Fourth Congress of Electronics, Robotics and Automotive Mechanics

Distributed Collision Avoidance Based on Ad-Hoc Radio Communications

D. W. Carr Finch Departamento de Ingeniera de Proyectos, Universidad de Guadalajara. dcarr@gmail.com R. A. Santos Facultad de Telemtica, Universidad de Colima. aquinor@ucol.mx R. Ruelas Departamento de Ingeniera de Proyectos, Universidad de Guadalajara. rruelas@dip.udg.mx A. Gonzlez Potes Facultad de Ingeniera de Mecnica y Elctrica, Universidad de Colima. apogon@ucol.mx

Abstract
As radio systems become more reliable and cheaper, it becomes feasible to use ad-hoc radio communications as an extra layer of safety, to prevent crashes between trains in a light rail control system. In this paper, we look at physical tests of a modified ZigBee radio to determine the minimum reliable communication distances, and also a simulator based on the information provided by this radio system, to evaluate the performance of collision avoidance algorithms.

1. Introduction
As we become increasingly concerned about safety of transport systems, especially the light rail system of Guadalajara, Mexico, and as prices drop for equipment that can be used to add layers of safety, new solutions become feasible. Among several possibilities, ad-hoc radio communications are an interesting option in order to increase the number of security layers, which is low cost but it requires testing because its reliability must be verified. In this work, specifically, we present the results of tests of low cost transmitters that can be used for distributed ad-hoc communications between trains, and the results of simulation based on the results of these tests. We look at physical tests of a modified Zigbee radio to determine the minimum reliable communication distances. For the feasibility of the layer of security, the results are based connecting all pairs of simulated trains, running as processes, when communications would be possible given the

characteristics of the transmitters. The simulator is based on the information provided by tests of the ZigBee radios, and assumptions made about degradation on curves and hills. According to the conditions of the light rail system, the maximum allowed speed of the trains is 70 km/h. From here, and considering the worst case stopping distance, time to establish contact, round drip delays, error in assumed position, the minimum estimated contact distance should be about 300 meters for all points in the system. The objective of ad-hoc radio communications is to assure, in a reliable way, the communications among trains, at least at this minimum distance, in the most unfavorable conditions, that is, no matter the conditions that prevail in the environment, such as the curves of the railway, the weather, the possible obstacles on the rail, etc. the communication must be assured at this distance. This extra layer of safety will be an aid for operators, and will only take effect if all other layers of safety/control systems fail and the driver of the train also fails to react to the danger and does not stop the train. The decision to act is based on the information about the position and speed of trains, as proposed in previous works [1-5], similar to the calculations of CBTC [6-8], as well as in the analysis of risk previously identified and incorporated in the control algorithm. This layer of security also incorporates our current work with ad-hoc wireless networks [9], as a proposal for distributed collision avoidance based on ad-hoc radio communications. This research is part of joint research between the University of Colima, and the University of Guadalajara, Mexico, and is partially supported by grants from ANUIES.

Unrecognized Copyright Information DOI 10.11/CERMA.2011.127

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2. Distributed collision avoidance

For a distributed collision avoidance system, each train should be equipped with an ad-hoc radio communication system in order to establish a linkage with any train in front or behind it. Figure 1 illustrates this situation, indicating also the direction of travel.

3. Propagation models of wireless signals

Propagation models are used extensively in network planning, particularly for conducting feasibility studies and initial deployment. They are also very useful for performing interference studies as the deployment proceeds. Besides, mobile computing applications are becoming increasingly common in outdoor, indoor, pedestrian and vehicular scenarios. These models can be broadly categorized into three types: empirical, deterministic and stochastic [10]. Empirical models are those based solely on observations and measurements. These models are mainly used to predict path loss. The deterministic models use the laws governing electromagnetic wave propagation to determine the received signal power at a particular location. Stochastic models, on the other hand, model the environment as a series of random variables.

Figure 1. Distributed collision avoidance system. From the real conditions of the light rail system, the minimum estimated distance of security is 300 m which involves the uncertainty about the relative positions of the trains, the delay to start the communication, the necessary distance to completely stop a train, a security factor, and the maximum safe slow down speed of the train. Figure 2 shows most of these aspects.

4. FREE space model

The fundamental aim of a radio link is to deliver sufficient signal power from the transmitter to the receiver at the end of the link. The benchmark by which the loss of a transmission link is measured is the loss that would be expected in free space, in other words, the loss that would occur in a region which is free of all objects that might absorb or reflect radio energy [11]. The free space path loss equation can be expressed logarithmically as

Figure 2. Minimum distance required for communication. As the railway is partially on the surface and partially underground and it has some curves, the distributed communication system will probably need ground based repeater systems such that the minimum distance is really assured. Other tests will be conducted for different conditions such as the communication on the surface on a rainy day. Figure 3 illustrates the case of a curve.

