INTRODUCTION This brief was drafted by non-attorney Appellants.

Appellants have made every attempt to comply with any and all applicable Rules of the Court and Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure at all times. Objections to key purported evidence in the circuit court were timely made and preserved for appeal. The record extract contains all things "necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal and includes the judgment appealed from, contrary to Tretick v. Layman, 95 Md. App. 62, 1992 or Rogers v. Baker, 77 Md. App. 1988. Citations to the record are thorough and legal assertions are supported by cited case law with Appendices when applicable. If there are any mistakes in Appellants brief, Appellants will amend to conform to the rules. Appellants sit in the same shoes as the litigants in Bank of NY v. Walden, 751 NYS 2d 341, 2002 NY Misc LEXIS 1513 (2002) and in Stovall v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106137 (September 20, 2011) as shall be demonstrated later in this Brief and it is axiomatic to American Jurisprudence that this appeal be heard on the merits with a de novo standard of review. Foreclosure and mortgage servicing fraud is rampant across the country and has been exposed as a national epidemic. Lives have been destroyed and families torn apart, resulting in divorce, suicide, substance abuse, depression, homelessness, and a host of other social ills; the direct result of the fraud of the banks (masked as irregularities) upon the people, aided by a complicit, uninformed, and/or apathetic government, complicit media, and complicit attorneys, looking out for their own self interest. Contrary to public perception and myth, molded daily by the controlled media, this is 1

not about irresponsible or greedy deadbeat homeowners who cant honor their obligations or carry their weight, as the same tired sound bites, and boilerplate, scorched earth, foreclosure mill pleadings would have one believe. This is about a very complex fraud that most persons, including state and federal judges, and many foreclosure defense attorneys, barely comprehend. The self described maxim the more complex the fraud, the easier it is to hide rings true in the area of foreclosure, securitization, and mortgage servicing fraud. If one remembers back to the BCCI scandal, ..it proves an old maxim: The best way to launder money is to own a bank. Or, bank, mortgage company, real estate brokerage or investment business. (Appendix (App) 1 p.2). Appellant Todd Wetzelberger, a former deep sea diver that worked in the energy business in the Gulf of Mexico during the Enron scandal (very similar swindle), and 15 yr veteran real estate investor and developer, with an MBA and finance background, has developed intimate knowledge of foreclosure, securitization, and mortgage servicing fraud as Appellant invested over 5,000 hours investigating and exposing the how to aspects of the fraud, aided and abetted by unknowing or complicit courts over the past several years. BACKGROUND ON MONEY TO UNDERSTAND THE CASE Heres how the scam works. Its about the note, not the house. Contrary to what unscrupulous foreclosure mill attorneys with no first hand knowledge claim, this is not theory, it is fact. The house is merely the vehicle to perpetrate the fraud via an illegal foreclosure sale. The fraud being the illegal conversion of the homeowners personal property (original note) from a promise to pay into a draft/ security, and subsequent securitization and sale for

multiple times the face amount of the note (App 13 p.6 d,e,f) (Extract (E) 167 p. 39 L4-17, p.40 L 14-18). The ill gotten profits from the sale of the homeowners personal property (unjust enrichment) do not include the additional profits collected via multiple unregulated insurance contracts (credit default swaps) (App 13 p.5) on pools of notes that allegedly defaulted. The bifurcated recorded copy of the mortgage/DOT (rendering it void) (E. 167 p 39 L 22-25, p. 40 L 1-4) is pledged as collateral by county governments to purchase securities through the collection of ad valorem taxes. The homeowners note and credit, not the bank, funded the whole transaction. The bank never put one cent at risk, and the purported contract fails for lack of consideration in violation of MD Comm. Law Art. 3-303(b) (E. 23 3-6). The bank suffered no injury as a condition precedent to commence either a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. (App 2 p.1-2, App 3 p. 3-6) Due to the United States bankruptcy of 1933 and abrogation of the gold clause as evidenced by Public Law 73-10, 31 U.S.C. 3123, 5103, and treaty law (UNCITRAL and Universal Postal Union) debt instruments circulate as functional money in our present fiat currency system. The attached Appendix 4 explains the complex financial arrangement on which our country functions. (App-4) No person of the U.S. can lawfully pay for anything, as gold and silver no longer circulate as currency. The current private Federal Reserve (they are no more federal than Federal Express) debt money system is a topic for another brief, but suffice it to say that all one can do is pass on the debt (i.e. Fed Reserve notes- FRNs) to the next person to pay for goods and services.

Since the U.S. currency is no longer backed by tangible gold and silver, those FRNs and other debt instruments (i.e. homeowners note) circulate as money and have value because they are backed by the full faith and credit of the American people; whose labor and property have been pledged to support the currency and allow the country to operate. If all the working people of America decided to stay home from their jobs and businesses for a few months and lay on the couch eating bonbons while watching television, the current U.S. debt money system would come crashing down. If anyone is watching economic events unfold domestically and around the world, (Greece protests, Italys Unicredit imminent collapse, teachers protesting pension cuts in WI) its very close to that point now. If one researches the phrase history of money, as Appellants did many years ago, one would discover that every economy that operated on a fiat debt money system, since the Romans began the practice in the first century, eventually collapsed, with no exceptions. One only has to look at pre-WWII Germany to see a recent example of that fact. Per the un-rebutted preceding facts, homeowners original, genuine, wet ink signature notes are money in the current system. They are the same as the FRNs in ones pocket, only with more zeros. Banks, through sleight of hand, creating the appearance of lending money, dupe the homeowner into signing the all important original note (fraud in the inducement), thinking they received a loan, when in fact they just created a publicly issued debt instrument (30 yr bond) that is discounted (original issue discount) to its present face value (i.e. amount of purported loan).

Without express or implied consent by the homeowner, their instrument is then illegally converted (alteration voids the note) by indorsing the note pay to the order of.. without recourse.. in violation of MD Comm. Law Art 3-407(a) and (b) (E. 24 9,11). Per MD Comm. Law Art. 4-406, the customer has a duty to discover and report an unauthorized signature or alteration. That is exactly what Appellants did (E. 12-22, E. 25 17). This goes well beyond the mere changing of a date witnessed in cases like Placido v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., No. 128, September Term, 1977, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 38 Md. App. 33; 379 A.2d 773; 1977 Md. App. LEXIS 350; 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 113, November 10, 1977. Via the magic of fractional reserve banking, that note is hypothecated (pledged to borrow multiple times the face amount), and/or securitized (depending on whether its a residential or commercial portfolio note) and is used by the bank or the SPV (special purpose vehicle) or REMIC (real estate mortgage investment conduit) to fund further instruments and securities (derivatives) via false statements to the bondholders on the back end (i.e. AAA rated toilet paper sold to unwitting investors and pension funds). The irony is that those same state pension funds that judges in every state are vested in, were also duped into investing in those very same bogus derivatives, CDOs, CMOs, hedge funds, credit default swaps, and bank stocks of the very banks that continue to swindle homeowners on a daily basis. For evidence of this fact, see the line item investments in public record CAFRs (comprehensive annual financial report) on state pension funds for each state. The entire money system is one big, bloated, ponzi scheme that dwarfs the Madoff ponzi scheme 1000 fold. At the base of the scheme is the unwitting homeowner/consumer who

must continue consuming to keep the scheme afloat. Since original notes are money in the current system, this explains why original notes are never returned to the homeowner when the purported loan is paid off (conversion and theft) (E 167, p. 39 L 3-16). In pursuit of the media fueled illusion of the American Dream, the homeowner was made an unwitting third party to an undisclosed investment contract via the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) (E. 169 p. 51 L 18-23), thereby violating the Statute of Frauds per MD Comm. Article Sec. 1-206. (E. 118 4, E. 119 7, E. 121 11,) Further, courts across the country are making rulings by applying UCC Article 3 with regard to alleged holders of notes, when in fact UCC Article 8 controls per UCC and MD Comm. Law Art 4-102, and must be applied when there is a conflict since the note was converted into a security. Assuming arguendo, Article 3 of UCC did apply, both articles are addressed in the Notice of Adverse Claim. (E. 122-132). The recent Maryland decision in Anderson v. Burson is flawed in that Anderson mistakenly admitted default, and Article 3 was improperly applied when Article 8 controls. Despite the fact that the bank, purported originator, or lender with unequal bargaining power; never risked a penny; never provided valuable consideration (a necessary element for a lawful contract per MD Comm. Law. Art. 3-303(b)); never disclosed material facts (failure of meeting of the minds); engaged in fraud in the inducement through material omissions; illegally converted the homeowners personal property, generating multiple times the face amount of the note and generating additional proceeds from the mortgage/DOT (App 13 p.6 d,e,f); never suffered any injury; violated the Statute of Frauds; the fact that there

is no amount due and owing; the fact that the DOT and trusts created to pool notes violates the Uniform Trust Code 406, 707, 801; and the fact there was never a default, foreclosure mill attorneys across the country file sham complaints with boilerplate alleged pleadings violating Md. R. Civ. P. 2-303(e) (complaints are to be constructed to do substantial justice). Mere recitals and promises of Consideration having been given are insufficient. See Generally Venners v. Goldberg, 133 Md. App. 428 (200). Summary judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded. The recital for monies received in the note constituted prima facie proof the note was supported by consideration but did not establish conclusive presumption to that effect, and parol evidence could be admitted to prove the contrary. Defense of lack of consideration could be raised in suit on negotiable instrument under seal. The sham filings allege a purported default; a purported amount due and owing; a copy of a fraudulently recorded DOT/mortgage that is bifurcated and void (App 6 p.8); copies or purported original notes (in truth color copies of scanned documents); bogus unsubstantiated affidavits with no first hand knowledge; no chain of custody of authenticated documents; no admissible evidence; and outright lies to the tribunal and to the homeowner. The legal maxim a thing similar is not exactly the same applies, in that originals were demanded by Appellants per MD Comm.Law Art. 3-308, and MD Evidence Rule 5-1002 (E. 25 14, 15, E. 161 p. 6 L 11-18, E. 168 p. 42 L 5-13, 22-23, p. 43 L 1-7) and should be demanded by every homeowner. Most unsophisticated homeowners, thinking they are deadbeats who cant pay their bills, or even the more sophisticated homeowners who are so far upside down they strategically default as a financial decision, simply walk away from the property despite the

fact that they were swindled. But that is not the proper route to take, as noted by Bank of NY v. Walden, 751 NYS 2d 341, 2002 NY Misc LEXIS 1513: The plaintiff attempts to portray the defendants as conniving, manipulative court-wise litigants bent on abusing the legal system. Rather, there is ample evidence that the practices of Delta and their cohorts were fraudulent, misleading and possibly criminal. The defendants are typical of the people preyed upon: working poor, minority homeowners with little or no experience in financial matters. (See Ex. B to defendants motion) Motion by attorney for Defendant' Walden for an Order restraining the execution of the eviction proceeding commenced under Index No. 639/02, in District Court, County of Nassau pending the final determination of this action, is granted.

