Russia and Pakistan: The Difficult Path to Rapprochement Author(s): Rouben Azizian and Peter Vasilieff Reviewed work(s):

Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 36-55 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172570 . Accessed: 21/11/2011 01:20
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Russiaand Pakistan: The DifficultPathto Rapprochement

ROUBEN AZIZIANAND PETER VASILIEFF

rom the 1960s onwards,Soviet relations with Pakistanwere shapedby PakF istan's political and military links with China and the United States, and Moscow's relations with India. In the 1980s another factor, Afghanistan, was addedto this list.' Pakistanwas a staging groundfor guerrillaattacksin Afghanistan and a frontline state in Islamic and Westernefforts to end the Soviet occupation;it was also home to 3 million Afghan refugees. The paralleldevelopments of the Sino-Soviet schism, the Sino-Indianconflict, and Sino-Pakistani ententein the 1960s and 1970s ensured that relations between Pakistanand the U.S.S.R. In would be subordinated "theIndiafactor." the words of Rasul Rais, Pakistan to was told repeatedlythat "theroad to Moscow was via New Delhi."2 The end of the Cold War,the withdrawal Soviet troopsfromAfghanof istan, and democraticchanges in Russia and Pakistanin the late 1980s offered for opportunities the two countriesto overcomelong years of hosunprecedented and mistrustand establishmutuallybeneficial relations.In the last decade, tility Moscow andIslamabad havehadthreemajoropportunities reacha breakthrough to in bilateralrelations and regional cooperation.The first chance appearedwhen BorisYeltsin'spost-Sovietgovernment optedfor a majorrevisionof Moscow's foreign policy, includingits SouthAsian component.Second,in 1998-99 PrimeMinisterYevgenyPrimakovlaunchedan energeticcampaignto promotemultipolarity in international relationsto undermineU.S. predominance interventionism and in Asian countries,includingPakistan, were perceivedas potentialpartglobal affairs. ners in this struggle.Finally,the events of 11 SeptemberbroughtRussia and Pakistan togetheras key Americanpartners the war on terrorism. in 36

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as Despite dramaticchanges in the geopolitical environment well as in domesrelationsremainvery fragile and tic conditionsin both countries,Russo-Pakistani strained.A numberof issues both within and beyond the control of Moscow and Islamabadcontinue to hamperfull normalizationof theirrelations.

A False Start in the Early '90s The breakdownof the strategic partnershipbetween Islamabad and Washington after the Soviet withdrawalfrom Afghanistan increased the temptation for Pakistan to exploit other opportunities, while the warming of relations between Beijing and Moscow reduced the risks of antagonizing China by such a course. By the middle of 1991 Pakistan was already signaling interest in obtainingmilitaryequipmentfrom Moscow. In turn,Moscow initiated a de-ideologization of its foreign policy. Yesterday'senemies became today's potential friends. India's appeal temporarilyfaded, as the pro-WesternRussian government focused on relations with the United States and Europe.Geopolitical considerations were subdued, allowing Central Asia to drift quietly toward the Islamic South, and the slogan of equal partnershipwith Asian countries was proclaimed. In the context of India-Pakistan relations Moscow took some unprecedentedsteps, such as supportingPakistan'sproposal for a nuclear-free SouthAsia and holding a multilateralconference to discuss the issue. Vice President Alexander Rutskoi showed an understandingof Pakistan'sperspective on the Kashmirproblem, causing uproarboth in India and among the "realists"at home. When Foreign MinisterAndrei Kozyrev visited Islamabadin April 1993, he stated that both sides, not only Pakistan, should respect human rights in Kashmir.3 In April 1992 an internationalconference on relationsbetween Pakistanand the CIS was held in Moscow. The participantsexplored the possibility of opening a port for Russia on Pakistan's coast as a means of simplifying and accelerating the turnoverof goods between Pakistan and the CIS states. Other proposals includedjoint developmentof oil, gas, and metal deposits and Pakistan's participation in the conversion of defense factories in the CIS into civilian industries.At their meeting in New York in 1995 at the United Nations General Assembly, Yeltsin and Benazir Bhutto agreed to boost bilateral relations. However, hopes of smoothing over bilateral relations were dashed by the reappearanceof old obstacles, such as the resumption of close Russo-Indian ties and Pakistan's support of pro-Islamic and anti-Russian forces in Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as the emergence of new challenges, such as Chechnya and the nuclearization of Pakistan. The thaw in bilateral relations lasted no more than a year, and from 1993 tension between Moscow and Islamabad was on the rise again.

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New Delhi thatRusDuringhis visit to Indiain January1993,Yeltsinreassured sia's rapprochement with Pakistanwould not affect their friendly relations. He confirmedonce again that Moscow would continueto supportIndiain the Kashmir conflict. The Declarationon the Protectionof the Interestsof Multinational States, signed with India in July 1994, was anothermessage of Russia's support of Indiain its disputewith Pakistan.Indiareciprocated offeringits contribution by to containingthe growing influence of Islamic militancyin CentralAsia. Vladimir During his trip to India in March 1995, Russia's ultranationalist Zhirinovsky suggested that Pakistan and Bangladesh were "artificial"nations, and thatNew Delhi shouldfeel free to dissolve the boundariesthatdividedBritish Indiaalong Hindu-Muslimlines in 1947. Zhirinovsky'sgeopolitical outlookcontemplated a map of Asia reorderedto suit the two great powers of Russia and India; Russia would reintegrateCentralAsia, and India would absorbits South Asian neighbors.4 Amid worsening economic conditions, Moscow decided to boost its arms exports, and New Delhi rapidly regained the status of one of Russia's major weapons buyers.In 1990-96 Indiapurchased$3.5 billion in weapons from RusIndia'spurchaseof Ilyushin-78 aircraft, the sia. Accordingto AnupamSrivastava, andthe MIG-29, and its developmentof night-fightingandelectronic SU-30 MK, warfarecapabilities,give it a decisive qualitativeand quantitative edge over Pakistan in conventional warfare."India thanked Russia for its strong supportof India's action against Pakistanin Kashmir'sNorthernAreas in May-July 1999, and the Russian media emphasizedthe role of Russian weapons in "India'ssuccessful militarycampaignagainst Pakistan'sintervention."6 The chairmanof the foreign affairs committee of Pakistan'snational assembly, Mian Abdul Waheed, expressed "grave concern" over the Russo-Indian defense ties, termingthem a serious threatto Asia in general and South Asia in India,he said, believes in establishinghegemony over an area stretchparticular. from the Red Sea to the Straits of Malacca and beyond: "India which is ing alreadya nuclearpower, will receive huge quantitiesof nuclearand conventional weapons, including aircraftcarrierand nuclear submarines,which would be equippedwith nuclearmissiles."7 With the transferof power in Russia fromYeltsin to VladimirPutin, a further warmingof relationswith Indiaensued.In June2000, duringthe visits to Moscow of India's foreign minister and defense minister,Russia and India describedthe using the same phrase expansion of their relations as a "strategicpartnership," to relationsbetween China and Russia.8 previously applied Russo-Indianrelationsare not free from contradictions, however.Suggestions by some Indian analysts that New Delhi needs to move away from strategic dependenceon Moscow are soundingalarmbells in Moscow. Some of those ana-

