ORDER IN DISORDER: RULE-GOVERNED ACTIONS AS SOCIO-LOGICAL PHENOMENA Alain Bovet and Philippe Sormani1.

University of Fribourg, University of Manchester

A recent development within ethnomethodology concerns the explicit focus on the local organisation and autochthonous order properties of social practices and phenomena, as well as the call for their uniquely adequate description. Our concern, for the exploratory purposes of the present contribution, is twofold: First, what about the standing issue of rulegoverned actions in the light of this development? Second, how may conversation analytic notions and methods be brought to bear upon their empirical investigation as socio-logical phenomena from within? To address this twofold concern in participant-relevant detail two perspicuous settings will be described, namely the filmed sequences of a television debate and a crossroad traffic jam, respectively. These settings are perspicuous, insofar as they exhibit two instances of order in disorder. That is, members involved not only formulate their activities as getting out of order but also do this in an orderly way, incidentally in terms of rules and rule-governed conduct. Keywords: local organisation, television debate, intersecting traffic, participant-relevant detail

INTRODUCTION

Ethnomethodology, as a distinctive program of sociological inquiry and established corpus of empirical studies, can be characterised for the continuities it expresses as well as the transformations it has encountered (Watson 2001). The recent publications of H. Garfinkel, edited by A. W. Rawls (Garfinkel 2002), and co-authored with E. Livingston (2003), place strong emphasis on (a) the local organisation and (b) autochthonous order properties of the social practices and phenomena they describe, such as to be found in queues and queuing, the canonical example in this respect. a) An evocative explication of practical activities and settings, as being locally organised, is provided by M. Lynch2:
The term local organization (or local production) enjoys currency in ethnomethodology as well as related areas in the social sciences and philosophy. Unfortunately, to speak of local organization or local production is often understood to imply a kind of nominalism or, worse, a kind of spatial particularism. In ethnomethodology, the adjective local has little to do with subjectivity, perspectival viewpoints, particular interests, or small acts in restricted places. Instead, it refers to the
1

Our correspondance addresses are the following: Alain Bovet, Universit de Fribourg, Dpartement des Sciences de la Socit, Av. de l'Europe 20, CH-1700 Fribourg, alain.bovet@unifr.ch; Philippe Sormani, University of Manchester, Dept of Sociology, Roscoe Building, Oxford Rd, GB-Manchester M13 9PL, philippe.b.sormani@stud.man.ac.uk. Acknowledgements are due to the Swiss National Science Foundation, for its financial support, as well as to Francisco Bautista and Atyabel K. Valdovinos, for their invaluable patience. 2 The explication is qualified and quoted as authoritative by H. Garfinkel and E. Livingston (Garfinkel, Livingston 2003:22). We refer to it as evocative in view of present purposes, namely the procedural description of specific, locally organised practices, not their nominal definition in these terms alone.

heterogeneous grammars of activity through which familiar social objects are constituted. Instead of trying to overcome heterogeneity by theoretically postulating an homogeneous domain (e.g. of panlinguistic dispositions, cognitive structures, doxa, or historical discourses), ethnomethodologists attempt to investigate a patchwork of 'orderlinesses' without assuming that any single orderly arrangement reflects or exemplifies a determinate set of organizational laws, historical ages, norms, or paradigmatic orders of meaning. They do not deny the historical and social 'contexts' in which social action and interaction take place; rather, they insist that specifications of such contexts are invariably bound to a local contexture of relevancies(Lynch 1993a:125).

A similar ethnomethodological argument has been spelled out concerning rulegoverned actions: actions cannot be governed by rules, be it in a causal or normative sense, where a given rule determines the conduct of an action per se. Rather, it is in the very course of a particular action that the specific sense of a rule is discovered and determined by members, if at all. That is, what the rule may amount to for its actual, setting-specific conduct; the former being occasioned as an "embedded instruction" to articulate the latter (see, for instance, Wieder 1974). Note, in this respect, that the critical assessment of conceptual flaws in dualistic accounts of social action is one thing (e.g. against the idea of abstract rules determining concrete conduct); the procedural description of how, why, when and where such or other accounts are made to operate quite another (e.g., to put it in garfinkelian terms, rules as a description of the work of following them, Garfinkel 2002:295)3. (b) Autochthonous order properties, as Garfinkel characterises them, are empirically observable properties of the congregational work of producing social facts(Garfinkel 2002:245). These properties are empirically observable, not primarily from the vantage point of a professional analyst, but to the members involved in the practical accomplishment of a particular social action; that is, as (a constitutive part of) any objective, recognisable, social fact (displaying, say, the durkheimian properties of "exteriority", "constraint", and "typicality" (Wieder 1974:34-35)). Yet these accountable properties are not always nor necessarily observed by members involved, nor are they unobservable for professional analysts, in and as participant-relevant details. That is, they can be "missed out" by both actual participants and potential sociologists. If one's turn in a queue can be missed out, and hence its local organisation, so can the queue be, as a sociologically perspicuous phenomenon. By and large, this seems to be the case, insofar as sociology addresses social order as produced by purported institutions, instead of analysing particular instances of practical activities, whatever their institutional import (Sacks 1984). In turn, the topic of rule-governed action may be considered as a standing, conceptual issue within sociology at large. Indeed, it may be found in past and present debates in sociological theory, be it in textbook or journal article form (see, for instance, Scott 1995, Crossley 1999). A common, epistemological mistake is to dismiss the notion of "rule" as viable, sociological concept or explanation of "social action", where it was not necessarily nor exclusively meant to do that job in the first place (Sharrock, Button 1999). As part of natural language use, rules may be invoked, referred to or hinted at, to formulate the practical activities they relate to. That is, to explain, justify and/or summarize, among others, an unfolding activity in so many words (Garfinkel, Sacks 1970:351). These various jobs of explanation, justification, and so on, are part and parcel of the very activity they articulate (natural language organising the practices from within which it is used). To recruit and criticise the notion of "rule", as an inadequate sociological explanation of the manifest
3

The distinction abstract rule/concrete conduct, as to be found in social theorising, cannot but appear as a simplistic and misleading device in the light of conceptual clarification (Bogen 1996). However, its use in the local organisation of practical affairs, including theorising, remains as commonplace as ever, at least arguably so (that is, as a vernacularly available distinction: You dont have to go to college to learn it, Garfinkel 2002:198).

regularities in social practices, is hence to disregard its varied, mundane use in these self-same practices, notably as linguistically articulated practices4. Ethnomethodological conversation analysis, at its best, has most significantly contributed to detailed exploration of social practices as linguistically articulated practices. That is, not the exploration of any details of talk but those and only those demonstrably relevant to participants (Schegloff 1991). Drawing upon conversation analytic notions and methods, the present contribution is not programmatic but exploratory. The contribution addresses the issue of "rule-governed actions" via the close inspection of two perspicuous settings where it becomes a members' issue, namely in the course of a television debate, to start with, and in a traffic jam at a busy crossroad, subsequently. Whatever the differences and similarities between these two settings, they will not be stipulated in advance but suspended in favour of a detailed exploration of the socio-logical phenomena the respective settings exhibit (Coulter 1991). Their local organisation may afford us with possible points of comparison. These will be alluded to in conclusion, notably insofar as rules and rule-governed conduct are concerned5. 2 ON THE LOCAL ORGANISATION OF A TELEVISION DEBATE

In this section, well consider a relevant sequence in a particular television debate. We found it relevant, in the first place, because it exhibits a great deal of overlaps and interruptions. For quite similar reasons, it is oriented to by the participants as displaying disorder. A practical solution, for a return to the order of the debate, is then looked for by one of them, notably through the formulation of a rule. The selected sequence occurs at the beginning of the broadcast; a television debate about a referendum that proposes restrictions on animal and vegetal genetic engineering. Prior to the debate, a short film presents the state of the art in genetic engineering. Thereafter, the journalist hosting the debate elicits a position statement from each of the invited panellists, to offer an overall framework for the debate to take place6. 2.1 Overlaps and interruptions: a display of disorder?

