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volume8,no.6 july2008
1. Introduction Since the publication of G. E. Moores Principia Ethica it has become commonplace for philosophers to distinguish between questions in metaethics and those in normative ethics.1 A sympathetic characterizationofthecenturyofself-consciouslymetaethicalresearchthatfollowedwouldemphasizetheextraordinarydevelopmentbothinour understandingofthecentralmetaethicalproblemsandinthesophisticationofthetheorieselaboratedtomeetthem.However,someare notsosympathetic.Inthispaper,Iexamineonesourceofdistrustin metaethicalresearch:itsapparenttensionwiththenotionthatmoralityisautonomous. Tobegin,IbrieflysketchhowIamthinkingofmetaethics,ofthe autonomyofmorality,andofthetensionthatcanappeartoexistbetweenthem.Onetraditionalconceptionofmetaethicstakesittoconcern only the analysis of moral language.2 However, contemporary philosophers typically use the term more expansively.3 Here, I use the term to pick out elements common to these contemporary discussions.Thiscommoncoreencompassesmoralontologyandmoral psychologyaswellasmoralsemantics.Bycontrast,normativeethics (sometimesalsocalledsubstantiveethics)concernsthestructureand contentofthecorrectmoralevaluationofagents,statesofaffairs,and actions. Normative ethical theories typically offer accounts of moral valueandmoralreasons,ofvirtuouscharactertraits,ofrightness,and oftherelationshipsbetweenthese.
1. The word metaethics came into regular philosophical usage much later. Moores discussion emphasized the distinction between two kinds of questionsaboutmorality,whichinturnencouragedthedevelopmentofindependentresearchprogramsinwhatwouldlaterbecalledmetaethicsandnormativeethics. 2. ObviousworriesaboutthisconceptionarisefromQuineanconcernsabout analyticity.SuchworriesledZimmermantoargueforanontologicalturnin metaethics(1980,653). 3. VariousbroaderconceptionsofmetaethicsaresuggestedinDarwall,Gibbard, andRailton(1997,7),Miller(2003,2),andSinnott-Armstrong(2006,6).
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AdomainofinquiryisautonomousinthesenseIintendifresultsin otherdomainsdonotcontributetothejustificationoftheoriesinthat domain.4Theautonomy of moralityisthustheclaimthat: autonomy: Non-moral theses are irrelevant to the justificationofnormativeethicaltheories. Iwillsometimesrefertothisastheautonomy thesis.5Theideathatnormativeethicaltheorizingisautonomousmayappearintuitivelyattractive.Thus,itmayseemonreflectionthattheonlylegitimategrounds for abandoning a basic moral principle will involve tension with othermoralcommitments.6Further,theautonomythesispromisesto explain the plausibility of Humes dictum that one cannot derive an oughtfromanis:ifmoralityisautonomous,itwillalwaysbeanerror toderiveamoralconclusionfromstrictlynon-moralpremises.
4. My use of the term autonomous here is inspired by Harmans distinction between naturalism and autonomous ethics in moral theory (2000, 79). However, I use it to make a slightly different distinction. Harman suggests thatanyapproachtoethicsnotdominatedbyaconcerntoplacevaluesin the natural world discovered by science is autonomous (2000, 79). On my gloss, science is only one domain with respect to which morality might be autonomous.Forexample,Ialsotakedivinecommandtheorytobeincompatiblewiththeautonomyofmorality,asitwouldrenderevidenceofGods willprobativefornormativeethicaltheory. 5. Therestrictionofthescopeoftheautonomythesistotheories,understood as consisting of fundamental principles, is crucial to the plausibility of the autonomythesis,becauseitisimplausiblethatevidencefromotherdomains isnotrelevanttothejustificationofderivativeprinciplesorofparticularmoraljudgments.Forexample,considerthemoralprincipleItiswrongtofire loadedgunsatinnocentpeopleandtheparticularmoralclaimLeesfiring hisgunatJohniswrong.Anaturalwaytojustifysuchclaimswouldappeal inparttomorebasicnormativeprinciples,andinparttothetypicalorpredictablecausalconsequencesoffiringloadedgunsatpeople.Theautonomy thesis should thus be understood as compatible with a role for non-moral thesesinexplainingwhyanormativemoralprincipleappliestoaparticular case,orsupportsaderivativeprinciple. 6. CompareHarmansdescriptionoftheautonomousethicistsreasoningabout acase:[W]eshouldcontinuetobelieve[thatacriminalhassufficientreason not to harm his or her victims] unless such continued belief conflicts with generalizationsorothertheoreticalprinciplesinternaltoethicsthatwefind attractivebecausetheydoabetterjobatmakingsenseofmostofthethings weoriginallybelieve(2000,87).
