Boazii University, ATA 554 2010780150

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Struggle Over Land: Israeli Spatial Policies over the Occupied Territories ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the Israeli spatial policies over the Occupied Territories. It is argued that those cannot be properly understood without taking into account the colonial-settler character of Israel which continues to this day. The Israeli geopolitical imagination necessitates the simultaneous existence and nonexistence of the Palestinians for its legitimization. Those factors together feed into the indeterminedness of the Israeli borders, imaginatively kept open as nodal points for further expansion, deeply affecting the lives of thousands of Palestinians. This paper is an attempt to analyze the Israeli policy concerning the Occupied Territories of Palestine from a spatial perspective. While it is true that the importance of spatial dynamics is not unique to Israel and that territoriality is a prime aspect of every state; some features specific to that country make such an analysis particularly revealing in Israels case. Keeping that in mind, the purpose of this paper is to place the current spatial politics of Israel within the historical context of her foundation as a colonial-settler society. It shall be emphasized that this analytical framework owes much to Edward Said both in its substance and inspiration; as after more than three decades of its first publication, the authors insights and analyses in The Question of Palestine continue to shed light on what happens today. A proper understanding of the logic of current Israeli policies, such as the turning of Gaza into the Worlds largest prison camp or the building of a separation wall along the West Bank is best possible within the historical 1

framework marked by the colonial-settler character of Israel. While peace negotiations proceed saturated with new maps and plans, Israel continues to unilaterally transform as well as control and destroy the space inhabited by the Palestinians through temporary measures adopted for security reasons. But the oppressive measures against the Palestinian population are only one side of the coin; incomplete without its mirror image, the Jewish settlement. Those two movements indeed, pointing to the two opposite ways of how Israel deals with two different populations; are complementary at the analytical level: they form the geography of imagination of the Israeli state. Before addressing this concept of the geography of imagination adopted from Ghazi-Walid Falah in detail; I would like to return to Edward Said and his discussion of imperialism and colonialism in relation with Zionism. The first thing that strikes the reader in The Question of Palestine is the umbilical cord between imperialism and Zionism which provided the ideological base for the foundation of Israel. There is no doubt that Israel has been founded through settler colonialism. Can we say therefore that the foundation of Israel was an imperialistic project? What is the relationship between colonialism and imperialism, in the Israeli case in particular as well as in general? Wikipedia, under the article of colonialism distinguishes two main types: settler colonialism and exploitation colonialism. The first involves large scale emigration; be that for religious, political or economic motives. In the second, the metropole uses the colony, its resources as well as population for purposes of economic extraction. Perhaps the fact that we are, or I am more familiar with this second type did refrain me from seeing the same logic underlying both: This logic is intimately linked to imperialism and has a prime importance in understanding Israel, both in its past and current states. Hence in Edward Saids words: Imperialism was the theory, colonialism the practice, of changing the uselessly unoccupied territories of

the world into useful new versions of the Europe metropolitan society. (Said, 1979, p. 28) Uselessly unoccupied territories is the keyword in Saids sentence. It tells pages about the lot and the history of colonized peoples and territories. The two adjectives describing the noun territory, also describe the logic of imperialism as an ideology: as the word unoccupied renders the native populations of colonized lands non-existent, the designation useless points to the unique entitlement and moral authority of the metropole to bring under human use those blank parts of the globe. Edward Said shows how the 19th century idea of the distinction between the civilized and uncivilized man sealed by science transformed the non-European world into something to be claimed, occupied and ruled by Europe. (Said, p. 25) Cultivating the land was thus the prerogative of the civilized man in his supreme capacity of the use of his productive powers: in the hands of the native, the land was either badly cultivated or left to rod. Our two abovementioned adjectives jointly hold the key to the moving spirit and legitimization of imperialist ventures: The territories are unoccupied because the natives inhabiting them are from the stock of inferior races; they are subhuman, therefore non-existent. Consequently, to occupy them and put their latent capacity into effective use is almost a moral duty of the European colonialist: hence both the concepts of right and duty are embodied in the single word uselessly in its relation to colonized territories. Zionism may not be an imperialist project in itself, but it did operate through and thanks to its logic and existence. Said places Zionism within the wider framework of imperialist ideology; and shows the relationship of these two present on a number of levels. Surely Zionism is not just another manifestation of European colonial undertakings, if we can make such a generalization. What distinguish Zionism from other European colonial ventures are its Jewish character and its vision of building a national homeland for a landless people. The first, points to the minority status of a

