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Conflict Studies Research Centre

Russian Series 06/37

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Sovereign Democracy: the Ideology of Yedinaya Rossiya


Dr Mark A Smith

Key Points
* Post-Soviet Russia has no official ideology. However all political systems require an ideology, just as nature requires air. * Political stability since 2000 has now led to discussion about ideology in the pro-Putin party of power, Yedinaya Rossiya (YR). * Deputy head of the presidential administration and YR official Vladislav Surkov outlined the ideology of Sovereign Democracy in February 2006. This is a nationalist, statist and collectivist ideology, that presupposes the domination of the political system by the Putin leadership and YR for the next 15 years. The ideology reflects some aspects of the Soviet past, and collectivist traditions of the pre-Soviet era. * This concept was expanded by YR presidium member Andrey Isayev in June 2006. He says YRs aim is to restore Russian superpower status. He summarises YR ideology as: statism, the supremacy of ideas over material advantage, the consolidation of the nation around a leader, requirement for a broad social consensus, a striving for justice and freedom. * This ideology may be seen as the tacit official ideology of the Russian leadership. It is likely to remain the de facto ideology after Vladimir Putin passes from the political scene. * The debate revealed consensus on one significant aspect: a belief that there could only be one correct national ideology; as a result opposition parties are delegitimised.

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Sovereign Democracy: the Ideology of Yedinaya Rossiya


Dr Mark A Smith

The post-Soviet Russian state has, as part of its attempt to break with the authoritarian communist past, eschewed the idea of having an official ideology. Article 13 of the 1993 constitution states that: Ideological plurality shall be recognized in the Russian Federation. No ideology may be instituted as a state-sponsored or mandatory ideology. Russia is thus in theory at least akin to western parliamentary democracies in that it has no official ideology. However it would be wrong to believe that political systems are devoid of ideology. All political systems have an ideological or philosophical underpinning, and political parties also have an ideological outlook, and therefore when a particular party is in power its ideology is in some sense the ruling ideology. Obviously, in a pluralist multi-party system, the ruling ideology enjoys no monopoly. Ideology is like air. It is invisible, yet omnipresent, and without it, nothing would survive. Where the current Russian political system is peculiar is that the current president (like his predecessor) has no party affiliation, and also rejects any overt ideology. Does this mean then Russia has no ideology? Because no political system can exist without ideology, then there must be a ruling ideology in Russia. However, this ruling ideology has not hitherto been fully developed, largely because there is no ruling party. The incomplete development of a ruling ideology can be said to be the cause of an ideological crisis in the Russian Federation since 1991, and compounds the problem of defining Russias post-communist identity. In the 1990s many Russian intellectuals engaged in a debate about the Russian idea in the postSoviet era, and about whether Russia should have a state ideology. The 1990s under Boris Yeltsin was a time of considerable uncertainty, as the state ceased to exercise effective control over the country, and the country suffered a crisis over defining its post-Soviet identity.1 Moves are now being made to rectify this state of affairs. The closest entity Russia has to a ruling party is the Yedinaya Rossiya party (United Russia), which dominates the Duma. It has close links with the Kremlin and has received tacit support from Vladimir Putin in the past.2 Analysis of the debates within YR about ideology will therefore give some idea about the development of a ruling ideology within the Russian Federation. Such a debate was initiated by a speech given by deputy head of the presidential administration and presidential aide Vladislav Surkov to YRs Centre of Party Training and Cadre Preparation in February 2006, entitled Sovereignty is a synonym for political competitiveness.3 This speech constituted an attempt to outline the tasks for YRs political and ideological work, and to define post-Soviet Russias future, whilst taking into account both the positive and negative aspects of her Soviet legacy.

