Ratio Juris. Vol. 9 No.

4 December 1996 (321-30)

On Values. Universal or Re1ative?

AULIS AARNIO and ALEKSANDER PECZENIK
Abstract. Any value statement belongs to a certain value code shared, to a certain degree, by a number of people. Is the value code itself relative or not? To solve this problem, one must assume that universal value statements and principles always have a primalfucie character. Primafacie value propositions not only claim universality but can also be understood as universally valid in the following sense. First, their validity does not depend on an individual's free preferences. Second, although they are culture-bound, there is something all cultures must have in common. But such prima-facie propositions do not logically imply a moral judgement in any particular case. They are merely a starting point of an evaluation procedure, i.e., of weighing and balancing, nothing more. On the other hand, the final (contextual, all things considered) evaluations are necessarily relative to a certain culture and, indeed, to individual preferences. When claiming universality of values, people see the first side of the problem. When endorsing relativism, they see only the second side.

1 Mr. Justus Caritas and Mr. Pedro .

Let us start with an example formulated, as far as we know, first by Bernhard Williams but later on used in a sophisticated way, for instance by Maija-Riitta Ollila in the Finnish moral philosophical discussion. In the example, the story goes as follows. Mr. Justus Caritas, an explorer, arrives one afternoon at a small village, let us say, somewhere in Latin America. In the market place he sees 20 Indians captured. Mr. Pedro, a commander of a small revolutionary group is just making a decision on the fate of the prisoners. Seeing Justus Caritas, Mr. Pedro wants to celebrate the event and makes a suggestion. If Justus Caritas kills one Indian, the others are free. If the explorer refuses to do so, all the prisoners will be shot. There is a genuine moral problem at hand. Justus Caritas has to make a choice on the basis of extremely scanty alternatives: to kill or not to kill. If Mr. Caritas is a moral man, he may prefer to follow the maxim: Do not kill
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an innocent person. His individual morality has, however, a dramatic consequence. All the Indians will be shot. Killing one, Mr. Caritas would save the other 19 but then he has to violate his basic maxim. The story has, especially for the present contribution, an important point. Is the maxim Do not kill an innocent person to be followed regardless of its actual consequences? Furthermore, is this maxim universally valid? Or is it valid only relatively to a certain culture, group or individual? Would a moral and rational Chinese assess the problem in the same way as the European Justus Caritas? This is our basic problem, which can also be formulated as follows: What is the nature of values?
2. Some Preliminary Distinctions

At least the following positions can be taken as far as the nature of values is concerned: (1)Values are entities of their own, they do exist independently, even if not in the same way as, for instance, physical bodies, but still they belong to the world, in one sense or another; (2) Values are properties, comparable to, e.g., the colour yellow; ( 3 ) Values are or at least can be derived from facts (they are reducible in a certain way). From an epistemological point of view, however, both (1) and (2) have some problematic consequences: The knowledge about objective values is not inter-subjectively controllable. On the contrary, the knowledge is personal, like intuition. G. E. Moore advanced a view that has been called ethical intuitionism. For Moore, A is good because it is good. In Moores view, a value concept, such as good, is simple, undefinable and nonnaturalistic. Moore added that we cannot prove if something is good, but we can know it. For reasons we have given in other contexts, this kind of intuitive knowledge cannot be a basis of a sound value theory. It does not matter if values are defined to exist independently (in a non-nominalist sense) or if they are properties of existing entities. As regards (3),one may recall the naturalistic fallacy, related to Humes guillotine: It is impossible logically to derive a normative or evaluative sentence from a factual one. A human being needs water and food but from this fact it does not logically follow that every human being ought to get enough food and water. Further, a value statement cannot be justified using facts as the only reasons. We share, of course, the opinion that everybody has some basic needs, but this is a value statement, a normative standpoint, which can only partially be justified referring to elementary conditions of human life. On the other hand, values are not merefeelings or otherwise subjective matters. To be sure, C. L. Stevenson characterised value statements as follows: I now approve of this, do so as well. For the representatives of the so-called Uppsala school, value statements were only expressions of personal feelings. For Leon Petrazycki, they were emotional projections. Yet, following this
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line, one cannot, in the last instance, use rational argumentation at all to support values. A value-nihilistmust conclude that one can only persuade others, not convince them rationally. Unfortunately, this assumption contradicts the common practice. People normally do not regard values as merely a matter of private, personal and irrational taste. On the contrary, the value statements also have a social dimension:They are used in social interaction. In this regard, a value statement cannot be completely personal. Here we only refer to Ludwig Wittgensteins analysis of the private language. In this paper, we are not in need of an ontology of values other than in a Popperian sense. The focus is on argumentation. For us, the possibility of inter-subjective control, also in regard to value statements, is the core of human thinking. Values are reasonable matters.
3. What about Relativism?