The very small percentage who discover the fraud, and demand proof of claim and injury, as any reasonable person would, face well funded foreclosure mill attorneys, with foreclosure mill documents supplied by document mills like DocX and LPS (under investigation by the FL AG) (E. 42 5-12), and unwitting and/or complicit courts, who aid and abet the scheme under color of law. http://www.myfloridalegal.com/lit_ec.nsf/mortgage/9B099A9DD32030BE852577130 0426A68 Allegation or issue being investigated: Docx has produced numerous documents, called Assignments of Mortgage, that to even the untrained eye, appear to be forged and/or fabricated as the signatures of the same individual vary wildly from document to document. These documents are then used to gain standing for the plaintiff in a foreclosure suit. Subject corporations seem to be creating and manufacturing "bogus assignments" of mortgage in order that foreclosures may go through more quickly and efficiently. These documents appear to be forged, incorrectly and illegally executed, false and misleading. These documents are used in court cases as "real" documents of assignment and presented to the court as so, when it actually appears that they are fabricated in order to meet the demands of the institution that does not, in fact, have the necessary documentation to foreclose according to law. AG unit handling case: Economic Crimes Division in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida

The losers are forcibly removed from their home by coercion and threat of bodily harm at gunpoint by complicit sheriffs deputies, again acting under color of law, claiming Im just doing my job. The property is then sold to an unsuspecting new buyer (investor or homeowner) who unbeknownst to them has a defective title (App 5 p.3, p. 6-9), covered up by a complicit title company and complicit attorney who whitewashed the title abstract. In most cases, the new buyer, under the banks fraudulent claim they are a bona fide buyer (App 5 p.3), signs a new note (remember its about the note, NOT the house), despite the fact the bank never risked a penny of its own funds, funds of depositors, or bank credit. Title 12 U.S.C forbids it and Nowhere is the express authority given to the corporation to lend its own credit Gardiner Trust v. Augusta Trust, 134 Me. 191; 291 US 245. This final step completes the fraudulent money laundering cycle to be repeated all over again. Knowing that judges participate in pension funds in every state, and the fact that those very pension funds are invested in the same bank stocks, derivatives, swaps, CMOs, etc. issued by the very banks that are either suing to foreclose or being sued for their fraud, one has to question how impartial can the judiciary be when every judge has a pecuniary self-interest in the outcome of the case.
Its common public record knowledge that the purported justice system is corrupted beyond recognition.

Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has taken up the cause of reforming state judicial campaign and election systems, writing that the crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is real and growing. If left unaddressed, said O'Connor, the perception that justice is for sale will undermine the rule of law that courts are supposed to uphold. 9

O'Connor's comments came in her introduction of a new report which concludes that partisan and special interest groups have grown far more organized in their efforts to use judicial elections to tilt the scales of justice. Campaign fundraising for judicial elections more than doubled from $83.3 million in 1990-1999 to $206.9 million in 2000-2009, according to the report. http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/08/sandra_days_new_quest_stat e_judicial_reform.php. (E. 137-138 28) STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review as to all issues should be de novo. The initial order by Judge Nagle denying Appellants Motion for Declaratory Judgment on 27 September 2010 (E 57-59) that led to the subsequent order(s) from which this appeal is taken, was made erroneously, and only shortly before the news broke in the local media that Appellee Dore was caught filing fraudulent affidavits in foreclosure cases. Not only were there clear errors in the finding of fact, but also errors on conclusions of law that warrant a de novo review. What does clearly erroneous mean? In United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 333 U.S. 364 (1948), the Supreme Court gave this answer: A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. As the Supreme Court has observed, [T]he appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants have reported the fraud, along with supporting evidence to federal (FBI) (E 137 21, 22), state, and local law enforcement agencies, yet all have turned a deaf ear and in

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unison claimed this is a civil matter. In spite of the lack of action by law enforcement with a duty to investigate crimes reported to them, Appellants have continued to document and expose the fraud of the banks and their attorneys upon unwitting homeowners and the courts. A private attorney general action will fill the gap for failure of those with an oath and duty to enforce the law to do so. Due to the exposure of said fraud at great risk, Appellants have been personally attacked on multiple occasions. Those attacks have been aided and abetted by (hopefully unwitting) law enforcement acting under color of law. http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=jYZi2NFsq84&feature=player_embedded The pattern of attacking those that expose the fraud is common knowledge to those in this arena. Well known veteran foreclosure defense attorneys Matt Weidner and April Charney have been repeatedly attacked; as has Nye Lavalle, a member of the mainline Pew family, themselves victims of the same fraud, who has been exposing this very fraud for over 15 years. Neil Garfield, a 30 year veteran attorney, who worked on Wall Street, and expert in securitization fraud, has also been attacked in an attempt to discredit him for revealing the complex truth. Garfields declaration (App 13) is a must read in its entirety (several times) to fully understand the complex fraud. This appeal is the result of a fraudulent purported foreclosure case filed against Appellant in retaliation for exposing the fraud of the banks long before the sham case was filed. Further, be it known, in the classic phrase of Justice Cardozo, in Steelman v All Continent Corp., 301 US 278, 81 L. Ed 1085 Suits as well as transfers may be the protective coverings of fraud., that as in First National Bank v Flershem, 290 US 504, 78 L. ed. 465. The fact that the means employed to effect the fraudulent conveyance was the judgment of a court and not a voluntary transfer does not remove the taint of illegality. 11

It may not be desirable merely to assume the accuracy of a plaintiffs's factual assertions. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez 460 Mass. 762; 955 N.E.2d 884; 2011 Mass. LEXIS 918 (App 5 p.2, p.3) Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold and seek judicial redress. (Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 812 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]) Professor Siegel (NY Prac, 136, at 232 [4d ed]), instructs that: [i]t is the laws policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of standing to sue, in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a jurisdictional dismissal: (1) the courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a plaintiff found to lack standing is not involved in a controversy; and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a plaintiff purports to bring it. Acts of fraud taint/void everything it touches as the US Supreme Court has declared: There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. (United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61)" A. Nature of the Case This is an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court decision in error, purportedly ratifying a fraudulent sale allegedly ordered on 31 January 2011 (E. 93) but mysteriously not filed into the record until 16 February 2011, 12 days after the circuit court also summarily denied Appellants Show Cause Motion (E. 85-91) per MD Rule 14-207.1 without a hearing. Despite public record self authenticating admissible fact evidence (E. 94 16, -106) per MD Evidence Rule 5-902, of Apppellees fraud upon Appellants and the court, filed into the case by Appellants (E. 45-56), the circuit court refused to dismiss Appellees case. Appellees have proffered no admissible evidence, as a condition precedent per MD Rule 14-202(b),(c),(f),(k),(q) (E. 27 7,8,9, E. 28 15, , E. 95 17-21), from the day Appellees case was docketed, and have repeatedly ducked Appellants pre-petition discovery requests, served over 6 months prior to the fraudulent case being filed by Appellees (E. 26 12

19-21, E. 29 16,17, 19,20, E.30 21,24, E. 78-80) (App 8) (E. 161 p. 8 L 4-10). To add insult to injury, the circuit court again grossly erred by summarily refusing to grant Appellants Show Cause motion per MD Rule 14-207.1 (E. 85-92), filed on 4 February 2011, and Motion to Reconsider, without a hearing (E. 107-111, E.117), in flagrant violation of MD Rule 2-311(f). The circuit court doesnt follow its own rules when it doesnt suit the court. MD Rule 14-207.1 is designed to specifically address bogus affidavits filed by Appellee Thomas P. Dore as noted in this October 19, 2010 news story: http://thedailyrecord.com/2010/10/19/maryland-court-of-appeals-adopts-newforeclosure-rule/ To rebut the presumption that Appellants may have slumbered on their rights (which they did not), had Appellants been aware that MD Rule 14-207.1 was passed sooner, Appellants would have filed the Show Cause Motion much sooner than the 4 February 2011 filing date. Appellants did not become aware of the rule until shortly before the motion was filed. MD Rule 14-207. 1 was passed in an emergency session of the MD Court of Appeals to address the very abuses, and fraudulent documents filed into MD foreclosure cases. On or about October 13, 2010 Judge Alan M. Wilner, who chairs the Maryland Court of Appeals Special Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, wrote: "preliminary audits have shown that hundreds of such bogus affidavits have been filed in Maryland circuit courts. The judges are alarmed at this development." Judge Wilner also stated in a letter to the court that: In the Committees view, the use of bogus affidavits to support actions to foreclose. constitutes an assault on the integrity of the judicial process itself (E. 86 6,7) Despite the failure of Appellees, with prior knowledge of defects, to meet any of the conditions precedent to file a purported foreclosure case per MD Rule 14-200, and willful failure of the purported lender M&T Bank to answer any prepetition discovery requests in violation of federal and state laws (E. 161 p. 8 L 4-10), a sham foreclosure case, filed in retaliation for exposing the fraud of M&T Bank was filed on 14 January 2010. A subsequent fraudulent non- judicial foreclosure sale, illegal credit bid by M&T Bank with prior knowledge of defects in their claim, and erroneous ratification of the illegal 13

