ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

Before 1947 tensions were mounting between Palestinians and the growing Jewish population. Conflicting ethnic and religious identities in the region both of which laid a strong nationalist claim to the same land. 1948, November the UN approved the partition of Palestine. Widespread violence erupted between local Arab resistance groups and Jewish groups, like Haganah. At the height of the fighting was the battle at Deir Yassin a massacre by Lehi and Irgun forces. Both Israeli and Palestinian officials exaggerated the details of this event, the latters plan backfired as instead of stirring resistance it caused thousands of Palestinians to flee. This period was so violent and disruptive that historians, such as Avi Shlaim, have called the time between November 1947 and the creation of Israel the first unofficial phase of the 1948 war. WAR OF INDEPENDENCE / THE CATASTROPHE of 1948 State of Israel declared May 14th, 1948 Immediately afterwards, forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attacked Israel. Zionists still maintain the overriding Jewish perspective at the time: that the Arab forces were united in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state and cast the Jews into the sea. However, although the military experts of the Arab League had worked out a unified plan for the invasion, King Abdullah who was given nominal command of all the forces wrecked the plan by making last-minute changes. King Abdullahs objective was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state but to make himself master of the Arab part of Palestine. Indeed, King Abdullah did attempt to engage in secret negotiations with Israel to facilitate this. All of the Arab states were moved by dynastic and/or national interests, hidden behind by the guise of securing Palestine for the Palestinians. The inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military plans was in no small measure responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them. Israels leaders knew of these divisions and exploited them at the official outbreak of hostilities. It has always been assumed that the Arabs enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority a monolithic Arab adversary waging war on a tiny Israel, David vs. Goliath. However, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) significantly outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it by almost 2:1. The IDF initially had inferior military hardware at their disposal, however the first truce brought illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia which decisively tipped the scales in their favour. Revisionist historian Efraim Karsh, The final outcome of the war was not a miracle, but a reflection of the underlying Arab-Israeli military balance. Israel negotiated bilaterally with its neighbouring Arab states, beginning with Egypt, and concluded separate armistice agreements with each of them. The first Arab-Israeli war was officially over by July 20, 1949 when the last armistice agreement was signed between Israel and Syria. Israel expanded its territory from 55% allocated by the UN to 79% (most of the rest annexed by Jordan).

Israel expelled all the Arab forces from Palestine (exc. Arab Legion which maintained control of WB) Palestine was erased from the map. Palestinian historian Edward Said, Palestinians were left out in the cold. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR Israel was economically exhausted, but had superior organisation and morale, a tremendous sense of achievement and a confident outlook on the future. The victory showed the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy, and seemed the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on. However, peace was elusive in the region. Traditional Zionists: Martin Gilbert, this was due to Arab intransigence. Revisionist historians: post-war Israel was far more intransigent than the Arab states and bears a larger share of the responsibility for the political deadlock that followed the hostilities. Avi Shlaim: the real question facing Israel at that critical point in its history [after the first war], should not have been whether peace with its Arab neighbours was possible, but at what price. 750,000 Palestinian refugees had fled from, or been forced out of, Palestine, and were living in bleak refugee camps along the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in various neighbouring states, such as Lebanon. 385 towns were taken over and large parts of 95 other towns of all buildings were taken by Israelis (over 200,000 homes and businesses) Palestinians were in a far worse position than they would have been had they accepted UN Res. 242. Skilled Palestinian workers went to the major Arab cities some gained citizenship (in Jordan), education and entry to the army/civil service (in Lebanon), while others had no rights at all (in Egypt). Most refugees went to UNRWA camps, which had little sanitation or medical facilities. Pan-Arab position: Israel alone had created refugee problem and must not be allowed to evade its responsibility to solve this problem Israeli position: Arabs created refugee problem because they started the war in the first place and Israel was not responsible in any way. Israel did not accept the UN resolutions which gave refugees the right of return and/or compensation. Palestinian views as to why no Palestinian state emerged: - the US supported Israel and prevented Palestine emerging - British hostility and duplicity destroyed Arab leadership, enabling Zionists to take over and expel Arabs Israeli views as to why no Palestinian state emerged: - Arab state did emerge as an expanded Jordan - No Palestinian state should exist west of the Jordanian River because Jordan is Palestine Various plans were proposed within Israel for a separate Palestinian government. BenGurion actively discouraged political planning of any kind and sought to solve most problems by military means, pressing Israels military advantage. Avi Shlaim: As a result, Israels Arabs felt increasingly marginalised and frustrated.

POLITICAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967 Refusal of Arabs to recognise Israel Refusal of Israelis to recognise Palestine No solution to the refugee problem (Israel refused to acknowledge the rights of Arabs) US support for Israel Israels extreme retaliatory strikes over small guerrilla raids Rise of Pan-Arab nationalism Great divide over Suez crisis SOCIAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967 No equal rights for Arabs in Israel limited living space (1ha per Israeli vs. 0.1ha per Arab), few education opportunities, stunted economy Tension between Zionists and Arabs siege mentality and fear of subversive fifth column No solution to the refugee problem

NATURE AND IMPACT OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism: desire to create a political framework a national state with all that it implies in terms of borders, language and national homogeneity. Zionist view: the conflict is an issue of competing nationalisms and the violence is the fault of Arabs in their failure to acknowledge and accept the legitimacy of the state of Israel. Arabs view: Israel is foreign imperial domination, not a nation. JEWISH NATIONALISM: Core of Zionism: need for Jews to re-establish their nation in its historic location, Israel; A land without a people, for a people without a land. Heart of Jewish nationalism: belief that the Jews are a people and have a right to a homeland, which, by history and heritage, is rightfully in Israel. Some Zionists see this as a divine right granted by God to the Jewish people, according to the Old Testament. Extreme religious Jews: desire to restore Eretz Israel and return to Zion (Jerusalem) In the mid-19thC this longing took on a more secular character and a new urgency Before 1948, the goal and task of Zionists was to re-establish a Jewish state. Since then, the task of Zionists both within and outside of Israel has been to ensure the states security, prosperity and continuity. PALESTINIAN AND ARAB NATIONALISM: After 1948, most Palestinians were worried about survival many were cast into refugee camps while others attempted to rebuild a life in neighbouring Arab states. Palestinians who remained in Israel were given little freedom and their lives seriously altered. During this time the Arab states took control of what became the Palestinian issue. As with the war, however, most were driven by self-interest. The Palestinian issue was useful to Nasser. The failure of the old regimes to claim victory in the 1948 war legitimised his revolution of 1953, in which he overthrew Farouk, a British client, and erased the last vestiges of Western influence in the region. The liberation of Palestine would ultimately be used as an issue that would establish his credentials as the dominant leader of the Arab word. Nasser coined the term Pan-Arab nationalism Nasser conceived the PLO in 1964. Financed by Arab states it brought Palestinian guerrilla and rebel groups under control and gave the Palestinian issue a voice. Created by Ahmad al-Shukeiri, the Arab League, mainly Egypt, controlled the organisation which had no means of operating independently. The PLO accelerated the Palestinian cause in name only. 1967 Six Day War: 1.2 million Palestinians in WB and GS under Israels control the Occupied Territories. Debacle of the war spurred Palestinians into action. They could no longer rely on the Arab states to reclaim Palestine as they were incapable (and/or unwilling) to do so. Palestinians would have to liberate Palestine themselves through armed struggle. Palestinians rejected all UN Resolutions which recognised the state of Israel (181, 242, and later 338). They called for the return of Palestine as it was under British Mandate. Palestinian nationalism re-emerged and steadily gathered momentum. In 1969 Fatah emerged as the dominant group on the Palestine National Council and took control of the organisation.

The PLO became an independent organisation, run by Palestinians, with the sole aim of destroying Israel in order to liberate Palestine. By the late 1960s the majority of those involved in the struggle had joined the PLO.