Overlaps and interruptions, as they occur in a television debate, may count as a display of disorder, all the more so as they go against a primordial rule of conversation: one party speaks at a time. Indeed, it is not infrequent to hear complaints from either debating participants themselves ("please let me finish", "would you mind not to interrupt me?", etc.) or from members of the audience (they all talk at the same time, they dont listen to each other, etc.) in that regard. Moreover, such complaints may occasion parallel ones about the chaos, brouhaha and disorder in result of the breach of the aforementioned conversational

In this respect, the critique of the explanatory status of rules, as to be found in the writings of P. Bourdieu, seems somewhat misguided, if not misleading, however compelling the alternative theoretical concept, say, in terms of "habitus" actually is (see Bourdieu 1980; Crossley 1999:82-86). 5 We are not unaware of the possible tensions between conversation analysis and ethnomethodology (see Lynch 1993). For present purposes, these will be suspended, too. In our understanding, they are often based on programmatic discussions, rather than on empirical investigations. For a notable exception, see Hester, Francis (2000). 6 The debate took place on francophone Swiss television, prior to a national vote on the aforementioned referendum. Regarding overlaps in conversation, both E. Schegloff and G. Jeffersons work revealed itself as relevant, insofar as it identifies the practices by which overlaps are orderly resolved. For an overview, see Schegloff (2000, 2001). For the entire transcription of the selected sequence, see Appendix, Section 6.1.

rule. Yet television debates get accomplished in a routine manner, "for each another next first time" through (Garfinkel, Wieder 1992). How come? Let us take a closer look at the selected sequence (see Appendix, Section 6.1). The transcript begins with a question that is asked to one of the panellists, Mr C. Grobet. He offers a concise answer (from lines 5 to 8). After a short pause he expands his answer into what shocks [him] deeply in this campaign (from line 8 onwards). Grobet apparently orients to the emerging regulation of the debate-thus-far: before him, two guests were given the floor for very expanded answers, up to three minutes long. Such a precedent, as well as the general principle that all guests receive equal treatment, may allow Grobet this kind of non sequitur expansion. This orientation is also ratified by the journalist: first, she doesn't exploit a possible completion point (at line 8), and second, she doesn't sanction Grobets continuation into a different topic (from line 8 onwards). The expansion takes three parts (until line 27). It is focused on the lies about the referendum that are attributed to the opposite camp7. The last part of the three-part list presumably occasions the series of subsequent overlaps and interruptions in the sequence. Let us take a look at how it is introduced and organised:
Excerpt I Lines 23 35 23 grob fifty-three years\ and last example/ . it is . your small 24 presentation/ .. madam/ where there were two minutes of an 25 idyllic view on genetic engineering/ . you did NOT present/ for 26 instance the converse effect/ . uh of gene transmission from 27 animals/ to human beings\ . which would be desastrous\= 28 journ =excuse me/ [but this is not being done/ this is not being done/ 29 but this is not being done/] 30 grob [AND THAT IS FORBIDDEN TODAY by the (compet-)] the constitution/ 31 by [article]/ 32 journ [mister] grobet excuse me/ you challenged me Im obliged to 33 answer/ . I didnt put it/ because I said it is not being applied 34 today/ . and what is and I it was completely [neutral/ it was 35 descript- . please/]

To start with, we may notice that it is introduced as the last item of a list of arguments (from line 23 onwards). Grobet makes clear that the adressee of the argument is the journalist, who is made responsible for the presentation that preceded (from lines 23 to 25)8. The last exemple of what shocks [Grobet] deeply is the fact that the presentation proposes an idyllic view of genetic engineering. The problem is exemplified by a risk of genetic engineering that was not presented in the film (from lines 25 to 27). In so doing, Grobet enlists the way the journalist presents the issue in the same set as the other political actions that shock him deeply. In turn, the journalist intervenes quickly at a possible completion point (at line 28). The first component of her turn - excuse me - is followed by an heterocorrection. The expression excuse me can be understood as oriented to the interruptive character of her talk, and/or as a preface to the forthcoming hetero-correction as a dispreferred action (excuse me but...). That turn beginning, though, is not efficient in giving her the floor. Grobets continuation indicates that his turn was not completed. A sustained overlap is the result (at lines 28-29 and 30-31). Both components of the overlap exhibit a distinct
7

The three-part construction provides Grobet with a standard format to expand his turn as well as the journalist with a resource to project its completion, however delicate the topic(s) the turn develops. How conversationalists display an orientation to the three-part contruction of lists has been explored by Jefferson (1990). 8 This explicit recipient design is recognised and exploited by the broadcast director who alternates shots of Grobet and of the journalist for the rest of the sequence.

competitive procedure (Schegloff 2000): the journalist repeats her point three times, while Grobet speaks louder. Grobet wins the overlap battle, in that he continues his turn while the journalist stops talking (at lines 30-31). That continuation retrospectively constitutes the journalists intervention as interruptive, i.e. as talk starting before the interlocutors turn completion. Though Grobets louder speaking indicates an orientation to the overlap, there is no display of taking into account the content of the competitive talk. In that regard, Grobet opts for a solo production, i.e. talking as if there was no overlap (Schegloff 2000). The journalists next intervention is noteworthy in at least two respects (lines 32-35). On the one hand, it constitutes a sort of climax of the developing dispute. On the other, it attempts to resolve it, though with limited success. This time, it has all the formal features of an interruption: starting to talk while the other still talks and causing him to stop. The journalists intervention displays no orientation to the content of the ongoing turn, nor to its construction. Maybe it should rather be said that she displays an active and deliberate disattending of the ongoing talk. That second try is not just a repeat of her first intervention (at lines 28-29). Importantly, she begins her turn with a direct address term. This technique is quite frequent in controversial contexts. There are several instances in this debate where it seems to act a) as a getting attention device, though its sequential environment is very different from summons, and b) as a pre-placed appositional (Schegloff 1987): an initial turn-component that is likely to appear in overlap with the others turn termination (typically, words such as well). In the present instance, it attempts to bring Grobet's turn to a close, presumably to initiate a return to the projected order of the debate (i.e. opening on a position statement, rather than the challenge of the host)9. 2.2 Formulating a rule: an attempt at order

A further excuse me is produced as a next turn component (at line 32). Once again, it can be understood as oriented to the interruptive character of the prior and as a preface to the ensuing talk. The subsequent turn component - "you challenged me I'm obliged to answer" - is central to our analysis of rule-governed conduct (at lines 32-33). What does this utterance relevantly accomplish in its practical context? In a classical conversation analytic vein, we can try to figure out what the problem is that such a way of talking attempts to resolve. Obviously, the journalists problem is to address a critique raised by Grobet about her presentation, dismissed as an "idyllic view on genetic engeneering" (line 25). A first attempt was unsuccessful in that Grobet did not display any taking into account of it. Grobet displayed a disattending of the interruption in and through a continuation of his point about an issue that was missing in the presentation (see analysis above). Compared to the first try, the second try is complemented with a formulation, in the loose sense of a description in so many words of the situation. Heritage and Watson (1979), though they restricted their analysis to a subtype of formulation, remarked that formulations rely on and display the intersubjectively accountable character of the ongoing talk. In this case, you challenged me indicates that Grobets talk is accountable as a challenge, by and for his interlocutor, the journalist. Im obliged to answer formulates the upcoming talk as sequentially and normatively related to that challenge. In other words, the two-part utterance formulates what is going on as a kind of adjacency pair: challenge answer. In that
9

In this respect, the observed overlaps and interruptions display disorder, even if they are resolved in an orderly way by the participants involved. In Sacks's terms, we may gloss the "naming" (of Grobet) as "doing an instruction"(Sacks 1992 I: 289), to get (him) back on the routine track of the television debate (as a piece of "institutional talk" with the host allocating turns and the panelists complying with the turns allocated, including the intended turn-type and turn-design).