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mightsuggestthatthereissomeerrorimplicitinmetaethicaltheorizing.Somephilosophershaverecentlyoffereddiagnosesofthisalleged error. Thus Christine Korsgaard suggests that the dialectic between metaethical realists and antirealists rests on a mistaken conception ofthefunctionofmoralconcepts.Sheclaimsthatwhenourthinking aboutthesubjectiscorrected,wewillnotbeinclinedtothinkthat there is a difference between doing meta-ethics and doing normativeorpracticalethics(2003,121n.44).RonaldDworkinalsofinds errorinmuchapparentlymetaethicaltheorizing,arguingthatitrests onmistakingsubstantiveethicalclaimstobemetaphysicalorphilosophical(1996,100). This paper examines three ways to address the apparent tension betweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Insection2,Iexaminetheattempttoaddressthistensionbyrejectingtheclaimthat metaethics can be relevant to the justification of normative ethical theories. I evaluate this strategy in part by examining the reasoning thatleadsDworkintothediagnosismentionedabove.Insection3,I examinevariantsontheproposaltovindicatetheautonomyofmoralitybyappealingtoadeepcontrastbetweenpracticalandtheoretical reason. Korsgaards diagnosis is best understood as following from such a commitment. Finally, in section 4 I suggest what I take to be themostpromisingwaytoresolvetheapparenttensionbetweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality. 2. NeutralityandQuietism Onewaytoresolvetheapparenttensionbetweenmetaethicsandthe autonomy of morality would be to endorse what I call the neutrality thesis: neutrality: Nometaethicaltheoryisrelevanttothejustificationofnormativeethicaltheories. Theneutralitythesisresolvesthetensionbetweenmetaethicsandthe autonomy of morality by denying the first of the apparent features of metaethical theses mentioned above: their possible normative
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orerrortheory(1996,92ff.).However,partofDworkinscentralargumentative strategy seemingly involves deploying the neutrality constraint.HereIfocusonthisuseoftheconstraintanditsimplications formetaethics.7Dworkinappliesatwo-stagetesttoanarrayofcentral metaethical proposals in his paper. First, test whether the seemingly metaethical claim can be interpreted as having normative import. Second,testwhetheritcanbeinterpretedashavingdistinctivelymetaethical import (Dworkin 1996, 97).8 If the result of the first test is positiveandtheresultofthesecondisnegative,thentheseemingly metaethicalclaimwillbeshowntobeadisguisednormativeclaim.I considerthesetestsinturn,andexplainhowtheneutralityconstraint isindispensabletoDworkinsapplicationofthesecondtest. Dworkins first test examines whether we can interpret pieces of seemingly metaethical discourse as expressing normative ethical claims. He suggests that people typically use seemingly metaethical adverbs, such as subjectively and really, to clarify their normative ethicalopinions.Hethusnotesthatsomeonemightusethewordsubjectivetosignalthathisclaimthatsoccerwasbadmeantthathehad areasontoavoidsoccerthatisnotsharedbythosewhohaveataste forthegame(1996,98). Inordertoproperlyperformthefirsttest,weneedtodistinguish agent-relativityfromevaluator-relativity.Agent-relativityisafeatureof valueorreasonsinanormativetheory.Veryroughly,thinkofastate ofaffairsashavingagent-relativevalueifnotallagentshaveareason tobringitabout.9Dworkinsglossonhisexamplepointsoutthatthe
7. Myconcernhereistoteaseouttheimplicationsofacceptingtheneutrality constraint.IthusfocusonelementsofDworkinsdiscussionthatappearto pursue this strategy. Dworkins argument in (1996) is complex and not alwaysclear,andIdonotclaimtoofferafullyadequatereadingofitinthis b riefdiscussion. 8. Hereandbelow,thisglossmustbereadextensionally.WhileDworkinsleadingtargetsinthispaperareclearlymetaethicaltheories,hegenerallyprefers to talk of collapsing the distinction between first-order evaluative claims andphilosophicalclaimsaboutmorality(e. g.1996,100). 9. ThelocusclassicusforthisdistinctionisNagelsdiscussionofsubjectiveand