CHANGING PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT

PALESTINIAN Palestinian nationalism initially lay in the hands of Arab regimes where it was largely ineffective. After 1948, independent resistance groups, like Fatah, refuse to recognise Israel and conducted raids After 1967, PLO under Arafat took an extreme stance attaining global recognition but few successes. Defeat in the 1967 war discredited Arab regimes, spearheading Palestinian liberation and vindicating Arafats strategy. Fatah and other Palestinian groups began to take hold of the liberation drive by increasing raids on Israel. Arafat also used the victory at Karameh to canvas Palestinian cause on an international level. Late 1960s to mid-1970s: PLO used terror to disrupt Israel and draw attention to the cause. In 1974, with the fear that Arab nations would trade land for peace with Israel (and Palestinians would miss out), Arafat introduced moderation of Palestinian tactics, introducing diplomacy to armed struggle. Rabat Summit: PLO recognised as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. PLOs recognition of Israel and the phased-plan pursued by Arafat marked a change in official policy, but the rise of fundamentalist religious groups, such as Hamas, continued a belligerent stance towards Israel, e.g. George Habashs continued terrorism Intifada shows the new generations willingness to oppose Israel through non-violent methods, independent of external agencies. 1988 Arafat proclaims independent Palestinian state, rejects terror and acknowledges Israel's right to exist. This shows further moderation in the Palestinian approach and a willingness to use diplomatic means to achieve goals The progressive Palestinian moderation resulted in Western pressure for Israel to make peace in the 1993 Oslo accords. However this was a peace enforced from on-high and both sides had misgivings. ISRAELI Israels responses to terrorism and cross-border raids are part of a harsh, retaliatory policy consistent from its inception 1967 self-confidence grew; nationalist sentiment intensified Israel disregarded UN Resolution 242 and kept territories for strategic depth Increasing terrorist acts are met by harsh Israeli military responses in the hopes of forcing the harbouring countries to cast out the PLO. Jordan does so 1970; Lebanon after the civil war. Israel initiates facts on the ground, a creeping annexation of the occupied territories; military settlements to provide security. This gradually forces Palestinian dependence on Israel for work and imports 1973 Yom Kippur War: Labour governments arrogance regarding Arab impotence discredited increase in Israeli conservatism. Recognition of the necessity of peace with Arabs.

1977 Likud government: Begin initiates deliberate policy of creating settlements, citing religious rights. This is an acceleration of a process initiated by the Labour government a more extreme level which becomes a complicator for peace. Begin manipulates Camp David accords Israeli nationalism prevents actual progress over OT Conflicted response to OT: - Oriental Jews relied upon Palestinian under-class to elevate them from social and economic under-class - Sephardic Jews had less of an attachment to Palestinian underclass, although it does support the economy. They were generally more willing to trade land for peace 1978-1982 Israel continues policy of two-fold reprisals against PLO attacks from Lebanon. Sharons violent push into Beirut in 1982 causes public outcry internationally, and also within Israel Israel responds harshly to the intifada, using violence to break up riots (Iron Fist Policy), assassination of Abu Iyad, etc. The attempts to end intifada with violence attracted international and domestic condemnation, and inevitably failed. Shamir Plan created in response to the failure of aggressive policy, outlines negotiation with Arabs which fails 1993 Rabin signs Oslo Accords. However it was a peace enforced from on high and did not carry down to regular Israelis Rabins assassination shows a division of opinions over peace. Perez maintains commitment to Oslo, but responds harshly to attacks from Muslim extremists which provokes fear in Israeli population Netanyahu denies Palestinian state, and supports Occupied Territories this is a reverse of Rabins efforts Israels democratic system has caused inconsistencies in policy. Avi Shlaim: divisions lay not only between parties but within parties. Religious fanatics, e.g. Herut, Likud and Zionists are attached to OT as part of Eretz Israel. They are responsible for the continuation of the settler movement

NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1948, 15 May War of Independence 1949, 24 April King Abdullah of Jordan officially annexes West Bank and East Jerusalem 1967, 5-10 June Six Day War 1967, 22 November UN Resolution 242 1977, May Menachim, Begin and Likud win Israeli elections 1987, December Intifada 1988, July King Hussein renounces claims to the West Bank 1993, September Israel and PLO recognise each other and sign Declaration of Principles on Palestinian interim self-government The 1947 UN Partition plan proposed a division of the mandated territory into an Arab and Jewish state with Jerusalem under international control. Israel, however, ended the war controlling many of the areas allocated to the Palestinians. The remaining territory was absorbed into Egypt (Gaza Strip) and Transjordan (West Bank). Possible collusion with the Jordanian King and Ben-Gurion over this matter is a controversial area. Israel captured both WB and GS in 1967. UN Resolution 242 introduced the Land for Peace formula to normalise Arab-Israel relations WB problematic: having absorbed over a million hostile Palestinians, Israel constantly feared a vengeful fifth column and so restricted the movements and rights of Palestinians. Israel: the material prosperity of Palestinians improved under occupation when the economy was absorbed into Israels the labour force was given greater opportunities for unskilled work By 1981, Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories numbered about 100,000. They controlled 30% of the land and 90% of the water supply. By 1988 this had increased to 50% of the land. Some claim that if the issue of water could be agreed upon, peace would be possible in the region. By the 1980s, a whole generation of Palestinians had grown up under Israeli control; their political status uncertain, their civil rights severely threatened, and a large proportion living in abject poverty. Approximately half of the male workforce was commuting each day into Israel proper in the 1980s, constantly reminded of the difference in quality of life. This led to the first intifada ISSUES: Right of return for millions of displaced Palestinians Israeli settler movement Legal status / autonomy of the Palestinian state Israeli wall Security for Israelis and Palestinians CONSEQUENCES: Intifada:1987 and 2000 Continued terrorist attacks in Israel and Occupied Territories Continued repression of Palestinian nationals

