Are Deontology and Teleology Mutually Exclusive?

James E. Macdonald Caryn L. Beck-Dudley

ABSTRJ\.CT. Current discussions of business ethics usually only consider deontological and utilitarian approaches. What is missing is a discussion of traditional teleology, often referred to as "virtue ethics." While deontology and teleology are useful, they both suffer insufficiencies. Traditional teleology, while deontological in many respects, does not object to utilitarian style calculations as long as they are contained within a moral framework that is not utilitarian in its origin. It contains the best of both approaches and can be used to focus on the individual's role within an organization. More work is needed in exposing students and faculty to traditional teleology and its place in business ethic's discussions.

People having even a passing acquaintance with moral philosophy have probably met with the distinction betv^^een deontological and teleological approaches to moral questions. "A deontological norm is one that evaluates an act by a characteristic that cannot be gathered from its consequences" (McCormick, 1973, p. 62).
Dr. James E. Macdonald received a Master of Business Administration, a Ph.D in Philosophy, and aJ.D. He is a founding member of the Business Ethics section of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and pastpresident of the Rocky Mountain Academy of Legal Studies in Business. Professor Caryn L. Beck-Dudley received a Juris Doctorate. She is a member of the Business Ethia sections of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and the Society of Business Ethics. She has published several articles and in 1993 she received the Holmes-Cardozo award from the Academy of Legal Studies in Business for outstanding paper submitted and presented at the national meeting. She is currently secretary-treasure of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.

Deontological approaches to ethics attempt to ascertain the content of duty u^ithout considering the consequences of particular v^ays of acting. Generally speaking, deontologists have thought that moral principles are ascertained through some sort of logical test of consistency, as Kant maintained; or they have thought of the moral rightness of actions as directly intuited, as H. A. Pritchard (1949), for example, held. Teleological approaches to ethics, on the other hand, morally evaluate actions by looking to their consequences right actions being right because

they tend to have good consequences, wrong actions being wrong because they tend to have bad consequences. Thus, for teleologists, evaluations of consequences as good or bad provide the premises for inferring the norms of right acting. Arthur Andersen's educational programs in business ethics' have probably done as much to popularize this distinction as any other contributor, but Arthur Andersen is not alone: Most writers in business ethics seem eager to pay their respects to the distinction (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1993; Donaldson and Werhane, 1993). With tables of contents that look almost liturgical in their repetitive sameness, deontology is introduced with Immanuel Kant, teleology with Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. Teleology is quickly identified with some variety of utilitarianism and perhaps prettified in the latest, fashionable economic dressing for our money, a fair enough assessment of developments in the law and economics movement, although recently there have been calls for change (Solomon, 1992; Wolfe, 1991). Invariably, the apparent contradiction between deontology and teleology is emphasized, each approach is subjected to battering-ram criticism, and, in the rubble that
Journal of Business Ethics 13: 615-623, 1994. 1994 Kluwer Academic PubUshers. Printed in the Netherlands.

616 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley remains, bewildered students, marvelling at so mucb effort squandered with so little to show for it, scavenge for something useful to carry away. Their antecedent moral skepticism and relativism seems confirmed in their minds, and their already too feeble grip on moral truth is further loosened, perhaps irretrievably. Their brief exposure to moral philosophy often leaves them worse off than they were before (Wolfe, 1991). There ought to be a better way, a safe passage between the Scylla of deontology and the Charybdis of utilitarianism. There is such a way. On the one hand, utilitarianism is, at its root, a milquetoast descendant of the traditional teleological approach to ethics that originated in antiquity and came to prevail in medieval times.^ Deontology, for its part, has strained unsuccessfully to recapture the moral absolutes that once inhabited that same teleological tradition; but it has left much that is essential behind. Both modern approaches are subject to maladies from which their much

heartier and more robust ancestor was spared. At the same time, the truth that is missed in utilitarianism, and (some say) is found in deontology, is also found - and found much more richly in traditional teleology. Almost in the Hegelian sense, the traditional teleology is a synthesis of the thesis of deontology and the antithesis of utihtarianism. It is a synthesis that, as any good synthesis should, absorbs the truth from the thesis and antithesis, while leaving behind their falsity and insufficiency. One can only conclude that in arriving at deontology and utilitarianism history took a wrong turn and marched away from truth. Odd. First comes the synthesis, then the thesis and antithesis: Hegel is stood on his head in a way Marx never envisioned. This introduction is a sort of retrospective that must now be followed by a delivery of the goods promised. At least, as it is said in sales law, a conforming tender must be made, with the reader left to decide whether acceptance is proper. It must be shown that what is true in deontology and utilitarianism is not original, and what is original in them is not true. Tall order. Our hope in this short paper is only to make a substantial beginning of performance. First, however, before the good news of the synthesis can be sprung, the thesis and the antithesis have to be understood and their insufficiencies indicated. That should be short work, since deontology and utilitarianism are already widely understood. Present memory need only be refreshed or, at the most, past memory recalled.

Deontology
"It is impossible to conceive of anything in the world, or indeed out of it, which can be called good without qualification save only a good will." This is Kant's (1964, p. 64) stirring beginning
to his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

and the opening shot of deontology. It should not be overlooked that the statement has an initial strangeness, one that tends to wear off. Older moralists (St. Thomas Aquinas (1848) in particular) had always carefully distinguished the goodness of the inner act (criminal lav^^ers now call it the mens rea) from the goodness of the external act (called the actus reus) (Mclnerny, 1982; 1992). The simple thought, for traditionalists, was that what is intended is one thing, what is done is something else - the moral character of an action might not match the moral

character of the intent with which it is done. Crimes committed for laudable motives are still crimes, i.e. bad acts done for good ends. Robin Hood is said to have stolen from the rich to give alms to the poor, for instance, but his acts of robbery remain no less wrong. Conversely, good acts can be done for bad ends: giving alms to the poor, a good act considered in itself, may be done for the evil end of humiliating the recipient. Kant's preoccupation with good will is strange because intent was traditionally viewed as only one aspect to be considered in reaching an overall moral assessment of a particular human action. External actions were traditionally thought to have their own antecedent moral character as good, bad, or neutral, separate and apart from the moral character of the end for which they are chosen. This familiar distinction between the goodness of the internal and external actions evaporates with Kant's enthronement of good
Deontology and Teleology 617