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shown that a variety of vocabulary seemingly used to express metaethicalclaimscanbeusedtoexpressnormativeclaims.However,he hasntshownthistobetrueforsuchvocabularyasitisusedincontexts where we would intuitively take it to have metaethical import. ThissuggeststhatDworkinssecondtestisthecrucialone.Thegoal ofDworkinssecondtestistoshowthat,forarangeofputativelymetaethical vocabulary, no distinctively metaethical interpretation is in factavailable.Werethistestsuccessful,itmightbepossibletoaccommodatetheapparentcounterexamplestothefirsttestjustdiscussed asinstancesofdiversenormative-levelusesofsubjectivelyandreally. Dworkinsleadingstrategyinapplyinghissecondtesttoapparently metaethicalclaimsistoarguethatthoseclaimsentailnormativecommitments (1996, 99112, cf. especially 100). The example of analytic utilitarianism, mentioned above, suggests that at least some apparentlymetaethicaltheorieshavesuchimplications.However,Dworkin repeatedly moves from the premise that an apparently metaethical theoryhasnormativeimplicationstotheconclusionthatitistherefore actuallyanormativetheory.Thisinferenceseemstopresupposethat nogenuinelymetaethicaltheorymayhavenormativeimplications.In otherwords,itpresupposestheneutralityconstraintoncountingasa metaethicaltheory. ConsiderDworkinstreatmentofanexampleofanapparentlymetaethical thesis with obvious normative implications: the thesis that the property of rightness is identical to the property of maximizing happiness.Callthisthesismetaphysical utilitarianism.Thisappearsto beametaethicalthesisaboutmoralontologythatentailsanormative theory. This normative theory, simple act utilitarianism, states that an actisrightjustincaseandbecause,amongtheoptionsavailableto theagentoftheaction,itwouldbringaboutthemosthappinessinits consequences.However,Dworkinrejectstheclaimthatmetaphysical utilitarianismandsimpleactutilitarianismaredistincttheories: Theidentityclaimaboutrightnessistheupshot,inaparallelway,ofasubstantivemoralthesisutilitarianismand
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be revealed to be normative ethical claims because they fail his second test. Dworkin thus appears to defend a kind of quietism about metaethics.11 Isuggestedatthebeginningofthissectionthatacceptingtheneutralityconstraintseeminglypromisestoresolvetheapparenttension betweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Thediscussionof Dworkin shows that accepting the constraint would also entail that manyphilosopherswhotakethemselvestobeaddressingdistinctively metaethicalquestionsaredeeplyconfused.Thisisbecause,according totheviewsketched,manyofthesephilosophersareactuallyaddressingfirst-ordernormativequestionsratherthanmetaethicalquestions. WhileDworkinsargumentclarifiestheconsequencesofapplying theneutralityconstraint,hisownexampleshelptoillustratewhythere isgoodreasontorejectit.ConsideragainDworkinsidentificationof metaphysicalandnormativeutilitarianism,anditsimplicationthatthe apparentlymetaphysicalcharacteroftheformertheoryisillusory.The problemwiththisidentificationcanbetracedtooneofthecentralmotivationsfordistinguishingmetaethicalfromnormativetheories.This isthatitispossibletoagreeaboutthecorrectnormativetheorywhile disagreeingaboutthecorrectmetaethicaltheory.12 Thedeepmotivationforthisclaimcanbebroughtoutespecially clearlybyconsideringthedisagreementbetweentwotheistswhoagree about which acts are right. Suppose, for example, that they both acceptsimpleactutilitarianism.Supposefurtherthattheyalsoagreethat, necessarily,anactisrightjustincaseGodapprovesofit.Thesetheists canstilldisagreeaboutthetruthofthedivinecommandmetaethics:
11. Inareplytocritics,Dworkinrejectsthislabel,saying:Idontliketheterm quietist for the reason I mentioned: it suggests that some more robust sense of objectivity makes sense but is wrong (1997). I intend my use of quietism topick outexactly thisdenialoftheintelligibilityofdistinctively m etaethicalcontent. 12. This point has been suggested across the history of discussion of metaethicsandnormativeethics.SeeforexampleFrankena(1951,45),Zimmerman (1980, 659), and Kagan (1998, 5), who mentions but does not explicitly endorsethispossibility.
