Drivers of Strategic Contestation in South America

Daniel Flemes and Leslie Wehner GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies

1. Introduction Secondary regional powers can respond to the regional powers leadership claim by unfolding conflictive, competitive or cooperative approaches. Besides total passivity relative contestation is the most likely strategic response to regional leadership or hegemony, because no state perceives itself as a pure follower of another state. Moreover, secondary regional states as most actors in the international system have foreign policy goals and choices beyond their relations to the regional hegemon that might produce indirect contestation patterns. Therefore, this article explores the competitive and cooperative end of the continuum between hard balancing and bandwagoning that interactions between regional powers and secondary regional powers produce (Waltz, 1979; Schweller 1994). South America is a negative zone of peace in which tensions may exit but coercive and military-based types of contestation are not a viable option (Kacowicz 1998), and as such conflictive approaches are not part of the secondary powers strategic portfolio towards Brazil. In view of the marginal gains that South American secondary powers can expect from the pursuit of coercive strategies in their relations with the primary power, institutional strategies seem to be the most promising approach to impact the regional hierarchy of states. Soft-balancing is a strategic choice for secondary powers relations with the regional power in regions with low levels of conflict, in which rivalry is replaced by competitive patterns. The purpose of soft balancing is to even up or ameliorate the existing asymmetric distribution of power, and to frustrate the achievement of foreign policy goals of the powerful actor within a region by increasing its costs of action (Pape 2005, Paul 2005). Whereas revisionist hard balancing involves a reconfiguration of the regional order, e.g. the end of the predominance of the primary power, soft balancing aims at hampering and constraining the process of emergence to the extent that the primary power takes into consideration the claims and demands of the secondary power. Ending regional predominance of the rising power is thus not the leitmotiv of contestation through soft balancing. Thus, soft balancing includes institutional strategies such as the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes to constrain the superior power. This institutional strategy is also referred to as buffering and aims to extend the room to maneuver of weaker states vis-vis stronger states (Greenfield Partem 1983). It also involves strengthening economic ties between peers, which can possibly shift the balance of economic power against the regional power in the long term. Questioning the legitimacy of unilateral policies will increase the costs of using unilateral power. Entangling diplomacy describes the use of the rules and procedures of international institutions in order to influence the primary states foreign policy (Paul 2005: 57). Binding strategies aim to restrain stronger states through institutional agreements (Ikenberry 2003). The most extensive means of binding is omni-enmeshment which is a process that allows weaker states to tie down several superior powers in multilayered institutional affairs in order to create overlapping spheres of influence. In this sense, the purpose is to develop a web of sustained exchanges and relationships to an extent that the target states interests are redefined, and its identity possibly altered (Goh 2008: 121-8). Even though we can expect all South American secondary powers to pursue softbalancing strategies toward the primary power in the absence of security threats posed by the latter, the empirical case studies will demonstrate variance in the types of soft-balancing 1

behavior that secondary powers such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela have been projected against Brazil in the last decade. The empirical aim of this article is thus to explore the differences of South American secondary powers foreign policy strategies towards Brazil. Unpacking the motives and dynamics that drive the strategic responses of these states are key to explaining the variance of soft-balancing behavior of South American secondary powers towards the primary power. One fundamental question of foreign policy theory asks for the balance between domestic and systemic drivers that shape states external behavior; the latter comprising structural, historical and behavioral contestation drivers in our terminology. Zakaria (1992: 482) notes that a good theory of foreign policy should first ask what effect the international system has on national behavior, because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system. Secondary powers are defined as the second most powerful states in a regional hierarchy. The secondary position is determined by their relative material and/or ideational capabilities (Cooper et al. 1991; Flemes and Wojczewski 2011). Therefore, secondary powers have a two-sided systemic position: they formulate their foreign policy strategies under the condition of factual, perceived and/or anticipated inferiority to the primary power and superiority to the other states of the region (Ebert et al. 2011). Our first assumption is that if a region consists of one primary and more than one secondary power, then the relative systemic positions of the secondary powers do not deviate considerably from each other and, therefore, can be excluded as variables able to explain variation of regional secondary powers strategies. Our second argument for finding the balance between systemic and domestic drivers is borrowed from Norrin Ripsman (2009: 186), who states that domestic actors have the greatest influence over foreign policy during stable periods when the state faces a low or non evident threat in the regional and international environment. However, when the states survival is at stake and the margin for error is minimal, the foreign policy executive (FPE) will have powerful incentives to ignore domestic demands, to extract resources from domestic actors and to formulate foreign and security policies with the overriding goal of securing the state. Conversely, in a security-abundant environment, the costs of allowing domestic actors to contribute to the making of foreign policy are low and the FPE will be more willing to make concessions to domestic interests groups (ibid.). This argument rests on the assumption that the FPE is more aware of the national interest and the constraining effects of the international system than other domestic actors because of its privileged access to information from state agencies (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 27). On the base of these theoretical arguments, we hypothesize as follows: If regional orders are characterized by cooperative or competitive interstate relations (security-abundance) and comprised of one regional and more than one secondary power (relative power symmetry), domestic drivers of contestation will have a stronger weight in explaining the variance in the strategic responses of secondary powers to the leadership claim of the primary power. The article proceeds as follows: first, we propose an analytical framework following the premises of neoclassical realism. Within this section, we highlight the different drivers of contestation of secondary powers to the primary power, that is, domestic, structural, historical (relation between secondary and primary power) and behavioral (behavior of the primary power) factors. Second, we give an overview of the relationship between Brazil and its contenders in South America. Third, we present the dynamics of Brazils foreign policy behavior in South America. Fourth, we introduce the drivers of contestation of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. Finally, we assess the main findings regarding the politics of contestation in South America.

