders between states, and pull on popular emotion connected to and have the potential to resolve claims related to historical events. They can also benefit domestic elites, and be used as resources for personal gain. So while the state may try to exploit nationalism to further its own ends, these motivating factors suggest there may be other actors who can draw benefits to doing so as well.

162

News.

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V. Grassroots Initiatives Civil society is the other side of the coin. As suggested by previous research, it is heavily influenced by the state-promoted national myth of nationalism and responds in numbers to perceived threats to the nation. As others have argued though, it also has begun to play a vital role in influencing policy and politics through its implementation of nationalism and actions. Exploration of Civil Actors Japan As Haddad explains, advocacy groups are growing in popularity across Japan, and they are now often the organizational starting point for local political activity. 163 Within this context, a tenuous connection can be drawn to the establishment of the memorial days discussed in the previous section, as most were developed and ratified on the local, rather than national level. Haddad also cites Skocpol in establishing that Japanese NPOs and NGOs have also experienced rapid growth and ability to influence in response to new technologies like the internet.164 A particularly interesting aspect of Japanese advocacy groups is that they show a strong connection between the average Japanese and his sense of the imagined community of the nation. As Haddad explains, the commitment to traditional attitudes of civic obligation remain strong in Japan. Japanese continue to support their traditional membership organizations at very high rates, and these organizations continue to be viewed as vital parts of Japans social and political landscape.165

163

Mary Alice Haddad, "Transformation of Japan's Civil Society Landscape," Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 3 (2007). 417 164 Ibid. 428 165 Ibid. 429

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The NGOs groups most actively involved in regards to territorial disputes are the Uyoko dantai or right-wing groups. As established in the previous section, these are the people who most commonly come out and protest during times when the nation is perceived to be under threat. The right, as described by Suzuki, typically hold one or more of the viewpoints that Japan was not a malicious aggressor in the Pacific War, a general dissatisfaction with Japans weak diplomacy, and a strong sense of dislike towards the Peoples Republic of China.166 As early as the day the U.S. relinquished sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands in 1972, some members of the Japanese right wing group Patriotic Youth Federation (PYF) landed on Senkaku and planted a Japanese flag, in order to establish claim to what had just become a disputed territory between Japan and China.167 Since then, they and other groups like the Japan Youth Association (JYA) have made frequent trips to Senkaku. On at least one occasion in 2004, another group, the Nihon-Shidokai (Japanese Way of The Samurai Association) attempted to land on Takeshima, but was turned away by the South Korean military.168 Also significantly, they have shown themselves to perform these activities in opposition of the state. In 1988, when the JYAs official application to build a lighthouse on Senkaku was deferred indefinitely, members of the group went and built one anyway.169 Claims are also made by rightist advocates that China packages the Senkaku, Taiwan, United Nations, and the East China Sea

166

Shogo Suzuki, "The Strange Masochism of the Japanese Right: Redrawing Moral Boundaries in Sino-Japanese Relations," in Decoding Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The Koizumi Administration and Beyond, ed. Glenn D. Hook(New York, New York: Routledge, 2011). 37 167 Daiki Shibuchi, Contemporary Japanese Rightist Movements (National University of Singapore, 2006). 178 168 Park. 128 169 Shibuchi. 185

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gas field issues together and uses the history card to demand concessions from Japan, and that Chinese civil protests in regards to those issues are entirely staged.170 Similar arguments are made by these groups in regards to Korean claims to Takeshima and the Kurils. Similar to China, rightist groups claim the Korean government is exploiting and rewriting history in order to claim (what they see as) unjustified reparations for the Pacific War. Rather, they argue, Japan has always been a victim of foreign states which hate Japan for its prosperity.171 This plays into the Kuril dispute as well; according to The Wall Street Journal, every year since the local government established Northern Territories Day, small groups of hardcore Japanese extreme rightists take to their signature black vans blaring 1930s military music, protestors gather in front of the Russian embassy and events are held throughout Japan.172 At these protests, the protestors take the position that Russia unfairly breached the 1941 neutrality agreement, and claiming the continued occupation is part of a universal conspiracy to victimize Japan.173 China Like Japan, grassroots protesters in China tend to be motivated by an established historical connection between the territorial disputes and seeing Japan as an important, bullying other.174 Chinese nationalists, like the CCP perpetuate the idea that the Senkaku dispute is an example of a revived imperialism by Japan. This idea has gained more traction since 1990, when the Japanese government directly sent the Japanese Self-Defense Force to