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lysts have been complainingthat India's overrelianceon Russian weapons systems has slowed the progressof India's self-reliance and is becoming a serious Therehas also been disquietin India'smilitarycircles regardstrategicdrawback. the quality of Russian weapons systems. ing Russia's growing ties with China are provingto be anotherirritantfor RussoIndian relations. Russia's new foreign policy doctrine issued on 10 July 2000 clearly distinguishes between China, with whom Russia has "concurrent issues," and India, which is referredto as a "traapproachesto key international ditional friend."9According to Sublash Kapila, Russia's military supplies to Chinahave enabledChinato overcome the qualitativeedge that Indiaenjoyed in conventionalweapons and have led to a significant accretionof Chinese offensive capabilities, including the prospect of China's intrusive naval presence in SouthAsian waters.'0 Russia had to assure India that its weapons sales to China would not hinder Russo-Indiansecurity relations. General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian told the Indianmedia that although Defense Ministry'sinternational department, Russia supplied weapons and military hardwareto other countries, including China, it was above all guided by the principles of doing no harm to existing Russo-Indianrelationsand maintainingstability in the region." CentralAsia and Taliban South Asia's importancefor Moscow's interestsis in many ways determined by its proximityto the southerntier of the CIS. Pakistanis a naturalconduitconnectingCentraland SouthAsia. Islamabadhas a threefoldinterestin CentralAsia: to expand its regional links with the newest membersof the Muslim community of nations, to secure tradelinks, and to provide landlockedCentralAsia with an outlet to the sea.12After the breakupof the U.S.S.R. Islamabadtook advantage of CentralAsia's geographicproximityand culturaland linguistic links to establish or expandfootholds there.HoweverPakistan'seconomic designs for Central Asia were hamperedby the continuing civil war in Afghanistan.The Taliban's radicaland expansionistagendabecame anotherobstacle to Islamabad'scooperation with the CentralAsian states and Russia. CentralAsian countries became concerned about Pakistan's supportof the Talibangovernmentin Afghanistan, into CentralAsia. Uzbekwhich was seen as spreadingIslamic fundamentalism istan's foreign ministry publicly accused Pakistan's Islamic parties of arming Islamic militantsin CentralAsia. As for Russia, it hadbeen advancingpartnerships with Indiaand Chinaagainst the rise of Islamic unity in CentralAsia and regardedPakistanas the main troublemakerin the area.In a joint statementissued at the end of Putin'svisit to India in October2000 Moscow and New Delhi pledged to set up a working group on Afghanistan,notingtheir"seriousconcern"aboutthe situationin thatcountryand

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in The condemning"terrorism the CentralAsian states."'13 ShanghaiCooperation which includes Russia, China,Kazakhstan, Organization, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan,has been focusing its efforts on the growing Islamic militancy. In May 2000 Karl Inderfurth, U.S. assistant secretaryof state for South the Asian affairs,arrivedin Moscow to announcethe "commonapproach" the two of countriesto the Talibanand terrorism.In the joint statementsigned on 26 May by Inderfurthand Russian Deputy Foreign Minister A. Losyukov, both sides "expressedconcern"aboutthe "growinginfluence of extremistgroupingsin Pakistan"andcalled on Islamabad"totake efficient measuresto preventthose groups from interacting with internationalterrorist networks."A joint U.S.-Russian working group on Afghanistanand terrorismwas established,with Undersecretaryof StateT. Pickeringandthe formerdirectorof Russia'sFederalSecurityService (FSB), now ForeignSecretaryV. Trubnikov, cochairmen.The first session as of the group was held on 1-2 August 2000 in Washington.Renewed condemnation of terrorismemanatingfromAfghanistanfollowed, and the two sides reiterated theirdetermination cooperatein counteringit. Islamabadwas irritated to and frustrated the "unitedRussian-American by front." Moscow believed thatPakistanhad the strongestand most effective influence on Islamic militancy (labeled in Moscow as an "Islamic terroristnetworks") looming on the southernbordersof Russia. It noted the presenceof a large number of extremist organizationsin Pakistan,which provided assistance to "their brothers"in "any place where Muslims are endangered." One of the objectives pursuedby Moscow was to convince Islamabadto moderatethe Talibanand subdue radical Islamic forces in Pakistanitself. Islamabadrecognized the damage caused by the Talibanto its relationswith Russia and the states of CentralAsia. One of the main purposes of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) chief LieutenantGeneralMahmud'svisit to Russia in September2000 was to addressMoscow's worriesaboutPakistan'srelationshipwith the Taliban.In Islamabadat the end of discussed the September2000, Russian presidentialaide Sergei Yastrzhembsky situationwith the Pakistanigovernmentand expressedMoscow's hope that Pakistan will act as a "stabilizinginfluence."l4 Moscow was encouragedby Islamabad'sstatementsthat it favored a broadbased coalition governmentin Afghanistan,realizing that that was the only feasible way to restore lasting peace in that country.On completion of his visit to Islamabadin April 1999 the Russianparliament's(lower chamber)speaker,Gennady Seleznyov, acknowledgedthat "the deadlock in Afghanistancreates lots of It problemsfor the Pakistanis."'15did not go unnoticedin Moscow thatIslamabad was becoming irritatedby the independentbehaviorof the Taliban,which preof sented the problem of the "talibanization" Pakistan, with frenzied mullahs challenging the federalgovernmentand prophesyinga purifiedand rigid version of Islam. The threatof internalterrorismwas rising in Pakistanitself, with bomb blasts and assassinationsbecoming regularevents. The governmentwas tryingto