sale was granted by the court in blatant denial of Appellants substantive and procedural due process rights protected by the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The final insult and affront on the integrity of the judicial process is the fact that Substituted Trustee Thomas P. Dore, Esq., a partner in one of the largest foreclosure mills in MD, admitted under oath in a hearing on 11 August 2010 that he had no personal first hand knowledge of any facts, was not the document custodian, could not authenticate any documents, and was not present or a witness to the purported closing. (E. 162 p. 16 L. 1922) The alleged unauthenticated original note entered into the record (E. 74-77), upon the objection of Appellants, (E. 162 p.14 L.13-14) is a counterfeit color copy of a scanned document, not even a high quality scan. One can see with the naked eye (or using a 10x jewelers loop) that the purported signature is made up of a series of broken lines and dots, evidencing the fact that the original note was printed from a printer and is NOT a wet ink original. Filing bogus original notes in fraudulent foreclosure cases is common practice as original notes are destroyed. (E 97-106) (E. 163. p,17 L.8-11) Assuming arguendo, even if the note was authenticated as the original (which is virtually impossible) signatures can only be attested to by one who actually signs a note, mortgage, deed, etc. per MD. Comm Law Art. 3-401(a). Appellants per Md. Comm. Law Art. 3-308(a), denied any purported original signatures as masterful forgeries. The signatures are masterful forgeries under [People v Martinez 161 Cal App. 4th 754, People v Looney 125 Cal. 4th 242, People v. Parker 255 Cal. App. 2d 664, 11 A.L.R. 3d 1074 Forgery-Procuring Signature by Fraud (1967)] Case authority provides that procuring of a genuine signature to an instrument by fraudulent representations constitutes forgery. 2 Witken & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3rd ed. 2000) Crimes Against Property 164, pp. 194-195 and annotated. (E 362-363 i) Despite the complete lack of credibility of Appellees and affiants; lack of standing (App 5 p.2); lack of any admissible evidence entered by Appellees; and public record evidence of prior knowledge of the fraud of Appellees and M&T Bank upon the court (E. 45-56); Judge Dugan erroneously signed the ratification order, and Judge Turnbull erroneously summarily

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denied Appellants Show Cause hearing that would further expose the fraud upon the court and Appellants. Appellants have suffered bias and prejudice at the hand of the circuit court in an obviously fraudulent foreclosure case filed without a shred of admissible evidence entered by substituted trustees with a history of filing fraudulent foreclosure cases in Maryland courts. To conserve judicial resources, this appeal is taken from the Order of Ratification erroneously signed by Judge Dugan on 31 January 2011 (E. 93). Appellants are also addressing the subsequent summary denial of the Show Cause Motion filed on 4 February 2011, signed by Judge Turnbull on 8 February 2011 but not filed into the circuit court until 16 February 2011, along with the erroneous decision denying Declaratory Judgment to Appellants (E 57-59) without evidentiary support, that led to subsequent rulings. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Were Appellants denied Substantive and Procedural Due Process, including but not

limited to the denial of Appellants Motion to Show Cause, where a judicial process riddled with fraud voids the entire proceeding?
2. Must a Plaintiff prove standing as the real party in interest per MD Rule 2-201 and

carry the burden of proving their case with admissible evidence, beyond a naked affidavit in order to commence foreclosure? 3. Must a witness have personal first hand knowledge to attest to facts under oath and to be deemed a credible witness? 4. Must a court take Judicial Notice of adjudicative facts and act on crimes reported to Judicial Officers? STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellant attended a purported closing on 22 December 2006. 2. At said closing Appellants were made an undisclosed third party to an investment

contract via the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) violating the Statute of Frauds per MD Comm. Article Sec. 1-206 (E. 118 5,). The PSA is the holy grail of securitization, and had M&T Bank complied with state and federal law by producing the PSA, the exact parties, 15

obligations, liabilities, and duties would have been identified for the court.
3. Appellants personal property, i.e. original, genuine (free from fraud or forgery per MD

Comm. Art. Sec 1-201(18)), unaltered wet ink promissory note and original Deed of Trust (DOT) were bifurcated/ split (App 6 p. 8) voiding the DOT per Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 271 (1872)
4. Said note was illegally converted from a promise to pay into a draft/ security, deposited

into a transaction account and sold for an undisclosed multiple of the face amount of the note. (E. 35-38).
5. As admitted by the Florida Bankers Association to the Florida Supreme Court,

physical notes (personal property of homeowner) are routinely destroyed and converted to digital form (E. 97-106) without the express or implied consent of the bona fide owner/bailor of said note. Said personal property as a special deposit was to be held in safekeeping by the bailee/bank per Title 12 U.S.C.
6. After destruction of the original note and conversion to digital form, said digital note

was securitized and sold as evidenced by M&T Banks own public record 2007 10k Annual Report filed with the SEC. (App 7) 7. MD Rule 14-207.1 was added to the MD Rules of Civil Procedure on October 20, 2010.
8. At no point in time have any original authenticated documents (admissible evidence),

i.e. original, genuine, unaltered, un-bifurcated note, DOT/mortgage, assignments or allonge been entered into evidence by the Appellees.
9. In addition to the DOT being void for violating the Uniform Trust Code 406, 707,

801, the DOT was also bifurcated/split from the note rendering the security instrument void (App 6 p. 8)
10. Appellant served a RESPA Qualified Written Requests (QWR), FDCPA validation of

debt, dispute and TILA request for substantiation, authentication and validation of the purported debt claimed as allegedly due and owing to M&T Bank (purported beneficiary under the DOT) on June 22, 2009, 6 months prior to the fraudulent foreclosure case being willfully filed by Appellees in the circuit court. (E. 26 19-21, E. 29 16,17, 19,20, E.30 21,24, E. 78-80) (App 8) (E. 161 p. 8 L 4-10)
11. M&T Bank failed/ refused to comply with state and federal law in substantively

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answering the QWR, FDCPA, and TILA demand for proof, despite their duty to do so and in violation of MD Comm. Law Art.13-316.
12. On or about 24 August 2009, 5 months prior to the fraudulent foreclosure case filed,

Appellants tendered legal tender funds per MD Comm. Law Art. 3-311(a) (E. 78-80) for settlement and closure of the account consistent with the dismissal in Pennsylvania in Citimortgage v. Paules, York Cty. 2011-SU-1542-06 (App 9) E. 34 51-55, E. 33 44-50, (E. 166 p.34 L 10-13).
13. M&T Bank failed/ refused to produce the required documents, including the return of

Appellants personal property when legal tender funds were tendered per MD Comm. Law Art. 3-501(b)(2), failed/refused to collect the legal tender funds, and failed/ refused to settle the purported account. (E. 14-16).
14. Had the court not erred by saving Appellees the embarrassment of appearing for a Show

Cause hearing, Appellees and purported affiants would have had to produce the IRS forms 1099 OID, and form 8281, identifying the issuer, drawer, and maker, and evidencing the source of funds that would have gotten to the bottom of who the bona fide creditor in the transaction truly was. (E. 142)
15. Per MD Comm. Law Article 3-311(a), (b), and 3-603(b), the purported obligation

was discharged as an operation of commercial law.(E 34. 55)

16. Evidence of the fact that M&T Bank reported Appellants had no obligation under the

purported contract is the fact that M&T Bank filed a 1099a with the Internal Revenue Service. Said filing stated in Box 5 was borrower personally liable for repayment of the funds ? was checked NO. (E. 96). When choosing to either defraud the IRS or the court, M&T Bank went with the safer bet.
17. On 16 February 2010, via Cert. Mail # 7009 0820 0001 5470 7295, Appellants served a

TILA rescission per 15 U.S.C 1601 et seq. (App 10) 18. Upon receipt of a TILA rescission, M&T Bank had a mandatory statutory duty to rescind the security instrument and failed/refused to do so.
19. Appellees as agent for M&T Bank engaged in continued collection efforts in violation

of 15 U.S.C. 1601, and Md. Comm. Law Art. 14-202(8). (E. 38-39 88- 95).
20. Appellees as agent for M&T Bank, violated Md. Crim. Law Art. 8-606 by filing false

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fraudulent documents into the Circuit Court and Land Records for Baltimore County. (E.4556). Appellants noticed Clerk of Court Julie Ensor of these crimes on 26 August 2011.
21. Appellees as agents for, and including M&T Bank, violated Md. Crim. Law Art 8-601,

8-602, and 8-402. (E. 45-56). Appellees as agents for M&T Bank violated Md. Real Property Art. 7-401(c). (E. 45-56). See Stovall v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106137 (September 20, 2011) Stovall has alleged, that in connection with the foreclosure instituted by SunTrust's substitute trustee, Bierman, Geesing, and Ward, filed and had notarized various documents with deliberate misstatements as to the documents' true signatories. See Am. Compl. 4850. These allegations are sufficient to plead a violation of the MMFPA. Accordingly, SunTrust's Motion to Dismiss is denied with respect to Count Three. 22. M&T Bank engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Md. Comm. Law Art. 13-301(1),(3),(9).
23. M&T Bank violated Md Comm. Law Art. 13-301(12) by use of a confessed judgment

clause in the DOT. The power of sale and/or consent decree clause found in 22 of the DOT essentially has the same force and effect as a confessed judgment rendering the DOT void. The security instrument has clogging provisions extinguishing the homeowners right of redemption, rendering the purported contract unconscionable and void. 24. Due to M&T Banks failure/refusal to comply with Appellants pre-petition notices and demands, M&T Bank and its/their agents (notice to agent is notice to principal/notice to principal is notice to agent) are estopped from any continued collection activity, including proceeding with any fraudulent foreclosure sale. 25. M&T Bank and its/their agents is/are estopped from entering any oral or written rebuttal, as the time to object or rebut the public record, self authenticating evidence entered into the record by Appellants has passed long ago.
26. M&T Bank was caught in a scheme to defraud the U.S. Government via the HUD 203K

program. Case details are found in the U.S. District Court- Eastern District of N.Y. Pugach et al v. M&T Mortgage Case #CV-05-2498. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/m--tbank-subject-of-whistle-blower-lawsuit-bank-accused-of-defrauding-government-out-ofmillions-from-forged-mortgages-52712792.html