sequence the formulation itself is part of the answer preface. There is a reflexive relation between the formulation, its sequential placement, and what is referred to by the formulation. Syntaxically, the relation between the two parts is simply appositional. Though minimal, this articulation allows the relation to be heard as temporal (then) and normatively causal (therefore). It indicates that Grobets talk, in its accountable specificity, urges her to answer. Sequentially, it accounts for the interruptive character of the second try: it is the very nature of Grobets talk that gives her not only a right but an obligation to clearly interrupt him (at line 32). A stronger sequential constraint than the right of a current speaker to speak a turn to its completion is thus displayed. The formulation of the challenge is retrospective, while that of the answer is prospective. The latter has the crucial sequential property to project an immediate continuation of the turn, for the answer. The short pause is then not a candidate possible completion point (at line 33)10. As a reflexive account, the formulation exhibits a rule. Thus far, the formulation of the challenge-answer pair has been described as inextricably sequential and normative. Im obliged to answer emphasizes the ostensible constraint. What the formulation does is to account for what is going on and what is still to come, not anyhow but as rule-governed conduct. Conduct is obviously not formulated in terms of an abstract rule only (e.g. in case someone is challenged, s/he must answer at once). Rather, it is exhibited at the same time as a formulation of the rule and an instruction on how to understand it in just this situation. Among other things, the formulated conduct indicates a) who the incumbents of the categories, occasioned by the interaction-as-formulated, i.e. you - the "challenger" - and me the "answerer", were and are to be, b) what kind of accountable speech act it accomplishes, and c) what its sequential-and-objectively-constrained-consequences are. Hence, the journalist puts herself in a position to answer the challenge without further a due (at lines 33-34). Her answer reiterates her first try, apparently unnoticed (at lines 28-29). She personnally endorses the responsibility of the presentation (in congruence with Grobets challenge), and justifies it. The rule-as-formulated may thus be characterised as providing grounds for the participants, panelists and host alike, to resume the debate. This, however, doesn't mean that the provision is efficient per se in re-establishing the intended order of the debate (i.e. bringing the challenge to a close, getting back to the elicited position statement). It may remain an attempt. 2.3 Formulating another rule: a solution to disorder

As mentioned from the outset, formulations of conversational rule(s) of conduct are far from infrequent in debates (e.g. I have not finished, I didnt interrupt you, so let me finish, etc.). However, their emergence cannot but depend on a local contexture which it reflexively constitutes. Our analysis, committed to the local organisation and autochthonous order properties of social practices, has been restricted to the "issue of rules" as and only as the object of participants orientations and activities. Formulation, in particular, appeared as a major vehicle to accomplish and account for conduct as rule-governed. As a routine matter, conversation and other conduct don't have to be formulated to get accomplished - whatever it is that is formulated (rules, identities, contexts, etc.). Hence, as Sacks (1992 I:515-522)

10

In that respect, the formulation is different from the subtype of formulation analysed by Heritage and Watson , that is, formulation of the gist or upshot of previous talk. In our example, the formulation does not constitute the first part of the type of adjacency pair analysed by Heritage and Watson (formulation decision, with a strong preference for agreement). It rather prefaces the second part of an adjacency pair, challenge answer. For an alternative analysis, see Heritage, Watson (1980).

suggested, it seems all the more interesting to explore when and where formulations do nevertheless occur, as well as in which form and with what consequences11. We may now turn to the end of the sequence, to make explicit how the formulation of another rule operates as a practical solution to "remedy" the disorderly features of the sequence, as displayed in participants' conduct. It runs as follows:
Excerpt II Lines 32-57 32 journ [mister] grobet excuse me/ you challenged me Im obliged to 33 answer/ . I didnt put it/ because I said it is not being applied 34 today/ . and what is and I it was completely [neutral/ it was 35 descript- . please/] 36 grob [listen/ . you did not .. you absolutely] did NOT show/ the 37 possible [DANGERS of genetic engineering that are ack- .. that uh 38 that]= 39 journ [yes but the de- EXCUSE ME IT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE DEBATE IT IS 40 THE SUBJECT OF THE DEBATE OK/] 41 grob =and its the subject of the debate/ and Id like to say that 42 these dangers . are ALREADY acknowledged in the constitution/ . 43 because the article twenty-four novies that youve just/ . 44 quoted/ FORBIDS . genetic engineering procedures/ on HUMAN/ 45 being\ . SO the danger/ . is admitted POSITIVELY in the 46 constitution/ and this article . provides for prohibitions\ but 47 does NOT provide/ for . prohibitions in two other domains of 48 gene- engineering . that is animals/ and plants= 49 journ =OK: [mister grobet thank you/] 50 grob [and Id just like] to say/ . that the the referendum/ intends to 51 COMPLEMENT . prohibitions that already exist/ . because genetic 52 engineering can be EXTREMELY dangerous\= 53 journ =and we will DEBATE these prohibitions/ . we will debate these 54 dangers/ therell be we have one hour and forty to do it/ . what 55 I wanted at the start was a PRINCIPLED position precisely on the 56 . attitude towards . genetic engineering/ professor heidi 57 diggelmann . you are chair of the national research fund council

Having formulated the challenge-answer pair, the journalist embarks on a continuation of her answer (at lines 34-35). After a few hesitations and false starts, she provides a justificatory account for the nature of the presentation, but her account is interrupted by Grobet, exploiting apparent progressivity troubles occurring in the course of its production (Jefferson 1984). His interruption may also exploit a sequential implication, namely that the challenge - answer sequence gives the floor back to the challenger for a counter-assertion, once the answer is completed, or treated as complete. The interruption occasions another sustained overlap (at lines 37-38 and 39-40). In the present case, it is explicitly oriented to by both participants (via tokens such as please and listen). Incidentally, Grobet wins the floor and initiates another critique of the presentation, namely that it did not show the possible dangers of genetic engineering (from line 41 onwards). As soon as the word "danger" is pronounced, the journalist intervenes. Here again, the resulting overlap is oriented to by both participants. The journalists turn displays a dispreferred turn construction, quite
11

Our analysis thus far largely relied upon the identification of an interruption. This identification was not entirely arbitrary: several particulars of the talk by both participants were identified as oriented to that interruption. Yet the proposed identification was not grounded in its formulation by the participants. That is, the formulation of the challenge-answer pair implies other rules to be relevant then and there, in particular the right to speak a turn to its completion.

similar to her previous interruptive interventions (via the format yes, but and the subsequent expression excuse me, at line 39). Her new intervention is oriented to the overall organisation of the debate, indicating that what Grobet claimed was missing in the presentation is to be discussed during the forthcoming debate (at lines 39-40). Grobet succeeds in keeping the floor, while displaying an attention to the journalists intervention through a repeat of her argument (=and its the subject of the debate, at line 41). He then initiates a long turn in whose course his interrupted argumentation is developed (e.g. regarding the dangers the presentation omitted, as well as the scope and purpose of the referendum in this respect, lines 41-52). In the course of the developed argumentation, the journalist identifies a possible completion point and intervenes ("OK mister grobet thank you", at line 49). Grobet, however, continues, and it is only later that a completion point can be identified and turn transition achieved (at lines 52-53). However, the journalists turn is not restricted to ratifying Grobets turn completion (already taken place prematurely, at line 49), nor to selecting the next speaker (at lines 53-57, see also lines 1-4, Appendix 6.1). She also reformulates her prior intervention (at lines 39-40). This reformulation indicates that the issues raised by Grobet, though they have a legitimate and important place, are specifically out of place at this moment ("we will debate these dangers/ there will be we have one hour and forty to do it/", lines 53-54). Her second utterance respecifies and relocates the ongoing activity as a sub-part of the broadcast, as a kind of preface to the debate itself (from "what I wanted at the start..." onwards, at lines 54-56). This could again be understood as the formulation of a rule, this time regarding the temporal and topical organisation of the debate. Again, the formulation is not disengaged from the setting it formulates. It closes a sequence that, if our analysis is correct, was produced and recognised by its partipants as controversial, interruptive, chaotic, etc.. In short, formulating another rule provides a solution to disorder then and there12. 2.4 Order in disorder: differences and similarities

