01 Strategy BIS WS0304 Ds18 1FpS

Strategy
Betriebliche Informationssysteme
Strategie, Anwendungen, Integrationstechnologien, Management
Vorlesung im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Wirtschaftsinformatik (AWI) Hauptstudium WS03/04

Prof. Dr. Detlef Schoder Betriebliche Informationssysteme WS 03/04
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An Information Systems (IS) Framework
Prof. Dr. Detlef Schoder
Betriebliche Informationssysteme WS 03/04
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IS Information systems perform three vital roles in business firms. They support:
Business processes and operations Business decision making Strategic competitive advantage
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Information Systems (IS) 1. Strategy 1.1. The Evolving Role of Information Systems and Technology in Organizations: A Strategic Perspective Implications for Management and Strategic Planning Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage with IT/IS Strategy Tools and Techniques Cases
1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5.
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References (must read) Ward, J.; Peppard, J. (2002): Strategic Planning for Information Systems, 3rd ed., Wiley Series in Information Systems, John Wiley&Sons, Chapter 1
Clarke, Roger (1994): The Path of Development of Strategic Information Systems Theory, Online: http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/StratISTh.html
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1.1. The Evolving Role of Information Systems and Technology in Organizations: A Strategic Perspective
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Information Technology (IT) Definition Information Technology (IT)

IT refers specifically to technology, essentially hardware, software and telecommunications networks. It is thus both tangible (e.g. with servers, PCs, routers and network cables) and intangible (e.g. with software of all types). IT facilitates the acquisition, processing, storing, delivery and sharing of information and other digital content.
EU uses ICT as term (Information and Communication Technologies)
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Informations Systems (IS) Definition Informations Systems (IS)

IS: the means by which people and organizations, utilizing technology, gather, process, store, use and disseminate information. It is thus concerned with the purposeful utilization of information technology. The domain of study of IS involves the study of theories and practices related to the social and technological phenomena, which determine the development, use and effects of information systems in organizations and society.
ORGANIZATIONS
TECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT
Source: The UK Academy of Information Systems (UKAIS)

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Contemporary Approaches to IS
Technical Approaches Computer Science Operations Research
Management Science
IS
Sociology
Psychology
Economics Behavioral Approaches

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Application - Definition Application

An application refers to the use of IT to address a business activity or process. There are essentially two types of application: general uses of IT hardware and software to carry out particular tasks such as word processing, electronic mail or preparing presentation materials; uses of technology to perform specific business activities or processes such as general accounting, production scheduling or order processing.
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Early Views and Models of IS/IT in Organizations
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The Widening Scope of Information Systems

1950-1960 Data Processing 1960-1970 Management Reporting 1970-1980 Decision Support 1980-1990 Strategic & End User 1990-2000 Electronic Commerce
Electronic Electronic Data Data Processing Processing - -TPS TPS
Early Early Management Management Information Information Systems Systems
Decision Decision Support Support Systems Systems - -Ad hoc Ad hoc Reports Reports
End User End User Computing Computing Exec Info Sys Exec Info Sys Expert Systems Expert Systems SIS SIS
Electronic Electronic Business & Business & Commerce Commerce -Internetworked -Internetworked E-Business & E-Business & Commerce Commerce
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Typical planning, control and operational systems Anthony 1965
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p. 9

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Transition between computer and information management: relationships and emphases
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p. 12; partly derived from EDP AnalyserHow the management job is changing, June 1984, Vol. 22, No. 6
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From the data processing (DP) era (1960s) towards the management information systems (MIS) era (1970s onwards) Traditional, mainly operational and control, systems were essentially of two types:
Monitoring transaction handling and control; Exception triggered reporting and/or action. Although these provide management with information, they are primarily focused on the processing of data.
At about the same time, office automation systems provided new means of processing and communicating information.These advancements permitted two new functions to be added to the repertoire of IS/IT:
Enquiry flexible access to data and information initiated by user Request analysis decision support, with flexible processing of data and information.
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Towards the third era

Unfortunately, two factors served to confuse the progress in evolutionary terms that even the best-managed companies were achieving:
1. How was the large new investment required in hardware and softwaremany hundreds of workstations, networking costs and multiple licences for software packagesto be justified?
The rationale for investment had reverted, in many cases, from business pull to technology push.
2. How should the new applications and supporting technology be managed and, even more critically, who should be responsible?
Should the role of the IT unit be extended or should such systems be the responsibility of users?
Were the new office systems an extension to a department level of personal computing or an integral part of the organizations information processing ability and resources? How did the management of personal computing and office systems relate?
As the new strategic potential of IS/IT began to be appreciated in the mid-1980s, most organizations were still wrestling with the problems of managing concurrent DP and MIS applications based on rapidly evolving technology.
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Summary and Lessons from DP and MIS eras DP lessons

Need to understand the process of developing complete information systems, not just the programs to process data. More thorough requirements and data analysis to improve systems linkages and a more engineered approach to designing system components. More appropriate justification of investments by assessing the economics of efficiency gains and converting these to a return on investment. Less creative, more structured approaches to programming, testing and documentation to reduce the problems of future amendments. Extended project management that recognized the need for coordination of both user and DP functions and the particular need to establish user management in a decisive role in the systems developmentthe user had to live with the consequences. The need for planning the interrelated set of systems required by the organization. Better planning produced overall improvements in systems relevance and productivity.
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Summary and Lessons from DP and MIS eras MIS lessons