will as the sole unqualified good. It never seems to reappear, although, remarkably, it is rarely missed. At any rate, understanding Kant's deontology requires understanding what he means by "good will." It means acting out of respect for the moral law, i.e., for the sake of duty (Kant, 1964, p. 74) Good will means acting/or the sake of duty, mind you, not merely in accord with it. People's actions often externally conform to duty's requirements for no other reason than blind inclination. Yet there is no moral merit in following morally unguided inclinations, even when such inclinations result in external actions consistent with morality. People may have nonmoral reasons for acting as morality requires: Rosa Parks, for instance, is said to have sat in the front of the Birmingham, Alabama, bus just because her feet hurt and there were no other empty seats: not that she wanted to protest the segregation of the races. And, no doubt, she acted rightly, albeit for a morally irrelevant reason. It is sometimes correctly said that Kant accords priority to "the right" over "the good." This is what makes for his deontology, his placement of duty first.' In contrast, the teleological approach to morals first identifies the sorts of goods human actions ought to protect and realize, then evaluates actions as right or wrong according to their

effects. Wrong actions tend to be harmful, and right ones tend to be beneficial. Kant reverses this ordering, even defining good will as a sort of right acting, i.e., acting with duty in mind, for its own sake. And, recall, all he requires for good will is action on a maxim that may or can be universalized - let the chips fall where they may. Let justice be done though the heavens fall. The observance of duty thus becomes for him an end-in-itself, detached from all practical results, binding in the same measure on angels as on man. That there is something very attractive about Kant's insistence on the absolute demands of duty, no one can deny. One of the most deepseated moral convictions is that there are ways of treating people that can never be allowed, no matter how dire the circumstances. Kant captures this conviction. Indeed, criminal law is absolutist to a degree that seems Kantian: Murder^ is always and everywhere forbidden, for instance.'* It is entirely fair to say that substantive criminal law reflects Kant's absolutism much more than utilitarianism's incessant balancing of consequences. Yet there is also something repellant about Kant's approach. It smells of fanaticism, and, in fact, his Categorical Imperative leaves ample room for fanaticism. Boiled down to familiar terms, the Categorical Imperative commands us to do as we would be done by. Never act on a maxim that one would not consent to be a part of a system of moral rules binding upon everyone. The objection to Kant's test of moral maxims is not that it is mistaken. Hardly anyone wittingly denies the Golden Rule. Rather, the objection to Kant's moral philosophy is that it is entirely too permissive, allowing morally horrendous maxims to pass muster (Grisez, 1983). As examples, one sees no knock-down argument against racial genocide or chattel slavery in the Golden Rule. I might be a Nazi or a slave holder and reason that, were I an enlightened Jew or Negro, I would consent to extermination or enslavement as my just dessert. Indeed, John Hospers (1961), pushing the logic of the Categorical Imperative to its almost comic limits, imagines how it would apply to a sadomasochist: He should not hesitate to inflict pain upon others since he would welcome their infliction of pain upon himself. In sum, the Golden Rule (and Kant's

Categorical Imperative), although no doubt a necessary moral measure, is far from a sufficient test of practical maxims. It commands us to do as we would be done by, but leaves the question of how we should be done by unanswered, even unaddressed. Explained differently, [t]he assumption Kant makes is that moral virtue or perfection consists in the rejection of desire in moral action. This conception is developed at length into a full fledged moral theory with all the attendant distinctions, such as acting from duty versus acting according to duty, self-interest as prudence and not morality, and the obedience to rules for their own sake. Thus, for Kant, a person \vho overcomes contrary inclinations and actions from duty is morally superior to one who does his duty and likes it (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991, p. 38). 618 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley Therefore, I am to do as I v^ould be done by: But how do I know how I would be done by? What sorts of harms ought I to protect myself against? I must first know how I should allow myself to be treated before I can know how^ I may allow myself to treat others. A missing identification of the true and comprehensive human good and the included basic goods of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion and practical reasonableness, is needed to get started (Finnis, 1988). It is possible to couch the same point in familiar legal terms. The "equal protection of laws"^ cannot, standing alone, be a sufficient test of legal justice: Many unjust laws pass its test easily. Equal injustice under law is a real possibility. Unfair discrimination, particularly unfair self-preference, is only one way of being unjust.* Yet equal protection is Kant's only test of the maxims upon which people act, and it is too slender a base upon which to ground much, if any, moral content. Is utilitarianism a more adequate starting point?

Utilitarianism
As was stated earlier, teleological approaches to morals are now often identified with some variety of utilitarianism. Utilitarians morally assess individual actions (or sometimes policies, laws or rules of action) by their consequences, the best being those that produce the greatest proportion of good over evil. If substantive criminal law has a Kantian deontological flavor,

widely used judicial balancing tests have a utilitarian one. And cost/benefit critiques of governmental regulations, which are essentially utilitarian, are now^adays familiar to almost everyone. Except perhaps for business majors, for whom the groundwork for utilitarianism has already been cleared by their economics courses, students often wonder v^hat question utihtarianism answers: It comes at them like a bolt from the blue (Wolfe, 1992). Yet it is really best understood in the light of Jeremy Bentham's originally planned use of it. He intended utihtarianism as an engine of social change, employed to change the laws, especially as to criminal penalties, of early nineteenth-century England. Laws, he thought, must be measured by their "utihty", their contribution to general social welfare. They must be reformed as need be to make for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." It may be, for instance, that the incidence of pickpocketing is actually increased through the pubhc hanging of pickpockets because of the opportunities for pickpocketing afforded by the large crowds that gather to view such spectacles: If so, then the general welfare would appear to be harmed by this form of punishment. In fact, criminal penalties across the board must be adjusted for maximal net social benefit. Nothing could sound more plausible. Every schoolchild knows that Bentham originally identified happiness with pleasure, unhappiness with pain. No less than with Kant, these is here from the outset a foreboding sense of strangeness that tends to get lost. What, after all, does the justice of laws have to do with how generally pleasing they are to those afFected by them? In any event, not all pleasures are created equal, as John Stuart Mill (1967) pointed out early on. The pleasures of reading poetry seem to differ qualitatively from those of playing pushpin, Bentham (1962) notwithstanding. Should higher grade pleasures not count for more? How, in any event, did pleasure, whatever its grade, come to be identified as the sole ultimate good? Is doing the right thing nothing more than calculative efficiency in pleasing people? These are foundational questions that many utihtarians (particularly those working in economics) have always tried to avoid, preoccupying