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counterthat threatbut remainedapprehensiveof the powerful "religiouslobby" As (clericalpolitical partiesandorganizations). Yastrzhembski it afterhis visit put to Islamabad,"the cat [Taliban]seems to be out of the bag but Islamabadis still holding it by its tail."'6 These realities prompted some in Russia to suggest a change in Russia's Afghanistanpolicy by giving up one-sided supportof the NorthernAlliance and establishing direct contacts with the Taliban.Andrei Nikolaev, chairmanof the State Duma's Defense Committee,called on the Russian governmentto embark on talks with the Taliban"forthe sake of security and stability in CentralAsia." Duma deputy speaker Vladimir Lukin likewise suggested that Russia would have to open official or unofficial talks with the Talibansooner or later.'7It is believed that Yastrzhembskyrequested that Pakistani authorities facilitate the establishment of such contacts and convey to the Taliban Moscow's concern about its activities.'8 Islamabadagreed to talk to the Talibanbut warned that its influence was limited. To convince Moscow of its genuine readiness to fight terrorism, Pakistan proposed to host an antiterrorismmeeting of the internal affairs ministers of Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.At the same time, Islamabadrenewed its interest in Russian mediation in Kashmir.As the Nation wrote in its editorial: of and [I]nthematters helpon Afghanistan Pakistan helpby Russiato Pakistan by on Kashmir, theassumption Pakistan someinfluence Afghanistan on that has in and has Russia someinfluence India, willingness helpmadeavailable either on the to by is But is country goodin principle. whether anything goingto comeoutof it, would in GiventhatAfghans fiercelyindependent Indiahas so far remain doubt. are and remained inflexible Kashmir, on whatever influence is supposed have each to totally is obviously circumscribed the valueRussiaattaches IndiaandPakistan to to by Afghanistan.19

Chechnya Adds to the Tension While Moscow was looking at ways of startinga dialogue with the Taliban with Pakistan'shelp, Islamabadwas trying to distance itself from its own radicals in connection with Chechnya.Pakistanapologized for receiving a Chechen official delegation in 1997 and promisedthat no such visits would be allowed in future without Russia's consent. PakistaniPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif called the visits of Chechen emissaries to Pakistan"disgracefuland outrageous." a As result, Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov was refused entry to Pakistan in 1998. Following bombings in Moscow and other Russian towns in September 1999, the Pakistani foreign ministry stated that "the Governmentof Pakistan stronglycondemns the recent wave of terrorismand bomb blasts in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia,"and that "thesecowardlyacts of senseless violence constitute a serious threat to peace and stability not only in Russia, but also in the

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region."Reacting to the concern of the Russian authoritiesregardingthe "activities of PakistaniIslamistgroups seeking to join or aide the Chechenseparatists," to Islamabad'sambassador Moscow, MansurAlam, assuredRussia thathis counwould be "takingmeasures"to preventsuch developments.20 try However in the middle of November 1999, Islamabad'stone on Chechnya became much more critical. On 15 November the Pakistani Foreign Ministry declared that "Pakistanwas deeply disturbedby the humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the massive and relentless militarycampaign in Chechnya."The statement noted that while "Pakistancondemns terrorism,"it was concerned about the "entirepopulation of Chechnya having been subjectedto indiscriminate use of force."'21 fierce, government-supported A anti-Russiancampaignwas launched in the Pakistani media. Newspapers vividly depicted Russian "savLocal analysts claimed that "Russia refused to learn agery" and "genocide."22 and from history"23 "enteredthe war with a no win situation."24 to Radicalreligiouspartieswere calling on Islamabad takea firmanti-Moscow stand.Jammat-i-Islami amirQazi HussainAhmadmet with the foreign min(JI) ister,Abdul Sattar,on 20 December 1999 and urgedhim to supportthe Chechen Muslims in theirstruggleagainstthe Russians.On 23 February 2000 the JI leader demanded from the government (as well as from the governments of "all 56 nationscomprisingthe Muslim Ummah")to recognize "independent Chechnya" and extend to it moral and diplomatic support.25 "Russianaggression"was conof AllamaNaqvi, andImran demnedby the chairman Tehreek-e-Jaffriya Pakistan, who stressedthe need to declareRusKhan,leaderof the PakistanTehrik-e-Insaf, sia a "terrorist state."Some extremistorganizationsfighting in Kashmir(particularlyAl-Badr)expoundedtheir readinessto assist Chechenmilitants"withmen and weapons." InitiallyMoscow reactedwith some restraint, tryingnot to exacerbatetensions But between the two countries.26 in January2000 its position became harsherand morerigid, a reactionto the Chechenofficials' visits to AfghanistanandPakistan. Initially the Talibanavoided a direct clash with Russia, dismissing any suggestion that it was helping Chechnya.It even stated that it "wouldnever permitthe establishmenton its territoryof a Chechen Governmentin exile."27Therefore Mullah Omar'sdecree of 16 January2000 recognizing the "Republicof Ichkeria" (independentChechnya) came as a big surpriseto Moscow. The next day Russianforeign ministerIgor Ivanov declared"thisrecognitionto be legally null and void" and threatenedthe Talibanwith additionalUN sanctions.28 Moscow was most irritatedwith the absence of a reaction from Islamabad.In its press release of 27 January 2000 the Russiangovernmenttermedsuch silence as a proof that Islamabad,contraryto its assertions,continuedto be in control of "terrorist Russian authoritieswere conand extremistorganizationsstationedin Pakistan." fident that Islamabadwas behind the Taliban'saction and dismissed as a fiction suggestions that Kandaharwas operatingon its own. According to Moscow, it

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was clear that the Chechen terroristswere interactingwith militant religious extremistsbased predominantly Pakistan. in In December 1999, following Russianrequests,the PakistaniForeignMinistry instructedits missions abroadnot to issue any documentsor visas to representatives of the Chechenrebels, butin practicethatinstruction was violated. The same monthZelimkhanYandarbiev, adviser to the Chechen president,arrivedin Pakistan. The main objectives of his trip were to collect money for the struggle against the Russians and to seek stronger support from the Muslim Ummah he against Moscow. According to Yandarbiev, had secret meetings with General Pervez Musharraf ForeignMinister Sattar,both of whom denied such meetand visit to Pakistanas "anunfriendings took place.29 Moscow treatedYandarbiev's and a "hostile act" that would "inevitablycomplicate"bilateralrelaly gesture" was accused of being "totallyresponsiblefor tions. The Pakistaniadministration the organizationof the visit and for a wide anti-Russiancampaign in the country"with "certaincircles in Islamabadassociating themselves with the Chechen bandits.''30 Islamabadlabeled Moscow's accusationsa "grossinterference" its domesin tic affairs.Russian demandsto expel Yandarbiev from the countryand to explain "how this person could have received a visa to enter Pakistan"were ignored. Islamabadpromisedonly to "clarifythe situation"and "takemeasures," Yanbut darbievcontinuedto stay in the countryand left only in the end of February. On 28 February2000 the PakistaniForeign Ministry for the first time openly criticized Russia's behavior in Chechnya. Moscow was urged "to halt the military campaignwhich has resultedin the destructionof many cities and towns including Grozny and the death of thousandsof innocent civilians."31 The "trilemma"of Afghanistan, Chechnya, and terrorismthus became the in main irritant Pakistani-Russian relations.In spring2000 the rise of Islamic militancy in CentralAsia provokedMoscow's unprecedentedthreatto launch preemptive air strikesagainst"terrorist trainingcamps"in Afghanistan.Those statements were aimed both against the Taliban and Islamabad,the latter seen in Moscow as an "accomplice"of the terrorists.However,the threatproved to be First, it was a pure bluff, since Moscow lacked the military counterproductive. capability to launch the air strikes.This was well understoodboth in Kandahar and Islamabad,where there did not seem to be any alarm. Second, Moscow's threatwas condemnednot only by the Taliban,but by its archrival,the Northern Alliance.32Pakistan'sForeign Ministry also reacted angrily,accusing Russia of destabilizing the region. The Nation warned that Russia harboredaggressive intentionstowardsthe region. It claimed that "by such air strikes Russia intends to divertworld attentionfrom its own ruthlessmilitaryoffensive in Chechnyaand the atrocitiescommittedby its troops againstthe civilian population."33 Russia's standon the Kashmirissue was visibly influencedby Pakistan'srole in Afghanistanand CentralAsia, as well as its statementson the Chechen con-