1
Sovereign Deomocracy: the Ideology of Yedinaya Rossiya Conflict Studies Research Centre ISBN 1-905058-82-9 August 2006

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Surkov argued that ideology should play a more important role in a democratic political system than a totalitarian system, as a democracy has to rely more on persuasion than a totalitarian polity, which relies more on coercion. This argument is not wholly correct, as the communist systems saw ideology as an important means of justifying and legitimising their monopoly of power; they did not see it as feasible to rely on power alone. As the post-Soviet Russian political system is a curious hybrid combining authoritarianism with the institutions of representative democracy, the ideology that YR may evolve could play a role similar (although not identical) to that played by Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet political system. Although the Constitution does not permit a state ideology, the ideology of YR may become a state ideology in all but name, if the party succeeds in dominating political life in Russia. In his speech, Surkov outlined the context in which YR has to operate. He argued that the collapse of communism had caused the distortion of democracy in the Russian Federation, as it resulted in the emergence of the old nomenklatura as a corrupt oligarchy which was able to buy its way into power and so subvert the democratic process. The 1990s therefore saw the emergence of a deformed democracy in Russia. In addition Russia also faced a threat to its territorial integrity and its state sovereignty. As democracy was deformed by the oligarchy it was unable to ensure the survival and flourishing of the two key concepts of freedom and justice, which Surkov saw as essential features of post-communist Russian democracy. Surkov argued that the election of Vladimir Putin began the process of political normalisation, that is removing the distortions of democracy and permitting a stable, reformed (i.e. normal) democracy to emerge. This is of course a selfserving argument from a member of the Putin leadership, who argues that everything Putin has done since January 2000 has been aimed at strengthening democracy in Russia. Hence the clampdown on the oligarchs and the tightening of state control over the electronic media are both seen as perfectly compatible with democratic procedures. Surkov argued that YRs ideology must be democratic; he regarded the Putinite political system as democratic (in similar fashion, the preGorbachevian Soviet political system was portrayed by Soviet political scientists as democratic). He thus discusses YRs ideological development in terms of strengthening democracy in Russia. In this context it would be more accurate to speak of strengthening YRs and the Kremlins hegemony within the Russian political system, with the concept of democracy being used to legitimise the strategy of both YR and the Putin leadership. Surkov sees the neutralisation of the business oligarchy as one of the key developments of the Putin era. This enables the state to be the state of the entire population, and not merely the property of a few businessmen. Democracy and anti-oligarchy can be regarded as key features of his ideological vision for YR. In addition, he places much emphasis on national sovereignty (hence the title of his February 2006 lecture), and on territorial integrity. He argues that in order for Russia to be a flourishing, prosperous country, two strategic conditions must be fulfilled to ensure long-term stable development democracy and sovereignty. On democracy, he states: The necessity of democracy is obvious indeed only a society based on the competition and cooperation of free people can be efficient and competitive. Because if in society the level of competitiveness is lowered,

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if it does not all the time reproduce an efficient leading class, then that society will achieve nothing. Moreover, there is an important pragmatic aspect: if we will not become a free democratic society, if we will not become widely integrated into the global economy, into the global system of knowledge, then we will not gain access to the contemporary technologies of the West, without which, it seems to me, the modernisation of Russia is impossible. With regard to sovereignty he argues against the notion that globalisation has made sovereignty obsolete. He warns that because the benefits of globalisation are divided unequally, there is a danger that some states will lose their independence, just as if they had been militarily occupied by a foreign power. He warns that if Russia does not govern itself, then it faces the danger of being controlled by transnational corporations and NGOs, and Russia will only receive as many benefits of globalisation as these actors will be pleased to allow her to have. Therefore, in order for Russia to be fully competitive in a globalised world, she must have full state sovereignty, that is full control by the Russian state over her borders and territory. Surkov therefore states that sovereignty is the political synonym of competitiveness. Sovereignty is essential as the Russians, in contradistinction to many of the other nationalities of the former Soviet Union, are a state-forming people. He contrasts this with the approach of certain other former Soviet states, which having thrown off Soviet domination, now seek the tutelage of the European Union. He argues that Russia cannot pursue such a destiny, as she must be an independent state, capable of playing a major role in shaping the future international system. His argument then develops into an argument for a moderate, democratic nationalist regime, which would reject the fortress Russia and statist and protectionist approaches of more extreme nationalist movements.4 Surkov argues that the fuel-energy complex, strategic communications, the financial system and defence sector must be controlled by Russian (not necessarily state) capital. Other sectors should be open to foreign capital. He calls for the formation of a national bourgeoisie as the leading stratum of society. He sees this as essential if Russia is to become the sovereign democracy he desires to see. If such a national bourgeoisie is not formed from the current Russian business class, then he believes that Russia has no future. He considers that there are two main threats to achieving the vision of a democratic sovereign Russia. These are: firstly, those who desire the restoration of the oligarchs, which would result in a loss of democracy and sovereignty as existed in the 1990s; and secondly, the national-isolationists (i.e. communists and extreme nationalists), who would establish a quasi-Soviet system in Russia were they to come to power. He argues that victory for YR in the 2007 Duma election is essential if his desired vision is to be achieved, and that YR needs at least 10-15 years in power to create a sovereign and democratic Russia. Surkov seems to be unaware that there could be a potential contradiction between democracy and sovereignty, in that democratic elections could in theory bring to power forces which he would consider to be antisovereign.