themselves instead with efforts at solving technical problems, especially the measurement of pleasure. The problem is obvious and immediate: Social welfare (or total pleasure, or "the greatest happiness of the greatest number") would seem to have to be measured if it is to be the test of actions, policies, and laws. Yet a moment's reflection reveals that pleasures are incommensurable, that they cannot, as Bentham thought they could, each be translated into so many "utiles" and simply added up. Much, if not most, of the history of utilitarian thought has been Deontology and Teleology 619 devoted to attempting to get around this problem. A major advance was made when preference satisfaction took the place of pleasure as the goal of action and policy. At the same time it became evident that, while cardinal measures of utility are impossible, individuals can and do rank alternatives ordinally, as more, less, or equally satisfying. People clearly forgo the satisfaction of some preferences to pursue others. They identify marginal increases in pleasure even though cardinal measures must always elude them. The quest for an adequate metric of social welfare continued. Figuring the overall level of preference satisfaction seemed to require more than each individual's ranking of their own utilities (mfrapersonal comparisons); it seemed also to require comparisons of one person's utilities with other people's (interpersonal comparisons). A change in the existing allocation of resources might be preferred by one person and not by another - yet there seemed to be no way, without comparing the effect on one person's satisfaction with other people's results, to know whether the reallocation increased or decreased the overall level of satisfaction. Enter the Pareto tests (Coleman, 1980). While avoiding any direct measure of total utility, one allocation of resources can be recognized as superior to another if anyone is made better off by it and no one is made worse off. Indeed, a Pareto optimal allocation is one where no one can be made better off without someone being made worse off. Of course, as a practical matter, as Richard Posner points out, the only way to know if someone is made "better off" by a resource reallocation is if he consents to it. That being so, Posner (1983) notes, the Pareto

approach becomes useless for most policy questions: It is usually impossible even to identify, much less to secure the consent of, everyone affected by an action, law, or policy. Posner has his own ingenious solution to the problem of an adequate social metric. He equates the "value" of people's preferences with their willingness to pay to have them satisfied (Posner, 1983). Unlike the utility of satisfying preferences, which will remain imponderable forever, the value of satisfying them has the notable advantage of being measurable in money. Wealth (the total value of satisfied preferences) thus replaces utility for Posner as the quantity that actions, policies and laws must maximize. And the beat goes on: Posner, having formulated perhaps the most powerful version of utilitarianism so far, has also brought it into clear focus for a wide audience. He has made real progress, we think, on the measurement problem that has so plagued utilitarianism in the past. He is also sensitive to the notorious "moral monstrousness" of traditional utilitarianism: His new and improved version is perhaps much less monstrous than earlier ones. No doubt, his product looks glossy by comparison with Bentham's crude original. But the fruit does not fall very far from the tree. Something morally essential is lost in all varieties of utilitarianism, including even the most recent. All of them do unacceptable violence to the insight behind the old saying that "the end does not justify the mean" - in the v^^ords of St. Paul, that evil may not be done that good may come of it. Of course, only an end can justify a means. What else? But the sense of the saying is that there are means that cannot be justified by any end, that there are ways of acting that are morally prohibited no matter how much good might be yielded by allowing exceptions in hard cases. Whatever other insufficiencies afflict Kant's effort in moral philosophy, at least it has the considerable merit of attempting to capture and protect the sense of this old saying. Indeed, that is its chief attraction over utilitarianism, which loses grip on the saying entirely. For utilitarians, anything goes, nothing is entirely forbidden, and everything can be rationalized by the shifting sands of expected good and evil consequences. "Woe to those who creep through the serpentwindings

of Utilitarianism," said Kant. He hit the nail on the head. We spoke earlier of a teleological tradition that is older and more adequate than either deontology or utilitarianism, and we particularly complained of the modern tendency to identify teleology with utihtarianism. The time has come to introduce this venerable oldster. 620 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley Traditional teleology Georg Henrik von Wright (1963, p. vi) once made a distinction that makes a good starting point for reflection. Defending teleology, he distinguished between two main variants of this position in ethics. The one makes the notion of the good relative to the nature of man. The other makes it relative to the needs and wants of individual men. We could call the two variants the 'objectivist' and the 'subjectivist' variant respectively. I think it is right to say that Aristotle favored the first. . . . [The second] is, I think, more akin to that of some writers of the utilitarian tradition. Textbook distinctions between deontology and teleology typically identify teleology with one of its modern subjectivist variants (i.e., some form of utilitarianism), leaving the traditional objectivist variant undefined, even unmentioned. The resulting tunnel-vision makes deontology and utilitarianism appear to be the only players on the field - both, as it turns out, so crippled as to be of little use. A third player is needed (Newton, 1991; Solomon, 1992). That third player is traditional, objectivist teleology. Utilitarianism is widely understood, but, unfortunately, traditional teleology is not. Comparing and contrasting utilitarianism and traditional teleology, subjectivism and objectivism, should help in understanding the latter. First the comparison. There is much upon which utilitarians and traditional teleologist seem to agree: that a happy life is the final and ultimate end of all human action; that all other ends are sought for the sake of happiness; that happiness is never sought as a means to any other end; that happiness is the one end that is not also a means; that happiness is the end behind all ends and means; that a happy life is the all-encompassing, comprehensive good in which every assorted lesser good must find its place (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991; Mclnerny, 1992).