2. Comparative Framework: Drivers of Contestation in International Relations 2

The explicit or implicit drivers of secondary powers to contest rising powers claims to (sub)regional leadership can be explained by four overriding categories: structural, historical, behavioral and domestic drivers of contestation.1 These categories motivate secondary powers regional strategic actions and the ways they approach the primary power. First, secondary powers strategies of contestation can be motivated by their discontent with the status quo of the regional power structure. From the neo-realist perspective, regional contestation is explained by the balance-of-power approach because the scope and ambition of a states foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its relative power capabilities. Secondary powers can engage in internal or external balancing in order to break up the status quo of power distribution and balance the regional power. This driver of contestation is most likely to be a key variable if the regional security order is characterized by conflict formation (Buzan and Waever 2003) and by a mode of conflict management designated as power restraining power (Morgan 1997). Alternative modes of conflict management like power concerts, collective security and security communities might cause different types of contestation such as soft balancing or their complete avoidance. Moreover, regional uni-, bi- and multipolarity may also stimulate secondary powers to pursue different paths of contestation. A unipolar security cluster seems to be most likely to provoke secondary powers to contest the dominant state, whereas under conditions of regional multipolarity it might be even difficult to identify a potential target of contestation. However, a path of developing multipolarity may trigger competition for predominance in a regional setting as secondary powers will put the efforts to achieve the necessary material capabilities to match the predominance of a regional power. Under conditions of regional bipolarity - in which one of the existing secondary powers develops material capabilities that surpasses the rest of the secondary powers with the purpose of matching the power of the regional predominant state - the contestation is two dimensional. On the one side, the secondary powers will tend to constrain and hamper the emergence of the secondary power to regional powerhood. On the other side, the existing regional power will also unfold strategies to hamper the secondary powers transition to regional power status. In this possible setting, implicit or explicit coordination amongst secondary states to hamper the rising of the ambitious secondary power may be expected as much as the cooperation between the secondary and the primary power to impede the further rising of the secondary state with regional powerhood ambitions. Second, strategies of regional contestation can be driven by historical experiences of conflict or rivalry and its legacies. Historical drivers must be seen in direct connection with behavioral drivers of contestation as secondary powers will interpret historical experiences in the light of the current relationship (Hwang 2003). In short, both categories are likely to reinforce each other and can lead to threat perceptions on the part of secondary power. It seems unlikely that secondary powers that have been victims of aggression by the regional power in the past are ready to accept the latters claim to leadership. In particular, unresolved territorial or border disputes will motivate secondary powers to firmly contest the regional ambitions of primary powers and deny to support or follow them. Negative historical experiences and unresolved conflicts are likely to cause images of violent enemy or competitive rival, which are part of the collective memory of the secondary powers society and political elite (He 2007, Thies 2008, Goertz and Diehl 1993). Hence, imminent or latent threat perceptions of secondary powers will most likely become manifest in their security strategies and military doctrines. Otherwise, military and defense cooperation between the regional and the secondary power in terms of military
By implicit we refer to the foreign policy goals and actions of secondary powers that go beyond the regional hegemon and that are not necessarily aimed at contesting it regional leadership claims or initiatives. However, these goals and actions may produce contesting effects as perceived in that direction by the regional leader.
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personnel exchange or common maneuvers hint to a certain degree of mutual trust. If two state actors intend to overcome the historical use of violence among them by developing trustbuilding measures and mutual transparency in the defense sector, mutual negative images might change, and the degree of contestation might decrease and cooperation increase. Trust building measures are sine qua non to develop friendship between former rivals (Berenskoetter 2007, Oelsner and Vion 2011a, Oelsner and Vion 2011b). Third, contestation strategies can be caused by the foreign and security policy behavior of the primary power. The strongest driver of contestation consists of a direct security threat to the secondary state. The regional power can threaten the secondary powers vital interests such as its territorial integrity and its natural resources. Primary powers can also actively engage in intra-regional coalitions or military alliances with adversaries of the secondary power that aim to or involuntarily result in isolating the latter (Arquilla and Fuller 1996). In the same way special relationships of the primary power with extra-regional great powers seen as foes by the secondary power are likely to trigger contestational politics (Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). In addition, secondary states are more likely to be driven to contestation, in cases where the primary power abandons the rule-based order and act[s] unilaterally on a global scale (Ikenberry 2003: 5). Explicit or latent security threats are typical drivers of contestation, if the relation between primary and secondary power is marked by imperial or hegemonic behavior of the former. Regional strategies of empire and hegemony are based exclusively on the self-interest of the primary state, whereas in particular in the case of imperial strategies, secondary powers are expected to subordinate after being confronted with politics of coercion or intervention (Destradi 2010). Here contestation will be the most obvious choice of secondary powers because every state avoids abiding by rules made by others without considering its values, interests and survival. Besides active foreign policy behavior like coercion and alliance building, regional powers can also provoke politics of contestation by their passivity. We assume that an implicit or explicit claim to leadership must be substantiated by the rising powers regional strategy. If the most powerful state does not at least partially enact and play the role of a regional leader including the respective duties and responsibilities (regional neglect), secondary powers will tend to contest the use of the region as a power base for the rising powers global ambitions. The more types of regional leadership the regional power is ready to provide, the less intense we expect the politics of contestation by the secondary power to be. To avoid contestation the regional power must be able and ready (i) to provide public goods such as relative stability and infrastructure to its region and to pay a high proportion of the economic costs of cooperation (distributional leadership); (ii) to share power with secondary states by including them in regional decision-making through multilateral summits or intergovernmental institutions or dual leadership patterns (multilateral leadership); (iii) to project norms and values based on its legitimacy and moral authority that include the ideational beliefs of the potential followers to gain their acceptance for a regional project (ideational leadership); or (iiii) to guide discussions based on inclusion, bridge political and ideological cleavages and articulate a pluralistic agenda leading a discourse of regional consensus creation (consensual leadership). Fourth, endogenous forces may also have an impact on the types of contestation secondary powers unfold towards the rising power. International state actions are part of a two-level game (Putnam 1988), in which the government positions are shaped by the preferences of economic, political and social groups. The magnitude of the impact of those actors always depends on the state apparatus and its relation to the surrounding society (Rose 1998: 161).The relative autonomy of the FPE from domestic actors is also an important factor for the type of foreign policy strategies that a state unfolds. In fact, the relative autonomy of the government is expected to be more important than the type of regime (Ripsman 2009: 4

171). Thus, the more autonomy a FPE has from domestic groups the lesser concessions it has to make in the process of resource extraction to conduct security and foreign policies. Ripsman (ibid.) argues that even in non-democratic regimes there are key domestic groups that may act as veto players, hampering the state power to extract resources from privileged groups with material and economic power. Although the regime type is secondary to autonomy, it still plays a role for the states capacity to extract resources from the society. In fact, state power to extract resources from society may create winners and losers, as the state resource extraction capacity relies not only on institutional bargaining between the executive and domestic groups, but also on the leadership capability of the one holding power. In other words, state power and concessions is not cost-free for the government (see Taliaferro 2007: 156). In this sense, the more influential domestic players will be those with sufficient power to remove national executives from office (whether through the ballot box or coups detat), those that can act as veto players to obstruct the governments programmatic goals, or those that can shape the definition of the national interests. In non-democratic states, potential veto players such as powerful bureaucratic actors, religious leaders, economic elites, or the military can extract policy concessions from the executive (Ripsman 2009: 185). In a democratic state, the legislature, either as a whole or through its key legislative committees on foreign affairs might be the principal veto player able to channel the public opinion including single-issue interest groups and the media (see Tsebelis 2002). However, in a democratic system and where a low level conflictive regional environment exists, the government may provide access points for different domestic groups to shape the government agenda, as the former needs inputs for its policy-making and ties-up domestic actors for keeping its extractive capacity whereas domestic groups need to convert their interests into policy outcomes (see Ehrlich 2007). Therefore, government changes through elections, the preferences of relevant economic interests, the military and foreign policy think tanks as well as the role of media, parliament and public opinion may have an impact on the way a secondary powers contests to or cooperates with the primary state in regional affairs. Neoclassical realists argue that foreign policy choices also depend on the perceptions of relative power by the actual FPE and not simply on relative quantities of physical resources (Rose 1998: 147). Consequently, the misperception of the regional power distribution and polarity can drive the strategy of a state. The FPE might also be constrained since there is no internal agreement on the assessment of the international environment. By positing an intervening role for elite perceptions of systemic variables, neoclassical realist scholars violate the assumption that states act rationally in pursuit of their intended goals (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 22). The change of government not only brings new leaderships and individual perceptions that affect the international behavior of states (Jervis 1976), but also new directions in a foreign policy agenda, when the new government has a different ideological orientation from the previous one. Foreign policy decision-makers and societal leaders in secondary states might respond to shifts in the relative distribution of particular capabilities that threaten specific strategic interests. Lobell (2009: 55) argues that the perception of the primary state by the elites of the secondary state is in part a function of which component of power is rising. Specific components might include shifts in territory, population, ideology, military or economic power (see Spiegel 1972). For instance, economic elites may follow and demand a state to reduce the use of foreign policy means that jeopardize their economic interests, as well as pursue and promote a closer relation with the emerging power if this primary actors economic growth has a potential positive impact on powerful economic actors from the secondary state. On the contrary, if the primary regional actor pursues self-serving economic strategies affecting influential domestic coalitions in the secondary state, then the government

- responding to domestic pressures - may unfold counter-policies to ameliorate the exclusive economic dependence on the regional power. Figure 1 provides an overview of the drivers of contestation and proposes how to put them into operation for the comparative analysis.
Domestic drivers of contestation - Election/ change of government - Economic interest (groups) - Armed forces - Parliament, media, think tanks ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Structural drivers of contestation Regional polarity Distribution of capabilities - Unipolarity - Bipolarity - Multipolarity Security order Mode of conflict management

- Power restraining power - Concert of powers - Collective security - Security community ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Historical drivers of contestation Historical legacies Collective images Threat perceptions

- Territorial disputes - Violent enemy - Government, security agencies - Border disputes - Competitive rival - Population, media, social actors ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Behavioral drivers of contestation Security threats Empire/ hegemony Alliance building - Intervention/ coercion - Regional alliance building - Threat to vital interests - External alliance building Non-provision of leadership Regional neglect - Lack of distributional leadership - Lack of multilateral leadership - Lack of ideational leadership - Lack of consensual leadership

Figure 1: Operationalizing Drivers of Contestation

Summarizing, the secondary powers strategic choice to regional power is contingent on the regional power structure, the foreign and security policy behavior of the rising power, the history of their bilateral relationship, and on the influence of endogenous actors. It is puzzling to ask for the balance between these overriding groups of drivers, as they provide the secondary and regional powers with different courses of action. Whereas rising powers can directly adjust their foreign policy behavior to overcome regional contestation, they can only indirectly control structural factors such as the regional polarity. To transform historical patterns of enmity and mutual distrust between regional and secondary powers a long-term approach and political will on both sides is needed. While we establish a clear distinction of these drivers of contestation for analytical purposes, they unfold in a intertwined manner in the reality of international politics as the next sections show.

