-7-

7,

P-*

CSI BATTLEBOOK
CS.I -BATTLEDOOK -15-D
OPERATION ENCORE

Combat Studies Institujte Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LIBRAR

RHA

R RE

LEC T E_
II

STDISApposud

1W STNbm%

s-0

LY+'

-Z

'

--

...

-'

" +

'

--

."

"

-I

E -RTSCUMfENTTICON PAGE
ACCESSION NO 3. RSCIFIET'S CAT ALOa sUMEERa

a .. AERGO.~VT
-E (A+* Su.:1,:r)

iI
S. TYPE OF rPORT A PERIOo C o.--. R
1

[ 9-

l3attle Anaysis:- Oeration Encore

'

The 10th Mounta n

6.

Paper
N

vision in Adtion, Limited Offensive' in Mountains, 18 Februla'ry 'to 5 MarA 1945;.

MAJS

student Paper

7.

BOrMarls Clements, Hawkins, UldmIxon,

6. CONTRACT OR GRANT N-,UMsEr r)

Samollerk, Shimmick, Tartella, Thore, Tempone McMahon, Patterson, Rankin, Tarantelli,Canton, Duncan ,

Pr-RcV1OR.l.

ORGANIZATION NAME ANO ADDRESS

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK 1

AREA 6 WORK UNIT NUMBERS
,.-

-.
.'

:, USACGSC, Combat Studies Institute, ATZL-SWI Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

I.CTRLIGOFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

AMLW

REPOR

DATE-

USA.XGSC, Combat Studies Institute, ATZL-SWI. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

14. -W NITCR.NG AGENCY NAME A ADORESS(1I dJ1*ruwt !z.Controlling Office)

NUMBER OF PAGES

73

IS.

SECURITY CLASS. (of L.%e report)

i_J

[]

~~UNCLASSIFIED
SCK;FDuLE..:

.'-:8%
'

7:

S. S7 AT E WES T (4!Yier.'

c:

-L

I s"id

..

,8

"18.
.7..

SLPPLE-ME.1.TARY NOTES
ST~UNSATMnalss ry Batl (.1 ha Sblatu.f:dis

-Mniloitary Opefra~tifons I RoTacia)nlss

1a4

amb

O i

1945

-It was a limited . ,r

H.isiory, Battle Analysis, CasPo Studies, Military Operations, Tactical Analysis, Bat1le.,. Military Tactics, World War II, Operation Encore, Limited Offensive,

Itai, Mountain Warfare

',25

A1C.' +7

re.. .fwI

lokrmbv
The operation took place as the Allied

)eu.y: "niyb
I.

Operation Encore took place from 18 February to 5 March 1945. -It was a limited offensive operation designed to secure better positions for initiating a spring Sarmies in Italy were conducting an active defense which had been assumed in October 1944 when large scale offens'ive operations were" suspned due to a lack of sufficient ammunition, bad weather, and heavy losses. The objective of the operation was to seize a series of moun.tain peaks and ridges averaging 3,800 feet in height. Control of these peaks and ridges would .,rovic- a strong anchor from which the spri -*I-. -y

offensive to capture the Po Rivet Valleys.

1"
i

--

-"-

,-7

.:._

~OPERATION ENCORE -THE

10TH MOUNTAIN

DIVISION

IN ACTION

.;i

~~LIMITED OFFENSIVE IN MOUNTAINS

:o. IS1 FEBRUARY TO 5 MRH14 Prepared by: Staff BoranMajor -j~r.haek k J~or jCh4,ek telements ;t~a*1*s1kawinsMajor Maztr Melr-r Bob -;Idmixon
ba--

:'-'--

Gr6up 15

Ray Canton Major Norm Duncan Tim McMahon Patterson Major Bill Major Dick. Rankin Major Fred Tarantelli --qpone Maj or John

I,.:

0 ;""Major _]I Major'

Colonel Preecha Samollerk Jag Shimmick Major Jack Tartella Mike Thore
313

!j'

U.S. ~Submitted to the Combat Studies Institute, fulfillment partial College, in HMONANDIIININATO ~General Staff TH ENCOR KPRAIO
-%

Army

requirements for

the subcourse P651,

Battle

Command and of= the Analysis. r

1 Accession

:_ii

~~J,-';ti Ileation

SP~

Distribution/ Availability Codes

!m ,A

I.

BACKGROUND OF OPERATION ENCORE

Date,

Location, Operation

and Principal

Antagonists. to 5 March

Encore took place from 18 February limited offensive operation initiating

1945. better

It

was a

designed to secure to capture

positions for

a spring offensive took

the Po River Valley. armies in assumed in Italy

The operation

place as the Allied had been

were conducting an active defense which 1944 when

October

large scale offensive operations ammunition, bad

were suspended due to a weather, NZ, and heavy

lack of sufficient The objective

losses.

of the operation was averaging 3,800.

to seize a series feet in height.

of mountain

peaks and ridges

Control of these peaks and ridges would provide

"a strong anchor from which the spring offensive could be

launched. The German Grenadier defensive sector was held by troops of the 232nd spread along an 1 mile

Division,

which was thinly

"front with the 1045th Grenadier Regiment holding most of the

Belvedere Torraccia Ridge, the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment in Regiment

the Mount Castello area, scattered along the Serriccia

and the 1044th Grenadier

-

Campiano Ridge and the mountains intended only for rear area old men or units on the

to the southwest of it. duty, most of the division's

Originally

troops were either

convalescents eastern front.

intercepted enroute to their In

former

reserve were the 232nd Fusilier Independent Mountain Battalion

Battalion and (21:79-60)

elements of the 4th

':J*
KIRW 0

- -

--------

The attack was conducted by the 10th Mountain Division

consisting of the 85tV

86th,

and 87th Mountain

Infantry

Regiments and the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division of the

Br-azilian Expeditionary Force (BEF).

The 10th Mountain Division had

and was the only division in

recently arrived in

Italy

the United States

Army organized

primarily for mountain fighting.

About a fourth of its the Aleutian Islands. The

personnel had already seen service in principal distinction between

the Mountain Division and a its transportation, which in its

standard in'antry division lay in

consisted almost entirely of horse and pack mule trains, artillery, /pack which was composed of only three battal and its

ions of 75MM

"

howitzers, battalions. comparatively

organic anti-tank and quarternastt;.

i,-

S []
1

Because of specialized mountain training and light organic artillery, commanders in other

theaters had declined the division's services. engaged in mountain warfare,

But to an army

the 10th Mountain Division's attractiveness (29:464).

specialized training enhanced its Finland's initial

victories over Soviet Union armies during aroused America's political and On 6

"the winter of 1939 first

military
January

leaders in
1940,

highly specialized winter troops.

the Assistant

Louis Johnson,

Secretary of War,

asked General Marshall what considerations the General Staff had given to the subject of special transportation, clothing, equipment, food,

and other essentials necessary for an effective

field force under conditions approximating those of the

\campaigns .

in

Finland and northern Russia (16:1). 3

While winter

Z-5m-,ZxM

training and tests

reports attributed and failures in Albania

were being

completed

by the War Department, the Balkans divisions to

the success of the German Army in Army in Norway and Italian

of the British

to the presence or absence of trained mountain terrain (29:1). These reports

troops

operate in sources 'Al

from various in

demonstrated the need for specialized

training

mountain warfare were reinforced Department from interested officials

by pressure on the War of the National Ski men but ..

Association and the American Alpine Club. were highly skilled their natural interest difficulties training down in ski

These patriotic techniques,

and mountaineering

and enthusiasm

caused them to ignore many the way of such 1941, the

of the logistic specialized U.S. Army set

which stood in 1). In

(14:Chapter on paper it

November ol

first

mountain Patrol

infantry to recrbit

regiment

(the 87th) volunteers.

and asked the National Ski Two more regiments

were then added as the 10th in. the summer of 1943. With its the

Mountain Division was activated 75MM pack howitzer artillery

support and few motor vehicles, jaeger or light divisions, infantry

division resembled a German In

division. the

sharp contrast to most other U.S.

the ranks of of

10th Mountain Division contained a college-trained men.

high percentage

Evaluation

of the Sources. The

No books have been written about -Operation Encore. best operations summary to the Alps. is found in Ernest Fisher's

book Cassino were unit

The majority of sources available

44
%.

'Aa

histories and after-action reports.

Mountain Division and Fifth

Histories of the 10th

Arng provided the most information. fighting Books

There are also selected and training

readings on mountain and winter that assisted in the research. also added results.

requirements

by Generals Mark

Clark and Lucian necessity

Truscott

insight The de

into the operational

of Encore and its

book on the Brazilian Expeditionary Moraes glorifies the part

Force by Mascarehas

played by the Brazilian Expeditionary in the book questionable

Force making some of the information from a sufficient battle, its historical viewpoint.

The one major area where of the

information was not found was an analysis significance, and the units

involved from the German strategy with Field was of little value in

perspective. Marshall this

A German article

discussing

Kesserling

and General Westphal

study.

The order of battle

of the German Intelligence

Army prepared by

the War Departrr.ent's Military useful ,r, article concerning

Division was the most German forces. references contradicted of One more

participating certain particularly

problem encountered each

was that

other on some points,

on the dispositions

German forces. While there are still this as a

-Z

individuals alive identified Mr. L.

who participated

in
*,*
I -

operation,

they were not

soon enough

to be used

~!-4

major source of

information.

0. Grantham would have He was a (11). 10th Mr. He .

been an excellent supply sergeant in

source if

we had found him sooner.

Infantry Regiment

the 86th Mountain collection of

has a substantial

information

about the

Mountain Division which he has collected over the years.

N%
Mi!

Grantham joined the Division at Camp Hale and remained with it until the end of the war. Fort Leavenworth. In studying Operation Encore, be read is Ernest Fisher's book, the first source that should This book He lives approximately 90 miles from

Cassino to the Alps.

deals with the Italian Campaign May 1944 until

utilized in

from the attack on Cassino in

the war ends.

Although only a few pages are

it does give a good outline

r.iscussing

the operation

and overview of the operation.

This book also discusses U.S.

and German strategy and allows the reader to see how the operation planning developed, results were obtained. why it was necessary, and what

The books by Mark Clark,

who was the

commander of Allied armies in

Italy and previously Fifth Army commander and Lucian Truscott who succeeded Clark as Fifth Army commander, provide an insight into how the commander perceived

the operation and on their attitude toward the units involved. The rest of the resources are basically unit histories or
studies done by the Army on various aspects of training,

logistics, and strategy which provide bits and pieces that allow us to piece together an understanding of the problems encountered in winter and mountain operations conducted by a division. A secondary study that results from

light infantry

research on Operation Encore was a fairly comprehensive view of the history of the 10th Mountain Division and its their organization in units from

1942 through Operation Encore.

""4,% 62

U.-

II.

REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC SETTING

WA

Causes of the Conflict World War II was the most destructive war in history,

damaging more property and reaching more parts of the globe than previous wars while killing nearly all sides. Though difficult 16 million servicemen from the price tag
estimated at

to measure,
is

to the

more than 50 nations who participated

$1,150,000,000,000. Major battles in and Pacific Oceans, Asia, Europe, North Africa, the Atlantic

and the Mediterranean Sea were stark

evidence that few areas were left untouched by this global war. Newq, more lethal weapons were unleashed to include the atomic bomb. Amphibious tracks, large tanks, accurate artillery, bombers, and

paratroopers, ballistic used.

mountain warfare specialists,

missiles were but a few of the advanced means of war

Who started this war? and Japan.