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betweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Recallthatthisapparent tension is generated in part by the pressure to reconcile our accountsofmoralsemanticsandontologywithourgeneralsemantic andontologicaltheories.Nomatterwhatwecallthem,thesemantic andmetaphysicalviewsidentifiedherefacesuchpressure. Dworkinsuseoftheneutralityconstraintonmetaethicaltheories seemingly promised to undercut the apparent tension between metaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality,byshowingthattheapparent metaphysicalcharacterofmanymetaethicaltheoriesisanillusion.If sound,thisuseoftheneutralityconstraintwouldvindicatethecurrent ofdistrustinmetaethicalresearchmentionedatthebeginningofthis paper.Thisisbecausethisconclusionsuggeststhatmostmetaethicists arebadlyconfused,eitheraddressingpseudo-questionsordoingnormativeethicswithoutrealizingit. Inthissection,Ihavearguedagainsttheattempttousetheneutralityconstrainttoresolvetheapparenttensionbetweenmetaethicsand theautonomyofmorality.Ifirstarguedthatametaethicaltheorythat entailssomenormativethesisshouldnotbeconflatedwiththatnormativethesis(oranyother).Thisisbecausemetaethicaltheorieswith normative implications also have further distinctive content. I then arguedthattheappealtotheneutralityconstrainteitherisobjectionableinvirtueofobscuringthiscontent,orfailstoresolvetheapparent tensionbetweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Thissuggeststhatweshouldlookelsewheretoresolvetheapparenttension betweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Inthenextsection, Iexamineaclusterofstrategiesthatseektovindicatetheautonomyof moralitybyappealingtoacontrastbetweenpracticalandtheoretical reason. 3. ThePracticalityofMorality IsuggestedintheIntroductionthattheautonomyofmoralitycanappearintuitivelyattractive.However,evenifoneissympathetictothe autonomythesis,itwouldbemoresatisfyingtohaveaplausibleexplanationofwhymoralitymustbeautonomousthantotakeitasabrute
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thatmattersformoralityisverythin.Hethenusesthismetaphysical premisetoarguefortheparityofmoralsignificancebetweenintrapersonalintertemporalconsiderations,andinterpersonalconsiderations (1984,199350). Korsgaard claims that Parfits argument misses its mark, because the conception of personal identity relevant to deliberation is one required by practical reason, not one identifiable by metaphysical inquiry (1989b, 112). She argues further that we all have sufficient practicalreasonstoviewourselvesasunifiedpersons.Thesereasons are twofold. First, there is the raw necessity of eliminating conflict. Korsgaardclaimsthatunlessonespartsbothonessubpersonalprocessesandonestemporalslicescoordinateinsuchawayastoallow one to act as a unified agent, anything resembling action would becomeimpossible,andpracticalparalysiswouldresult.Second,thedeliberativestandpointrequiresthatadeliberatorseehimselfassomethingbeyondamerecollectionofdesiresorothersubpersonalstates. Thus,Korsgaardobservesthatonecannotdeliberateaboutwhattodo merelybywaitingtoseewhichofonesdesireswinsout.Onecanonly choosefromapracticallyunifiedstandpoint(1989b,1101). Suppose that Korsgaard is correct, and that the conception of identity that we have practical reason to accept is distinct from the conceptionthatParfitdefends.Thiswouldsuggestatestcaseforthe threewaysofdevelopingthedeliberativerequirementthatIwillnow sketch:Parfitsmetaphysicalargumentssuggestonethingaboutpersonalidentityandnormativeethics,whilepracticalreasoningpresupposesanother.Iftheaccountstobesketchedaretovindicatetheautonomyofmorality,theymustexplainwhyParfitsargumentsarenot relevanttonormativetheorizing. Consider first the idea that one can have divergent practical and theoreticalreasonsconcerningtheacceptanceofagivenproposition. Thisdistinctionsuggestsapossiblecontrastbetweenthemetaethics forwhichwepossessthebestevidence,andthemetaethicsthatwe havedecisivepracticalreasonstoaccept.Howonedevelopsthisproposaldependsuponwhetheronetakespracticalreasoningtorequire agentstobelieveinametaethics,ormerelytohavesomespeciesof