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Yedinaya Rossiyas Ideology


Former leader of the YR Duma faction Boris Gryzlov has in the past described YR as a conservative party, and it has sometimes been likened to the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party. In April 2006 Gryzlov commented that YR had started work on a programme for the December 2007 Duma election, and that the party would have an ideology of social conservatism. This notion can be seen as synonymous with Surkovs concept of sovereign democracy. Gryzlov argues that YR should be prepared to take responsibility for the countrys development for the next 20 years. The basic policy positions of YR as outlined on the partys website amount to generalities and are not informative. A more interesting discussion of its ideological orientation appeared in a speech made in June 2006 by Andrey Isayev, entitled Yedinaya Rossiya follows the Russian political tradition.5 Isayev, who is a member of the Presidium of the General Council of YR argues that YR is the only Russian political party which has ever been a bearer of what he terms the Russian political tradition. Isayev proceeds to outline the meaning of this term. He considers that belief in a strong state is the most important aspect of this tradition, arguing that Russians will support any regime, be it liberal or authoritarian, provided it is fully sovereign. He sees Putin as a clear bearer of the idea of sovereignty. His advocacy of a strong state echoes that made by Putin in his December 1999 internet essay Russia on the threshold of a new millennium.6 The second feature of the Russian political tradition is an inclination to ideocracy. Abstract ideas are more important to Russians than concrete interests, and so a political programme that would give the Russians the living standards of Switzerland would be unattractive if it meant that Russia could only be as great and powerful as Switzerland.7 Instead Russians prefer the notion of a great idea, for a great power. He therefore argues that the contemporary task for YR is to bring about the rebirth of Russia as a superpower (sverkhderzhava). The third feature is belief in a strong, individual leader, irrespective of whether he is democratically elected or not. The fourth feature is that of togetherness (sobornost). Isayev argues that even the most authoritarian Russian leader seeks to create a firm social consensus. Voting and elections have always been less important than the seeking and attainment of consensus. Therefore YR clearly supports the creation of social mechanisms, which give the opportunity of consensus from the trilateral commission on labour questions to the Public Chamber. The fifth feature is a belief in justice (spravedlivost) and its relation to freedom. Justice is seen as more important than freedom, and does not necessarily mean equality. Instead the Russian concept of justice can be formulated as corresponding to the moral feeling of redistribution. Sixthly, Russia has a specific approach to freedom. He states that in the Russian political lexicon two words are used in relation to this concept, freedom (svoboda), and will (volya), and Russians have traditionally a greater affinity with volya than with svoboda. He says YRs aim is to transform the often destructive volya into svoboda. Isayev sums up the Russian political tradition as statism, the supremacy of ideas over material advantage, the consolidation of the nation around a leader, requirement for a broad social consensus, a striving for justice and freedom (volya).