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The whistle blower suit stems from a case involving more than 50 mortgages owned by M&T on properties in Manhattan and Brooklyn that were fraudulently secured through HUD's 203K program for non-profits. A new admission by M & T's lawyer reveals there are nearly 400 fraudulent mortgages worth a half-billion dollars. Indeed, on Friday night, June 29, 2007, Todd Marcus, the attorney for M & T, admitted in a letter to the court that his client never made him aware of a secretive deal between the bank and HUD, in which HUD agreed to pay off not just these 50 fraudulent mortgages, but an astonishing total of 374 fraudulent mortgages worth some $500 million! Marcus previously represented to the court that M & T had no knowledge of any fraud in the origination of any of these loans. The deal between M & T was reached six years ago, according to a letter dated January 11, 2001. Although his law partner attended the meeting at which the deal was reached, Marcus told the court on Friday that he was not aware of the agreement or even the letter's existence until April of this year!
27. Appellants filed a Mandatory Judicial Notice of relevant law that was ignored in

violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process. (E. 41-44)

28. Appellants moved the circuit court for a Show Cause Hearing per MD Rule 14-207.1

to personally examine alleged affiants, to impeach the testimony of purported affiants and destroy the credibility of purported affiants while under oath.
29. Appellants were erroneously summarily denied the show cause hearing without

explanation, finding of fact or conclusion of law, yet another violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process. (E. 85-92)
30. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and request for hearing per MD Rule 2-

311(f) that was summarily denied, in violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process. (E.117) 31. Appellants are most likely the only litigants in Maryland and possibly the entire United States to have the good fortune of examining a foreclosure mill attorney under oath.
32. Appellee Dore admitted under oath in the 11 August 2010 hearing to no first hand

knowledge, his inability to authenticate documents, and lack of credibility as a witness, other than offering his opinion to the court. (E. 162 p. 16, E. 163 p.19, p.20, E. 164 p.21, E. 166 p. 33, p. 35, p. 36).
33. As fate would have it, subsequent to Dores admissions, the Baltimore Sun broke the

story reporting the filing of fraudulent documents in foreclosure cases by Dore et al, Bierman 19

et al. and Buonassissi et al. (E. 86-87) 34. On 31 January 2011, Appellants/ Defendants discovered that: In Baltimore, Maryland, The Daily Record reports: Attorney Thomas P. Dore on Tuesday conceded that five pending foreclosure proceedings should be dismissed because he could not vouch for his signature on documents filed with the Baltimore City Circuit Court. Judge W. Michel Pierson must still determine what action to take, if any, with regard to at least 15 other foreclosures involving notarized documents not actually signed by Dore, who represents lenders.

Eighteen current and former notaries public invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify regarding their certification of Dores signature on the documents. Truthful answers to questions posed might tend to incriminate them, the notaries attorney, David B. Irwin, of Irwin Green & Dexter LLP in Towson, told Pierson. I have no doubt that they have a good-faith invocation right.

Notaries who knowingly certify false signatures face possible criminal sanctions for misconduct in office or fraud.(1)

Dore came under heavy questioning from the judge and a special master appointed to review his foreclosure documents for irregularities. At the end of his testimony, Dore expressed regret to the court for failing to sign the documents himself but said he always acted in good faith.

I apologize for having put you through this, Dore told Pierson from the stand. I made a terrible mistake, he added. It was never my intent to deceive the court. It was frankly stupid, your honor.

[D]ores system of authorizing others to sign for him had gotten out of hand and he discovered that staff members whom he had not authorized to sign his name had, in fact, signed foreclosure documents, he said.

Ethically, I should have signed those affidavits myself, Dore said. I realized I made a stupid mistake and we changed our practice. Dore insisted that at no time did documents leave his office without being carefully reviewed for accuracy. (E. 86-87) 35. Appellees, as officers of the court, with documented prior knowledge, and without

meeting the conditions precedent, are well aware they committed fraud upon the court, violated the equity maxim those who come to equity, must do equity by coming to court with unclean hands, and pursued a case that other well-seasoned jurists have found to be without merit.
36. Judge John J. Nagle III was served a Notice of Felony Crime on 10 August 2010 and

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had a duty to act on said Notice per Title 18 USC Sec4 Misprision of Felony. (E. 45-56)
37. Upon information and belief, to date neither Judge Nagle, or any other judicial officials

with an oath and bond, has acted on the Notice of Felony Crime, despite their duty and oath to do so.
38. Neither Appellees or M&T Bank are the real parties in interest per MD Rule 2-201. (E.

143 2, E. 142 3,4).

39. Appellants also asserted per MD. Comm. Law Article 3-305(c) the affirmative

defense of recoupment and Notice of Adverse Claim. (E. 120 9). Appellants encourage the appellate court to review Appellants Notice of Adverse Claim (E. 118-136) to further educate the court on the fraud being perpetrated by purported lenders. 40. Per Md. Comm. Law Art. 3-305 (a)(1) Appellants preserved defenses and asserted a Notice of Adverse Claim and claim in recoupment. 41. Appellants are in possession and control of additional overwhelming evidence if the court should so desire to review additional evidence. ARGUMENT
1. Were Appellants/Defendants unlawfully denied Substantive and Procedural Due

Process, including but not limited to the denial of Appellants Show Cause Hearing per MD Rule 14-207.1, where a judicial process riddled with fraud voids the entire proceeding? Absolutely. The Lower Court cannot explain the complete failure to address the public record self authenticating evidence per MD Evidence Rule 5-902 of fraud upon the court filed by Appellants, the admissions by Dore (E. 163 p.20 L 7-24, E. 164 p. 21 L 1-24), summary denial of Appellants Motion to Show Cause, and Motion to Reconsider particularly against the backdrop of MD Rule 2-201. It is well settled in law that No right by ratification or other means can arise out of fraud. It undermines the very foundation of our judicial system to allow fraud to taint a case, to allow ones 5th and 14th Amendment right to due process and equal protection to be trampled upon, and would cause anarchy and civil unrest if allowed to go unchecked.

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A transaction originally unlawful cannot be made any better by being ratified. US v Grossmayer, 9 Wall 72, 19 L Ed 6 27. To date both M&T Bank and Appellees, both with a duty to answer, failed/refused to answer Appellants discovery requests. Appellees are estopped from entering any oral or written rebuttal, and the circuit court has denied Appellants access to Appellees and other purported witnesses under oath in blatant denial of court rules. Appellees had a duty to answer and remained silent, thereby admitting to their fraud. Your silence is your acquiescence. See: Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391. Notification of legal responsibility is the first essential of due process of law. Also, see: U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297. Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading. Acts of fraud taint/void everything it touches as the US Supreme Court has declared: There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. (United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61)" As said long ago by the great Justice Story in Prevost v Gratz, 6 Wheat 481, 497; 5 L Ed 311, 315, It is currently true that length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; and in a case where fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought not, upon principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the contrary, it would seem that the length of time during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practiced, is rather an aggravation of the offense, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to grant ample and decisive relief. Estoppel by Silence. It arises where a person is under duty to another to speak or failure to speak is inconsistent with honest dealings. In Re McArdles Estate, 140 Misc. 257, et seq. and Silence, to work estoppel, must amount to bad faith. Wise v USDC Ky., 38 F Supp 130, 134, where duty and opportunity to speak, Codd v Westchester Fire Ins. Co. 14 Wash. 2d 600, 128 P 2d 968, 151 ALR 316, creating ignorance of facts, Cushing v US, DC Mas s, 18 F Supp 83, inducing person claiming estoppel to alter his position, Braunch v Freking, 219 Iowa 556, 258 NW 892, knowledge of facts and of rights by person estopped, Harvey v Richard, 200 La. 97, 7 So. 2d 674, willful or culpable silence, Lenconi v Fidelity Trust & Savings Bank of Fresno, 96 Cal. App. 490, 273 P. 103 et seq. , Silence implies knowledge, and an opportunity to act upon it., Pence v Langdon, 99 US 578 @ 581, et seq. 22

2. Must a Plaintiff prove standing as the real party in interest per MD Rule 2-201 and

carry the burden of proving their case with admissible evidence, beyond a naked affidavit in order to commence foreclosure?
Yes. The circuit court cannot explain the complete failure of Appellees to prove

Standing per Maryland Rule 2-322 (a) and (b), and should have been dismissed per MD Rule 2-324(b) (App 5 p.1,2,3). Per Article III 2 of the National Constitution, standing is a threshold issue that should have been addressed by the court sua sponte but never was (E. 167 p.38 L 19-25). When the court finds Plaintiff lacks standing the court shall dismiss the complaint (E. 148, E. 147 21). (App 5 p. 2, App 6 p. 5-16) When a plaintiff lacks standing the court is deprived of jurisdiction, and shall dismiss per Md. R. Civ.P 2-324(b). The Court cannot grant foreclosure because a Jury is entitled to determine who the Real Party in Interest is. See Townsend Properties v. Z.N., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538 (1995) At no time did Appellees substitute or join indispensible parties per MD Rule 2-211. Neither Appellees or M&T Bank suffered any injury. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) Held: Because none of the relief sought would likely remedy respondent's alleged injury in fact, respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit, and this Court and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it. Pp. 3-26 This Court declines to endorse the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction,. For a court to pronounce upon a law's meaning or constitutionality when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act. Pp. 8-17 . The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , supra , at 560. First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proven) an "injury in fact"-a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is "concrete" and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Whitmore v. Arkansas , supra , at 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 -102 (1983)). Second, there must be causation-a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41 -42 (1976). And third, there must be redressability-a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. Id. , at 23