Justification of IS investments is not entirely a matter of return on investment/financial analysis. Databases require large restructuring projects and heavy user involvement in data definitiondata integration had been weak based on the project by project DP approach. The IS resource needs to move from a production to a service orientation to enable users to obtain their own information from the data resourcethe information centre concept. Need for organizational policies, not just DP methodologies. Personal computers and office systems enable better MIS to be developed, provided that users and IS specialists both focus on the information needs rather than the technology.
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The Strategic Information Systems Era During the late 1970s, a number of organizations had began to use IS/IT in ways that fundamentally changed how their business was conducted, changing the balance of power in their industry with respect to competitors, customers and/or suppliers.
The use of IS/IT was thus directly influencing their competitive position and had become a new weapon to improve their competitiveness, implying a new relationship between IS/ IT investment and strategic development.
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Trends in the evolution of business IS/IT The three-era model
(1/2)
The prime objective of using IS/IT in the eras differs:

data processing to improve operational efficiency by automating information-based processes; management information systems to increase management effectiveness by satisfying their information requirements for decision making; strategic information systems to improve competitiveness by changing the nature or conduct of business (i.e. IS/IT investments can be a source of competitive advantage).
The objectives of DP and MIS are, strictly speaking, a subset of the SIS objectiveto improve competitiveness.
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Trends in the evolution of business IS/IT The three-era model
(2/2)
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p. 24; adapted from R.D. Galliers and E. Somogyi, From data processing to strategic information systems: A historical perspective, in R.D. Galliers and E. Somogyi, eds, Towards Strategic Information Systems, Abacus Press, 1987
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Strategic Uses of IS/IT: Classification, and Management Implications, Factors for Success
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Classification of Strategic Systems 1/4 (Ward/Peppard) The four main types of strategic system appear to be, those that
1. share information via technology-based systems with customers/ consumers and/or suppliers and change the nature of the relationship; 2. produce more effective integration of the use of information in the organizations value-adding processes; 3. enable the organization to develop, produce, market and deliver new or enhanced products or services based on information; 4. provide executive management with information to support the development and implementation of strategy (in particular, where relevant external and internal information are integrated in analysis).
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Classification of Strategic Systems 2/4 (Notowidigdo) internal systems that have direct benefit for the company; external systems that have direct benefits for the companys customers.
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Classification of Strategic Systems 3/4 (Venkatraman)

Venkatraman described three types of revolutionary uses of IT, which require considerable transformation in terms of what the organization does or how it does it: 1. business process redesignusing IS/IT to realign business activities and their relationships to achieve performance breakthroughs;
2. business network redesignchanging the way information is used by the organization and its trading partners, thereby changing how the industry overall carries out the value-adding processes;
3. business scope redefinitionextending the market or product set, based on information or changing the role of the organization inthe industry.
1.-3. called revolutionary levels within Scott Mortons framework
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Classification of Strategic Systems 4/4 (Scott Morton)

Scott Morton proposes five levels of complexity at which reconfiguration can be applied.
evolutionary levels
localised exploitation within individual business functions. The primary objectives addressed are local efficiency and effectiveness; internal integration between different systems and applications, generally involving not just automation, but also rationalisation, and using a common IT platform. Efficiency and effectiveness are enhanced by coordination and cooperation within the enterprise.
Plus revolutionary levels (3 levels as introduced before)
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Scott Morton's Five Levels of IT-Induced Reconfiguration
High Revolutionary Levels (Transformate)
Business Scope Redefinition Business Network Redesign Business Process Redesign Internal Integration Localised Exploitation
Evolutionary Levels (Automate & Informate)
Low Low High
Range of potential benefits

(Scott Morton 1991)
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Summarizing: The changing role of IS/IT
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1.2 Implications for Management and Strategic Planning
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The relationship between the business, SIS, MIS and DP
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The relationship between business, IS, and IT strategies

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Applications portfolio

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Applications portfolio, explained

Strategic applications that are critical to future business success. They create or support change in how the organization conducts its business, with the aim of providing competitive advantage. Note that whether the technology used is leading edge does not indicate that the application is strategic assessment must be based on business contribution. Key operational applications that sustain the existing business operations, helping to avoid any disadvantage. It can be argued that, in many industries, substantial numbers of applications (e.g. EPOS [electronic point of sale], ATMs [automated teller machines] and ERP) have become so pervasive that they have become mandatory for survival in the industry. Support applications which improve business efficiency and management effectiveness but, in themselves, do not sustain the business or provide any competitive advantage. High potential innovative applications which may create opportunities to gain a future advantage, but are as yet unproven.
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What is an IS/IT Strategy?