The finger can be pointed at Germany it will be. addressed later. On I

Their -easons for

September 1939, Germany attacked Polann. In less than 3 months in 1940, Germany continued its blitzkrieg tactics by rollin, 44 over Denmark, France. Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, by and

Though Hitler failed to knock out Great Britain in

intense bombings,

1941 he quickly conquered Yugoslavia and Italy, a foe of France.

Greece which had been attacked by Hitler, then moved into Russia. 7

'6y* -

e-'

ft

In

the Pacific, 1941

Japan's expansionist attack on Pearl

plans continued with and America entered

the 7 Decemoer the war.

Harbor,

Fighting was to continue

for almost 4 years until

"Italy's surrender on 3 September 1943, Germany's on 7 May 1945,

and Japan's on 2
ki

September in

1945.

It

was indeed a

long and greater

costly war and one that

the end created a

potentially

nemesis - a powerful,
It II: is said that lefi

communist Russia.
there were three main causes of World War unsolved from World War I, Italy, the rise of

the problems
Ag

dictatorships, morq territory remaining (.

and the desire of Germany, and resources. from World War

and Japan for

One of the major problems Treaty. The i..

I was the Versailles

~Treaty placed heavy demands on GermanW,

give up land, Moreover, Allies pay reparations, occupied part

forcing her to disarm, the war. entire economy

and admit starting of Germany and its

suffered from rampant unemployment, inflation, and shortages. The Germans' hatred of the Treaty and the conditions perceived

to be caused by

it

fueled the fire. in

Many of the hopes of the German government were placed the post-World War I League of Nations. Unfortunately, the United States pnw'r to either never joined the League and the League had little to answer

snuff out sparks of war or pleas for help.

the German depression in the Nazi the

government's of 1929,

With the international release

German its

discontent

grew and found a

party and Allies'

leader,

Adolph Hitler.

The League World War a lower

followed-up

disarming

of Germany after

I with several

meetings that

would help guarantee

level of armament.

A,
B++

0'"+

Germany,

in

1932,

agreed to its to that

post war armament level.

level

if

other

countries would reduce unless an Again, a international

France iefused

to comply

police system could be established. was unable to prevail and 8 of

weak League of Nations this meeting, Hitler

months after Germany.

had become Chancellor

Two other problems remaining from World War I economics and nationalism. the major one that Japan felt instigated

were

This combined problem may have been World War II. Germany, Italy, and

that France,

Belgium,

Great Britain,

and the United

States had an unfair rontrol of most world markets and thus its wealth and people. High tariffs aggravated they and the severe the sit,',tion. their depression of

the 1930's further

Germany, share of

Italy,

and Japan felt

were not getting

the world's

wealth,

perhaps even not enough to survive. they mus c take the lands if they

This lea them to could not compete

believe that
.fairly

I
I

for the markets. The rise of World War -ascism In in of dictatorships, II, manifested Nazism in itself Germany, listed in as the second major communism in Russia, Japan. of but the cause

Italy,

and militarism in the iron hnd

Russia,

Lenin then Stalin

ruled through property, dictatorship

"communism, seizing all

'-

private

outlawing all of

communist people.

party,

and promising a in Italy

the working Party, became

Mussolini

founded the Fascist powers of government greatness. Hitler

Prime Minister, return Italy

seized all ancient

and promised to seized on the to

to its

discontent of his people,

the depression,

and inflation

4.,

promise prois

a A

reunid

"Greater Germany"

with great military 3 country. and she

feelings Were

Lu

-strength.
Meanwhile,
-once again

He tuo had absolute Japan's militarists

looked

control over his

dominated the liberals

conquests. These

toward war and

evidenced by her invasion of Manchuria on 18 September Many - II. The third the aggressive territories its major cause for World War II Italy, is historians consider this act to be the start

1931.

of World War

considered to be

desires of Germany, After

and Japan for more and _o

avid resources.

Japan acquired Manchuria The

abundant natural

resources, 1932,

she turned to China. withdrew,

Japanese

invaded China in

and then began an to include the

economic campaign United States, problem.

against her.

Few countries,

did- little

more than throw rhetoric at the

Many still in

n 137 agan
1937,

an h competedi thad an b198,Jaan Fighting provided war materials to Japan.

and by 1938, Japan had completed an her ports, industries,

L
N~

began again economic and rail

blockade of China controlling centers. was seen in

Mussolini's aggression slaughtered Ethiopian Hitler

1935 as Italy Ethiopia. He and

forces while conquering

then turned to Spain where their Franco

backing of rebel

iFrancisco Franco allowed dictatorship Germany. force, in Spain in in

to organize an absolute to those in Italy and air

1939 similar 1935 Hitler

Meanwhile,

established

his army,

and navy contrary

to the Versailles

Treaty.

Though words I Allies, no -,4'

were exchanged

between Germany and the World War In 1936,

F
Ije

overt action was taken to stop him.

he moved militarg

10
Y,, 1.++., ++.+,+-,v;,.,, . ,",, ." ++,. + "+.,,. ,.N : - ,'.+
I

fbraess into the demi-l-itarized zone aonig the French :Aqain, iCOmplai-ntS were raised but Hitler won.
Sconfident of Suess, Hitler

iorder.

-yw

then,
1938 the

turned on Austria and in Czechoslovakia

.reuni-ted her with GermAny. last territorial I

was supposedly Europe, so in

claim Hitler

had to make in 1938,

accordance with the Munich agreement of lost the Sudetenland to Germany. Sanother last claim. Hitler

Czechoslovakia there was to be 19.9,

Unfortunately, In

wanted Poland.

March

Hitler took the remainder of Czechoslovakia, then a portion of Lithuania and in April, Italy sei-zed Albania. Having just completed a non-aggression Germany Britain.

pact with Russia,

on 1 September

19394

invaded Poland amid threats

from France and (reat

Great Britain and France declared war against Germany 1939 and World War Bulgaria, Finland, II had Hungary, begun. Italy, and Romania

on 3 SePtember Albania,

sided with Germany and Japan and powers. General Major Hideki

became known as the Axis

leaders among the three primary Axis powers were Tojo of Japan, of Germany. Benito Mussolini of Italy and

Adolph Hitler

They-were ably supported by Field Kesselring and Rommel of Germany, and General Yamashita and Admiral

Marshals Von Rundstedt, Marshal Graziani of Italy,

Yamamoto of Japan. The war appeared to begin in Pacific and Atlantic. followed by continual in Europe in 1939 and unrelateed acts China in in both the

Japan's attack of fighting there until

1937 was

the German attacks to extend any the

1940 gave Japan

the opening

war to her south.

No evidence has been found to suggest

formal conce-rt

joint to

strategic win World

plans for Japan and Germany War II. However,

to act

in

both had similar

goals,

one called the European New Order and the other Greater East Asia Co-prosperitw Sphere. establish a powerful * and south. She then empire by occcupying planned to Germany territory

called the intended to to her east using an air

overrun France and, Thereafter,

war, force Britain to seek Russia, Order.

v-,,

peace. oilfields

she would defeat

capture the Caucasus' Much like a weak sister,

and create the New hoped to take advantage for herself.. Pacific fleet so that she

Italy

of Germany's success and grab territory Japan hoped to cripple could then overrun Thailand, Netherlands Indies. all the U.S.

Malaysia,

the Philippines,

and the

China would then be conquered and Japan

could unite

of East Asia under the Greater East Asia Sphere. Japan had no plans to invade the United

Co-prosperity States'

mainland,

hoping instead that a

two-ccean war would to allow

exhaust the Allies' Japan to retain

resources and make them willing seized territories.

-i-

Comparison of the Principal When the war being substantially wartime with industrial began,

Antagonists

Germany and Japan had the advantage of Germany in particular had

mobilized. plants in

operation,

106 combat divisions artillery force. as well as a She also had

tanks,

motorized vehicles,

and heavy

large,

well-equipped

and well-trained air

12,000 aircraft men and women.

and by war's end had mobilized over 30 million She had a decided advantage as the war began.

L2
/

Allied forces were made up of Great Britain, almost 50 other nations. States, Great Britain, Attlee, Roosevelt,

France and

The Allied Big Four were the United and Russia. Stalin, Churchill,

China,

Truman,

and Chiang Kai-shek were leaders of Generals Eisenhower, Marshall, and Admirals

the major Allied nationsi MacArthur, Pound, and De Gaulle,

Field Marshal Montgomery,

Mountbatten,

and Nimitz were but a few of the many leaders.

outstanding Allied military

Though the United States did not enter the war until December 1941, it fortunately had begun the industrial It did not have the production of the

mobilization process earlier.

capacity or equipment of the Axis powers at the start war, but by mid-war the potential

of the United States industry

(
*1 *

was being realized and it powers. Moreover,

was by far outproducing the Axis

the Allies mobilized double the men and women uniform, totalling 62 million.

that the Axis could put in Aircraft, ships, bombs,

and many other weapons systems were limits. established in a

seemingly produced without

Allied basic war strategy was first December 1941 conference where it Germany first, then on Japan.

was decided to concenirate on Germany, the Allies

To defeat

would invade Western Europe and crush the Germans against the Russians who would move westward. invading her from North Africa. Japan would be invaded after the Allies seized key Pacific islands and placed bomber bases in would be the springboard China. The islands and bases Italy would be eliminated by

for the invasion of Japan.

S' .

%'-V4

Situation in
In

the Theater
of giving priority to the

pursuit of the strategy

European Theater,

the United States in

began committing enormous As North Africa their next

resources to the campaign began to wind step. down in

North Africa. the Allies

1943,

considered

of 1943 two muddied currents merged in the Mediterranean. The first was the Allied strategic problem of where to go and what to do now that the North African campaign was ending. The second was the Italian political problem of how to get out of an increasingly pointless war. The Allies at Casablanca had decided on the taking

"In

the summer

--

of the island of Sicily, as a means of utilizing their strength in the theater, and of easing their shipping problems. In spite of the American desire for an invasion of the Continent, they accepted the British contention that Sicily was a valuable objective; theg were also susceptible to the point that it was better to use troops in the Mediterranean to some advantage, than to withdraw them and have them cooling their heels in 1944, waiting for the 1943 and into through late invasion. In this they were conscious of the immense battles being fought in Russia, and they believed rightly that the Russians would resent the downgrading of the one area where there actually was contact between Western Allied and Axis ground forces. For a variety of reasons then, most of which made good sense at the time, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on Sicily as the next campaign. They did not, as they began staff planning for the invasion, consider going on to invade the Italian mainland."(26:291)
SBritain

With the success of the Sicilian

*I
-

campaign, on their

events occurred strategy for

-.

which

produced

a rift

in

Allied cohesion Mussolini

!-

the prosecution of collapse and such a

the war. collapse

was on the verge of

could be exploited.

"The British, with their traditional interests in the Mediterranean, urged that past Allied success be exploited by an invasion of Italy or the Balkans. General Marshall wanted to withdraw maximum forces from

14

14

mej

.. . . . -. ...... .. ..