From another point of view, every individual is bound to language. She internalizes the rules of the language games, especially in the native language. People develop (alter) the language but they cannot escape it. Everybody living in a certain linguistic community is a prisoner of the language. It is the basis for social behaviour. The same holds true as far as the value code is concerned. It is for people the value language which they internalize, at least to some degree. A person who wants to live fully outside of any value code, isolates himself from society. In this very regard, value standpoints of individuals are always relative to a certain value code. This applies not only to instrumental values, i.e., statements like This is a good knife, but also to the so-called intrinsic values, like Killing an innocent person is evil or Do not kill an innocent person. Any value statement belongs to a certain value code, a complex set of values organised to a certain degree as a system, and shared, to a certain degree, by a number of people. The problem now arises: Is the value code itself relative or not? In order to answer this crucial question, we make a short excursion to the present-day individualistic vs. communitarian value theories.
4. Individualism vs. Communitarianism

Both utilitarianism and justice-and-rights theories, such as Rawlss political liberalism, are individualist. They attempt to base the morally good or right on an aggregate of preferences of various individuals, on the needs of individuals, on the work of individuals, on the choice various individuals would make as regards the organisation (charter) of society, and so on. Such theories are also analytical in the sense of dismantling society into its atoms-individuals. However, the individualist approach confronts serious problems.
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To be sure, preference utilitarianism, e.g., succeeded in developing a valuable insight into the ultimate goal of morality-to follow other persons' preferences. It lacks, however, an efficient method to make particular moral decisions. Preferences of various individuals can be incommensurable, and a reasonable compromise will be impossible. A similar criticism can be directed against theories of justice. Various principles of justice compete with each other; no uncontroversial priority rule determines the morally right choice between them. This also applies to Rawls's principles. One cannot show that all reasonable individuals (behind the "veil of ignorance" as regards their own future) must follow Rawls's difference principle, and thus demand priority for the interests of the weakest members of the society. To do so, they must be not only reasonable but also afraid of taking risks. Nozick's theory of entitlement is controversial, as well. When all goods are already distributed among the entitled persons, shall the late arrivals (the young or strangers) abstain from all claims to redistribution? Such problems prepared the ground for communitarianism. This philosophy claims that "the shared life" (Williams 1985, 104) requires "our commonality'' (Sandel 1982, 174), that is, something more than an atornistic individualism. An individual cannot make a reasonable choice of moral standpoints unless he assumes his cultural heritage. Moreover, a selfconscious personality can evolve only in the entourage of other persons (cf., e.g., Simmonds 1988, 35). An individual can survive as such a personality only if the bulk o morality of his society is not endangered (cf., Spector 1993, f 178ff.). A human being is not a mere goods-maximising or risk-minimising homo oeconomicus, he is also a homo socialis. Yet, communitarianism can be criticised in the following way. Certainly, morality must pay attention to the cultural heritage of a particular society. Yet, how local can this heritage properly remain? Cannot they be criticised, ranked and transcended? (Williams 1985, 104). To answer such questions correctly, one must in our opinion pay attention to the following. The moral community can be construed as a system of various practices with a different geographical and temporal range. An act of weighing and balancing can indicate the right mean between the demands posed by various practices. Such an act can create new values, transcending the cultural heritage. Some innate capacities, functions and perhaps even concepts are involved in all thinking and all languages, and thus common for all people, regardless of their cultural background. In brief, one needs a synthesis in which different moral theories are taken seriously, but are weakened to avoid exaggeration.