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YR was formed in this system of coordinates, and hence is the sole political party bearing the Russian political tradition. Isayev takes the view that as YR is the only contemporary bearer of the Russian political tradition, then this situation makes it imperative that it holds power. Only when a rival party emerges which also bears Russian political traditions, would it be desirable for YR to become an opposition party. In practice in the eyes of YR leadership this is more likely to mean that no other party is ever likely to adequately bear the national political tradition, and that therefore no suitable rival to YR could emerge that they would ever regard as a legitimate opposition. Interestingly, Putin himself sees West European style multi-party politics as being currently unsuitable for Russia. In January 2006 he stated that: As for a party-based government, everything is possible in the future, but I am against introducing such a practice in today's political environment in Russia. I am deeply convinced that in the post-Soviet area, while we have a developing economy, a statehood that is being consolidated, and while we are finally determining the principles of federalism, we need strong presidential power." He then referred to the deadlock following the 2005 federal elections in Germany, which he said was resolved only thanks to that country's developed political culture and the "goodwill" of the parties involved. He commented that, "as for us, in the post-Soviet area, where so far we have not yet developed stable national political parties, how under such conditions can we talk about a party-based government? It would be irresponsible. In the future anything is possible, but, in my opinion, this is a matter for future generations."8

The Debate Over Ideology


Leonid Radzikhovskiy, in his analysis of Surkovs speech, warns that the dominance of YR over the political system so favoured by Surkov and Isayev means that the YR is likely to end up as something similar to the CPSU.9 He agrees with Surkov that Russia needs a national elite if the country is to modernise and flourish, but warns that it is difficult to produce a capable elite if there is insufficient political competition inside Russia. Obviously the lack of a credible rival to YR makes such political competition currently impossible, and it is also doubtful whether YR really desires to see genuine political competition develop. Furthermore, as society is divided and hostile to elites, with an us and them mentality, the emergence of a stable, self-confident elite is likely to be problematic. He argues that the elite, if it is to survive, needs a state inoculation. This inoculation he sees as the elite having the perception that it has a secure existence in Russia and faith in long-term national projects. This requires the existence of a reliable, predictable political system as the foundation of a stable country. However stability cannot be produced by what Radzhikovskiy calls old methods of administrative stability (i.e. pre-1985 Soviet administrative methods). Instead he argues that what must be created is a civil society capable of selfadministration, namely a civil society akin to those existing in Europe. A paradox exists in that this self-regulating civil society must be built from above using in many cases the structures of YR. This begs the question of whether it is possible to build democracy and civil society in this way, always assuming that the YR leadership genuinely desires to see a competitive multiparty democracy. Furthermore, building civil society and democracy from above, would indeed

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probably result in YR evolving into an entity closely resembling the CPSU. Article Six of the 1977 USSR Constitution described the CPSU as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations. YRs domination of the political system in some respects makes it a leading and guiding force, and it therefore plays a more intrusive role than that played by parties in western parliamentary democracies. Putin envisaged YRs predecessor, Yedinstvo, playing such a role back in May 2000: the economic and state reforms need a reliable, political bulwark. The citizens of Russia should have the opportunity to engage in matters of state and take an active part in the party's work. So far, however, we have been faced, unfortunately, only with weakness of state institutions as well as with weakness of civil society. It is the party's task to overcome this weakness and to attract as many people as possible into its organizations. A political party can become a partner and a bulwark of the authorities only when it is itself involved in forming these authorities. We know that Yedinstvo has entered into this process.10 Social mechanisms such as the Public Chamber, mentioned by Isayev above, arguably undermine the role of parliament, and the role of YR in creating and managing the institutions of civil society such as NGOs probably aims more at creating and arguably imposing a social consensus than in reflecting one which arises naturally from below. This is also an echo of the Soviet past. Another assessment of Surkovs speech was made by Andrey Gromov in March 2006.11 He welcomed Surkovs views and was not of the opinion that Surkov advocated YRs domination of the political system for the next 10-15 years simply for the sake of power. He argued that YR domination of the political system by virtue of its own resources will enable the Russian state to lay down the foundation of the political system, so that the values of freedom, justice, material wellbeing and sovereignty will become immutable features of Russian political life, that no political circumstances will be able to remove or undermine. A similar notion to that of YRs sovereign democracy is that of Russia as a statecorporation put forward in January 2006 by Karen Markaryan.12 He regards the discussion about national ideology as part of the search for a national idea. National ideas arose in 1917 (all power to the Soviets), 1941 (the Motherland calls!), and 1986 (perestroyka and glasnost). The goals of these ideas were achieved, and now there is a need for a new national idea, capable of indicating goals and priorities, which will transform the Russian people into a single united people. He sees the national idea stemming from the fact that Russia is a communal (obshchinnaya) civilization. Markaryan argues that this is why Alexander IIs local government reforms (the zemstva) were successful, whereas Pyotr Stolypins agrarian reforms failed. Russian civilization is not compatible with the postulates of western liberalism, based on the alien ethic of Protestantism. Russian civilisation is instead organically closer to a socio-economic order which combines all-citizens interests and values with private initiative, based on the strong positions of society in relationship with the authorities and business. Markaryan regards this socio-economic order as a corporate state. He refers to a statement made by Vladimir Putin when he first became president, that he was the hired manager of the huge corporation Russia who has been appointed by the people. Putin also spoke of Russia as a big joint-stock company. He comments that the Putinite idea of the corporate state is based on the harmonic symbiosis of