170 171

Suzuki. 49 Ibid. 50 172 Tomikawa. 173 Suzuki. 50 174 Ibid. 53

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assist the UN during the Gulf War.175 This was significant, as it was the first overseas deployment of the Japanese SDF, and overwrote any theoretical constraints against overseas military deployment established by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.176 Later that year, Japans Maritime Safety Agency suggested that they might recognize the lighthouse built by the JYA as an official Japanese Beacon (thereby making an official Japanese claim to the islands), these claims only further reinforced the Chinese nationalists claim that Japan was beginning to act as an aggressive power again.177 Chinese grassroots nationalism in relation to the territorial dispute issues draws from a larger base than the far-right in Japan, and often attracts extensive support from overseas ethnic-Chinese nationals as well. In reaction to the announcement by the Maritime Safety Agency in 1990, over ten thousand residents in Hong Kong took the irredentist Diaoyu issue to the street, especially significant because it was the first time ever that both sides of the Taiwan Strait condemned Japanese activities regarding the Diaoyu islands.178 In reaction to the Chinese fishing boat captain being arrested in 2011, thousands of Chinese protested in various cities across China, some breaking store windows and committing other acts of vandalism against Japanese retailers.179

175

Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations : Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Asian Interactions and Comparisons (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai'i Press, 2000). 140 176 Article 9 of the Japanese post-war constitution states that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In the case of the Gulf War, various military incarnations of the Cold War and other international conflicts, this has been skirted around to allow participation and the development of the Self-Defense Force using various loopholes and arguments in the language of the article and remains controversial both in and outside Japan. SCAP, "The Constitution of Japan," in Text of the Constitution and Other Important Documents (Tokyo, Japan: National Diet Library, 1946). 177 Suganuma. 139 178 Ibid. 140 179 Anna.

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Chinese civil society groups are generally less organized than their Japanese counterparts due to strict government control, and the Chinese government often quickly shuts down impromptu protests. There is also infrequent address of the dispute in national media on a regular basis; the frequency of articles on the Senkakus in national Chinese newspapers is often a fraction of those dealing with the political status of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands, two other disputed territories for China.180 Also, when not politically convenient for negotiations with Japan on other subjects, the government will discourage anti-Japanese protests; clamping down on internet discussion and forcibly relocating key activists out of the capital.181 As a result, much like their Japanese counterparts, Chinese civil activists have come to believe that their government may not be up to the task, and have on occasion, criticized the central government for having a conciliatory stance towards Japan. After the previously mentioned Hong Kong protest in 1990, Chinese citizens sent over 37,000 letters and petitions with more than 150,000 signatures to the Peoples Daily and the Peoples Liberation Daily, demanding that the central government aggressively defend Chinas claim.182 Shanghai residents also distributed documents criticizing the CCP for quelling anti-Japanese protests and demanding a punishment for the suppression of a patriotic campaign.183 As discussed earlier in Sections III and IV, fear of loss of legitimacy has led to the CCP cracking down heavily on protests that it could see as potentially spiraling out of its control and focusing on the CCPs legitimacy. As a result, much of the grassroots element forms dynamically

180

Although the number of articles increase in years when tensions over the territory flares up, Fravel notes that overall the rate of articles about Senkaku were eclipsed by ones with mentions of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands from 1987-2005. Fravel. 153 181 Strecker Downs. 64 182 Ibid. 65 183 Ibid. 66

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and spontaneously with each flashpoint, something that exploded with the advent of the internet. Although the CCP places strict controls on internet access and communication, Chinese activists have begun to frequently use it to develop and organize local and countrywide protests and as a place of discourse to explore issues.184 Per CCP intent, China traditionally has not been conducive to this kind of public political environment, but online free-use bulletin boards have begun to provide individuals with a type of cyberdemocracy that is allowing the civil society to share information and promote increased collective action, independent of the state.185 South Korea Much of Korean civil nationalism pre-1990s was class and politically-based. It was primarily centered around events like the anti-feudal riots in 1896, Japanese occupation of Korea beginning in the early 1900s, and the student uprising in 1960 against Syngman Rhee and autocratic military leadership which followed his administration.186 Since the election of Roh Tae-woo in 1987, greater civil freedoms have been introduced in South Korea and many groups have developed around a broad range of issues. On first glance, Korean nationalism in its current manifestation bears some similarities to elements of the nationalism that appears in both Japan and China. Groups in South Korea usually focus on an ethnocentric form of nationalism, defining South Koreas national identity as a homogeneous race, unified state,