Two situated formulations have been examined in quite some detail, not just any but participant-relevant detail. We described both as exhibiting and oriented to some rule for action. Let us now consider some differences and similarities between these formulations. The first formulation (at lines 32-33) allowed the journalist to simultaneously accomplish and justify an interruption. Designed to correct a critique raised by the panellist, regarding the presentation introducing the debate, the interruption served as a justification of that presentation. The interruption was accounted for and accomplished through the formulation of a rule. That rule seems to be at a high level of generality. We described it as a kind of secondary turn-taking rule, providing for the breach of more basic conversational rules (such as one speaker at a time, to start with). However, the formulated rule needs not to be considered as specific to a particular setting. One can imagine its situated invocation in n different settings. Yet we tried to show how its phrasing accomplished its accountable relevance for the examined occasion only. As far as the second formulation is concerned (at lines 53-56), it can be heard as closing implicative; that is, for the problematic sequence examined. It displays and relies upon authority and knowledge regarding the organisation of the broadcast. Whereas the first formulation categorizes its speaker (that is, the journalist) as a participant to a dispute, the
12

The formulation is both retrospective and prospective. On the one hand, it indicates that some aspects of the previous sequence were out of place, indeed. On the other, it "warns" the next speaker on the constrained character of her/his talk, notably regarding the type of turn that s/he is expected to produce (a principled position, as indicated at line 55).

second categorizes its speaker as the host of the debate. Can we find local practical reasons to say that and, if so, why there is a categorisation problem addressed through the second formulation? Prior to it, Grobets turn was composed of three examples of what he found deeply shocking in the campaign. The last one was the journalist's idyllic presentation. The two first examples were attributed to the opposite camp, explicitly categorized as "liars". In accordance with the framing of the debate thus far, none of the present members of that camp replied to that direct criticism, nor were they able to do so. In turn, the journalist, after several trials, succeeded in answering Grobets challenge, at least partly so. Her answer occasioned a somewhat chaotic sequence, much closer to exchanges between opposite camps than between host and panellists. Most importantly, the development and form of Grobets argument places the journalist in the same collection as the members of the opposite camp. This placement may, of course, raise serious concerns regarding the breach of common expectancies, typically bound to the category "journalist". Among these expectancies, the values of neutrality and disengagement seem particularly important for hosting a debate. What we find, then, is the journalist undertaking to correct Grobet's critique, through the very practices that would support it13. Having examined two situated formulations of rules and rule-governed conduct, we may conclude this section, referring to Garfinkel's point about the pointless task of desindexicalisation of indexical accounts (Garfinkel 1967). That is, our aim here is not to decide on the best or most adequate objective substitute to a situated formulation. It is rather to take seriously the reflexive character of the ever indexical formulation of rules. Hence, we offered empirical arguments to see turn-taking organisation as reflexively related to the participant-relevant specificity of the ongoing activity. Moreover, we proposed to understand the examined cases of "formulating a rule" as oriented to this relation, as well as to the exhibited order in disorder. 3 ON THE LOCAL ORGANISATION OF INTERSECTING TRAFFIC

This second section is concerned with another instance of order in disorder. Filmed on the outskirts of Mexico City, the sequence to be examined shows a busy crossroad. Trivial as it may be, the sequence will be examined for two related, analytic purposes: First, a procedural description of the visible order drivers accomplish, and have to accomplish, to get across the intersection, without collision, undue delay or modification of destination, will be provided (e.g. where traffic lights cannot be relied upon for how to proceed). Second, we examine the conversational organisation of talk in, as part of and about that visible order. The participants use of indicator terms and occasioned formulations will be of particular interest (e.g. insofar as it exhibits the category-bound formulation of traffic rules). In short, well be concerned with members practical solutions to navigational problems and their cooccurring traffic talk, both under the auspices of the socio-logical issue of rule-governed action(s); that is, insofar as it turns out to be a members issue14.

13

In this respect, note the overlapped part of her answer where she claims the neutral and descriptive nature of the presentation (at lines 34-35). 14 An initial analysis has been presented at a previous occasion (Sormani 2003). For an ethnomethodological analysis of practical solutions to navigational problems in walking, see Ryave, Schenkein (1974), as well as Livingston (1987). For an overview on traffic, see Lynch (1993b).

3.1

The visible order of intersecting traffic

Intersecting traffic, in Mexico City or elsewhere, presupposes its visible order. That is, for drivers (and pedestrians) to get across the street or an intersection, they have to be able to see the present state of traffic, as an (at least minimally) visible order, that may allow them to anticipate its unfolding as well as to project an appropriate course of action (to get across, as fast as possible, without collision, etc.). This visible order can also be analysed, as it will be here, for how it is accomplished by drivers themselves, in and through their very conduct (e.g. in line with an expectable trajectory, driving on the right or left, waiting in front of a red light, getting across when green, etc). The filmed sequence of intersecting traffic, as it is available to us as subsequent analysts, is not identical with its local organisation in real time, by the participants themselves. Nevertheless, it provides us with a means for describing its visible order as their practical accomplishment, notably via the observable procedures for displaying and taking turns in traffic15. The visible order of intersecting traffic as a practical accomplishment Consider the two following excerpts (taken from the first 3 seconds of the video recording):

0 seconds (Sequence 1)

3s

The move of the gasoline truck may be described first; that is, for the turns it takes the truck to make its move. In advancing smoothly and stopping shortly thereafter, the truck's exhibiting that it is moving up within a queue (its move appears in contrast to the stationary position of the car on its left). The stopping is accounted for through its very accomplishment (see the truck's red backlights, at 3 s). The occurrence of that stopping, right after a smooth advancing, allows us to see it as a typical achievement of moving-up-within-a-queue. In terms of turn-taking, the local production of that typicality can be considered as the practical accomplishment of an adjacency pair: given a prior vehicle that moves up, the subsequent vehicle is expected to do so next (as, indeed, the truck is visibly doing). It is also in contrast to this general format for taking turns, and the normative expectancies it defines, that the particular gap between the truck (as a prior vehicle) and the cab (as a subsequent one) may be

15

As H. Sacks and his colleagues pointed at in the opening section of their classic paper on turn-taking in conversation, conversation is by no means the only (speech) exchange system or, in goffmanian terms, interaction order that is organised in turns and amenable to analysis in terms of turn-taking, by present participants and/or subsequent analysts (Sacks et al. 1974). Pioneering work in the analysis of urban interaction, among which traffic, has been conducted by J. Lee and R. Watson in these terms (1993).

10

noticed. In short, the latter, from within which the sequence is filmed, is not complying with the rule of the queue, as evidenced by serial "moving up's"16. Consider the three ensuing excerpts, for how the truck crosses the intersection:

4s (Sequence 2)

7s

12 s

Again, the particular move of the truck may be described; this time, for the turns it takes the truck to cross the intersection. First, one may notice that the serially produced queue can serve as a local resource, not only for advancing within it but also for breaking out of it. The gasoline truck's positioning, visibly accomplished by a slight change of direction, turning the front wheels to the right, displays a possible break-out of that sort (from 3 s onwards, see sequence 1). Then, the actual production of the break-out is exhibited by the truck's original trajectory (from 7 s onwards). Speeding up, the truck drives around and takes over the queue member hitherto in front of it (the grey van, as it appears in the middle of the intersection, at 12 s)17. The originality of the truck's trajectory may be described in terms of the local organisation of the turns it actually takes and accountably displays. That is, the truck breaks out of the order of the queue and speeds up across the intersection, regardless of the red traffic light in front of it (from 7 s onwards). Hence, the truck's trajectory may well go against a basic rule for turn-taking in traffic (e.g. wait at red, go at green). More importantly, its trajectory draws upon and displays the visible order of intersecting traffic, as the unfolding situation makes it available. Notice, in this respect, the parallel positioning, at increased speed, of the truck relative to the grey van, protecting the truck from intersecting traffic (e.g. the white van about to cut across, from left to right, at 12 s). Passing-in-parallel appears as a first, practical solution to the navigational problem involved then and there; that is, getting across without getting hit18.