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norms. This account can grant that Parfits arguments might give us goodepistemic reasonstobelieveinathinaccountofpersonalidentity andintheallegedconsequentialistnormativeimplicationsofthisaccount.However,thepracticalnecessityofacceptingastrongeraccount ofidentitywouldneverthelessrequireustobelievethatthestronger account is correct. This proposal would not vindicate the autonomy thesis:forallitsays,Parfitsargumentsepistemicallyjustifynormative ethicaltheses.However,itdoesentailsomethingrecognizablysimilar totheautonomythesis:thatitisnevercorrecttoformamoralbeliefon theoreticalgrounds,wherepracticalconsiderationscountagainstit. This proposal has interesting implications for normative and metaethical thinking. On the one hand, it is clearly consistent with the existence of true metaethical and normative theories, each discoverablebytheoreticalreasoning.Ontheotherhand,itraisestheperhaps disturbing possibility that we might be practically required to disbelieve the true moral theory, or to refrain from theoretical inquiry i ntomorality.16 The two attitudes proposal differs from the two norms account invirtueofthepsychologicalstatethatitclaimstoberationalizedby practicalnorms.Accordingtothisaccount,whileepistemicnormsrationalize belief, practical norms rationalize a distinct state of practicalcommitmenttowardsaproposition.Thisideaagaincriesoutfor moredetailedtreatment.However,thissketchsufficestosuggestthe implicationsrelevanttothispaper.Likethetwonormsaccount,the twoattitudesaccountcangrantthetheoreticalforceofargumentslike Parfits.However,itclaimsthat,invirtueofconflictingwithpractically necessarysuppositions,theseargumentstellusnothingaboutthedistinctivepracticalcommitmentsthatweoughttoaccept. This proposal is thus consistent with the existence of true moral
16. The two norms account will also seem objectionable to some in virtue of presupposingacontroversialviewconcerningtheethicsofbelief:thatthere could be practical requirements not just on the actions that lead to beliefs butonbeliefsthemselves.Thishasseemedwrongtosome,invirtueofthe thoughtthatbelievingisinvoluntary,andthatpracticalrequirementscanapplyonlytovoluntaryaction.
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The last way to develop the contrast between practical and theoreticalreasonthatIconsideravoidsthisobjection.Thisaccountclaims that practical and theoretical reasoning involve distinctive types of content.Ithuscallthisthetwocontentsaccount.Suchanaccount suggests that nonderivative theoretical reasoning about morality wouldinvolveacategorymistake.Thisinturnensuresthattherecannotbeatruemoraltheorydiscoverablebypurelytheoreticalinquiry. The two contents account thus promises to more fully vindicate the autonomyofmoralitythantheotherproposalssketched.Becauseof this, I consider the two contents account to be the most interesting developmentofthecontrastbetweenpracticalandtheoreticalreason thatgroundsthedeliberativerequirement.Consequently,Iconsiderit ingreaterdetailthantheothers. Themostpressingquestionfacingsuchanaccountiswhatexactly the notion of distinctively practical content could come to. Here, I pursue a helpful suggestion offered by Korsgaard.18 She claims that practical concepts do not function to describe reality (2003, 105). Rather,theessentialfunctionofapracticalconceptistorefertothe solutiontoa[practical]problem(2003,115).19 Korsgaard offers as an example of this model a reading of Kants derivationoftheUniversalLawformulationofthecategoricalimperative.Thepracticalprobleminthiscaseisthatthewillmustadopta principleforitselfonpainofheteronomy.Further,thatprinciplemust bealaw,because(accordingtoKant)forthewilltobeacause,itmust conform to a law. Korsgaard claims that the Universal Law formulationofthecategoricalimperative(Actonlyonamaximthatcanbe
18. It is not entirely clear whether Korsgaard consistently endorses what I call thetwocontentsaccount.Forexample,NelkinsuggestsreadingKorsgaard asadoptingthetwostandpointsproposalmentionedinthepreviousnote (2000,5678).However,NelkinexpressesuncertaintyregardingKorsgaards ultimate view. I intend here to apply Korsgaards account of practical content, while making no claim to have identified her considered opinion on t hesetopics. 19. Compare also her claim that morality requires a different conceptual organization of the world from that required by the theoretical perspective ( 1989a,37).