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flict. Moscow confirmedits refusal to facilitate any negotiationsbetween Islamabadand New Delhi, althoughin 1999 some hints were made by certainRussian politicians that Moscow might consider low-key mediation between India and Pakistan.State Duma SpeakerSeleznyov, for example, did not rule out a mediaDuring his India trip in tory role for Moscow if "both sides ask us for help."34 October2000, Putincalled for a "toughapproachagainstforces thatorganizeterrorist attacks from the Philippines to Kosovo, including Kashmir,Afghanistan, He India'sproposalto createajoint andRussia'sNorthCaucasus." also supported front to combat terrorism.35 New Domestic and Geopolitical Realities The factors we have outlined considerablyimpeded the overdue process of normalizationof bilateralRusso-Pakistanirelations.At the same time Moscow and Islamabadstill had the appetiteto forge more constructiverelations,particularly because of both countries'preoccupationwith economic recoveryas well as concern about unilateralisttendencies in U.S. policy. In many ways 1999 looked like a promisingyear for bilateralrelations.After numerousconsultations and preparations,the official visit of Nawaz Sharif to Moscow took place on 19-21 April 1999. The Pakistaniprime ministermet with President Yeltsin and held talks with Prime Minister Primakov. Both sides relations"and assertdeclaredtheirreadinessto develop "mutuallyadvantageous and ed their commitmentto the cause of disarmament, nuclearnonproliferation, to settlementof conflicts, and their determination "combattransnationpeaceful The leaders al organized crime, illicit drug traffickingand arms smuggling."36 trade and economic cooperationand agreementon signed an intergovernmental commission on economic, trade, decided to establish a joint intergovernmental scientific, and technological cooperation. At the end of April 1999 a high-rankingdelegationof the RussianParliament (Gosduma)led by Seleznyov came to Islamabad.The Russiandelegationpraised Pakistan'sapproachto majorinternational issues, includingAfghanistan,stressRussia's positive ing that Islamabad"seems to be moving in the right direction." tone toward Pakistan stemmed to a great degree from its fierce opposition to underNATO'smilitaryaction in Kosovo. Moscow was pleased with Islamabad's of its stand, and particularlyabout its consent to include into the joint standing communiqu6signed during Sharif's visit a provision upholdingthe currentbalance in international relations,respect of international law, and a multipolarand nonconfrontational world order.37 The military takeover in Pakistan on 12 October 1999 requiredfresh decisions and prompt steps from Russia. Innovative thinking could have opened new avenues in bilateral relations. The military administrationin Pakistanhad come under strong criticism from the West for its "unconstitutionaland anti-

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democratic" action. It was looking for external support and understanding. Musharraf emphasized "the importance of Russia" and advocated boosting bilateral cooperation.38On 19 October 1999 Pakistan's Ambassador Alam assuredthe Russian governmentof "Islamabad'scontinued interest in developing relations with Russia on the basis of principles of mutualrespect, non-interference in each other's internalaffairs and mutually advantageousco-operation in various fields."39 Some Russian commentatorsdrew parallels between Russia and Pakistan's rejection of a Western model of democracy and their introduction of "enlightenedauthoritarianism." Russian military, which at that The time was showing signs of discontent over the government'sappreciationof its successful campaign in Chechnya and was demanding adequate moral and materialcompensation, seemed to be sympatheticto the militaryadministration in Islamabad. However, Moscow was quite slow to exploit those opportunities.Initially it concurredwith the statementsby Westerngovernments.Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman on 14 October 1999 reiteratedMoscow's "serious concern" aboutthe situationin Pakistanand called on the militaryadministration avoid to excesses and reinstate constitutional and democratic norms.40On 30 October 1999, after consultationsin Washingtonbetween Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and Assistant Secretaryof State for South Asian Affairs KarlInderfurth, Russia and the United States issued a joint statementcalling on Pakistaniauthoritiesto restore democraticrule.41However the tone in Moscow startedto change. On 3 November 1999 the RussianForeignMinistrywas already statingthat the situationin Pakistanwas rathercalm and a transitionalmilitarycivilian administration being formed.It was also pleasedthat"anexperienced was andcapablediplomat,Abdul Sattar,who was earlierAmbassador Moscow, was to Minister."42 appointedForeign Putin's formal accession to power in Russia in March 2000 aroused mixed feelings in Islamabad.On the one hand, Pakistaniofficials hoped that Russia's young and dynamicpresidentwould be able to reshapeRussia's policies in South Asia, makingthem more pragmaticand independentand less pro-Indian.On the other hand, Putin's rigid approachtowardChechnya and his energetic efforts to enhance Russia's influence in CentralAsia were met in Islamabadwith extreme caution and mistrust.Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, a leading Pakistani analyst and memberof the foreign policy group createdby Musharraf, wrote: Thedirection Putin's of our has of in policiestowards region beena source concern his to This Islamabad, notably inclination be influenced NewDelhi's by perceptions. includes strong his stance the in whichalso against Taliban government Afghanistan, on with we in better However, needto persist seeking impinges relations Pakistan. relations with Russiaand to show sensitivity its concerns Central for in Asia in As tackles formidable our should Afghanistan. Putin challenges, diplomacy persuade himto adopt morebalanced a stance towards Pakistan theMuslim and world.43

