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What is scientific realism? Critically discuss Laudans view that since past theories have consistently been wrong about their objects, we should not be realists.

I would define scientific realism as belief in a true ontology of things in the world which successful scientific theory accurately describes. This is opposed to the anti-realist belief that our theoretical ontology consists of artificial constructs which model observable phenomena. The question seems to be whether phenomena lead us to discover the unobservable entities that we think of as existing or whether we invent them. For realists, saving the phenomena is not a sufficient account of truth. Realism turns on the intuitive notion of truth as a mirroring of the structure of things by the structure of ideas (van Frassen 1998). Thus realism stipulates that a theory is true only if the entities which it posits really exist and if they have the characteristics that the theory says they do. In applying this notion of truth we are led to a certain epistemological view of past and present scientific theories based on an assumed connection between success, reference and approximate truth (Laudan 1981). Laudan calls this standpoint convergent epistemological realism (ibid) and sums it up in five central points: R1: Scientific theories (at least in the mature sciences) are typically approximately true and more recent theories are closer to the truth than older theories in the same domain. (ibid P.20) R2: The observational and theoretical terms within the theories of a mature science genuinely refer. (ibid) R3: Successive theories in any mature science will be such that they preserve the theoretical relations and the apparent referents of earlier theories. (ibid) R4: Acceptable new theories do and should explain why their predecessors were successful insofar as they were successful. (ibid) R5: Theses R1-R4 entail that scientific theories should be successful; indeed these theses constitute the best, if not the only, explanation for the success of science. The empirical success of science accordingly provides striking empirical confirmation for realism. (ibid) The intuition behind this epistemology is, I think, a commonly held one. Science, most would accept, seems to be continually making progress in its search for truth; continually improving on the explanatory power and predictive accuracy of its theories. For realists, there is an obvious explanation for this- science is building up a picture of the world that is gradually converging toward the true picture. The axioms underlying this view are outlined

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in R1-R4. The main realist argument (sometimes referred to as the ultimate argument) is that the assumptions R1-R2 have a causal explanatory role in accounting for the success of science and that without them we are forced to view this success as miraculous or unexplained (ibid). Thus the realist argument for the referential and approximately true nature of our scientific theories is an abductive argument (i.e. an inference to the best explanation) of the following form: 1. If scientific theories are approximately true, they will typically be empirically successful. (ibid P.21) 2. If the central terms in scientific theories genuinely refer, those theories will generally be empirically successful. (ibid) 3. Scientific theories are empirically successful. (ibid) 4. (Probably) Theories are approximately true and their terms genuinely refer. (ibid)

Clearly this reasoning can also be applied to past theories which enjoyed a great deal of empirical success but which are no longer considered accurate by the scientific community. Realists hold that, although we no longer accept such theories, insofar as they were successful, this was because they were approximately true and (at least most of) their central terms genuinely referred. This is the rationale for R3-R4. In keeping with their view of science as gradually building up a true picture of the world, realists argue that old theories shouldnt be (and arent) simply discarded when a more successful theory comes along (ibid). Rather, the new theory must be such that it is compatible with the old theory inasmuch as it allows for the theoretical ontology of the original to be preserved and the relations between these entities maintained as a limiting case of the new theory (ibid). If they are completely incompatible then the new theory cannot be accepted as this would be inconsistent with the assumption that the old theory was successful as a result of being approximately true and genuinely referential. In Laudans view, the first two premises above (in bullet-points) are spurious and at odds with the historical record; Are genuinely referential theories invariably or even generally successful at the empirical level? There is ample evidence that they are not. (ibid). He points to the chemical atomic theory of the 18th century, the Proutian atomic theory and the Wegenerian theory of continental drift. All of these theories posit entities and describe processes that are now universally accepted and yet in their own time they were strikingly unsuccessful when subjected to empirical test. Indeed, Laudan argues, it stands to reason that this should be the case, given the looseness of the idea of reference. Going by Putnams standard, which holds that a theory is genuinely referential provided there are entities which approximately fit the theorys description of

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them (Putnam 1981), Laudan says that such a theory need not be such that all- or even most-of the specific claims it makes about the properties of those entities and their modes of interaction are true (Laudan 1981). He cites Daltons atomic theory and Bohrs early theory of the electron as notable exemplars of this. Since it is these specific claims that are subject to empirical test, this seems to suggest that there is little necessity to the relationship between reference and success at the empirical level. But it is precisely this necessity that justifies the inference from success to reference and approximate truth, and thus the whole argument for realism. It should at least be highly improbable that a theory which is wrong about its objects should be empirically successful. However, as Laudan points out, there are many examples of such theories, of which the most striking are the aether theories of the 19th century (ibid). This family of theories was used to explain an incredibly broad range of phenomena from the fields of electrical, chemical, heat and light theory. Optical aether theory even produced the startling (and correct) prediction of a bright spot at the centre of the shadow of a circular disc (what Popper might call a risky prediction) (ibid). Laudan cites the remark of the theoretical physicist J.C. Maxwell, to the effect that the aether was better confirmed than any other theoretical entity in natural philosophy! (ibid).