Ploss = 32.4 + 20log 10 d + 20log 10 f

(1)

where 32.4 is the reference loss constant, d is the distance in kilometers (km) and f is the frequency in Gigahertz (GHz). Equation (1) can be simplified when cases of single frequency are considered. For example, if we utilize exclusively the 2.4 GHz frequency band, equation (1) reduces to

Ploss = 40 + 20log10 d 5. Ad-hoc 802.11 model

(2)

Figure 3. Terrestrial system for communication in a curve.

While the commonly used path loss equation model is fairly accurate for free space loss, mobile WLAN systems typically operate with antennas that are between one and two meters above the ground. Then the model for the free space requires an extension and this could be as the one proposed on the equation

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Ploss = 40log10 d + 20log10 f 20log10 ht hr

7. Simulator
(3) We have developed a simulator that generates the speed and then uses this information to determine when each pair of trains can communicate with each other, and then allow simulated communications through inter-process communication [13]. The simulator also constantly shows which trains are in communication with each other, and the last messages communicated. The simulator uses the departure times from a table that represent the actual departure times for the light rail system in Guadalajara, Mexico. These departure times can be modified to simulate prospective changes in the time table. We then use velocity profiles that are derived from actual data collected on moving trains. The velocity profiles are then modified for each section to account for driver characteristics, either slow or fast, and then a random factor is added for each segment. So, when a train enters the system, we add a train to the array of trains, and randomly assign a driver type. Then, every second, we calculate where the train is in the system and what the speed is. The data from this simulator can then be used to generate crossing events when a train crosses the position of a sensor, and also to generate CBTC messages that would be generated on a real running system. In this case, this information is used by our radio system simulator, that checks every second for trains that have either moved close enough together that radio transmissions can start, or that were transmitting, and have now moved far enough apart that transmissions will no longer be possible. The simulator then opens simulated communications between the processes for a pair trains that are close enough to communicate, and closes communications between pairs of trains that are no longer close enough to communicate.

where f is the frequency in Gigahertz (GHz), hthr is the antenna heights for Tx and Rx, and d is the overall distance in kilometers (km). If Equation (3) is applied in the 2.4 GHz frequency band, it can be simplified to

Ploss = 7.6 + 40log 10 d 20log 10 ht hr

6. Radio tests

(4)

We have tested transmitters available from MaxStream that use the unlicensed 2.4 GHz band [12]. Specifications for these devices are for a maximum reach of 1,600 meters for ideal line of site applications. In our tests, we have found that at a distance of 500 meters we still have a 19 dB of System Operating Margin (SOM). This SOM expresses an ideal transmission between transmitter-receiver pair.
Modelos de Propagacin para Espacio Libre y Ad-Hoc 802.11 20

R eceiver po w er (dB m )

20 40 60

-20

-40

-60

-80

-100

80 10 0 12 0 14 0 16 0 18 0 20 0 22 0 24 0 26 0 28 0 30 0 32 0 34 0 36 0 38 0 40 0 42 0 44 0 46 0 48 0 50 0

Distance (m)
Free Space Ad-Hoc 802.11 Experiment Receiver sensibility

8. The collision avoidance running on each train

algorithm

Figure 4: Free space and Ad-Hoc 802.11 models for MaxStream. Though further on-site tests are needed to determine where repeaters are necessary to guarantee minimum distance of 300 meters for communications, we have developed a rough approximation of minimum expected contact distance, based on initial tests. A graph of estimated minimum contact distance, as a function of location, is shown for line 1 of the light rail system in Figure 2.

Each process for a train has three threads. The first thread will be constantly waiting for new connections from other trains, the second thread will be waiting for messages from other trains, and, the third thread will be sending messages to all of the trains within range at regular intervals. With this information, each train will be able to constantly check for each train that it is communicating with, if it is dangerously close to a train in front, and apply the brakes if necessary. Of course the driver will be warned if there is a train behind that is too close, so, where possible, the driver can increase or at least maintain speed to reduce risks.

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Below, we describe in detail the calculations of stopping distance and uncertainties that factor into the determination of when a train should be stopped, and when the driver should be warned.

Table 1. Results of simulation for two approaching trains when the first one stops because of a failure.

