SovereigntyDisputesintheSouth ChinaSea:Diplomacy,LegalRegimes andRealpolitik

CarlyleA.Thayer

Paperpresentedtothe InternationalConferenceonTopicalRegional SecurityIssuesinEastAsia St.PetersburgStateUniversity St.Petersburg,RussianFederation April67,2012

SovereigntyDisputesintheSouthChinaSea: Diplomacy,LegalRegimesandRealpolitik CarlyleA.Thayer*

Introduction
This paper analyzes the political interactions between China, members of the AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),andASEANoversovereigntydisputesin theSouthChinaSeasincetheadoptionoftheGuidelinestoImplementtheDeclaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in mid2011. For purposes of this paper diplomacy refers to bilateral relations between China and the ASEAN claimant states; legal regimes refers to negotiations on Guidelines to Implement the DOC and negotiationstocraftaCodeofConduct;andrealpolitikreferstotheeffortsbystatesto manage South China Sea disputes through the regions multilayered security architecture. Thepaperisdividedintothreepartsandaconclusion.Thefirstpartreviewsthefactors thatledChinaandASEANtoadopttheDOCGuidelinesaftersevenyearsofstartstop negotiations. The second part reviews developments between ASEAN and China since the DOC Guidelines were adopted with a focus on the Joint Working Group to Implement the DOC Guidelines and the parallel efforts by ASEAN to draft a Code of ConductfortheSouthChinaSea.PartthreereviewsbilateralrelationsbetweenChina andtwoofASEANsclaimantstates,thePhilippinesandVietnamintheperiodfromJuly 2011 to the present. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the interplay of diplomacy,legalregimesandrealpolitikwillshapetheresolutionofsovereigntydisputes in the South China Sea. In particular, the conclusion reviews ongoing discussions on maritime security in regional multilateral organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum,theASEANDefenceMinistersMeetingPlusandEastAsiaSummit.

1.GuidelinestoImplementtheDOC
ThissectionreviewsthefactorsthatledChinaandASEANtoadopttheDOCGuidelines aftersevenyearsofstartstopnegotiations. The Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed in PhnomPenhonNovember4,2002betweenthegovernmentsofthememberstatesof

Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au,SubmittedApril3,2012.RevisedApril21,2012.

theAssociationofSoutheastAsianStudies(ASEAN)andthePeoplesRepublicofChina.1 Thisdocumentsetoutfourtrustandconfidencebuildingmeasuresandproposedfive cooperativeactivities. TheDOCstatedwithrespecttothetrustandconfidencebuildingmeasures: Pendingthepeacefulsettlementofterritorialandjurisdictionaldisputes,theParties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including: a.holdingdialoguesandexchangeofviewsasappropriatebetweentheirdefense andmilitaryofficials; b.ensuringjustandhumanetreatmentofallpersonswhoareeitherindangeror indistress; c.notifying,onavoluntarybasis,otherPartiesconcernedofanyimpending joint/combinedmilitaryexercise;and d.exchanging,onavoluntarybasis,relevantinformation. TheDOCthenwentontoproposefivecooperativeactivities: Pendingacomprehensiveanddurablesettlementofthedisputes,theParties concernedmayexploreorundertakecooperativeactivities.Thesemayincludethe following: a.marineenvironmentalprotection; b.marinescientificresearch; c.safetyofnavigationandcommunicationatsea; d.searchandrescueoperation;and e.combatingtransnationalcrime,includingbutnotlimitedtotraffickinginillicit drugs,piracyandarmedrobberyatsea,andillegaltrafficinarms. It took a further eighteen months (November 2002July 2004) before senior officials from China and the ASEAN member states agreed to establish the ASEANChina Joint WorkingGroup(JWC)toImplementtheDOC.AnotheryearpassedbeforetheASEAN China JWG held its first meeting in Manila (August 2005). The Terms of Reference for theJointWorkingGroupspecifiedthattheJWGwastomeettwiceayeartoformulate recommendationsinfourareas: GuidelinesandtheactionplanfortheimplementationoftheDOC SpecificcooperativeactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea

Forbackgroundsee:TranTruongThuy,TheDeclarationontheConductofPartiesintheSouthChina SeaandDevelopingMaritimeEnergyResources,inNBRSpecialReport#35.Seattle:theNationalBureau ofAsianResearch,December2011,175189.

4 A register of experts and eminent persons who may provide technical inputs, nonbinding and professional views or policy recommendations to the ASEAN ChinaJWG Theconveningofworkshops,astheneedarises2

ASEANalsotableddraftguidelinestoimplementtheDOCfordiscussionattheAugust 2005meeting.TheseguidelinesmadeprovisionforASEANstatestocaucusfirstpriorto meeting with China. China objected and insisted that outstanding disputes should be resolved by bilateral consultations among relevant parties and not with ASEAN as a group.Consequently,theJWGdidnotmakeanyprogressforthenextsixyearsasChina and ASEAN quibbled over the wording of at least twentyone successive drafts. The provisionfortwoannualmeetingsoftheASEANChinaJWCwashonouredinthebreach. Arguably, with one possible exception, none of the cooperative activities listed in the originalDOCwasevercarriedout.Thepossibleexceptionwasthe2005agreementby the national oil companies of the Philippines, China and Vietnam to undertake a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in waters off the western coast of the Philippines. This agreementlapsedin2008. In July 2011, ASEAN Senior Officials quietly revised the offending text in point two of their original draft guidelines and offered a drastically watered down formulation to theirministersforapproval.OnJuly20,theASEANandChineseforeignministersfinally approvedtheGuidelinesfortheImplementationtheDOC.Theseguidelinesconsistedof eightbriefpointsprecededbyathreeparagraphpreamble(seeTable1).3 WhatfactorsledChinaandASEANmemberstoadoptthe DOCGuidelinesafterseven years of startstop negotiations? The most important factor was the international and regional backlash provoked by increased Chinese assertiveness in enforcing its jurisdictionindisputedwatersintheSouthChinaSeaoverthepreviousfouryears,and in2011inparticular.Forexample,U.S.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonraisedconcerns overfreedomofnavigationandoverflightandunimpededcommercialactivitiesinthe SouthChinaSeaattheASEANRegionalForummeetingheldinmid2010.Elevenother ministersraisedvaryingconcernsaboutmaritimesecurity.Theseconcernswereechoed attheinauguralASEANDefenseMinistersMeetingPlusheldinHanoiinOctober2010. China was isolated diplomatically by its own assertiveness and sought to limit further damage by agreeing to revive the moribund ASEANChina Joint Working Group. China also sought to undercut Secretary Clintons offer for the United States to facilitate a
AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations,TermsofReferenceoftheASEANChinaJointWorkingGroup on the Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, December 7, 2004.Availableat:http://www.asean.org/16886htm. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC. http://www.asean.org/4979.htm. The DOC Guidelines were posted on the ASEAN Secretariat web site underExternalRelations,China,CooperationontheSouthChinaSea.Theyhavesincebeenremoved.
3 2

diplomaticsolution.Forexample,Chinesediplomatsworkedhardtopreventmaritime securityissues(readSouthChinaSea)frombeingdiscussedattheEastAsiaSummitin November2011. ThefifthmeetingoftheJWGwasconvenedinKunming,ChinainDecember2010.The sixthJWGmetinMedan,IndonesiainApril2011.Atbothmeetingsitbecameclearthat progress was still hostage to Chinas insistence that territorial and sovereignty claims couldonlybesettledbilaterallybythestatesconcernedandnotmultilaterally.InJuly 2011ASEANseniorofficialsagreedtocompromiseonthiscontroversialpoint(seeTable 1). WhydidASEANmakethischange?AsecondfactorintheadoptionoftheGuidelinesto ImplementtheDOCwastheconcernofseveralASEANmembers,particularlyThailand, that rivalry between China and the United States would intrude into regional affairs. Thesestatespreferredquietdiplomacyratherthanconfrontation.Theysoughttoavoid having to take sides between Washington and Beijing. Besides, the ASEAN Charter (2008) made provision for ASEAN members to consult on important issues. ASEAN memberscouldmeetasagrouptodiscussSouthChinaSeaissuespriortomeetingwith Chinese officials regardless of the wording of the draft Guidelines to Implement the DOC. Table1 ComparisonoftheFinalDOCGuidelineswithTextofOriginalDraft

Point
1

FinalWording(2011)

OriginalDraft(2005)

The implementation of the DOC should be TheimplementationoftheDOCshouldbe carriedoutinastepbystepapproachinline carried out in a stepbystep approach in withtheprovisionsoftheDOC. linewiththeprovisionsoftheDOC. ThePartiestotheDOCwillcontinueto promotedialogueandconsultationsin accordancewiththespiritoftheDOC. ASEANwillcontinueitscurrentpracticeof consulting among themselves before meetingwithChina.

The implementation of activities or projects TheimplementationoftheDOCshouldbe as provided for in the DOC should be clearly based on activities or projects clearly identified. indentified. The participation in the activities or projects The participation in the activities or shouldbecarriedoutonavoluntarybasis. projects should be carried out on a voluntarybasis. Initial activities to be undertaken under the Initial activities to be undertaken under ambit of the DOC should be confidence the ambit of the DOC should be buildingmeasures. confidencebuildingmeasures. The decision to implement concrete The decision to implement concrete measures or activities of the DOC should be measures or activities of the DOC should


based on consensus among parties be based on consensus among parties concerned, and lead to the eventual concerned and lead to the eventual realizationofaCodeofConduct. realizationofaCOC. 7 Intheimplementationoftheagreedprojects under the DOC, the services of the Experts and Eminent Persons, if deemed necessary, will be sought to provide specific inputs on theprojectsconcerned. In the implementation of the agreed projectsundertheDOC,theserviceofthe experts and eminent persons if deemed necessarywillbetoprovidespecificinputs ontheprojectconcerned.