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On 19 June 2000 Foreign Minister Sattar reiterated Islamabad's wish to improverelationswith Russia.Thatsame monthPutindenouncedthe term"rogue states"and denied thatthere was any nuclearthreatfrom them;the agreementon commission was at last signed in Moscow. Musharraf sent the intergovernmental two messages to Putin duringthe Kursktragedy-the first expressing hope that Russia would succeed in saving the crew, and the second offeringcondolences at the loss of theirlives. In August 2000, ISI directorMahmudvisited Moscow. He met with the chief of the RussianFederalSecurityService (externalintelligence), and Nikolai Patrushev, Defense MinisterIgor Sergeev.The leadingPakistaniEnglish-language newspaper,the News evaluatedthis trip as the "acknowledgment by the Pakistanigovernmentof the need to arrestthe downwardspiral in which Russian-Pakistani relationshave now been caught for a long time."44 the Millennium Summit in New York an "unscheduled"meeting During took place, and the two leaderstalkedfor ten minbetween Putin and Musharraf utes. According to Pakistan's Foreign Ministry the meeting was "cordial and warm,""no discordant"issues were raised, and both sides expressed desire "to In strengthenfriendly relations."45 October 2000 Putin's envoy Yastrzhembsky handed over to Musharrafthe Russian President's message, which contained assurancesto PakistanthatMoscow's militarycooperationwith India would not destabilize South Asia. Islamabadresponded positively to Moscow's proposal to sign a bilateralextraditiontreaty and promised not to issue visas to Chechen representatives. Putin'svisit to Indiain October2000 was perceivedin Pakistanin a quiteoptiunder mistic way. It was suggested that with the Russia-Pakistan rapprochement Russia's cooperationwith Indiacould be useful for Islamabadby leading to way, the relaxationof regional tension and facilitating a solution in Kashmir.Islamabad appreciatedPutin's call for a bilateral dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabadat a time when IndianPrimeMinisterAtal BihariVajpayeerefusedall It contact with the militaryadministration. was also noted that the Russianpresident did not make any hostile statementstowardPakistan. Economic Constraints between Russia and Pakistanhas been The process of political normalization modest progressin economic cooperation.AnnualRussian-Pakaccompaniedby istani tradeamountsto aboutU.S.$100 million, comparedwith aroundU.S.$300 million in the Soviet period. The biggest enterprisebuilt with Soviet helpKarachiSteel Mill-although still functioning,desperatelyneeds renovationand financing, which Moscow is unableto provideon a full scale. There are hopes in Moscow that Pakistanwill resume purchasesof Russian machineryand technology. A numberof Russian companieshave been successful in selling diesel generators, water purificationinstallations, and electronic equipment.Russia-Pak-

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istan cooperationin the areaof space explorationis developing,too. Russian and Pakistani space agencies have concluded an agreement envisaging the use of Russian boosters for Pakistan'sscientific satellites. Pakistan'sfirms have been encouragedto establishbusiness links with Russia's regions, includingTatarstan, An Altai, and Khabarovsk.46 orthopediccenterrunby Russiandoctorshas opened in Navabshakh(Sind), with more to follow. It seems that the most promisingareasfor tradeare Russian arms supplies as well as energy cooperation.Pakistanhas been interestedfor decades in buying Russian military hardwareand technology. Moscow has been understandably lukewarmto the idea, unwilling to endanger its relations with India. Modest attemptsat change were made at the beginning of the 1990s, when then foreign ministerKozyrevtook notice of the "enthusiasts" militarytradewith Pakistan, of who pointedto France'ssuccess in selling weaponsto both New Delhi and Islamabad.Russia decidedto offer to Islamabad"dualpurpose" items (uniforms,boots, binoculars,and so on). However,the deal did not proceed,andin 1994 PrimeMinister Viktor Chernomyrdinmade a categorical statement in New Delhi that Moscow did not supplyarmsto Pakistanandhadno intentionto do so in the future. Until the end of the 1990s Russia refused even to discuss with Pakistanany aspect of military cooperation, and only with the "thaw"of 1997-99 was the questionwas raisedagain.When Deputy ForeignMinisterKarasinarrivedin Pakistan he announcedthatRussia did not mind discussing possible opportunitiesin the sphere of military and technical cooperation.Moscow noted, however, that the issue was very sensitive and any practicalsteps had to be undertaken only "if the generalbilateralatmospherewas conducive."'47 a meeting in early 2000 the At SecurityCouncil of Russia optedfor militaryand technicalcooperationwith Pakistan based exclusively on "dualpurpose"items and without damaging RussoIndianrelations.Even this cautiousmove caused serious objectionfrom Russia's powerful pro-Indianlobby, which in May 2000 pressuredRussianVice Premier Ilya Klebanovinto rejectingthe possibility of any kind of militaryrelationswith Pakistanbecause "Indiais our strategicpartner."48 The fragility of Russo-Pakistanieconomic ties and their dependence on the Indianfactorwere vividly demonstrated the helicopterdeal, in which the Ulanin Ude factory signed a contract to supply Pakistanwith twelve MI-17 choppers worth U.S.$500 million. According to some sources, New Delhi became concerned about the helicopters, which it regardedas dual purposeequipment,and went out of its way to spoil the deal. Allegedly the Indianswere even lobbying for the Ulan-Ude factoryto be strippedof its license to sell abroad.The pressure was applied after the contract was already signed, and it naturallycaused an uproarin Pakistan. Islamabadthreatenedlegal action: The final decision was takenat the highest level in Moscow, anddespite the Indianpressurethe deal was approved.The first chopperswere suppliedto Pakistanin summer2002. Some other positive changes in the economic sphere have taken place. The

