JOHN STUART MILL SOBRE LA LLIBERTAT IV.

DELS LMITS DE L'AUTORITAT DE LA SOCIETAT SOBRE L'INDIVIDU

JOHN STUART MILL

On Liberty
Chapter 4. Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual. WHAT, THEN, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more particularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society. Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going to

1. Quin s doncs el lmit just de la sobirania de l'individu sobre ell mateix? On comena l'autoritat de la societat? Quina esfera de la vida humana pertoca a la individualitat i quina a la societat? 2. Cadascuna d'elles rebr la part que li correspon, si disposa d'aquella que l'afecta ms particularment. A la individualitat li hauria de pertocar aquell mbit de la vida en el qual s'interessa sobretot l'individu; a la societat, aquell mbit que interessa sobretot la societat. 3. Per b que la societat no es basi en un contracte i per b que no s'hi guanyi res inventant-ne un per tal de deduir-ne obligacions socials, tots els qui reben la protecci de la societat li deuen alguna cosa a canvi pel benefici percebut, i el fet de viure en societat fa indispensable que cadasc es vegi en l'obligaci d'observar una certa lnia de conducta envers la resta. Aquesta conducta consisteix, primer de tot, a estar-se de lesionar els interessos dels altres o, millor dit, certs interessos que, ja sia per disposici legal o per consentiment tcit, sn considerats drets subjectius; i, segonament, en el fet que cada persona assumeixi la seva part (fixada segons un principi equitable) dels treballs i sacrificis que suposi la defensa de la societat o dels seus membres quan siguin objecte d'ofenses i vexacions. La societat es troba plenament justificada d'imposar, costi el que costi, aquestes condicions a aquells que voldrien incomplir-les. Per la

societat pot fer quelcom ms. Els actes d'un individu poden resultar nocius als altres o faltar a la deguda consideraci que es mereix llur benestar, sense necessitat d'arribar a violar algun dels seus drets constituts. En aquest cas, l'ofensor pot ser punit justament per l'opini, per no per la llei. Tan bon punt com un aspecte del comportament d'una persona afecta d'una manera perjudicial els interessos d'altri, la societat hi t jurisdicci i esdev objecte de discussi la qesti de si la intervenci de la societat s favorable o desfavorable al b com. Per no treu cap a res plantejar aquesta qesti quan la conducta d'una persona afecta noms els seus propis interessos o no t necessitat d'afectar els interessos dels altres si no ho volen (partint del supsit que totes les persones afectades sn majors d'edat i tenen un grau normal d'enteniment). En tots aquests casos, l'individu hauria de gaudir d'una llibertat perfecta, tant jurdica com social, per portar a terme l'acte que volgus i atenir-se a les conseqncies. 4. Seria una interpretaci totalment errnia d'aquesta doctrina suposar que predica la indiferncia egoista, que pretn que a la vida els ssers humans no tenen cap mena de relaci amb les seves respectives conductes i que no han de preocupar-se per la prosperitat o el benestar dels altres, tret que llurs propis interessos no en siguin afectats. En lloc d'una disminuci hi ha necessitat d'un increment de l'acci desinteressada per a promoure el b dels altres. Per la benevolncia desinteressada pot trobar altres instruments que els fuets i els flagells, tant en un sentit literal com metafric, per a persuadir la gent de quin s el seu b. Sc la darrera persona a menysvalorar les virtuts de la prpia estimaci. Noms sn les segones en importncia, si s que ho sn, desprs de les socials. L'objecte de l'educaci s el conreu de totes dues per igual. Per fins i tot l'educaci obra tant per convicci i persuasi com per compulsi, i

the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.

It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is passed, the selfregarding virtues should be inculcated. Human beings owe to each other

quan el perode de l'educaci s ja clos, precisament les virtuts de la prpia estimaci haurien de ser inculcades emprant la fora de la persuasi. Els ssers humans es deuen ajut els uns als altres per tal de distingir all ms bo d'all ms dolent, aix com estmuls per a escollir entre l'un i l'altre. S'haurien d'esperonar tothora a incrementar l'exercici de les seves facultats superiors i a acrixer la direcci de llurs sentiments i fins vers objectes i contemplacions assenyats en comptes de necis, elevats en comptes de degradants. Per no t cap mena de justificaci que una persona, o una colla d'elles, diguin a una altra criatura humana dotada d's de ra que no pot fer amb la seva vida en benefici propi all que li plagui de fer-ne. Ella mateixa s la persona ms interessada en el seu propi benestar i l'inters que qualsevol altre, llevat d'alguns casos de fort lligam personal, hi pot tenir, s ftil, comparat amb aquell que ella mateixa hi t. L'inters que la societat hi t individualment (tret de quan la seva conducta afecta els altres) s fragmentari i totalment indirecte, mentre que, respecte als seus propis sentiments i circumstncies, l'home o la dona ms vulgars tenen mitjans de coneixement que superen incommensurablement els que pot posseir qualsevol altre. La interferncia de la societat amb la intenci d'anular el judici i propsits d'aquests en all que noms els concerneix a ells, cal que es basi en presumpcions generals que poden ser totalment falses i, encara que siguin certes, corren el risc de ser aplicades malament als casos individuals per persones no ms ben familiaritzades amb les seves circumstncies que uns observadors externs. Aix, doncs, en aquesta esfera dels afers humans, la individualitat t el seu camp d'acci propi. En el mutu capteniment dels ssers humans, cal que s'observin en la majoria dels casos regles generals per tal que la gent spiga a qu atenir-se, per pel que fa als interessos de cadasc la seva espontanetat individual t dret a exercitar-se lliurement. s

help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has; the interest which society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and altogether indirect; while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect: but in each person's own concerns his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others: but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good.