Progressoftheimplementationoftheagreed Notinoriginaldraftguidelines activitiesandprojectsundertheDOCshallbe reported annually to the ASEANChina MinisterialMeeting(PMC)

What did the Guidelines to Implement the DOC have to say? The preamble characterized the DOC as a milestone document signed between the ASEAN Member StatesandChina,underscoringthattheDOCwasnotanagreementbetweenASEANas agroupandChina.Second,thepreamblestatedthattheeffectiveimplementationof theDOCwillcontributetothedeepeningoftheASEANChinaStrategicPartnershipfor Peace and Prosperity. This was an inducement for China to take concrete action in order to further its relations with ASEAN. Finally, the preamble noted that the Guidelines are to guide the implementation of possible joint cooperative activities, measures and projects as provided for in the DOC. This formulation clearly indicates thattheGuidelinesweretentativeandnonbinding. Table 1 above sets out a comparison of the original 2005 draft and the final draft adoptedin2011.Thereareonlytwosubstantialpointsofdifference.Asnoted,Point2 intheoriginaldraftwassubstantiallyrevisedtomeetChineseobjections.PriorASEAN consultation was replaced with the weaker injunction to promote dialogue and consultations in accordance with the spirit of the DOC. An eighth point was added specifyingthatactivitiesandprojectsundertakenundertheDOCshouldbereportedto theASEANChinaMinisterialMeeting. ImmediatelyaftertheGuidelineswereadopted,thePhilippinesForeignSecretaryAlbert delRosarionotedthattheywouldneedmoreteethtomakethemeffective.According to del Rosario, [t]he necessary elements to make the guidelines succeed are still incomplete.Werelookingfortheparticipantstobehonorable.Beyondthattheresnot muchroomforustoexactconsequencesformisbehavior.4

2.DevelopmentsSincetheAdoptionoftheDOCGuidelines
ThissectionreviewsdevelopmentsbetweenASEANandChinasincetheDOCGuidelines were adopted with a focus on the Joint Working Group to Implement the DOC GuidelinesandtheparalleleffortsbyASEANtodraftaCodeofConductfortheSouth ChinaSea.
4

PurpleS.Romero,Asean,ChinaadoptguidelinesonSpratlys,Newsbreak,July22,2011.

ItisimportanttonotethatnomajormaritimeincidentshavetakenplaceintheSouth ChinaSeasincetheDOCGuidelineswereadopted(seeTable2below).AdmiralRobert Willard, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted in testimony to the Senate ArmedServicesCommitteethatChinawaslessconfrontationalin2011inassertingits claims in the South China Sea than it was in 2010.5 Nonetheless, Admiral Willard observedthatChinacontinuedtochallengevesselsengagedinoilandgasexplorationin watersthatitclaimed. In 2000, when ASEAN members and China began to meet to discuss South China Sea issues, several ASEAN members, particularly the Philippines, pressed for a Code of Conduct (COC). Vietnam sought to include a definition of the geographic scope of the COC with the aim of including the Paracel Islands.6 These islands had been seized by ChinafromtheRepublicofVietnam(SouthVietnam)inJanuary1974.IntheendaCode ofConductontheSouthChinaSeaprovedtobeabridgetoofar.ASEANmembershad to settle for the 2002 DOC, a nonbinding political statement. Nevertheless, ASEAN membersroutinelydescribedtheDOCastheinitialsteptowardsamorebindingCodeof Conduct. When the Guidelines to Implement the DOC were agreed, two separate diplomatic tracks emerged. The first involved negotiations between China and ASEAN member states on practical measures to implement the intent of the DOC. The second track involved discussions among ASEAN members themselves on a draft Code of Conduct thattheywouldlaterpresenttoChina. OnNovember11,2011ASEANSeniorOfficials(ASEANSOM)metinBalitodiscusshow to follow up agreementon the DOC Guidelinesin preparation for the 19th ASEAN and related summits.7 According the Director General of ASEAN Politics and Security in Indonesias Foreign Ministry, Ade Padmo Sarwono, the ASEAN SOM decided that its membersshouldmeetfirsttoagreeonwhatcooperativeactivitiesandprojectsinthe SouthChinaSeamightbecarriedoutbeforemeetingwithChineseofficials.Theaimof the meeting with Chinese officials would be to discuss implementation and continuation of declaration on conduct (DOC) including several projects in [the] South

5 6

ChengGuangjin,BeijingconsistentonS.ChinaSea:FM,ChinaDaily,March1,2012.

CarlyleA.Thayer,ChallengestoASEANCohesion:ThePolicyofConstructiveEngagementandaCodeof Conduct for the South China Sea, Paper to international workshop on Regionalism and Globalism in Southeast Asia, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Tampere and theCentreforSoutheastAsianStudies,boAkademiUniversity,Marienhamn,land,Finland,June24, 2000,3138. AccordingtoKaviChongkittavorn,SeniorAseanofficialsmetanddiscussedthetermsofreferencelast year[November2011]amongthemselves,ignoringChinasrequesttositinonthemeeting,see:New chairCambodiacanresetAseanpower,TheNation,January16,2012.
7

ChinaSeaandtodeterminewhat,when,whereandhowtheprojectwouldbecarried out.8 AccordingtoAdePadmoSarwono,aworkinggroupofASEANSeniorOfficialsdiscussed the Code of Conduct as a follow up to ASEAN SOM discussions in July. Once ASEAN members and China had agreed on measures to implement the DOC Guidelines, they would resume their dialogues on COC which contains specific and technical matters relatedtocooperationaroundtheSouthChinaSea.9 IndonesiasForeignMinisterMartyNatalegawawasquotedasstating,Wehavebegun the conversation of the code of conduct among ASEAN first, but there will be a time when we begin to engage China.10 In a later interview he confirmed that after agreementontheDOCGuidelinesASEANmemberswerenowmovingontotheCodeof Conduct (CoC).11 In a later interview he noted that after the DOC Guidelines were adopted there was some apprehension, a doubt, because China used the terms appropriatetimingandappropriateconditions.Wechosenottobepreoccupiedby whatismeantbyappropriate,wearejustgettingonwithit.Havingdecidedtomove forwardwiththeprocessoftheCoC,Chinaisnowsayingitsreadytojoinintheinitial session.12 Erlinda F. Basilo from the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that a meeting on drafting a binding COC with China was scheduled for January2012withaviewtocompletionbyJuly2012.13 PriortothetalksbetweenASEANmembersandChina,ASEANForeignMinistersmeton January 11, 2012 in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary AlbertF. del Rosario reiterated anearlier proposal that ameeting beheld as soon as possible among the claimant states and China, under the guidance of ASEAN.14 Del Rosario told his colleagues that the Philippines is willing to commit to a Code of Conduct that addresses the very core of the issue and that is to define, clarify and segregatethedisputedareasfromthenondisputedareasintheWestPhilippineSea.15
8 9

Antara,ASEANreadytodiscusscontinuationofdocwithChina,November14,2011. Antara,ASEANreadytodiscusscontinuatinofdocwithChina,November14,2011.

10

AhmadPathoni,ASEANstartsworkonSouthChinaSeacodeofconduct,DeutschePresseAgentur, November16,2011.

Mustaqim Adamrah, ASEAN can persuade Chinatoward CoCnegotiation, mediateregional conflict, TheJakartaPost,November25,2011. Mustaqim Adamrah, ASEAN can persuade Chinatoward CoCnegotiation, mediateregional conflict, TheJakartaPost,November25,2011. Antonio Siegfried O. Alagado, ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January, BusinessWorld,November28,2011andSenatorFranklinDrilonquotedinButchFernandez,Senatorhelp DFAlobbyforcodeofconductonSouthChinaSea,BusinessMirror,January11,2012. Associated Press, Philippines seeks Asian summit on disputed islands, TheEconomic Times, January 15,2012andJ.P.D.Poblete,ASEAN,Chinatacklecooperation,BusinessWorld,January15,2012.
15 14 13 12

11

J.P.D.Poblete,ASEAN,Chinatacklecooperation,BusinessWorld,January15,2012.

According to a press release issued after the meeting, the ministers stressed on the needtointensifyeffortstoensuretheeffectiveandfullimplementationoftheDoCin ordertomaintainpeace,securityandstabilityintheSouthChinaSea.16But,according todelRosario,theCOCwasnotdiscussedinacomprehensivemannerandtherewas no real focus given to the DOCThere were strong expressions, however, on the desirabilityoffinalizingabindingDOCin2012.17 TwodaysaftertheASEANForeignMinistersmeeting,ASEANandChineseseniorofficials metinChinaforthreedays(January1315)todiscusspracticalmeasurestoimplement the DOC and how to utilize the three billion yuan (US $476 million) ChinaASEAN MaritimeCooperationFundannouncedbyChinainNovember2011.18Attheconclusion of the meeting it was agreed, to speed up specific cooperation projects, and to host seminarsonmaritimedisasterrelief,environment,rescueandbiology[sic]research.19 Towards this end four experts committees were set up: maritime scientific research, environmental protection, search and rescue, and transnational crime. These committees were derived from the five cooperative activities listed in the 2002 DOC. Significantlynoexpertcommitteeonsafetyofnavigationandcommunicationatseawas established.LittleprogressseemstohavebeenmadeonaCodeofConduct;according tothePeoplesDaily,ChinafullyrespectsthepositionandconsiderationoftheASEAN andwoulddiscussanddraftCodeofConductwiththeASEANwhenconditionspermit [emphasisadded].20 The issue of ASEANs draft COC and the timing of Chinas involvement in the drafting processcametoaheadatthe20thASEANSummitheldinPhnomPenhfromApril34. Prior to the summit President Hu Jintao made a highprofile visit to Cambodia. In discussions with Prime Minister Hun Sen President Hu indicated that Beijing did not
16

Xinhua,ASEANFMsendmeetingwithagreementsonregional,internationalissues,ShanghaiDaily, January11,2012. J.P.D.Poblete,ASEAN,Chinatacklecooperation,BusinessWorld,January15,2012.