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Pakistanitelecommunication satelliteAl-Badrwas launchedby the Russianspace vehicle Zenith-2on 10 December 2001 from Baikonur.Also, Russian engineers completely overhauleda giant blast furnace at the KarachiSteel Mill at a cost $U.S.4.8 million. About 100 specialists from Russia workedon the project.Two Gazprom (Russia's gas monopoly) delegations visited Islamabad(in May and October2002) to conduct a feasibility study of the gas pipeline projectconnecting Iran,Pakistan,and India. Both Russia and Pakistanregardthemselves as natural"gates"to the untapped gas and oil resourcesof CentralAsia, and the two have been unableto reconcile their geopolitical rivalryover the constructionof pipelines from the region. Russia has been advocating the "continentalapproach," with an overland route to Pakistanis keen to become a bridge between the landlockedregion and Europe; its developing seaports.At the same time Moscow and Islamabadhave been trying to find a mutuallyacceptableformulathroughthe explorationof the Iran-Pakistan-Indiagas pipeline. According to Russian media reports,Gazpromreached an understanding Islamabadabout its participationin the constructionof an in underwater pipeline between Iranand Pakistan.49 However it is premature to gas influentialforces in Pakistan'sgovernmentwho preferthe trans-Afghan disregard pipeline lobbied by American companies. Russia's enthusiasm for the transAfghan pipeline is questionable,given oppositionfrom the U.S. oil industry. September11 The events of 11 Septemberhad a powerful impact on Russia-Pakistan relations and have boosted the process of normalization.Pakistanianalysts stressed re-evaluatingthe importanceof Russia as "one of the most urgent considerations."50Moscow and Islamabadfound themselves in the same camp, with the same allies, pursuinga common objective--the struggleagainstterrorism.On 18 March 2002 Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko of expressedMoscow's appreciation Pakistan's"activerole"in antiterrorist operwas made duringthe visit to Moscow ations in Afghanistan5' The announcement of Anisuddin Ahmad of Pakistan'sForeign Ministry;Ahmad expressed confidence that the talks opened "a new page" in bilateralrelationsleading to "fruitful cooperation."52 May 2002 Anatoly Safonov, Russia's deputy foreign minIn ister overseeing antiterroristcooperation, accompanied by officials from a number of law enforcement agencies, conducted talks in Islamabad.The trip focused on "issues relating to struggle against terrorism,extremism and illicit drug trafficking."53 The first meeting of the Russian-Pakistani workinggroupon counteringinternational terrorismand other new challenges to internationalsecurity took place in Moscow on 2-3 December2002. Russia's delegationwas headedby Safonov, and Pakistan'sby Ahmad. The two sides exchanged views on a broad range of

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international regionalissues in the antiterrorist and campaign.In particular, they examined the course of the antiterrorist in Afghanistanand the situaoperation tion in that country.Moscow and Islamabadexpressed full supportfor the consistent implementationof the Bonn agreementsand stressedthat eradicatingterrorist activities in Afghanistan completely is an important contribution to strengtheningregional security and stability. The sides emphasized the central coordinatingrole of the United Nations, particularlythe Security Council, in international efforts to combat terrorism.In this context they reaffirmedthe key coordinatingrole of the UN in postconflict settlement and the socioeconomic reconstruction Afghanistan.The sides reaffirmedthe importanceof antiterrorof ist cooperationat the regional level. They agreedto hold the next workinggroup meeting in Islamabadin 2003.54 Both Moscow and Islamabadfear instabilityin Afghanistan,weakness of the centralgovernment,and warlords'excesses. They seem to be genuinely interested in ensuringpeace and reconciliationin Afghanistan,so importantfor containing Islamic radicalismin both Pakistanand Russia, as well for the realizationof energy cooperation across Afghan territory.At the same time differences on elements in Afghanistanremainstrong.Although Pakistansupportspro-Pashtun the Karzaigovernment,particularly faction headedby the Pashtuministerof the finance, Moscow is still more comfortablewith NorthernAlliance leaders. Pakistan is also seriously concerned about the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.M. Fahim and other NorthernAlliance members are suspected of turning over Pakistani prisoners of war to New Delhi. India's consulates in Afghanistanare regardedas nests of spies conducting subversivework against Islamabad.Russia, on the contrary,is quite welcoming of the Indianpresence in Afghanistan. The commitmentto condemnterrorismin "all its forms"has obliged Pakistan actionsby the Chechenmilitants.Whena groupof Chechens to denounceterrorist capturedmore than700 hostages in a Moscow theaterin October2002 Islamabad officially condemned the terroristact. For the first time Islamabaddid not supportan EU-sponsoredresolutioncondemningviolationof humanrightsin Chechnya at the annual session of the UN Human Rights Commission in April 2002. The Pakistanidelegationabstained,as did the majorityof Islamiccountries.However this drew criticism from Pakistanimedia and society. Manyjournalistsand political scientists were dissatisfied with the voting. According to Afzaal Mahmood, "Itwas a shocking decision enablingRussia to escape censurefor its dirty war in Chechnya."55 Moscow has been tryingto encourageand facilitateIslamabad'sown struggle with Islamic radicalism.In the beginningof 2002, following terrorist acts in New Delhi, Moscow received Musharraf's special envoys Najmuddin Sheikh and AsfandiarWali Khan, with the personalmessages of Pakistan'sleader for Putin. Even thoughthey did not get to meet with PresidentPutin personally,the envoys

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were receivedby ForeignMinisterIgor Ivanov.In press statementsfollowing the talks Moscow called for a dialogue between Islamabad and New Delhi and endorsedMusharraf'scounterterrorism measures,which New Delhi had considIn ered insufficientand decorative.56 Almaty in June 2002, at the first summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), PresidentPutin attemptedto forge a dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad,which was welcomed by the Pakistanis,who comparedit to the Soviet mediationin Tashkent 1966. Those efforts,however,were thwarted India, in by which was reluctantto accept third-party mediation. Moscow was cautious to avoid overreacting the strongshowing by Islamic to forces in the Pakistanparliamentary elections in October2002. In its official stateto ment, the RussianForeignMinistrypreferred perceive the election results as a welcome confirmationof "the course declaredby the administration Pervez of Musharraftowardrestoringand strengtheningthe constitutionalnorms of Pak57 the istani statehoodand democratizing sociopoliticallife of the country." It stated also that "theRussian Federationis interestedin developing good-neighborly and mutuallybeneficialrelationswith Pakistanand supportsthe effortsof its leadership to preservethe countryas a united, stable and predictablestate." on Moscow and Islamabad have starteda processof regularconsultations longConsultermstrategictrendsand issues. The firstmeetingof the Russian-Pakistani 2003. The tativeGroupfor StrategicStabilitytook place in Moscow on 16 January of Russiandelegation,composedof representatives the Defense Ministry,Foreign was IntelligenceService,andthe ForeignMinistry, headedby DeputyForeignMinister Georgy Mamedov,and the Pakistanidelegationby Deputy ForeignMinister coordinaTariqOsmanHyder.A commoninterestwas expressedin strengthening tion between the two countriesat international forums,above all in the UN, espeof cially in the interestsof a peacefulsettlement regionalcrisesandconflicts,in particular,in the MiddleEast, in the PersianGulf, and on the KoreanPeninsula.58 Summit Putin-Musharraf PresidentMusharraf'sofficial visit to Russia on 4-6 February2003 became culminationof the two countries'effortsto revive andconsolidatetheir the natural relations. Musharraf'svisit was the first by a Pakistanihead of state since the 1970s, when ZulfiqarAli Bhutto visited Moscow. Foreign Ministry spokesman Yakovenkowas quoted by Interfaxas saying on the eve of the visit that "Russia intends to carry on work jointly with the Pakistaniside to eliminate remaining with no detridisagreementsand seek to furtherdevelop ties in all fields, naturally He ment to our relationswith our traditionalpartners."59 also noted that Pakistan occupied an importantplace and played an independentrole in Russia's foreign policy prioritiesdetermined Pakistan'sweight in the region adjacentto the CIS by southernborders,and in the Islamic world as a whole.60