an IS component and an IT component.
(1/2)
Essentially, an IS/IT strategy is composed of two parts:
The IS strategy defines the organizations requirement or demand for information and systems to support the overall strategy of the business. It is firmly grounded in the business, taking into consideration both the competitive impact and alignment requirements of IS/IT. Essentially, it defines and prioritizes the investments required to achieve the ideal applications portfolio, the nature of the benefits expected and the changes required to deliver those benefits, within the constraints of resources and systems interdependencies.
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What is an IS/IT Strategy?
(2/2)
The IT strategy is concerned with outlining the vision of how the organizations demand for information and systems will be supported by technologyessentially, it is concerned with IT supply. It addresses the provision of IT capabilities and resources (including hardware, software and telecommunications) and services such as IT operations, systems development and user support.
In short:
IS demand refers to the IS strategy Similarly, IT supply refers to IT strategy
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Why Have an IS/IT Strategy? Or: Consequences of not having an IS/IT Strategy
(1/2)
Systems investments are made that do not support business objectives. Systems are not integrated. This can also lead to duplication of effort and data leading to inaccuracy and no coherent information resource. No means of setting priorities for IS projects/resources and constantly changing plans leading to lower productivity, etc. No mechanisms for deciding optimum resource levels or the best means of supplying systems. Poor management information; it is either not available, inconsistent, inaccurate or too slow.
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Why Have an IS/IT Strategy? Or: Consequences of not having a IS/IT Strategy (2/2) Misunderstanding between users and IT specialists leading to conflict and dissatisfaction. Technology strategy is incoherent and constrains options. Inadequate infrastructure investments made. All projects evaluated on financial basis only. Problems caused by IS/IT investments can become a source of conflict between parts of the organization. Localized justification of investments can produce benefits that are actually counterproductive in the overall business context. Systems, on average, have a shorter than expected business life and require, overall, considerably greater IS/IT spending to redevelop more frequently than should be necessary.
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The Context for IS/IT Strategy Two perpectives

internal perspective focusing on the role of IS/IT in the organization external perspective exploring the overall dynamics of IS/IT
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Environments of IS/IT strategy, INTERNAL perspective Framework by SULLIVAN (1/3) simple matrix to explain how the IS/IT strategic environment is being affected by forces outside the control of any individual organization. He describes two axes within which an organization can consider the implications of these forces:
Infusion: the degree to which an organization becomes dependent on IS/IT to carry out its core operations and manage the business; Diffusion: the degree to which IT has become dispersed throughout the organization and decisions concerning its use are devolved.
By plotting high and low degrees of infusion and diffusion, four essentially different environments are established.
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Environments of IS/IT strategy, INTERNAL perspective Framework by SULLIVAN (2/3)

Conflict: While moving towards complex situations (with their more decentralized control) a more centralized approach for IS/IT planning and management makes sense.

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Environments of IS/IT strategy, INTERNAL perspective Framework by SULLIVAN, explained (3/3)

Low diffusion/low infusion
highly-centralized control of IT resources, and IS is not critical to the business. This, Sullivan describes as a traditional environment typical of companies using IT solely to improve efficiency on a system-by-system basis.
Low diffusion/high infusion

highly-centralized control, and IS is critical to business operations and control. The business could be seriously disadvantaged if systems fail. Therefore, high-quality systems are needed with, normally, a high degree of integration. The systems have become part of the backbone of the organization, in Sullivans terms.
High diffusion/low infusion

largely-decentralized control, giving business managers the ability to satisfy their local priorities. Any integration of systems occurs due to useruser cooperation (a federation of interests), not by overall business or IT design. The management approach is essentially opportunistic, driven by short-term priorities that may create business advantage in some areas. largely-decentralized control but the business depends on the systems for success, both in avoiding disadvantage and in achieving its overall business objectives. Sullivan describes this as a complex environment that is difficult to manage. Too much central control to avoid poor investments will limit innovation, hence new strategic opportunities may be missed; too little control and the core systems may disintegrate.
High diffusion/high infusion
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Environments of IS/IT strategy, EXTERNAL perspective The duality of IT (2/3)

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Environments of IS/IT strategy, EXTERNAL perspective The duality of IT (1/3) The duality of technology:
it not only supports the strategy of an organization (arrow astrategic alignment) but can also define the business, as strategic moves may not be possible without technology (arrow bcompetitive impact).
For example, organizations such as

ebay, eSteel and Covisint all deploy business models that are fundamentally defined by technology. Technology also facilitates new ways of organizing new process innovations and can enable the creation of innovative network-based businesses.
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Environments of IS/IT strategy, EXTERNAL perspective The duality of IT (3/3) However, an organization does not exist in isolation (unless it occupies a monopoly position), but has competitors and is part of a wider industry system and business environment.
Competitors moves, including new entrants, affect the dynamics of an industry and, consequently, the organization itself and its strategies (arrow c); at the same time, strategic plays made by the organization effect competitor moves (arrow d). Technological innovations can have disruptive effects on an industry (arrow e), rewriting the rules of competition and even challenging traditional notions of industry structure.
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1.3.
Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage with IT/IS
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How do we define and achieve competitive advantage? Competitive advantage means:

Being able to earn a ROI (return on investment) that is persistently above the average for a given industry. (not just a temporary advantage or high ROI)
Crowston & Treacy, Assessing the Impact of IT on Enterprise Level Performance 1986.
How do firms achieve competitive advantage?
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Two Major Schools of Thought The strategic positioning school of strategy

Associated with Michael Porter Select the right position in an attractive industry
The Resource Based View of the Firm (RBVF)

Originated with economist Edith Penrose; developed by strategy professors Jay Barney; Dierickx & Cool Recently popularized by Hamel & Prahalad, Competing for Time (1990) but re-named core competencies Develop and exploit your unique capabilities
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Why is Michael Porter important? First strategy writer to analyze why information and IT can be critical to competitive advantage
Competitive Strategy, 1980 Competitive Advantage, 1985
What contributions is Porter best known for?