17 18

Thiswasthe4thASEANChinaSOMonimplementingtheDOC.DarwinWallyT.Wee,ASEAN,Chinahold threedaymeettoreducetensionsintheSouthChinaSea,MinadNews,January13,2012;XiaWenhui, Maintaining Safety Valve in South China Sea is Vital, Xinhua, January 13, 2012 and Darwin Wally T. Wee, Situation in South China Sea peaceful and stable, MindadNews, January 15, 2012. Kavi Chongkittavornassertsthatthismeetingtookplaceaftermonthsofdelay;see:NewchairCambodia canresetAseanpower,TheNation,January16,2012. China,ASEANholdmeetingonSouthChinaSea,Xinhua,January15,2012.Otherreportsreferredto jointworkshoponmarineecologicalenvironmentandmonitoringtechniques(tobeheldinChina)and search and rescue (Vietnam), see: Erwida Maulia, RI lauded for S. China Sea maritime proposal, The JakartaPost,January18,2012.Foracriticalviewthatarguesjointworkshopswouldnotaddresscore problemsintheareathatmustberesolvedtobringaboutdurablestabilityintheAsiaPacificregion,see: FahlesaMunabari,AlookintoASEANChinasDOC,TheJakartaPost,February7,2012.
20 19

Zhong Sheng, Resolving South China Sea issue needs concrete measures, Peoples Daily Online, January17,2012.

10

want talkson a binding code of conduct to move too quickly.21 Whether actingunder Chinese inducement or not, Cambodia, as ASEAN Chair, removed formal discussion of theSouthChinaSeafromtheagendaoftheASEANSummit.22 ASEANforeignministersandseniorofficialsmetonApril2ndthedaybeforethestartof formal proceedings. Both Vietnam and the Philippines immediately raised the South China Sea issue and the drafting of a legally binding COC.23 When ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan announced that China might be invited to take part in the draftingofthecodeheprecipitatedwhatthePhilippineSecretaryofForeignAffairsdel Rosariocalledabigdisagreement24BoththePhilippinesandVietnamobjected. WhenthemeetingconsideredaproposalrelayedfromChinaforthesettingupofaten membergroupofexpertsandprominentstatesmenthatwouldhelpthinkofsolutions, Vietnam and the Philippines rejected it outright according to two Southeast Asian diplomats involved in the discussions.25 Secretary del Rosario later issued a statement on the presummit discussions. The statement noted that the ASEAN SOM working groupwascurrentlyengagedinidentifyingthemainelementsoftheCOC.DelRosario argued,Ithinkthedifferenceofopinionliesinthefactthatweareadvocatingadraftof the COC be prepared before we sit down with China. Others are taking the view that Chinashouldbeinvitedtocomeinfortheinitialdiscussions.26Forexample,Indonesias Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said ASEAN should hear Chinas views before presenting Beijing with a draft code. He said it was important to listen and we hear what Chinas view are so that we can really develop a position that is cohesive and coherent. AccordingtodelRosario,WeresayingthatwerehappytoinviteChinabutthisshould bedoneaftertheapprovaloftheCoC(byASEAN).Ithinkthatweshouldbemastersof ourowndestinyasfarastheCoCisconcerned,addingthatVietnamexpressedasimilar sentiment. Del Rosario said it would be difficult for ASEAN to have all of the ten membersagreeoninvitingChinatobeinvolvedinthecodesdrafting.Wearetryingto
21 22 23

Reuters,PhilippinespushesSouthChinaSeaissueatsummit,ABSCBNNews,April2,2012. LindsayMurdoch,IslandsoffagendabutstillsplitASEAN,TheSydneyMorningHerald,April4,2012.

HengReaksmey,InSurprise,CambodiaPutsSouthChinaSeaonSummitAgenda,VOANews,April3, 2012 and Jim Gomez (Associated Press), Southeast Asian countries, China bring South China Sea territorialrifttoregionalsummit,TheWashingtonPost,April3,2012.
24 25

AFP,ASEANparalysedoverChinaseadispute,sayanalysts,April4,2012.

SophengCheang,SoutheastAsianations,Chinabringrifftosummit,AssociatedPress,April3,2012; JimGomez(AssociatedPress),SoutheastAsiancountries,ChinabringSouthChinaSeaterritorialriftto regional summit, The Washington Post, April 3, 2012 and Amiel Ungas, Cambodia Wants Economic Focus:Vietnam&PhilippinesDiffer,IsraelNationalNews,GlobalAgenda,April4,2012. Irwin Loy, Burma, S. China Sea Dominate ASEAN Summit Discussions, VOANews,April 2, 2012and Irwin Loy, Burmese Election, South China Sea, Draw Attention at ASEAN Summit, VOA News, April 2, 2012.
26

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doitasfastaswecan,butwhatweareobjectingtoiswedontwantChinatobeinvited in terms of the drafting and decisionmaking. When asked which countries wanted ChinatobeapartdelRosarioreplied,IthinkCambodiawouldbeoneofthem.27 DelRosarioalsoproposedadisputesettlementmechanism.HetoldtheASEANforeign ministers,IreiteratethatthePhilippinesadherestotheprimacyofinternationallawin resolving the disputes. We believe that a rulesbased approach under the dispute settlement mechanism established in UNCLOS is the legitimate solution in addressing conflicting and overlapping claims in the West Philippine Sea.28 According to del Rosario, the disputed areas of the South China Sea must be clarified and segregated fromnondisputedareas.Finally,delRosarioconcluded,ThePhilippineshopesthatthe codeofconductwillbearealmoveforwardnotmerelyintermsofform,butmore importantly of substance.29 A senior Southeast Asian diplomat revealed that ASEAN memberswerealsodividedonwhethertoincludeadisputesettlementmechanismin thecode.Despiteinternaldisagreements,ASEANministerswereagreedtoadoptacode ofconductthisyear(2012). Thefirstdayofthe20thASEANSummitwasaformalplenarymeetingthatconsidereda widerangeofissuesrelatedtoASEANCommunityBuilding,aDrugFreeSoutheastAsia and other matters. Nevertheless, according to a statement issued by the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, President Benigno Aquino raised the South China Sea issues.HearguedthatASEANshouldforgeacommonpositiononaproposedcodeof conduct before talking with China. He said the fundamentals of the proposed code shouldbeinternaltoASEANsmembers.30PresidentAquinowasquotedasstating,It isimportantwemaintainASEANcentralityAftertheCoC(codeofconduct)hasbeen finalizedbyASEAN,thenASEANmemberstateswillmeetwithChina. ThelastdayoftheSummitwasaninformalASEANLeadersRetreat.AccordingtoSoeu RatChavy,SecretaryofStatefortheCambodianMinistryofForeignAffairs,theSouth China Sea issue was now back on the agenda. At the conclusion of the 20th ASEAN SummittheChairmansStatementnotedthefollowingundertheheadingSouthChina Sea: 91. We reaffirmed the importance of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
Martin Abbugao, Philippines urges united ASEAN stand on South China Sea, Agence FrancePresse, April3,2012.
28 27

PNA, Phl hopes code of conduct on South China Sea issue to move forward substantially, ZamboangaTimes,April3,2012.

AgenceFrancePresse,ASEANstruggleswithSouthChinaSeacode,ABSCBNNews,April2,2012and PNA,PhlhopescodeofconductonSouthChinaSeaissuetomoveforwardsubstantially,Zamboanga Times,April3,2012. Martin Abbugao, Philippines urges united ASEAN stand on South China Sea, Agence FrancePresse, April3,2012.
30

29

12 the South China Sea (DOC) as a milestone document signed between ASEAN and China embodying the collective commitment to promoting peace, stability, and mutual trust in the South China Sea and to ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputesinthisareainaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations,andthe universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United NationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)andtomovefortheeventual realizationofaregionalcodeofconduct(COC). 92. We stressed the need to intensify efforts to ensure the effective and full implementationoftheDOCbasedontheGuidelinesfortheimplementationofthe DOC. In this regard, we supported the convening of the ASEANChina Joint Workshoptocommemoratethe10thAnniversaryoftheDOC,inCambodia,inthe fourth quarter of 2012. We also looked forward to the holding of the 5th ASEAN China Senior Officials on DOC and the 8th Meeting of the ASEANChina Joint WorkingGroup.

AtapostsummitpressconferenceASEANSecretaryGeneralSurinadmittedtherewere shades of difference among ASEAN members drawn between those who had claims and those who did not over when to include China in negotiations over a COC.31 According to Indonesias Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, This is not necessarily a neatsequentialprocessisntit.Ofcourse,ASEANfirstandforemost,musthaveasolid consolidated position. But at the same time as we proceed, there will be constant communication through the ASEANChina framework, so that whatever final position ASEAN comes up with will have benefited from having some kind of communication withChina.32Heconcluded,Thebigpictureistheonethatmustnotbelost.Namely that in contrast to the recent past, now we have a situation where all are basically rushing and competing to get the Code of Conduct off the ground.33 Quite clearly ASEANmembershadreachedacompromise.However,aPhilippinediplomatinvolvedin the negotiations said the Philippines was frustrated by Indonesias rejection of any conflict resolution mechanism in the code. He added that other countries, including Cambodia,wereeitherlukewarmtotheproposalorhadignoreditaltogether.34

3.ChinasRelationswiththePhilippinesandVietnam
This section reviews bilateral relations between China and two of ASEANs claimant states, the Philippines and Vietnam, in the period since the DOC Guidelines were adopted.