possible que els altres ofereixin ajut al seu judici, exhortacions per a enfortir la seva voluntat, que fins i tot insisteixin repetidament, per en tot cas ell t la darrera paraula. Tots els errors que pugui cometre contra els consells i les admonicions es troben mpliament contrarestats pel mal de deixar que els altres el compelleixin a fer all que jutgen s el seu b. 5. No vull dir amb aix que els sentiments que una persona inspiri als altres no hagin de ser afectats de cap manera per les seves qualitats o defectes personals, cosa que no s possible ni desitjable. Si s eminent en alguna de les qualitats que contribueixen al seu b, aix el fa digne d'admiraci, ja que aix s'acosta ms a la perfecci ideal de la naturalesa humana. Si, en canvi, s summament deficient en aquestes qualitats, se'n seguir un sentiment contrari a l'admiraci. Hi ha un grau de niciesa i un grau d'all que hom pot anomenar (tot i que aquesta expressi s fora objectable) la baixesa o la depravaci del gust, els quals, encara que no puguin justificar fer mal a la persona que els manifesten, la fan tornar necessriament i justa un objecte d'aversi o, en casos extrems, fins i tot de menyspreu, car s difcil que una persona tingui fortament aquestes qualitats contrries sense nodrir aquests sentiments. Malgrat que no faci mal a ning, una persona pot obrar talment que no tinguem ms remei que jutjar-lo i veure'l com un ruc o un sser d'ordre inferior i, com que s comprensible que s'estimi ms evitar aquest judici i aquest sentiment, prevenir-lo d'antuvi de les desagradables conseqncies a qu s'exposa s prestar-li un servei. De fet, convindria que aquest bon servei fos fet ms lliurement del que actualment permeten les nocions corrents d'urbanitat i que una persona pogus honradament cridar l'atenci a una altra si creu que no obra b, sense sser considerat per aix grollera o presumptuosa. Igualment tenim dret, en diversos aspectes, a obrar d'acord amb la nostra opini

I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though

desfavorable d'alg, no pas de cara a l'opressi de la seva individualitat, ans en l'exercici de la nostra. No estem obligats, per exemple, a cercar la seva companyia; tenim el dret d'evitar-la (per no pas a fer ostentaci d'aquesta evitaci), car tenim el dret a escollir la companyia que ens s ms grata. Tenim el dret, que en alguns casos pot esdevenir el nostre deure, de prevenir els altres en contra seu, si creiem que el seu exemple o conversa pot tenir un efecte pernicis sobre aquells amb el quals s'ajunta. No tenim l'obligaci d'utilitzar a favor seu els nostres bons oficis, llevat d'aquells casos en qu procurem el seu millorament. Per aquestes diverses maneres una persona pot sofrir penalitats molt greus ocasionades pels altres per faltes que noms l'afecten directament a ell mateix; per pateix aquestes penalitats noms en la mesura que sn conseqncies naturals i, podrem dir-ne, espontnies, de les faltes mateixes, no perqu li siguin infligides intencionalment per tal de punir-lo. Una persona que demostra temeritat, entestament, urc, que no pot viure amb mitjans moderats, que no pot abstenir-se de rabeigs nobles, que percaa plaers carnals a expenses dels de la sensibilitat o de l'intellecte, cal que esperi ser objecte d'un rebaix en l'opini dels altres i tenir una part menor dels seus sentiments favorables, per d'aix no t ra per queixar-se'n, fora que hagi merescut llur favor per una excellncia especial en les seves relacions socials i hagi conquerit aix un ttol a llurs bons oficis, que no es vegi afectat pels seus propis demrits. 6. El que tracto de sostenir s que els inconvenients que sn estrictament inseparables del judici desfavorable dels altres, sn els nics als quals una persona hauria d'estar subjecta per aquella part de la seva conducta i del seu carcter que afecta el seu propi b, per que no afecta els interessos dels altres en les seves relacions amb ell. Els actes lesius als nostres semblants requereixen un tractament

not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit- who cannot live within moderate means- who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences- who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect- must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself.

What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not affect the interest of others in their relations with him. Acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment. Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights; falsehood or

totalment diferent. La violaci de llurs drets; l'acte d'inferir-los prdues o danys no justificades pels nostres drets; la falsedat i la duplicitat en els nostres tractes amb ells; l's injust o poc geners dels nostres avantatges aprofitant-se d'ells; fins i tot la nostra inhibici egoista de defensar-los contra l'agressi, aquests sn actes mereixedors de reprovaci moral i, en els casos greus, de reparaci i de cstig. I no sols aquests actes, sin les disposicions que hi menen sn tamb immorals i objectes dignes de desaprovaci que poden donar origen a una mena d'aversi. La tendncia a la crueltat, la malcia i la malfiana; l'enveja, la passi ms antisocial i odiosa de totes; la dissimulaci i la manca de sinceritat; la irascibilitat per causa insuficient i el ressentiment desproporcionat a la provocaci; les nsies de domini sobre els altres; la cobejana d'acaparar una part ms gran dels avantatges que pertoquen a cadasc (la teleologia dels grecs); l'orgull que obt gratificaci amb l'enviliment dels altres; l'egoisme que creu que el jo i els seus interessos sn ms importants que tota la resta i que decideix totes les qestions dubtoses al seu favor, sn tots ells vicis morals i constitueixen un carcter moral dolent i odis, a diferncia dels defectes personals abans esmentats, que de fet no sn ben b immoralitats i que per ms intensitat que ostentin no denoten malignitat. Poden ser prova d'un cert grau de niciesa o d'una manca de dignitat personal i d'amor propi, per noms sn dignes de reprovaci moral quan suposen una infracci del deure envers els altres, per mor dels quals l'individu est obligat a tenir cura de si mateix. Tots aquells que denominem deures envers nosaltres no sn socialment obligatoris, llevat que les circumstncies els converteixin alhora en deures envers els nostres semblants. El terme deure cap a un mateix, quan significa quelcom ms que prudncia, vol dir amor propi o creixement personal, per cap d'aquests dos ning no s responsable davant dels seus semblants,

duplicity in dealing with them; unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury- these are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most anti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and insincerity, irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment disproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others; the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the pleonexia of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour;- these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and odious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of any amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than prudence, means self-respect or self-development, and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow creatures, because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them.