. .....
France. The United
-

the Medit4efranean
pr-ojected invasion

to speed the build-up for the

of northern

'GN,

fwestern

States Nay, its primary interest being in the war in the Pac-iftic, demanded the trd-ntfer of scarce assault (amphibious) shipping to the Far East. Finally, during the TRIDENT and QUADRANT conferences (May and August 1943) the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the major European operations for 1944. Operation OVERLORD would be the primary United States-British effort in Europe and, as sud-i, it wfould commanid -priority in men and supplies. Operations in the Mediterranean, therfore, must be designed to immoblize enough German divisions to enable OVERLORD to succeed. This could best be accomplished by forcing Italy out of the war and by threatening Germany's southern frontier; these objectives, in turn, could best be achieved by invading Italy. Possession of Italian airfields would enable Allied bombers to strike industrial areas -- hitherto relatively inaccessible in southern Germany and southeast Europe. Italy's surrender would cause the defection of the thousands of Italian troops on occupation duty in southern France and the Balkans, forcing the Germans to garrison those areas with their own forces. Finally, later operations would occupy Sardinia and Corsica, tightening the Allied grip on the Mediterranean and opening the way for an eventual invasion of southern France."(27:Section 2, map 94) When the Italian political situatuion became clear to

Hitler,

his first in

impulse was to order German troops to the defensible mountain terrain of northern he subsequently decided to defend as much of This decision resulted in 2 years of

consolidate Italy.

However,

the peninsula as possible. bloody fighting June 1944. in Italy.

Rome was eventually captured on 4 Operation OVERLORD began, (2:150). It7

However,

two days later,

taking all publicity away from the Italian campaign

would eventually General Mark

take away supplies and replacements as well. Clark was ordered to continue the attack to

the north against heavy German

resistance.

"Now, instead of waiting for Eisenhower to assure the surrender of so many Germans that those in Italy would have to throw in the sponge for lack of support, his 15

'.4.

troops would be in

on the publicity

once again.

Generals like to fight their troops, not to sit by while somebody else assures a victory. Major General Lucian K. Tiuscott, commadin n Fifth Army, concurred with Clark on these grounds " (1) The attack of Fifth Army, if launched in coordination with the attack on the Eastern and WeStern fronts in northern Europe...may cause the final German collapse. (2) If we succeed in destroying the Boche here, he. will be unable to withdraw to the Alps- and prolbng +he struggle there. (3) if we sit by and wait, we allow him to continue the exploitation of northern Italy. By destroying him here, we will quickly complete the liberation of all Italy.""(2:150) Throughout in second priority this period the Allies in Italy were considered operations priority

being conducted dropped

to the invasion and subsequent in western France. In fact, Italy's

VI-

to number

3 with the prospect of a second invasion of

cthyFrtantce.oocRo ["Following prolonged (and occasionally sharp) consultations, Churchill yielded to Roosevelt's insistence. Seven divisions, including all of the French Expeditionary Force, were withdrawn from the Fifth Army, completely unbalancing Alexander's dispositions -- and jamming his lines of communications as they moved southward to prepare for the amphibious assault against southern France. This transfer stripped Alexander of best -in fact, his only -mountain troops; At replacements, he could expect the American 92nd Division in September and a Brazilian division in late October. One group of bombers and twenty-three squadrons of fighters were likewise diverted to southern France. Alexander was then instructed to continue his advance to the approximate line Verona-Padua-Venice. Meanwhile, Hitler had reinforced Kesselring with eight more divisions of varying quality (one each from Denmark, Holland, and Russia; two from the Balkans; and three -- hitherto earmarked for the Russian front -from Germany). He also allowed Kesselring to retain the redoubtable Hermann Goring Panzer Division, previously scheduled for transfer to France." (27:Map 105) The fact that priority the Italian campaign little was not the first on this front

(I
4 Ihis

does not imply that

was expected

from the Supreme Allied Commander.

S16 V7A

_ ".

."Y

......

"a"The task before the 15th Army Group was to destroy

some 30 divisions of the Nazis' Army Group Southwest before they could retire to the northeast into the Alps toward Austria and prolong the struggle. For any force, in any terrain, the task would have

been formidable. On the west, the enemy right was firmly planted on the rugged mountains. On the east he was solidly entrenched behind the Senio, Santerno, Sillaro, and Idice River, all comparatively wide and steeply banked. An attacker there faced a maze of dikes, ditches, and flooded fields. Behind these riverlines were the machine gun nests, 88's and ack-ack on the Po River's north shore; behind them was the short and heavily fortified Adige River line; and beyond that more river lines and mountains across the road to Austria. However, he had little motor transport, less air power, and was so short of gasoline that he was reported to be using grappa -- the very best grappa, no doubt -in some of his vehicles. Overwhelmed in the sky, he could not defe'nd his highways or his railways. His communications with Germany in a critical state, he grew ever more dependent on the Po Valley. Two lines of action were open to the enemy:

S
/'

a. He could fight where he stood, and if forced to withdraw, could delay successively on each river line, using floods and demolitions to slow our advance, or b. He could attempt a voluntary withdrawal position behind the Po and subsequently the Adige. to a

Since he desperately needed the Po Valley, it was believed he would contest every foot of ground. It appeared to the Group Commander that if the 15th Army Group could achieve a quick break-through and a rapid exploitation, huge enemy forces might well be destroyed or captured before they could retire across -the Po." (6:28) In January 1945, the German forces in Italy were under the control of German Army Group C (the Army Field Marshal C, 17 Group Southwest was the of 30

mentioned above). commander.

Albert Kesselring there were a total

Within Army Group

'

divisions.

However, border.

it

also had responsibility Only 23 divisions

for the faced the Allied 15th

French-Italian Army Group.. divisions .-. i ,i

The Allied

tSth Army Group consisted of 24 It was commanded by LTG Mark Clark, 1944 from General Alexander, a who -.

(20:L07-108).

assumed command in British * Generals Italy officer

December

(7:406). in

Alexander and Clark planned the 1945 offensive if objective -Its to block the German withdrawal.

possible --

was to destroy

the German forces The Eighth Army was

in

Italy

before

they could cross the Po. along the Adriatic

to attack first The Fifth capture After the

coast and push northwestward.

"Army, under MG Truscott,

K lBologna,

would then drive northward,

and advance to link-up with the Eighth Army. the Allies would strike north across (27:106). objective that It

link-up, the last

the Po to block

escape routes Encore,

into Germany with its initial

Operation

of seizing heralded the was became the

Mount Belvedere, beginning of

was part of the preliminaries in Italy.

the 1945 spring offensive

designed to keep spearhead that (8-130).

the enemy off balance and eventually victory in Italy

pointed the way to final

'Z-

II.THE TACTICAL SITUATION

The Area of Oper'ations-.

A
F

At the end of 1944, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's

~Allied Armies in Italy were spread along the northern Apennine

Mountains, (composeci mostly north of the divide, with the Fifth U.S. Army of the IV and !I U.S. Corps) in the west and the

Eighth British Army in the east.

I,7
Al

It

NAUA

1.

!-. ;Q4

41x

AsW

News4

This mountain barrier, Italy, separating

50 miles wide,

stretched

southeast

across

the continental

Po Valley from the From the Ligurian Sea on the

comparatively narrow peninsula. west i._plains

to the Adriatic Sea on the east, on each extremitw, extended

with only narrow coastal line of in

the almost unbroken

ridges and peaks,

some of which reached well over 6,000 feet

elevation. scrub oak,

The upper

slopes were

covered with chestnut the soil bare rock

trees,

and pine forests

wherever

was deep enough. slopes, razorback

|But many mountains had precipitous, ridges, and sheer cliffs.

Trne mountain mass was pierced by only improved to provide passage for a The IV Corps battles to enter the Po (highway 1, highway the

a few roads sufficiently modern mechanized army. Valley were fought

largely along these roads which

12,

and highway 64)

crossed the mountains through The passes by which

principal river

valleys.

these roads Most of but

surmounted the ridges varied from 3,000 to 4,500 feet. these roads followed almost all at the line of streams, varying in size

high water stage during Although this it

the greater

part

of the

winter months.

road net afforded failed to provide in

a number of adequate number. and lateral All

routes over the mountains, communications.

Secondary roads were limited twisting curves,

road-, were marked by narrow defiles.

sharp gradients,

Bridges over mountain streams were often hard Land slides were frequent even without As a result, the units of

to bypass. assistance

of German

demolition experts.

the IV Corps were forced to utilize

poor trails

and to constuct

k2

-4.

.4.

-~

"many

routes themselves.

Many of these hastily hacked out or rainy weather,

improved trails

became practically impassible in

and mule pack trains and soldier carrying parties were necessary to reach the troops in positions. otherwise inaccessible mountain

Although the alignment of the Northern Apennines was erosion caused by numero us transverse !

southeast to northwest,

streams cut out many irregular spurs projecting northeast to The ill-defined summit line, averaging 3000 to 4000 southwest. feet, lay toward the southwest edge of the range so that the

[those

slopes which faced the Allied forces were generally steep while facing northeast were relatively long and moderate. The eroding effect of the mountain streams together with the irregular geologic formation of the Northern Appenines has
I.S

served to divide the range into a number of compartments marked by broken ridges, spurs, and deep gorges
-

offering the Axis In contrast

forces a series of excellent defensive positions. to the rolling, Italy, extensively cultivated hill

country of central if

the mountains of the Northern Apennines were so rugged

that movement of wheeled or tracked vehicles off the roads was

seldom possible. In late September the fall rains begin.

Mountain streams which virtually dry up in change to raging torrents * in a few hours'

the summer months time. Fog and mish, to near

accompanying the cloudy days, zero. By late October,

often reduce visibility

"N

snow begins to fall on the higher peaks, for short in the

and in midwinter periods.

can block mountain passes to traffic

The problems of conducting offensive operations

'.4.

21

--

w7'-7

li"

Ni

mountains, difficult at best, are greatly fall rains and winter snow set in.

increased once the

During Operation Encore, it

was bitterly cold and the ground was snow-covered. Although haze reduced visibility on the first days of the operation, weather was marginally suitable for air operations. I The Northern Apennines, at all points, are a deep and formidable obstacle to an advance into the Po River Valley. f the

4.44~
,.. g

..

-064.

'-.% Th pnie nI CrsSco 747

Thimuntinbarie e.,end fom heLiurin

lp Sothas

coat. heythen Apennsouinwar

Clorse Setor th

7cas4

fr2)or

22

distance Northern in a

before gradually

swinging

inland.

The north side of plain of

the

Apennines meets the broad fertile curved coastal line.

the Po River abruptly

slightly

To the south they

drop away

to the narrow irregularly point,

plain along the Ligurian Sea and the Arno. At its narrowest approximately feet high are

to the plain along between

Florence and Bologna,

the range is over 7,000

50 miles wide and individual scattered a throughout and fields

mountains

(15:307-310). of fire positions

The Germans had excellent large section of highway In

observation

over a east
would

64 and into the American

American

of the Reno River. provide observation Thus,

hands,

the high terrain

almost as far as the Po River this

Valley,

about 20 miles. terrain.

high ground had to be considered key of this

General the objective of

Truscott made the securing Operation Encore.

high ground

The most dominant

portion

of this

key terrain

consisted of and 5,000 Ridge, left was flank

two ridges whose highest feet. The first of

peaks rose to between 3,000 the Serriccia-Campiano It overlooked the

the two,

Sknown to Americans as Riva Ridge.

of

the 10th Mountain Division and dominated routes of approach ridge, the Mount Belvedere-Mount della Torraccia

to the second

The Serriccia-Campiano the division's

4

Ridge paralleled

the

left

flank of of the

zone of action for 4 miles.