16

There seems to be a peculiar chaining rule involved in the serial production of the queue through the adjacency paired activities of moving up within it. That is, once a first vehicle has moved up, it is the second that is expected to move up, and then the third one, and so forth. Of course, both notions - adjacency pair and chaining rule - have been developed within the field of conversation analysis. This, however, doesnt exclude that they capture sequential features of queues, nor that these features are produced and oriented to by queue members in its local organisation, as in the sequence analysed. In this respect, see also Watson (1994). 17 In addition to the smoothly advancing queue, the end of sidewalk (or little wall) on the lower right-hand side may serve as a resource to break out of that very queue, too. In other words, it does not only put physical constraints on the trucks possible trajectory but may also be taken into account as a scenic indication device, as Barthlmy puts it (1991), in and for its actual trajectory (for where and when to break out). 18 The filmed occasion (of the passing truck) may be analysed as articulated around a "turn-transition relevance place"(Sacks et al. 1974). This place appears both as a temporally produced phenomenon (e.g. the truck is speeding up...) and as a spatially organised one (...in order to pass in parallel). It may be considered as an ethnomethodological object, whose practical identification hinges upon the embodied competence of both seeing and driving in intersecting traffic (see Lynch 2000).

11

Consider a further series of excerpts for two related solutions for crossing the intersection:

13 s (Sequence 3)

16 s

18 s

This series exhibits a first vehicle (the white van) crossing the intersection, from left to right, followed by a second vehicle (a black car). Several observations can be made here: To start with, the first vehicle, to cut across, must have moved/is moving into a slot for doing so (its perpendicular position in relation to the advancing queue(s) on the left may be seen as the result of such a move, at 13 s). In continuing its trajectory across the intersection, it orients to the present state of traffic (competing vehicles have either passed, as the grey van and the truck, or do not follow up, as the cab from within which the sequence is filmed, at 16 s). In passing, this first vehicle may also take into account the state of the traffic lights (presumably at green, from its perspective). However, its conduct can hardly be described as rule-governed in this respect. Indeed, if the passing vehicle drove in accordance with the traffic lights, it would risk to crash into the intersecting traffic, since its visible order must have been disregarded (e.g. it wouldnt make sense to move into a "slot to pass" or to speak of "competing vehicles" in the first place). Passing-in-cutting-across appears as a more appropriate characterisation of the conduct involved, as a second, practical solution to the navigational problem it addresses. Let us focus on the second vehicle's trajectory in terms of turn-taking (the black car following the white van). It may not only be said to follow the first one but also be seen to move up within the queue it constitutes by so doing (at least, as a minimal queue composed by two members). It accomplishes "moving up" within this queue as a two-turn, adjacency paired activity. The instantiated rule of the queue (see note 16) defines normative expectancies not only within the queue (for queue members to move up immediately) but also outside of it (for non queue members wanting to cut across; typically, they have to be quick, ask permission, provide excuses and/or be allowed to do so). Passing-in-following may hence serve as a third, practical solution to solve the navigational problem of getting across the crowded intersection (as the black car does, in the examined instance). Practical solutions and preference rules Thus far, we've provided for three ordinary solutions for getting across a crowded Mexico City crossroad, described as passing-in-cutting-across, passing-in-parallel and passing-infollowing, respectively. There is an orderly relationship between them, insofar as the two latter solutions presuppose the achievement of the prior one. Any given vehicle can only pass "in parallel with" or "follow" a prior vehicle, if there is a such vehicle, "cutting across" perpendicular traffic, as it were. Moreover, this order of presupposition provides drivers with a set of preference rules (to get across the crowded crossroad), where basic traffic rules tend neither to be attended to, nor complied with (e.g. the observable non-compliance with traffic lights). That is, the local organisation of intersecting traffic seems to draw upon other basic 12

rules, such as the chaining rule evidenced for moving up within queues (e.g. through adjacency pairs), for the set of preference rules to operate in situ (e.g. from the first or second position in the queue). Participants orientation to the exhibited practical solutions, as rules for preferred conduct, appears both when they are complied with (through their immediate reproduction by subsequent parties) and when they are not (through the manifest recognition, by those selfsame parties, of their prior "production failure", via honking, admonishing remarks and gestural work of various kinds, etc.)19. 3.2 The conversational organisation of traffic talk

To a large extent, intersecting traffic is self-explicative, maybe not at first sight, but to the trained eye, for certain. That is, competent members don't have to formulate, comment upon or otherwise relate its visible order to their talk, let alone in relation to rules of conduct. In troubled instances of traffic, however, they happen to do so. The incipient talk, as it occurred in the course of the examined sequences, runs as follows20:
Audio Transcript ((T: taxi driver, P: passenger)) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7 8 9 T: P: T: (1s) and here the people that get off the: bus\ yes\ as God may help them because [there are no (specific bus stops) (.) [((honking)) and now the people((honking)) the lights are red <red yes yes\> but nevermind\ ((laughing)) <no no> Corresponding Video Sequence ((Sequence 1, 0 s)) ((Sequence 2, 4 s)) ((ibid., 7 s)) ((Sequence 3, 13 s)) ((Ending, 18 s))

P: T: P: T:

How is the conversational organisation of the transcribed talk embedded in, part of and about the visible order of the traffic described so far? To start with, one may notice that the participants, a taxi driver and his passenger, seem to have no particular problem to relate their talk to the phenomena it yields (in contrast to, say, the potential reader of the present text, who may ask her-/himself how their talk "corresponds" to the setting or scene in which it occurs). For them, the initial utterance and here the people that get off the: bus\ is sufficiently specific for the topic it initiates. That is, it doesnt occasion a query as to its referent or meaning in subsequent turns. Instead, a continuer signals acknowledgement of understanding (at line 3) for its topic to be developed (from line 4 onwards). Second, we may notice that the ongoing conversation displays a particular turn organisation; current turns are not only oriented to prior and subsequent turns at talk but also to simultaneous, prior and subsequent turns at conduct (e.g. those moves of other traffic
19

Hence, upon the sequences described so far, instances of passing-in-parallel and of passing-in-following are reproduced, as the situation unfolds, when further vehicles cut across. Conversely, the cabs potential failure to move up to the truck is made noticeable through sustained honking by queue members behind. The visible order of intersecting traffic appears as a moral order through and through, possibly and partly through conversation. For the distinction between basic and preference rules, see Garfinkel (1963). 20 For the original transcript in Spanish, see Appendix 6.3.