45-46; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. U.S. Attorney General, Eric H. Holder Jr., fully understands that when a party is not injured they lack standing to sue. See Laroque et. al v. Holder, U.S District Court, D.C. 1:100561, Doc 61, p.7 (p.14 of doc) These bare allegations must fail especially at this stage of the litigation. Whereas general factual allegations of injury may suffice at the pleading stage, they are insufficient at the summary judgment stage, when plaintiffs can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Yet the record contains no evidence of concrete, personal injury resulting from the 2006 Amendments on their face. Standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must affirmatively appear in the record. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D4, LLC, 541 U.S. 774 (2004). Claim Two must, therefore, be dismissed. M&T Bank is acting as purported servicer for an entity (unknown at this time) which, on information and belief, issued securities which may or may not have been properly registered and in the form of either collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or other form of exotic investment vehicle which may or may not be collateralized in whole or in part by the mortgage/DOT the subject of this action, and where the Certificate holders of the subject securities may or may not have an interest, in whole or in part, in the mortgage and or the Note the subject of this action. (E. 143 2) Neither M&T Bank or Appellees/ Substituted Trustees have a legal interest in either the mortgage/DOT or the Note, the subject of this action. (App 7) To wit: Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 2011 NY Slip Op 4184 (May 17, 2011) In order to commence a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the mortgage (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d 204, 207, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615). 24

A plaintiff has standing where it is both (1) the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and (2) the holder or assignee of the underlying note, either by physical delivery or execution of a written assignment prior to the commencement of the action with the filing of the complaint (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Marchione, 69 AD3d at 207-209; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754, 890 N.Y.S.2d 578). Thus, as long as the plaintiff can establish its lawful status as assignee, either by written assignment or physical delivery, prior to the filing of the complaint, the recording of a written assignment after the commencement of the action does not defeat standing (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d at 754). We find that Aurora has failed to make this showing. There being no material distinction between the Aurora case(s), the Bank of New York Case and the case at bar the same result must obtain, particularly in light of MD Rule 2-201. Affidavits are out of court statements made to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Affidavits are hearsay and are inadmissible per Md. Evid. Rule 5-802.(App 11 p.4-11, 13-18) Appellees made general assertions to the circuit court, however none of those assertions were supported with admissible evidence or first hand knowledge per MD Evidence Rule 5602, and were merely opinion. No Plaintiff/Appellee, or witness for Appellees, has presented authority or credibility to authenticate any admissible documents in said fraudulent foreclosure case per MD Evidence Rule 5-901. Affiant Christopher M. Zeis, purported V.P. of M&T Bank, filed the first affidavit in support of the alleged note. Zeis was caught in other cases in FL and NY filing false affidavits as VP of MERS and Asst. VP of Chase Home Finance LLC, and has zero credibility. Affiant Laurie Abramo, purported V.P. of M&T Bank filed an affidavit attesting to a second copy of a purported original note, yet the second original copy was missing the indorsement that was on the first copy Zeis swore to as the original (E. 161 p. 5-6)

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M&T must use invisible ink, since two different copies of alleged originals were filed into the case, yet the second copy was missing the indorsement. Dore tried to explain this irregularity as a mistake. Yet, Dore has no credibility either. Appellants preserved Appellants objections to the purported evidence offered in the 11 August 2010 hearing in the transcript and in the record, anticipating a future appeal of an erroneous decision. Per MD Rule 5-301(b) If underlying considerations are of equal weight, the presumptions shall be disregarded." The presumption that M&T Bank is the creditor and holder in due course has been soundly rebutted with substantial public record evidence entered into the circuit court. (E. 30 25) The fact remains that MD Rule 2-201, MD Evidence Rules 5-801, 5-802, and MD Rule 14-207.1 were enacted to prevent the sort of abuses that New York Courts, who fully understand the Wall Street abuses, have shut down in other jurisdictions where the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) or Real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMICs) are created under New York Trust law: Well known N.Y. Supreme Court Justice Arthur M. Shack opined: Plaintiff BNY failed to submit proof of the facts in an affidavit made by the party.(Blam v Netcher, 17 AD3d 495, 496 [2d Dept 2005]; Goodman v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. 2 AD3d 581[2d Dept 2003]; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2002]; Parratta v McAllister, 283 AD2d 625 [2d Dept 2001]; Finnegan v Sheahan, 269 AD2d 491 [2d Dept 2000]; Hazim v Winter, 234 AD2d 422 [2d Dept 1996]). Instead, plaintiff BNY submitted an affidavit of merit and amount due by Ely Harless, an employee of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and failed to submit a valid power of attorney for that express purpose It is clear that plaintiff BNY failed to provide the Court with: an affidavit of merit by an officer of plaintiff BNY or someone with a valid power of attorney from BNY; an affidavit from Ely Harless, explaining his employment history; and, an explanation from BNY of why it purchased a nonperforming loan from 26

MERS, as nominee of DECISION ONE. Moreover, plaintiff BNY did not own the subject mortgage and note when the instant case commenced. Even if plaintiff BNY owned the subject mortgage and note when the case commenced, MERS lacked the authority to assign the subject MULLIGAN mortgage to BNY, as will be explained further. Plaintiffs counsel offers a lame and feeble excuse for not complying with my June 3, 2008 decision and order, in 23 of his affirmation in support, claiming that [t]he affidavits requested in Honorable Arthur M. Schacks Decision and Order should not be required, given the annexed closing loan schedule. 3. Must a witness have personal first hand knowledge to attest to facts under oath and to be deemed a credible witness? Absolutely. The testimony of Dore, who lacks first hand knowledge is hearsay and is inadmissible per MD Evidence Rule 5-802. Testimony of foreclosure mill attorneys is often offered as fact when its against the MD Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct and MD Evidence rules, but is common practice as most litigants dont object to said attorneys opinions. This practice is so pervasive, two well known attorneys recently addressed the issue in a public record blog post. The comments are from renowned Florida foreclosure fraud/ defense attorney Matt Weidner, Esq., and 30 veteran attorney Neil Garfield, who is one of the nations experts in securitization, mortgage servicing and foreclosure fraud. (App 12) Appellants cite Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Carlsen, 2011 WI App 58 (March 24, 2011) the Court reasoned and held as follows: P7 Aurora argues that Conner's testimony is sufficient to support the circuit court's finding that Aurora had been assigned the note. Our review of her testimony, however, reveals that Conner lacked the personal knowledge needed to authenticate Exhibit D. See Wis. Stat. 909.01 (documents must be authenticated to be admissible, and this requirement is satisfied "by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims"). Relevant here, Conner made general assertions covering several documents. Conner either affirmatively testified or agreed to leading questions with respect to the following:

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 She works for Aurora. She "handle[s] legal files" and she "attend[s] trials." "Aurora provided those documents that are in [her] possession." She "reviewed the subject file" in preparing for the hearing. She declined to agree that she is the "custodian of records for Aurora." She "look[s] at documentation ... [does] not physically handle original notes and documents, but [she does] acquire documentation." "Aurora [is] the custodian of records for this loan." She is "familiar with records that are prepared in the ordinary course of business." She has "authority from Aurora to testify as to the documents, of [Aurora's] records." As it specifically pertains to Exhibit D, the document purporting to evidence the assignment of the note and mortgage from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems to Aurora, Conner testified: Aurora has "possession of Exhibit D." Exhibit D is "an assignment of mortgage." With respect to possession of Exhibit D, Conner did not assert that Exhibit D was an original or that Aurora had possession of the original document. For that matter, Conner did not provide a basis for a finding that any original document she might have previously viewed was what it purported to be. 2 P8 Thus, Conner did no more than identify herself as an Aurora employee who was familiar with some unspecified Aurora documents, who had reviewed some Aurora documents, and who had brought some documents, including Exhibit D, to court. Although Conner was able to say that Exhibit D, on its face, was an assignment, she had no apparent personal knowledge giving her a basis to authenticate that document. See Wis. Stat. 909.01.P12 In sum, Aurora failed to authenticate Exhibit D, the document purporting to be an assignment of the note. Thus, regardless of other alleged proof problems relating to that note and the Carlsens' alleged default, the circuit court's finding that Aurora was the holder of the note is clearly erroneousno admissible evidence supports that finding. Aurora failed to prove its case, and it was not entitled to a judgment of foreclosure.

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Appellee Dore admitted under oath as to no first hand knowledge and lack of credibility as a witness. Appellee Menapace, who filed the fraudulent Amended Statement of Debt, likewise has no first hand knowledge of any purported facts. Appellants had planned to examine Appellee Menapace under oath as to her first hand knowledge of purported facts had the Show Cause Motion per MD Rule 14-207.1 been granted. Said motion was summarily denied in error to shield substituted Trustees/attorneys/ officers of the court the uncomfortable duty of having to be examined under oath by a litigant who knows exactly what kind of fraud Appellees are perpetrating. Affidavits are hearsay and inadmissible per MD Rule 5-802. Every attempt by Appellants to attack the credibility of the declarants that filed bogus affidavits in the circuit court per MD Rule 5-806 has been summarily denied in error, in blatant denial of Appellants due process rights. Appellees and purported affiants know that if they were to be sworn in under oath and had to identify the account debtor per MD Comm. Article 9-102(a)(3) they would be unable to do so. Appellants identified persuasive law in Florida that mirrors MD rules. Self-serving Affidavits are insufficient in order to commence foreclosure proceedings. See Glarum v. LaSalle Bank, 4D Florida District Court of Appeals, No. 4D10-1372 http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Sept%202011/09-07-11/4D10-1372.op.pdf To establish the amount of appellants indebtedness for summary judgment, LaSalle filed the affidavit of Ralph Orsini, a specialist at the loan servicer, Home Loan Services, Inc. Orsini claimed in the affidavit that appellants were in default of their payment obligations and owed in excess of $340,000 on the note. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, appellants filed Orsinis deposition, wherein Orsini explained that he derived the $340,000 figure from his companys computer system. However, Orsini did not know who entered the data into the computer, and he could not verify that the entries were correct at the time they were made. To calculate appellants

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payment history, Orsini relied in part on data retrieved from Litton Loan Servicing, a prior servicer of appellants loan. . We find that Orsinis affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and, as such, could not support LaSalles motion for summary judgment.1 4. Must a court take Judicial Notice of adjudicative facts and act on crimes reported to Judicial Officers? Absolutely. Per MD Evidence Rule 5-201(d) the court must take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The circuit court was noticed of foreign case citations per Art.IV 1 full faith and credit clause of the National Constitution, evidencing the fraud of M&T Bank upon the FL and NY courts along with the Notice of Felony Crime served on Judge John J. Nagle III with a duty to act per Title 18 USC Sec 4 Misprision of Felony, and the court failed to act on those notices. Appellees were also served a copy of said notices and had a duty as officers of the court to act on those notices per Title 18 USC Sec 4, but failed to act on those notices. The failure of Judge Nagle and Appellees, all of whom had a duty to act, but failed to do so, adds additional taint to this case and Appellants were prejudiced by that taint. Any orders issued after being noticed of crimes committed should have been voided, and Judge Nagle should have recused himself from the case.