31 32 33 34

AFP,ASEANparalysedoverChinaseadispute,sayanalysts,April4,2012 IrwinLoy,ASEANStillSearchingforConsensusonSouthChinaSeaDisputes,VOANews,April4,2012. Reuters,SoutheastAsiafailstotackleseaspatwithChinaheadon,April4,2012. Reuters,SoutheastAsiafailstotackleseaspatwithChinaheadon,April4,2012.

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ThePhilippines
The Philippines approaches the management of South China Sea disputes with China from an entirely different geostrategic setting than Vietnam (see discussion below). AlthoughboththePhilippinesandVietnamaremembersofASEANthesimilarityends there.ThePhilippinesdoesnotsharethedensecrosscuttingnetworkofparty,stateand military ties that Vietnam has with China. The Armed Forces of the Philippines are structuredtodealmainlywithinternalsecuritythreatsandtheircapabilitiesforexternal defence have been badly run down. The Philippines, however, has a longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States which offers a measure of deterrence. WhenPresidentBenignoAquinobecamepresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippineshe wasinformedthatChineseincursionsintoFilipinowatershadsteppedupinlate2010. These continued in the early months of his presidency and became a major source of tensioninSinoPhilippinesrelations(seeTable2).ThePhilippineshasmanageditsSouth China Sea dispute with China through six mechanisms: diplomatic protests, bilateral discussions,reaffirmationofthealliancewiththeUnitedStates,forcemodernization,35 launchinganewmajordiplomaticinitiativeandlobbyingASEANmembersforsupport. This subsection mainly deals with developments after July 2011 as developments beforethenhavebeendiscussedelsewhere.36 InresponsetoChineseassertivenessin2011,PresidentAquinolaunchedanewinitiative calling for the South China Sea to become a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). Aquino explained, what is ours is ours, and with what is disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.37 He directed the Department of ForeignAffairs(DFA)topromotetheZOPFF/Cconceptthroughsustainedconsultations anddialogue.ThisinitiativeprecededtheadoptionoftheGuidelinestoImplementthe Declaration on Conduct of Parties and remains the policy position of the Philippine government. According to the DFA, the ZOPFF/C provides a framework for separating the disputed territorialfeaturesthatmaybeconsideredforcollaborativeactivitiesfromnondisputed waters in the West Philippines Sea (South China Sea) in accordance with international

InlateJanuary2012itwasannouncedthatthePhilippineswouldbeginimmediaterepairsontwoCoast Guardvessels(BRPBatangasandBRPSanJuan)inordertoprovideroundtheclocksecuritymonitoringin disputedwatersintheWestPhilippineSea.OnlyoneCoastGuardship,BRPEdsa,wascurrentlyonpatrol. See:JocelynR.Uy,CoastGuardtobeefupsecurityinSpratlys,GlobalNationInquirer,January27,2012. Carlyle A. Thayer, The South China Sea Disputes and Their Impact on the Security Environment of Southeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?, Presentation to the International Conference on the Political and Security Implications of the South China Sea Dispute, cosponsored by the Center for AsiaPacific Area StudiesandtheEastWestCenter,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,January1213,2012,914. AlbertF.DelRosario,ARulesBasedRegimeinTheSouthChinaSeaBy:SecretaryofForeignAffairs, PublicInformationServiceUnit,June7,2011.
37 36

35

14

lawingeneralandUNCLOS)inparticular.38Adisputedarea,accordingtotheDFA,could beturnedintoaJointCooperationAreaforjointdevelopmentandtheestablishmentof marineprotectedareaforbiodiversityconservation.Areasnotindispute,suchasReed BankthatliesonthePhilippinescontinentalshelf,willbedevelopedexclusivelybythe Philippines or with the assistance of foreign investors invited to participate in its development. In July 2011, at the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the Foreign Secretary of the PhilippinespresentedhiscounterpartswithaproposalforanagreementonaZoneof Peace,Freedom,FriendshipandCooperationintheSouthChinaSea.Theministerstook note of this proposal and referred it to a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials and legal expertsforconsideration.39The1stASEANMaritimeLegalExpertsMeetingwasheldin Manilafrom2223SeptemberandresolvedtoforwardthisproposaltothenextASEAN SeniorOfficialsMeetinginNovemberforconsideration. PresidentAquinocalledforASEANsolidarityatthe19thASEANSummitbutfailedtogain formal endorsement of his ZOPFF/C proposal.40 The 19th ASEAN Summit merely took noteoftherecommendationsbytheASEANSOMthatfurtherstudyontheproposalis required, in particular, its legal, technical and political feasibility.41 In sum, it appears that some ASEAN members are lukewarm to the Philippines proposal and that consensushasnotbeenreached.NonethelessthePhilippineshaspersistedinadvancing this proposal. As recently as February 2012, the Philippines circulated an unofficial WorkingDraftforaCodeofConductontheSouthChinaSeathatstated,[t]heParties shall try to define, clarify, and segregate the disputed relevant land features in the Spratlys,inaccordancewithinternationallaw,specificallyUNCLOS.42 AlsoinJuly2011,thePhilippinessteppedupitsdiplomaticcampaignbyproposingthat thePhilippinesandChinataketheirterritorialdisputetotheUNsInternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea for arbitration. This proposal was raised by Foreign Secretary AlbertdelRosarioinhisdiscussionswithChinasForeignMinisterYangJiechiinBeijing thatmonth.43
38 39

AmitaO.Legaspi,PalacepreparesSpratlysincursionsreport,GMANewsTV,June3,2011.

BrianPadden,ASEANMaritimeSpecialistsDiscussGuidelinestoResolveS.ChinaSeaDispute,Voiceof America,September22,2011. J. P. D. Poblete, Manila to press resolution mode, BusinessWorld,November 20, 2011.An internal documentpreparedbythePhilippinesDFAstatedthatthePhilippineswouldcallonASEANleadersatthe 19th Summit to facilitate a meeting among the South China Sea claimant states to define both the undisputed and disputed areas for the purposes of establishing a joint cooperation area, see: Manila seeksASEANfrontagainstChinaonsearow,TodayOnline,November15,2011.
41 42 40

ChairsStatementofthe19thASEANSummitBali,17November2011,Point149.

PhilippineWorkingDraft,CodeofConductintheSouthChinaSea,February6,2012,ArticleII.2.b,p. 3.
43

BloombergNews,U.S.JointNavyDrillsInappropriate:China,July11,2011.

15

AfterPresidentAquinoassumedofficehereceivedaninvitationtopayanofficialstate visit to China. The visit was reportedly postponed because of rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. When ASEAN and China adopted the GuidelinesontheDOCinJuly2011thewaywasnowclearedforAquinotovisitBeijing. He made his official visit from 30 August to 3 September 2011 at the invitation of PresidentHuJintao. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of their talks indicated that economic issuesfeaturedprominently.Forexample,AquinoreportedlygarneredUS$1.3billionin new investments. The joint statement only made reference to the South China Sea at thebottomofthelistoftopicsdiscussed(point15of17points): Both leaders exchanged views on the maritime disputes and agreed not to let the maritimedisputesaffectthebroaderpictureoffriendshipandcooperationbetween thetwocountries.Thetwoleadersreiteratedtheircommitmenttoaddressingthe disputesthroughpeacefuldialogue,tomaintaincontinuedregionalpeace,security, stability and an environment conducive to economic progress. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the Declaration on the ConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSeasignedbyChinaandtheASEANmember countriesin2002.44 On Aquinos return to Manila he revealed that President Hu Jintao supported an implementingagreementforaSouthChinaSeaCodeofConduct.AccordingtoAquino, thiswasverysignificant,becausebeforeitwasjustageneralstatementofprinciples. Now theres a desire to really put in the implementing rules and regulations.45 Nevertheless, President Aquino continued to press for a multilateral South China Sea CodeofConductandagreementondemarcatingtheprecisemaritimeareasindispute. OnJanuary14,2012,onthesidelinesoftheASEANChinaSeniorOfficialsMeeting,the Philippines and China held their 17th Foreign Ministry Consultations in Beijing.46 This meetingfocusedonelevenareasofcooperationcontainedinthealreadyagreedPlanof ActionandProgramforthePhilippinesChinaYearsofFriendlyExchanges,20122013.47 Agreement was reached to promote the comprehensive development of bilateral relations in the fields of energy, science and technology, disaster mitigation and adaptation, law enforcement and maritime cooperation. According to the Foreign
44

JointStatementofthePhilippinesandChina,Beijing,September1,2011,reprintedinInquirerGlobal Nation,September7,2011. ChinaWantsBindingS.ChinaCode:Aquino,BloombergNews,August31,2011. JerryE.Esplanada,ChinatiesstillfriendlyDFA,PhilippineDailyInquirer,February24,2012.

45 46 47

J. P. D. Poblete, ASEAN, China tackle cooperation, BusinessWorld, January 15, 2012. Under the PhilippinesChina Years of Friendly Exchanges, 20122013 two former Chinese ambassadors to the Philippines made a goodwill visit from February 1723, 2012. See: Jerry E. Esplanada, China ties still friendlyDFA,PhilippineDailyInquirer,February24,2012.