184

Shih-Diing Liu, "Networking Anti-Japanese Protests: Popular Sovereignty Reasserted since 2005," in Online Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Bilateral Relations, ed. Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010). 81 185 Ibid. 84 186 BBCNews.co.uk, "Flashback: The Kwangju Massacre", BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/752055.stm (accessed Nov. 6 2011).

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and indigenous culture uniquely separate from those of China and Japan.187 Also similar is the perspective that South Korea has been victimized by various external forces, although this belief extends back to when Korea was forced into trade with the West in the 19 th century. Anti-Japanese sentiment is also particularly high among civilians and nationalist groups due to the nature of and various atrocities that occurred during the long-term Japanese occupation that occurred from 1910 to the end of the Pacific War. And like China, many Korean citizens believe that Japan has not yet sufficiently provided recompense for those atrocities and the occupation.188 Nationalist issues in Korea attract a broad range of appeal among both average citizens and ultra right-wing groups. Even recent events, such as the 2011 66th anniversary of liberation from Japan draw thousands of conservative citizens in protest of Japans claims to Dokdo. 189 In more dramatic instances, individuals have also publically cut off fingers and otherwise selfmutilated in protest.190 Organized civil groups are also responsible for major public pushes to recognize Takeshima as the Korean territory Dokdo, and the Sea of Japan as the East Sea. 191 For example, it was civil groups that originally lobbied the Korean government for the establishment of a Dokdo memorial day. While the Korean national government has never

187

Hyung Il Pai, Constructing "Korean" Origins : A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000). 2 188 See footnote 133 189 Nick Rowlands, 2011. "South Koreans Protest against Japan," Reuters. Video, http://www.reuters.com/video/2011/08/15/south-koreans-protest-against-japan?videoId=218330340 (accessed 11/06/2011). 190 Scanlon. 191 Sea of Japan is used here as it has been the commonly accepted English term for the strait between Korea and Japan since the early-mid 1800s. James, "Defending the Sea of Japan from Korean Ultra-Nationalist Propaganda", Japan Probe http://www.japanprobe.com/2006/07/15/defending-the-sea-of-japan-from-koreanultra-nationalist-propaganda/ (accessed Nov. 6 2011).

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officially established the holiday,192 various civil groups have unilaterally announced its establishment almost annually since 2000. The most recent claim was made by the Korean ederation of Teachers Association in 2010 in commemoration of a declaration by a past emperor who claimed the island for Korea in the year 1900.193 Other groups like the Voluntary Agency Network of Korea (VANK, which claims 40,000 active members, including some abroad194) and For the Next Generation have launched propaganda campaigns online. One particular tactic is to contact various websites and urging them to correct any mistakes in labeling the geographical sites as anything other than East Sea and Dokdo.195 VANK and other civil groups like it, operate with the explicit blessing and encouragement of the Korean Governments Korean Information Service (K IS), which holds contests for civilian nationals and groups to find and challenge incorrect foreign websites.196 K IS, explains one official connected to the organization, is resolved to monitor the contents of Korea-related Web sites and provide correct information on the net in order to help generate an accurate image of the country.197 Unlike civil activists and groups in Japan, China, and Russia ones in South Korea apparently believe that the key to success lies in international recognizance of their claims. Going beyond the net, For the Next Generation, a group started by a Korean pop singer, has

192

Although the Korean postal service did release a Dokdo postage stamp, which did prompt the adoption of a Takeshima Memorial Day by a local government in Japan; see previous section. 193 Korean Broadcasting System, "Oct. 25 Designated as 'Dokdo Day'", KBS http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?No=76630&id=Cu (accessed Nov. 6 2011). 194 Voluntary Agency Network of Korea, "About Vank", VANK http://www.prkorea.com/english/etc/about1.htm (accessed Nov. 6 2011). 195 James, "Ultra-Nationalist High School Club", Japan Probe http://www.japanprobe.com/2011/10/25/ultranationalist-high-school-club/ (accessed Nov. 6 2011). 196 James Card, "Korea's Cyber Vigilantes," Foreign Policy 164 (2008). 197 Ibid.