The side
jr

ridge facing the division was a cliff, rising

amost 1,50W feet above the valley floor.

s5ome places
had to be

This cliff

23

.. - 0 " ,.,_; ',-:

i"

(-::,;.."'.,,-.-.'-

'.''-':.

V ..,-.'._''.

'','.;,,.-O..

,- .'Y

scaled. offered

The snow-covered ground lying little, if any,

in

front

of

this

cliff

cover and concealment.

There was Vehicular

nothing more than scattered movement would be difficult trails

clumps of stunted trees. at best because and in

the few roads and poor condition. mainly on pack be n

L;

crossing the area were narrow the burden of transport

Therefore, mules,

had to fall

full-tracked

Weasels,

and Jeeps.

Tanks could only

brought forward as far as the town of Quericola which was more than a mile southwest of Mount Belvedere. handling existed to This movement (7:425-430). of fog the could

be accomplished only with skillful Although the possibility

take advantage hours,

or haze to conduct limited cover

the operation

during daylight

and concealment, of fire

together with the excellent afforded the Germans dictated a

"observation and fields

night operation.

Comparison of Opposing Forces Allied forces during Operation Encore consisted of the 10th
V.

Mountain

Division and the Ist

Brazilian

Infantry

Division. disposal,

In

addition to these ground substantial

c

forces at the commander's operations

support Air Command. for

for air-ground

came from

the XXII

Tactical support The

The Brazilian Air Force also provided

the operation. base strength (8:129). of 14,101

10th Mountain Division had a with three

personnel,

infantry regiments Infantry,

These and the

regiments were the 85th

the 86th Infantry,

.24

17-

WN-SrSI24.

87th

Infantry.

The division was organized and equipment tailored For example,

as a

light

infantry in

division,

with training terrain.

to fighting

mountainous

the artillery

was 75MM pack

by

howitzers mules. during

that

could be broken

into components for transport combat power to the division

To provide additional

14P

Field

were attached: 175th the attack, the following units Artillery Battalion (105MM), A/1125th Field Artillery (iO5MM), 84th Chemical Battalion (4.2 inch mortars), and

Battalion

751st Tank Battalion, Company A,

894th Tank Destroyer

Battalion, (21:147).

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force Infantry Divsion and its

consisted of the Ist The ist Brazilian There were force.

support troops. 15,069

Infantry Division consisted of A _ approximately 10,000 additional

personnel. in

personnel

the support

The division was organized three infantry regiments: Infantry Regiment, and the

as a regular the

infantry

division with the 6th The

1st Infantry Regiment, Regiment

11th Infantry

(8:20).

1st Brazilian

Infantry Division had been experienced combat.

in-country

for some

time and had already Operation battle Encore, the

When committed to into

1st Brazilian

Infantry Division went

without additional assets,

attachments

but was reinforced with and 155MM howitzers.

corps artillery

primarily

105 MM

German forces opposing the Allied attack consisted of the 232nd Grenadier the 29th Division, the 714th Light Infantry Division, and

Panzer Grenadier

Division as the area's

major reserve. 18 mile front with

The 232nd Grenadier Division was defending an

25

VVUIN

-W-.A

Sthree

regiments on line, 1043nd Grenadier The division and the 4th Regiment,

the 1045th Grenadier

Regiment,

the

and the 1044th Grenadier

Regiment. Battalion The 11,909

reserve

ctinsisted of the 232nd Fusilier Mountain Battalion (7:428).

Independent

wdivision as structured
-.-

to operate at a strength of strength. to be a

~-personnel *

but was at 60 percent Infantry Division non-motorized in a normal was organized Its

The 714th Light highly mobile,

light,

division.

weapons were similar to those found but in it had slightly more

infantry

division,

mobility. at

As with most units

the theater,

the division was

60 percent strength.

The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was The standard panzer grenadier an artillery firepower was mobility was

the major reserve

(7:433).

division consisted of

two infantry regiments, gun battalion. division Its

regiment, comparable often greater

and an assault

to a German armored (7:422:.

but its

An analysis that, in general,

of the opposing

levels

of technology level

so~ws of was

both sides enjoyed a similar

advancement. similar, Army

Fire control of artillery mass

on both sides its fires.

each able to effectively

The German

used the light firepowee, in

machine gun to deliver and their light

the majority of the

infantry's

machine gun was considered factor For the first (VT) the Allies time in

to be the best used, however,

the world. that

An off-setting advantage.

negated

the Italian used

Theater,

the artillery

variable time air bursts

fuze was

(15:523).

This allowed artillery

over varying

.N',

26

,*-.

terrain

without

prior

adjustment

of rounds.

Another

technical ropes

advantage used by the Allies to scale Mount Belvedere.

was the use of nylon climbing Without this new out. lightweight

rope,)

the assault Logistics

may not have been carried

was primarily a problem only

for the German Army.

interdiction results.

of

lines

of communications practice

with outstanding local resources for campaign, =

The German

of relying on

food and water reduced the effectiveness but ammunition resupply ammunition was of particular was critical. concern

of the air

A shortage of artillery to the Germans.

46

NC

~__*".._a'

,,

...

Resupply

of Ammunition

for Pack Howitzers

('21:20-21)

The greatest problem Allied supply

officers

faced was keeping uLp

27
4S

~
...

:Z'
!&_

with the location

of forward units

so as

to ensure constant

resuppply.
During the battle, command and control passed and status exception to this On occasion, units. all both sides enjoyed an adequate over their forces. in a In general, level of

orders were The one

of units rule

reported

timely manner. Infantry

was the 1st Brazilian communication

Division.

they experienced however,

problems with their

Overall,

command and

control was adequate for

forces involved. In contrast to many other aspects of the battle, The Allies, through ULTRA, intentions. were This level,

intelligence

was one-sided.

aware of the status was a strategic

of German forces and their to the Allies.

advantage

At the tactical

the Allied forces again enjoyed an advantage. aerial partisans dispositions. The greatest area of disparity reconnaissance, aggressive patrolling clear picture

A combination of and the use of of German

gave the Allied forces a

among the forces of training

involved

in

Operation Encore was the level

the various forces

had. divisions in

The

10th Mountain Division was one of the best in the U.S. in Army. It had received

trained training

extensive and its

Colorado

both winter and mountain warfare, and in

soldiers physical

and leaders were highly skilled condition. While most of capabilities, its it

excellent a high

members possessed had special

degree of specialized

teams trained were

by some of the country's best experts.

An example of this

28

-V-%~

SI

'"

the teams who climbed and prepared Serriccia-Campiano the assault experience, however, (7:429). The one aspect it

Ridge for

lacked was combat first battle. This was,

as Operation Encore was its by its high

offset

level of training

and thorough

knowledge of current

doctrine. Infantry Division, while having by .s

The 1st Brazilian previously ,t 1the 10th tasted

combat,

was not yet up to the standards seWhen the Ist it came with a battle, it Brazilian low level Infantry of training.

Mountain Division. in Italy, in this

Division arrived Prior

to commitment

had received equipmenti Although had

and training its

-

and had seen combat against the Germans. training level had improved, the BEF still

overall

problems

(21:7-10). training But had always been one of by 1945, training had by its

Within the German Army, major strengths. suffered. the quality personnel Further, of soldiers now found in It

had to be. the training

deficiency

was aggravated Most of the

coming to the front. units

were older or convalescents, area protection. highly effective These two factors German TI-se saving organization were key in

primarily trained grace for all and an efficient

to perform rear German units staff was a

system.

getting more out of the available observers would have thought

resources than most

possible. the forces involved in Operation. The. in

The final Encore forces is

way of comparing intangible

-

the most

morale and leadership. spectrum of varying levels

involved ran the entire

29

both areas. The 10th Mountain Division had the best of both worlds. 'The division was created out of a specialized recruiting had experienced tough, number ot athletes, realistic training, drive,

and had drawn a high It had

some of world class stature (7:425).

in Colorado that

>4

weathered adversity

had acted as a weeding-out

process, all, it

and had retained only people with high motivation. was an organization of highly skilled,

In

highly motivated MG Hayes, the

fortunate to be lead by a very able commander.

division commander,

was a former Medal

of Honor winner whom ((7:425).

General Truscott called "one of my abiest leaders" Hayes was always concerned for his troops,

often visiting them

in

the hospital,

and rotating battalions from the front to the The regimental But effective commanders possessed leadership extended

rear for periods of rest. an equally good reputation. down to the riflemen

as well.

Due to the high level of the division, there were

motivation and quality of soldiers in repeated riflemen.

The 1st Brazilian Infantry

instances of courageous leadership

by individual

Division

had a

"mixed bag"

of

qualities. described in ( would

The morale of the individual the highest terms by all

soldier was repeatedly The soldiers

observers.

advance under heavy fire in the war effort. less clear.

and were anxious to do their part

The qualityj of leadership of the division isW" described his

While the division commander 30

..

,i

4L'~

regimental the staff

commanders

in

glowing

terms,

he often units

sent members of But,

to oversee the actions of his in totality, the division

(20:113).

when viewed untried unit

had developed from a raw, force anxious to fight

into

an effective

fighting

and prove itself. The German forces,

-,'
fl, 4

in

contrast, its

had somewhat

different .fl'-;*

problems.
trained, situations -,;

Throughout the war, highly far motivated, more effectively

leaders remained highly

and able to manage resources and than most would have expected. The German Army on all and had been in other fronts in Italy

But morale was not good. was on

the verge of collapse, year.

retreat

for over a

The personnel

within the division were mainly for more mobile, strenuous

-4-

older men and convalescents unfit

fronts

(7:428).

German forces fought more out of desperation However, they retained the ability to put Lup a

than motivation. stubborn

defense when

called upon and did so when needed. 1944 drew to a close with the Allied and In December, the 0.

The turbulence of German forces braced German offensive the Allied line staggering offensive,

for the final

effort.

of the Ardennes, and capture

whose objective was ended

to break in a

the port of Antwerp, in

defeat.

For the 2 month delay

the Allied loss from which offensive

the cost to the German forces was a be able to mount

the Germans would never operation. operations Allied

an effective

commanders, in

therefore viewed the final of the following: solution settling

of the war

the context

the war with Germany with a

pure military

31

f4-

(unconditional surrender) and ending hostilities in Europe with the maximum number of U. S. troops available for immediate

re-deployment to the Pacific.

Immediate Military Objectives of the Antagonists The objectives of the Allied forces in Italy therefore
Would

complement such a plan by Preventing German forces from

withdrawing and reinforcing the armies in Germany, neutralizing their ablilty to wage war by destroying of the Po Valley. the rich industr-ial area

Feasible Courses of Action for Each Antagonis-t

(might
surrender.

Allied staffs viewed several courses of action the Germans

consider.