car aquesta rendici de comptes no ocasionaria cap b a la humanitat. 7. La distinci entre la prdua de consideraci en la qual una persona pot justament incrrer per defecte de prudncia o de dignitat personal i la reprovaci que li correspon per trepitjar els drets dels altres no s purament nominal. Hi ha una gran diferncia en els nostres sentiments i en la nostra conducta envers ella segons si ens desplau en coses en les quals nosaltres creiem que tenim el dret de sotmetre-la a control o en coses en les quals sabem que no el tenim. Si alg ens desplau podem expressar-li el nostre disgust i podem mantenir-nos allunyats d'una persona o d'un objecte que ens desplagui, per no per aix hem de sentir-nos empesos a fer-li la vida impossible. Hem de pensar que ja est suportant o b que li tocar suportar tot el pes de les conseqncies del seu error i, que si ell s'entesta a malmetre la seva vida amb les seves barrabassades, no per aquesta ra hem de voler desgraciar-la-hi encara ms. En comptes de desitjar punir-lo, haurem de maldar ms aviat per alleujar les seves penalitats a base de mostrar-li com pot evitar o guarir els mals que el seu capteniment tendeix a presentar-li. Pot ser per a nosaltres un objecte digne de compassi, tal vegada d'avorriment, per no d'ira o ressentiment. No hem de tractar-lo com un enemic de la societat: la cosa pitjor que nosaltres podem sentir-nos justificats a fer s deixar-lo tot sol, si s que no decidim benvolament a ingerir-nos en la seva vida mostrant cura o preocupaci per ell. Es tracta veritablement d'un cas diferent si ha infringit les normes necessries per a la protecci dels seus semblants, tant individualment com collectiva. Les conseqncies perjudicials dels seus actes llavors no recauen sobre ell, sin sobre els altres, i la societat, com a protectora dels seus membres, ha de prendre represlies contra ell, ha d'infligir-li dolor amb el propsit exprs de castigar-lo i assegurar-se que la punici

The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow creatures, individually or collectively. The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty

sigui prou severa. En un cas, es tracta d'un delinqent davant el nostre tribunal i ens sentim empesos no sols a enjudiciar-lo, sin, d'una forma o d'una altra, a executar la nostra prpia sentncia; en l'altre cas, no ens incumbeix d'infligir-li cap mena de sofrena, llevat de la que pugui derivar-se incidentalment del nostre dret d'usar de la mateixa llibertat de regulaci dels nostres afers que li reconeixem a ell en els seus. 8. Hi ha moltes persones que refusaran d'admetre la nostra distinci entre l'esfera de la vida d'una persona que solament l'afecta a ella i aquella que afecta els altres. Com s possible (poden preguntar-se) que un mbit de la conducta d'un membre de la societat pugui ser indiferent als altres membres? No hi ha ning que sigui un sser enterament isolat: s impossible que una persona es mogui seriosament o permanentment sense que el mal atenyi almenys als individus ms propers amb qui es relaciona i sovint els situats ms enll d'aquests. Si ell causa lesi a les seves propietats, perjudica els qui directament o indirecta en depenen i normalment fa minvar, en un grau ms o menys gran, els recursos generals de la comunitat. Si deteriora les seves facultats corporals o mentals, no solament causa mal a tots aquells que en depenen, encara que sigui noms en una part de la seva benaurana, ans s'inhabilita per prestar els serveis que deu en general als seus conciutadans, tal vegada esdev una crrega a llur afecte o benevolncia i, si tal conducta fos molt freqent, seria difcil trobar un acte delictiu que suposs una minva ms gran al b com general. Per ltim, si pels seus vicis o follies una persona no fa mal als altres, tanmateix (hom pot allegar) el seu exemple podria sser noble i, per tant, se li pot demanar que reguli la seva conducta, la visi o el coneixement de la qual podria corrompre o esgarriar alguns dels seus semblants. 9. I dhuc (hom podria afegir-hi) si les conseqncies de la mala

in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resource; of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead. And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be

conducta es poden confinar a l'individu vicis o eixelebrat, s convenient que la societat abandoni a llur propi senderi aquells individus que no tenen prou preparaci? Si els nens i els menors d'edat tenen un clar dret a rebre protecci contra ells mateixos, no conv tamb que la societat la proporcioni igualment a les persones madures que s'han mostrat incapaces d'autonomia? Si el joc, la beguda, la incontinncia, la peresa, la brutcia sn tan ofensives al goig i un obstacle tan gran al millorament com molts o la gran majoria dels actes interdits per la llei, per qu (hom pot preguntar) la llei no s'ha d'escarrassar, en la mesura que aix s'adiu amb la factibilitat i les convenincies socials, a reprimir tamb aquestes activitats? I com a complement de les imperfeccions inevitables del dret, no feria bo que l'opini organitzs una vigilncia extrema contra aquests vicis i sancions rgidament amb punicions socials aquells reconeguts per practicar-los? No es tracta (hom pot dir) de restringir la individualitat ni d'impedir el tanteig d'experincies de vida noves i originals. Les niques coses que hom cerca d'evitar sn activitats que han estat provades i condemnades des dels inicis del mn fins ara; coses que l'experincia ha mostrat que no sn tils ni convenients per a la individualitat de ning. Per tal que una veritat moral o prudencial pugui considerar-se establerta cal un cert perode de temps i un determinat grau d'experincia, i el que simplement hom pretn s d'impedir que una generaci rera l'altra caigui pel mateix precipici que ha estat fatal als seus predecessors. 10. Admeto plenament que el mal que una persona es causa a ella mateixa, pot afectar greument, ads per les seves simpaties, ads pels seus interessos, els que s'hi relacionen i, en un grau menor, la societat en el seu conjunt. Quan per una conducta d'aquesta mena una persona es veu arrossegada a violar una obligaci clara i adjudicable envers una altra persona o persones, aquest cas ja no cau dins l'mbit

confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as injurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many or most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not law, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience, endeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may be said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be some length of time and amount of experience after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors.

I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the case is taken out of the selfregarding class, and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the

de la moralitat privada, i llavors esdev susceptible de desaprovaci moral en el sentit apropiat del terme. Si, posem per cas, un home, per intemperncia o extravagncia, deixa de pagar els seus deutes o b, havent assumit la responsabilitat moral d'una famlia, per la mateixa causa deixa de ser capa d'educar o mantenir els seus fills, mereix una justa reprovaci i pot ser castigat, per si ho s ho ser a causa de la infracci del seu deure envers la seva famlia o els seus creditors, no pas per la seva extravagncia. Si els recursos que s'havien consagrar a la famlia fossin destinats a la inversi ms prudent de totes, la culpabilitat moral seria la mateixa. George Barnwell occ el seu oncle per aconseguir diners per a la seva amistanada, per si ho hagus fet per muntar un negoci, hauria estat condemnat igualment a la forca. De 1a mateixa manera, en el sovintejat cas d'un home que causa problemes a la seva famlia per donar-se a mals hbits, mereix retrets per la seva duresa i ingratitud, per tamb pot sser-ne objecte per conrear hbits que en ells mateixos no sn viciosos, si causen aflicci a aquells amb els quals comparteix la seva vida o que depenen d'ell per vincles personals per a llur conhort. Quisvulla que no rex en la consideraci generalment deguda als interessos i sentiments dels altres, sense que s'hi vegi emps per algun imperatiu moral o justificat per una preferncia permissible, s subjecte a la desaprovaci moral per aquesta incapacitat per no pas pel seu origen o pels errors, merament personals, que remotament li poden haver menat. De manera semblant quan una persona s'incapacita per ra del seu comportament privat per a l'exercici de qualsevol deure precs envers la collectivitat que li ha estat encomanat, s culpable d'una infracci social. s injustificat de castigar alg perqu est ebri, per en canvi cal punir un soldat o un policia que s'embriagui estant de servei. En resum, sempre que existeix un dany o un risc de dany definits, ja sia a un individu o a la collectivitat, el cas ja no cau dins l'mbit de la