TERRORISM/VIOLENCE AND THEIR IMPACT ON ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN COMMUNITIES

PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE: After 1948, mainly guerrilla raids (esp. pre-1970) and terrorism (assassinations, bombings, hijackings) Until 1970, Fedayeen raids were common. Between 1949 and 1956 alone , 400 Israelis were killed International terrorism campaign launched in the aftermath of Black September. Nearly 500 attacks carried out on international targets, mainly by Black September and the PFLP Islamic terrorism and suicide bombings became major features in the conflict after the 1987 Intifada, with 172 Israelis killed by 1991. Since 1967, 2,178 Israelis have been killed in terrorist attacks ISRAELI VIOLENCE: Largely carried out by the military. To punish perpetrators of terrorist attacks and/or discourage future attacks Policy of massive retaliation has remained constant since the 1948 war: from the destruction of Qibya and 60 civilian deaths under Ariel Sharon in 1953 operation peace for Galilee. Since 1948, 5,144 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli military operations Noam Chomsky labels Israeli military actions of deterrence in the OT state terrorism EFFECTS: RECOGNITION terrorism was extremely successful strategy in bringing Palestinian issue to the attention of the world. Milton-Edwards and Hinchclife: However, Palestinians became synonymous with terrorism the world over BITTERNESS / HATRED / DISTRUST inevitable result of a cycle of violence is perpetuated hatred. For years the PLO were marginalised by Israelis for their terrorist past, but more importantly, at a basic level, Israelis and Palestinians were alienated from each other by continuing violence RADICALISATION violence of Israeli occupation and the apparent hopelessness of the Palestinian position have driven Palestinian youth towards fundamentalist Islam. Richard Ben Cramer: these religious radicals are now perceived as leading the national struggle Israeli politics have been radicalised by violence. The idea of a life and death struggle, of a nation under threat established after the holocaust and during the four wars has been further ingrained by Palestinian terrorism. A clear example of this process can be seen in Benjamin Netanyahus 1996 election victory after a string of destabilising suicide bombings. INSTITUTIONALISATION Ben-Cramer and Milton-Edwards/Hinchcliffe: continuing violence ingrains violence and violent people in the political system. Five of the last six Israeli prime ministers have been ex-generals. Cramer: the army ate the state. This situation installs people in power who potentially have a vested interest in conflict.

ATTEMPTS AT PEACEMAKING
1978, September Camp David Accords Negotiations Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Palestinian representatives to settle the question of WB and GS. Self-governing Arab authority would replace Israeli military forces in OT for 5 years. From the signing of the accords (September 78) until the signing of the peace treaty (March 79), both Sadat and Begin were under intense domestic political pressure not to make concessions. Disagreements broke out almost immediately among Carter, Begin and Sadat as to exactly what had been agreed The Camp David Accords contained provisions that have formed the basis of all subsequent peace negotiations. However, they simply ignored the issue of Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights. 1982, September The Reagan Plan & The Fez Plan As soon as the PLO left Beirut in 1982, US President Reagan proposed the Reagan plan and the Arab League put forward the Fez Plan. Palestinians rejected Reagan Plan: it did not support Palestinian state, rather a JordanianPalestinian state. Israelis rejected Fez Plan: it did not include Arab peace with Israel and demanded total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories. 1987, December The Intifada A result of the gradual shift of resistance into the OT a new style of rebellion which seriously challenged the sustainability of occupation. Edward Said: The intifada combined the character of a civil rights movement with that of a national struggle for independence 1. Iron Fist Policy (Jan 88) Yitzhak Rabin: subject to harsh military and economic pressure, in the end, they will be broken 2. The Shamir Plan (May 89) diplomatic response based on principles of Camp David. The initial decentralised and varied methodology of the intifada confused Israelis and local initiatives showing potential for sustainability. The movement faded out due to ruthless Israeli repression and the PLOs attempts to centralise the movement (this decreased the level of popular participation and marginalised local leaders, allowing semi-militant groups, such as Hamas, to become the main players). 1988, December The Stockholm Declaration Arafat recognised Israel and condemned and rejected terrorism in all its forms. Shift in PLO policy gained international support, however Israel refused to accept PLO peace initiatives until the Palestine National Covenant and 1974 phases plan was amended. 1990, August Gulf War Arafats solidarity with Iraq badly damaged the PLOs reputation and resulted in political and economic setbacks as Arab states withdrew diplomatic and financial support. In the aftermath, when an Arab-Israeli peace process was placed high on international and regional agendas, the Palestinians were in a weakened position forced to make political concessions to keep the Palestinian issue at the forefront of discussions. 1991, October Madrid Peace Conference Participation in peace talks meant addressing the question of territorial compromise. Shamir was not willing to negotiate.