Some estimates saw no other options available

but to

to Marshall Kesseiring, German Army Group C's commander,

Others feared that Kesselring might order a general

withdrawal to the north and find refuge among the former Austrian fortifications that had survived World War I. withdrawing from Northern Italy, the Germans might By

then occupy a

"National Redoubt" in an Alpine zone extending from Salzburg and Klagenfort in the east to the Swiss frontier thereby attempting As the Allied staffs

a last ditch stand of indefinite duration. correctly deduced, however,

there were no indications of such a

withdrawal and indeed the Germans continued to defend in place, falling back, only if overwhelmingly pressed and using the natural barriers of the Italian mountain=. and the series of
'32

,~!rA

river lines that dominated- the northern portion of the

'peninsula.

Although Army Group C still defensive line in

maintained an unbroken January 1944, their general

Norhtern Italy in

ability to wage an effective campaign was rapidly deteriorating. Marshall Kesselring other fronts,
-

had m~ved four divisions out of Italy to 1945 the lines of communication were

but by early

so badly damaged that it was impossible for the Germans to Kesselring's conduct a strateqic withdrawal from the peninsula. desire was to coeate a more flexible strategy whereby he would be allowed to withdraw without pressure to more advantageous positions when the Allies commenced their offensive operations in
-positions

the spring.

Although there was no intention for a strategic Italy, Hitler viewed withdrawal from the present
concept as bad for morale of the

withdrawal for

under Kesselring's

troops and denied Kesselrang the freedom of action to enact such a strategy (7:443). deploy in depth in 1945. Hitler's directive and recommendation to

the sector with the greatest threat came on As a consequence a long standing plan for Operation Herbstnebel, was scrapped and in

.22February

such a withdrawal,

the view of the German Fourteenth Army's chief of staff was a death sentence for the German Army Group in Accordingly forces in Northern place, Italy, Italy (7:449).

the 15th Allied Army had missions to fix German prepare forces for the final assaults into and allow sufficient logistical build-up for the

such an operation.

While the battle for the Ardennes raged, 33

Mim

J.

SFifth

Army took good advantage stalemate situation final to re-train

of the stabilized

lines

and the

and re-arm the force for

spring offensive. I April the Fifth

Accordingly 1945. In

no major offensive was to attacks to .t

take place until that offensive,

the preliminary use its

Army would

forces to clear highways 64 and 65 of these

German forces off the high ground overlooking and open the way to the Po River. attacks fell to the

The commencement

preliminary specially Mountain

10th Mountain Division which was such a mission. The 10th

trained and equipped for Division's mission in this

plan was to attack and which would provide the Army's spring

occupy those advantageous offensive

key terrain lines of

features

departure for the Fifth

(21:22-28). Army were elements of the 14th German held strategic and tactical high ground

Opposing the Fifth Army Group whose forces

overlooking River. critical In

highway 64 and Allied positions German possession First,

east of the Reno them three

these peaks afforded observation

advantages.

of Allied movement warning of

toward the rich area of the Po and accordingly early the time and location of the main effort offensive. two critical Lastly, this Secondly, roads that terrain occupation of these of the Allied features

was astride

led to Bologna: favored

highways 64 and 65. in that the

heavily

the defender

peaks had a general ele\'ation to defend and equally difficult 232nd Grenadier Division initally

of 3,500 feet and were both easy to assault. positioned Accordingly the in

three regiments

S34

-N

- f

line across an 18 mile front.

occupation and defense of

The mission of the division was

from In were addition tasked

the peaks and ridge lines

Porretta north to points south and west of Vergato. to the defensive missions, the forces additionally

with observation of Allied movement. The Fifth Army's limited objective attack would be a forces from this, Mount

two-phased operation those

designed to clear the German To facilitate

peaks and open the waW to Bologna.

the first della

phase would attack and secure Mount Belvedere, and Mount Castillo.

Torraccia

Phase two of the attack from Mount Torraccia Castelnovo.

would be seizure of the ridge line northwest ot Mount Castellana

and the town of

11

35

R.'!t

7,

l%%

1N,

N3,

I."A U.Z -

IV.

DESCRIPTIOIN

OF THE ACTI0N

Operation Encore was divided from 18 February objective of until

into two phases. During Phase

Phase I I the

was

25 February.

the 10th Mountain della

Division was the seizure of the Ridge. The objective of

Mount Belvedere-Mount the 1st Brazilian

Torraccia

Infantry

Division was the seizure of Mount to 5 March. Tenth Mountain of ;;

:1:

Castello. Division's Castel

Phase II

was from 1 March

objective was the seizure d'Aiano. The Brazilian Division's

the high ground vicinity objective was the

siezure of Castelnuovo.

The action will

be described hy phases.

Phase I ,l~g [' The

Initial

Disposition

of Forces IV Corps left in flank

10th Mountain its in

Division occupied the

bg.:

with the majority of Belvedere but still confluence the Corps'

10th

troops to the rear of Lizzano the Silla River. in River Valley near the The 1st Brazilian River Valley.

of right

the Reno flank

Division was on Opposing were the

the Rena

Mountain

Division and the

1st Braziliar Division

elements of Light

the 232nd German Grenadier Elements

Division and 714th German occupied

Infantry Division. Division's

of both divisions

the 10th Mountain 714th German

-

zone while only elements of the occupied the ist Brazilian

Infantry

Division

Division's

zone.

German soldiers

from the 232nd Grenadier

"*s *36

vex,*

"\

Division were thinly spread across the Serricca-Campiano Ridge and Mount Belvedere-della Torriccia Ridge (7:429).

KIVS

484

44

.%at

Phase I

-Initial

Disposition of Forces

Phase I

-Opening

Moves By Each Antagonist

Phase I of Operation Encore began on 18 February. By nightfall of 18 February 19?45, the 10th Mountains Division was ready for its first major engagement with the Germans. Corps

artillery commenced the delivery of normal harassing -fires for the night attack so as not to indicate anything Lmtn.sual
37

to the

-~

4IF5*

zS

I'-I

enemy (15:512).

At 1930 hours, the preliminary attack to secure 'The I1st

the flanking Serriccia-Campiano Ridge was laurnched. Battalion,

86 Mountain Infantry Regiment had been selected to in the area. Expert rock climbers

seize the key, terrain feature

of the battalion clambered up the rocks for 1500 feet and laid out ropes after them for the use of other personnel not so well42 trained in mountain climbing (15:513).

too*~.

%*D

-;Tn

2311

4-4

ft4~~!

WEauta.,!1A ..

.9

fKf1

Phase~~~~

Ecr

ofOerto

-.

.... ... .....

just

as it

was

in

the initial

stages of relief

by elements of

the 232nd Fusilier Battalion

off-guard, gave up the little tactically resistance.

(15:513).
critical

The Germans,

thus caught

heights after 19 February, 19 February,

Soffering

only a

By 0600 hours, Not until 0655 hours, and that

the ridge line was secured. did the German silenced artillery

become active

was quickly

by IV Corps artillery. description Infantry of the attack is critical by the Ist Battalion, the

A detailed 86th Mountain operation.

Regiment

to understanding

The battalion's

attack aimed at the to its front. A Company moved Cappel Buso, attached to

Serriccia-Campiano

ridge directly

against Mount Manunello, and C Company

B Company against Mount

against Mount Serriccia.

F Company,

the 1st Battalion,

advanced against positions south of Mount flank protection, of the battalion's and one platoon of A right flank to ,$

Manunello to provide left Company operated take the Pizzo di impassable terrain

independently

Campiano spur. caught

The attack over this

seemingly A

the Germans cow.pletely Mount Manunello at

unawares. 0045 hours, B the

Company reached the ridge at closely

supported by F Company at 0300 hours lower slopes of its objective

(15:513). where arms fire.

Company reached the first a opposition

was met in

the form of small

After

1 hour skirmish,

the objective

was seized and At 0505 hours, it secured after a

the German C Company brief fire

garrison attacked fight.

was captured or killed. its objective, which

The detached

platoon of A Company reached the summit of

39

AVS;

Pizzo di Campiano after occupied broke, the ridge in

a hard 9 that area.

hour

climb and successfully light of dawn had

Before the

the 1st Battalion, its objective enemy

86th Mountain

Infantry Regiment

secured

(15:514) counterattacks Regiment were against the ist Battalion, A

The first 86th Mountain

Infantry

directed against

Company's detached varying during attacks in

platoon on 19 February.

Three assaults, were repelled their

strength from platoon

to company-sized,

the day.

As darkness came the Germans renewed to hammer at the thin

and continued

line of defense

throughout the night of

19-20 February.

Prior to losing

communications with the Battalion, artillery fire of which

the platoon called for By the captured the

(morning
7,

blasted the Germans off the slopes. the platoon had killed 26 Germans,

the 20th,

and wounded many others.

Isolated and low on ammunition, finallu arrived on 2.

platoon held on until February. relief,

reinforcements

Between the time it

arrived on the ridge and its beat off seven enemy attempts

the platoon successfully the position (15:514).

to recover

Counterattacks

were also made against other units

of the

10th Mountain Division along the ridge, repelled. Two

but these were also Independent Mountain

companies of the German 4th wiped out in

Battalion were virtually (15:515). Seven

these counterattacks

.e.

.50 caliber

machine guns and two 75 MM pack the

howitzers were emplaced on the newly seized ridge to support main attack on Mount Belvedere (15:515).

40-

With the left flank protected by the capture of the Serriccia-Campiano Ridge, the 10th Mountain Division secretly

jmoved

its

other uinits into attack

positions.

The division plan

of attack called for the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment to move northeast uip the western slope of Mount Belvedere while on its right the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment was committed to a frontal attack against the Belvedere and Gorgolesco sutmmits.
MF

L-ZL

View From the Division's Positions to Mount Belvedere (21:80-81)

The 3rd Battalion, 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment was established on the division's right flank and had the mission of protecting this flank by seizing the village of Mazzancana.

~U~y ~,When

the 10th Mountain Division reached Hill 1053, in the saddle

411

approximately
-.

halfway

between Gorgolesco and Mount della, Force was to attack Mount portion

Torraccia, Castello.

the Brazilian Expeditionary It was essential that the

launching of this

of the attack

be timed correctly

(15:515).

Since the enemy

on Mount Belvedere had complete observation

~over the division position in the Silla Valley, assault tr~oop:s

marched eight miles during the night of 18-19 February into

forward assembly areas at the base of the Belvedere-Gorgolesco

Ridge. The attack jumped-off preparation surprise in at 2300 hours, 19 February without

any artillery tactical

the hope of securing initial On the Infantry left, the ist

by the night assault. of the 87th Mountain

and 3rd Battalions

Regiment

crossed the line The Ist Belvedere

of departure along the road net near Quericola. pressed northeast up the slope toward Mount The leading the first

Battalion

and north to the village

of Valpiana.

troops of B Company advanced 800 yards before German outpost. At the outpost,

reaching

sporadic resistance They and

groups of were dug fortified

entrenched in along a

Germans offered sporadic resistance. line of bunkers, machinegun positions,

Shouses

which extended from the summit of Mount Belvedere west -to Rocca Corneta
-,

(15:516). and anti-tank minefields were The

Extensive anti-personnel encountered on anti-personnel partisans

the western slope near Corona. mines caused some casualties

among the Italian forward. the

who were showing

the Americans the best route by-passing

An hour and a half after

Corona at 0300 hours,

4:2

let Battalion, 837th Mountain Infantry Regiment reached Mount Belvedere in the face of moderate resistance and immediately began clearing a spur of the main ridge running north toward Valpiana.. The Regiment's 2nd Battalion meanwhile moved around
I5l

Corona after pushing through a minefield that had fortunately been uncovered by the melting snow and swung a half mile west

IWZ-

tqq

AlA

Soldiers Walk Through a Minefield near Corona (21.'86-87)

Polla was taken at 1035

hours on 19 February.