proper sense of the term. If, for example, a man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family, becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance. If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral culpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits, he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life, who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being compelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable self-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure, but not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to himself, which may have remotely led to it. In like manner, when a person disables himself, by conduct purely selfregarding, from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law.

llibertat i entra de ple dins el de la moralitat o el dret. 11. Per amb referncia al perjudici merament contingent o, com podria anomenar-se, el menyscapte que una persona causa a la societat per una actuaci que ni viola un deure especfic envers la collectivitat ni ocasiona un dany perceptible a qualsevol individu determinable llevat d'ell mateix, aquest menyscapte s un dels que la societat pot permetre's de suportar per mor del b ms gran de la llibertat humana. Si calgus castigar a les persones adultes per no tenir cura d'elles mateixes, ms valdria que fos pel seu propi b ms que no pas amb el pretext d'impedir que menyscabin llur capacitat de prestar uns beneficis a la societat que aquesta no pretn tenir el dret d'exigir. Per no estic gens d'acord a tractar aquesta qesti com si la societat no tingus altres mitjans per tal d'elevar els seus membres ms febles al nivell ordinari de conducta racional que esperar que perpetrin alguna acci irracional i aleshores infligir-los una punci jurdica o moral per aquesta transgressi. La societat t un poder absolut sobre ells en les primeres etapes de llur existncia: ha tingut a la seva disposici tot el perode de la infncia i de la minoritat amb l'objecte de fer les provatures necessries perqu fossin capaos d'una conducta racional en la vida. La generaci existent s responsable de la formaci i de les circumstncies que envolten la generaci segent. No s possible que faci tornar els membres de la futura generaci perfectament bons i assenyats, perqu lamentablement ella tamb s deficient en bondat i seny. Els seus millors esforos no sn sempre, en certs casos individuals, totalment reeixits. Per s capa d'aconseguir que la generaci que puja sigui, en lnies generals, tan bona i un xic millor que ella mateixa. Si la societat deixa que un nombre considerable dels seus membres creixin com infants, incapaos de ser influts per la consideraci racional dels motius distants, el blasme per les conseqncies s imputable a ella mateixa. Armada no sols amb

But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity or rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do something irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for it. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always, in individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little better than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves; and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the power to issue commands and enforce

els poders de l'educaci, sin tamb amb l'ascendent que l'autoritat de l'opini admesa sempre exerceix sobre les ments d'aquells que sn menys aptes per a jutjar per si sols, i ajudada per les sancions naturals que no poden deixar d'abatre's sobre aquells que incorren en el disgust o el menyspreu d'aquells que els coneixen; no permetrem que la societat pretengui que necessita, a ms de tot aix, el poder de decretar ordres i d'imposar obedincia en l'mbit dels interessos personals dels individus, en el qual, tant per raons d'estricta justcia com de govern, la decisi hauria de recaure en aquells que han de patir-ne les conseqncies. No hi ha res que tendeixi a desacreditar i a frustrar els millors mitjans d'influir la conducta que el recurs als pitjors. Si entre aquells als quals es tracta de junyir a la prudncia o a la temperncia s'hi troben alguns amb carcters vigorosos i independents, es rebellaran indefectiblement contra el jou. Una persona d'aquesta mena no acceptar mai que els altres tinguin dret a controlar les seves coses, de la mateixa manera que el tenen a l'hora d'impedir-li que els perjudiqui en les coses prpies. Llavors fcilment hom considera un senyal de valor i coratge desafiar obertament aquesta autoritat usurpadora i fer amb ostentaci exactament tot el contrari del que prescriu, com en el cas de la moda grollera que va tenir xit en temps de Carles II per la fantica intolerncia moral dels puritans. Respecte al que hom addueix sobre la necessitat de protegir la societat contra el mal exemple que representen per altri els viciosos i els llibertins, s veritat que aquest pot tenir efectes perniciosos, especialment sobre el malfactor que veu com es pot causar perjudici als altres amb impunitat. Per ara estem parlant de conducta que, sense causar mal a altri, ocasiona gran dany al mateix agent, i no acabo de veure com els qui creuen aix poden deixar de pensar que 1'exemple, en regla general, s ms saludable que noble, ja que, si b posa al descobert la mala conducta, tamb posa en evidncia les

obedience in the personal concerns of individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences.

Nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct than a resort to the worse. If there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the time of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does no wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself: and I do not see how those who believe this can think otherwise than that the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to

conseqncies doloroses o degradants que, si l'actuaci s justament blasmada, recauen forosament sobre tots o la majoria d'aquells que hi concorren. 12. Per el ms fort de tots els arguments contra 1a ingerncia de la collectivitat en la conducta purament personal s que, quan s'hi immisceix, hi ha moltes probabilitats que ho faci malament i en els punts menys adients. En qestions de moralitat social, de deure envers els altres, l'opini del pblic, aix s, de la majoria aclaparadora, tot i que sovint sigui incorrecta, s probable que ms sovint sigui correcta, perqu en aqueixes qestions els seus membres no fan altra cosa que jutjar els seus propis interessos i la manera com un determinat comportament, si es permet la seva prctica, els pot afectar. Per l'opini d'una majoria semblant, imposada a tall de llei sobre la minoria, en qestions de capteniment personal, s tan probable que sigui encertada com desencertada, car en aquestes ocasions l'opini pblica vol dir, en el millor dels casos, l'opini d'algunes persones sobre all que s bo o dolent per a altres persones i molt sovint ni tan sols significa aix, car el pblic, passant per alt amb la ms perfecta indiferncia el plaer o la convenincia d'aquells la conducta dels quals censura, noms considera la seva prpia preferncia. N'hi ha molts que consideren com una ofensa contra ells qualsevol comportament que els desplau i que experimenten com un ultratge a llurs sentiments, com en el cas d'un fantic religis, que quan fou acusat de menystenir els sentiments religiosos dels altres, respongu que sn ells qui menystenen els sentiments d'ell tot persistint en llur culte o credo abominable. Per no hi ha paritat entre el sentiment d'una persona pel que fa a la seva prpia opini i el sentiment d'una altra que s ofesa pel fet que ella la mantingui, com no n'hi ha entre el desig d'un lladre de robar una bossa i el desig del seu propietari legtim de conservar-la. I el gust d'una persona s una