Note that Defendants in the FL case admitted default, Appellants in the Case at Bar do not. None of that changes the basic fact that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish their case through any reliable means.
1

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Given the paucity of any admissible evidence filed in the record in the circuit court, one must review the fact that Maryland as a quasi non-judicial foreclosure state, is a hotbed for criminal activity that has led one of the States largest foreclosure mill attorneys to back away from several cases amidst a pandemonium of Fifth Amendment fear by the associated notaries as must be restated from 18 in the Statement of Facts. In Baltimore, Maryland, on January 31, 2011 The Daily Record reports:

Attorney Thomas P. Dore on Tuesday conceded that five pending foreclosure proceedings should be dismissed because he could not vouch for his signature on documents filed with the Baltimore City Circuit Court. Judge W. Michel Pierson must still determine what action to take, if any, with regard to at least 15 other foreclosures involving notarized documents not actually signed by Dore, who represents lenders. Eighteen current and former notaries public invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify regarding their certification of Dores signature on the documents. Truthful answers to questions posed might tend to incriminate them, the notaries attorney, David B. Irwin, of Irwin Green & Dexter LLP in Towson, told Pierson. I have no doubt that they have a good-faith invocation right. Appellees, with zero credibility, and no first hand knowledge, will most likely put forth

the same tired, boring argument that Appellants defaulted, there is an amount due and owing, Appellants failed to pay the amount due and owing, blah, blah. Yet Appellees can offer no admissible evidence to prove their claim, and the court should just take their word for it. At the same time, Appellees will duck the substantive elements of Appellants brief and hope that the 600 lb. elephant in the room will just disappear if no one is looking. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF The more important question (that is better addressed in another brief) is who is going to protect Appellants, should the bona fide holder in due course (if UCC Article 3 controlled)

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come out of the dark to collect on the purported obligation that is claimed to be owing in compliance with MD Comm. Law. Art. 3-309(b)? 3-309 (b) "The court may not enter judgment in favor of the person seeking enforcement unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument". The odds of getting struck by lightening are barely higher than this scenario happening, but assuming arguendo, there is such a person(s) out there that could make a bona fide claim, who is going to indemnify Appellants against that claim? Appellants guarantee if Appellees Dore, Miles, Devan, Haskins, Menapace; alleged affiants Zeis, Abramo; VP Jill M. Smith (who illegally indorsed the note); Mark Czarnecki (M&T Bank CEO); Judge Nagle, Judge Dugan, Judge Turnbull, Clerk Ensor, Baltimore County Sheriff R. Jay Fisher, or any other parties who are culpable (wittingly or unwittingly) in the fraud perpetrated upon Appellants, were questioned under oath as to whether they should be held personally liable to Appellants, a reasonable person could presume that no one would step up to assume the liability and indemnify Appellants. The fact is, none of the above parties can guarantee the purported claim of M&T Bank is not a sham and a fraud. For the reasons set forth above, the orders of the circuit court denying Appellants Motion for Declaratory Judgment, denial of Appellants Show Cause Motion, and alleged ratification should be reversed with instructions to set aside the foreclosure as defective for the reasons stated above. Appellants only need about 15 minutes with each trustee and alleged affiant under oath in a Show Cause hearing, to get to the bottom of who committed the fraud.

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Dated this ___ day of _______________ 2012 Respectfully submitted, _______________________ Todd Wetzelberger Font: Times New Roman, 13 point ______________________ Erin Wetzelberger

TEXT OF PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES

U.S. Constitution Article IV, Sec 1

Full Faith and Credit shall be given to each State to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State

U.S. Constitution 5th Amendment No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment Sec. 1 nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 33

That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land (amended by Chapter 681, Acts of 1977, ratified Nov. 7, 1978). MD Evidence Rule 5-201(d) (d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information. MD Evidence Rule 5-602 -- Lack of personal knowledge Except as otherwise provided by Rule 5-703, a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness's own testimony. MD Evidence Rules 5-801 -- Definitions The following definitions apply under this Chapter: (a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. (b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. (c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. MD Evidence Rule 5-802 -- Hearsay rule Except as otherwise provided by these rules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is not admissible. MD Evidence Rule 5-901 -- Requirement of authentication or identification (a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Cross references. -- Rule 5-104 (b). (b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this Rule: (1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony of a witness with knowledge that the 34

offered evidence is what it is claimed to be. (2) Non-expert opinion on handwriting. Non-expert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. (3) Comparison with authenticated specimens. Comparison by the court or an expert witness with specimens that have been authenticated. (4) Circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics, that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be. (5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, based upon the witness having heard the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. (6) Telephone conversation. A telephone conversation, by evidence that a telephone call was made to the number assigned at the time to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone. (7) Public record. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. (8) Ancient document or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data compilation: (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be, and (C) has been in existence twenty years or more at the time it is offered. (9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce the proffered exhibit or testimony and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result. Committee note. -- This Rule is not intended to indicate the type of evidence that may be required to establish that a system or process produces an accurate result. See, e.g., Rule 5-702 and its Committee note.

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(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by statute or by these rules. (Amended Feb. 10, 1998, effective July 1, 1998.) MD Evidence Rule 5-902 -- Self-authentication (a) Generally. As used in this Rule, "certifies," "certificate," or "certification" means, with respect to a domestic record or public document, a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury and, with respect to a foreign record or public document, a written declaration signed in a foreign country which, if falsely made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of that country. The certificate relating to a foreign record or public document must be accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (1) of the individual executing the certificate or (2) of any foreign official who certifies the genuineness of signature and official position of the executing individual or is the last in a chain of certificates that collectively certify the genuineness of signature and official position of the executing individual. A final certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country who is assigned or accredited to the United States. Except as otherwise provided by statute, extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following: (1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution. (2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in subsection (a)(1) of this Rule, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is genuine. (3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in an official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or attestation and accompanied by a final certification. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification. (4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 36

public office, including data compilations, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with this Rule or complying with any applicable statute or these rules. (5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued or authorized by a public agency. (6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals. (7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin. (8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (9) Commercial paper and related documents. To the extent provided by applicable commercial law, commercial paper, signatures thereon, and related documents. Cross references. -- See, e.g., Code, Commercial Law Article, 1-202, 3-308, and 3-505. (10) Presumptions under statutes or treaties. Any signature, document, or other matter declared by applicable statute or treaty to be presumptively genuine or authentic. (11) Items as to which required objections not made. Unless justice otherwise requires, any item as to which, by statute, rule, or court order, a written objection as to authenticity is required to be made before trial, and an objection was not made in conformance with the statute, rule, or order. Committee note. -- As used in this Rule "document" is a generic term. It includes public records encompassed by Code, Courts Article, 10-204. (b) Certified records of regularly conducted business activity. (1) Procedure. Testimony of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required as to the original or a duplicate of a record of regularly conducted business activity, within the scope of Rule 5-803 (b)(6) that has been certified pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, provided that at least ten days prior to the commencement of the proceeding in which the record will be offered into evidence, (A) the proponent (i) notifies the adverse party of the proponent's intention to authenticate the record under this subsection and (ii) makes a copy of the certificate and record available to the adverse party and (B) the adverse party has not filed within five days after service of the proponent's notice written objection on the ground that the sources of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 37

Committee note. -- An objection to self-authentication under subsection (b)(1) of this Rule made in advance of trial does not constitute a waiver of any other ground that may be asserted as to admissibility at trial. (2) Form of certificate. For purposes of subsection (b)(1) of this Rule, the original or duplicate of the business record shall be certified in substantially the following form: Certification of Custodian of or Other Qualified I, , do hereby certify that: (1) I am the Custodian of Records of or am otherwise qualified to administer the records for: (identify the organization that maintains the records), and (2) The attached records (a) are true and correct copies of records that were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from the information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of these matters; and (b) were kept in the course of regularly conducted activity; and (c) were made and kept by the regularly conducted business activity as a regular practice. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Signature and title: Date: MD Evidence Rule 5-1002 -- Requirement of original To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute. MD Rule 2-201 -- Real party in interest Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except that an executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, person with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, receiver, trustee of a bankrupt, assignee for the benefit of creditors, or a person authorized by 38

statute or rule may bring an action without joining the persons for whom the action is brought. When a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the State of Maryland. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for joinder or substitution of the real party in interest. The joinder or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. MD Rule 2-211 -- Required joinder of parties (a) Persons to be joined. Except as otherwise provided by law, a person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if in the person's absence (1) complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) disposition of the action may impair or impede the person's ability to protect a claimed interest relating to the subject of the action or may leave persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations by reason of the person's claimed interest. The court shall order that the person be made a party if not joined as required by this section. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person shall be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. (b) Reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the name, if known to the pleader, of a person meeting the criteria of (1) or (2) of section (a) of this Rule who is not joined and the reason the person is not joined. (c) Effect of inability to join. If a person meeting the criteria of (1) or (2) of section (a) of this Rule cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether the action should proceed among the parties before it or whether the action should be dismissed. Factors to be considered by the court include: to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to that person or those already parties; to what extent the prejudice can be lessened or avoided by protective provisions in the judgment or other measures; whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; and finally, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. (d) Exception. This Rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 2-231. MD Rule 2-311(f) Motions (f) Hearing -- Other motions. A party desiring a hearing on a motion, other than a motion filed pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading "Request for Hearing." The title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested. Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the 39

court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section. MD Rule 2-322 (a) and (b) -- Preliminary motions (a) Mandatory. The following defenses shall be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process. If not so made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived. (b) Permissive. The following defenses may be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (3) failure to join a party under Rule 2-211, (4) discharge in bankruptcy, and (5) governmental immunity. If not so made, these defenses and objections may be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate manner after answer is filed. MD Rule 2-324(b) -- Preservation of certain defenses (b) Subject matter jurisdiction. Whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. MD Rule 5-301(b) -- Presumptions in civil actions (b) Inconsistent presumptions. If two presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the court shall apply the one that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy and logic. If the underlying considerations are of equal weight, the presumptions shall be disregarded. MD Rule 5-802 -- Hearsay rule Except as otherwise provided by these rules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is not admissible. MD Rule 5-806 -- Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant (a) In general. When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. (b) Exception. This Rule does not apply to statements by party-opponents under Rule 5-803 (a) (1) and (a) (2). 40

