Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement. Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate. HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. THE TREASURER OF THEPHILIPPINES, ET AL.FACTS: In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Associations Inc. (Usaffe), prayed in itscomplaint before the Manila court of first instance that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement(1950) whereby the Philippine Government undertook to return to the United StatesGovernment in ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars advanced by theUnited States to, but unexpanded by, the National Defense Forces of the Philippines beannulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal and that defendants as officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained from disbursing any funds in the National Treasury inpursuance of said Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneysavailable, instead of being remitted to the United States, should be turned over to theFinance Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all pendingclaims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.The complaint rested on plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds to be "returned"under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the American Congress for the Philippinearmy, actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by saidGovernment; second, that U.S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority toretake such funds from the P.I. Government; and third, that Philippine foreign SecretaryCarlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called Romulo-Snyder Agreement.The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from suit. But the courtrequired an answer, and then heard the case merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the complaint,upheld the validity of the Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction i hadpreviously issued. The plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the Romulo-Snyder Agreement is void. HELD: There is no doubt that President Quirino approved the negotiations. And he hadpower to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No. 213, amending the Republic ActNo. 16. The most important argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of theAgreement by the Senate of the Philippines to make it binding on this Government. On thismatter, the defendants explain as follows:That the agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the Constitution, is conceded.The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 10 (7).However, it must be noted that treaty is not the only form that an international agreementmay assume. For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senatedoes not exhaust the power of the government over international relations. Consequently,executive agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even without theconcurrence of the Senate. It is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements intheir binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries haveremained within their powers. "The distinction between so-called executive agreements"and "treaties" is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance".There are now various forms of such pacts or agreements entered into by and betweensovereign states which do not necessarily come under the strict sense of a treaty andwhich do not require ratification or consent of the legislative body of the State, butnevertheless, are considered valid international agreements.In the leading case of Altman vs, U. S., 224, U. S. 583, it was held that "an internationalcompact negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign nations and made in thename and or behalf of the contracting parties and dealing with important commercialrelations between the two countries, is a treaty both internationally although as anexecutive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice and consent of theSenate.Nature of Executive Agreements. Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive actsaffecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, whichmay be termed as presidential agreements and (2) agreements entered into in pursuants of acts of Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely onSeptember 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of theUnited States, its agencies or instrumentalities.Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintainedthat the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to thesecond category, namely, "agreements entered into purely as executive acts withoutlegislative authorization." This second category usually includes money agreementsrelating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind.Such considerations seems persuasive; indeed, the Agreement was not submitted to theU.S. Senate either; but we do not stop to check the authorities above listed nor test theconclusions derived therefrom in order to render a definite pronouncement, for the reasonthat our Senate Resolution No. 15 3 practically admits the validity and binding force of suchAgreement. Furthermore, the acts of Congress Appropriating funds for the yearlyinstallments necessary to comply with such Agreements constitute a ratification thereof,which places the question the validity out of the Court's reach, no constitutional principlehaving been invoked to restrict Congress' plenary power to appropriate funds-loan or noloan.Petition denied Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary Facts This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court for the Senates concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of

a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5] The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence. Issue Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or any treaty) to the Senate for concurrence. Ruling The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise: The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration. If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternate, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state. Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature. Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. G. R. No. 167919 February 14, 2007 Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr. FACTS: On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes. This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments. ISSUE: Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a kind of a treaty. HELD: The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement. An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law. That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007. What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the procurement process. The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the implementing rules for foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former, during the ZTE controversy. as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without need of a vote by the Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international instrument binding at international law, The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it shall apply to: the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government, its departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned and/or -controlled corporations and local government units, subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed. Bayan vs Zamora Facts: The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes. Cause of Action: Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty, b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate. ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008 Decision: CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.