Five forces model What makes an industry attractive to compete in? 2 x 2 matrix of core strategies What are possible strategies for achieving advantage? The value chain How can we analyze the core activities that firms perform?
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Porters Five Forces Model (as applied to discount retail industry)
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Strategic Implications of Five Forces Analysis A given industry is unattractive when:

Rivalry is strong Barriers to entry are low Competition from substitutes is strong Suppliers and customers have strong bargaining power (relative to you)
or A given industry is ideal when:

Rivalry is moderate Barriers to entry are high Good substitutes dont exist Suppliers and customers are in a weak bargaining position (relative to you)
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What are possible strategies that may lead to competitive advantage? (1/2) Competitive Strategies (Porter, 1985)
Cost leadership Differentiation Focus
Competitive Advantage Competitive Scope

Lower Cost Broad Target Cost Leadership Differentiation
Differentiation
Narrow Target
Cost Focus
Differentiation Focus
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What are possible strategies that may lead to competitive advantage? (2/2) Additional competitive strategies
growth increasing market share, acquiring more customers or selling more products. improved internal efficiency alliances working with business partners to create synergy & provide opportunities for growth innovation developing new products and services customer relationship management customer-oriented approaches time competing on the basis of time
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How Can You Deploy IT to Create a Competitive Advantage? Identify novel uses of IT that are consistent with and support your strategy These novel uses of IT may:
Reinforce your cost leadership position Allow you to provide product/service differentiation to your customers (or suppliers)
Strive to lock-in your customers (or buyers) through such innovative uses of IT
What factors can enhance customer lock-in?
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Example: Mass Customized Jeans may lead to lock-in.
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Is Such a Competitive Advantage Really Sustainable? What happens to innovative IT solutions?

.. ..
Which is better: first-mover advantage or second-mover advantage?
Does customer lock-in really work?

Why or when? ..
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But Remember, We Said There Are Two Major Schools of Thought 1. The strategic positioning school of strategy
Associated with Michael Porter Select the right position in an attractive industry
2. The Resource Based View of the Firm (RBVF)

Originated with economist Edith Penrose; developed by strategy professors Jay Barney; Dietricx & Cool Popularized by Hamel & Prahalad, Competing for Time (1990) but re-named core competencies Develop and exploit your unique capabilities
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What Do RBVF Strategists Say? Innovative IT solutions are copied or imitated

Most IT applications are imitable Some exceptions exist when IT cant be imitated
Unless the capabilities to create the innovative IT solution are unique and immobile, then second-movers may:
copy your great ideas more cheaply learn from your mistakes
Customer lock-in does not really work

Customers are too smart and will avoid becoming over-committed to you ..
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Resource Based View of the Firm and Sustainable Competitive Advantage A resource (asset) is valuable to the firm when: 1. It adds positive value to the firm
rather than a liability e.g., outmoded factories or employees Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities
2. Not all firms possess it to the same extent

it is heterogeneously distributed across firms
3. It cannot be easily imitated, acquired, or stolen

it is immobile or at least imperfectly mobile this means that other firms are at a cost disadvantage if they try to acquire, imitate, or internally develop the same resource
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When is Competitive Advantage Sustainable or Temporary? All three criteria must be present for a firm to have a sustainable competitive advantage If only two of the criteria are present (1 and 2), then a firm has a temporary competitive advantage
if the resource is not immobile what is an example of such a resource?
If only one of the criteria is present (1), then a firm only has competitive parity
if the resource is equally distributed across firms if the resource is not immobile what is an example of such a resource?
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Which of these are sources of sustained competitive advantage for a firm? Why?
Customer lock-in Access to financial capital Proprietary technology (patents, copyrights, etc.) Technical IT skills (e.g., software developers) Managerial IT skills (e.g., IT managers, business unit managers, the ability to collaborate in order to identify and deploy effective IT)
Why do the authors argue that many of these resources cant create sustainable advantage?
IT and Sustained Competitive Advantage: A Resource Based Analysis, MIS Quarterly 1995
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Achieving a Competitive Advantage Strategy IT Role

Improving Business Process reduce costs of doing business Promote Business Innovation
(1/2)
Locking in Customers and Suppliers
create new products or services
improve quality link business to customers and suppliers
Outcome
Enhance Efficiency
Create New Business Opportunities
Maintain Valuable Customers and Relationships

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Achieving a Competitive Advantage Strategy IT Role

Raise Barriers to Entry Increase amount of investment or complexity of IT needed to compete Build a Strategic IT Platform
(2/2)
Build a Strategic Information Base
Leverage investment in IS resources from operational uses to strategic uses
Use IT to provide information to support firms competitive strategy
Outcome
Increase Market Share
Create New Business Opportunities
Enhance Organizational Collaboration

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A brief critique
(1/3)
A particularly surprising weakness of the existing literature is its inapplicability to organisations which are not subject to powerful market-based competitive forces, such as notfor-profit enterprises, public sector agencies, and associations which are intentionally monopolistic, including industry and professional associations. This is so marked that some definitions of the term 'strategic IS' are restricted to systems that "confer a unique, sustainable, or otherwise significant advantage" (Ciborra 1991).
Source: Clarke, R. (1994)