MD Rule 14-202(b)(c)(f)(k)(q) Definitions (b) Borrower. "Borrower" means: (1) a mortgagor; (2) a grantor of a deed of trust; (3) any person liable for the debt secured by the lien; (4) a maker of a note secured by an indemnity deed of trust; (5) a purchaser under a land installment contract; (6) a person whose property is subject to a lien under Code, Real Property Article, Title 14, Subtitle 2 (Maryland Contract Lien Act); and (7) a leasehold tenant under a ground lease, as defined in Code, Real Property Article, 8402.3 (a)(6). (c) Debt. "Debt" means a monetary obligation secured by a lien. (f) Lien. "Lien" means a statutory lien or a lien upon property created or authorized to be created by a lien instrument. (k) Power of sale. "Power of sale" means a provision in a lien instrument authorizing, in the event of a specified default, a sale of the property subject to the lien. (q) Secured party. "Secured party" means any person who has an interest in property secured by a lien or any assignee or successor in interest to that person. The term includes: (1) a mortgagee; (2) the holder of a note secured by a deed of trust or indemnity deed of trust; (3) a vendor under a land installment contract or holding a vendor's lien; (4) a person holding a lien under Code, Real Property Article, Title 14, Subtitle 2; (5) a condominium council of unit owners; (6) a homeowners' association; (7) a property owners' or community association; and

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(8) a ground lease holder, as defined in Code, Real Property Article, 8-402.3 (a)(3). MD Rule 14-207.1 -- Court screening (a) Generally. The court may adopt procedures to screen pleadings and papers filed in an action to foreclose a lien. If the court determines that the pleadings or papers filed do not comply with all statutory and Rule requirements, it may give notice to the plaintiff and each borrower, record owner, party, and attorney of record that the action will be dismissed without prejudice or that some other appropriate order will be entered by reason of the noncompliance if the plaintiff does not demonstrate within 30 days that the papers are legally sufficient or that the deficiency has been cured. Committee note. -- This Rule prevails over the provision in Rule 1-321 (a) or any other Rule that purports, where a party is represented by an attorney, to permit service on only the attorney. This Rule requires service on both. (b) Review of affidavits. (1) In this section, "affidavit" includes any attestation or certification by an attorney, borrower, record owner, party, or agent of the attorney, borrower, record owner, or party concerning the truth or accuracy of a pleading or paper. Cross references. -- See Rule 1-202 (b) for a general definition of "affidavit." (2) If the court has reason to believe that an affidavit filed in the action may be invalid because the affiant has not read or personally signed the affidavit, because the affiant does not have a sufficient basis to attest to the accuracy of the facts stated in the affidavit, or, if applicable, because the affiant did not appear before the notary as stated, the court may order the party to show cause why the affidavit should not be stricken, and, if it is stricken, why the action should not be dismissed or other relief granted. (3) As part of the show cause order, the court may order that the affiant and any notary appear before the court at a time stated in the order for the affiant to attest under penalty of perjury that the affiant read and personally signed the affidavit and had a sufficient basis to attest to the accuracy of the facts stated in the affidavit, and, if applicable, for the affiant and the notary to attest that the affiant appeared before the notary and made the oath stated. (4) A copy of the order shall be sent to the plaintiff and to each borrower, record owner, party, and attorney of record, together with a notice that they may appear and examine the affiant and notary. The court may further require that the plaintiff serve the order and any response thereto on each borrower, record owner, party, and attorney of record. Cross references. -- See Rule 1-341.

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(c) Special masters or examiners. The court may designate one or more qualified Maryland lawyers to serve as a part-time special master or examiner to screen pleadings and papers under section (a) of this Rule, conduct proceedings under section (b) of this Rule, and make appropriate recommendations to the court. Subject to section (d) of this Rule, the costs and expenses of the special master or examiner may be assessed against one or more of the parties pursuant to Code, Courts Article, 2-102 (c), Rule 2-541 (i), or Rule 2-542 (i). With his or her consent, the special master or examiner may serve on a pro bono basis. (d) Assessment of costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. The costs, expenses, and attorney's fees of any proceeding under this Rule, including any costs or expense of a special master or examiner under section (c) of this Rule, shall not be assessed against the borrower or record owner either directly or as an expense of sale, unless the affidavit in question was filed by or on behalf of the borrower or record owner. Md. R. Civ. P. 2-303(e) -- Form of pleadings (e) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. Md. R. Civ. P. 2-324(b) -- Preservation of certain defenses (b) Subject matter jurisdiction. Whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. MD Comm. Article 1-201(18) -- General definitions (18) "Genuine" means free of forgery or counterfeiting. MD Comm. Article 1-206 -- Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered (1) Except in the cases described in subsection (2) of this section a contract for the sale of personal property is not enforceable by way of action or defense beyond $ 5,000 in amount or value of remedy unless there is some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the parties at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent. (2) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to contracts for the sale of goods ( 2-201) nor of securities ( 8-113) nor to security agreements ( 9-203). MD Comm. Law Art. 3-303(b) -- Value and consideration (b) "Consideration" means any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. The drawer or maker of an instrument has a defense if the instrument is issued without consideration. If an instrument is issued for a promise of performance, the issuer has a defense to the extent performance of the promise is due and the promise has not been performed. If an instrument is issued for value as stated in subsection (a), the instrument is also issued for consideration. 43

MD Comm. Law Art. 3-305 (a)(1) -- Defenses and claims in recoupment (a) Except as stated in subsection (b), the right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following: (1) A defense of the obligor based on (i) infancy of the obligor to the extent it is a defense to a simple contract, (ii) duress, lack of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which, under other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor, (iii) fraud that induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its essential terms, or (iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings; MD. Comm. Law Article 3-305(c) -- c) Except as stated in subsection (d), in an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the instrument, the obligor may not assert against the person entitled to enforce the instrument a defense, claim in recoupment, or claim to the instrument ( 3-306) of another person, but the other person's claim to the instrument may be asserted by the obligor if the other person is joined in the action and personally asserts the claim against the person entitled to enforce the instrument. An obligor is not obliged to pay the instrument if the person seeking enforcement of the instrument does not have rights of a holder in due course and the obligor proves that the instrument is a lost or stolen instrument. MD Comm.Law Art. 3-308 -- Proof of signatures and status as holder in due course (a) In an action with respect to an instrument, the authenticity of, and authority to make, each signature on the instrument is admitted unless specifically denied in the pleadings. If the validity of a signature is denied in the pleadings, the burden of establishing validity is on the person claiming validity, but the signature is presumed to be authentic and authorized unless the action is to enforce the liability of the purported signer and the signer is dead or incompetent at the time of trial of the issue of validity of the signature. If an action to enforce the instrument is brought against a person as the undisclosed principal of a person who signed the instrument as a party to the instrument, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the defendant is liable on the instrument as a represented person under 3-402 (a). (b) If the validity of signatures is admitted or proved and there is compliance with subsection (a), a plaintiff producing the instrument is entitled to payment if the plaintiff proves entitlement to enforce the instrument under 3-301, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim in recoupment. If a defense or claim in recoupment is proved, the right to payment of the plaintiff is subject to the defense or claim, except to the extent the plaintiff proves that the plaintiff has rights of a holder in due course which are not subject to the defense or claim. MD Comm. Law. Art. 3-309(b) -- Enforcement of lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument (b) A person seeking enforcement of an instrument under subsection (a) must prove the terms of the instrument and the person's right to enforce the instrument. If that proof is made, 3-308 applies to the case as if the person seeking enforcement had produced the instrument. The court may not enter judgment in favor of the person seeking enforcement unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected against loss that might occur

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by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the instrument. Adequate protection may be provided by any reasonable means. MD Comm. Law Art. 3-311(a) -- Accord and satisfaction by use of instrument (a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply. MD Comm. Law Article 3-311(a), (b) -- Accord and satisfaction by use of instrument (a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply. (b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. MD. Comm Law Art. 3-401(a) Signature (a) A person is not liable on an instrument unless (i) the person signed the instrument, or (ii) the person is represented by an agent or representative who signed the instrument and the signature is binding on the represented person under 3-402. MD Comm. Law Art 3-407(a) and (b) Alteration (a) "Alteration" means (i) an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party, or (ii) an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. (b) Except as provided in subsection (c), an alteration fraudulently made discharges a party whose obligation is affected by the alteration unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the alteration. No other alteration discharges a party, and the instrument may be enforced according to its original terms. MD Comm. Law Art. 3-501(b)(2) Presentment (b) The following rules are subject to Title 4, agreement of the parties, and clearinghouse rules and the like: (2) Upon demand of the person to whom presentment is made, the person making presentment must (i) exhibit the instrument, (ii) give reasonable identification and, if presentment is made on behalf of another person, reasonable evidence of authority to do so, and (iii) sign a receipt 45

on the instrument for any payment made or surrender the instrument if full payment is made. MD Comm. Law Art. 3-603(b) -- Tender of payment (b) If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument and the tender is refused, there is discharge, to the extent of the amount of the tender, of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse with respect to the obligation to which the tender relates. MD Comm. Law Art. 4-406 -- Customer's duty to discover and report unauthorized signature or alteration; comparative fault (a) A bank that sends or makes available to a customer a statement of account showing payment of items for the account shall either return or make available to the customer the items paid or provide information in the statement of account sufficient to allow the customer reasonably to identify the items paid. The statement of account provides sufficient information if the item is described by item number, amount, and date of payment. (b) If the items are not returned to the customer, the person retaining the items shall either retain the items or, if the items are destroyed, maintain the capacity to furnish legible copies of the items until the expiration of 7 years after receipt of the items. A customer may request an item from the bank that paid the item, and that bank must provide in a reasonable time either the item or, if the item has been destroyed or is not otherwise obtainable, a legible copy of the item. (c) If a bank sends or makes available a statement of account or items pursuant to subsection (a), the customer must exercise reasonable promptness in examining the statement or the items to determine whether any payment was not authorized because of an alteration of an item or because a purported signature by or on behalf of the customer was not authorized. If, based on the statement or items provided, the customer should reasonably have discovered the unauthorized payment, the customer must promptly notify the bank of the relevant facts. (d) If the bank proves that the customer failed, with respect to an item, to comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (c) the customer is precluded from asserting against the bank: (1) The customer's unauthorized signature of the customer or any alteration on the item, if the bank also proves that it suffered a loss by reason of the failure; and (2) The customer's unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any other item paid in good faith by the bank if the payment was made before the bank received notice from the customer of the unauthorized signature or alteration and after the customer had been afforded a reasonable period of time, not exceeding 30 days, in which to examine the item or statement of account and notify the bank.