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also run full-page English ads in three prominent American newspapers to raise awareness of the Korean terms, supposedly with the donations of 110,334 web users.198 Korean nationals and Korean-Americans living in the US have also become very active in regards to Dokdo in recent years, creating Dokdo wine,199 putting up Dokdo Island Belongs to Korea billboards up in Los Angeles and Texas,200 even advertisements on dry cleaning bags in New York.201 Russia The situation regarding the disputed territories in Russia is somewhat different from that between Japan, China and Korea. For one thing, in addition to mainland activism, three of the four Kuril Islands in question are also somewhat populated, with a total population of around 14,000 people.202 The importance that this plays in how grassroots activism is significant. Williams notes that:
or most Russians, Nazi Germany is the despised and vanquished opponentHowever, in Sakhalin and the rest of the Russian Far East which was under martial law as a result of repeated acts of armed provocation and violations of its land and maritime borders and air space by Japanese imperial forcesthere is an added dimension to celebrations for victory in the campaign of the Red Army in the ar East, which was part and parcel of the Great Patriotic War.
203

Most Russian civilians have traditionally come to associate the Great Patriotic War as the European campaign of World War II. However, for residents of the islands and nearby Sakhalin

198

The ads were published in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post Brian Deutsch, "Singer Kim Jang-Hun Puts East Sea, Dokdo Back in US Papers.," in Brian in Jeollanam-do, ed. Brian Deutsch (Blogger, 08/06/2009). 199 Nari Kim, "Winery in US Introduces 'Dokdo Wine'", Korea's Global TV - Arirang http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=122156&code=Ne2&category=2 (accessed Nov. 6 2011). 200 GI Korea, "Picture of the Day: Dokdo Billboard Goes up in Los Angeles," in ROK Drop (02/01/2010). 201 Kareem ahim, " n Citys Plastic Bags, an ld and Distant Dispute", New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/21/nyregion/21islands.html (accessed Nov. 6 2011). 202 Williams. 141 203 Ibid. 140

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that definition is expanded to include the capture of the disputed territories; they argue that Russias invasion in 1945 was really the reclamation of part of the motherland. n a broader scale though, Williams notes that the Russian national identity has been in flux since the collapse of the Soviet Union and that any territory that might be given up by the Russian government would be another blow to that identity, and a sign of weakness. 204 Although the majority of Kuril residents hold these beliefs, some have also unexpectedly argued for the return of the islands to Japan.205 This reflects a general feeling of neglect by the Russian national government among the civilian population, who often complain about a failure for the state to provide key infrastructure. On occasion, this dissatisfaction has resulted in the rise of civic groups such as the Zemlyak (fellow countryman), a group of hundreds of residents of Kunashir,206 which began protesting in 1992 against failed economic conditions, and the central governments failure to finish repairs on an airstrip that was the islands regular contact with the outside world.207 While the group achieved some political success, it suffered a blow when an 8.1 magnitude earthquake hit the area and the Russian government did not prioritize repairs, forcing many of its members to return to the Russian mainland. Generally, over 10,000 residents of the Kurils have left the islands since the collapse of the Soviet Union; a move largely attributed to central government neglect.208 As Russian news sources have noted, the Japanese have also begun offering variable cost educational and tourist programs to Kuril
204 205

Ibid. 138 Williams clearly establishes that those with a desire to relinquish Russian control of the island only make up roughly 1-2 per cent of the total oblast population, and that this view is not representative of popular opinion in Sakhalin as a whole. Ibid. 143 206 The smallest island of the four 207 Merrill Goozner, "Kurile Islanders Pawns in Japan-Russia Dispute", Chicago Tribune http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-08-24/news/9203170249_1_kunashir-kurile-chain-japan-and-russia (accessed Nov. 11 2011). 208 Williams. 141