9. Description algorithms

of

collision

avoidance

In this section we describe the collision avoidance algorithms and how they work. The collision avoidance algorithm is completely distributed with no dependency on a central system. As described, all pairs of trains that are close enough to communicate will send a message to each other every second. These messages are then processed to determine if the trains are too close to each other. The minimum following distance is calculated by adding the following factors as described earlier: 1) stopping distance at a deceleration of one meter per second squared, 2) factor of uncertainty in the location of each train, 3) uncertainty in time, 4) time since last message received, and finally, 5) safety factor. We add up all of these factors, and then subtract this from the actual distance between the trains. For equation (5) we have considered a stopped train, whatever the reason, and the second one approaching it a given speed v and acceleration a. The change on the distance between both trains is then given by (5).

d = v 2 2a

(5)

If the distance calculated is zero or less, the stop command is immediately issued. If the difference is less than or equal to 200, the driver is warned that he is approaching a train and should slow down. If the distance is greater than 200, no warning is given. Notice that the train in front will also get a warning when there is a train behind. In this case, the driver of the train in front will be told there is a train behind and to maintain his velocity. All of the parameters for these calculations can be set by the appropriate people at the train system. Table 1 shows an example taken from the simulator where there is the time, the speed, the location, the relative distance and the messages sent to the operators. We would like to emphasize that this is an extra layer of safety, running on top of other safety systems, either CBTC, or signaling, and is completely distributed and independent of a central system. If the driver even receives a warning message, it is because the other safety systems have failed to maintain proper spacing between trains.

In Table 1 t represents the time in seconds, d the distance from start, sp the speed of the train, sd the stopping distance, sdusf the stopping distance plus all uncertainties and safety factors, dbt is the distance between trains, dsc the distance to stop command and Msg the messages sent to the operator of the train. Table 1 shows the sequence of events for an example of a stalled train where other systems are not fonctionning, but where our collision avoidance system continues to function on battery power. We programmed the simulator to stall the train at about 1810 meters on Line 1 after leaving the first station. A following train makes first contact at 1172 meters, about 530 meters from the stalled train, and is alerted of a train ahead. At 1272 meters, the driver in the following train is alerted there is a train very close and he should slow down, but we assume he continues as normal. At 1505 meters, since the driver did not slow down, the situation has become very dangerous, and the driver is told to stop, but ignores the message. Finally, at 1608 meters, about 200 meters from the stalled train, the situation is dire, and the brakes are applied automatically, with the following train coming to rest about 55 meters from the stalled train. As described before, this extra 55 meters is due to the safety factor, and a programmed uncertainty in position of the trains. The position uncertainty and safety factors are tunable parameters that can be changed. We of course will be working on adding to the simulator as

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many types of dangerous situations as possible, and verify correct operation in all cases.

10. Advantages of simulation

From many years of control experience, and the availability of each time more powerful computer systems, some type of simulation is almost always required or desirable such that the system can be tested before implemented on a live system. Simulation has the advantage that hundreds of tests can be carried out before a real test can be performed. A set of different conditions considered as interesting have to be defined, and the system must be simulated such that a better understanding on its behavior is obtained, and good estimations on its real performance are possible. Simulations are realized for feasibility tests, safety and for schedule considerations, but also, it is often either not safe, or not practical to test all aspects of a control system on a live system. Obviously, for safety, most systems should be minimally tested, to verify control algorithms and check for errors before running live. From a scheduling standpoint, it is often necessary to fully test and debug software, so that it is ready at the same time as the hardware for the final control system. For example, for a light rail system it would be unsafe to test on the live system the case when all other layers of the control system failed, and it rests only on the communication between two trains that got too close to each other, before finally being stopped by this last layer of safety. Also, testing many features during actual operation would disrupt operations, and bringing in operators after hours before official service started would be prohibitively expensive. In section 11, we discuss some tests that are practical during operation, such as constantly verifying that oncoming trains can always initiate communication with each other, within a distance beyond the minimum required contact distance. With the simulator, we have the ability to create test cases for each type of scenario necessary for testing. This gives us the ability to test many different scenarios that would not be safe to test on a real system, or would be much too costly to test on a real system. We can also maintain all of the test cases as a test suite to be applied when changes are made to the system.

consequence of a malfunction; it is supposed that the other parts of the control system fail allowing two trains to come close together and potentially crash. Specifically, we picked a train at random to stop, and then also assume that the other parts of the control system fail, and the operator does not receive, or ignores, warning messages, allowing trains to approach each other dangerously. Table 1 contains a list of messages that could be sending to the operators and it provides the actions to be taken, along with a timestamp for each event. As you can see, the messages prevent the operators with different levels of emergency. At the first level, the system proceeds by alerting the driver that there is a train in front, but to proceed normally. At the second level, the system tells the driver to slow down because it is approaching in a risky way to the train in front. The third level consists of a message telling the driver to stop as the distance with the previous train is dangerously small. In the fourth and last level, the system overrides the driver and stops automatically the train. Even if here we are presenting only results of simulations, these show that the radio communication systems and the algorithm worked correctly, issuing the appropriate message and the command in time to stop the train a safe distance before crashing when necessary. This is for a situation where the radio communications were adequate to give the driver sequentially more sever messages before stopping the train.