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A brief critique
(2/3)
It is contended that, even in corporations operating in free-market economies, organisational strategy should not be analysed exclusively in competitive terms. Other possible bases include:
short-term survival (which is essentially concerned with being around long enough to be able to compete at all); medium-term survival (which is concerned with the establishment or re-establishment of a platform or infrastructure on which recovery from current difficulties can be based); service ("our clients need it"); the marketing imperative ("our customers want it"); the regulatory imperative ("if we don't do it, we'll be precluded from participating by some powerful legal or political authority"); corporate infrastructure (which is concerned with investing in an environment which will support future adaptability, and the conception and implementation of as yet unspecified - and probably unspecifiable - future strategic advantage); and the national strategic imperative ("the government has determined that it is essential to the nation's competitiveness"). This is apparent as an important factor in such countries as Japan and Singapore, and is the subject of Porter (1989).
Source: Clarke, R. (1994)
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A brief critique
(3/3)
A further common feature of most papers to date is the implicit assumption that business needs drive IT and information strategy. There is evidence, however, that, in some organisations, IT strategic planning is driving corporate planning, and that IT can actively assist in the creation of business opportunities, rather than just support them (Oesterle 1991).
(see also slides in this deck: The duality of IT)
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1.4 Strategy Tools and Techniques Ward, J.; Peppard, J. (2003): Strategic Planning for Information Systems, 3rd ed., Wiley Series in Information Systems, John Wiley&Sons, Chapter 2
Good overview: Clarke, Roger (1994): The Path of Development of Strategic Information Systems Theory, Online: http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/SOS/StratISTh.html
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A Strategic Framework
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p.71
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Strategic IS/IT Planning Process Inputs & Outputs

External business environment I N P U T S Internal business environment Current applications portfolio Internal IS / IT environment
External IS / IT environment Strategic IS / IT planning process Planning, approaches, tools & techniques
O U T P U T S
IS management strategy Applications portfolio
Business IS strategy Models & matrices
IT strategy
Adapted from: Ward et al Figure 3.8

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Methods for deriving Strategy inputs to the strategic planning approach
References to Chapters in Ward/Peppard

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Methods and Frameworks Portfolio and Planning Matrices based on life-cycle approach (BCG) Value chain (Porter 1980, 1985) Information intensity matrix (Porter and Millar 1985) Earls procedure for generating competitive strategies (Earl 1987, based on Porter and Wiseman) Customer resource lifecycle model (Ives and Learmonth 1984)
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Industry and product life cycles information and systems focus
Source: Ward/Peppard, 3rd ed., p.71; derived from an analysis in J.M. Higgins, Strategy Formulation, Implementation and Control, Dryden Press, New York, 1985, pp. 130135
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Product portfolio (Boston Consulting Group Matrix)

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Policy/ Portfolio Matrices

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Value Chain and IS, examples (generic)
Source: Porter 2001

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Value Chain and IS, examples (specific to Airline industry) Identifies uses of IT for each element of the value chain
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The airline industry: how IS/IT has affected competitive forces (1/2)
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The airline industry: how IS/IT has affected competitive forces (2/2)
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Information intensity matrix (Porter and Millar 1985)
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Earls Procedure for Generating Competitive Strategies (based on Porter and Wiseman) Earl (1987)
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Strategic option generator sample questions

1. SuppliersCan we use IS/IT to:
Gain leverage over our suppliers (improving our bargaining power or reducing theirs)? Reduce buying costs? Be a better customer and obtain a better service? Identify alternative sources of supply? Improve the quality of products/services purchased?
2. CustomersCan we use IS/IT to:

Increase our customers switching costs (to alternative suppliers)? Increase our customers knowledge of our products/services? Improve support/service to customers and their needs? Identify new potential customers?
3. Rivals/CompetitorsCan we use IS/IT to:

Raise the entry cost of potential competitors? Differentiate (or create new) products/services? Reduce our costs/Increase competitors costs? Alter the channels of distribution? Identify/Establish a new market niche? Form joint ventures to enter new markets?
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Customer Resource Life Cycle Framework (Ives and Learmouth, 1984)

T he C ustomer's R esource Life C ycle M odel
E xte nd e d M od el 1. Set Requirem ents 2. Specify 3. Select Source 4. Order 5. Authorize 6. Acquire 7. Test and Accept 8. Integrate 9. M onitor 10. Upgrade 11. M aintain 12. Transfer or Dispose 13. Account For and Pay For D e scription How m uch of the resource is required? What are the resources' attributes? Where will we buy it from ? Order a quantity from the supplier. Authorize m onies to be spent. Take possession of the resource. Ensure it m eets specifications. Add to existing inventory. Control access and use of the resource Upgrade resource if conditions change Repair resource if necessary. M ove, return, or dispose of the inventory as necessary. M onitor where and how m uch m oney is spent on the resource.
Fro m: Ive s, B. and Learmonth, G. "The Information Sy ste m a s a Co mpetitive Weapon", Co mmunications of the ACM , Dece mber 1984, page 25.
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1.5. Cases in Strategic Information Systems Success Factors in Strategic Information Systems Cases
ECONOMOST, McKesson Drugs SABRE, American Airlines MAC vs. GEORGE
Vgl. Ward/ Peppard, 2002, 3rd ed., pp. 28 Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supply, Otis Elevators, Schneider National, Inc., Amazon.com, Bootsphoto.com, Leather Xchange.com, Ryanair, ATC Bologna,
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Success Factors in Strategic Information Systems External, not internal, focus Adding value, not cost reduction Sharing the benefits Understanding customers Business-driven innovation, not technology-driven Incremental development Using the information gained
See cases!
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1.5. Cases Strategic Information Systems

Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte Bestellsystem von McKesson Drugs
Literatur: Clemons/Row, 1988; Clemons, 1991; Segars/Grover, 1993; Kettinger et al., 1994
Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines

Literatur: Copeland/McKenney, 1988; Hopper, 1990
Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia

Literatur: Clemons, 1990
Vgl. Ward/ Peppard, 2002, 3rd ed., pp. 28

Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supply, Otis Elevators, Schneider National, Inc., Amazon.com, Bootsphoto.com, Leather Xchange.com, Ryanair, ATC Bologna,
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Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte Bestellsystem von McKesson Drugs (1/3)