Having thus called into question the epistemic justification for assuming that our scientific theories are approximately true and genuinely referential, Laudan has greatly undermined the realist argument for theory retention. If we cannot make the blanket assumption about our successful theories that they are fundamentally right about their objects, then we do not have a rationale for demanding of new theories that they preserve this ontology. Laudan also refutes the idea that it is the practice of science generally to do so. In fact, he says that some of the most important theoretical innovations have been due to a willingness of scientists to violate the cumulationist or retentionist constraint which realists enjoin mature sciences to follow (ibid P.39). He points to the adoption of the wave theory of light (in place of the corpuscular theory) and of Darwinian evolutionary theory as examples of such innovations. These innovations only came about, Laudan argues, by virtue of the fact that the strategy of science is to accept an empirically successful theory, regardless of whether it contains the theoretical laws and mechanisms of its predecessors (ibid P.38). According to Laudan, realist principles of retention are too inflexible to allow for the natural development of science. The limiting case relation that realists believe obtains between old and new theories is, he says, more stringent than they realise. In order to be a genuine limiting case, he says, the new theory must assign values (equal or similar values- within certain boundary conditions) to all variables contained in its predecessor as well as preserving the full original ontology and all of the original laws (ibid). By this standard, even the realists much cited

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exemplar of theoretical preservation, the transition from classical to post-classical mechanics is not a perfect limiting case relation (ibid). This is, I think, Laudans most damning criticism of scientific realism. Far from being an epistemology of progress to truth, his analysis shows it up as one of stagnation. He establishes quite convincingly that if scientists took realism seriously, any prospect for deep-structure, ontological changes in our theories would be foreclosed (ibid P.42). His criticism of R1-R2 was a little less convincing, I found. While it is certainly true that he cast doubt on the idea that reference entails success, he was not able to conclusively refute it. This was partly because he was attempting the arduous task of refuting an empirical hypothesis about the record of reference, approximate truth and success in science (one which he admits required greater investigation than could be done within the confines of the essay) (ibid). The viability of R1-R2 seems to have been left a bit of an open question. It is also worth noting that almost all of the examples that he gives of the success of nonreferring theories and of the failure of genuinely referring theories are taken from the 19 th century or earlier. We may reasonably ask how the standard of empirical test to which these theories were subjected measures up to the modern standard. In the interim, the ability of scientists to accurately and extensively test their hypotheses has dramatically increased. Science has also become a much more cohesive unit, which means that theories are subject to the need to be consistent with a much larger and broader body of theoretical knowledge. One could perhaps argue that empirical success in the 19th century and empirical success in the 21st century are not really comparable. At the same time, our core theoretical ontology seems to have become more cemented. If correct, this observation might support the counter-argument that modern science is essentially retentionist and that Laudans examples are anachronisms. Personally, I found Laudans logical arguments much more convincing than his empirical arguments as they seemed to come closer to the heart of the issue. For me, the problem with realism is not its faith in the approximate truth of scientific theories but how it accounts for that truth. The confused notion of truth as contingent on reference leads one to think that, if we are to accept that science gradually progresses towards truth, we must be able to show that its theoretical ontology gradually progresses towards one true ontology. It is this misguided intuition that makes retentionist principles of theory-change, shown here by Laudan to be incompatible with the scientific method, appear necessary. What this points to, in my opinion, is the need for a positivist account of the truth conditions of scientific theories. This would allow us to dispense with the idea of reference altogether. Instead, we can think of theories simply as explanatory models which entail what Quine calls observation conditionals (Quine 1975 P.318). Science, on this view, is not a search for the answer but rather a search for increasingly accurate models. Theories are privileged only by virtue of empirical success. This perspective has the advantage of allowing us to avoid concerns about retention and the methodological bias that comes with them.

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The so-called ultimate argument has no force against this. Our models work simply because they are modelled on the behaviour of phenomena. No further explanation is required. I find this a much more satisfactory account of success than the causal explanatory one put forward by realists, with its murky concepts of reference and approximate truth.

Bibliography

B. van Frassen (1998), in M. Curd and C. Grover, Philosophy of Science; The Central Issues ,W.W. Norton and Co. Ltd, London L. Laudan (1981), A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science Vol. 48, University of Chicago Press H. Putnam (1981) in Laudan, A Confutation Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science Vol. 48, University of Chicago Press W. Quine (1975), On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World, Erkenntnis Vol.9