13

participants, drivers or pedestrians, as witnessed in the scene, or the ones of the cab, from within which the scene is filmed)21. Whereas both types of turns may provide a topic for talk, only the latter ones do in the present case (be it the moves of drivers or pedestrians, as witnessed in the scene, or the ones of the cab). Consider the first turn at talk, by the taxi driver (from line 2 onwards). On the one hand, the utterance "and here the people that get off the: bus\" is both oriented to prior talk (e.g. the connector "and" marks this orientation, given the prior gap, see line 1) and projecting further talk to come (e.g. the relative clause, marked by "that", calls for the main clause to be produced subsequently). On the other hand, that same utterance does the job of a formulation, occasioned by the observable state of traffic; that is, the cab holding the second queue position, behind the gasoline truck, while a woman is crossing the street (presumably having just got off the bus, visible on the left, see video sequence 1, at 0 s). The category-bound use of indicator terms and occasioned formulations The apparent complexity of the sequential environment, displaying a double orientation to turns at talk and turns at conduct, may vanish once the use of indicator terms (such as "here" and "now") and occasioned formulations (by any present state of traffic so indicated) is considered as a category-bound activity (that is, notably bound to the category taxi driver). The particular task that the taxi driver achieves through their use may be glossed as providing a "running commentary of the intersecting traffic (e.g. not unlike a tourist guide, although the commented phenomena may turn out not to be the same). In this respect, the spatial indicator here may be heard as a temporal indicator, too (indicating both that a commentary is coming up, in the unfolding turn at talk, and when it is, after a comment-able phenomenon has been observed)22. The ensuing formulation, as occasioned by the observable state of traffic, is cast in general terms (e.g. it doesnt specifically refer to the category woman, but to people, at line 2). That is, the taxi driver delivers his formulation so as to provide for the general relevance of the witnessed activities in and through the particular case (e.g. not women only, nor the observed woman in particular, but anyone of the people that get off the bus, as the observed woman does, may encounter difficulties in doing so). The prior use of the indicator term here marks this general relevance as a local relevance (e.g. both for the witnessing and witnessed parties). More specifically, the taxi driver displays his competence to see and tell the local relevancies for the participants in the scene (e.g. the intentionality of and in their activities). That competence is spelled out through the ensuing formulation. At the same time, the formulation presupposes and addresses its recipient as lacking the competence exhibited (e.g. the passenger is addressed, to put it somewhat crudely, under the auspices of presumed ignorance). Reconsider the design of the first turn at talk. We have already noticed that it is so designed as to project further talk to come. Now, we may also notice that it is so designed as to take into account the recipients responses to that talk (e.g. the downward intonation at the end of the first unit of the unfolding turn, at line 2, may be heard as yielding a display of attention and understanding by its recipient; indeed, produced as such thereafter, with a continuer, at line 3. That downward intonation, as well the idiomatic exaggeration, "as God may help them", and the explanatory account, "because there are no (specific bus stops)", at
21

J.L. Heap makes a similar distinction between turns at talk and turns at action, though in another setting: collaborative computer editing (Heap 1992). 22 As H. Sacks put it, "the distinction between temporal and spatial indicators is weak (...) there are ways in which the spatial indicators invoke time and the temporal indicators invoke space as well ()"(Sacks 1992 I:519).

14

lines 4-5, account for the presumption of the recipients ignorance, regarding the traffic commented upon). The occasioned formulation of traffic rules Consider now the passengers turn at talk: the lights are red (line 9). Noticeably, he doesnt use indicator terms to produce his formulation of the current state of traffic. Yet his turn at talk is oriented to the occurring turns at conduct. That is, his utterance the lights are red occurs after sustained honking (at lines 6, 8). Whereas the latter is hearable as sanctioning the cabs current turn at conduct (e.g. its stationary position), the former is hearable as sanctioning that sanction (e.g. it formulates the cabs position in relationship to the basic rule of conduct, wait at red). Two things may be noticed here: First, the passengers utterance is hearable as the expression of the rule in relationship to the conduct it sanctions (be it honking, at lines 6 and 8 in the audio transcript, or passing across the intersection when the lights are red, see corresponding video sequence 2, or both at the same time). Second, the rule expressed doesnt fit the local organisation of intersecting traffic (as described above, in terms of practical solutions and preference rules), but is formulated as an abstract rule (e.g. abstract from and/or in contrast to that local organisation)23. The examined utterance, far from being descriptive only, is produced as an evaluative formulation of the basic traffic rule expressed. The passenger not only places his formulation after the honking it sanctions but also designs it so as to cover any case of (mis-)conduct (e.g. the absence of indicator terms accounts for the general scope of the formulation and rule formulated), regardless of the exceptions to the rule such honking may occasion (such as passing-in-following, see video analysis above). In the present case, after having been recognisably produced, the evaluative character of the formulation is progressively downgraded, notably via an ironic uptake (at line 8) and its reception (at line 9). By and large, the formulated rule is exhibited as locally irrelevant (e.g. for the turns at conduct of the witnessed vehicles, honking behind and/or getting across the intersection in front). Paradoxically, the stationary position of the cab exhibits its relevance for the taxi driver and his cab, regardless of the conduct by other drivers in the scene. The stationary position of the cab is in line with the maxims and expectancies bound to the category "taxi driver", at least arguably so (e.g. as being attentive to local circumstances, not endangering his/her passenger, adapting conduct to the passenger's agenda, etc.). The respective formulations, by the taxi-driver and his passenger, differ not only in the way they are indexical to the situation but also regarding their consequentiality for the unfolding talk and conduct. In this respect, just as the first analysis showed it to be the case, formulating and formulating a rule, in particular, may occasion situated enquiries as to its scope, validity, adequacy, etc. Order in disorder, as to be found in intersecting traffic, afforded us with another occasion to explore how formulating practices contribute to establish an accountable reality, incidentally in terms or rules and rule-governed conduct.

23

In any case, to put it in Wieders terms, the observers [and the participants] work of transforming remarks into statements of rules, or the task of simply hearing talk as expressions of rules, depends on the observers [or the participants] discovery of some set of behaviours which are the fulfilment [or, indeed, the violation] of those rules(Wieder 1974:192).

15

CONCLUSION

The present contribution explored two related issues: Firstly, the standing issue of rulegoverned actions in the light of a recent, programmatic development in ethnomethodology and, secondly, the possible pertinence of conversation analytic notions and methods for their empirical investigation as socio-logical phenomena from within. We tried to address both issues in participant-relevant detail. For this purpose, two perspicuous settings were described, namely the filmed sequences of a television debate and a crossroad traffic jam, respectively. These settings were considered as perspicuous, insofar as they exhibited two instances of order in disorder, formulated by members involved as getting out of order in an orderly way, notably by reference to rules and rule-governed conduct. Is there anything to be gleaned from a comparison, beyond the local specificity of each case? In both cases, rules were observably oriented to by the participants, notably through their formulation by these selfsame participants. We tried to show how they happened to formulate aspects of the situation in terms of rule-governed action, for the conduct of their practical affairs. In both cases, we indicated how these formulations displayed an orientation to the particular circumstances in which they occurred. Beyond these superficial convergences, some striking contrasts may be spelled out now, in the remaining part of this conclusion. To a large extent, the analysis of the television debate was conducted on the basis of an audio transcript. The debate was essentially conducted through talk. Of course, any utterance, by any participant to a debate, is vulnerable to the contingencies of talk as it unfolds. Her or his utterance can be interrupted, misunderstood, ignored, etc.. Yet, however the utterance is treated, it will be treated in and as part of the debate. If we use the (somewhat exhausted) game metaphor, every move played by the parties appears as a move in the debate. Hence, the formulation of a rule, as it occurs in the course of a debate, cannot but become a constitutive part of that debate, a move that alters the state of the game without remedy nor time out, as Garfinkel may put it. In its course, a debate offers no place for a disengaged formulation of its course. Hence, any formulation in a debate can be inspected for its analysable basis (its indexical inscription) and its lines of consequences (its reflexive impact), as Sacks suggested (1992 I:518). Accordingly, we tried to describe how formulating a rule was unavoidably consequential, not as a move in a game but as part and parcel of the debate it reconfigured. As a visually available phenomenon, intersecting traffic was analysed on the basis of video data. The first part of the analysis was devoted to describe its visible order, as produced in situ, by and for the parties involved. Part of that description made explicit how intersecting traffic could be accounted for in terms of preference rules, as displayed in participants practical solutions to navigational problems. The second part of the analysis addressed the formulation of basic traffic rules, in and through the verbal interaction between a taxi driver and his passenger. Taking turns at talk was shown to be oriented to the taking of turns at conduct. It appeared that the formulation of a rule was locally occasioned by the particulars of traffic. Formulating a rule depended upon the visible order of intersecting traffic, as documented by the examined video sequences. Yet the local organisation of intersecting traffic was differently available to each of the participants. That difference was accounted for in terms of their respective membership categories, taxi driver and passenger, as well as the knowledge that can be conventionally attributed to them. In Sackss terms, the examined formulations have an analysable basis but no lines of consequences for the conduct they gloss. Whilst "the operation of the [formulated] rule can itself become implicated in the reflexive reformulation of the 'circumstances' [of talk]"(Heritage 1984:126), this cannot be said for the local organisation of intersecting traffic; at least, not for the instance examined.