16

Affairs Secretary del Rosario, this meeting did not specifically address maritime cooperationunderthetermsofthe2002DOCandamorebindingCOC.48 Duringthefirstfourmonthsof2012therewerethreedevelopmentsinSinoPhilippine relationsthatillustratetensionscontinueoversovereigntydisputesintheSouthChina Sea.Thesedevelopmentsmaybecharacterizedasmoreorlessroutine.BothChinaand thePhilippinesmustimmediatelyprotestanactionbytheotherpartyindisputedareas lestsilencebeconstruedasacquiescence.However,thethirdincidentdevelopedintoa standoffthathasyettoberesolved. In late February the Philippines Department of Energy announced that it would proceedtoofferfifteenoffshoreoilandgasexplorationlicenses.Twoofthelicenses includewatersnearPalawanthatareclaimedbyChina,Area3andArea4.49China responded by declaring, [i]t is unlawful for any country or company to explore oil and gas in sea areas under Chinese jurisdiction without the permission of the Chinese government.50 Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin later stated that [w]e areamenabletothe(Chineseofferofjointcooperation)foraslongasitconformsto ourlaws.51 OnMarch21,2012itwasreportedthatthePhilippineswouldupgradefacilitieson PagasaIslandbybuildingarollonrolloffdockforferryboats.TheChineseForeign Ministry immediately expressed its objections: China opposes any countrys illegal activitiesthatinfringeuponChinassovereigntyovertheNansha[Spratly]Islands Relevant countries should abide by the spirit of the Declaration on Conduct of PartiesinrhwSouthChinaSeaandavoidtakinganymovethatmaycomplicatethe disputesoastojointlymaintainpeaceandstabilityintheSouthChinaSea.52 On April 10,, the Philippines Navy dispatched the frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar to Scarborough Shoal to investigate the presence of eight Chinese fishing boats. An armed boarding party from the frigate discovered that the fishing boats were in possession of a large illegal catch of coral, giant clams and live sharks. Before the fishing boats could be detained, two China Marine Surveillance vessels interposed themselves between the fishermen and the frigate thus preventing any further action. The Philippines attempted to diffuse the matter by replacing the warship
J.P.D.Poblete,ASEAN,Chinatacklecooperation,BusinessWorld,January15,2012.

48 49

ThomasHogue,Philippinessettoawardoffshoreoil,gasblocksdespiteChinaclaims:report,Platts, February28,2012;AssociatedPress,PhilippinesreignitesrowwithChinaoveroilexplorationrights,The Guardian,February29,2012.

50 51

ZhaoShengnan.ManilasplanforS.ChinaSeaillegal,ChinaDaily,February29,2012.

Desiree Caluza, Philippines ready to take up China offer for talks on joint Spratly development, InquirerNorthernLuzon,March17,2012.
52

PiaLeeBrago,ChinahitsplanforPagasadevt,ThePhilippineStar,March27,2012andPhilippines tobuilddockonSouthChinaSeaisland,PeoplesDaily,March23,2012.

17 with a Coast Guard cutter. China reinforced its presence with the dispatch of an armedFisheryLawEnforcementCommandship.AlloftheChinesefishingboatsand their illegal catch left the shoal unhindered. Efforts to resolve this incident though diplomaticmeanshavefounderedasbothpartiesclaimthattheScarboroughShoal is an integral part of their national territory. As of this writing three Chinese ships continuetoconfrontthesingleCoastGuardcutter. Table2 ReportedIncidentsInvolvingChineseCivilianStateShipsAgainstFilipinoand VietnameseFishingBoatsandExplorationVessels,February2011March2012

Date
25/2/11

Incident
PLANfrigatefiresthreeshotsatfourFilipinofishingboatsoperatinginwatersnearQuirino (Jackson)AtollonedgeofRectoReef. Two Chinese Patrol Boats (surveillance ships) force MV Veritas Voyager from seismic surveyworkinReedBank. ChinesevesselspottedatBombayShoal TwoidentifiedaircraftintrudeintoPhilippinesairspace HaikouMunicipalgovernmentimposesunilateralfishingban16May1August CMSandSalvageshipsintrudeintoSouthernBank PLANandCMSshipsunloadanderectanumberofthreemetrelongtidestaffsinvicinity of Amy Douglas Bank (some reports indicated unspecified construction material). China admitsithadamarineresearchshipinareaconductingmaritimeresearchactivities. ThreeChineseMaritimeSurveillanceshipsaccostexplorationshipBinhMinh2andcutits seismiccableinBlock148inVietnamsEEZ Chineseboats,FeiShengNo.16andVesselNo.B12549,reportedlyattempttointerferein commercialactivitiesofVikingIIexplorationshipinBlock13603nearVanguardBank Chineseboats,FeiShengNo.16andVesselNo.B12549,reportedlyattempttointerferein commercialactivitiesofVikingIIexplorationshipinBlock13603nearVanguardBank ChinesemilitaryvesselsreportedthreatentofireonaVietnamesefishingboatinwaters nearSpratlyIslands Philippines navy discover tide staffs planted partially submerged around Rajah Soliman (Boxall)Reef PhilippinevesseldiscoversasteelcylindricalbuoyonwesternedgeofRectoBank. Chinese ships reportedly cut seismic cables towed by Viking II in Block 13603 near VanguardBank

2/3/11

6/5/11 11/5/11 11/5/11 21/5/11 24/5/11

26/5/11

29/5/11

31/5/11

1/6/11

5/6/11

8/6/11 9/6/11

18

30/6/11 5/7/11

UnreportedallegedthirdattempttocutcableofVietnameseexplorationship ChinesewarshipdispatchesspeedboatwitharmedcrewtoboardVietnamesefishingcraft. They alleged beat captain, threaten crew, seize fishing catch and force fishing craft to leavewatersneartheParacelIslands ApresumedChineseaircraftflewlowoverFilipinofishermenoffRajahSolimanReef. PhilippineNavydiscoverssteelmooringbuoyinvicinityofEscoda(Sabine)Shoal

11/7/11 12/7/11

18/10/11 ChinesefishingvesselnearlycrossespathofdisabledPhilippineNavypatrolinRectoBank inanearcollision. 11/12/11 Two Chinese warships from Panganiban (Mischief) Reef sailed around Escoda (Sabina) Shoal twice before returning to Hainan Island. The Philippines submitted a formal complaintonJanuary5,2012. 12/12/11 A third Chinese ship sailed around Escoda (Sabina) Shoal. The Philippines submitted a formalcomplaintonJanuary5,2012.ChinaclaimsthesandbarhasChinesenameandis underChinesejurisdiction. 22/2/12 Vietnam claims a Chinese Maritime Surveillance ship fired shots at and damaged a VietnamesefishingboatneartheParacelIsland. Chinese authorities detain twentyone Vietnamese fishermen and their two boats in waters near the Paracel Islands and demands payment of 70,000 yuan (US $11,000) for theirrelease. A standoff develops at Scarborough Shoal when two China Marine Surveillance vessels prevent the Philippines from detaining eight Chinese boats for illegal fishing in the PhilippinesExclusiveEconomicZone.

3/3/12

10/4/12

Source:ClarissaBatinoandJoelGuinto,PhilippinesProtestsNewChinaIntrusioninDisputedWater, Bloomberg, January 9, 2012; Jarius Bondoc, Sneaky big bully talks about peace, The Philippine Star, February29,2012;Reuters,Insight:ConflictloomsinSouthChinaSeaoilrush,February28,2012;and Simone Orendain, Philippines, China Vow Friendly Relations Despite Territorial Dispute, Voice of AmericaNews,March12,2012whichclaimsnineincidents.

Vietnam
In 1999, eight years the normalisation of diplomatic relations, Vietnam and China adopted a longterm cooperative framework agreement to structure their relations.53 Sincethenrelationshaveevolvedintoacomprehensivestrategicpartnership.AJoint SteeringCommitteechairedatdeputyprimeministerleveloverseesallaspectsoftheir growingbilateralrelationship.Inaddition,VietnamandChinashareadensenetworkof party,state,defenceandothertiesthroughregularexchangevisits.Vietnam,unlikethe Philippines,isnotatreatyallyoftheUnitedStates.
53

CarlyleA.Thayer,VietnamandRisingChina:TheStructuralDynamicsofMatureAsymmetry,inDaljit Singh,ed.,SoutheastAsianAffairs2010(Singapore:InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies,2010),392409.

19

ChinaandVietnamhavebeenabletoresolvelandborderissuesanddemarcatetheGulf of Tonkin, including a joint fishery area. Their respective Committee on Land Borders meet regularly.54 They conduct joint naval patrols, exchange naval port visits and conduct search and rescue exercises. But sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea haveprovedtobeintractable.Vietnamemploysfivemajormeanstomanagesecurity tensions: special diplomatic envoys, highlevel bilateral discussions, public reaffirmations of sovereignty and livefiring naval exercises, force modernisation, and calibrated moves to step up defence cooperation with major powers including the United States. This subsection mainly deals with developments after July 2011 as developmentsbeforethenhavebeendiscussedelsewhere.55 During the first half of 2011 Chinese paramilitary ships were involved in at least two cable cutting incidentswithin Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zone (seeTable 2 above). Afterthesecondablecuttingincident,VietnamdispatcheddeputyforeignministerHo XuanSontoChinaasaspecialenvoy.SonhelddiscussionswithhiscounterpartZhang Zhijun. Significantly, Son was received by State Councillor Dai Bingguo who had been appointedchairofanewLeadingSmallGrouptooverseeSouthChinaSeapolicyatthe endof2010.Accordingtoajointpressreleaseissuedon25June: The two sides emphasized the necessity to actively implement the common perceptions of the two countries leaders, peacefully solving the two countries disputes at sea through negotiation and friendly consultation; employing effective measuresandworkingtogethertomaintainpeaceandstabilityintheEastSea[sic]. Theyalsolaidstressontheneedtosteerpublicopinionsalongthecorrectdirection, avoidingcommentsanddeedsthatharmthefriendshipandtrustofthepeopleof thetwocountries. Thetwosidesagreedtospeedupthetempoofnegotiationssoastoearlysignan Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between VietnamandChina,andboosttheimplementationoftheDeclarationonConduct ofPartiesintheEastSea(DOC)andfollowupactivitiessothatsubstantialprogress willsoonbeachieved.56
The most recent meeting was held from February 2728, 2012 in Beijing and focused on facilitating touristvisitstotheBacLuanRivermouthandtheBanGiocwaterfalls.ThongTinXaVietNam,VietTrung lap duong day nong ve van de tren bien, March 1, 2012 and Prensa Latina, South China Sea Dispute HidersVietnamChinaTalks,March2,2012. Carlyle A. Thayer, The South China Sea Disputes and Their Impact on the Security Environment of Southeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?, Presentation to the International Conference on the Political and Security Implications of the South China Sea Dispute, cosponsored by the Center for AsiaPacific Area StudiesandtheEastWestCenter,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,January1213,2012,49. SocialistRepublicofVietnam,MinistryofForeignAffairs,VietNamChinajointpressrelease,June26, 2011.http://www.mofa.vn/en.
56 55 54