They also agree that human beings, of necessity, pursue their own happiness. People desire only what appears to them desirable and worthy of their desire good, that is. Of course, what looks good may not be good, looks being deceiving. For that reason humans must submit their actions to rational guidance if they are to realize the true human good and not be misled by appearances. Indeed, moral guidance is nothing but guidance in the ways of reasonability (Aristotle, 1991; Gratsch, 1985). So much verbal agreement between utilitarianism and traditional objectivist teleology can seem impressive, but it obscures important underlying differences. The problem is that the same words are often used with entirely different meanings. The rival understandings of happiness, moral rectitude, rationality, and the general welfare are cases in point. Utilitarians think of the happiest life as the one with the highest possible overall level of satisfied desires. An egalitarian democracy of desires reigns: One desire, one vote. For his part, Bentham went so far as to think of people as pleasure maximizers, his premise being one of psychological egoistic hedonism (Bentham, 1962). To this day, utilitarians recognize no external, independent test of which desires are right, which wrong; which natural, which acquired; which of real, genuine goods, which of merely apparent goods. Lacking any such independent test, an internal measure of coherence is all that remains to them: Those pleasures are best that are in keeping with the largest available package of pleasures. This conception of happiness seems awfully strange to a traditional teleologist. Given the sort of creature humans are, they realize happiness through participation in a fairly short list of basic goods: friendship, learning, play, work and leisure are familiar examples. Indeed, John Finnis's (1988) enumeration of the basic forms of human good, which seems to us well thought out, includes most of these. People find their fulfillment through realizing and partaking in these goods: Through them, they can "be all that they can be." The objective requirements of humans as rational animals provide the external, independent tests of desires that is lacking in utilitarianism. Human nature is the basis for a correspondence test of moral truth for traditionalists.

Utilitarians later replaced it with a coherence test. To explain, a judgment is true in a correspondence sense if it conforms with reality. A judgement is true in a coherence sense if it coheres with other judgments that are generally Deontology and Teleology 621 accepted as true. The difference is between the truth of a judgment measured against reality, versus its truth measured by its fit with the overall web of belief. Once the knowability of reahty as it is in itself is surrendered, or even seriously called into question, the working understanding of truth slides away from correspondence toward coherence. Thus, the working understanding of moral truth slipped toward a coherence test once an understanding of the needs of human nature ceased to be the starting point for moral reflection. Utilitarians and traditional teleologists also differ in their understanding of what makes for moral rectitude, or the rightness of human actions. Utilitarians are left to figure the rightness of actions by how generally pleasing they are. Of course, because what pleases and displeases varies so much from person to person, time to time, and place to place, utilitarian identifications of right and wrong sorts of actions are highly fluid. On the other hand, reliance on human nature as the basis of morality stabilizes the traditional teleologist's assessments of right and wrong. Given the identification of the true human good and certain basic human goods that make it up, a universal rule protecting those goods can be formulated: Respect every basic human good in each of your actions (Aristotle, 1991). In particular, never intentionally harm a basic good: "First of all, do no harm!" More specific rules protect specific goods over a wide range. From the recognition that life is good comes the realization that murder is wrong; from the knowledge that property is good comes the prohibition of theft; and so on to complete a list of moral rules that includes most of the Ten Commandments. Another point to note is how radically differently utilitarians and traditional teleologists think of rationality and reasonableness. Rationality for utilitarians essentially amounts to efficiency in allocating resources to maximally satisfy preferences. Indeed, the economic concept of rational man reflects the modern triumph of this understanding of rationahty (Aristotle, 1991).

In contrast, traditional teleologists, from Aristotle on, make use of a "prudent man" standard in all essential respects the ancient equivalent of the "reasonable man" standard lawyers use today. Reasonable people steer clear of acting as morality forbids, while at the same time affirmatively developing the natural virtues - prudence, courage, temperance, and justice that morality (and, for that matter, their own self-respect and happiness) requires. It is easy to see that the utihtarian standard of rationality sometimes collides with the traditionalist's standard or reasonability. To see this, consider Alan Donagan's example, cited by Richard Posner (1983, p. 57): It might well be the case that more good and less evil would result from your painlessly and undetectedly murdering your malicious, old and unhappy grandfather that from your forebearing to do so: he would be freed from his wretched existence; his children would be rejoiced by their inheritances and would no longer sufFer from his mischief; and you might anticipate the reward promised to those who do good in secret. Nobody seriously doubts that a position with such a consequence is monstrous. The utilitarian standard of rationality would seem to approve of the monstrous murder contemplated, although the traditionalist's standard of reasonability never would: An innocent human life, a basic good, may never intentionally be destroyed. It should be noted, finally, how different are the utilitarian and traditional teleologist's conceptions of the general welfare. Utihtarians think of the general welfare as nothing but the overall level of satisfaction the highest possible level being the proper aim of government and rulers. Indeed, this way of thinking of the general welfare is the source of the title of utilitarians, ever since John Stuart Miss (1978) wrote On Liberty, toward libertarian causes: Total happiness would seem to be maximized when people's freedom to satisfy their preferences is unfettered by legal constraints to the greatest extent consistent with maximal equal liberty for all. Traditional teleologists, on the other hand, instead of speaking of the general welfare, tend to draw on the traditional notion of the common good (Finnis, 1988). The common good is the end a community's rulers must seek to realize for

its members if they are to have their best chance at happiness, defined as "lasting and justified 622 J.E. Macdonald and C.L. Beck-Dudley satisfaction witb one's life as a wbole" (Murray, 1988, p. 34). It is misconceived as total bappiness: It is, ratber, tbe good available for tbe common use of a community's members in tbeir separate pursuits of bappiness. Indeed, so distant is tbe standard of tbe common good from tbat of overall satisfaction tbat it must trump tbe latter wben tbey conflict. Minorities, for instance, bave rigbts even democratic majorities must respect (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 1991; Finnis, 1988). And everyone knows tbat doing tbe rigbt tbing is often unpopular.

Deontology or Teleology: Mutually Exclusive?