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twocontentsaccountwerecorrect,thedefenderofthepracticalityof morality would be in a position to say something much stronger in responsetoParfitthanwaspermittedbytheotheraccounts.Onthis accountshecouldconvictParfitofmakingafundamentalmistake,becausemoralconceptsandconceptsofpersonalidentityarepractical, andhencenotappropriateobjectsforthesortoftheoreticalreasoning thatheattemptstoapplytounderstandthem. Therelationbetweenthetwocontentsaccountandmetaethicsis lessobviousthanthatofthepreviousaccounts.Onemightthinkthat the proposed distinctively practical character of moral concepts was incompatiblewithmetaethics.Theworryisthat,sincemetaethicsisa theoreticalproject,themetaethicistinevitablymakesacategorymistakeonthisaccount,likeachessplayerdecidingthatmakinghimself acoffeewouldbethebestmove.However,thisdiagnosiswouldfail toappreciatethescopeandflexibilityoftheoreticalreasoning.Iwill arguethatKorsgaardsaccountofpracticalconceptscanratherbebest understoodasentailingaspeciesofresponse-dependentmetaethical realism. Tobegin,considerthefollowingschemaforaresponse-dependent accountofapropertyF: rd XsareFjustincaseandbecauseYsrespondR-ly toXsinconditionsC.22
This is a schema for response-dependent accounts of a property, because it is some response of Ys that metaphysically determines that anXisF.Forexample,acruderesponse-dependenttheoryofhumor wouldclaimthatforajoketohavethepropertyofbeingfunnyjustis forpeopletotendtorespondwithamusementuponhearingthejoke inordinaryconditions. ItispossibletousetheKorsgaardianaccountofpracticalconcepts
22. Johnstonintroducedthetermresponse-dependenceinhis(1989).Isetaside avarietyofimportantissueshere.Mostimportantly,Iassumetheontological respectabilityofresponse-dependentproperties.Readersattractedtoamore austereontologyshouldtranslatewhatfollowsintoadefenseoftheclaimthat thetwocontentsaccountpermits(derivative)theoreticalmoralconcepts.
This account grants that moral concepts can be nonderivatively graspedonlyfromwithinthepracticalperspective. According to practical response-dependence, facts derived from the practical perspective are necessary and sufficient to fix whether an option is permissible for an agent. However, practical responsedependenceisnonethelessanidentifiablymetaethicalview.23Thisis becauseitoffersanon-triviallyexplanatoryaccountofthepropertyof permissibility,graspablebyapurelytheoreticalreasoner. If this reading of the metaethical upshot of the Korsgaardian accountofpracticalconceptsiscorrect,thenthetwocontentsproposal, likethetwoattitudesproposal,turnsouttoentailmetaethicalcommitments.24However,unlikethetwoattitudesproposal,thisaccountdoes
23. Practicalresponse-dependenceisalsoobviouslyincomplete;afullresponsedependentmetaphysicsofmoralitywouldhavetoaccountforthepluralityof normativeproperties.However,thiscomplicationisorthogonaltowhether themostpromisingversionofthetwocontentsaccountentailsaresponsedependentmetaethics. 24. Tosaythatthetwocontentsaccountentailsaresponse-dependentmetaethics
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not permit conflict between the evaluations suggested by practical andtheoreticalreason.Thisisbecauseofthedeferentialnatureofthe theoreticalreasoningaboutmoralitypermittedbythisaccount. Inthissection,IhavedrawnonKorsgaardsdescriptionofthebasic tension between Parfits argument and the deliberative requirement, andIhaveusedsomeofherdiscussionofpracticalconceptstodevelopwhatItaketobethemostpromisingversionofthatrequirement. However,intheIntroductionInotedthatKorsgaardtookacorrectunderstandingofmoralitytoentailthaterrorsinfectstandardmetaethicalpractice.Whateverthedetailsofherview,Korsgaardisclearlysympathetic to some variation of the view that there is a deep contrast betweentheoreticalandpracticalreason.Havingexploredthreeways