3. Applying the Puzzle to South America: Brazil and its Contenders Brazilian foreign policy can be divided into two traditions of thinking. One emphasizing the relations with the United States and some European states in order to promote bilateral trade and achieve international recognition. The other is based on Brazils identity as a developing country and aimed to build a network of Third-worldism (Jaguaribe 2005). From this perspective the primacy of development and multilateralism are two legacies that condition Brazils foreign policy until today (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006). The governments of President Lula da Silva have been successful in connecting these different traditions emphasizing an autonomous foreign policy (Soares de Lima 2008: 64). The pursuit of autonomy should lead to Brazils active participation in the creation and application of international norms that are closer to Brazilian interests and values (Pinheiro Guimares 2006). In the inaugural speech of his first administration (2002-06), President Lula da Silva defined a prosperous and stable South America as the priority goal of his foreign policy. The regional initiatives of the da Silvas administration have introduced a shift from trade-driven foreign policies to a more political or strategic one, focusing on the construction of a regional power base for a global diplomacy in the shifting world order. For example, the admission of Venezuela as the fifth full member of MERCOSUR in July 2006 reaffirmed Brazils intention to extend its room to manoeuvre into the north of South America. Moreover, Brazil has also sought that countries such as Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador become MERCOSURs associate member as an intermediate solution for these countries reluctance to achieve full membership status. The extended MERCOSUR is thus apart from Surinam and Guyana geographically congruent with the UNASUR project, a Brazilian integration initiative started in 2004 including all South American states. Alongside common values such as democracy and human rights accepted and promoted by all South American state leaders, the region is also marked by sharp differences: For instance, some South American states, such as the Venezuela of Hugo Chvez and the Bolivia of Evo Morales, no longer share the market economy paradigm. Conversely, Chile and Colombia have signed bilateral free trade agreements with the US in 2003 and 2006 respectively and engaged in the pro-market Alliance of the Pacific with Peru and Mexico in 2011. While Bogot seeks security and military cooperation with Washington in the framework of the Plan Colombia, Caracas feels threatened by a potential military intervention by the United States. In this regard, Brasilia takes a moderate stance and tries to mediate between these different positions. Brazil also has played the leading part in security cooperation in South America guiding the region into a security community (Flemes 2006). The Conference of the Home Secretaries of the MERCOSUR is the most significant forum for the dialogue on transnational threats and common measures for their containment. In terms of military and defense cooperation, the UN Haiti mission MINUSTAH is of great importance for defense and military cooperation in South America. The stability mission consists of South American troops and is commanded by Brazil. It is demonstrating, for the first time in history, the intention of the South American states to handle regional crises by themselves. In March 2008 President da Silva proposed the creation of a South American Defense Council (CSD) focused on the establishment of a NATO-like defense alliance and, in the long run, South American armed forces and a regional armaments industry. The UNASUR members agreed to the establishment of the CSD as a mechanism for conflict prevention on the basis of mutual consultations in December 2008. Brazil is the dominant player in the CSD, as it is in UNASUR. With respect to military potential, Brazil ranks far ahead its South American neighbors. Brazilian military expenditures in recent years (20052010) were higher than the total sum of the defense expenditures of Argentina, Chile, Columbia and Venezuela. 7

In UNASUR, material resources are distributed relatively evenly among secondary states in comparison with other world regions. For instance, Columbias and Chiles military expenditures were higher than Venezuelas in 2010 (SIPRI 2011). However, Venezuela and Columbia command more military personnel than Chile and Argentina. Venezuela is the biggest oil producer in the region and uses its oil-fuelled affluence as a political weapon in the regional arena. Argentina produces more natural gas than Venezuela and Brazil and its absolute GDP is higher than Venezuelas. When considering GDP per capita, Chile ranks above Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. Additionally, Chile has a more competitive economy than Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela. Yet, Argentina commands more population and land area than Venezuela. Depending on the weighting of these indicators, each of the four states could be defined as secondary powers in South America. The suggested analytical framework distinguishes four categories of contestation drivers with the purpose of setting clear boundaries between its constitutive elements as well as to separate it from neighboring concepts. However, only two of those categories have demonstrated significant variance in the investigated period in South America (2000-11). Regional polarity (unipolarity) and the security order (security community) have not changed significantly during the last decade. Moreover, historical drivers of contestation play no important role because of the peaceful past between Brazil and the South American secondary powers. Besides the historical rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, neither legacies of conflict nor mutual threat perceptions undermine the relationships of the states under consideration. Consequently, it is not likely that major policy shifts of the secondary powers towards Brazil in the last decade are based on historical or structural drivers. Therefore, in the subsequent sections we will explore the behavioral and domestic drivers of contestation in order to explain how South American secondary powers differ in their foreign policies towards Brazil.

4. Brazils Foreign Policy Behavior in South America The acceptance of Brazils leadership status in South America will depend, not least, on its ability to bridge political and ideological cleavages. Brasilia tries to guide the states of the region towards the shared goal of a South American space. The main ideas of its consensual hegemony consist in the protection of democracy, economic growth and regionalised responses to the challenges of globalisation through multilateral deals within South America (Burges 2008: 75). The Itamaraty is selling this approach and the multilateral institutions as being in the wider regions interest. But the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) and MERCOSUR lead to surpassing advantages for the greatest regional economy because Brazil is the greatest exporter of manufactured products as well as the leader in terms of its FDI in South America. In the case of the FTAA negotiations, Brazils multilateral approach reshaped North-South relations, allowing the participating countries to negotiate with the US on a more equal basis. Brazil exerted its power through the proposal of initial ideas and the subsequent guiding of discussions. Brazilian diplomats have highlighted the strategy of pushing collectivised responses based on discussion and inclusion as one of their strengths. In particular, in the course of IIRSA and UNASUR the Itamaraty has articulated a pluralistic agenda and has led a discourse of consensus creation in South America. Material incentives such as the provision of regional public goods and the payment of integration costs would generate more acceptance in South America. Through its various mediation engagements and security-cooperation initiatives, Brasilia provides regional stability. Additionally, Brazil invests in the public goods of regional energy security and infrastructure (IIRSA). However, Brazil is not taking on a great share of the economic 8

integration costs. For instance, Brazil does not support the smaller members through payments into structural funds. It is true that Brazil abated the debts of Bolivia (US$50 million) and Paraguay (US$1 billion) in recent years, but the smaller neighbours are demanding that Brazil opens its consumer market to the goods of those countries. In Brazil most parts of the society are sceptical of regional integration and not ready to pay the costs of regional leadership. This includes the business sector, in particular, the export sector, which could suffer from the reduction of protective measures and the opening up of the economy. Hence, Brazils willingness to provide public goods differs with regard to the issue area under consideration. Brasilia is not ready to pay the costs of economic integration, but is willing do what is necessary to provide regional stability. The willingness to do the latter can be explained by the expected economies of scale induced by providing regional security and protection. Brazil has recently been increasing its military spending in order to secure the status of the regions dominant military power (Flemes 2008). In its search for state-of-the-art military technology, Brazil entered into a strategic partnership with France in December 2008, signing armament contracts for US$8.5 billion. Unlike investments in regional states economies, the volume of investments in military technology and equipment, intended to project force over distance (in particular, sea and air capabilities), varies relatively little in relation to the number of states included in the regional sphere of influence. The number of beneficiaries of the stability induced by Brazil has increased over recent decades: Argentina, Southern Cone, UNASUR. This has led to the problem of free-riding: Brazils neighbors have received the benefits of social order for free, without having to accept its rule or comply with its demands. A solution to the problem of free-riding is the multilateralisation of the Brazilian commitment to South American stability through the regional defense council (CSD). Mutual aid and reciprocity are the main principles to avoid free-riding and increase regional states dependence (Lake 2009). The CSD reduces the number of independent alliances among its subordinates. It also makes them dependent on Brazil and therefore subject, at least in part, to Brasilias influence over their security policies. Brazil is not interested in building inclusive and democratic institutions that would allow for the participation of secondary players like Venezuela, Columbia, Chile and Argentina in regional decision-making processes. Cooperative hegemony (Pedersen 2002) includes the readiness to share power on a permanent basis. But Brazil does not share power with its neighbours on a permanent basis, because MERCOSUR and UNASUR have no significant competencies. Brazil has leading roles in these regional institutions without being prepared for economic concessions or the transfer of sovereignty to regional institutions. Moreover, Brazil does not support the institutional consolidation of MERCOSUR. In fact, it is the country that ratifies the fewest MERCOSUR resolutions. MERCOSUR is today neither a common market nor a complete free-trade area. This is partly a consequence of Brazilian foreign policy, which is focused much more on national sovereignty than on the countrys integration into regional institutions in the long run. Or in Perdersens (2002) wording, Brazils foreign-policy makers preserve the regional structure of asymmetrical federation. Under these circumstances the regional acceptance of Brazils leadership status and the willingness of potential followers to follow might be rather limited. Summarizing, the low level of multilateral and the selective distributional leadership are the principle drivers of contestation that result from the primary states foreign policy behaviour. But similar to the ideational and consensual leadership types provided by Brazil to a great extent, the secondary powers under consideration are not discriminated because all four types of leadership are provided (or not) to the region as a whole. What might vary among the secondary powers are the expectations and perceptions of Brazils behaviour.