Altbougb we bave not yet directly addressed tbe question we started witb, our answer to it sbould be evident. Traditional, objectivist teleology is not deontological in its approacb (it does not place tbe rigbt abead of tbe good), but it is deontological in many of its results: Certain ways of treating people are always forbidden, let tbe cbips fall wbere tbey will (Mclnerny, 1982). On tbe positive side, everyone is obliged to develop certain virtues. Indeed, Aristotle implied tbat only a life of virtue is witbin our control, all otber genuine goods are not entirely witbin our control. Yet, in anotber vi^ay, objectivist teleology is quite undeontological in considering good will as only one element in tbe moral assessment of buman action. Tbe tendency of an action to be beneficial or barmful places it objectively as rigbt or wrong in tbe first place, separate and apart from tbe subjective intent witb wbicb it is done. Indeed, tbe traditionalist begins bis identification of moral goodness from tbe objective pole. Giving alms to tbe poor is not good because people of good will do it, for example; ratber, people of good will give alms because it is good (Mclnerny, 1982). Traditional objectivist teleology bears a superficial resemblance to utilitarianism, anotber, but quite different, teleological position. No objectivist bas any objection to utiUtarian-style efficiency calculations, so long as tbey are contained witbin a moral framev^^ork tbat is not utilitarian in its origin. To tbe contrary, preferences tbat are morally allowable sbould be satisfied as efficiently

as possible. Winding up, it must be empbasized tbat everday moral reasoning makes use of a few exceptionless moral norms tbat are as universal and uncbangeable as any norms ever promised by tbe deontological tradition. Tbese moral absolutes are, bowever, more securely grounded in traditional, objectivist teleology tban tbey ever could be in deontology. At tbe same time, mucb of everyday reasoning amounts to tbe familiar utilitarian balancing of good and evil consequences. Tbus, botb deontological and teleological results coexist side by side in traditional objectivist teleology and in common sense, any appearance to tbe contrary being tbe result of tbe mistaken reduction of teleology to utilitarianism and subjectivism. Traditional teleology offers tbe best of botb deontology and utilitarianism witbout tbe insufficiencies or perversions of eitber. Students brougbt aboard for brief tours of deontology or utilitarianism will, unfortunately, probably miss tbe one boat tbat does not leak.

Notes
' Arthur Andersen & Co., the large accounting firm, initiated a "Conference on Teaching Business Ethics" in the summer of 1988. As of 1993, participants from more than 220 institutions have participated in the sessions. This paper is not meant to criticize Arthur Andersen's approach to teaching business ethics. Rather, its intent is to focus on the larger problem of failing to include traditional teleology in current ethical discussions. ^ For purposes of this article, the tradition originates in Aristotle and is advanced in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, hereinafter referred to as "traditionalists." While we recognize that there are important differences between the two philosophers, the focus of this paper is on their similarities. ' Murder is defined in the common law as "the killing of another human with malice aforethought." It does not refer to all killings. ^ This statement must be qualified somewhat. John Finnis (1983), notes that the Model Penal Code, arts. 2 and 3, provides for a necessity defense to homicide that is explicitly utilitarian in its rationale. Although the future of this defense remains open, it seems for now to be an anomalous utilitarian intrusion into Deontology and Teleology 623
an overall fabric of substantive criminal law that is deontological.

' The fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in part, "No State Shall make or enforce any law which should abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; now shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." * Self-preference occurs where a rule is enacted to benefit the rulemaker at another's expense. One such rule in Oklahoma was a law that required a person to pass a literacy test before being allowed to vote unless a lineal descendant had voted before 1866. See Guinn V. United States, 238 U.S. 368 (1915). John Rawls in A Theory of Justice tries to solve this Kantian self-preference problem by imposing a "veil of ignorance" over individuals. In a veil of ignorance individuals cannot choose alternatives that unfairly benefit themselves since they do not know their "station" in life. This veil, then, restricts the range of choices individuals have since they may have to live with the choice. In the "grandfather clause" case, you would not know whether you were white or black, male or female, and therefore you would choose to allow every adult the right to vote. References Aristotle: 1991, 'Nicomachean Ethics', in J. Barnes (ed.). The Complete Works of Aristotle 2 (Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, Oxford) pp. 1729-1868. Aquinas, T: 1948, Summa Theologica, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Christian Classics, Westminster, MD). Beauchamp, T. L. and N. E. Bowie: 1993, Ethical Theory and Business 4th (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ). Bentham, J.: 1962, The Works of Jeremy Bentham 2, John Bowring (ed.) (Russell & Russell, New York). Coleman, J. L.: 1980, 'Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law', California Law Review 68, 221. Donaldson, T and P H. Werhane: 1993, Ethical Issues in Business A Philosophical Approach (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffi, NJ). Finnis, J.: 1983, Fundamentals of Ethics (Georgetown University, Washington, D.C). Finnis, J.: 1988, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Gratsch, E. J.: 1985, Aquinas Summa An Introduction and Interpretation (Alba House, Staten Island, NY). Grisez, G.: 1983, Tlfie Way of the Lord Jesus (Franciscan Herald, Chicago). Hospers, J.: 1961, Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York).

Kant, I.: 1964, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (Harper Torchbooks, New York). McCormick, R.: 1973, 'Notes on Moral Theology', Theological Studies, pp. 34, 62. Mclnerny, R.: 1982, Ethica Thomistica (The Cathohc University of America Press, Washington DC). Mclnerney, R.: 1992, Aquinas on Human Action (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington D.C). Mill, J. S.: 1967, Utilitarianism (Liberal Arts Press Inc., Indianapolis, IN). Mill, J. S.: 1978, On Liberty (Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IN). Murray, C: 1988, In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government (Simon and Schuster, NY). Newton, L.: 1991, 'Virtue and Role: Reflections on The Social Nature of Morality', Business Ethics Quarterly 1, 357-367. Posner, R.: 1983, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA). Pritchard, H. A.: 1949, Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press, New York). Rasmussen, D. B. and D. J. Den Uyl: 1991, Liberty and Nature An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order (Open Court, La Salle, IL). Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). Solomon, R. C: 1992, 'Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,' Business Ethics Quarterly 2, 317-341. Von Wright, G. H.: 1963, The Varieties of Goodness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York). Wolfe, A.: 1991, 'Reflections on Business Ethics: What Is It? What Causes It and. What Should a Course in Business Ethics Include?', Business Ethics Quarterly 1, 409-441. Department of Business Administration, Weber State University,

Ogden, UT 84408, U.S.A. Department of Management and Human Resources, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84321, U.S.A.