people within Europe, which underwent countless persecutions and oppression. The second constitutes the moving spirit through which the Zionist project was put into practice: It was not the mere existence of virgin territories waiting for exploitation and the concomitant right and duty of putting them under effective use that moved the Jewish settlers into Palestine: the quest was first and foremost for a national homeland. And Zionism collaborated with imperialism for this objective. This collaboration was at the two interrelated levels of the ideological and the material: the ideology of imperialism provided a perfect legitimization and a framework for the fulfillment of Jewish aspirations on Palestine; its reality procured her with more than powerful allies in the shape of the European imperial states. For all their minority status, the Jews were European and hence entitled to rule over the territories and peoples of the Orient whomever those happen to be. Imperialism endowed Zionism with a legitimization, a modus operandi and powerful allies necessary to turn its ambitious projections into reality. The foundation of Israel is thus based on these premises, of which we need a firm grasp for understanding her today. Before finishing this long detour, I would like to introduce a final element about the Israeli state. Since its declaration of independence from the British Mandate in 1948, Israel has fought several wars changing her borders; and today the status of the West Bank and Gaza remain unresolved after endless negotiations: The borders of Israel are indeterminate, and consciously so. Israel keeps her boundaries open, not in the sense of militarily allowing passage (this she would never do) but in the sense of treating them as always subject to expansion and change. This malleable geography consciously left unclosed marks a state under an ever process of foundation: In the current maneuvers of Israel for grabbing from the West Bank as much as possible, lies not only a commitment to an end result with Israel holding the maximum from the territory of historical Palestine, but maybe more than that a commitment to the process itself. The noneclosedness of this geography is rooted in the foundational ideology of Israel

as a homeland for the Jewish people. This homeland needs to be geographically unbounded as the people it is intended to house is not either delimited. Waves of immigrants formed the foundation stone of Israel; and are still a constant feature of her society and demographics. The last big wave of immigration did in fact take place in the aftermath of USSRs dismantlement, resulting in an influx of population comparable to the postWWII situation. Israel not only opens her arms to the Jewish people around the world but also creates diverse incentives in order to keep a constant flow of immigration pouring into her borders. We said before that the migration flows constituted the foundation stone of the state of Israel. When exactly can we locate this moment of foundation? In Israels declaration of independence in 1948? Can we locate it at all? Or can we say that Israel is a state ever in her stage of foundation, always in the process of being founded, functioning on this image of a future to be realized, embodied in the dream of Eretz Israel? In fact, the logic of state in Israel functions by keeping her boundaries indeterminate: the colonizersettler character of Israel is not something confined to a past historical moment. Israel continues to absorb and settle new waves of immigrants while at the same time colonizing the remaining chunks of historical Palestine. I think that the spatial policies of Israel can best be understood by considering her colonial-settler character, ready to accommodate and settle indeterminate numbers of immigrants of whom by definition she is the welcoming home. It goes without saying that the Palestinians constitute the defining other of the Israeli state. Israel simultaneously functions on their existence and nonexistence: both are necessary to the logic of the state. The existence of the Palestinians is indispensable as it provides a powerful legitimization for state action in the face of the common enemy. Also, Israel makes use of unskilled Palestinian labor force without granting them any sort of social/political rights.

The non-existence of the Palestinians stems directly from the imperialist and colonialist discourses which delegate the non-European native populations to the status of sub-humans, and hence of non-existence. As Edward Said so skillfully shows in his analysis, the Israeli colonizers wanted to have the land without the people living on it, and the argument is still valid today. However, this fact is complicated by the above-mentioned necessity of the Palestinians to the very Israeli identity. From the tension between these two (the necessity of the existence and non-existence of the Palestinians) emerge the different ways in which Israel deal with the lands and populations under occupation. Ghazi-Walid Falah, in his article The Geopolitics of Enclavisation and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, argues that Israelis strategy since the second Intifada has not been solely one of security and counter terror but part of a long-term strategy of spatial demolition and strangulation. (Falah, 2005, p. 1441) The author argues that this strategy seemed to have the double aim of first, unilateral separation from the Palestinian population and than second, its territorial dismemberment. The author further argues that this Israeli policy shattered the territorial basis of a two-state solution to the conflict. Falah further shows that the 2nd Intifada has been a wonderful opportunity as a legitimization of the nationalist realpolitik and the imaginary of the Israeli state, which he summarizes in the following sentence: The effective control of ever more land for potential settlement, not for purposes of security but for purposes of state ideology and territorial expansion. (Falah, 2005, p.1342). In order to discuss Israels relationship with space, Falah underlines three conceptual frameworks: The first is the geography of the colonial-settler, grounded on the spatial imagination of creating a state in another peoples country. The second, points to the geography of national redemption thus aiming to control over ever further space. The third emerges as a geography of threat as inhabited by the Palestinians, which therefore needs