5. Domestic-driven Strategies of South American Secondary Powers? 5.1. Argentina: Influencing through Competitive Partnership Argentina has experienced a process of declination in its power capabilities since the 1930s onwards (Tokatlin 2009: 17, Malamud 2011a: 89). This declination was enhanced by the economic crisis of 2001, which made of Argentina a less powerful actor as well as it became more isolated internationally. Yet Argentina was able to keep regional bilateral relations in a good track following a policy of necessity with countries such as Venezuela (Russell 2010a: 304). Andrs Malamud (2011a: 87-88) argues that Argentinas foreign policy is the reflection of the domestic political process that follows a short-term rationale. This subordination of the foreign policy to domestic politics is key to understand the Kirchners administrations in regional and global affairs, and especially in its relationship with Brazil. Historical continuity is also observable regarding the relationship with Brazil. On the one hand, Argentina sees Brazil as its main partner but, on the other hand, it is Argentinas competitor. This apparent ambivalence of Argentinas competitive partnership with Brazil has the rationale of balance of power. For example, the then President Nstor Kirchner kept a fairly good relationship with Brazil, but at the same time established a new alliance to counterbalance Brazil; that is, Venezuela inasmuch as the alliance with the US broke down after the economic crisis of 2001. This approach of Argentina to Brazil in terms of keeping alternative options responds to soft-balancing behavior through patterns of binding (Mercosur) and omni-enmeshment (previous relationship with the US and current one with Venezuela). However, such relationships also reflect concessions to some domestic groups in terms of economic and political interests. Thus, domestic and behavioral drivers of contestation are key to understand Argentinas approach to Brazil in the context of regional unipolarity. These drivers unfold in foreign policy actions with the purpose of reducing existing economic asymmetries and dependencies, as well as soft balancing Brazils material superiority. Presidency of Nstor Kirchner (2003-2007) Argentina sees Brazil as a partner in the creation and function of the MERCOSUR (Taiana 2006: 12), and it perceives its participation in MERCOSUR as equal and not as the result of Brazilian supremacy (see Malamud 2011a: 92). This image of certain equality is related to Argentinas traditional view of Brazil as a competitor for the exertion of influence in South America (Russell and Tokatlin 2003). Nevertheless, this competition has become more asymmetrical, favoring Brazil as Argentina has experienced consecutive crises that have undermined its potential to be a proactive and relevant actor in South America. Moreover, Brazil has also experienced material growth and has tried to exert not only regional but also global influence, which increases the power gap between both actors. During Nstor Kirchners presidency, the domestic economic and societal interests were a driving force for this countrys foreign economic policy orientation. As consequence of the economic crisis of 2001, the main priority was the economic recovery and the reindustrialization of the country: [] the nation should recover its capacity to make decisions and to think about how the country should join the globalized world, that is, separating the positive elements, which we support, from those negative aspects of globalization (Frente Para la Victoria 2003). These guiding principles of Kirchners government meant that Argentina went into a process of isolation. Argentina broke its relation with the IMF and it kept its relationship with Washington at the multilateral level rather than at the bilateral level. In this sense, Argentina sought to establish a close political relation with Brazil and Venezuela to compensate the loss of preponderance at the international level. 10

However, Argentina adopted a defensive economic strategy towards Brazil its main trade partner - to protect part of Kirchners electoral base. Argentinas favored domestic economic coalitions from the industrial sector (producers and workers) through implementing economic measures in its relation with Brazil such as controlling the flows of trade, applying voluntary export restraint measures and implementing other ad-hoc protective measures. (Bouzas and Kosacoff 2009: 16). These commercial disputes took place within the economic frame of MERCOSUR. In fact, both countries, Brazil and Argentina, are the countries that implement the lesser of the MERCOSUR regulations. Despite the defensive orientation of Argentinas economic relation with Brazil, the latter adopted a tolerant position on this matter as it was also hit by the economic crisis (Real devaluation) and adopted protectionist measures for its vulnerable economic sectors. Moreover, Brazil unfolded a strategic patience approach towards Argentinas re-industrialization process (Guadagni et.al. 2010: 15) as a way to preserve the good diplomatic relationship with its main regional partner. Nstor Kirchner replaced the coalition with the United States because Washington did not do much to help Argentina vis--vis the IMF, and because the new government identified itself with the ideological left. In this sense, the influence of domestic factors in Argentinas foreign policy was stronger because of the involved electoral costs that is, office-seeking rationale - and because of the absence of security threats making possible to break down the alliance with the US. Kirchner was elected with 22% of votes and, thus, he needed to respond to domestic pressures to legitimate its government and to secure the presidential election of a member of his political circle for the next term. Moreover, the creation of an explicit alliance with Venezuela had ideological, political and economic motives. First, Chvezs hard rhetoric towards the US and economic globalization became an umbrella protection for Argentinas isolation from the international scene as well as a response to the pressure of Argentinas social movements. In other words, Argentina self identified at least rhetorically with Chvez ideological orientation. Second, the buffering strategy with Venezuela was also seen as a way to balance and constrain Brazils global ambitions and to prevent using the region as a platform to go global. Argentinas strong support to the inclusion of Venezuela in the MERCOSUR illustrates this countrys goal of soft balancing Brazil within and beyond the MERCOSUR, and of reducing the extant asymmetry between the two countries (cf. Simonoff 2008: 49). Finally, the approach to Venezuela was economic-pragmatic in the sense that Argentina needed access to foreign credit to implement the national economic measures of re-industrialization in key sectors and to fulfill its obligations with its creditors (Malamud 2011a: 94-95). Moreover, Venezuela also became an export market for Argentina agro-industrial production - that is, strengthening economic ties with peers. In this sense, the economic side of this alliance based on economic necessity was also conceived as a way to gain room to maneuver from international creditors, as well as from global and regional hegemons. The Presidencies of Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner (2007 to present) Cristina Fernndezs foreign policy orientation follows a similar path to that of her husbands government. She gives priority to the response to domestic protective pressures coming from the industrial sector, as well as those coming from social movements, on which her electoral platform was built. These domestic priorities also reflect her approach to foreign policy issues. With the sub-prime crisis ongoing, Cristina Kirchner used the UN General Assembly of 2008 to criticize the neoliberal approach as cause for the global economic crisis triggered in the US as much as to criticize her political competitors in Argentina who support this model. The speech can then be interpreted as a response to her domestic political platform, that is, the left-oriented social movements (Russell 2010b: 117).