Deontological Vs. Teleological Ethical Systems in Criminal Justice

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FlagPost a comment Deontological vs. Teleological Ethical Systems Deontological ethical systems are concerned with the nature of an action that is being judged. If the action is considered to be inherently good, even if the action has bad consequences than it can be defined as good. Deontological ethical systems include ethical formalism, religion, and natural law (Pollock, 2004). Ethical formalism is based on motive and intent of the person who performs the action (Pollock, 2004). For example, a friend stops by another friend's apartment to visit and finds him struggling to breathe, and was grasping at his chest. He dials 911 and then having remembered a commercial for Bayer aspirin that mentioned taking an aspirin during a heart attack can help, she goes into her purse and gets an aspirin to give to her friend while they are awaiting the arrival of rescue crews. After giving him the aspirin, his symptoms worsen and by the time paramedics arrive, the man was dead. After autopsy, information was revealed that the man died from an allergic reaction to acedimenaphin, not because of the heart attack. Even though the man died due to the actions of the woman, ethical formalism believes that because her intention was to give him the medication to help him, her intentions were good, even though the result was bad. However, ethical formalism also believes that what is considered to be wrong is wrong no matter what. There is no justification for Murder, in the eyes of ethical formalism, and believes that no good can come from a person taking another persons life intentionally (Pollock, 2006). For example, recently Saddam Hussein, who has been the President of Iraq for the past two decades, was put to death for his crimes against humanity (Santora, Glanz, & Tavernise, 2006).Even though most people believe that his death sentence was justified, ethical formulation says that there is no justification for murder, even if it is for the betterment of society. (Pollock, 2004). Another form of the deontological ethical system is religion. Religion is the most widely used source of individual ethics. Religion has us believe that what is morally good is what is defined by God. All religions believe that their supreme being is all knowing so there is no further examination needed and even though God has given us guidelines to follow the only question that is left is God's will. Even though there is a continued struggle with in religions, to figure out God's will, they all have the same general concepts of good and evil, and what is right or wrong (Pollock, 2004).

The Ten Commandments are what guides us to live a good life and to achieve greater good among ourselves and serve as a guideline on which to live. In our quests for divinity, if something arises, the act will be judged mostly on the intentions of the actor and even though it may have grave consequences, if the intention of the act was good, than God will see it as being morally good. (Pollock, 2004). For example, if a person decided to give to the poor out of the kindness of their heart it is deemed as being a good act but, if the person does it with the intentions of gaining notoriety or anything else, than God says this is wrong. Natural law believes that "what is good is that which is natural" (Pollock). If the action is to defend themselves in efforts to save their own lives, than this is considered to be a natural reaction and therefore seen as a good action. Natural law can be considered a deontological ethical system because it is much like religion in that the acts are judged based on the situation (Pollock, 2004). For instance, a person breaks into a home and takes a family hostage. After a few hours of watching his family being victimized, the father decided to take action and fight back. During the struggle with the assailant, the gun goes off mortally wounds the attacker. Natural law would say that the father's act was considered to be good based on the fact that he was doing what was natural to him; defending his family. The last deontological ethical system is egoism. Egoism believes that what ever it takes to achieve personal happiness is considered moral. It gives the belief that what ever it takes for us to gain personal happiness and whatever benefits themselves is moral (Pollock, 2004). For example, a student attends Western International University to obtain their degree, but they can find no time to study or do their work so they employ someone else who does not attend the University, to do their work for them. Under the egoism ethical system, this person would consider the choice to be moral based on the fact that they will gain their degree, even though it is considered cheating. But, because it made them happy, it is considered to be moral. The Teleological ethical system is the opposite of the deontological system. The teleological ethical system judges the consequences of the act rather than the act itself. It believes that if the action results in what can be considered as a good consequence, than it must be good and that the end result will justify the reason that the act was committed in the first place (Pollock, 2004). Among the teleological ethical systems are utilitarianism, ethics of virtue, and ethics of care. Utilitarianism is the view that "what is good is determined by the consequences of the action". If it can be shown that an action benefits the greater amount, than it is good because it outweighs the small amount of harm that the action has caused (Pollock, 2004).

For example, a family and their two dogs go out on a boat ride and ended up getting stranded on an island with no food. Even though they love their pets, they chose to kill them and eat them to provide food for their children and used their fur to keep warm. Even though many people find their pets to be like their children, and animal organizations see no reason for killing animals, they did what they had to do to survive, which under the utilitarianism was a moral choice. Another form of teleological ethical systems is the Ethics of virtues. Instead of judging the act or consequences, this ethical system looks at the person who is committing the act. It believes that in order for something to be considered a good act than the person must be a good person with virtues such as compassion, honesty, humility, courage, and devotion. If a person holds such virtues, they are good people and will do good (Pollock, 2004). For instance, a doctor in the emergency room gets a visit from a friend who is there for the intentions of getting the doctor to write a prescription for pain medications. However, the doctor finds nothing wrong with the friend and gives him samples of Tylenol instead. The thought never entered his mind that his friend was a drug seeker and depended on their friendship to get the medication. Instead, the doctor applied his medical expertise to the situation and the act was considered to be good because he has always done good, and wasn't tempted to do otherwise. The last teleological system is virtue of care which is based on the needs of individuals who are sick, injured, or incapable to make decisions on their own. The decisions are based on the immediate needs of individuals being cared for and doesn't concern itself with a person's individual right's (Pollock, 2004). If a person was injured severely in an automobile accident and was put on life support, they would not be able to make decisions for themselves. The next of kin is responsible for making a decision on whether to care for the person or to take them off life support. The next of kin then decides that they are going to take the person off life support because they feel that they would not want to live like that and that their quality of life would be diminished if they chose to keep the person on life support. This ethical dilemma would be a justifiable moral choice, according to the ethics of care. The teleological ethical system is a system that matches my views the most. The teleological system seems to be the most humane system in that there is no one set of rules to abide by. It is a system that is judged by individual circumstances rather than just the actor themselves. People are all generally good and try and follow God's law, but when it all comes down to it, there is no universal guideline on what to do when life presents us with moral decisions. However, with the teleological system, it offers us the chance to understand that life does happen and that we can not judge on the basis of one universal set of rules. 333333

Compare and Contrast deontological & teleological ethical systems.?