By

taking Polla,
.

the battallion had punched a second hole in the German's defensive line, Campiano. the first being the positions on the Pizzo di

This made the German positions between Polla and

43,

FI

"M*

Pizzo di Campiano untenable. Infantry Regiment moved into

The 3rd Battalion,

87th Mountain Mountain Throughout and

the center of the 87th

Regiments's

zone north of Corona during the morning. the regimental front

the day positions on organized. Regiment

were improved

Two companies of the ist heavy casualties

Battalion, during

1044th Grenadier advance

were dealt

the initial

and during an abortive counterattack hours (15.517). Further to the east similar the 85th Mountain Infantry

which they launched at 0400

successes were achieved when its 3rd Battalion Mount

Regiment sent

against Mount Belvedere and its Gorgolesco. encountered At 0100 hours, Ge:-man resistance Three hours

1st Battalion against the 3rd

20 February,

Battalion first NE

300 yards below the summit of later, leading elements had fought battalion Gorgolesco,

Mount Belvedere. their

way to the very

top and at

0615 hours the entire

was on the ridge between where it barrage was caught delivered in

Mount Belvedere and Mount

an extremely

heavy mortar and artillery On Mount Gorgolesco, enemy reaction along the by 1st

by the Germans. almost identical

Battalion experienced 0610 hours had cleared toward Mount della

but

the summit and advanced It was meeting advanced.

the ridge

Torraccia. as it

increased German German--

small arms and mortar fire artillery was partially fire

However,

neutralized (151517).

by previously

planned

counter-battery

The 3rd Battalion, experienced

-..

86th Mountain to its

Infantry supporting

Regiment attack on the

.77.

little

opposition

44

~
N.

X-N

right

flank of the 85th Mountain of Mazzancana

Infantry

Regiment.

It

occupied

the village about

and established defensive

positions on the were

,--

half-way

up the southeastern Company

slope of the saddle

morning of 20 February. made against at the battalion's

strength

counterattacks

positions east of Mount Gorgolesco Several later in other smaller At 1800 hours, passed Regiment to

1115 hours and were repelled. were repelled

counterattacks

the day.

the 2nd Battalion, through the ist

85th Mountain

Infantry

Regiment Infantry

Battalion,

86th Mountain

continue the attack. By the end of 20 February, secured Mount forward to seize S +well on its the 10th Mountain Division had to move its units

Belvedere and was beginning Mount della Torracia.

Operation Encore was

way to suzcess.

Phase

Continuation of

the Action on 20 February. were against, to the the r"''~:+

Air operations for Operation Encore began Missions were flown primarily against German immediately behind the German lines command . N "85th posts. The air Infantry support was particularly Regiment. During

guns that and also

++m::+"displaced ++'

helpful 3 days,

Mountain strong air support in

the next

support

coupled with the artillery Castello on

and the Brazilian right its mission

-

capturing Mount

the division's

flank enabled the (28:466).

10th Mountain

Division to complete

The Germans began

their

counterattacks on 21 February.

The

45

7,

87th Mountain

Infantry Regiment

successfully

repelled

counterattack Regiment

by 80 men at

dawn. dawn

The 85th Mountain

Infantry

was also attacked at The

and the Germans inflicted the due to Division

some casualties.

10th Mountain Division continued Enemy opposition The was limited 10th Mountain

attack to the northeast. the rapid development had the element

of the attack. on its Much of

of surprise

side and was able to offensive action by bold night fires, and

overpower during this

the Germans.

the 10th's was

phase of the battle

characterized

attacks without the aid of preparatory

-

or supporting

in .

many

cases,

the division took objectives

with bayonets and .4

grenades

(28:466). Infantry Hill Regiment began its attack on the della

The 85th Mountain [( final

objectives of Phase I, on the morning of shared The

1018 and Mount

Torraccia,

21 February.

The 85th Mountain the 87th Mountain ran

Infantry Regiment Infantry along Regiment.

a defensive line of

line with

departure

for the attack

the reverse slope of Mount Belvedere to the Peak of Mount Belvedere counter

through Polla to The Germans the Belvedere

Valpiana conducted Ridge German line

(3:20).

attacks at many points along

prior to the attack

the Division was faced with fresh Infantry Regimemt. ground, forward but These they

troops from the 741st German failed halt

counterattcks

to gain any of the lost the Mountain Regiments'

did temporarily

progress

"once the attack began.

Infantry Regiment,

The 2nd Battalion, way forward

85th Mountain and by darkness

inched its

"46
-7.7

A&

reached points below Mount della Torriccia

(15:519).

Hill 1018

was taken by 2100 hours, 21 February without much difficulty. The 126th Mountain Engineer Battalion provided a great dea., of

assistance matter of a

to the 85th few hours,

Regiment they

during

its

attack construct

(2:156). an aerial

In

were able to Ridge.

tramway up Serriccia-Campiano

The tramway was over with much needed

1500 ,

"feet long and not only provided the units

combat supplies, but

also served as a method to evacuate cut down the time it from 8 hours to 5

the took L]P

wounded.

This method of evacuation to reach the aid station rate

for a casualty minutes. 4t'thirty-four

The casualty casualties

was very low.

There were only (2:156). This the

of whom seven were killed was so well planned and

part 1st

of the battle Battalion

conducted that

and F Company of the 2nd Battalion were the only Infantry of Regiment that took part.

elements of the 85th Mountain The 3rd Battalion and the rest reserve at

the 2nd Battalion were in Ridge.. continued strong into

.i,

the bottom of Serriccia-Campiano for the final

The see-saw battle 22-23 February. counterattacks The Division,

objective

The Germans continued to launch against all units battle, taken. in

the 10th Mountain Division. was very impressive. Every '

in

its

first

assigned objective had been Regiment Mount della suffered

The 85th Mountain as they

Infantry

the highest casualties By 0900,

approached

Torraccia.

23 February,

the 10th Mountain on its

"Division had secured its

positions. Heavy

objectives and was consolidating measures were taken 47

security

to help prevent

any counterattack the entire first

that might be mounted by the Germans. phase of Operation Encore,

During

the 10th Mountain

Division suffered 850 casualties, (3:24). The Germans,

of which 195 were killed and suffered heavy The Germans offered artillery

on -the other hand,

losses and had 1,200 men captured (28:468). less than expected resistance.

During the action,

supported the advancing Americans by pounding the Germans ,, continually (15:522-523).

The 10th Mountain Division's performance during Phase I of Operation Encore was outstanding. All unit member performed

like combat-seasoned veterans. performance

Not only did their valor and

earn the respect and admiration of the Fifth Army,

but also from the Army as a whole.

Phase I

-Action

by 'the Brazilians

The 1st Brazilian Division did not make any attack until 21
February (20:111). It had been given more time to prspare f ision had been given for earlier
attack against Mount

Operation Encore than the oi

operations.

The 1st Brazilian Division's

Castello used tactics similar to those used by the 10th Mountain Division. The 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment attacked (21:84) while the 11th Brazilian Infantry eastern slopes. The from the

west and south

SRegiment

pushed north across the lower,

attack by the Ist Brazilian Regiment was the division's main effort. The attack of the 11th Brazilian Regiment (20:111-112). 48 was conducted

by only one battalion

The main effort had the

31'p,*

5support of an engineer battalion and had tactical from Brazilian Air Force aircraft. position on 20 February, The aircraft

air support strafed German

the day before the attack kicked off support of Phase I began at 0530

The Brazilian attack in hours, 21 February.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Regiment attacked from positions north and below the summit within 2

Brazilian Infantry

east of Mazzancana and took hills hours.

The Germans had had their right turned by the 10th y.

Mountain Division's seizure of Mount Belvedere and withdrew after receiving on the summit in little pressure. The two battalions converged As they approached the

a pincer movement.

summit of Mount Castello at approximately noon on 21 February, they were preceded by a 15 minute artillery preparation which reinforced Those Germans

was fired by the 1st Brazilian Division's artillery by a battalion from IV Corps artillery (20:112).

who had not already mountain (21:84).

left were blasted off the top of the The mountain was secured and being mopped by

2040 hours,

21 February. the ist Brazilian Division continued its Bella Vista. This
_

On 23 February, advance,

attacking toward the village of

attack paralleled

the 10th Mountain Division advance which was The village itself was

moving along the della Torriccia Ridge.

out-flanked by the 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment and captured in the face of heavy machinegun fire. The area around I-a Serra pill boxes were

and Hill 958 fell

on 25 February when several

.,5,
g w--.
lp--.I

oi.

reduced in Brazilians killed,

a determined (21:84).

bayonet

and grenade assault

by the 32

The Brazilian and 9 missing

suffered 246 casualties: (15:522).

25 wounded,

Phase II A-4

Initial

Dispositions the 10th Mountain Division was on the Brazilian Division was on the Corps' Division was arrayed approximately Infantry in Regiment on its left, as the

On 26 February, Corps' right. shown, left The

and the ist

10th Mountain

with the 87th Mountain Infantry

85th Mountain

Regiment on

the center, The left,

and the 86th Ist Brazilian

Mountain Infantry 1iRtn Division had its ll1th Brazilian

Regiment

the right. its

1st Regiment on

the 2nd Battalion, and the 6th "

Infantry Regiment in

the center,

Brazilian These Operation Ist effect,

Infantry Regiment dispositions Encore.

on the right

(20:119). Phase II of

were changed The 87th Mountain Regiment

to support Infantry

Regiment and the reliefs. In its

Brazilian
pi6

Infantry split

conducted division,

mutual

this

the Brazilian

putting one of

regiments on the left flank of the 10th Mountain leaving its other regiments on the 10th Mountain

Division and Division's

right

flank

(20:119).

The 10th Mountain Division had been given it was to launch had the main effort of

a corridor through Phase II.

which

The Germans still

the :232nd and 714th German They had also

"Divisions opposing the 10th Mountain Division.

A: ibrought

up the Mittenwald Battalion, Mountain School (25:report

cadre from the German There were four

of 26 February).

50

46.J

enemy battalions in the zone of the 10th Mountain Division, each from the 1043rd and 1045th Regiments. substantial reserves. There were also

two

These included the Mittenwald Training

Battalion, the 114th Recona-issance Battalion, and the 721st Infantry Regiment (3:29).

-ZipI-"

At

:Tr
16*

fft

CkuI.

rI. n~uatelren

Dsoiiosa Phase~~~~~~~~~~-

II

BgnigofOeain

II Phas penng Mvesof te Atagoist

IVCrssette The.March consol

eidbten26Fbur

daisposits

oiions

an

cod

tig

civ

patrolling.

As mentioned above, temajor movement of friendly

eJI0

K,4

PII
"
,

forces was the shifting

of regiments to give the 10th Mountain

Division a more favorable sector for Phase II. not idle during this period.

The Germrrans were

-

The seizure of Mount Belvedere

Mount della Torraccia Ridge had disrupted their defensive positions. The Germans tried vainly to get Mount della Battalions of the 85th and 86th Mountain

Torraccia back.