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The economic relationship with Brazil within Mercosur improved in terms of economic exchange. However, protectionist measures were still used in a reciprocal way. Moreover, MERCOSURs institutional development stalled without envisaging serious attempts to relaunch this regional group. Regarding the relationship with Venezuela, Argentina has deepened its alliance with this country as a way to soft balance Brazil. In addition, Argentina has also enhanced the economic and political ties with China already established in the previous government. In this sense, Argentinas economic recovery was not only pushed by enhancing economic relationships with peers, but also became the way of achieving economic recovery. It is important to mention that China has become Argentinas second most important economic partner after Brazil (Zelicovich 2011), and it has also helped to ameliorate the effects of the global crisis (2008-2010) through an increasing demand of primary resources (Cesarin 2010: 10). Moreover, China has become one of the main sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) for Argentina. Although strengthening economic ties with peer countries may be a consequence to the need of broadening markets s and attracting FDI, it also produces a diffusing effect and the reduction of political and economic dependencies from the main trade partner, in this case Brazil. In this sense, the process of enhancing the existing economic bilateral relationship with China also produces an indirect way of contesting Brazilian regional hegemony. As part of a competitive relation, Argentina also aspires to play the joint role of an entrepreneurial leader with Brazil in the institutionalization and crisis management duties of the newly launched regional group UNASUR. In this regard, Argentinas interest is to secure a predominant position in Brazils foreign policy, as well as to play the role of a soft balancer toward Brazil within the UNASUR. The election of former president Kirchner as the UNASUR Secretary-General not only reflected his personal interest in using the post as a platform for a presidential nomination,2 as well as the partnership between both countries, but it also responds to the need of unfolding soft-balancing behavior entangling diplomacy towards Brazil. The sharing of the leading role between Argentina and Brazil within the UNASUR became evident in their dual effort to facilitate the dialogue between Colombia and Venezuela, during the crisis of JulyAugust 2010 (Wehner 2011a). Whereas dual leadership and cooperation is part of the relationship between these two countries in an institutional forum as UNASUR, Argentina along with Chile has also unfolded a parallel entangling diplomacy strategy within this regional grouping by setting the programmatic orientation of the CSD. In fact, Argentina and Chile have become leaders in the making of a security agenda within the CSD (Nolte and Wehner 2011). In addition, Argentina has also adopted an omni-enmeshment approach as it has an instrumental view of a Latin American region as a whole in order to include Mexico as a balancer to a possible hegemonic project of Brazil. Argentina includes Mexico in its soft-balancing strategy by supporting the creation of Latin American schemes such as the Community of the Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which superpose and overlap with sub-regional groupings. Whereas Argentina has a cooperative and competitive relation with Brazil at the regional level, Argentinas competitive rationale becomes stronger at the international level. During the government of Fernndez, Argentina has kept its traditional refusal to support Brazils quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC. The permanent seat excludes Argentina from Brazils power equation, and it creates the fear that the power gap between the two countries will increase, transforming the extant partnership into a type of subordination. For this reason, Argentina has joined the group Uniting for Consensus along with Italy, Pakistan and others to balance Brazils and the rest of the G4 members quest for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Argentina favors a reform of the UNSC, yet one with new non-permanent members (see Bielsa 2005: 4). This view is also consistent with the desire and the proposal of Argentina to
2

Nstor Kirchner died during his mandate as UNASUR Secretary General.

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have a permanent regional seat for Latin America based upon a rotation system (Mayoral 2004). These proposals are also consistent with the view of competitive partnership and with the idea of preventing an even larger asymmetric relationship between Argentina and Brazil, which might eventually erase Brazils need of such a partnership.

5.2. Chile: Autonomy through Bilateral Free Trading Chiles main foreign policy goals after Pinochets government and during the presidencies of Patricio Aylwin (1990-94) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) were to return to the international scene by improving its status and economic presence, and by dealing with bilateral historical border issues. Chile adopts a pragmatic approach in its external relations in order to secure its traditional principle of autonomy within the frame that international law and multilateral institutions provide. Chiles relation with Brazil is of friendship as they do not share a common border (lvarez and Fuentes 2007). However, the same fact impedes further cooperation, despite Chile is seen as Brazils most reliable partner in the region (see Malamud 2011b). Nevertheless, Chile has unfolded a soft-balancing behavior towards a project of regional hegemony rather than towards Brazil in itself, as the following analysis shows. Presidency of Ricardo Lagos (2000-06) During this presidency Chiles foreign policy strategy was to increase its network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) within and beyond Latin America, that is, the US, South Korea, China, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EU, the Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Brunei, Singapore, and New Zealand), and Central America (signed in 1999 but valid since 2002 with Costa Rica and El Salvador). By opening new markets, and by having FTAs with all the economic powers and developing countries, Chile is reducing both the economic asymmetric dependence and the potential political influence that world and regional powers may exert over it, through the diffusing effect that multiple commercial ties produces. Chile has strengthened economic ties with its peers and uses FTAs as a soft-balancing tool. Chile has unfolded a pragmatic approach to regional integration, giving priority to the economic side of integration rather than to the hopes of other countries, such as Brazil and Venezuela, that regional schemes can be used as political projects. This country, as MERCOSURs associated member, has an ambivalent position towards this regional grouping. In fact, Chile seeks to prevent a potential entrapment within MERCOSUR by lessening both its economic dependence and political influence (Wehner 2011b). Chile sees the MERCOSUR as Brazils political project and full membership into this group means the acceptance of this country leadership, which might limit Chiles autonomy in its foreign relations (Mullins 2006: 123). Rather than direct contestation, Chiles foreign policy goals and choices go beyond the view of Brazil as a predominant power. However, Chiles goals and actions produce indirect contestation patterns. In the security domain, Chile unfolds a mixed strategy of soft and hard balancing. On the one hand, it continued improving security cooperation with Argentina by establishing measures of mutual trust such as the signature of a protocol to establish a bi-national peace operation force, and an accord to create a system to homologate their defense expenditures (Villar 2006: 135). In addition, Chile was one of the main promoters and participant to give regional solutions to regional security problems such as that of Haiti. In fact, Chile participates in the peace keeping operations in Haiti since 2004 (MINUSTAH) (Fuentes 2006: 115-16). On the other hand, Chile has continued increasing its defense expenditure, becoming one of the main military powers in South America. In fact, Chile spent 3.6% of GDP in 13

defense in the period 2000-2005, whereas Brazil spent as an average 1.7% of its GDP in the same period (see SIPRI data base). Flemes and Nolte (2010: 26) assume that Chile is achieving NATO standards and that it may even match Brazils capabilities in air-force and tanks once it completes the renewal of these items. Although Chile does not have any historical rivalry with Brazil, Chile indirectly unfolds a strategy of military predominance regarding its neighbors and an indirect balance of power strategy towards potential regional hegemony. Presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) This government foreign policy is of continuity as the modernization of the military equipment and the opening of more FTA negotiations with countries from Asia, and South America illustrate. Moreover, the logic of using FTA as a soft-balancing tactic towards global powers, regional integration and regional powers was still present. However, some new issues were included under Bachelets presidency such as the exertion of a proactive role in regional affairs. Although the previous government tried to exert a leading role in regional affairs, Lagos government was regionally confronted with Bolivias sea issue. In this sense, Bachelets government sought to improve bilateral relations with Bolivia by establishing an agenda of 13 points in which mutual trust measures and the sea issue were included (Wehner 2010). Not only showed this agenda Chiles will to improve bilateral relations with Bolivia, but it also erased potential obstacles to exert a proactive role in South America. Fuentes (2009: 140) argues that the South American agenda of Bachelets government became more proactive when Chile assumed UNASURs pro tempore presidency. In our view, the reduction of bilateral tensions and the regional projection of a friendship-building path between Chile and Bolivia were important steps to reduce regional contestation towards Chile and facilitate a more proactive stand on regional affairs. Although Chile was reluctant to join UNASUR as it prefers bilateral relations (see Wehner 2011a: 150), it assumed the first presidency of this regional grouping. In fact, UNASURs early institutionalization in security affairs and articulation of a role of conflict manager was casted by mediating in the internal conflict that jeopardized the integrity of Bolivias territory (see Flemes and Radseck 2010; Flemes, Nolte and Wehner 2011). This regional grouping is a Brazilian initiative, yet for Chile was better to be inside than outside this group, and articulate and express its priorities and agenda from within (Angel Flishflish, interview by LW in April 2011). In this sense, Chile has used a binding strategy, as it has shaped and set UNASURs security agenda by bringing its bilateral experience of security cooperation with Argentina into a regional frame. Argentina and Chile have exerted dual leadership to institutionalize the security practices of the South American Defense Council (CDS) (Nolte and Wehner 2011). On the one hand, Brazil creates the need of regional platforms for achieving global projection, but on the other hand it has not been able to make out of UNASUR a springboard for its global interests (Malamud 2011b), as Argentina and Chile have gained a leading role in the making of a security agenda. The cooperation pattern within UNASUR also carries competition towards Brazil as secondary powers seek to embed and prevent that the regional leader unfolds a hegemonic strategy (see Nolte 2011). In fact, Chile offered Argentina and Uruguay an explicit alliance to articulate common positions in the region in order to constrain Brazils rising process. However, this proposition was rejected by Argentina, since the latter perceives that a tacit alliance and coordination between both countries already exists at the regional level (NN, interview by LW in Buenos Aires).