be in all or most cases attendant on it. But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct is that, when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though of wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would effect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very of it does not even mean that; the public, with the most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal

qesti tan prpia com la seva opini o la seva bossa. s fcil per qualsevol d'imaginar un pblic ideal que dna un marge de llibertat i d'elecci als individus en totes les qestions incertes, i noms els exigeix que s'abstinguin dels modes de conducta que ha condemnat l'experincia universal. Per, on s'ha vist mai un pblic que marqui tals lmits a la seva censura? o b, quan s que el pblic es preocupa de l'experincia universal? En les seves ingerncies en la conducta personal la collectivitat poques vegades pensa en altra cosa que en la perversitat que suposa obrar o sentir diferent d'ella mateixa, i aquest criteri, finament disfressat, s el que nou dcimes parts dels moralistes i escriptors especulatius mantenen davant els ulls dels homes com els dictats de la religi i la filosofia. Aquests ensenyen que les coses sn certes perqu ho sn: perqu sentim que ho sn. Ens diuen que escorcollem dins de les nostres ments i cors a la recerca de lleis de conducta que ens obliguin a nosaltres mateixos i a tots els altres. Qu pot fer el pobre pblic sin aplicar aquestes instruccions i fer que els seus propis sentiments personals del b i del mal, si sn tolerablement unnimes entre els seus membres, siguin obligatoris per a tothom? 13. El mal assenyalat aqu no existeix solament en teoria, i potser caldr esperar que especifiqui els casos en qu el pblic d'aquest temps i pas inverteix imprpiament les seves preferncies en el carcter de les lleis morals. No estic escrivint un assaig sobre les aberracions dels sentiments morals existents. Es tracta d'un tema massa feixuc per a sser discutit a tall de digressi i per via d'illustraci. Nogensmenys, calen exemples per a mostrar que el principi que mantinc s d'importncia seriosa i prctica i que no estic tractant d'erigir una barrera contra mals imaginaris. I no s difcil mostrar, amb abundants exemples, que una de les propensions humanes ms universals s eixamplar els lmits del que hom pot anomenar vigilncia moral fins a

experience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right because they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these instructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world?

The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it may perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples are necessary to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and practical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police, until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual, is one of the most

arribar a violar la llibertat de l'individu ms inqestionablement legtima. 14. A tall de primer exemple, considerem les antipaties que els homes nodreixen sense cap altra justificaci contra les persones amb opinions religioses diferents de les seves, car no practiquen llurs observances religioses, en especial llurs abstinncies religioses. Per citar un exemple ms aviat trivial, res en la creena o prctica dels cristians fa ms per enverinar l'odi que senten els musulmans contra ells que el fet que mengin carn de porc. Hi ha pocs actes que els cristians i els europeus considerin amb un disgust menys dissimulat com el que produeix als mahometans aquesta manera de satisfer la fam. En primer lloc, es tracta d'una ofensa contra llur religi, per aquesta circumstncia no explica ni el grau ni la mena de repugnncia que senten, car el vi s tamb prohibit per llur religi i tots els musulmans consideren que prendre'n est mal fet, per no s fastigs: L'aversi que experimenten envers la carn de l'animal impur s, al contrari, d'un carcter peculiar que s'acosta a l'antipatia instintiva que la idea de brutcia, una vegada que amara totalment els sentiments, sempre sembla despertar; fins i tot en aquells que tenen uns hbits personals escrupolosament nets, i de la qual el sentiment d'impuresa religiosa, tan intens entre els hinds, en constitueix un bon exemple. Suposem ara que en un poble format per una majoria musulmana, aquesta insists en el fet de no permetre menjar carn de porc dins els lmits del pas. Aquest fet no seria gens nou en els pasos mahometans. Seria un exercici legtim de l'autoritat moral de l'opini pblica? i, en cas negatiu, per qu no? Aquesta prctica inspira realment fstic a la collectivitat en qesti. Els seus membres pensen sincerament que s prohibida i avorrida per la divinitat. Tampoc aquesta prohibici podria ser blasmada com una persecuci religiosa. s possible que el seu origen fos religis, per no seria una persecuci

universal of all human propensities. As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs do not practise their religious observances, especially their religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing in the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred of Mahomedans against them than the fact of their eating pork. There are few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected disgust than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion; but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. Their aversion to the flesh of the "unclean beast" is, on the contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment of religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable example. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in Mahomedan countries.* Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really revolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin, but it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation would be that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of

per ra de religi, ja que el fet de menjar carn de porc no constitueix un deure en la religi de ning. L'nic motiu de condemna defensable d'aquesta prohibici seria que la collectivitat no t dret a immiscir-se en els gustos personals i en els interessos privats dels individus.

individuals the public has no business to interfere.

* The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a religion.

15. I si volem acostar-nos un xic ms a casa, la majoria dels espanyols consideren una gran impietat ofensiva en major grau a l'sser Suprem, retre-li culte per mitj d'altres rituals que no siguin els prescrits per l'Esglsia Catlica i la legislaci espanyola interdeix sobre el territori sota la seva jurisdicci tota altra mena de culte pblic. Els pobles d'Europa meridional consideren els clergues casats persones no sols irreligioses, sin impdiques, indecents, grolleres i fastigoses. Qu en pensen els protestants d'aquests sentiments perfectament sincers i dels intents d'imposar-los sobre els no catlics? Tanmateix, si els homes estan justificats a intervenir en la llibertat d'altri en coses que no pertoquen a llurs interessos, a partir de quin principi s possible d'excloure d'una manera coherent aquests casos? o qui pot blasmar els qui cobegen reprimir el que consideren un escndol als ulls de Du i de l'home? 16. No pot adduir-se argument millor per prohibir quelcom, que s considerat com una immoralitat personal, que el que invoquen per a la supressi d'aquestes prctiques els qui les tenen per impies, i, a menys que estem disposats a adoptar la lgica dels perseguidors i a afirmar que nosaltres podem perseguir els altres perqu tenim ra, mentre que ells no ens han de perseguir perqu estan equivocats, hem d'anar amb compte a l'hora d'admetre un principi que, si ens fos

To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to worship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other public worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against non-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others, on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of God and man?

No stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent

aplicat a nosaltres, reputarem com una gran injustcia. 17. Hi ha la possibilitat que hom objecti -sense ra- que els exemples precedents estan extrets de contingncies impossibles entre nosaltres, car l'opini, en aquest pas, no s probable que imposi l'abstinncia de certes carns, que s'immisceixi en matria de cultes o en matria de matrimoni, segons les creences o la inclinaci dels interessats. Aix, posar un proper exemple basat en una ingerncia en la llibertat, el perill de la qual no ha passat del tot. En tot temps que els puritans disposaren de poder suficient, com ara a Nova Anglaterra o a Gran Bretanya al temps de la Repblica, han maldat amb xit considerable per a descoratjar tota mena de diversions pbliques i gaireb totes les privades, en especial la msica, la dansa, els jocs pblics o altres reunions destinades a la diversi aix com el teatre. En aquest pas resten encara grups importants de persones que segons les seves nocions de la moralitat i de la religi condemnen aquests tipus d'esbarjos. Com que aquestes persones pertanyen sobretot a la burgesia, que constitueix el poder dominant en la condici social i poltica present del regne, no s gens. impossible que aquests sectors arribin a assolir algun dia una majoria en el Parlament. Qu els semblaria als membres de la part restant de la comunitat el fet que les diversions permeses siguin regulades pels sentiments religiosos i morals dels calvinistes i metodistes ms estrictes? No desitjarien sense dilaci que aquests pietosos intrusos es fiquessin en llurs propis assumptes? Aix s precisament el que cal contestar a tot govern i a tot pblic que t la pretensi que ning gaudeixi dels plaers que ells troben dolents. Ara b, si el principi de la pretensi fos adms, ning no podria raonablement objectar al fet que fos aplicat en el sentit de la majoria o algun altre poder preponderant al pas i tothom hauria d'estar disposat a acceptar la idea d'una repblica cristiana, tal com l'entengueren els primers

as a gross injustice the application to ourselves. The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as drawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country, not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with people for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying, according to their creed or inclination. The next example, however, shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently powerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put down all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music, dancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely what should be said to every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or other preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs

colonitzadors de Nova Anglaterra, si una confessi religiosa semblant a la seva arribs mai a recuperar el seu terreny perdut, com les religions presumptament decadents han fet tan sovint. 18. Imaginem una altra contingncia, tal vegada de realitzaci ms probable que la darrera esmentada. Existeix declaradament una forta tendncia en el mn modern vers una constituci democrtica de la societat, acompanyada o no d'institucions poltiques populars. Hom afirma que en el pas on aquesta tendncia es materialitza ms plenament -on tant la societat com el govern sn ms democrtics-, els Estats Units, el sentiment de la majoria, a la qual qualsevol manifestaci d'un estil de vida ms ostents o costs del que llurs membres poden esperar emular s de mal gust, opera com una llei sumpturia fora efica, i en moltes parts de la Uni tota persona que posseeix uns ingressos molt grans no sempre troba mitjans adients per a despendre'ls sense incrrer en la desaprovaci popular. Si b aquesta mena d'afirmacions sens dubte sn exagerades com a representaci dels fets existents, l'estat de coses que descriuen no solament s concebible i possible, ans un resultat probable del sentiment democrtic, conjuminat amb la idea que la collectivitat t un dret de veto sobre la manera en qu els individus despenen els seus ingressos. Noms cal que suposem, a ms, una difusi considerable de les opinions socialistes per tal que esdevingui infame als ulls de la majoria la possessi de ms d'una petita quantitat de bns o de qualsevol renda que no sigui procedent del treball manual. Opinions semblants en principi a aquestes ja prevalen fora dins la menestralia i pesen opressivament sobre aquells qui sn susceptibles de ser influts per l'opini d'aquesta classe, o sia, els seus propis membres. s sabut que els mals treballadors manuals, que constitueixen la majoria d'operaris en moltes branques de la indstria, sn decididament de l'opini que ells haurien de cobrar el

should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do. To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realised- where both society and the government are most democratic- the United States- the feeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts of the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income to find any mode of spending it which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to these already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or otherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter skilful workmen from

mateix salari que els bons i que no hauria d'estar perms, ja sia treballant a preu fet o altrament, de guanyar ms que els altres mercs a una aptitud o esfor superior. I aix fan servir una vigilncia moral, que ocasionalment pot esdevenir coacci fsica, per tal d'impedir que els treballadors qualificats rebin, i els empresaris els ofereixin, una remuneraci ms gran per un servei ms til. Si el pblic t jurisdicci sobre qestions privades, no entenc perqu aquests treballadors obren malament ni que hom pugui blasmar un pblic determinat per afirmar la mateixa autoritat sobre la conducta d'un individu, si s'accepta que el pblic general t el dret a afirmar-la sobre les persones en general. 19. Per, sense necessitat d'ocupar-nos de casos hipottics, als nostres dies es practiquen usurpacions importants de la llibertat de la vida privada, i encara hom commina d'efectuar-ne d'altres ms grans amb una certa probabilitat d'xit, i hi ha qui proposa opinions que declaren un dret illimitat del pblic no noms a prohibir per llei tot all que creu que s dolent, sin a interdir una srie de coses que admet que sn innocents a fi de barrar el pas a les que creu dolentes. 20. Sota el pretext d'impedir la intemperncia, el poble d'una colnia anglesa i el de gaireb la meitat dels Estats Units, han hagut de sofrir la prohibici per llei de fer un s qualsevol de les begudes fermentades, com no sia per raons mdiques, car la interdicci de la seva venda significa, de fet, la prohibici del seu s. I tot i que la impossibilitat de l'execuci d'aquesta llei ha provocat la seva revocaci en alguns dels estats que l'adoptaren, dhuc en aquell que li ha donat el seu nom, s'ha encetat una campanya, secundada amb un zel considerable per molts dels filantrops declarats, a fi d'iniciar una agitaci a favor d'una llei semblant en aquest pas. L'associaci, o Aliana com s'autodenomina, que ha estat constituda per a aquesta finalitat, ha adquirit una certa notorietat a travs de la

receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct which the general public asserts over people in general.