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5.1. Starting Point

A value can be defined as a certain ideal, i.e., a yardstick of evaluation. The ideal can be fulfilled to a certain degree, more or less (cf., Alexy 1985,130ff.). From a logical point of view, such ideals are expressed in universalisable value statements. They do not point out particular cases, but refer to classes characterised by concepts, e.g., (all)human life is good, (all) freedom is good, (all) equality is good. It is assumed here that value statements correspond to principles. The former say what is good whereas the latter say what ought to be done. The correlation of values and principles is conceptually necessary.
5.2. The Problem
Such value statements and principles also claim material universality, i.e., all life, freedom, etc., is good, not only within our culture but also in other cultures. The content of value statements is universal in this sense, not restricted to the culture in question. Yet, assuming that value statements and principles have truth values (or at least rightness-values, from a logical point of view similar to truth values), one may argue that rightness conditions (or validity conditions) of value statements and principles do depend on the culture. In the European culture it is true that all xs are good, in a Chinese culture it is not. Is the thesis that: - the rightness (validity) conditions of moral value statements and principles depend on a particular culture, tradition and language compatible with the thesis that: - moral value statementsand principles have a materially universal content? This is one of the main problems of cultural relativism (cf., e.g., Wong 1991, 442ff.).

5.3. Prima-facie To solve this problem, one must assume that universal value statements and principles always have a prima-facie character. The concept of prima-facie was introduced by D. Ross, contested by many philosophers and regarded as plausible by others (cf., e.g., Williams 1985, 176; Thomson 1989, 8). In our interpretation, a principle (or a value-statement) has a primu-facie character if the following holds: 1. According to its meaning in the culture considered, such a statement decides that an action of the kind it indicates ought to be performed ceteris paribus (cf. Searle 1978, 88ff.). 2. The statement must, if applicable, be taken into account in weighing and balancing which decides whether a particular action is good (or,
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respectively, ought to be performed). No person who belongs to this culture can simultaneously refute a great number of such statements and be considered a normal member of the society. 3. However, the statement does not decide definitively (all-thingsconsidered) that such an action ought to be performed. This is the case only if the value it indicates outweighs in the particular situation the competing values, requiring ceferis paribus that the action is not to be performed.

5.4. Contextuality
Every prirna-facie value (or principle) may collide with others. When applied to a particular situation, it must be weighed with other values. The result of weighing decides what ought to be done definitively, all things considered. The weighing means that the colliding prirna-facie values are supported by a coherent network of evaluative, empirical and analytic arguments. The totality of these decides what weighs more in the considered situation. To be sure, some philosophers think that one can justify universal moral rules which definitively and in a weighing-free manner decide what to do, eg., one ought neuer kill an innocent person. But we believe that one shall never say never. Killing an innocent person to save the world from a Hitler may be morally right and obligatory.
6. The Solution

Now, let us present a tentative solution of the problem of materially universal moral statements with the culture-bound rightness (validity) conditions. A rationally arguing person who belongs to the Western culture can, e.g., regard the statement:
(1) All people have the right to express their political opinions freely a s right and valid, albeit he cannot convince a rationally thinking Chinese that this is the case (cf., e.g., Larmore 1994,78). More precisely, the statement (1)can be satisfactorily justified in the Western culture and, at the same time, an incompatible statement can be satisfactorily justified in the Chinese culture, namely that:

(2) Only well-informed, wise and loyal citizens have the right to express their political opinions freely. The controversy with the Chinese appears hopeless, unless one employs the idea of prirna-facie. To be sure, the controversy can still be interpreted in a way which implies a logical contradiction. The statement (1)can thus mean the same as:
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(1) There are prima-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that all people have the right to express their political opinions freely

while the statement (2) can mean the same as: (2) There are no prima-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that badly informed, stupid or disloyal citizens have the right to express their political opinions freely. However, it is rather strange to ascribe such a strong theory to our Chinese friends. If a European is more respectful to them, he may rather choose another interpretation of the Chinese standpoint (2), namely: (2) There are prinza-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that no badly informed, stupid or disloyal citizens have the right to express their political opinions freely. Whereas weighing and balancing of (1) and (2) is impossible, weighing and balancing of (1)and (2) is quite possible. Moreover, nothing prevents the result that (1)prevails in many more cases in the European culture whereas (2) prevails in many more cases in the Chinese culture.
7. Common Core of Different Cultures?