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Presidency of Sebastin Piera (2010-present) Pieras right wing government has also kept the main elements of Chiles foreign policy under the left-wing governing coalition La Concertacin (1990-2010). Chile continues with its rush to FTAs and its strategic goal of using them to reduce potential political influences, thereby enhancing its constructed external image of pragmatism and of a choosing not to choose position between the leadership quests of regional and hegemonic powers (Wehner 2011b). Moreover, Chile supports UNASURs role as conflict manager and the peace keeping operation in Haiti along with Argentina and Brazil. Even though Chile has continued exerting a proactive role in the institutionalization process of the CDS, the leadership of the foreign ministry under Piera plays its part in the UNASUR on the base of obligation and not conviction (Fernando Schmidt, interview by DF in September 2011). Otherwise, Santiagos actual FPE is aware that it will be very difficult to pursue specific national interests in global forums without the support of UNASURs gravity center Brazil, for instance the keenly aspired approximation to Asia (ibid.). In this sense, Chiles approach to UNASUR is a pragmatic and power-driven choice. From within the UNASUR Chile can establish issue-area alliances such as the existing dual leading initiatives in defense issues with Argentina; unfold its binding strategy towards regional hegemony projects; shape the security and economic agenda of the region, and also keep a friendly relationship with Brazil without incurring high costs in political and economical binding compromises. As an active member state Chile can also hamper, delay and find intermediate solutions when its national interest may be affected by a regional initiative. As the governments of La Concertacin did, Piera has also supported Brazils claims for a permanent seat without veto rights to the United Nations Security Council (see Wehner 2011a). Chile also seeks to prevent hegemonic temptations by unfolding an omni-enmeshment strategy such as binding Brazil through including other actors Mexico - in its regional view. The goal of having a Latin American view rather than a pure South American perspective is also an element of continuity in Chiles foreign policy strategy. In this sense, Chiles strategy is to include Mexico into regional initiatives such as Chiles active support to the creation of the Community of the Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as a way to ameliorate Brazils regional influence and Chiles entrapment within UNASUR. This logic of having a partnership relationship with Mexico is also thought as balancing mechanism towards Argentina-Venezuela relationship.3 What is new in Pieras government foreign policy is the use of the strategy of buffering as Chile is participating in an explicit strategic alliance of promarket countries, the Alliance of the Pacific, integrated by Colombia, Mexico and Peru. This alliance is commercial in nature but it has political connotations as it excludes Brazil and opposes the left-wing regional coalition of Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

5.3. Colombia: Pragmatic Re-orientation between UNASUR and Pacific Alliance The relationship to the United States has traditionally been a fundamental force shaping Colombian foreign policy, which does not mean that Bogot always pursued a bandwagoning approach towards the northern powerhouse. For instance, after the Cold War period President Csar Gaviria (1990-1994) reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba and pressed forward a third-worldist diplomacy obtaining for Colombia the presidency of the G-77 and the nonalignment movement. The term of the Liberal Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was characterized by tensions with the United States and a lack of international credibility because of Sampers
The support to recent projects of regional integration such as UNASUR and CELAC does not erase Chiles skepticism towards regional schemes. Chile still prefers a bilateral approach in its commercial and political relations with the rest of South America to preserve its foreign (economic) policy autonomy.
3

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ties to the Cali narcotics cartel. After the election of Andrs Pastrana (1998-2002), who represented the Conservative-Liberal coalition Gran Alianza por el Cambio, the Clinton administration changed its attitude towards close collaboration with Colombia in the course of the war on drugs. Initially, the new government sought support from European countries and regional neighbors. In this regard, Colombia and Brazil signed the COBRA agreement on binational police cooperation for the surveillance of the common Amazon border and intelligence exchange. However, in 2000 President Pastrana started the broad-based Diplomacy for Peace initiative addressing economic and social challenges as well as illegal drug production, which quickly became the repression-based Plan Colombia once serious negotiations with the Clinton administration began. Presidencies of lvaro Uribe (2002-2010) During the two administrations of lvaro Uribe, Colombias foreign policy was in great parts instrumental to the realization of domestic policy priorities in the framework of his program for Seguridad Democrtica. Accordingly, the foreign ministry played an underpart without mentionable margins of autonomy. International initiatives were mostly limited to reactive policies toward political and ideological tensions with neighboring states and free trade agreements. Whereas Bogot tried to increase the economic ties with Brasilia through the Rueda de Negocios, the bilateral free trade agreement with the US signed in 2006, but not ratified by the US Congress until today was the top priority of President Uribes foreign policy. Additional paths of free trade negotiations included the Pacific arc (Chile, Peru, Mexico), the Central American states and the European Union. In general, the bandwagoning approach towards the United States was the pivot of foreign policy in the Uribe years and a relative isolation in South America was the consequence of that one sided orientation. In this regard, Colombia has been called the Israel of Latin America (Cardona 2011: xx). An expression of Uribes regional isolationism was Bogots reluctance to the project of UNASUR, which he perceived as politically weak and inappropriate for economic integration. In addition, President Uribe feared the potential use of the UNASUR as a platform for a political discourse against the US, the Plan Colombia and his administration. Colombia passed the unions first one-year presidency to Chile in 2007. When the South American Defence Council was created one year later, President Uribe did not attend the summit in Brazil. Bogots political isolation triggered a marginalization from regional trade and investment flows (Herrera Chaves 2010: 488). Colombias role in IIRSA has been peripheral as Brazil is building its bi-oceanic corridor though Chile (Pacific) and Venezuela (Caribbean). This passive resistance against Brazilian launched cooperation projects already led to political resentment and a lack of confidence between the two states. The Colombian bombing of the FARC camp on Ecuadorian territory in 2008 without prior regional consultations aggravated the geopolitical antagonism. The perception of the Colombian government and the dominant public opinion was that the Brazilian government of Lula da Silva has an excessive tolerance to Venezuelas President Chvez. In particular, Colombian officials felt that Brazil was biased as the latter did not react to the evidence about the presence of Colombian guerillas in Ecuador and Venezuela (Pastrana and Vera 2008, Ramirez 2010). Presidents Uribe and Lula agreed on the need to eradicate illicit drug crime, but they disagreed on the means to manage this transnational security threat. Even though the Colombian military alliance with the United States reflected by the Plan Colombia was not directed against Brazil, it undermined the regional powers geostrategic interests in South America. In particular, the use of seven Colombian military bases by US armed forces can be interpreted as collateral hard balancing against the militarily predominant Brazil (Flemes and Nolte 2010: 30-32). President Uribe had to justify the 16