20

On August 29, 2011, Vietnam and China held their 2nd Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue atvice ministerial level. Vietnam wasrepresented by Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh and China was represented by Senior Lt. General Ma Xiaotian, Chief of the PLA GeneralStaff.Thediscussionsreviewedrecentmilitarytomilitaryactivitiesandagreed tostepupmilitaryexchangesatvariouslevelsandestablishahotlinebetweendefence ministries.ChinaagreedtoshareitsexperiencesinUNpeacekeepingwithVietnam.Lt. Gen. Ma confirmed that the South China Sea was the most sensitive disagreement between China and Vietnam. Lt. Gen Vinh detailed Vietnams plans to curb public protests in Vietnam that he claimed were aimed at undermining SinoVietnamese relations. Both sides agreed not to use force or threaten to use force to settle their territorialdisputes.57 InOctober2011VietnamCommunistPartySecretaryGeneralNguyenPhuTrongvisited Beijing for discussions with his counterpart. Both party leaders then witnessed the signing of the Agreement on Fundamental Principles to Guide the Settlement of Sea Disputes. The agreement committed both parties to seek mutually acceptable fundamentalandlastingsolutionstosearelateddisputes.Intheinterim,thetwosides shallactivelydiscussprovisionalandtemporarymeasureswithoutaffectingeachsides positionsandpolicies,includingtheactiveconsiderationanddiscussiononcooperation for mutual development [hop tac cung phat trien] The two parties also agreed to speedupnegotiationstodemarcatethewatersformingthemouthoftheGulfofTonkin and actively discuss cooperation for mutual development in these waters (emphasis added). The agreement also specified if the disputes involve other countries, the consultationsshallincludeallotherpartiesconcerned. InDecember2011,VicePresidentXiJinpingmadeanofficialvisittoHanoiandmetwith allofVietnamstoppartyandstateleaders.Xisvisitwasprimarilyagettoknowyou visit as he is widely viewed as Hu Jintaos heir apparent. Both sides stressed the importanceofthecomprehensivenatureoftheirbilateralrelationshipandfocusedon suchmajorissuesastrade,educationalandyouthcooperation,andpartytopartyties. As for the South China Sea, the two leaders reaffirmed past commitments to refrain from the use of force, respect each others interests and settle the dispute through internationallaw. The first highlevel visit in 2012 was undertaken by Vietnams new Foreign Minister, PhamBinhMinhwhopaidanofficialvisittoBeijingfromFebruary1215.Minhmetwith his counterpart, Yang Jiechi, and held separate meetings with Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Stare Counsellor Di Bingquo.58 Binhs visit may have includedpreparationsforthestatevisitofPresidentTruongTanSanglaterintheyear.
57

PANO, The second VietnamChina Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue concluded successfully, August28,2011reproducedbyConsulateGeneralofVietnam,Sydney,Australia.www.vietnamconsulate sydney.org/en/news.AccessedFebruary21,2012.
58

Xinhua,SeniorOfficialExpectsStrongerChinaVietnamTies,February14,2012.

21

TheSouthChinaSeawasdiscussed.AccordingtoChinaForeignMinistryspokesperson, ChinaisreadytoconsiderexploringsolutionstotheSouthChinaSeadisputeswithall relevantpartiesunderreasonableconditions[emphasisadded].59 The next highlevel visit from Vietnam was undertaken that same month by Politburo memberToHuyRua,whoisSecretaryofthepartySecretariatandheadoftheCentral CommitteesOrganisationCommission.Ruametwithhiscounterpart,LiYuanchao,who is a member of the CCP Politburo, Secretary of the CCP Secretariat and head of the Central Committees Organisation Department. Ruas visit was not directly related to SouthChinaSeaissuesandfocusedonwaystoadvancepartytopartyrelationsasone componentofthecomprehensivestrategicpartnership.60Ruasvisitillustratetheeffort by Vietnam and China to prevent the South China Sea issues for spilling over and affectingbilateralrelationsgenerally. During the first quarter of 2012 there were six developments in SinoVietnamese relations that illustrate tensions continued to roil the South China Sea territorial disputes. These incidents may be characterized as more or less routine or simply everydaysecurityissues.BothVietnamandChinamustimmediatelyprotestanaction bytheotherpartyindisputedareaslestsilencebeconstruedasacquiescence.Thesix incidentsareasfollows: OnJanuary12,2012ChinasMinistryofAgricultureannounceditsannualfishingban intheSouthChinaSeafromMay16August1andthreatenedtopunishanyfishing vesselsviolatingtheban.ThispromptedanimmediateprotestbyVietnamsForeign Ministry to Chinese diplomatic officials. Vietnam stated it had sovereign and jurisdictional rights over the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf over boththeParacelandSpratlyislands.61 Perhaps the most serious incident in the first quarter of the year took place on February22whenVietnamallegesthataVietnamesefishingcraftwasshotatand damaged by a China Marine Surveillance vessel near the Paracel Islands. The VietnameseallegedthattheChinesetriedtorobtheelevenVietnamesefishermen andblockedthemfromseekingrefugeinastorm.Vietnamlodgedaformalprotest withtheChineseEmbassyinHanoidemandingcompensationandanendtoattacks on fishermen. China reported that a China Marine Surveillance ship carried out a routinepatrolinwatersaroundXisha(Paracel)Islandsandnoshootingincidenttook place.62
59 60 61

ChengGuangjin,BettertiesholdkeytoSChinaSeadisputes,ChinaDaily,February14,2012 Xinhua,China,Vietnamagreetofurthercooperation,PeoplesDaily,February15,2012

DeutschePressAgentur,ChinesefishingbanstokesprotestfromVietnamamidseadispute,January 20,2012. Xinhua, China denies shooting at Vietnamese boat, February 27, 2012; Vietnam blasts China for assaultonfishermen,TuoiTre,March1,2012;JeremyPage,BeijinginFreshSeaRowWithHanoi,The
62

22 On March 3, 2012 Chinese authorities detained twentyone Vietnamese fishermen andtheirtwoboatsforfishinginwatersneartheParacelislands.Chineseauthorities have demanded payment of 70,000 yuan (US $11,000) for the release of the fishermen.63 Vietnams Foreign Ministry officials handed a protest note to the ChineseEmbassy.ChinasForeignMinistryofferedthisview:[r]ecently,morethan 100 Vietnamese fishing boats entered the waters around the Paracel Islands for illegal fishing. Unable to drive them off, relevant Chinese authorities investigated anddealtwithaVietnamesefishingboatand21fishermeninaccordancewiththe law... China has irrefutable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, and there is no dispute over this. Vietnamese fishing activities infringe on Chinas sovereignty and maritimerights.64 OnMarch9,2012anofficialfromthePolicyandRegulationDivisionoftheHainan TourismDevelopmentCommissionannouncedthathiscommissionwouldworkwith the National Administration of China to expand tourist activities in the Paracel archipelago.65 Earlier, on November 22, 2011, Hunan Province government authorities reportedly issued a license to a travel company to send tourists to the Paracel Island. This action was immediately protested by a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson who declared that every foreign activity that occurs there withoutthecountryspermissionisaviolationofitssovereignty.66 OnMarch12,2012anotherdisputebrokeoutwhenprovincialauthoritiesinKhanh Hoa province announced they were sending six Buddhist monks to reestablish templesthathadfallenintodisrepairontheSpratlyIslands.67 On March 15, 2012 Vietnams Foreign Ministry accused China of violating its sovereignty by permitting the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to open bidding for nineteen oil exploration blocks near the Paracel Islands. Vietnam specificallysingledoutBlock65/24;thisblockisthesouthernmostoffshoreareathat

WallStreetJournal,March1,2012;AssociatedPress,VietnamproteststoChinaoverallegedassaulton fishermen in disputed waters, The Washington Post, March 1, 2012; and Reuters, China justifies expulsionofillegalVietnamfishermen,March1,2012;
63 64

AnhNgoc,VietNamyeucauTrungQuocthangayngudanvatauca,TheGioi,March21,2012.

Reuters,ChinadetainsVietnamesefishermenindisputedSouthChinaSea,TheTimesofIndia,March 22, 2012; Agence FrancePresse, Vietnam, China in new spat over fishermen detentions, March 22, 2012;MarianneBrown,ChinaUrgesVietnamtoStopllegalPoachingNearDisputedWaters,Voiceof AmericaNews,March22,2012.
65 66

UCANews,China,VietnamInSovereigntySpatInSouthChinaSea,EurasiaReview,March16,2012.