But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success, and opinions propounded which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but, in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit a number of things which it admits to be innocent. Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which had adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The association, or "Alliance" as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its secretary and one of the very few

publicitat donada a la correspondncia entre el seu secretari i un dels pocs homes pblics anglesos que creu que les opinions d'un poltic s'han de basar en principis. La participaci de Lord Stanley en aquesta correspondncia segurament enrobustir les esperances ja dipositades en ell per aquells qui saben que les qualitats que aquest poltic ha manifestat en algunes de les seves aparicions pbliques malauradament sn ben rares entre tots aquells que figuren a la galeria d'homes pblics. L'rgan de l'Aliana, que deploraria pregonament el reconeixement de qualsevol principi que pogus ser emprat per tal de justificar el fanatisme i la persecuci es permet d'assenyalar l'mplia i insalvable barrera que separa aquests principis dels de l'associaci. Totes les qestions relatives al pensament, a l'opini, a la conscincia, em semblen -diu- situar-se fora de l'esfera de la legislaci; totes les que es refereixen a l'acci, hbit i relaci socials, subjectes noms a un poder discrecional conferit a l'Estat i no pas a l'individu, entren en canvi de ple dins ella. Cal remarcar que no n'esmenta una tercera classe diferent de les dues anteriors, a saber, els actes i els hbits que no sn socials, sin individuals, si b s precisament a aquesta darrera classe a la qual pertany sens dubte l'acte de beure licors fermentats. La venda de les begudes alcohliques, tanmateix, entra dins del comer i aquest s un acte social. Per la infracci de qu hom es plany no es refereix a la llibertat del venedor, sin a la del comprador i consumidor, car l'Estat podria perfectament b prohibir beure vi amb la intenci manifesta d'impossibilitar la seva obtenci. El secretari, tanmateix, continua dient: Reclamo, com a ciutad, el dret de legislar sempre que els meus drets socials sn envats per l'acci social d'un altre. I com defineix aquests drets socials? Si hi ha res que envaeix els meus drets socials, certament ho fa el trfic de begudes fortes. Anorrea el meu dret primari de seguretat creant i estimulant constantment el

English public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances unhappily are among those who figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would "deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the association. "All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience, appear to me," he says, "to be without the sphere of legislation; all pertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a discretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the individual, to be within it."

No mention is made of a third class, different from either of these, viz., acts and habits which are not social, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The secretary, however, says, "I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another." And now for the definition of these "social rights." "If anything invades my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys my primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery I am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and by weakening and demoralising

desordre social. Envaeix el meu dret a la igualtat extraient un benefici de la creaci d'una misria, al sosteniment de la qual haig de contribuir amb els impostos que pago. Impedeix el meu dret al lliure desenvolupament moral i intellectual envoltant el meu cam de perills i afeblint i desmoralitzant la societat, de la qual tinc el dret a reclamar ajuda i tracte mutus. Una teoria dels drets socials, sense pari amb cap altra que fins ara hagus trobat probablement mai expressi en forma escrita, que no s res ms que aix: que s un dret absolut de tot individu que tot altre individu obri en tots els aspectes exactament com ell faria; que qualsevol que no hi rex en la qesti ms insignificant viola el meu dret social i em dna dret a posar demanda per tal que sigui rescabalat el greuge. Un principi tan monstrus s molt ms perills que qualsevol intromissi concreta en la llibertat. No hi ha violaci de la llibertat que no pogus justificar; no reconeix en absolut cap dret a la llibertat, llevat potser del de mantenir opinions en secret, sense mai revelar-les a ning, car des del moment que una opini que jo considero noble passa pels llavis d'alg, envaeix tots els drets socials que m'atribueix l'Aliana. Aquesta doctrina atribueix a tots els homes un inters creat mutu en llur perfecci moral, intellectual, i dhuc fsica, definida per cada reivindicador segons el seu propi criteri. 21. Un altre exemple important de la ingerncia illegtima en la justa llibertat de l'individu, no solament projectada, sin efectuada amb xit des de fa temps, s la legislaci sabtica. Sens dubte, el fet d'abstenir-se de les ocupacions diries normals un dia a la setmana, en la mesura que ho permeten les exigncies de la vida, si b noms obliga els jueus des del punt de vista religis, s un costum fora beneficis. I per tal com aquest costum no pot ser observat sense un consentiment general entre les classes treballadores, donat que en la mesura que algunes persones treballant, poden imposar la mateixa

society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse." A theory of "social rights" the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language: being nothing short of this- that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: for, the moment an opinion which I consider noxious passes any one's lips, it invades all the "social rights" attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard.

Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each the observance by others of the custom, by suspending

necessitat a d'altres, s permissible i just que la llei garanteixi a cadasc l'observana per part dels altres del costum a base de suspendre les operacions ms importants de la indstria durant un dia determinat. Per aquesta justificaci, fonamentada en l'inters directe que altres tenen en l'observana de la prctica per part de cada individu, no es pot aplicar a les ocupacions voluntriament escollides a les quals una persona li escau de dedicar les seves hores de lleure, com tampoc no s gens pertinent en el cas de les restriccions de les diversions per llei. s veritat que la diversi d'alguns comporta la jornada laboral d'altres, per el plaer, per no dir l'esbarjo til de molts, val ben b el treball d'uns quants, sempre que aquesta ocupaci sigui lliurement escollida i hom se'n pugui acomiadar tamb lliurement. Els obrers tenen el perfecte dret de pensar que, si tothom treballs el diumenge, caldria trescar set dies per una paga de sis, per mentre es deturin la gran majoria de feines, el petit nombre que han de feinejar per al goig dels altres obtenen un augment proporcional dels seus guanys i, d'altra banda, no estan obligats a seguir en aquestes ocupacions, si s que prefereixen el lleure a l'emolument. Si calgus cercar un altre remei hom el podria trobar en l'establiment per costum d'un dia de festa a la setmana per aquesta determinada classe de persones. L'nic motiu, doncs, que permet la defensa de l'establiment de restriccions als esbargiments dominicals s que sn censurables des del punt de vista religis, ra que, per legislar, hauria de ser impugnada amb totes les nostres forces. Deoruin injuriae Diis curae. Resta encara per provar que la societat o algun dels seus servents han rebut la comesa del cel de venjar una suposada ofensa a l'Omnipotent, que no s alhora un tort als nostres semblants. La idea que s deure d'un home que un altre sigui religis fou el fonament de totes les persecucions religioses perpetrades fins ara i, si l'admetssim, les justificaria plenament.