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the idea of national consolidation, of social state imperatives, and fundamental values of a market economy. This is the Putinite answer to the eternal question of how to combine economic efficiency and social justice. The vision of a corporate state sees Russia avoiding the models of western political and economic liberalism, and instead having an economic model of sufficiency rather than the abundance of western free enterprise economic models. It advocates an interventionist economic role for the state, allying with business groups, in a manner analogous to the South Korean chaebols. Markarayan draws parallels between his view of Russia as a corporation and the South Korean and Singaporean politico-economic models. He argues that a corporate state will provide a means of closely linking citizens with the state and society, so that citizens will eventually be able to claim, We are the state! He also states that the corporate system can be expressed by the formula: country = civil society + the state. He calls for the development of democracy at the local level, and greater involvement by citizens in local administration to help realise this corporate vision. This will enable the slogan of the Tsarist period, Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality to be replaced by Spirituality, Sufficiency, Peoples power. Markaryan somewhat optimistically sees Russia as a model for the rest of the world, so reflecting the messianism of Soviet Communism, and the belief in the special mission of Holy Russia adhered to by some Russian nationalists. He argues that Russia has formed over the course of centuries as a special social system, which has united in itself incompatible socio-economic and civilisational components. He sees it as a special achievement that Russia has managed to unite these conflicting tendencies (economic, racial, social, religious, cultural) into a harmonious whole. This country shows how (with all its contradictions) it is possible to unite all these opposing factors, whilst preserving the potential for development. But still more powerful could be the potential for the future: Russia could show how conditions giving rise to war can become conditions of progress and peace. Markaryan goes on to argue that the search for an adequate social model for Russias future will become not just the strategy of one country, but a prototype of the transformation of conditions for war into the foundations of peaceful progress for mankind. He considers that Russia can be such a prototype, as she is such a huge country and therefore comprises a significant portion of the planet. Russia can therefore be a trailblazer for the rest of the world. The views on ideology outlined by Surkov and Isayev are in effect a declaration of post-Soviet Russias de facto official ideology. The notion of sovereign democracy outlined by Surkov, with its emphasis on a strong state and the six points put forward by Isayev provide the ideological underpinning for a Russian political system with a strong state and an effective monopoly on power by the Kremlin (i.e. in reality a significant limitation on pluralist democracy), along with the desire to re-establish Russia as a superpower (not merely a great power). The collectivist, communal aspect of YR ideology as outlined by Isayev probably reflects, if even only subconsciously, the impact of the ideological education that Russians would have received during the Soviet period. This collectivism pre-dates communism, and Isayevs emphasis on sobornost (along with Markaryans emphasis on communal civilisation), indicates how he is reaching far back into Russias past in his attempts to define an ideological identity for contemporary Russia. This contrasts strongly

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with the stronger focus on individualism in Anglo-Saxon political culture. made a similar point in 1999, when he commented: The public looks forward to the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country. Social Solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for corporative forms of activity has always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots in Russian society. The majority of Russians are used to connect improvements in their own condition more with the aid and support of the state and society than with their own efforts, initiative and flair for business. And it will take a long time for this habit to die.13