respective bilateral agreement with the US at a summit of UNASUR and to assure that the US security forces would exclusively focus on fighting drug crime and exclude transborder activities of monitoring, espionage and intervention (see Carvajal 2011). Two views further suggest the interpretation of latent mutual threat perceptions between Bogot and Braslia: on the one hand, Herrera Chaves (2010: 488) argues that in the face of Bogots incapacity of controlling illegal activities of criminal actors in the Colombian Amazon and possible spill overs to the Brazilian Amazon territory, Braslias upgraded armed forces could take action to resolve the transnational problem. On the other hand, the Brazilian government undiplomatically stated that it would carefully monitor the implementation of the bilateral agreement on the use of military bases between Washington and Bogot (ibid.). Presidency of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-present) In the transition period from the Uribe to the Santos government the public opinion indicated the deterioration of the privileged partnership with the United States, the need to put an end to regional isolation and diversify foreign partners. Even though Juan Manuel Santos is from the Uribista platform Social Party of National Unity (Partido de la U) and lastly served as defense minister under Uribe, the democratic elections had a great impact on the orientation of Colombias foreign policy. The new foreign policy is characterized by more pragmatism and multilateralism than in the era of lvaro Uribe. Two changes will potentially impact the bilateral relations with Brazil. First, Pastrana (2011: 12) identifies a new South American strategy pursued by President Santos that is driven by conviction instead of obligation. And second, we observe a thematic shift of the foreign policy agenda: security, drug traffic and terrorism loose their centrality, whereas global issues like climate change, human rights, energy security and the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions become increasingly more important for the UN Security Council member (2011-12). On the global level, Colombia and Brazil have failed to tune in their voting behavior on how the UN Security Council should deal with the crisis in Libya. Additionally, the Santos administration does not support the Brazilian demand for a permanent UNSC membership. On the regional level, Bogotas approach is characterized by more multilateral engagement than the previous government. The normalization of the diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador and Santos first official visit was to Brasil illustrate the priority given to regional engagement during this administration. The de-ideologization of the relations with Venezuela responds to domestic economic preferences, in particular to the Colombian industry sector, since the neighboring country is the natural destination of processed export goods. Bogot and Caracas also agreed to share the conduct of the General Secretariat of the UNASUR for the period of 2011-12, with the former Colombian foreign minister Mara Emma Meja managing the intergovernmental cooperation process a collaboration hardly conceivable during the Uribe presidencies. Colombias bilateral relation with Brazil also gained a new momentum under Santos presidency as both countries has signed eight agreements. These cooperation treaties cover the areas of social and infrastructure development in the border areas, the collaboration in science and education, and the agreement to combat trans-border common crime combat. In the armament sector the ministries of defense conduct the project KC 390, which aims at the common production of a multifunctional airplane using Brazilian know how and the subsequent acquisition of twelve airplanes by Colombia. In the context of the 2010 trilateral agreement on the combat of transnational crime - including Peru, Colombia will buy fourteen Tucano and 25 Super Tucano airplanes produced by the Brazilian Embraer (Bromley and Guevara 2009: 170; Pastrana 2011: 14, 17).

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The Colombian Industry Association (ANDI) generally supports the political and commercial turn towards Brazil, hoping for technology transfers in strategic sectors like mining and armament as well as for upgraded transnational infrastructure and energy interconnections (ibid.: 10; Vieira 2010: 60). Likewise, the finance sector represented by the ANIF advocates the increasing bilateral interchange and stresses the great potential of Brazilian inversions (Clavijo 2011, Pastrana 2011: 11). The Santos administration may provide access points for the ANDI and ANIF letting them contribute to the foreign policy agenda and gaining domestic legitimacy that way. Contrary to these two economic interest groups, the Colombian Agriculture Society (SAC) calls for analyzing the liberalization of bilateral agritrade with cautiousness because the sector is vulnerable with a view to the highly competitive Brazilian agribusiness. Similarly, the National Association of Farmers (Fedegn) even fears the disappearance of farming in Colombia and a general socio-economic decline on the countryside in the face of the massive Brazilian ranching industry (Fedegn 2010, quoted in Pastrana 2011: 11). Even though the Santos government can expect domestic resistance by some pressure groups and unions of vulnerable business sectors, Bogot marches toward a strategic partnership in trade and defense with the Brazilian primary power. Pastrana (ibid.: 14) argues that President Santos disposes of two historical windows of opportunity: first, he could now begin to negotiate Colombias full membership in the MERCOSUR. And second, Bogot could use Brazil and a more liberalized and dynamic MERCOSUR as launching pads for a new Andean leadership project. At the same time President Santos and Foreign Minister Holgun seek continuity by pragmatically further developing the Pacific option by strengthening economic ties with their Chilean and Peruvian peers. The three states of the Alianza Pacfica having signed free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union and represent a market of 100 million consumers. Together with Mexico a common market would be bigger, less protectionist and therefore, possibly more competitive on the global scale than the Brazilian one. Bogots parallel strategic approach aims at attracting and binding Brazil to the alliance of the regions more liberal economies, while the limited diplomatic coalition will exclude partly state-directed economies such as Bolivia and Venezuela.

5.4. Venezuela: Competing Leadership through ALBA and Petro-diplomacy Venezuela has been referred to as a regional middle (Cardozo de Da Silva 1987) and regional leading power (Boeckh 2003) in South America, a classification which stresses the countrys petropolitics (Clem and Maingot 2011) and its alternative regional integration project of the ALBA (Williams 2011). It is true that already President Rafael Calderas regional policy was driven by geo-political thinking when Venezuela engaged in a privileged partnership with Brazil during his second government (1994-98) to balance the influence of the Colombian neighbor. But since the beginning of the era of Hugo Chvez in 1999, and in particular, since his second term, Venezuela plays a pivotal role in the regions integration dynamics. Chvez has not only activated a South American vocation but he has also tried to enhance Venezuelas position in the Caribbean region by allocating resources extracted from domestic groups (oil resources and revenues) into a project of regional leadership that may hamper and balance Brazils regional leaderships claim.

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Second Presidential Term of Hugo Chvez (2000-06) The idea of ALBA as an anti-neoliberal counterproposal to the US-led project of the FTAA, was presented for the first time in December 2001 at the Summit of the Americas at Isla Margarita. The limited diplomatic coalition was founded by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004 and joined by Bolivia two years later. Chvez project of the Bolivarianization of the region gained upper hand after the 2004 opposition induced referendum, where the majority of Venezuelans voted against his dismissal (Romero 2006: 94ff.). The impetus of exporting the Socialism of the 21st Century and the Bolivarian Revolution through petro-diplomacy was spelled out in the First Development Plan 2003-07. In addition to ALBA, this government document contents the project of a South American NATO, a regional broadcasting company (Telesur) and a development bank (Banco Sur). To gain acceptance for the implicit political project led by Venezuela, the world fifth biggest oil-exporter concluded numerous bi- and subregional energy agreements with the Caribbean (Petrocaribe), the Andean states (Petroandino) and Southern Cone (Petrosur) which provide oil according to special conditions. Yet, the above mentioned foreign policy goals, initiatives and behavior cannot be understood without referring to domestic dynamics. Most of these regional and extra-regional initiatives were possible because President Chvez was able to increase the governments relative autonomy from domestic groups mainly the opposition - after the failed coup d etat in April 2002. This event became a turning point for unfolding a more radical government agenda, and for exerting a foreign policy strategy, in which the promotion of a socialist model becomes key to understand Chvezs regional and extra-regional interactions. Domestically, the Bolivarian revolution reached a point of consolidation in 2003 and the extractive capacity of the state to pursue security and foreign policy goals increased with the definitive renationalization of the oil company PDVSA (Raby 2011: 163-64). Moreover, Chvezs politics of extra-regional alliances and recent arms acquisition from Russia are not only a reflection of how Venezuelas perceives its security position in the region, but also it is a response or a concession to one of its main domestic allies to carry out the revolutionary project: the armed forces. Even though President Chvez alternative claim to regional leadership became very clear after the failed coup dtat and the referendum, at that time the relations with Brazil were at their height. In 2004 Lula da Silva and Hugo Chvez were the protagonists of the establishment of the South American Community of Nations (later renamed as UNASUR) in Cuzco. The common interest of excluding the United States and Mexico from the South American sphere of influence overlaid the competitive constellation and both states engaged in a so called strategic alliance in 2005. In that occasion fifteen agreements in several issue areas from trade and finance to energy and military cooperation were signed. In the aftermath Brazil became Venezuelas third biggest trade partner and nearly decoupled its exports to Venezuela in the next three years (Gonzles Urrutia 2011: 8). In 2006 after Venezuela had signed the MERCOSUR treaty, the divergences between both governments ideational projects for South America became visible for the first time. Venezuelas resource-based diplomacy makes it an alternative partner for smaller countries such as Bolivia, something which gives these states room to maneuver in their bilateral relations with Brazil. The consequence is, for instance, rivalry on influence over Bolivia that traditionally had been part of the Brazilian sphere of influence. When President Morales nationalized Bolivias natural gas industry in 2006, among the 53 installations affected by the measure were those of the Brazilian Petrobras, one of Bolivia's largest investors, which controlled 14% of the country's gas reserves. Brazil's energy minister reacted by considering the move as an unfriendly act and contrary to previous understandings between Brazil and