ofdevelopingthiscontrast,Inowexaminetwostrikingimplications thatshetakesittohaveformetaethics. First,Korsgaardclaimsthatmetaethicaltheorizingisdistortedby thepresuppositionthatallauthenticallycognitiveconceptsfunction todescribetheworld(2003,105).Inotherwords,mostmetaethicists do not see the possibility of the sort of practical concepts that she suggests. This is arguably true. However, the practical response-dependenceaccountthatIsuggestshowsthatthisaccountofpractical concepts is not incompatible with metaethics, but rather suggests a determinate metaethics. So understood, Korsgaards first criticism is bestunderstoodasa(quitedeep)methodologicalcriticismwithinmetaethics,ratherthanadiagnosisofanerrorinevitablyimplicitinthe domainasawhole. Second,Korsgaardsuggeststhatonceheraccountisunderstood, [W]ewillnotbeinclinedtothinkthatthereisadifference between doing meta-ethics and doing normative or practicalethics.Theattempttospecifythemeaningand
isnottoimplythatindevelopingtheformer,onewouldnecessarilybeaimingtosolvemetaethicalproblems.Rather,thepointissimplythatsuchan accountpermitsakindofderivativetheoreticalreasoningaboutmorality.By engaginginsuchreasoning,Iclaim,onecoulddeterminethatthepractical response-dependencemetaethicsfollowsfromthetwocontentsaccount.
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ofmorality,andsuggestaresolutiontotheapparenttensionbetween theautonomythesisandmetaethics.Iarguedthateachofthethree accountsthatIexamineddoesvindicatesomeapproximationofthe autonomy of morality. However, I suggested that only the two contentsaccountisfullysatisfyinginthisrespect:theotheraccountswere consistentwiththetruemoraltheorysbeingdiscoverablebytheoreticalreasoning.Ialsoarguedthateachofthesetheorieswascompatible with metaethical theorizing, and suggested that this discussion permittedaclarifyingresponsetoKorsgaardscriticismsofmetaethics. 4. Resolvingthetension IntheIntroduction,Iexplainedanapparenttensionbetweenmetaethics, as it is ordinarily conceived, and the notion that morality is autonomous.Insections2and3,Ihaveexaminedtworelativelyradical strategiesforvindicatingtheautonomyofmorality.Inthissection,I suggestadifferentstrategyforresolvingthistension.Recallthattwo of the accounts examined in section 3 involved or entailed particular metaethical theories. This suggests a general insight that can be appliedtoresolvetheapparenttensionbetweenmetaethicsandthe autonomyofmorality:ratherthanbeingnecessarilyinconsistentwith metaethicalresearch,theautonomyofmoralitycouldbevindicatedin partbyaparticularmetaethicaltheory. The fictionalist and practical response-dependence metaethics introduced in section 3 can be understood as instances of this phenomenon. Thus, the two attitudes and two contents proposals were introducedasmeansofvindicatingtheautonomythesis.However,I suggestedthattheseproposalseachinvolvedcommitmenttoviewsin metaethics.Somemetaethicswouldvindicatetheautonomyofmoralitymoredirectly.Ametaethicscouldvindicatetheautonomyofmoralitybycharacterizingthesemanticsorontologyofmoralityinsucha way asto secure the irrelevance ofnon-moral theses tothejustification of moral theories. Consider two examples of how a metaethics mightachievethis. First, consider the thesis that the moral facts are determined by
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If you believe that not-not-P then you ought to believethatP.29