Putin

Markaryan is not writing in any official capacity, but his views concur with the statist and collectivist values of those within the YR leadership. His views on Russias potential special role in the world also reflects the views of some of the Eurasianist geopolitical thinkers in contemporary Russia. This geopolitical standpoint may form part of the ideological basis of future Russia foreign policy, in which Russian policymakers may see Russia as having a unique civilisation, synthesising European and Asian civilisations and playing the role of either being a balancer, or alternatively as a counterpart to Anglo-Saxon Atlanticist civilisation. Whilst it is unknown whether YR will survive as a political party once Vladimir Putin has departed from the presidency, the Putinite political establishment and the ideological values proclaimed by Surkov and Isayev will very probably do so, and will shape the broad ideological outlook of the Russian leadership over the next few decades. Endnotes
Much discussion of this took place. See for example the following: Sergey Kortunov, The national supertask, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 7 October 1995; The new Russian idea by Igor' Chubais and Does Russia need an ideology? by Tatiana Solovey and Valery Solovey in the Scenarios section of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 September 1996; various essays in the Scenarios section of Nezavisimaya Gazeta 21 November 1996; See the essays Tatyana Kutkovets and Igor Klyamkin on various types of Russian ideas in Scenarios Nezavisimaya Gazeta 16 January 1997; Ismail Aliev Eurasianism as a national idea in Scenarios Nezavisimaya Gazeta 8 April 1998; Sergey Baburin, Genuine peoples power in place of democracy, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 16 April 1998; Andrey Nikolaev The all-Russian idea: necessity and possibility, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 8 September 1998; the essay in Scenarios 14 July 1999 on the development of Russian state ideology; Yury Tavrovskiy, Three circles of a new ideology, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 8 September 1999; Sergey Kazennov and Vladimir Kumachev, To bring peace, but not to suppress, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 22 September 1999. See also the round table discussions on ideology in Svobodnaya Mysl, no.12, 1999; nos. 3 and 4, 2000. Putin made reference to the national idea on a visit to Vologograd in February 2000. See Yekaterina Grigoryeva and Andrey Serenko, Patriotism and the well-being of citizens, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 February 2000. 2 http://www.er.ru/ 3 http://www.er.ru/news.html?id=111148 4 For a discussion of the influence of nationalist ideas on the Putin leadership see Mark A. Smith, Russian Nationalist Movements and Geopolitical Thinking, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, Russian Series Paper 5(40), September 2005, and Mark A. Smith Putins Nationalist Challenge, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy Russian Series Paper 5(20), May 2005. http://da.mod.uk/CSRC
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http://www.er.ru/news.html?id=113902 http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/parliament/3005/poutine.html and Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self Portrait by Russias President, London, Hutchinson, pp.209-219. 7 For discussion of this attitude amongst Russians, see Matthew Maly, Understanding Russia, Moscow, Nefteotdacha, 1998. 8 RTR Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 0900 gmt 31 January 2006 BBC Monitoring (BBC M) Alert FS1 FsuPol mr/skh. 9 Leonid Radzikhovskiy, Yevropeitsy sverkhyu: bez natsionalnoy eliti u strany net budushchego, Nezavismaya Gazeta, 7 March 2006. 10 BBCM SWB SU/3852, 29 May 2000. 11 Andrey Gromov, Politik: Ideologiya. Ideologichesky fasad vlasti, Exspert, 9, March 2006. 12 Karen Markaryan, Strategiya: Rossiya kak gosudarstvo-korporatsiya, Politichesky klass, 1, January 2006. 13 http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/parliament/3005/poutine.html

Want to Know More ?


See: Mark A. Smith Putins Nationalist Challenge, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy Russian Series Paper 5(20), May 2005. http://da.mod.uk/CSRC Mark A. Smith, Russian Nationalist Movements and Geopolitical Thinking, Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, Russian Series Paper 5(40), September 2005. http://da.mod.uk/CSRC

Disclaimer The views expressed are those of the Author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence ISBN 1-905058-82-9

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Defence Academy of the United Kingdom


Conflict Studies Research Centre
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ISBN 1-905058-82-9

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