12. Conclusions and future work

The results with the wireless radio communication system show that it is possible to establish a link beyond the minimum required distance. However, the experimentations were realized under favorable conditions, and it is necessary to test in more realistic environment before it is used an extra security layer. From these results, the simulator developed allows us to show the feasibility and correctness of operation for a distributed collision avoidance algorithm developed for the light rail system in Guadalajara, Mexico. Although, this work only takes into account the distributed system among trains, in a future work we will demonstrate our research using the same radio system to prevent accidents for at grade vehicle crossings, and also inform the driver of the state of crossing signals, crossing guards, presence of vehicles in the intersection, as well as the communication with terrestrial systems located at the stations and that help as a source of information for the central control system of the light rail system.

11. A specific case

This section shows the results of simulation for the particular case of a train stopped on the rail as a

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13. References
[1] D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas, H. Salcedo Becerra, G. A. PonceCastaeda. A Linux based system to monitor train speed and doors for the light rail system in Guadalajara, Mexico. Eight Real-Time Linux Workshop, Lanzhou, Gansu, China, October 1215, 2006, pp. 41 46. [2] H. Salcedo-Becerra, D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas, G. A. PonceCastaeda. Performance Monitoring for the Light Rail System in Guadalajara, Mexico. Int. Conf. on Dynamics, Instrumentation and Control, August 1316, 2006, Quertaro, Mxico. [3] D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas Lepe, J. F. Gutirrez Ramrez. A discrete event control system to control trains for a subway system. IEEE 3 Congreso Internacional en Innovacin y Desarrollo Tecnolgico, Cuernavaca, Morelos, 28 al 30 de septiembre, 2005. pp. CP72-1 6. [4] M. C. Edwards, J. Donelson III, W. M. Zavis, A. Prabhakaran, D. C. Brabb, and A. S. Jackson. Improving Freigth Rail Safety with On-board Monitoring and Control Systems, Proceedings of the ASME/IEEE Joint Rail Conference, 1991. [5] R. A. Santos, A. Edwards. A Reactive Location Routing Algorithm with Cluster-Based Flooding for Inter-Vehicle Communication, Computacin y Sistemas, Vol. 9, Num. 4, pp. 297-313, 2006. [6] IEEE Std 1474.1-2004, IEEE Standard for Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements, IEEE, New York, NY, February 2005. [7] D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas Lepe, J. F. Gutirrez Ramrez, H. Salcedo Becerra. An open on-board CBTC controller based on N-version programming. International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Modelling, Control and Automation, Vienna, Austria, 28 al 30 de noviembre, 2005. IEEE Computer Society, IEEE, ISBN-10: 0-7695-2504-0 (ISBN-13: 978-0-7695-2504-4). Pp. 834-839. [8] D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas Lepe, J. F. Gutirrez Ramrez, H. Salcedo Becerra. A communications based train control system using a modified method of N-version programming. Congreso de Instrumentacin SOMI XX, Len, Guanajuato, 24 al 28 de octubre, 2005. ISBN: 970-32-2673-6. [9] R. A. Santos, A. Edwards, R. M. Edwards, and N. L. Seed. Perfomance Evaluation of Routing Protocols in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks, Int. J. of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing, Vol. 1, Num. 1/2, 2005. [10] Abhayawardhana, Wassel, Crossby, Sellars and Brown. Comparison of empirical propagation path loss models for fixed wireless access systems, University of Cambridge, UK.

[11] Barry, Mclarnon. VHF/UHF/Microwave Radio Propagation: A Primer for Digital Experimenters. Ottawa. [12] http://www.maxstream.net/wireless/zigbee.php [13] D. W. Carr, R. Ruelas, H. Salcedo Becerra, G. A. PonceCastaeda. A Multi-purpose multi-mode simulator for a light rail control system. Int. Conf. on Dynamics, Instrumentation and Control, August 1316, 2006, Quertaro, Mxico.

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