Infantry Regiments were attacked by an estimated German battalion on the night of 25 February. accompanied by February). February. and artillery Brazilians. the relief This counterattack was

1000 rounds of German artillery

(25:report of 26 26

The counterattack was repulsed by 0430 hours, On both the 26th and 27th of February, fire

German mortar '_it just as

harrassed both the Americans and the

One position was hit heavilu by artillery

operation between the Brazilians and Americans was causing many casualties (25:report of 28

taking place, February).

The Germans were also trying to improve their Kesselring was aware of the heavy casualties that

dispositions.

the 232nd and 714th Divisions had suffered during Phase I of Operation Encore. He was intending to replace the two divisions Phase II of Operation Encore was

"with a fresh division (7:433).

-,

to catch the Germans as they were trying to strengthen their battered units.

Phase II

Continuation of the Operation of Operation Encore was intended to push the IV It was originally scheduled to begin

Phase II

Corps postions to Vergato.

52

Mach

bu

wa

delaye

twc

due

to

wethr .

Th

attc

1(March,)butiwasldlayedwieuet to beducncto byth edi

weather 87thvmrsMouti

Tlaen he attack<

was h

nantyrch.i

K riht ad te

86h Montan Inantr

battalions'

Rein~et ontheleftATh

.4

of

the

85th

Mountain

InfSantyor-nreev

33)

4'N

ruI03

boom

E7__J~~4

' -4,F7

"MIT~
A4.~4

0 C.-

S'-

53~

attack

with two regiments abreast.

The 86th Mountain Vedetta,

Infantry Grande

"-.

Regiment had Mount Terminale,

Mount della

MoLurnt

d'Aiano as objectives. attacking ultimately 0630 hours, division's bursts, Mount della Castel

The 87th Mountain Infantry Croce,

Regiment was and At

Mount della Castellana, della Spe

d'Aiano and Mount the artillery

(21:524-525). the

3 March objectives.

began

to soften-up

The sky was dotted with occasional that the artillery

air

indicating

was making extensive use troops in until the open The

of variable (3:30).

time fuze - deadly against The actual attack did not start

0800 hours. to

10th Mountain Division was making of surprise. The 86th Mountain departure at 0800. Its Infantry

no effort

keep the element

Regiment

crossed the line

of

1st Battalion and its

moved around the-west

flank of Mount Terminale,

S"ieast

2nd Battalion moved around the had successfully it negotiated secured the

flank. enemy small

After the arms fire,

1st Battalion artillery,

and minefields, The 3rd Battalion, up to take over security

west slope of the mountain. Infantry Regiment was brought

86th Mountain flank of so

the west

Mount Terminale and the 1st Battalion rapidly

provide flank

for the regiment The 2nd Battalion However, just

could continue to advance.

cleared the eastern resistance During this in

slopu of the mountain. the village advance, of lola, the division's a ski jumper,

it

ran into stiff north *:soldier an air (21:525).

to the most famous by

was killed.

Sergeant Tokle,

was killed

burst while trying to

silence an enemy machine gun

54

..-. ,

L!

1.

16

(2:165). commanding Infantry

The 2nd Battalion officers and staff when it finally

captured the majority of the 2nd Battalion, captured Iola

of

the

721st German

Regiment

(21:525).

The tanks of the 751st Tank Battalion support during to the 2nd Battalion, the fight suitable for lola. In 86th Mountain spite of the

provided close Infantry Regiment

limited avenues of

approach essential

for armored vehicles,

the tanks were an

part of the operations. in Iola where they

The Germans had barricaded houses

themselves

had turned the thick-walled

into forts-in-miniature. town and assisted (1:2). in

The tanks led the advance into the the destruction the of the German positions progress

Without the tanks, substantially

10th Mountain Division's slower. Regiment in had also been of battalions

would have been

The 87th Mountain successful.

Infantry

The Regiment

advanced

a column

against varying resistance. established at Pietra Colora

By noon, (21:526).

road blocks had been

Across the division's ridgeline to ridgeline.

front,

the enemy fell

back as

from they had V

-F

They did not

counterattack and as their the

done during Phase i

I of the operation do.

doctrine

indicated they should Division relief-in-place. was relieving artillery the and air

Once again,

10th Mountain a Regiment t use of

had attacked just This

as the enemy was conducting Infantry

time +he 721st German Regiment. by "Rover

1043rd Grenadier support in directed

Extensive Joe"

kept the

Germans from moving

%N In-

any reinforcements.

They had no choice

wi

/but

to fall clear until that

t-.ck (21:526).

After seeing

these results, of O3peration decision.

it

is

the decision to delay Phase II

Encore

flying weather After

improved was the correct during the night, The division

consolidating

the attack began had chosen to wait T-he 8,6th objective by Mount Grande, hours, Infantry Mount

again at for

0800 hours,

4 March.

daylight to maximize Infantry

the use of air cleared its

power.

Mountain noon. the final

Regiment it

intermediate to seize over 2

At 1315 hours, regimental

began the attack In a little

objective.

German resistance Regiment

had been overcome. progress. Its

The 87th Mountain

made slower

1st Battalion attacked

Acidola while the 2nd Battalion attack Madonna di Brassa.

by-passed by

and moved ahead to At 1000 the German

Both fell attacked Croce

1600 hours. against

hours,

the 3rd Battalion della

to the east (21:527).

flank and took Mount

With the high ground the attack to seize

secured and mopping up operations underway, Castel Battalions in a d'Aiano and Mount

della Spe was begun. Infantry Castel

The 1st and 2nd

of the 87th Mountain

Regiment were committed By 1940 hours,

zone one mile wide against

d'Aiano. positions

the 2nd Battalion had secured covering ground

on the high

to the west of the town and the 1st Battalion entered the tank spearhead (21:528). to commit its

town lead by a

On 5 March, reserve,

the division made the decision Infantry Regiment.

the 85th Mountain of

The 85th was to

committed to the right seize Mount della Spe.

the 87th and given the mission attacked

The 1st Battalion

north--

'.%-.

56

directly

against the mountain while the 2nd Battalion in a flanking attack against It

attacked

to the northeast Castellana.

Mount della is worth noting

Both took

heavy casualties.

that on 5 March, support

the Division was able to get only one air bad weather (3:34). This may have in a

mission because of

permitted the Germans to move more freely stronger manner. was so intense the west ((21:528). and that The it fire fell

and react

directed against back, regrouped,

the 2nd Battalion circled around to direction

launched a new attack The mountain

from a different

troops had certainly

acted rationally,

even when under fire.

'ZY.

The heavy Kesselring Marshal

defensive fires

were the first the sector.

indication that The Field

had decided

to reinforce

had been attempting with a fresh

to replace the two German divisions division. Phase II of Operation

,.7

in

the sector

Encore (7:433).

had caught

him by surprise if

and was causing some concern the Allies attacks were finally trying

He may have wondered after all

an envelopment had failed. Allies' strategic

the frontal

to seize Bologna to determine the to rush in his It was

Since Kesselring intentions, reserve,

was unable

he had no choice but the 29th Panzer

Grenadier

Division.

the 15th Regiment of

the Panzer

Grenadier Division which made

"four counterattacks against the 10th Mountain Division during

the night of 5-6 March (21:88). All failed. The 10th Mountain

"Division had captured a springboard for the Allied offensive

into the Po River Valley.

57

Phase

II

Action by the Brazilians of the ist Brazilian Infantry Division on the coordinated with 11th

The effort right of

the 10th Mountain Division was closely advance.

the Mountain Division's Brazilian with Infantry

The 2nd Battalion,

Regiment was to maintain (20:121). its right

permanent conta-t The Brazilians

lud

the 10th Mountain Division the 10th by securing

supported forces, Division

flank,

mopping

up enemy

and taking over division objectives could continue to advance the 1st Brazilian The 6th Brazilian (21.88).

so the Mountain The primary

objective of Castelnuovo.

Infantry Infantry

Division was Regiment was to attack Regiment was to

and seize the town; [seize S

the 11th Brazilian

Infantry

the region northeast town of Africa (20:123).

of the town and

advance toward the

The Brazilian attack was coordinated Mountain Spe). Infantry Regiment at 0800,

NI

with the attack of (attacking

the 85th

to seize Mount della

The attack began

5 March and by 1910,

N

Castelnuovo had been seized. Regiment advanced of

Elements of which of

the 11th Brazilian overlooked Vergato Operation

2t,~

Infantry (15:530).

to positions Phase II

The objective

Encore had been

achieved.

SKey Events "The success of Operation Encore centered on several key

events. Mountain The first Division key event was the decision in the theater. The to use the 10th

Division had been a

58

-.%

.,%1

"Lq

-VN

--

stepchild of the Army since 1944. need for a Corps assault Comr,.dndc. FinalY, in mountain 1944 division. It

It

appeared that

there was no II Armored

44:

was trained with

April in s

(4:10th Mountain Division) empty island. because it

and made an The Army was too light.

the Aleutians on an in

France did not want it

the 10th Mountain Division was of luck. Ridge.

taken by

the 5th Army. of by

This ,was a matter Serriccia-Campi.no surprise. used

-~

The second event was the assault This caught the Germans totally

The Division used techniques which were not normally by Allied divisions in Italy: it climbed a mountain, The at

night,

and assaulted the German flank. used both to the maximum. by a fresh

division commander the capabilities

MG Hays clearly

his imagination Third,

and

(prepared

of his unit

the Germans were not The 10th It Mountain was I

for an assault Division was the onsly up-to-strength and Phase II their units. fire

fresh division. division in

the theater. Fourth,

and ready caught

for a

hard fight.

both Phase

the Germans just multiplied prevented

as they were relieving the confusion, and

The attacks support Again, that intuition

coordinated the situation. -othing intelligence. perhaps. from surprise

the Giermans from stabilizing of luck.. Th-ere is .. ,

this

was a matter

to indicate The Finally, night in

the attacks of

were timed based on ander was the key, to shift

the cc

the 10th Mountain Division knew when attacks to a bold pursuit during

daylight. from those

The operations in k Phase II.

Phase

I were dramatically

different

~~59

,a.

.N

NA The Outcome Operation Encore was a clear success for the Allies. Te did $.1 ddhave many advantages over the Germnans' more supplies, more fire support, and fresher units. But, the Allies had had these Operation

advantages for months before the operation began.

Encore was a success because an elite unit was used in an imaginative manner at the point and time where the Germans were N gweakest. It may have been lucky, but whatever the
-

circumstances, the entire operation functioned like clockwork.c

60t

-W

V.

ASSESSMENT OF

THE SIGNIFICANCE

OF THE ACTION

Immediate Significance Operation measures. mortally Encore was a success for the Allied forces climactic offensive was to structure which had The in all

The purpose of pierce the entire between

this

German defensive

been constructed conquest of this d'Aiano resulted which were essential

the Pamar and Reno Valleys.

watershed from Mount Belvedere in

to the Castel

the seizure of bases and observation points to the future offensive against Bologna as described by German Colonel

(20:108).

The German situation sets the scene

Adolf Heckel

for the Allied victory.

difficulties in supplying the forces with arms "...The and ammunition had been increased to such extent that of those substantial shipments for the rehabilitation At the beginning of could not be expected. divisions 1945, the shortage of ammunition made it necessary to ammunition of artillery prohibit temporarily the firing Fuel had become except in case of a major enemy attack. the shifting of operational reserves had so scarce that Most serious, however, was become nearly impossible. The employment of German in Italy. the air situation fighter planes or bomber formations was out of the "question and the lack of fuel made it impossible to assembly area and of Italian harbors, which were of

r;iimportance

for

incoming and outgoing shipment.s.