Can you give examples and descriptions of the seven major ethical systems and determine whether you believe each system to be deontological or teleological.

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Deontological: Deontological moral systems are characterized primarily by a focus upon adherence to independent moral rules or duties. Thus, in order to make the correct moral choices, we simply have to understand what our moral duties are and what correct rules exist which regulate those duties. When we follow our duty, we are behaving morally. When we fail to follow our duty, we are behaving immorally. Deontological moral systems also place some stress on the reasons why certain actions are performed. Thus, simply following the correct moral rules is often not sufficient - instead, we have to have the correct motivations. This would allow a person to not be considered immoral even though they have broken a moral rule, but only so long as they were motivated to adhere to some correct moral duty. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that in deontological moral systems, a correct motivation alone is never a justification for an action and cannot be used as a basis for describing an action as morally correct. It is also not enough to simply believe that something is the correct duty to follow. Duties and obligations must be determined objectively and absolutely, not subjectively. Perhaps the most significant thing to understand about deontological moral systems is that their moral principles are completely separated from any consequences which following those principles might have. Thus, if you have a moral duty not to lie, then lying is always wrong - even if that results in harm to others. For example, you would be acting immorally if you lied to Nazis about where Jews were hiding. The word deontology comes from the Greek roots deon, which means duty, and logos, which means science. Thus, deontology is the "science of duty." Key questions which deontological ethical systems ask include: What is my moral duty?

What are my moral obligations? How do I weigh one moral duty against another? Teleological Teleological moral systems are characterized primarily by a focus on the consequences which any action might have (for that reason, they are often referred to as consequentalist moral systems, and both terms are used here). Thus, in order to make correct moral choices, we have to have some understanding of what will result from our choices. When we make choices which result in the correct consequences, then we are acting morally; when we make choices which result in the incorrect consequences, then we are acting immorally. The idea that the moral worth of an action is determined by the consequences of that action is often labeled consequentialism. Usually, the "correct consequences" are those which are most beneficial to humanity - they may promote human happiness, human pleasure, human satisfaction, human survival or simply the general welfare of all humans. Whatever the consequences are, it is believed that those consequences are intrinsically good and valuable, and that is why actions which lead to those consequences are moral while actions which lead away from them are immoral. The various teleological moral systems differ not only on exactly what the "correct consequences" are, but also on how people balance the various possible consequences. After all, few choices are unequivocally positive, and this means it is necessary to figure out how to arrive at the correct balance of good and bad in what we do. Note that merely being concerned with the consequences of an action does not make a person a consequentialist - the key factor is, rather, basing the morality of that action on the consequences instead of on something else. The word teleology comes from the Greek roots telos, which means end, and logos, which means science. Thus, teleology is the "science of ends." Key questions which teleological ethical systems ask include: What will be the consequences of this action? What will be the consequences of inaction? How do I weigh the harm against the benefits of this action? ;-D Sorry, I just copied and pasted.

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Deontological Vs. Teleological Ethical Systems

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FlagPost a comment Ethics is a branch of philosophy dealing with right and wrong. According to MerriamWebster dictionary, the definition is "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation." To understand the Deontological and Teleological separations it is necessary to understand what ethics is. Obviously as it is a philosophical study, there are varying degrees and definitions that can be based simply on ones individual perception of these types. Deontological ethics is the study of moral obligation; obviously, morals are based on many separate views, as a result, it is important to understand the varying perceptions. In the study of deontological ethics, it is the right or wrong of the action that defines it. This is versus the teleological ethical system, which focuses on the good or evil of the action and the person committing the action. Emmanuel Kant first defined these principles, "Kant held that nothing is good without qualification except a good will, which is one that wills to act in accord with the moral law and out of respect for that law, rather than out of natural inclinations. He saw the moral law as a categorical imperative-i.e., an unconditional command-and believed that its content could be established by human reason alone." Ethical formalism tends to dictate the logic of the approach, and does not necessarily contemplate what benefits the human versus the law, however is based purely on the action and whether it is right or wrong. Another form of deontological ethics is egoism, in which the action must benefit the person committing the action, again however basing the form on the action versus the potential morality or reflection of god, as teleological arguments tend to be. Lastly, there is natural law, and the approach based on survival of the fittest, versus contributing to the whole. When utilizing this approach it is necessary to understand that according to "natural law" it is necessary that some humans, animals, etc, fail. Interestingly teleological ethics tend to encompass the religious ideals of ethical involvement versus a purely rational mindset and logical approach. The teleological argument is different due to the following "Teleological theories differ on the nature of the

end that actions ought to promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek eudaimonia, "happiness"), which hold that ethics consists in some function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, tend to emphasize the cultivation of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all action. These could be the classical virtues-courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom-that promoted the Greek ideal of man as the rational animal; or the theological virtues-faith, hope, and love-that distinguished the Christian ideal of man as a being created in the image of God. " Utilitarianism is a form of teleological ethics; this form states that what is good is that which has the greatest result for the greatest number. The ethics of virtue are also a form of teleological ethics; it promotes ones character over rules when approaching ethics. This form leads one to quest for a greater meaning in life and approach their ethical dilemmas with this mindset. Another example of the teleological system is religion ethics. This approach bases the ethical approach to ones religious stance, unfortunately this also tends to confine ones ethical abilities to that which most closely matches a system of belief that may or may not be correct in the societal situation one finds one self. An example of this ethical approach, Ethics of virtue can be seen in the very controversial abortion question; where in a majority of "pro-life" supporters are also religiously devout. The last system that addressed today is ethics of care, this system tends to allow one too care more for those that are close to oneself. With the ethics of care on may find that while we wish to prosecute a person for petty theft that we do not know, we may be willing to look the other way if it is a person we do know. Unfortunately, I disagree with this ethical standing, though I can understand the logic it is not a style I normally employ. In studying these systems, I find that the deontological system is more my approach to ethical dilemmas. The action itself is more important than the person committing that action. While this approach tends to delineate the personal aspect, it also allows for a more formal approach to legal matters. In many cases the particular action preformed (such as theft, or murder) remains the same, while the circumstances of said action differ. The person committing this action is separate from the legality of the action. The affect of the action on the surrounding community is important though should not be used as the decider as to whether the action is illegal or legal. By presenting actions separate from the human component one is more easily able to separate the wrongness versus the rightness of the action itself. For instance, there is the case of the juvenile offender that used a wrestling move on a much younger child and caused that child's death. The media characterized this as a case of television and games being the cause versus the offender, and recently we see that the offender was released back into society. However, the action that had been taken caused the death of another. While there was credence too the claims of societal pressure being involved it did not change the simple fact that causing another human pain and death is not right. My approach ethically tends to be ethical formalism, though I have been known to change this view upon occasion. In my opinion, the ability to change a view based on more evidence is the sign of growth. While ethical boundaries and commitment are important, we should be willing to approach every case individually which obviously means our ethical approach may vary, while our moral base remains the same. ethic. (2008). In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved August 08, 2008, from http://www. Merriam-Webster .com/dictionary/ethic