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PresidentsPutinand Musharraf in the Kremlinon 5 February. met Putinnoted that relations between the two countries have developed rapidly since Pakistan coalition following the 11 September2001 antiterrorism joined the international terroristattacksin the United States.61 One of the features of the summit was Islamabad's interest in purchasing Russian weapons. Some analysts suggest that Islamabadis increasingly interested in Russia's arms supplies, as China and Ukraine, two of its currentmain weapons suppliers, are unable to match the quality of Russian arms. Moscow made no commitments but did not rule that out either. Russia emphasized the importance of building more trust, which in reality means obtaining India's acquiescence to weapons deals between Moscow and Islamabad. A joint statementwas signed on completion of the visit, which elaborateson the results of the talks and futuredirections of Russo-Pakistanirelations. In the statement,Russia and Pakistan stressed the importanceof furtherintensifying mutuallybeneficial cooperation,especially throughclose economic interaction and augmentationof their bilateral trade. Energy, metallurgy,telecommunications, and several infrastructure development projects were identified as promising areas of cooperation. To remove impediments to cooperation between Russian and Pakistani organizations it was agreed to work toward prompt settlement of the issues of Pakistani debt restructuring,settlement of financial obligations, promotion of interbankrelations, and establishment of most-favored-nation status in tradeand investments.It was also decided that the Russian-Pakistanintergovernmentalcommission on trade, economic, and scientific and technological cooperation would startits activities with the expected expansion of trade and economic interactionbetween the two countries. The successful launch of Pakistan'sBadr-2 satellite with the aid of a Russian launch vehicle was cited as an example of fruitful cooperation in using space technologies for peaceful purposes. The two sides reaffirmedtheir desire to further develop cooperation in this sphere. They expressed satisfaction on the signing in November 2002 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between Gazprom and Pakistan's Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Resources.62

Discussions on Afghanistanwere of particularimportancein examining the international regional scene. Russia and Pakistanexpressedthe hope that the and transitional administrationof Afghanistan would succeed in restoring peace, to reviving the economic and social infrastructure promotegrowth and prosperiof stressed their common interestin the reintegration Afghanistaninto ty. They the international as a united,sovereign,stable,predictable,andpeacecommunity ful stateliving in harmonywith its neighbors.The centralcoordinating role of the United Nations and its Security Council in this process was emphasized.Russia strongly supportedthe adoptionin Kabul on 22 December 2002 of the Declaration on Good-NeighborlyRelations by representatives the states adjacentto of

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concern includingPakistan.Russia andPakistan expressedparticular Afghanistan, on the increasedproductionof drugsin Afghanistanand theirillegal trafficto the adjacentcountriesand other regions. They underlinedthe need to formulateand implementpreventivemeasures,as well as to providefunds for crop substitution underthe auspices of the UN and its specialized agencies, especially the United NationsDrug ControlProgram(UNDCP). Pakistanwelcomed Russia'svoluntary contribution U.S.$500,000 to the UNDCP andexpressedits readinessto expand of bilateraland multilateralinteractionin this area. The two sides reaffirmedthat securityand stabilityin CentralAsia are vital for both Russia and Pakistan.They the theirdemosupported efforts of the CentralAsian statesto furtherstrengthen Putin also acceptedMusharraf's invitationto visit Pakistan. cratic foundations.63 The date for the visit will be finalized throughdiplomaticchannels. Conclusion The rapidlychanging global and regional environment,as well as substantial and potential strategic shifts in South and East Asia, is influencing relations between Moscow and Islamabad.The warmingof relationsbetween the United States and India, close cooperationbetween Russia and China, and confidencebuilding between India and China, requireRussia and Pakistanto review their stagnantpolitical and economic relations and to adjustthem to new realities. It should be noted that some regional states-China in particular-are showing a willingness and taking practicalsteps to facilitate Russian-Pakistani rapprochement. This developmentis reinforcedby recentchanges of leadershipin Moscow and Islamabad,where pragmaticand popular strongmenPutin and Musharraf could demonstrateinnovativethinking and offer nonconventionalapproachesto the developmentof bilateralrelations.The events of 11 Septemberhave generated new reasons for betterunderstanding closer relations. and However,the relationshipwill continue to be fragile and sensitive to internal and external pressures. Russia's concern about unilateralisttendencies in U.S. policies has affected its vision of Islamabad.On the one hand, Moscow is objecin Moscow andIslamtively seeking partners counteringthe "U.S. hegemonism." abad, for example, maintainsimilar views on how the Iraq situation should be statementof 5 February2003 Moscow handled. In the joint Russian-Pakistani and Islamabad"resolutelyopposed"unilateraluse or threatuse of force in violation of the UN Charterand interferencein the internalaffairs of other states. They stressed that a comprehensivesettlement of the Iraq situation should be achieved throughpolitical and diplomatic efforts, in strict compliance with the law recognized norms of international and underthe auspices of the UN. On the otherhand,Moscow is temptedto use Pakistanas a whippingboy in its "axisof evil"formula,Ruscriticismof U.S. policies. In its attackson Washington's sia repeatedlynamedPakistanand SaudiArabiaas a more likely axis of terrorist