16

Conversely, in the case of the debate, the formulation of rules can be described as reflexive, insofar as it elaborates and configurates the course of action it formulates, elaborating and configurating it as rule-governed through its formulation. In that elaborative configuration, a distinction between formulated rule and ongoing conduct makes little sense. To draw such a distinction would be to committ a linear fallacy (Hester, Francis 2000), treating the formulation as disengaged, i.e. at a different level, from the supposedly primordial practices of talk. What about the second case, then, where the formulation was shown to be indexical to, but not reflexively elaborative of the intersecting traffic? In that case, the distinction seems constitutive of the respective courses of action: intersecting traffic and traffic talk. Of course, one can easily imagine and actually find instances where talk is constitutive of the visible order of traffic, but that is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its local organisation. As Sharrock and Coulter (2003) remarked, wearing rings is indifferent to the activity of starting a car motor. The distinction is a conceptual one, though it can be empirically observed. In this sense, the preference rules for intersecting traffic can be "non-reflexively" formulated only because intersecting traffic is massively indifferent to talk produced by drivers and passengers. There would be no sense here to identify a linear fallacy, except from an ironical perspective, assessing members conduct according to external criteria. The examined passenger's talk seemed to do just that, formulating a disenganged basic rule and evaluating the unfolding traffic therewith. Be it as a lay practice or professional endeavour, sociological reasoning heavily relies upon disengaged rule formulation. That is, it disattends, or takes for granted, the mundane occasions of such disengagement. As both analysis indicated, detailed attention to the involvement of rules in the courses of action they formulate provides access to various aspects of their local organisation. In both analysis, we tried to describe how members account for conduct in terms of rules, notably as and when they face instances of disorder. In that regard, the variety of our observations advise us to suspend any principled position on several classical issues. For instance, the ontological, causal or explanatory status of rules, be they formulated or not, as part of or disengaged from their occasions of use, can be considered as a members' affair - an irremediably, locally and practically managed one, indeed. Whatever the merits and outcomes of the exploratory comparison we sketched, it invites us to take seriously members methodic ways of treating rules as practical resources for finding order in and out of disorder.
5 REFERENCES

Barthlmy, M. (1991). "Voir et dire l'action. La normalisation des comportements des jeunes autistes", in P. Pharo, L. Qur (Eds) Les formes de l'action. Smantique et Sociologie. Paris: Editions de l'EHESS, Raisons Pratiques, 1:195-226. Bogen, D. (1996). Order without rules: Critical theory and the logic of conversation. New York: SUNY Press. Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le sens pratique. Paris: Ed. de Minuit. Coulter, J. (1991). Logic: ethnomethodology and the logic of language. In: G. Button (ed), Ethnomethodology and the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crossley, N. (1999). "The phenomenological habitus and its construction". Theory and Society 30:81-120.

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Garfinkel, H. (1963). A conception of, and experiments with, "trust" as a condition of stable concerted actions. In: O.J. Harvey (ed), Motivation and social interaction: cognitive approaches. New York: Ronald Press. Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Garfinkel, H. (2002). Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism. Edited and Introduced by Anne Rawls. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Garfinkel, H., Livingston, E. (2003). Phenomenal field properties of order in formatted queues and their neglected standing in the current situation of inquiry. In: Mike Ball (ed.) Image Work, a Special Issue of Visual Studies 18/1: 21-28. Garfinkel, H., Sacks, H. (1970). On formal structures of practical action. In: J.C. McKinney & E.A. Tiryakian (eds), Theoretical sociology: perspectives and developments. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Garfinkel, H., Wieder, D.L. (1992). Two incommensurable, asymmetrically alternate technologies of social analysis. In: G. Watson & R.M. Seiler (eds), Text in Context: Contributions to ethnomethodology. London: Sage. Have, P. ten (1999). Doing Conversation Analysis: a practical guide. London: Sage. Heap, J. L. (1992). Normative order in collaborative computer editing. In: G. Watson & R.M. Seiler (eds), Text in Context: Contributions to ethnomethodology. London: Sage. Heritage, J. (1984). "Actions, Rules and Contexts", in J. Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press. Heritage, J.C., Watson, D.R. (1979). Formulations as conversational objects. In: G. Psathas (ed), Everyday language: studies in ethnomethodology. New York: Irvington. Heritage, J.C., Watson, D.R. (1980). "Aspects of the properties of formulations in natural conversations: Some instances analysed", in Semiotica 30:3/4, 245-262. Hester, S., Francis D. (2000). Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis and "Institutional Talk", Text, 20: 373-396 Jefferson, G. (1984 b). Notes on some orderlinesses of overlap onset. In: V. DUrso & P. Leonardi (eds), Discourse analysis and natural rhetorics. Padova: CLEUP. Jefferson, G. (1990). List-construction as a task and interactional resource. In: G. Psathas (eds), Interaction Competence. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. Lee, J. R., Watson R. (1993). Regards et habitudes des passants: les arrangements de la visibilit de la locomotion. Les Annales de la recherche urbaine, 57-58: 101-10 Livingston, E. (1987). Making sense of ethnomethodology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Lynch, M. (1993a). Scientific practice and ordinary action: ethnomethodology and social studies of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Lynch, M. (1993b). The linear society of traffic. in M. Lynch Scientific practice and ordinary action: ethnomethodology and social studies of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 154-158. 18

Lynch, M. (2000). The ethnomethodological foundations of conversation analysis. Text, 24: 517-32 Ryave, A. L., Schenkein J. N. (1974). Notes on the art of walking. In: R. Turner (ed) Ethnomethodology. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In: J.M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (eds), Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on conversation. 2 vols. Edited by Gail Jefferson with introductions by Emanuel A. Schegloff. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Sacks H., et al. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn taking for conversation. Language 50, 697-735 Schegloff, E. A. (1987). Recycled turn beginnings: a precise repair mechanism in conversation's turn taking organization. In: G. Button, J.R.E. Lee (eds), Talk and social organisation. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Schegloff, E. A. (1991). Reflections on talk and social structure. In: D. Boden, D.H. Zimmerman (eds), Talk and social structure: studies in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Cambridge: Polity Press. Schegloff, E. A. (2000). Overlapping talk and the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language in Society 29:163 Schegloff, E. A. (2001). Accounts of conduct in interaction: interruption, overlap, and turntaking. In: J.H. Turner (ed), Handbook of sociological Theory. New York/Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Scott, J. (1995). Sociological Theory. Contemporary Debates. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Sharrock, W., Button, G. (1999). Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following. Human Studies 22: 193-210 Sharrock, W., Coulter, J. (2003). Dissolving the "projection problem". In: M. Ball (ed), Image Work, a Special Issue of Visual Studies 18/1: 74-82. Sormani, P. (2003) "Local order in concerted conduct", Paper presented at the International Institute of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. Manchester Metropolitan University, July 2003. Watson, R. (1994), "Catgories, squentialit et ordre social: Un nouveau regard sur l'oeuvre de Sacks", in B. Fradin, L. Qur, J. Widmer (eds.), L'enqute sur les catgories. Raisons pratiques. 5:151-184. Watson, R. (2001). Continuit et transformation de l'ethnomthodologie. In: M. de Fornel, A. Ogien, L. Qur (eds), L'ethnomthodologie: une sociologie radicale. Paris: Editions La Dcouverte. Wieder, D.L. (1974). Language and social reality: the case of telling the convict code. The Hague: Mouton