This solution presupposes, however, that our Chinese friend is prepared to accept the thesis: (1) There are prima-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that all people have the right to express their political opinions freely together with its consequence, i.e., the statement that: There are prhza-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that even badly informed, stupid or disloyal citizens have the right to express their political opinions freely. What ground do we have to assume such a thing? We can conceive here three kinds of grounds. 1. The first is a conviction from the internal point of view of ones moral culture. A person who thinks that freedom of speech has no universal primafacie value must mean that in some circumstances, for instance in the Chinese environment, a mentally sane individual can literally accept the thesis: (2) There are no prima-facie reasons supporting the conclusion that badly informed, stupid or disloyal citizens have the right to express their political opinions freely.
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This would, however, have grave consequences. The citizens thus labelled as badly informed, stupid or disloyal would then be regarded as not deserving elementary respect. In Kantian language, one may say that they would be regarded as the means only, not the goals. Are we ready to accept this consequence? 2. The second ground is an anthropological hypothesis from a point of view external to ones own morality: All human cultures must endorse some basic values, necessary for the survival of a human society. To be sure, some parts of this minimum of values are more centrally placed in one culture than in another. For instance, freedom of speech occupies a more central position in the Western than in the Chinese culture. But an effort to communicate across the boundaries of ones own culture makes a person realise that there is something primafucie relevant in the foreign culture, as well. Of course, such a hypothesis is falsifiable in the Popperian sense, let it be that the methods of falsification require a great deal of sophistication. 3. The third ground is philosophical. A lesson derived from Ludwig Wittgensteins theory of language games is that the ordinary language is not like an axiomatic system. The language, and indeed all knowledge expressed in it, is a totality in which any change results in some-often subtle-changes at another place (cf. Wittgenstein 1979, inter alia n. 105).For Wittgenstein, the language is action, it is an activity. In this sense, the concept of languagegame is successful. Words have their homes within the sphere of language, as Wittgenstein himself says. The totality is, however, not homogenous. It is a family of language games. The meaning of the words shifts from one language game to another. Yet the language games are not mutually isolated. One can move between them, in accordance with ones practical needs (cf., ibid. inter ulia n. 61 and 24). The language thus consists of the multitude of innumerable language-games. Each of them is complete as it is. In this particular sense language can be no further improved by philosophical means. Language-games are as they are. On the other hand, the above mentioned concept of family resemblance is essential to Wittgensteins later philosophy. It is useless to try to find features common to all language-games (to language as such). For what are the common features in the languagegames of, for instance, a physicist and a Hindu priest except the fact that each game is language. Speaking of language in general leads us astray, to believing that there really is something that justifies an effort to define the concept of language. In the same spirit, one can regard a culture as a cluster of components, distinct but interconnected, each one corresponding to a particular language game. Each single human being employs many components of the culture, in accordance with the needs imposed by ones life. Some components play a greater role in the life of certain persons, other components play a greater role in the life of other individuals. This can also be expressed as follows. Language-games, especially games dealing with morals and values, are
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culturally bound. There is no possibility to identify a common background to all different games. The only thing we will achieve as the result of the attempt is a tautology: Language is language. This view is coherent with an important assumption concerning the relationship between direrent cultures. To be sure, what is common to them is not a precise core of notions and views but rather a membership in a family of language games and, say, conviction games. As long as people belonging to different cultures can communicate with each other, they must have some common concepts and some common convictions. Were it not the case, crosscultural communication would be impossible. Thus, it is natural to assume that some prirna-facie moral opinions are more or less shared by a European and a Chinese. A philosopher has no means to tell which ones but he can tell that this must be the case. Hence, e.g., a European and a Chinese can have enough common elements to understand each other and to begin a discourse concerning all-things-consideredvalues.
8. Conclusions

If the common-core assumption is accepted, one may conclude as follows. The problem of cultural relativity involves a conceptual misunderstanding. Two different sides of the problem are unduly confused. First, prirna-facievalue propositions not only claim universality but can also be understood as universally valid in the following sense. First, their validity does not depend on an individuals free preferences. Second, although they are culture-bound, there is something all cultures must have in common. But such prirna-faciepropositions do not logically imply a moral judgement in any particular case. They are merely a starting point of an evaluation procedure, i.e., of weighing and balancing, nothing more. On the other hand, the final (contextual, all things considered) evaluations are necessarily relative to a certain culture and, indeed, to individual preferences. When claiming universality of values, people see the first side of the problem. When endorsing relativism, they see only the second side. In moral theory, it is easy to be one-eyed, that is, half-blind.

(for A. Aarnio) University of Tampere Research Institute for Social Science P.O. Box 607 SF-33101 Tampere Finland

(for A. Peczenik) University of Lund Box 207 S-22100 Lund Sweden

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Aulis Aarnio and Aleksander Peczenik

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