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evil. Duringhis trip to Chinaand Indiain December2002, PresidentPutin questionedIslamabad's The criticismshouldbe priabilityto controlits nucleararsenal. marilyviewed in the context of Moscow's reactionto the U.S. strategyto combat Islamabad was quick to tell Russia to mind its own weapons of mass destruction. business.Russia'sown system of nuclearsafety has not alwaysbeen effective, and since the demise of the Soviet Union about200 incidentsof nuclearmaterialsmuggling have come to light, while Pakistanhad "nothingof this kind."64 Islamabad was equallyunhappywith Putin'sremarks made duringhis tripto Indiain December 2002 on the situationin Kashmir,when the Russianpresidentreferredto the existenceof terrorist on and infrastructure Pakistan's territory Islamabad's blessing of cross-border infiltrationof mujahideeninto Kashmir.Pakistan'sForeignMinistry accusedRussia'sleadershipof being "takenin by Indianpropaganda."65 Russia-Pakistan relationsalso sufferfroma lack of strongdomesticlobbies supa rapprochement. Russia the pro-Indian In porting lobby remainsas powerful as even if it contradicts Putin'seconomic pragmatism intentionto maintain and ever, a balancedregionalprofile.The recentcommentsof Russia'sambassador India, to AlexanderKadakin,an old Indiahand,show a lack of intentionto move away from a traditional relations.Accordingto Kadakin,Russia approachon India-Pakistan and Indiashare"a common vision of the issue of preservingpeace and stabilityin South Asia," while Pakistan should "completely and unconditionallyfulfill its terrorismand destroy the terroristinfrastructure obligationsto end cross-border within its territory."66 Skepticsin Pakistancontinueto believe that "Russiaseems convincedthatthereare fundamental differencesbetweenit and Pakistanandrelations with the latterare unlikelyto enhanceits (Russia's)security."67 Russia's strong pro-Indianleaning was quite apparenteven on the eve of Musharraf'svisit to Moscow in February2003, when Putin conferredwith the Indian prime minister regardingthe Pakistani leader's visit. During his stay in Moscow, Musharraf repeatedlycalled on the Russian governmentto remove the "Indiafactor"from its relations with Pakistan.Moscow seems to have decided thatthe most efficient way to advanceits relationsandeconomic cooperationwith Pakistanwithout antagonizingIndia is throughfacilitatingthe normalizationof Indo-Pakistani relations. In his statementto the press on PresidentMusharaff's visit, Putin not only called for the resumptionof dialogue between Pakistanand Indiabut also acknowledged"thepossibility of a searchfor new opportunitiesto normalize relations and for new platformsfor exchange of views in a bilateral and a multilateralformat."'"68 achieve this, Moscow requires a shift in New To Delhi's thinking.The currentmood in India, however,does not seem to be very conduciveto such a change. Duringhis talks in Moscow two weeks afterMusharraf's visit to Russia, India's External Minister Yashwant Sinha demonstrably avoidedany appreciation the Russo-Pakistani of On rapprochement. the contrary, all of his public references to Pakistanwere very negative and focused only on Pakistan'salleged sponsorshipof terrorism.

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Russia's relationswith Pakistanin the foreseeable futureare likely to remain shaky and controversial.Despite energetic and efforts by PresidentsMusharraf has and Putinto improverelations,the process of rapprochement not yet become irreversible.There are too many factors, domestic as well as external,that continue to hauntMoscow and Islamabadand obstructthe completion of this longoverdueprocess.
NOTES 1. Romesh Thakurand Carlyle Thayer,eds., ReshapingRegional Relations:Asia-Pacific and the FormerSoviet Union (Westview, 1993), 174. Asian Survey31 (April 2. Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistanin the Regional and Global Power Structure," 1991), 390. 3. Moscow News 32, (12-18 August 1994). 4. Far Eastern EconomicReview, 23 March 1995. 5. Anupam Srivastava,"Indo-Russian MilitaryTechnicalCooperation:Implicationsfor Southern Asia," World Affairs (Spring 1999), internetcopy. 6. Ibid. 13 7. News Network International, January1999. <www.nni-news.com>. 8. Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor), "Moscow Abandons China for India," 30 June 2000. <http://www.stratfor.com>. 9. Informationand Press Departmentof the Ministryof ForeignAffairsof the RussianFederation, 20 "ForeignPolicy of the Russian Federation," July 2000. Time to Move Away,"SouthAsia Analy10. SubhashKapila,"India-Russia StrategicCooperation: sis Group 144 (2000). <www.saag.org>. 11. Hindu, 29 June 2000. 12. Thakurand Thayer,eds., ReshapingRegional Relations, 173. 13. Interfax,5 October2000. 14. Interfax,28 September2000. 15. Itar/TassNews Agency, 30 April 1999. 16. Moscow News, 3 October2000. 17. Interfax,28 September2000. 18. Kommersant Daily, 2 October2000. 19. The Nation, 28 September2000. 20. Informationobtainedfrom sources in the Russian foreign ministry. 21. The Nation, 16 November 1999. 22. The FrontierPost, 23 October 1999; 14 January2000. 23. The News, 12 November 1999. 24. The FrontierPost (WeekendPost), 23 October 1999. 25. The FrontierPost, 24 February2000. "I am sure that this war will lead to furtherdivision of leader. said the Jamaat-i-Islami Russia as happenedwhen it resortedto aggression in Afghanistan," 26. In December 1999 Russia even wrote off $57 million of Pakistan'sdebt, reducingit from $175 million to $118 million. 27. According to the Russian Embassy sources in Islamabad,this was statedby one of the Taliban diplomatsto an embassy official. 28. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 20 January2000. 29. The News, 21 February2000. 30. Russian foreign ministrystatements,4 and 9 February2000. 31. The News, 29 February2000. 32. Kandahar threatenedto retaliateif Moscow attackedits territory. 33. The Nation, 6 June 2000. 34. Itar/Tass,28 April 1999. 35. Interfax,4 October2000.

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36. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 22 April 1999. 37. DiplomaticheskiiVestnik (1999), 46. 5 38. Informationobtainedfrom Pakistan'sforeign policy community. 39. The News, 20 October 1999. 40. Itar/Tass, 14 October 1999. 41. Itar/Tass,30 October 1999. 42. Itar/Tass,3 November 1999. 43. The Dawn, 7 July 2000. 44. The News, 7 September2000. 45. Informationobtainedfrom Pakistan'sforeign policy community. 46. Itar/Tass,Dipcourier,7 (April 1999). 47. Informationobtainedfrom sources in the Russian foreign ministry. 48. Itar/Tass,23 May 2000. 49. <www.gazetasng.ru>,14 November2002. 50. FarukhKhan Pitafi, "Re-evaluating The Foreign Policy Parameters," Nation Review 2 December 2001, 2. 51. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 18 March2002. 52. The News, 19 March 2002. 53. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 29 May 2002. 54. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 6 December 2002. 55. Afzaal Mahmood,"TheForgottenChechens,"Dawn, 28 April 2002, 2. 56. The News, 21 January2001. 57. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 15 November2002. 58. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 17 January2003. 59. Interfax,4 February2003 60. RIA Novosti Interviewwith Russianforeign ministryOfficial SpokesmanAlxeanderYakovenko on Russo-Pakistani Relations, RussianMinistryof ForeignAffairs,press release of 3 February2003. 61. Itar-Tass,5 February2003. 62. Russia-Pakistan Joint Statement,5 February2003. 63. Ibid. 64. The News, 2 December,2002 65. The News, 6 December,2002 66. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, press release of 3 December2002. 67. Ayesha Siddiq-Agha,"Russia'sOffensive,"The Friday Times,20-26 December 2002, 5. 68. Statementto the press by Russian PresidentVladimir Putin following Russian-Pakistani talks, the Kremlin,Moscow, 5 February2003. Russian Ministryof ForeignAffairs, 7 February2003.