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(e) If subsection (d) applies and the customer proves that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in paying the item and that the failure substantially contributed to loss, the loss is allocated between the customer precluded and the bank asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the failure of the customer to comply with subsection (c) and the failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss. If the customer proves that the bank did not pay the item in good faith, the preclusion under subsection (d) does not apply. (f) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank, a customer who does not within 12 months after the statement or items are made available to the customer (subsection (a)) discover and report the customer's unauthorized signature on or any alteration on the item is precluded from asserting against the bank the unauthorized signature or alteration. If there is a preclusion under this subsection, the payor bank may not recover for breach of warranty under 4-208 with respect to the unauthorized signature or alteration to which the preclusion applies. MD Comm. Article 9-102(a)(3) -- Definitions and index of definitions (a) In this title: (3) "Account debtor" means a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper. Md. Comm. Law Art.13-316 -- Mortgage servicers (a) Definitions. -(1) In this section the following terms have the meanings indicated. (2) "Mortgage" includes a mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement, or other lien on 1 to 4 family residential real estate located in this State. (3) "Servicer" means a person responsible for collection and payment of principal, interest, escrow, and other moneys under an original mortgage. (b) Notice to mortgagor after acquisition of mortgage servicing. -- Within 7 days of acquiring mortgage servicing, a servicer shall send to the mortgagor a written notice containing the following information regarding the mortgage on the date of transfer: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the new servicer and the address where mortgage payments are to be forwarded; (2) The principal balance and escrow balance; (3) The telephone number of the contact designated under subsection (c) of this section; 47

(4) The responsibilities of the contact under subsection (c) of this section; and (5) A statement that the servicer's violation of this section will result in the servicer being held liable under subsection (e) of this section. (c) Contact person for complaints and inquiries. -(1) A servicer shall designate a contact to whom mortgagors may direct complaints and inquiries. (2) The contact shall respond in writing to each written complaint or inquiry within 15 days if requested. (d) Payments of tax or insurance premiums. -- A servicer shall make timely payments of the taxes or insurance premiums due under the mortgage so long as the mortgagor has paid an amount sufficient to pay the tax or insurance premium due and, with regard to the taxes, so long as the servicer is in possession of either the tax bill or notice from the taxing authority. (e) Penalties for noncompliance. -(1) If a servicer fails to comply with any provision of this section, the servicer is liable for any economic damages caused by the violation. (2) The penalties provided in this section are in addition to any other applicable remedies. (f) Toll-free telephone number. -- A servicer shall provide a toll-free telephone number through which any borrower residing in this State may direct telephone inquiries on outstanding loans during regular business hours.

Md. Comm. Law Art. 14-202(8) -- Certain acts prohibited (8) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist; Md. Crim. Law Art 8-601, 8-602, and 8-402 -- 8-601. Counterfeiting of private instruments and documents (a) Prohibited. -- A person, with intent to defraud another, may not counterfeit, cause to be counterfeited, or willingly aid or assist in counterfeiting any: (1) bond; (2) check; 48

(3) deed; (4) draft; (5) endorsement or assignment of a bond, draft, check, or promissory note; (6) entry in an account book or ledger; (7) letter of credit; (8) negotiable instrument; (9) power of attorney; (10) promissory note; (11) release or discharge for money or property; (12) title to a motor vehicle; (13) waiver or release of mechanics' lien; or (14) will or codicil. (b) Prohibited -- Possession of counterfeit. -- A person may not knowingly, willfully, and with fraudulent intent possess a counterfeit of any of the items listed in subsection (a) of this section. (c) Penalty. -(1) A person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $ 1,000 or both. (2) A person who violates subsection (b) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $ 1,000 or both. (d) Venue. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the prosecution of an alleged violation of this section or for an alleged violation of a crime based on an act that establishes a violation of this section may be commenced in any county in which: (1) an element of the crime occurred; 49

(2) the deed or other alleged counterfeit instrument is recorded in the county land records, filed with the clerk of the circuit court, or filed with the register of wills; (3) the victim resides; or (4) if the victim is not an individual, the victim conducts business. 8-602. Issuing counterfeit private instruments and documents (a) Prohibited. -- A person, with intent to defraud another, may not issue or publish as true a counterfeit instrument or document listed in 8-601 of this subtitle. (b) Penalty. -- A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $ 1,000 or both. 8-402. Fraudulent misrepresentation by corporate officer or agent (a) Prohibited. -- With intent to defraud, an officer or agent of a corporation may not sign, or in any manner assent to, a statement to or a publication for the public or the shareholders that contains false representations of the corporation's assets, liabilities, or affairs, to: (1) enhance or depress the market value of the corporation's shares or obligations; or (2) commit fraud in another manner. (b) Penalty. -- A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not less than 6 months and not exceeding 3 years or a fine not less than $ 1,000 and not exceeding $ 10,000 or both. (c) Statute of limitations and in banc review. -- A person who violates this section is subject to 5-106(b) of the Courts Article. Md. Crim. Law Art. 8-606 -- Making false entries in public records and related crimes (a) Definitions. -(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) "Access" means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, or retrieve data from, or otherwise use equipment including computers and other data processing equipment or resources connected with computers or other data processing equipment. (3) "Public record" includes an official book, paper, or record, kept on a manual or automated basis, that is created, received, or used by a unit of: 50

(i) the State; (ii) a political subdivision of the State; or (iii) a multicounty agency. (b) Prohibited. -- A person may not or may not attempt to: (1) willfully make a false entry in a public record; (2) except under proper authority, willfully alter, deface, destroy, remove, or conceal a public record; or (3) except under proper authority, willfully and intentionally access a public record. (c) Penalty. -- A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $ 1,000 or both. Md. Real Property Art. 7-401(c) (c) He may hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the interest of the estate. In this case, the personal representative is liable for a wrongful act of the nominee in connection with the security held.

Public Law 73-10, 31 U.S.C. 3123, 5103 Public Law 73-10 ...every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy. 31 U.S.C. 3123 (a) The faith of the United States Government is pledged to pay, in legal tender, principal and interest on the obligations of the Government issued under this chapter. (b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay interest due or accrued on the public debt. As the Secretary considers expedient, the Secretary may pay in advance interest on the public debt by a period of not more than one year, with or without a rebate of interest on the coupons. (c)(1) The Secretary may issue a bond, note, or certificate of indebtedness authorized under this chapter whose principal and interest are payable in a foreign currency stated in the bond, note, or certificate.

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The Secretary may dispose of the bonds, notes, and certificates at a price that is at least par value without complying with section 3102(b)-(d) of this title. (2) In determining the dollar amount of bonds, notes, and certificates of indebtedness that may be issued under this chapter, the dollar equivalent of the amount of bonds, notes, and certificates payable in a foreign currency is determined by the par of the exchange value on the date of issue of the bonds, notes, or certificates as published by the Secretary under section 5151 of this title. (3) The Secretary may designate depositaries in foreign countries in which any part of the proceeds of bonds, notes, or certificates of indebtedness payable in the foreign currency may be deposited. 31 U.S.C. 3123, 5103 United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts. Article III 2 of the National Constitution The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Uniform Trust Code 406, 707, 801 406 A trust is void to the extent its creation was induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence. 707 (1) Unless a cotrustee remains in office or the court otherwise orders, and until the trust property is delivered to a successor trustee or other person entitled to it, a trustee who has resigned or been removed has the duties of a trustee and the powers necessary to protect the trust property. (2) A trustee who has resigned or been removed shall proceed expeditiously to deliver the trust property within the trustee's possession to the cotrustee, successor trustee, or other person entitled to it. 801 Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust expeditiously and in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this chapter. NY Prac, 136, at 232 [4d ed] 52

[i]t is the law's policy to allow only an aggrieved person to bring a lawsuit . . . A want of "standing to sue," in other words, is just another way of saying that this particular plaintiff is not involved in a genuine [*4] controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a "jurisdictional" dismissal: (1) the courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a plaintiff found to lack "standing" is not involved in a controversy; and (3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a plaintiff purports to bring it. See Wis. Stat. 909.01 General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissiblity [admissibility] is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 15 U.S.C. 1601 (a) Informed use of credit. The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this title [15 USCS 1601 et seq.] to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices. Title 18 USC 4 Misprision of Felony Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I ____________________________certify that on this ___ day of _______________ 2012 per MD Rule 1-321, 2 copies of Appellants Brief and Record Extract filed in the MD Court of Special Appeals was served via USPS First Class Mail upon the following parties. Michael T. Pate Law Office of Michael T. Pate, LLC 20 S. Charles Street Suite 702 Baltimore, Maryland 21201

____________________________ Todd Wetzelberger

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