the greater operations of industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour of a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely resigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages; but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a proportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow those occupations if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further remedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a motive of legislation which can never be too earnestly protested against. Deorum injuriae Diis curae. It remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our fellow creatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and, if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It is a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of

Encara que el sentiment que es manifesta en els repetits intents de tractar d'aturar el funcionament dels ferrocarrils els diumenges, en la resistncia a obrir els museus, etc.., no t la crueltat dels antics perseguidors, l'estat d'nim que denota s fonamentalment el mateix. s la determinaci a no tolerar que els altres facin el que la seva religi els permet, car no ho permet la religi del perseguidor. s la creena que Du no sols abomina l'acte del descregut, sin que ens considerar culpables si no li fem la vida impossible. 22. No em puc estar d'afegir a aquests exemples de la poca consideraci en qu normalment hom t la llibertat humana, el llenguatge de franc esperit persecutori que esclata a la premsa d'aquest pas, sempre que s'ocupa de la notcia del fenomen remarcable del mormonisme. Hom podria fer molts comentaris sobre el fet inesperat i instructiu que una suposada nova revelaci, i una religi, fundada sobre ella, producte d'una palpable impostura, ni tan sols abonada pel prestigi de les qualitats extraordinries del seu fundador, s creguda per centenars de milers de persones i ha arribat a constituir el fonament d'una societat en l'poca dels diaris, dels ferrocarrils i del telgraf. All que ac ens interessa s que aquesta religi, com les altres i millors religions, t els seus mrtirs; que el seu profeta i fundador fou linxat pels seus ensenya- ments; que altres dels seus fidels perderen llurs vides a mans de la mateixa violncia desfermada; que foren expulsats a la fora, com a comunitat, de la terra que els vei nixer, i que, desprs d'haver estat encalats vers un recs solitari. al bell mig del desert, ara n'hi ha molts en aquest pas que gosen declarar obertament que estaria b (si b no s convenient) enviar una expedici contra ells per tal d'obligar-los per la fora a professar les opinions d'altres persones. L'article de la doctrina mormona que constitueix la provocaci principal de l'antipatia que aix desborda les contencions ordinries de la tolerncia religiosa s la seva sanci de la

the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested.

I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it, the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs: that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English and

poligmia, la qual, per b que permesa als mahometans, als hinds i als xinesos, sembla despertar una animositat insadollable quan s practicada per persones que parlen angls i que professen la doctrina de Crist. Personalment desaprovo pregonament aquesta instituci mormona, alhora per altres raons i perqu en comptes de ser abonada pel principi de la llibertat, en representa una infracci directa, ja que no s ms que una rebladura de les cadenes de la meitat dels membres de la comunitat i l'escapoliment per part de l'altra de la reciprocitat de l'obligaci que els deuen. Amb tot, cal recordar que aquesta relaci s tan voluntria per part de les dones implicades que hom pot considerar que la pateixen, com la que es dna en qualsevol altra forma d'instituci matrimonial. I per ms sorprenent que aquest fet ens sembli, t la seva explicaci en les idees i costums corrents del mn, que en ensenyar les dones a creure que el matrimoni s quelcom indispensable, fan comprensible que moltes d'elles prefereixin ser una d'entre diverses esposes a no ser-ne cap. No es demana que altres pasos reconeguin tals unions o deslliurin una part de llurs habitants de les lleis en vigor per mor de les opinions mormones. Ara b, quan els dissidents han fet concessions als sentiments hostils dels altres molt ms del que se'ls podia demanar; quan han abandonat els pasos en qu llurs doctrines eren inacceptables i s'han establert en un rac remot de la terra, que han estar els primers a fer habitable per a l'espcie humana, noms se'ls pot impedir que hi visquin sota les lleis que els plaguin recorrent als principis de la tirania, amb la condici que no cometin agressi contra altres nacions i permetin una perfecta llibertat de moviment als qui estiguin insatisfets amb llurs costums. Un escriptor recent, en alguns aspectes de mrit considerable, proposa (per usar les seves prpies paraules) no una creuada, sin una civilitzada contra aquesta comunitat poligmica per tal de posar fi al que li sembla un pas enrera

profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognise such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others far more than could justly be demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways.

A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words) not a crusade, but a civilisade, against this polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilisation. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any

en la civilitzaci. Jo tamb estic d'acord amb aquest darrer punt, per no crec que cap comunitat tingui el dret a forar una altra a civilitzarse. Mentre que els qui pateixen la llei dolenta no demanin ajut a altres comunitats, no puc admetre que persones que no tenen res a veure amb ells hagin d'intervenir-hi i acabar amb un estat de coses, amb el qual hi estan d'acord tots els directament interessats, perqu representa un escndol per a individus que es troben a mils de milles de distncia, que no hi tenen ni art ni part. Que els envin missioners, si volen, a predicar contra aquesta doctrina i que s'oposin amb mitjans justos (fer callar els seus mestres no n's cap) a l'aven de semblants creences entre els membres del seu poble. Si la civilitzaci ha avantatjat la barbrie quan aquesta dominava el mn, s exagerat tmer que la barbrie, desprs d'haver estat sotmesa plenament, revisqui i arribi a conquerir la civilitzaci. Una civilitzaci que pugui sucumbir davant del seu enemic venut ha d'haver esdevingut tan degenerada que ni els seus propis sacerdots ni mestres ni ning ms tenen la capacitat o s'amonen per sortir en la seva defensa. Si s aix, que aquesta civilitzaci desaparegui com ms aviat millor. Noms pot anar de mal en pitjor fins que sigui destruda i regenerada per brbars enrgics (com l'imperi occidental).

community has a right to force another to be civilised. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means (of which silencing the teachers is not one), oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.