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residents. The packages often include tours of nationalist museums and benefits offered to those under Japanese jurisdiction.209 However, even if there has been general civil dissatisfaction with the Russian governments administration of the island, annual surveys have shown that while some residents of the Kurils have argued that Japan may have a legitimate claim, there is also traditionally a consensus that they should remain under Russian purview.210 Analysis of Grassroots Initiatives in Context Overall, the common thread in grassroots nationalism around the disputed territories is based on two concepts. The first is a shared history, namely the Pacific War. All parties seem to believe that their nation has suffered uniquely and with insufficient recompense either during or as a result of the war and that the opposing powers claim reflects insensitivity to the events of the war. This is significant because of the other concept in play; that each island is an undeniable part of the nation. For example, both Japanese and Russian activists have argued that the Kuril Islands are part of their respective countries and that the country would not be the same without them. Although it can be argued that the cause of the dispute lies in the Russian state breaking the neutrality pact, to many Japanese, this also represents a site where over 60,000 Japanese civilians and military personnel were kidnapped and taken to Siberia with only half to return two years later. Chinese and Korean groups make the same arguments with Senkaku and Takeshima respectively, believing that Japan has no standing because it still has not made proper reparations for the millions of Chinese and Koreans who were exposed to military rule and countless wartime atrocities under the Japanese military. For both Korea and

209

Sergei Balmasov, "Japan Wins Hearts and Minds of Russians on Kuril Islands", Pravda.ru http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/19-10-2011/119376-japan_russia_kurils-0/ (accessed Nov. 11 2011). 210 Williams. 132

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Russia, the administration of Takeshima and the Kurils represent the ownership of reclaimed parts of the motherland, and to give them back would be like losing that again. Where is the government in all this? It has largely stood out of the way, preferring to exploit the groups fervor as necessary. In some cases, we do see the states influence, such as K IS encouragement of civil groups correcting references to Takeshima and the Sea of Japan. However, for the most part they have stayed on the sidelines. This reflects the fact that while civil groups and the states have occasionally had aligned interests, there is a lot of suggestion that grassroots groups see themselves as distinct of the state. Additionally, they often present the government as insufficient at representing the peoples national interests in regards to the islands. If anything, the power and influence of civil groups appears to be expanding beyond government control, especially with the added aspect of the internet and its ability to help activists organize. The cybernationalism contains a variety of popular imaginations that may support oppose or negotiate with the states claim to legitimacy.211 In this sense, the internet has become an engine of the primordialist nation. As Benedict Anderson describes the nation, he highlights that it forms around systems of communication which make it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.212 The internet brings members who share common perceived ties, primarily language and mentality, together in new imagined communities (websites, message boards, chat rooms) that are unchecked by the states influence. It depends on the value of the information, but even if something is censored by the government, civil
211 212

Liu. 80 Anderson. 36

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actors will often find ways to circumvent the censorship.213 In the case of China, the state absolutely attempts to interfere by censoring information and opinions, but is unable to do so perfectly. This lends some gravitas to the idea that Solts Cohesion Theory214 theory has begun to pull some weight in relation to nationalism in China, as the Chinese people have been given an outlet to look beyond the nationalist myth perpetuated by the state. What all of this suggests is that there is a burgeoning effort among nationalist groups in at least Japan, China, Russia and possibly Korea to gain their own legitimacy and influence the role of the state by representing themselves as the true voice of the nation. While their objectives may occasionally align with the state, unilateral organizing and actions by nationalists have also influenced the conflicts beyond the states control. An example of this is the number of extremist protesters who have gone so far to try to swim to the disputed territories and claim them, which has dramatic ripple effects on what the state is then seen to represent and the politics involved.

213

Brooke Larmer, "Where an Internet Joke Is Not Just a Joke", New York Times Magazine http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/the-dangerous-politics-of-internet-humor-inchina.html?scp=4&sq=china%20censorship&st=cse (accessed Nov. 13 2011). 214 Solt. 823