DoubleNegationentailsthatwhenonebelievesthatnot-not-P,one shouldbelievethatP.However,otherwisereasonablebutveryunlucky inquirersmightacquiremisleadingevidencethatDoubleNegationis notacorrectruleofinference.Andthatmightleadthemastray,when theythinkaboutwhattoconcludegivennot-not-P.However,ifDouble Negationisacorrectrule,itjustsettleswhattheyshouldconclude;the justificationofDoubleNegationisitselfaseparatematter. Thiscontrastbetweenthecontentofaruleanditsjustificationalso holdsfortheautonomyofmorality.Recallthattheautonomyofmoralityisthethesisthatnon-moralpremisesareirrelevanttothejustificationofnormativeethicaltheories.Now,supposethatametaethicaltheoryMistrue,andthatMentailsthatnon-moralpremisesare irrelevanttothejustificationofnormativeethicaltheories.Thenthe truthofMjustsettlesthatmoralityisautonomous.Theobjectorbalks becausethejustificationofMinvolvesnon-moralpremises.Thiscan onlyappeartobeanobjectionifonetakestheautonomythesistoapplynotjusttothejustificationofnormativeethicaltheories,butalso toits ownjustification.However,suchself-applicationisnopartofthe contentoftheautonomythesis. Nor could a plausible autonomy thesis ensure that it is always reasonable to believe that morality is autonomous. Compare again DoubleNegation:itmightbeunreasonableforourimaginedunlucky inquirers to accept or apply Double Negation, given their misleadinghigher-orderevidence.However,thisdoesnotentailthatDouble Negationisnotacorrectepistemicnorm.Anautonomythesisthatattemptedtoprecludethepossibilityofsuchmisleadingevidencewould simplybeobviouslyfalse.Theobjectionthusfails,andwithittheprimary motivation for resisting the simple resolution of the apparent tension between metaethics and the autonomy of morality. Thus, it
29. Thissuppositionisimplausiblysimple.Atminimum,adoublenegationeliminationruleofinferencelikelyneedstoread:Ifyoubelievethatnot-not-p thenyououghteithertobelievethatporceasetobelievethatnot-not-p.
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metaethical theorizing typically involves a fundamental error. I also arguedthatsomeofthesestrategieswereindependentlyunattractive. In the final section, I suggested that the apparent tension between metaethicsandtheautonomyofmoralitycanbedissolved:farfrom puttingmetaethicsintoquestion,theautonomyofmoralitymaymost simply be secured by defending a metaethical theory that explains whynon-moralthesesareirrelevanttonormativeethicaltheorizing. While the approaches discussed in sections 2 and 3 at least initially suggestedadiminishedroleformetaethicaltheorizing,theresolution proposed here suggests that metaethical theorizing has an indispensibleroletoplayintheevaluationoftheautonomythesis.31
31. I am grateful to many people for helpful comments and discussion, especiallyMichaelSmith,TomKelly,GilHarman,PhilipPettit,NadeemHussain, SarahBuss,MarkSchroeder,BrendanRitchie,AmyShuster,JohnMaier,Nick Stang,RochelleEdinburg,RyanDavis,SamArnold,andSariKisilevsky.Iam especiallyindebtedtotwoanonymousreadersforPhilosophers Imprint,who each made many extremely useful suggestions. I would also like to thank PrincetonsUniversityCenterforHumanValuesforafellowshipthathelped tosupportmyworkonthispaper.
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CenturyMoralPhilosophy.Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century. APA Centennial Supp. to Journal of Philosophical Research (2003):99122. Miller,Alexander.Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.Cambridge: Polity,2003. Moore,G.E.Principia Ethica.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1903. Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,1970. Nelkin,Dana.TwoStandpointsandtheBeliefinFreedom.Journal of Philosophy97.10(2000):56476. Parfit,Derek.Reasons and Persons.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984. Sayre-McCord, Geoff. Different Kinds of Kind Terms. Philosophical Issues8(1997a):31323. Sayre-McCord, Geoff. Good on Twin Earth. Philosophical Issues 8 (1997b):26792. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. New York: Oxford UniversityPress,2006. Zimmerman, David. Meta-Ethics Naturalized. Canadian Journal of Philosophy10.4(December1980):63762.
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