Fallstudie 1: ECONOMOST - das automatisierte Bestellsystem von McKesson Drugs
Literatur: Clemons/Row, 1988; Clemons, 1991; Segars/Grover, 1993; Kettinger et al., 1994 Im Jahr 1975 fhrte der amerikanische Pharma-Grohndler McKesson Drugs das elektronische Bestellsystem ECONOMOST landesweit ein, nachdem das System bereits einige Jahre in Teilen Kaliforniens eingesetzt wurde. McKesson ist ein Grohndler, der vor allem kleine Apotheken beliefert. Mit ECONOMOST wird das Bestellwesen fr diesen Kundenkreis wesentlich vereinfacht. McKesson stellt dem Abnehmer einen Strichcode-Leser oder ein tragbares Datenerfassungsgert zur Verfgung, mit dem bei einem Rundgang durch das Lager die Bestellnummern der bentigten Artikel erfasst werden. Die Bestelldaten werden ber Telefonleitung an McKesson bertragen. In der Regel werden die Bestellungen am nchsten Tag geliefert. Bei der Zusammenstellung der Lieferung wird die Anordnung des Lagers des Kunden bercksichtigt, so dass der Kunde die Waren der Reihe nach aus der Transportverpackung entnehmen und im Lager einordnen kann. Preisschilder und Codes fr den Strichcodeleser werden von McKesson ebenfalls mitgeliefert, auerdem erhlt der Kunde auf Wunsch ausfhrliche Auswertungen ber die einzelnen Artikel. Das System bietet somit fr die Kunden wesentliche Vorteile: die Kosten des Bestellwesens und der Lagerverwaltung deutlich reduziert, McKesson gewhrt fr ber ECONOMOST bestellte Artikel erhebliche Rabatte und der Kunde erhlt Management-Informationen, ber die Einzelhndler dieser Gre sonst nicht verfgen. Die elektronische Form der Bestellungen bietet auch fr McKesson selbst erhebliche Vorteile. Das Personal fr die Aufnahme telefonischer Bestellungen wurde von 700 auf 15 reduziert. Die Abwicklung im Lager kann wesentlich schneller erfolgen, da die Bestellungen intern nach dem Aufbau des Lagers sortiert werden. Im Zeitraum 1975-1985 stieg die Produktivitt des im Lager eingesetzten Personals auf das Fnffache. Da die erforderlichen Lieferungen im System erfasst sind, kann die Transportplanung optimiert werden, was die Transportkosten wesentlich verringert hat. Insgesamt konnte McKesson im Zeitraum von 1975 bis 1987 seinen Umsatz um 424% erhhen, whrend die Kosten nur um 86% stiegen. Bereits Mitte der 80er-Jahre war erkennbar, dass die Einfhrung des Systems auch wesentliche Auswirkungen auf den gesamten Markt hatte. Zum Zeitpunkt der Einfhrung des Systems befanden sich die kleinen unabhngigen Apotheken in intensivem Wettbewerb mit groen Ketten. Die groen Ketten hatten gegenber den kleinen Apotheken erhebliche Kostenvorteile. Zum Teil bezogen die Ketten ihre Waren unter Umgehung der Grohndler direkt von den Produzenten, aber auch gegenber den Grohndlern erzielten sie auf Grund ihrer Marktmacht gnstigere Preise. Darber hinaus hatten die groen Ketten auch Effizienzvorteile durch die zentralisierte Abwicklung und qualifiziertes Management. Diese Vorteile konnten die kleinen Apotheken durch die Nutzung von ECONOMOST weitgehend kompensieren. Die kleinen Apotheken verloren zwar weiter Marktanteile, aber weitaus weniger, als dies Mitte der 70er-Jahre prognostiziert wurde. Fr McKesson (und die anderen Pharma-Grohndler) blieb damit ein wichtiger Kundenkreis erhalten. Darber hinaus erwies sich die elektronische Bestellung beim Grohndler auch fr die groen Ketten als attraktiv, so dass der Anteil an Waren, die direkt beim Produzenten gekauft wurden, insgesamt zurckging. Die Struktur des Grohandels hat sich in den Jahren nach der Einfhrung von ECONOMOST jedoch drastisch verndert. Die Zahl der Grohndler sank in zehn Jahren auf die Hlfte, der Marktanteil der fnf grten Hndler stieg in der gleichen Zeit von 40 auf 65%. Gleichzeitig sank die durchschnittliche Handelsspanne um fast ein Drittel, von 12,2% auf 8,5%. Dementsprechend ergaben sich in der Struktur der Branche deutliche Unterschiede. Wiesen die drei fhrenden Unternehmen 1976 noch sehr unterschiedliche strategische Positionen bezglich ihrer finanziellen Struktur, der Effizienz ihrer Distribution und ihrer Marketingaktivitten auf, waren die strategischen Positionen Mitte der 80er-Jahre sehr hnlich. Alle fhrenden Unternehmen wiesen hohe Effizienz in der Produktion und einen betrchtlichen Anteil an Fremdfinanzierung auf. McKesson selbst hat aus der Entwicklung von ECONOMOST jedoch keine nachhaltigen Wettbewerbsvorteile gegenber seinen unmittelbaren Konkurrenten gezogen. Der Marktanteil stieg zwar von 20% auf 27%, diese Erhhung ist aber auf den Aufkauf eines frheren Konkurrenten zurckzufhren, die 27% entsprechen weitgehend der Summe der frheren Marktanteile der beiden Unternehmen. Dies ist nicht zuletzt darauf zurckzufhren, dass die Konkurrenten auf die Einfhrung von ECONOMOST bald mit der Entwicklung hnlicher Systeme antworteten. Die Umstellung zwischen den einzelnen Systemen, wenn eine Apotheke von einem Grohndler zu einem anderen wechselt, kann in einem Tag durchgefhrt werden. Die meisten Grohndler bieten fr den Wechsel zu ihrem System Untersttzungen und bernehmen auch die anfallenden Kosten.
Quelle: Vetschera 2000