19

APPENDIX

The following transcripts are based on the usual, conversation analytic transcription conventions (see Have 1999), except for the transcription of intonation, where / indicates a rising intonation and \ a falling one. 6.1 Translated English Transcript
OK mister christian grobet/ you are uh national deputy/ you are uh deputy of the left wing alliance in geneva/ you are one of the SUPPorters of the referendum/ same exp- same question as before/ . to what extent/ do you reject/ ge- genetic engineering\ I ABSOLUTELY do not reject genetic engineering/ I support it/ . what I think/ is that it has/ to be/ . REGULATED . against uh . possible MISUSE/ and against SERIOUS side-slips/ . and uh on the other hand/ euh that some procedures be forbidden\ . what SHOCKS me deeply/ and Id like to say it first in this campaign it is . not only the STAGGERING amount of money put at disposal by the pharma circles/ thirty-five billions into the campaign\ but above all the lies . since it is said uh in the ads/ that the referendum is a referendum that forbids medical research\ and its absolutely not the case/ its absolutely not the case . what is still more SERIOUS is what was said in another ad by the academic circles that is to say at the tax-payers expense/ . that in case the referendum against genetic engineering was accepted/ more than TWO THOUSAND PEOPLE in several university labs will immediately stop their research program/ . which is a pure lie/ because . there will be NO EFFECT . unless an enforcement law is voted by the parliament/ and you know that in the case . of of maternity insurance/ weve been waiting for fifty-three years\ and last example/ . it is . your small presentation/ .. madam/ where there were two minutes of an idyllic view on genetic engineering/ . you did NOT present/ for instance the converse effect/ . uh of gene transmission from animals/ to human beings\ . which would be desastrous\= =excuse me/ [but this is not being done/ this is not being done/ but this is not being done/] [AND THAT IS FORBIDDEN TODAY by the (compet-)] the constitution/ by [article]/ [mister] grobet excuse me/ you challenged me Im obliged to answer/ . I didnt put it/ because I said it is not being applied today/ . and what is and I it was completely [neutral/ it was descript- . please/] [listen/ . you did not .. you absolutely] did NOT show/ the possible [DANGERS of genetic engineering that are ack- .. that uh that]= [yes but the de- EXCUSE ME IT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE DEBATE IT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE DEBATE OK/] =and its the subject of the debate/ and Id like to say that these dangers . are ALREADY acknowledged in the constitution/ . because the article twenty-four novies that youve just/ . quoted/ FORBIDS . genetic engineering procedures/ on HUMAN/ being\ . SO the danger/ . is admitted POSITIVELY in the

1 journ 2 3 4 5 grob 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 journ 29 30 grob 31 32 journ 33 34 35 36 grob 37 38 39 journ 40 41 grob 42 43 44 45

20

46 47 48 49 journ 50 grob 51 52 53 journ 54 55 56 57 58

constitution/ and this article . provides for prohibitions\ but does NOT provide/ for . prohibitions in two other domains of gene- engineering . that is animals/ and plants= =OK: [mister grobet thank you/] [and Id just like] to say/ . that the the referendum/ intends to COMPLEMENT . prohibitions that already exist/ . because genetic engineering can be EXTREMELY dangerous\= =and we will DEBATE these prohibitions/ . we will debate these dangers/ therell be we have one hour and forty to do it/ . what I wanted at the start was a PRINCIPLED position precisely on the . attitude towards . genetic engineering/ professor heidi diggelmann . you are chair of the national research fund council (())

6.2
journ

Original Francophone Transcript

bien monsieur christian grobet/ vous tes euh conseiller national/ vous tes euh dput de lalliance de GAUCHE genve/ vous tes lun des PARtisans de linitiative/ mme exmme question que tout lheure/ . jusqu quel point/ est-ce que vous vous rejettez/ le g- le gnie gntique\ je ne rejette ABSOLUMENT pas le gnie gntique/ jy suis favorable/ . ce que je pense/ cest quil faut/ quelle soit/ . REGLEMENTEE: . contre euh . des ABUS ventuels/ contre des GRAVES drapages/ . et: euh dautre part/ euh que certaines oprations soient interdites\ . ce qui me CHOQUE profondment/ et je voudrais le dire dabord dans cette campagne cest . non seulement largent FARAMINEUX mis disposition par les milieux pharmaceutiques/ trente-cinq millions dans la campagne\ mais surtout les mensonges . puisque: on di:t euh dans les annonces/ que linitiative est une initiative qui interdit la recherche mdicale\ cest absolument pas le cas/ cest absolument pas le cas . ce qui est encore plus GRAVE cest quon a dit dans une autre annonce par les milieux universitaires cest--dire aux frais des contribuables/ . que si linitiative contre le gnie gntique est accepte/ plus de DEUX MILLE PERSONNES dans de nombreux laboratoires universitaire stopperont immdiatement leurs programmes de recherche/ . ce qui est un pu:r menson:ge/ parce que . il ny aura AUCUN EFFET . sans quune loi dapplication nait t vote par lassemble fdrale/ et vous savez notamment quen matire . de dassurance maternit/ on attend depuis cinquante-trois ans\ dernier exemple/ . cest votre petite . prsentation/ .. madame/ o on a eu deux minutes dune vue idyllique du gnie gntique/ . vous avez PAS prsent/ par exemple leffet inverse/ . euh de transmission de gnes danimaux/ aux tres humains\ . ce qui serait catastrophique\= =excusez-moi/ [mais a se fait pas/ a ne se fait pas/ mais a ne se fait pas/] [ET CA CEST INTERDIT AUJOURDHUI par la (compt-)] par la constitution/ par [larticle/] [monsieur] grobet excusez-moi/ vous mavez interpelle je suis oblige de rpondre/ . je ne lai pas mis/ parce que jai dit ce qui tait appliqu aujourdhui/ . et ce quest et je ctait compltement [neutre/ ctait descript- . sil vous plat/] [coutez/ . vous navez .. vous navez] absolument PAS montr/ les DANGERS [ventuels du gnie gntique qui sont rec- .. que euh que]= [oui mais le d- EXCUSEZ MOI CEST LOBJET DU DEBAT CEST LOBJET DU DEBAT voil/] =et cest lobjet du ddat/ et je voudrais dire que ces dangers . sont DEJA reconnus dans la constitution/ parce que larticle vingt-quatre nonis que vous venez/ . de citer/ INTERDIT . des oprations de gnie gntique/ sur ltre/ HUMAIN\ . DONC on admet/ . EXPRESSEMENT dans la constitution ldanger/ et cet article . prvoit des interdictions\ mais il ne prvoit PAS/ . des interdictions dans les DEUX autres domaines du gn- gntique . cest--dire les animaux/ et les vgtaux=

grob

journ grob journ grob journ grob

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journ grob journ

=VOILA: [monsieur grobet merci/] [et je voudrais simplement] dire/ . que la- linitiative/ vise COMPLETER . des interdictions qui existent dj/ . parce que le gnie gntique peut tre EXTREMEMENT dangereux\= =et on va DEBATTRE de ces interdictions/ . on va DEBATTRE de ces dangers/ y aura on a une heure quarante pour le faire/ . ce que je voulais au dpart ctait une position de PRINCIPE justement sur . lattitude face au gnie gntique/ professeur heidi diggelmann . vous tes PRESIDENTE du CONSEIL du fond national/

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Original Spanish Transcript

T: P: T: (1s) y aqui la gente que baja de:l bus\ si\ como Dios le ayude porque aqui [no hay (paradas especificas) (.) [((ruido de claxon)) y ahorita la gente ((ruido de claxon)) la luz esta roja <la roja si no si> pero no pasa nada\ ((risa)) <no no>

P: T: P: T:

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