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VI. Conclusion It is easy to assume that the territorial disputes in East Asia are being conducted by dueling nation-states all vying for power, because it fits very nicely in a neo-realist paradigm. And on some levels, this describes the situation adequately; the states involved in each conflict have regularly employed these territories to promote what Solt describes as a nationalist myth. Employing their individual nationally shared history, each state argues that the disputed territory is a unique and crucial aspect of the nation, and that truly nationalistic individuals owe a duty to the state that overrides all other public obligations in order to protect this idea.215 In the case of Japan, both local and national governments have taken steps to promote memorial days connected to each of the disputed territories, and publically highlight and condemn Korean actions in relation to the territories. Politicians also make highly symbolic moves and speeches to spread the narrative of bullying Chinese, Korean, and Russian opponents who have (according to them) unfairly continued to persecute Japan for its actions in the Pacific War. The Chinese government has direct and heavy control over domestic information, encouraging and discouraging protests when politically advantageous, and frequently ties Japanese wartime atrocities to the promotion of Chinese culture. The South Korean government subsidizes two people to live on Takeshima and government officials offer to lay down their lives for the islands. Russia, while not traditionally nationalistic about the Kurils has launched a new wave of it by having the Russian president visit the island, a

215

Ibid. 821

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deliberately provocative move that he could then use to promote the need to defend the islands and their inhabitants militarily. The states do this, because all four have an economic interest in the resolution of the disputes, which would bring a wide EEZ expansion to whichever state succeeded in gaining accepted sovereignty. Nationalism also helps secure the legitimacy of individual politicians (in the case of Russia and Japan), and state governments (in the case of China and Korea). The CCP in particular survives on its ability to tie itself to nationalism as a distraction from domestic economic problems and anti-government activists. Interestingly though, despite the strong historical associations reinforced by the state for each conflict and the level of bad blood that still exists among nationals, all four states continue to cooperate on larger economic and social relations suggesting a possible constructivist argument for the states behavior as well. Yet, nationalism in these disputes has shown itself to be a slippery thing. If we look at some of the nationalism displayed by civil groups within a constructivist model, we can see that in some cases civil groups are working again the states realist interests. In fact, civil groups have taken these images of the nation and run with them, often criticizing the state for not being protective enough of the nation. Japanese nationalists see an anti-Japanese conspiracy to (in their mind) perpetuate an unfair punishment and imposition on Japan for that countrys behavior during the events of the Pacific war, whereas Chinese and Korean nationalists argue that Japan has not been apologetic enough and that any territorial claims are an example of a revival of Japanese imperialism. This is not an element of the Kuril dispute for Russian nationalists, but they believe that the Southern Kurils are an inherent part of the nation, reclaimed and brought back to their rightful place at the end of the Pacific war.
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Protestors unilaterally swimming to the disputed islands and putting up structures or flags, or unilaterally provoking the foreign power into a military response can cause an international incident and forces the both the home and foreign governments into a standoff and can put the opposing country in a compromising position. China has noticed this already, and takes steps to tamp down on protests when they become politically inconvenient to maintaining relations with Japan, even if Chinese officials encouraged them in the first place. These groups (and in Chinas case, internet communities) also now have an easier time organizing and communicating their goals than they did even a decade ago, and have become generally destabilizing factors to whether or not any of these disputes can be easily resolved. Too many of the studies of these territorial disputes have concentrated solely on finding resolutions that will be mutually satisfactory to both states involved, making hasty and abbreviated mention of protests and other displays of nationalism associated with the islands. But as the research presented here indicates, these grassroots elements and their effects on the discourse around the islands may prevent any kind of resolution by the states until the struggle over who represents the nation is resolved. While the states in each instance have shown themselves to be very capable at exploiting these territorial disputes to develop nationalism, so too do nationalist activists seem to be pushing back to reclaim the right to define it on their own terms. As it stands, any resolution would alienate the state perceived to have lost the territory, opening it to rejection that it serves the nations best interests and vulnerable to the very nationalistic fervor it has been carefully balancing. Yet, the state also suffers by avoiding a conclusive resolution, having to cover the domestic, international and

69

economic costs of having to protect the islands in question from the other power that wants to take it. Thus far, researchers have tried to remain objective about the role that nationalism is playing in the disputes; often preferring to ignore it and take a non-judgmental legal, economic, or historical perspective. Others, usually nationals who are conversely too close to the issue, pick and choose from those perspectives to argue a nationalist position on which nation-state the territories should be awarded to. Both of these methodologies attack the symptom rather than promote a cure. Shared histories and other aspects of the nation remain a driving force in these disputes and broader international relations between all four of these countries. Until the state and civil society of Japan, China, Korea, and Russia have reconciled what their nations are, and have that nations needs met, the sovereignty of the islands may never be decided.

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