HeDan,Xishatourismtobedeveloped,ChinaDaily,March102012andVietnamcondemnsChina fortourismactivityonarchipelago,ThanhNienNews,November25,2011. BBC News Asia, Vietnam to send Buddhist monks to Spratly Islands, March 12, 2012 and Benjamin Cost, Occupy Spratly Islands! Vietnamese monks sent to live on disputed South China Sea territory, http://shanghaiist.com/2012/03/13/.AccessedMarch14,2012.
67

23 Chinaisseekingtodevelop.Vietnamalsocomplainedaboutlivefiringexercisesalso conductedinwatersaroundtheParacels.68

Inaddition,VietnamandthePhilippineshaveagreedtoconductjointmaritimepatrols in waters where the two countries have overlapping claims, according to a statement released by the Philippines Navy.69 This agreement was reached during discussions between Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command Vice Admiral Alexander Pama and Vietnam Peoples Army Navy Commander Admiral Nguyen Van Hien held in Vietnam fromMarch1114,2012.Thetwonavieswillconductjointnavalpatrolsundertheterms oftheSOP[StandardOperatingProcedures]onPersonnelInteractionintheVicinityof SoutheastCayandtheNortheastCayIslandbetweentheVPN[VietnamPeoplesNavy] and PN [Philippine Navy] as spelled out in a Memorandum of Agreement reached in October 2011. Admirals Pama and Hien also signed a MOU on the Enhancement of Mutual Cooperation and Information Sharing between the two navies; the MOU includesaprovisionforahotlinebetweentheoperationscentresofthetwonaviesand possiblecooperationinshipbuilding. In response to these developments, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a standard statement that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their adjacent waters. China is firmly opposed to other countries acts that undermineChinassovereignty.MaintainingpeaceandstabilityoftheSouthChinaSea isinlinewiththecommonandfundamentalinterestsofallcountriesinthisregion.The Foreign Ministry statement also repeated a formulation used on past occasions: [w]e hoperelevantcountrieswillearnestlyabidebythespiritoftheDeclarationonConduct ofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea(DOC)signedbetweenChinaandASEANcountriesnd refrainfromtakingactionsthatwillcomplicateandamplifytheSouthChinaSeaissueor impairpeaceandstabilityoftheSouthChinaSea.704.

Conclusion
This section concludes with a discussion of how the interplay of diplomacy, legal regimes and realpolitik in the regions security architecture has so far been unable to
Associated Press, Vietnam accuses China of violating sovereignty, Newsday March 15, 2012; Brian Spegele,VietnamProtestsCnoocsPlansinDisputedSouthChinaSea,TheWallStreetJournal,March 16, 2012; Bloomberg News, Vietnam Says Cnoocs South China Sea Bids Violate Territory, March 16, 2012;UCANNews,China,VietnamInSovereigntySpatInSouthChinaSea,EurasiaReview,March16, 2012; Voice of AmericaNews, China Detains Vietnamese Fishermen in NewSouthChinaSeaDispute, March 21, 2012; Agence FrancePresse, China holding 21 Vietnamese fishermen: official, March 21, 2012. Rene Acosts, PHL, Vietnam navies to jointly patrol Spratlys, Business Mirror, March 27, 2012 and BarbaraMaeDacanay,PhilippinesandVietnamagreetoholdjointwargamesintheSouthChinaSea, GulfNews,April1,2012. QuotedinPiaLeeBrago,ChinabucksjointdrillsofPhl,Vietnam,ThePhilippineStar,April1,2012.See also:ShannonVanSant,ChinaWarnsAgainstJointExercisesinSouthChinaSea,VoiceofAmericaNews, March29,2012andKyodo,ChinawarnsVietnam,Philippinesagainstdamagingpeaceinsea,Mainichi, March302012.
70 69 68

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address the core issue: conflicting sovereignty claims. The discussion below highlights that the major multilateral institutions ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence MinistersMeetingPlusandEastAsiaSummitareunabletoaddressthenexusbetween legalregimesandrealpolitikinfashioningadurablesettlement. Since its establishment in 1967 ASEAN has sought to promote the twin goals of Southeast Asia autonomy and ASEANs centrality in the regions security affairs. As an illustrationoftheformer,ASEANadoptedtheZoneofPeace,FreedomandNeutralityin 1971, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty in 1995. As an example of the latter, ASEAN initiated the ASEANRegionalForumin1994,theEastAsiaSummitin2005toincludeIndia,Australia andNewZealand,andtheADMMPlusin2010. ASEANsattempttopromoteSoutheastAsianautonomyanditscentralroleinsecurity affairs often comes under pressure by the centrifugal forces of the engagement strategiespursuedbyChinaandtheUnitedStates.Nowhereisthismoreapparentthan inthemaritimedomainwheretensionsinChinaU.S.relationhavebeentransmittedto Southeast Asia and overlay tensions in relations between China and ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea. Maritime security has now emerged as the main issue facingASEANanditsrelationswiththemajorpowers. Although ASEAN has set itself the goal of becoming an ASEAN Community by 2015 composed of three pillars (PoliticalSecurity Cooperation, Economic Cooperation and SocioCultural Cooperation) it is highly unlikely that ASEAN will develop a common foreign policy or common security and defence policy by that deadline. The reality of ASEANcentric security cooperation is that it coexists and overlays the security alignments of its individual members. Thailand and the Philippines are treaty allies of the United States, Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, while Singapore is a close strategic partner of the U.S. ASEAN is also divided on South China Sea issues between the four claimant states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) and the nonclaimant states. Even among the four claimantstatestherearedifferencesbetweenthePhilippinesandVietnamontheone handandMalaysiaandBruneiontheother.Theformeraremoreproactiveinresisting Chineseassertiveness,whilethelattermaintainaverylowkeyprofile. RegionalforcemodernizationcombinedwithtensionsintheSouthChinaSeahasraised thesalienceofmaritimesecurityissues.ASEANfacesthetwinprospectsthat(1)major power tensions will continue to be transmitted into Southeast Asia and (2) ASEANs centralityintheregionssecurityarchitecturecouldbeunderminedbyamajorpower takingunilateralactiontodealwithsecuritychallengesinthemaritimedomain. ASEAN has the means to position itself between the global powers to mitigate the spilloveroftheirrivalryinitsmaritimedomain.InMay2006,ASEANDefenceMinisters metforthefirsttimeandbegantheprocessofinstitutionalizingdefencecooperationon a regional basis. This enabled a new structure to emerge that now forms part of the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Council under the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Defence

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MinistersMeeting(ADMM)becamethecapstoneoverwhatwereinformalmeetingsof thearmy,airforce,navyandmilitaryintelligencechiefs. At present practical guidance to ASEAN Defence Ministers and their subordinates to addressmaritimesecurityissuesasapriorityappearstobelackingandtheprospectfor practicalcooperationamongASEANnaviesdoesnotappeargood.Atthe4thADMMin May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries. Little has been done to implement this agreement. At the most recent ASEANNavyChiefsMeeting(ANCM5)inVietnaminJuly2011therewasdisagreement overanumberofissuesincludingtheformalnameofthemeeting,howoftenitshould meet, the conduct of joint patrols and a proposal for an ASEAN communications protocolwhennavyshipspassedeachotheratsea.71 ASEAN has also initiated other mechanisms to deal with maritime security. In 1994 ASEAN took the initiative to form the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF has successfullycarriedoutalivedisasterreliefexercise(ARFDiREx).InMarch2011theARF established the InterSessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security. The ISM on Maritime Securitys Work Plan on Maritime Security was approved at the 44th ASEAN MinisterialMeetinginJuly2011.72Itfocusesoninformationsharing,capacitybuilding, andtraining.Accordingtoonespecialist: Theseforums[theARFandtheASEANMaritimeForum(seeblow)]haveresultedin coordinated training and patrols among navies, arrangements to authorize hot pursuitintothemaritimeterritoryofothercountries,streamliningportoperations and security procedures and building a Maritime Electronic Highway that would monitor and identify the movement of all shipping along the Malacca Strait. All thosepreventivemeasureshavebeeneffectivesofar.73 Nevertheless the ARF has not addressed the potentially disruptive impacts of current regionalforcemodernizationprograms.Indeed,in1995aproposaltocreatearegional armsregisterhasyettobeadopted. In2010,ASEANestablishedtheASEANMaritimeForum(AMF)underthetermsofthe ASEAN Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.74 The AMF is focused on a
71

Forgeneralreportssee:JoycePangco,VietnamasksAseannaviestouniteamidChinaforays,Manila Standard Today, November 24, 2011 and Viet Nam News Service, ASEAN navy chiefs advance co operation,MaritimeSecurityAsia,July28,2011.

ASEANRegionalForum,DraftOutlineofaWorkPlanonMaritimeSecurity:ATemplateforDiscussion, 2ndARFISMonMaritimeSecurity,Auckland,March2931,2010;CoChairsSummaryoftheThirdARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44th AM/PMC/18th ARF, Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18th ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia,Point41.
73 74

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AgusHaryanto,MaritimesecuritycooperationinSoutheastAsia,TheJakartaPost,February8,2012.

HanoiPlanofActiontoImplementtheASEANRegionalForumVisionStatement,May20,2010,Point 3.