.-d had

In view of these weaknesses, Army Group C impossible to put up any lasting considered it against the expected major offensive in the resistance spring of 1945, which would be launched by an enemy who at his disposal unlimited quantities of arms and (13:4-5) ammunition."

C'

61

*,lW

The winter of 1944 to 1945 area and resulted in

was particularly

harsh

in

the

S/

large accumulations of snow. an offensive in

The German a

High Command anticipated

the spring after

portion of the snow had melted. when

Toward the middle of February, snow, the 10th Mountain against

the area was covered with deep

Division surprised the 232nd Infantry characterized

the Germans by making a strong attack division. Field Marshal Kesselring

the division as being highly efficient stated, control of the key terrain

(18:148). features particularly

As previously V.,, was essential for the Battle

for the success of future operations, of Bologna. In addition,

the Operation Encore

objective routes

included highway 64 which was one of the two main on the Fifth Italy Army's front. Future and

leading to Bologna

(
., region.

operations into northern

would require

control of this this rugged

other routes which were thinly Once the Allies then only the Po Valley,

spread throughout

were able to control with relatively

the Apennines, obstacles,

few natural

lay between

them and the Alps.

4

The primary German strategic consideration was to utilize

Italy (19:5).
4.r4

as an advanced The German this

front defeat

in

the defense

of the German

homeland

during

the operation was a serious homeland was coming this this avenue, the

blow against

objective.

The German To protect

into the reach of the Allies. German High Command was

44

forced not to let

become the

KZ
t

forgotten critical
..... . ... ...

front. on all

Soldiers and supplies which were becoming fronts had to be divided 62 up. A portion of them

had to be invested

in

northern

Italy.

Operation

Encore

increased the requirement Kesselring's

on the German that

war machine.

statement

Operation Encore was a battle to the Po Valley at and German theater. the worst-

for the possession of

the entrance

possible point for the Germans, tactically, assets reveals the impact were strained

both operationally of the loss (7:433). the

here as well as throughout

The offensive was initiated it least and forced afford

weeks before the Germans anticipated when they could

the movements of German units it.

n0

Long Term Significance As a result S( of the seizure and occupation of Mount by the 10th Mountain Division, posts the

Belvedere and Castel d'Aiano

IV Corps held the high ground and thus the observation overlooking the Po River Valley (13:4-5).

The success of Group C to lose the

Operation Encore combat effectiveness

caused the German Army of

the 232nd Grenadier Division and the The German Army a decisive (18:149). It battle caused Group C at the time

714th Light commander and place men,

Infantry

Division.

did not want to fight chosen by and IV Corps

the loss ot

equipment, campaign.

supplies planned for battle

use in the German to the Po the the 10th had

spring Valley,

The

was for the gateway for

the possession of which was necessary Italy.

"sustainment of German forces in

Mountain Division's victory,

Because of

the IV Corps and 5th Army

t,-63

10.

N".N,

5%

achieved a campaign. fatal

distinct

advantage

for the launching

of

its

spring

The German Army

Group C had been Italy.

dealt the first

blow of the battle

for northern

Operation Encore did not win the war. facilitated in -

However,

it

the spring offensive of the 5th Army which resulted of Italy (7:433-434). It which ranks as a was necessary for it allowed thus Prance and of Europe. by the in '

the liberation

~significant supporting
the later

combat action,

rapid advance of the 5th Army. to the German

Also,

Allied forces to move closer enhancing Italy the pincer effect

homeland, in

of the Allied forces from the rest

as Germany if

became more isolated ierious

AN

Finally,

there ever was a

consideration with their

(
'C

Germans of occupying Italy,

a national redoubt its

forces

Operation Encore reduced

chances of success

(7:44t3).

Military

Lessons Learned time during the war, troops specifically

-

For the first

trained and equipped for a specific

environment by

mountains

"were employed.
Division prior operation assaulting and,

The training

conducted

the 10th Mountain I of the the

to deployment was used during Phase using mountain climbing techniques, surprise. skills,

allowed In

battalions

to achieve tactical environmental seizing in

addition

to application of attacking

of special

the principles and indirect

enemy

weakness,

key terrain,

approach are evident. and operating in

Training

sub-freezing during

temperatures, acclimated

snow and ice fields

training,

64

ax

NtIa!

1A
the troops to conditions found during Phase I of the operations. during by the

The advantages

given to the well-trained attacker

the conduct of a well-planned success of the the training of initial assaults.

night attack were evidenced

The keys to the success were prior to the

v

the Division and the planning

attkck.
Logistics, was of particular specifically concern trails As a resupply of rations and ammunition, The narrow and

to Division planners.

M.

winding mountain resupply trucks.

could not be easily result,

negotiated by Weasels, and

pack mule companies, the battalions

Jeeps were used to resupply counterattacks ice. effort of

defending against The continuous forward and the

on the mountains and ridges. logisticians

Division

to push reszupply

employment of
*'b' .Much

the transport

modes noted above was successful. trained and ropes,

of the equipment with which the division fought snap was civilian pitons, designed, in particular;

the climbing

links,

and other mountain climbing gear. several tactical lessons. The conduct

The operation offers of patrols prior

to the assault

and following

seizure of

assigned objectives.was near universal In the case of the former, patrols

throughout i-he operation. to secure In the warning of -

were conducted find the enemy.

friendly latter

troop concentrations and to patrols

case,

were conducted to provide early and to maintain pressure the risk associated with

enemy counterattacks they withdrew. initial assault Given

on the Germans as discovery of the

while the assaulting

forces were exposed tn the

S65

sheer wall of the ridge, and in

-

order to achieve tactical

~surprise,

an unsupported attack was planned..

AI

4:

'

Ski

Patrol of the 10th Mountain Division (7:426)

The

assault

was successful, and attests not only tu the

soldiers and leaders, but

abilities

of

also to

the

planning

which contributed to the achievement of tactical surprise.

-

The

indirect approach, an approach for which

+The division wjas,

specifically trained, was the key to the success of Phase I of the operation. assault, Registration of targets prior to conduct of the

responsive counter-battery fires following the seizure

i6
4.7

fof

the assigned objectives, sorties,

allocation air

of pre-planned support

air

and a responsive on-call

system were and execution of factors to the

hallmarks of the operation. fire suppo.t means were

The coordination

significant

contributing

success of the operation. The Division throughout Snot only continued to use its Patrolling to an attack, lessons learned continued to be extensive; but also during of fire ..

the operation. precursor

as a

consolidation support, units, ,;*There learned in

and reorganization.

The integration

to include the 4.2 inch mortars of the Chemical Corps in subsequent operations. of the lessons development of

was prevalent

are some contemporary Operation Encore.

applications

The continuing

(
I

special

operation

forces,

training,

doctrine, and training conduct

and equipment may of the of this in loth

be attributed Mountain

to the organization Division and its

successful

operation. most

The conduct of instances, achieving like tactical

operations by a text book

the Division reads, in the areas of

patrolling, and Those 10th The

surprise, and

conducting integrating

unsupported fire

supported night attacks, tactical Mountain

support. by the

lessons were not necessarily Division; however, they were

developed

learned and applied. those tactics

application

served to affirm the correctness of

and techniq~ues.

67

BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Action of the 751st Tank Battalion. Report Number 343, Army Ground Forces Board (Mediterranean Theater). 1945. Call Number 10515. 2. 3. Burton, Hal. The Ski Troops. New York, 1971. 142-166. Call Number 940.541273 B974s. Combat History of the 10th Mountain Division (1944-1945). Not published. A copy has been to CARL pp.

"[4
b

provided

4.

Fact Sheets on U.S. Divisions. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Washington, D.C.. 1947. Call Number 12472.3. Field Order 10319. 1, 10th Mountain Division. 1945. Call Number

i-s

-5. 6.

Finito - The Po Valley Campaign, 1945. Headquarters, 15th Army Group. 1945. p. 7. Call Number N12046. U.S. Army in
D.C.,

7. Fisher, Ernest F.
S...

World War II: Cassino to

pp. 424-433. Call

the Alps.

Washington,

1977.

Number 940.5421 F533c. .8 Forty. George. Fifth Army at War. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1980. pp.129-134. Call Number 940.541273 F745f. 9. Govan, Thomas P. Historical Section, Army Ground Forces. Study Number 23, Training in Mountain and Winter Warfare. 1946. Call Number N14786.
. Historical Section, Army Ground Forces. Study Number 28, History of the 10th Light Division (Alpine). 1946. Call Number 14788.

-5

'4l

10

11.

Grantham,

L.O. Phone Number 816-726-5225

(office) or

5502 (home). Member, 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment. Conversation with MAJ R. Rankin, 22 May 1984. 12. Grenier, Heinrich. Warfare (German). Tactical Principles of Mountain 1947. Call Number N16371.3.

13. Heckel, Adolf. The Battle of Bologna (October 1944April 1945). Historical Division. Headquarters, United States Army Europe. 14. History of the Mountain Training Center. Study Number 33, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces.

P4
r 37'

15.

History of the 4th Corps.

pp.

505-531.

Call Number

16.

Johnson, Louis. Memo for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Subject: Campaign Under Extreme Conditions of Weather. 6 January 1940. Kahn, E.J. and Henry McLenore. Fighting Divisions. Washington, D.C.. Reprinted 1980. p. 20. Call Number 940.541273 K12f. Kesselring, Albert. MS# 0-064, Mediterranean War Part V, "The Campaign in Italy: Part II". Southwest Historical Division, European Command. Kesselring and Westphal. Questions General Strategy during the Italian Number N16317. Regarding the Campaign. Call

17.

18.

19.

20.

tiq.

Mascarenhas de Moraes, J.B. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Government Printing Office, 1966. .pp. 110-127. Call Number 940.540945 M395b. Meyers, Bruce K. Fifth Army History, Part VII. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. pp. 78-68. Cal 1 Number N8723-4. Order of Battle of the German Army. Military Intelligence Division, War Department. 1945. Patrol Report of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 87th Mountain Infantry. Report Number 305, Army Ground Forces Board (Medite.rranean Theater). Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Washington, D.C.. 1945. Call Number N8393. Rasmuson, February John R. 1984. "Back to the Mountains," Army,

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

SFebruary
26.

Report of Operatio-is of the IV Corps, 1 February - 28 1945. G3 iV Cups. pp. 8-14. Call Number N12073. Stokesbury, James L. "New York. 1980. A Short History of World War II, II. ed.
-a

27.

The West Point Atlas of American Wars, BG V.J. E5posito. New York, 1959.

Volume

28. 29.

Truscott, Lucian K. Command Missions. New York, 1954. Call Number 940.542 T873c. pp. 464-468. War Department G-3 Memo for the Secretary, General Staff. Subject: Establishment of a Camp for a Division

ii
A

in High Mountain Terrain. 30. World Book Encyclopedia,

17 April

1941. 1983.

i2

Vol 21.

New York,

;'

.1

A.

(
,-

f r

..4

*A

I *S

*41 1I

t.
'. I.

V.

*'

L
LS'
'4 *...

'4

'*
4

ft* I *

*'
Uh

'1..

my

*, 4,-.

'4.

,.