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Vorteile Kunden
Kostenreduktion der Lagerverwaltung Rabatte Zustzliche Management-Information
Vorteile McKesson
Bestelldaten elektronisch verfgbar geringerer Personalaufwand bei der Bestellannahme Optimierung interner Ablufe Optimierung Transportwesen
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Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines (1/2)

Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines Literatur: Copeland/McKenney, 1988; Hopper, 1990 American Airlines war einer der Pioniere des Einsatzes von Informationstechnik im Luftverkehr. Bis in die 50er-Jahre wurde die Platzreservierung fr Flge weitgehend manuell in den Abflughfen vorgenommen. 1958 schloss American Airlines einen Vertrag mit IBM ber die Entwicklung eines computergesttzten Reservierungssystems ab, das ab 1961 schrittweise realisiert wurde. Das System "Sabre" bestand aus einem Zentralrechner und Terminals in den Verkaufsbros von Amarican Airlines, die ber Telefonleitungen mit dem Zentralrechner verbunden waren. Damit wurde es zum ersten Mal mglich, smtliche Daten eines Passagiers zentral zu verwalten und gleichzeitig das Platzangebot in einem Flugzeug laufend zu kontrollieren. Die Entwicklung des ersten Systems war mit groen technischen Problemen verbunden und gelang nur unter groem finanziellen Aufwand sowohl fr American Airlines als auch fr IBM. Mitte der 60er-Jahre war die technische Entwicklung weiter fortgeschritten und IBM bot hnliche Systeme "schlsselfertig" auch anderen Fluggesellschaften an, da das gestiegene Aufkommen an Flugpassagieren anders gar nicht mehr bewltigt werden konnte. Die Systeme waren jedoch auf die einzelnen Gesellschaften beschrnkt und wurden von diesen nur intern in ihren eigenen Verkaufsbros genutzt. Anfang der 70er-Jahre gab es einige Versuche, ein gemeinsames System fr alle Fluggesellschaften zu entwickeln, das auch den Reisebros zur Verfgung stehen sollte. Es kam jedoch zu keiner Einigung zwischen den Fluggesellschaften. Ende 1975 kndigte United Airlines an, sich nicht an den gemeinsamen Projekten zu beteiligen, sondern ihr eigenes Buchungssystem Apollo im Laufe des Jahres 1976 auch fr Reisebros zu ffnen. Darauf hin bot American Airlines bereits Anfang 1976 ihr System Sabre ebenfalls den Reisebros an. Die Nachfrage der Reisebros berstieg die Erwartungen drastisch. Ursprnglich wurde geschtzt, dass die ersten 200 Terminals in Reisebros in zwei Jahren installiert sein wrden und einen Umsatz von 3 Millionen Dollar erbringen wrden; tatschlich wurden die ersten 200 Terminals in 11 Monaten installiert und erbrachten einen Umsatz von 20 Millionen Dollars. Trotz dieser anfnglichen Erfolge sah sich American Airlines mit Sabre gegen Ende der 70er-Jahre erheblicher Konkurrenz durch United Airlines ausgesetzt. United Airlines hatte zwar spter damit begonnen, das Buchungssystem auch Reisebros zur Verfgung zu stellen, hatte jedoch ein greres Streckennetz, so dass die Reisebros das System von United Airlines bevorzugten. American Airlines begann daraufhin, das System auch fr andere Fluggesellschaften zu ffnen und deren Flge ebenfalls ber Sabre anzuzeigen und zu verkaufen. Zunchst wurden nur Fluggesellschaften bercksichtigt, deren Streckennetz das von American Airlines ergnzte und die Tarife, die von diesen Fluggesellschaften fr die Mitbenutzung von Sabre verlangt wurden, richteten sich nach dem strategischen Interesse von American Airlines. Durch Gerichtsbeschluss wurden die Fluggesellschaften Anfang der 80er-Jahre jedoch gezwungen, ihre Buchungssysteme auch konkurrierenden Gesellschaften zu ffnen und von allen Gesellschaften einheitliche Tarife zu verlangen. Auerdem wurde die Bevorzugung der eigenen Gesellschaft, etwa in der Reihenfolge der angezeigten Flge, verboten. Die erzwungene einheitliche Tarifgestaltung der Buchungssysteme fhrte jedoch zu einem drastischen Anstieg der Einnahmen aus den Buchungsgebhren. Vor der Vereinheitlichung wurden Buchungen fr Gesellschaften, deren Streckennetz das von American Airlines ergnzte, weitgehend gratis abgewickelt; 1980 erzielte American irlines mit Sabre lediglich Einnahmen von ca. 7 Millionen $. Auf Grund der gesetzlichen Vorschriften wurde dann eine einheitliche Buchungsgebhr von 1,75$ je Buchung verlangt, der Gewinn aus dem Betrieb von Sabre betrug 1985 bereits ca. 140 Millionen $. Ab der zweiten Hlfte der 80er-Jahre wurde das System auch auf Leihwagen und Hotels ausgeweitet. 1996 wurde Sabre von American Airlines als eigenstndiges Unternehmen ausgegliedert, an dem American Airlines aber noch einen Anteil von ber 80% hielt. Ende 1999 erfolgte die endgltige Trennung von American Airlines. 1998 wickelte Sabre ca. 410 Millionen Buchungen ab und erzielte einen Gewinn von ca. 230 Millionen US $. 75% des Umsatzes wurden mit Unternehmen auerhalb der American-Airlines Gruppe erzielt (1997: 70%).