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comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not dealt with either maritimesecurityorSouthChinaSeaissuesindetail.75TheAMF(alongiththeARF)has, however,goneintoextensivediscussionsonstrategiestomanagepiracy;thesmuggling ofgoods,peopleandnarcotics;terrorismandmarinedisasters.76Thesecondmeeting of the AMF was held in Thailand in August 2011 and proposed expanding its membershiptoincludedialoguepartnersinaseparatemeeting(AMFPlus). More significantly, in October 2010 ASEAN inaugurated the ASEAN Defence Ministers MeetingPlus(ADMMPlus).ThismeetingapprovedthecreationoftheASEANDefence Senior Officials Meeting Plus (ADSOM Plus) and five expert working groups.77 The ADMM Plus agreed tomeeteverythreeyearswith the second meeting scheduled for Bruneiin2013.Ayearafteritsestablishment,thetermsofreferencefortheADMMPlus ExpertsWorkingGrouponMaritimeSecuritywasapproved.Thisgroupwillnowreport its deliberations to the ADSOM Plus. In order to be effective, the ADMM Plus process mustbespeededupwithatleastannualmeetings.ThesecondADMMPlusmeetingwill conveneinBruneiin2013. The Inaugural ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security (EWG on MS) metinPerthfrom2022July2011.Discussedthebigpictureofmaritimesecurity,role ofdefenceinmaritimesecuritymanagement,sharinginformationonmaritimesecurity threats and challenges, and proposed activities on how to address those challenges. Twomaritimespecialistswereinvitedtoaddressthemeeting.AustraliasSamBateman gaveapresentationonMaritimeSecurityChallengesintheAsiaPacificwhileMalaysias Mohammed Nizzam Basiron spoke on Regional Maritime Security Deficits and Vulnerabilities.ItwasagreedthattheEWGonMSwouldmeettwiceayear. The2ndEWGonMSmetinKotaKinabalu,Sabahfrom810February2012.Themeeting focusedonspecificinitiativesfordefenceandmilitarypracticalcooperationtoenhance capacitybuildingonmaritimesecurity.MalaysiapresentedaproposalConceptPaper, ADMMPlus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security Future Development. This paperoutlinedtheestablishmentofamechanismtosupportworkoftheEWGonMS andtoimplementitsdecisions.Malaysiaalsopresentedapaperonthedevelopmentof apreventionofincidentsatseaagreementfortheSouthChinaSea.MIMAandtheRAN Sea Power Centre were tasked to develop a webbased mechanism for advancing the workoftheEWGonMS. Themeetingtriedtoidentifythecommonareasofcooperationasawayforward.The meetingconcludedwithadiscussiononscenariobasedworkshoponMaritimeSecurity tobeheldbacktobackatthe3rdEWGonMSscheduledforAugustinMalaysia.
75

Chairs Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime Cooperation). AgusHaryanto,MaritimesecuritycooperationinSoutheastAsia,TheJakartaPost,February8,2012.

76 77

HumanitarianAssistanceandDisasterRelief;MaritimeSecurity;Peacekeeping;CounterTerrorism;and MilitaryMedicine.

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Finally,inNovember2011theASEANinitiatedEASwasexpendedtoincludetheUnited States and Russian Federation. This expansion brought the EAS into congruence with ADMMPlusprocessasbothincludethesameeighteenmembers.Asnotedabove,China tried to keep maritime security/South China Sea issues off the agenda. They were successfulasfarastheplenarysessionoftheEAS,buttheEASinformalleadersretreat was another matter. According to a background briefing provided by a U.S. senior administrationofficial: Butthebulkofthediscussionswereaveryrobustconversationonmaritimesecurity andtheSouthChinaSea.Bymyreckoning,16ofthe18leadersaddressedmaritime security in varying levels of specificity. And most of them talked specifically about the South China Sea. The early speakers were included ASEAN members Singapore,Philippines,Vietnam,Malaysia,Thailand,aswellasAustraliaandIndia. AllofthesecountriesspokedirectlytotheSouthChinaSea.Theonlytwocountries thatdidntmentionmaritimesecurityissueCambodiaandBurma There was widespread consensus on a number of principles. Not every leader invoked every single principle, but certainly the earlier speakers were more extensive and more fulsome And as the sequence of speakers unspooled, increasinglyleadersreferredtopreviouscommentsandassociatedthemselveswith whatotherleadershadsaidratherthangoingthroughanexplication Several leaders, including the Russian Foreign Minister, and most importantly the Chairman of the EAS, President Yudhoyono of Indonesia, pointedly said that they thoughtmaritimesecurityissueswereappropriateandimportantissuesfortheEAS todiscuss.78 In East Asia, diplomacy and legal regimes serve to a certain extent to modify state behaviour, but state behaviour is largely motivated and constrained by realpolitik. MaritimesecurityissueshavebeendiscussedbyASEANmemberstatesthemselves(i.e., the four claimant states and the six nonclaimant states) and ASEAN is committed to promoting a legal regime based on the implementation of the 2002 DOC and a more bindingCodeofConduct. MaritimesecurityissuesintheSouthChinaSeaalsoarebeingaddressedbytheASEAN Maritime Forum, the ARFs InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security and by the ExpertWorkingGrouponMaritimeSecurityestablishedbytheADMMPlusprocess.In addition,maritimesecurityissueshavebeenaddressedattheEastAsiaSummit.Allof these processes have yet to move beyond confidence building measures. When traditionalmaritimesecurityissuesarisetheyaregenerallyaddressedbilaterallyathigh
BackgroundBriefingbyaSeniorAdministrationOfficialonthePresidentsMeetingsatASEANandEast AsiaSummit,AboardAirForceOneEnRouteAndersonAirForceBase,Guam,TheWhiteHouse,Officeof thePressSecretary,November192011.
78

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levelmeetingsamongthestatesconcernedat(ChinaUS,USJapanSouthKorea,China Japanetc.). In summary, the rise of China has raised the importance of maritime security for all statesinSoutheastAsia.Chinaisatthecentreofallthemajorchallengestomaritime securitydiscussedinthispaper.ThishasresultedinregionalstatesturningtotheUnited StatestobalanceChina.Thiscouldresultinthetransmissionofgreatpowerrivalryinto Southeast Asia and undermine the regions autonomy as well as ASEANs centrality in theregionalsecurityarchitecture. SoutheastAsiastatesarealsohedgingagainstChinasrisebymodernizingtheirarmed forces.Thishasledtotheproliferationofsubmarinesandantishipmissiles.According to one think tank, regional Sea Lines of Communication are set to become more crowded,contestedandvulnerabletoarmedstrife.79Inotherwordsrealpolitiklooks set to trump diplomacy and legal regimes in the construction of regional order. However,ifagreementcouldbereachedtogivetheEastAsiaSummitresponsibilityfor oversight over the regions multilayered security architecture it may be possible to fashion a regional order based on a judicious mix of diplomacy, legal regimes and realpolitik.

RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3.
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RecentPapersbyCarlyleA.ThayerontheSouthChinaSea
Availableathttp://www.scribd.com/carlthayer Maritime Strategic Overview of the AsiaPacific Region, Paper delivered to the InauguralInternationalMaritimeSecurityConference,cosponsoredbytheRepublicof Singapore Navy and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore ExpositionandConferenceCentre,Singapore,May1314,2009. Recent Developments in the South China Sea Implications for Peace, Stability and CooperationintheRegion,PaperpresentedtoInternationalWorkshoponTheSouth China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, coorganised by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers Association, Hanoi, November2728,2009. Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Peace and Prosperity,Paperpresentedtothe2ndInternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, cosponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers Association, New World Saigon Hotel, HoChiMinhCity,Vietnam,November1213,2010. The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea, Paper to International Studies Association 52nd Annual Convention. Montral,Qubec,Canada.March1619,2011. Chinas New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea, Paper to International Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea, Center for StrategicandInternationalStudies,Washington,D.C.,June2021,2011. SecurityCooperationintheSouthChinaSea:AnAssessmentofRecentTrends,Paper to the First Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward a Region of Peace, Cooperation, and Progress, cosponsored by the Foreign Service Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and National Defense College, Dusit Thani Hotel, Makati City, MetroManila,ThePhilippines,July56,2011. ChinaASEAN and the South China Sea: Chinese Assertiveness and Southeast Asian Responses,,PapertointernationalconferenceonMajorandPolicyIssuesintheSouth ChinaSea:EuropeanandAmericanPerspectives,cosponsoredbyInstituteofEuropean and American Studies and Centre for AsiaPacific Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan,October69,2011. WilltheGuidelinestoImplementtheDOCLessenTensionsintheSouthChinaSea?An Assessment of Developments Before and After Their Adoption, Paper to 3rd InternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea,cosponsoredbytheVietnamLawyers AssociationandDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November35,2011. Navigating the Currents of Legal Regimes and Realpolitik in East Asias Maritime Domain,PapertoInternationalConferenceonCooperationfortheSafetyofNavigation in East Asia: Legal Arrangements and Political Implications, organized by the National

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Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou City, Hainan Island, Peoples Republic of China,November1718,2011. MaritimeSecurityandtheRoleofNavalDiplomacyintheSouthChinaSea,Paperto MIMA Conference on the South China Sea: Recent Developments and Implications for Peaceful Dispute Resolution, The Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Royal Chulan Hotel, KualaLumpur,Malaysia,December1213,2011. PositioningASEANbetweenGlobalPowers,Presentationtothe14thRegionalOutlook Forum, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Shangrila Hotel, Singapore, January 5, 2012. The South China Sea Disputes and Their Impact on the Security Environment of SoutheastAsia:WhatLiesAhead?,PresentationtotheInternationalConferenceonthe PoliticalandSecurityImplicationsoftheSouthChinaSeaDispute,cosponsoredbythe CenterforAsiaPacificAreaStudiesandtheEastWestCenter,AcademiaSinica,Taipei, Taiwan,January1213,2012. Vietnams Security Outlook, Presentation to International Workshop on AsiaPacific Security,NationalInstituteforDefenseStudies,Tokyo,Japan,January1718,2012. Strategic Relations in Asia: An Overview, Presentation to 4th East Asia Security OutlookSeminar,SultanHajiHassanalBolkiahInstituteofDefenceandStrategicStudies, MinistryofDefence,BandarSeriBegawan,BruneiDarussalam,February2,2012. "TheRiseofChinaandMaritimeSecurityinSouthEastAsia,"Presentationto11thIDE Forum, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Headquarters,ArkBuilding,Akasaka,Tokyo,February9,2012. Efforts to Ensure Maritime Security, Presentation to 2nd Tokyo Defense Forum Seminar, organized by the Ministry of Defense, Galaxy, Chinzanso, Tokyo, March 16, 2012. Do Confidence Building Measures Really Address the Major Challenges to Maritime Security?, Presentation to Joint Meeting of the 36th Australia Council for Security Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (AUS CSCAP) Meeting and The Australian National University Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (ANUCEPS) Maritime Expert Networks Meeting, The Common Room, University House, The Australian National University,Canberra,March2223,2012.