By mid-1992 it became clear that peace between Israel and Arabs and an interim settlement with the Palestinians was an impossible target. However, Madrid talks marked a historic turning point. Martin Gilbert: The belligerents had met around the same table, and were talking directly to each other for the first time since the first Arab-Israeli war, forty-three years earlier 1993, September 13 Oslo Accords; Declaration of Principles Mutual recognition, phased redeployment of Israeli troops and Palestinian interim government in WB and GS for 5 years while permanent peace treaty and final status of OT were worked out. Israel-PLO accord ratified by Knesset and Palestine National Council. Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe: Secrecy was the key to the success of the Oslo talks; negotiators were free from the external pressures and interference which had characterised the Madrid process 1995, September 24 - Oslo II Broadest and most concrete agreement concluded. Facilitated limited withdrawal from WB, implemented election of Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and partitioned control of OT between Israeli military and PA. The agreement was never implemented in full. The Oslo experience makes clear that there will be no chance for a genuine settlement of the conflict unless the process is consistent with the Geneva Conventions, international law, and Palestinian rights. 1995, November 4 Yitzhak Rabin assassinated Rabin brought a credibility to the peace process that no other Israeli leader possessed. Major setback for peace process which stalled in his absence, while terrorist attacks intensified. 1996, May Netanyahu becomes prime minister Obstructionist to peace Netanyahu: terrorism was a weapon that could be successfully countered. He persisted in the controversial construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. 4 September 1996, yielding to internal and external pressure, Netanyahu finally met Arafat at the Eretz checkpoint near Gaza. The two shook hands which was largely symbolic but there was no real progress in implementing the peace accords.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT

After WWII, the decline of colonial powers, Britain and France, saw rise in influence of Superpowers in the region. Rivalry and competing interests of the US and Soviet Union have made major impact on politics and conflict in the Middle-East. Ian Bickerton: no real issue between the US and the Soviets over the partition of Palestine. Reasons for US involvement: - domestic political pressure applied by American Zionist lobbying - Trumans personal sympathy towards Jewish refugees - economic (oil) and strategic interests in the region - containment of communist expansion in the region Groisser: US significantly influenced others in the UN Reasons for Soviet involvement: - way of extending influence in the region - hoping region would become a predominantly socialist area - economic (oil) and strategic interests in the region - counter influence of US in the region Peter Hinchcliff, both competed for influence to safeguard oil interests and strategic routes Lesch: From 1956, the value of the Middle East became contemporaneously linked to the emerging cold war between the US and Soviets Both created client states to act as local proxies and allies. The US created intensive support for the Israelis while the Soviets favoured the Arab states Both supplied and supported each side with aid and arms Bickerton: US refusal to fund Nassers Aswan Dam sparked the Suez crisis The US developed special relationship with Israel as ally, recognising it as a strategic utility The Soviet Union also increasingly supported the Arab states. Both pushed their respective clients interests while avoiding direct involvement. War by proxy. Tibi: the Superpowers carried out intervention in the region in an indirect way after 1956. Both sides intentionally stirred nationalistic sentiments of clients while supplying both with the weaponry and assistance with which to pursue a militaristic means to an end. From 1973, Soviet influence began to wane as it faced internal and economic problems US took on a more dominant role in the region. PEACE subsequent pre-eminence of US meant it was able to pursue progressive peace agreements as a means of safeguarding interests.