deontological ethics. (2008). In Encyclopdia Britannica. Retrieved August 10, 2008, from Encyclopdia Britannica Online: http://www. Britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/158162/deontological-ethics teleological ethics. (2008). In Encyclopdia Britannica. Retrieved August 10, 2008, from Encyclopdia Britannica Online: http://www. Britannica. com/EBchecked/topic/585940/teleological-ethics

55555555 A Brief Introduction to Formal Ethics

You've been thinking about and discussing two ethical situations in class, the torture situation and the attempted suicide situation. You've been asked to think about what course of action would be (or would have been) right or wrong in those situations. You were not just asked, for example, what would be (or would have been) legally correct in those situations (which would be a purely legal question). You were not just asked what most people might do in that situation (a purely sociological question). You were not just asked what might feel more pleasant or unpleasant in those situations (a purely psychological question). You were instead asked what course of action you thought would be the best (or worst) one to take in those situations. That's the kind of question that ethics deals with. How does one think about ethical questions? Do you just go on your gut feeling and follow whatever your feelings tell you? Do you just go on what people in authority have told you in the past? Do you just go with what the law and courts have to say? How does one go about deciding what course of action would be the best, or most right, course of action in a given situation? Or rather, how should one even start to think about questions like that? What methods of analyzing these questions would be most helpful and would be most likely to lead to the best answers? In the history of thinking about ethical questions in the West, several methods for analyzing these questions have emerged. Many of those methods can be classified under two main headings: Teleological methods and Deontological methods. Below is a brief description of each of these two methods of thinking about ethical questions. In our discussions about ethical situations in class -- the torture situation and the attempted suicide situation, as well as some others we'll be discussing in the coming weeks -- you'll want to be able to identify which kind of thinking is being used to come to the conclusions people come to. Are they using a primarily teleological approach (TEE LEE uh LAWJ ih kul), or are they using primarily a deontological approach (DEE AWN tuh LAWJ ih kul)? So here's what each kind of method is: Teleological methods, sometimes called consequentialist methods, are based on estimating what the likely outcomes of a given course of action will be, and then choosing

the method that has the most positive consequences and the fewest negative consequences. According to these methods, those actions should be chosen which lead to more positive and fewer negative consequences, and those actions should be rejected which lead to more negative consequences and fewer positive consequences. In class, for example, some of you who said that it would be good to torture the person who had been arrested argued that the outcomes would be better if we did torture him (lives saved, etc) than if we did not (thousands killed, etc). That is using a teleological or consequentialist kind of thinking to determine which course of action would be best. John Stuart Mills Utilitarianism is usually seen as the classical expression of consequentialist ethical thinking, and so is Joseph Fletchers Situation Ethics. Future lectures in the course will focus on Mills utilitarian method as the primary example of teleological ethical thinking. Mill's most famous book outlining this method is titled Utilitarianism. Fletcher's book on the subject, taking a somewhat different approach, is titled Situation Ethics. ... Deontological, or duty-based, ethical systems, on the other hand, are those that simply claim, directly and simply, what the fundamental ethical duties are. The Ten Commandments (from Exodus and Deuteronomy in the Hebrew Torah) would be examples of deontological ethical thinking. According to the Ten Commandments, these actions -honor your father and mother, do not steal, do not commit adultery, keep holy the sabbath, etc -- are stated as simply right things to do or wrong things to do. They are said to be our clear moral duty. The Ten Commandments do not merely suggest, for example, that you look at the consequences of actions and then weigh the possible outcomes to determine if an action is right or wrong. Instead they say that some actions are just plain right and others are just plain wrong. This is what characterizes deontological ethical methods: they simply state that some things are right or wrong. Some things are your duty to do (Greek deon: duty) and other things are your duty to avoid. Human Rights documents, for example, are instances of deontological thinking. When The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) says, for example, that "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude" (article 4), or that "No one shall be subjected to torture" (article 5), it is saying these things are just plain wrong. When the UDHR says that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" (article 13), or that " Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association" (article 20), or that "Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work" (article 23), it is saying that these things are simply right and good. Human Rights documents, therefore, exemplify deontological thinking. After all, rights and duties are just the mirror images of each other. When these documents say that person A has a certain right, that means that person B (or state B) has the duty to see that that right

is fulfilled. If person A has the right to not be tortured, then person B has the duty to not torture them. Rights and duties are just two sides of the same coin. How does deontological thinking figure out exactly which actions are right and which are wrong, though? Several different analytical methods have been developed for determining what our ethical duties are. Two of the more famous methods can be found in the writings of Natural Law ethics and in the writings of Immanuel Kant, particularly his books titled Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, and his Critique of Practical Reason. We will explore Immanuel Kants ethical system as the primary example of deontological thinking. The Human Rights documents we will be examining in the coming weeks will also be examples of deontological thinking. Your assignment for this week will be to read selections from Immanuel Kants Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals and from John Stuart Mills Utilitarianism. Then you will write out answers to Study Questions for each reading, and post them into the SQs folder in our classroom. And then, in the classroom folder for week one, you will discuss what you understand these Philosophers to be saying, and how you think their ideas apply to the situations weve been discussing.