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Bolivia. President Chvez sent officials of the PDVSA, Venezuelas oil company, to advise and support Bolivian President Evo Morales in the conflict with the Brazilian government. Third Presidential Term (2007-present) The latest oil discoveries in Brazilian territorial waters in 2007 will most likely make the Amazon state one of the top-ten oil producers in the world and increase the competitive character of the bilateral relations between Caracas and Braslia. In particular, the deterioration of PDVSA in view of its lack of investment and judicial insecurity in Venezuela, put Petrobras in an advantageous position. In the future Braslia will be able to operate its material resources to neutralize oil-based regional initiatives of competing Venezuela. Venezuela successfully strived for expanding the ALBA coalition between 2007 and 2009 by six further member states. Among them was Ecuador, which can be seen as second important buffer state besides Bolivia. At the same time Brazilian diplomacy began to increasingly distance itself from President Chvez ambitious and often personal projects without directly confronting his regional initiatives. But projects like the Bank of the South, the Gas Pipeline of the South or the South American NATO have been dispelled or replaced by Brazilian initiatives like the UNASUR and its CDS since then. At the first Summit of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (CALC) hosted by Brazil in Costa do Saupe in the end of 2008 President Chvez reacted to the shifting character of the bilateral relationship by indirectly criticizing Brazils dominant role: Brazils leadership is important, but there should not be only one leader. We need many leaderships in Latin America (Diario Las Americas, 17 December 2008). In general, Venezuelas approach towards Brazil is based on focusing on common interests. For instance, the Initiative for IIRSA, pushed by Brazil and Venezuela, can be realized without political and ideological convergence. A further common interest of Brasilia and Caracas is the exclusion of the United States from South American politics and security affairs. But Washington is still the most influential external player in South America and delegates some of its power to Brasilia, which is more able to control Caracas because it enjoys more legitimacy than Washington in South America. Venezuela on its part has fostered two groups of external alliances. On the one hand, interest coalitions with countries in the Middle East (Iran, Syria) and Eurasia (Belarus, Russia) are characterized by a common anti-imperial approaches, the interchange of (defense) technology and common stances in international organizations. On the other hand, partnerships with Asian countries (China, Vietnam, Malaysia) are mainly motivated by mutual trade and investment, but also by the common interest of a more multipolar world order. In particular, China and Russia can be seen not only as strategic partners to counterbalance the US, but also in the context of an omni-enmeshment approach of Caracas as both great powers have the potential to redefine Brazilian interests and alter its positions, for instance with regard to regional trade and energy issues. For the future we can expect that the relationship between Brazil and the United States will be further strengthened under the administration of Dilma Rousseff. In particular, Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota, a former Ambassador to Washington, will make the US-Brazilian relationship a corner stone of his agenda. At the same time President Rousseff already stepped away from Venezuelan partners like Irans President Ahmadinedschad positioning herself clearly against human rights violations and authoritarian regimes in contrast to her predecessor in office. Both developments are likely to trigger contestational politics by Hugo Chvez.

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5. Conclusion South America has a unipolar structure consisting of one primary and different secondary powers that operate comparable overall capabilities. The relative power symmetry among secondary powers and the absence of vital threats resulting from the primary powers behavior or the respective historical legacies limit secondary powers spectrum of conducive strategic options. In view of the existing relationships between Brazil and each of the study cases, oscillating between cooperation and competition, the secondary powers contestational behavior is limited to soft-balancing strategies. In other words: systemic effects define the scope of strategic options applicable by the FPE. Soft-balancing becomes an umbrella strategy containing different tactics of direct and indirect contestation against Brazils leadership claim. All the study cases use the pool of instruments, yet with different intensities, of soft balancing such as alliance building, entangling diplomacy, binding, and omni-enmeshment as means to contest the regional hegemon. Reasons for this soft-balancing behavior toward Brazil are, first, that Brazil is only willing to burden the costs of regional cooperation in particular sectors beneficial to itself, that is, lack of distributional leadership. Second, Brazil unfolds a strategy of supremacy preservation in South America by not building inclusive and democratic institutions. This behavior of preserving the existing regional power asymmetry indicates that Brazil is not ready to provide multilateral leadership, that is, allowing for secondary powers participation in regional decision-making. For Brazil, the provision of multilateral leadership would jeopardize its position at the top of the regional hierarchical order. As we assumed, under conditions of security abundance and relative power symmetry domestic contestation drivers significantly contribute to explain the variance in South American secondary powers soft balancing behavior. In the case of Argentina, the subordination of foreign policy to domestic politics as well as the FPEs misperception of its relative position in the regional structure are key to understand the Kirchners approach of competitive partnership. On the one hand, Argentinas defensive economic strategy towards Brazil (and the anti-neoliberal government discourse) must be seen as a response to the electoral base in the course of an office-seeking rationale. On the other hand, the historicallyrooted self image of equality in relation to Brazil is far from the political reality. In comparison, Chiles foreign policy orientation of autonomy through bilateral freetrading is driven predominantly by the economic elites of the country. This economic approach to foreign policy has not changed first with the different governments of the centerleft coalition La Concertacin (1990-2010) and the new center-right government of Sebastan Piera (2010-present). In general, Chiles foreign policy is characterized by a great deal of continuity: for instance, even though Santiagos current FPE plays its part in regional multilateralism on the base of obligation and not conviction, Chilean diplomats are able to deliver Chiles promises in an efficient and effective way to UNASUR and its CDS. The case of Colombia also demonstrates the impact of endogenous factors on regional policies. President Uribes collateral hard balancing approach against Brazil was a consequence of the instrumentalization of foreign policy driven by domestic priorities in the course of the Seguridad Democrtica security program. The bombing of the FARC camp in Ecuador and the garrisoning of US troops on Colombian military bases were thought ina context of domestic priorities and without considering the eventual consequences for BogotBrasilia relationship. The strategic foreign policy re-orientation of the Andean state is also based on endogenous factors: the democratic elections in 2010. Juan Manuel Santos pursues a new South American strategy on the base of more multilateralism and pragmatism than his predecessor. As Santos and Uribe are from the same political camp, in particular, the approximation to Venezuela also must be explained by different personal perceptions and 21

leadership styles in dealing with President Chvez. In addition, the harmonization of the relationships with both neighboring countries, Brazil and Venezuela, is promoted by economic interest groups representing the industrial and financial sector that saw their interest jeopardized by the exclusive security driven approach of former president Uribe. Venezuelas regional policies cannot be understood without looking to the domestic level. The referendum after the failed coup dtat marked a strategic turning point in foreign policy as President Chvez succeeded in increasing his relative autonomy from the domestic critics (opposition, parts of the media). Thereafter, the regional promotion of the socialist model became more offensive, for instance, by the further extension of ALBA. The renationalization of the oil company PDVSA instrumentalized for alliance building through petro-diplomacy - reflected the high extractive capacity of the state apparatus. The only remaining domestic veto player the national armed forces have benefited from patterns of political patronage. A key driver of engaging in the strategic armament alliance with Russia was to serve the acquisition interests of the Venezuelan military institutions, renamed to Bolivarian Armed Forces in 2007. Nevertheless, the politics of soft balancing in South America are not driven by domestic factors alone. A novel aspect of secondary powers contestation to Brazil is the exertion of dual leadership which may qualify as tacit alliance building. As it was shown, Argentina and Chile have shaped and influenced UNASUR security agenda by bringing the mutual experience of cooperation in security, that is, dual leadership. This dual leadership is also expressed in the sharing of the command of UNASURs General Secretariat by Venezuela and Colombia. However, each country also follows its own way of direct and indirect contestation such as the above-mentioned case of Chiles rush to FTAs, which also becomes an instrument to reduce potential political and economic dependencies in the region. Argentina responds to Brazils economic preponderance by seeking an (economic) alliance with Venezuela. Colombias recent adoption of an FTA policy beyond the US may also become a way to reduce economic and potential political influences from the regional and external powers in a similar way Chile does. Venezuelas ambition to compete with Brazil for regional leadership through an exclusive regional forum as ALBA also indicates soft balancing and power ambition for predominance. In addition, President Chvez need to break isolation in world affairs has brought him to establish extra-regional security and economic alliances with China, Iran, Russia and Belarus as a way to balance the US as much as Brazils regional preponderance. Finally, all secondary powers except Argentina are involved in regional alliances that exclude Brazil, that is, the Alliance of Pacific and ALBA. Moreover, the four secondary powers also contest Brazils view of a South American region by superposing a Latin American view in order to include Mexico as natural balancer. Therefore, Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela contest Brazils power position in South America by adopting different ways of soft-balancing behavior. This soft-balancing strategy is a response to Brazils behavior of selective regional neglect, and it reflects these secondary powers distance and skepticism about how Brazil might use its regional predominance.

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