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Fallstudie 2: SABRE - das Buchungssystem von American Airlines (2/2)
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Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia (1/2)

Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia
Literatur: Clemons, 1990
1976 begann die Girard Bank in Philadelphia mit dem Aufbau ihres Netzwerkes von Geldausgabeautomaten unter dem Namen "GEORGE". Girard war zu diesem Zeitpunkt die drittgrte Bank in Philadelphia und war insbesondere im Privatkundenbereich sehr stark vertreten. Der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes von Geldausgabeautomaten in Verbindung mit der bestehenden groen Zahl von Filialen sollte diese Position weiter strken und wurde auch intensiv beworben. Die Philadelphia National Bank war zu dieser Zeit die zweitgrte Bank in Philadelphia. Ihre Strken lagen vor allem im Bereich der Geschftskunden, verglichen mit Girard hatte diese Bank ein weitaus kleineres Netz von Filialen. Der Aufbau und die aggresive Vermarktung von GEORGE wurde von Philadelphia National Bank als ernste Bedrohung angesehen, da befrchtet wurde, dass sich ein grerer Verlust von Privatkunden an die Girard Bank langfristig auch negativ auf das Geschft mit den Firmenkunden auswirken wrde. Auf Grund der geringen Zahl von Filialen und des insgesamt geringen Privatkundengeschfts sah die Philadelphia National Bank jedoch keine Mglichkeit, alleine ein konkurrenzfhiges Netzwerk an Geldausgabeautomaten aufzubauen. Das Management von Philadelphia National beschloss daher, ein Netzwerk in Kooperation mit anderen Banken aufzubauen. Dabei wurden zunchst zwei Strategien betrachtet: 1. Der Aufbau des Netzwerks in Form eines gemeinsamen Tochterunternehmens oder eines Konsortiums, bei dem das Netzwerk im gemeinsamen Eigentum der beteiligten Banken steht 2. Der Aufbau eines Netzwerkes in alleinigem Eigentum von Philadelphia National und das Angebot an andere Banken, das Netzwerk als Dienstleistung gegen Entgelt mit zu benutzen. Auf Grund der erwarteten Schwierigkeiten beim Aufbau eines Konsortiums wurde der zweiten Strategie der Vorzug gegeben. Philadelphia National Bank begann, ein eigenes Netzwerk aufzubauen und intensiv an andere Banken zu vermarkten. Bereits bei Beginn des Netzwerkbetriebes 1979 nahmen 13 Banken teil. Das Netzwerk expandierte rasch und 1988 wurde das CashStreamNetzwerk der Mellon Bank, die zuvor Girard und damit das GEORGE-Netzwerk aufgekauft hatte, ebenfalls bernommen. MAC erlangte damit eine Monopolstellung im Groraum von Philadelphia. Inzwischen ist MAC mit 32.000 Automaten das grte Netzwerk von Geldausgabeautomaten der USA und ein Teil eines eigenstndigen Unternehmens, das im gemeinsamen Eigentum mehrerer Banken steht.

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Fallstudie 3: MAC vs. GEORGE - Geldausgabeautomaten in Philadelphia (2/2)

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Erkenntnisse aus den Fallstudien

Alle drei Fallstudien zeigen, dass Informationssysteme die Wettbewerbssituation in einer Branche nachhaltig verndern knnen und somit strategische Bedeutung haben. Die strategische Bedeutung der Informationssysteme fr die einzelnen Unternehmen ist aber sehr unterschiedlich. Economost hat zu keinen nachhaltigen Wettbewerbsvorteilen fr McKesson gefhrt, ein EDV-gesttztes Bestellsystem ist fr alle Unternehmen dieser Branche zu einer Notwendigkeit geworden. Allerdings htte sich die Situation der Branche insgesamt durch den Wegfall einer wichtigen Kundengruppe mglicherweise ohne Einfhrung derartiger Systeme erheblich verschlechtert. Sabre hat zu erheblichen Wettbewerbsvorteilen fr American Airlines gefhrt, diese waren allerdings so gro, dass die strategische Nutzung des Systems durch die Wettbewerbsbehrden beschrnkt wurde. MAC stellte selbst eine Reaktion auf ein angekndigtes System eines Mitbewerbers dar und war als solche sehr erfolgreich. MAC ist damit auch das Einzige der drei Systeme, bei dem die strategische Bedeutung von Anfang an klar war. Sowohl Economost als auch Sabre wurden anfnglich wohl eher als Mglichkeiten zur Kostensenkung und Effizienzsteigerung operativer Ablufe gesehen. Die strategischen Auswirkungen dieser Systeme wurden erst spter erkannt.

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Information Systems (IS) 1. Strategy 1.1. The Evolving Role of Information Systems and Technology in Organizations: A Strategic Perspective Creating and Sustaining Competitive Advantage with IT/IS Strategic Information Systems Strategy Tools and Techniques Cases
1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5.
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Strategy

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