to be dismembered and enclaved. Falahs discussion makes it clear that the state ideology, and the Israeli elites rationale did not change much since their first inception with very first migrations of Jews into Palestine. Such a geographical imagination paralyzes any possible peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. As argued above, the state ideology of Israel is founded on a geopolitical vision of national redemption, this coupled with her defining other in the image of the Palestinians. Falah argues that Israel, building on these two premises keeps her boundaries intentionally indeterminate. (p.1349) This indeterminedness is both a result of the ideology of Zionism, projecting a national space of redemption; and the medium through which the Zionist project is actualized on the ground. Falahs analysis shows that Israeli state ideology aims at no less than controlling and settling all Mandatory Palestine. Another faultline characterizing Israeli realpolitik is related to the demographics of the region, setting the tone for peace negotiations oscillating between one-state and two state solutions. Israel, facing the demographic threat of losing her Jewish character in case of a future merger with the Palestinians produces new formulae against the actualization of such a dim prospect for them. Having this theoretical approach in mind, we can now look at the actual shapes that Israels spatial policies took in the last decade. Israel pursues a range of different spatial technologies in order to control, enclave or simply destroy the populations of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; this, in the name of temporary security measures. The emphasis of temporariness is important here, as it is through this alleged temporariness that Israel keeps her geography malleable, subject to change when necessary and capable of expansion. The measures are never really transitory in their substance because their existence is projected into an indeterminate future; but because they are transitory at the discursive level, they can adopt extreme forms deemed legitimate under exceptional conditions. This permanent

temporariness of the Israeli spatial policies is what complicates the plight of the Palestinians today. One of these measures is Israelis unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. From many points of views Israels disengagement is deceptive. Israel seems to adhere to the principle of partitioning only in the surface. Falah explains that disengagement is not synonymous with partitioning: the latter is a method of conflict resolution in which one party completely divorces itself from a territory and passes it over to the other party as a permanent redivision of space. In the case of the Gaza Strip however, Israel who nonetheless withdrew her settlements and military from the interior, continues to remain in complete control of the territory from the outside; turning the space into the worlds largest prison camp. This she does through controlling the checkpoints from and towards Gaza and remaining in firm control of the Egyptian border as well as controlling her coastal waters and airspace. The resulting enclave emerges as an unsustainable entity, cut off from its hinterland and surrounded by Israel from all directions for security purposes. The story of the Rafah district as told by Ghazi-Walid Falah would be instructive in terms of showing how these security measures function on the ground. Rafah was a Palestinian settlement area neighboring the Egyptian border, isolated from the rest of the Gaza Strip from the west, east and north. It underwent several attacks from the Israeli Defense Forces mainly in the form of house demolitions. The history of the spatial buffering of the area dates back to the 1993 Oslo accords, which gave to Israel the control of the Salah Al Din border route, than routinely patrolled by IDF. Falah reports that the process of buffering began in 2001 with night-time raids to the quarter. In 2002, after having demolished several hundred houses in Rafah, a de facto buffer zone between the patrol corridor and the camp was created. (p. 1357). Than followed the construction of a 8 m. high metal wall along the border, this clearly in breach of Oslo agreements. This metal wall, supposedly built for the security of Israeli military, became another node for

demolition and expansion. The wall which was in fact built between the camp and the Israeli patrolling corridor in order to protect this latter, became itself something to be protected; this at the cost of further demolitions in places where the houses happened to fall close to the metal wall. In that way Israel continued to nibble more and more territory from the Palestinians using the pretext of the second Intifada and its concomitant security discourse.

Falah shows that this tactic of securing land through the creation of a military excuse is not confined to the history of the metal wall in the Rafah district: setting up a military checkpoints at the heart of a Palestinian locality has been a typical tactic of Israeli expansion in Hebron as well as in Eastern Jerusalem and in other localities. In this way, argues Falah, the making of Israels borders did not stop with her declaration of independence

in 1948. I would further add that this indeterminedness is what feeds the state ideology and keeps in constant motion the state of Israel; through an imagination of expansion via new settlements, which legitimizes the Israeli state both in its existence and actions. If military checkpoints formed a nodal point from which Israeli expansion burgeoned, their civil counterparts have been the outposts set up on West Banks hilltops by young Israelis, rebelling against the suburban culture of their parents. The breaching of the Oslo accords formed the framework of this process. The Oslo interim agreement of 1995 split the territories of Gaza and the West Bank under the three categories of A, B and C. The area A comprises the Palestinian cities and is under full Palestinian control. The Area B is contains the Palestinian countryside and is under Palestinian civil, Israeli military control. The area C is under the control of Israeli military for both civilian and security affairs. According to the World Banks report on The Economic Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank, The land area controlled by the Palestinians is fragmented into a multitude of enclaves, with a regime of movement restrictions between them. These enclaves are surrounded by Area C, which covers the entire remaining area and is the only contiguous area of the West Bank. (p. iv) Area C covers approximately 59% of the land in the West Bank, and the World Bank report puts that it is underutilized and sparsely populated. Jerusalem was not included in this 3 fold splitting, which was designed to be a transitory arrangement, premised upon the planned Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which today seems a distant possibility. Whereas the Israeli state do not openly pursue a policy of settlement, which would undermine her credibility within the international arena, it does encourage her citizens to settle on Palestinian territory through word and deed in order to confront the Palestinians with a fait accompli at the negotiation table.

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The story of the Migron settlement as told by Eyal Waizman, in his book Hollow Land is instructive and telling. The author begins the story by stating the difficulty the settlers face for getting permits after the signing of the first Oslo accord; but the settlers always find a workaround with the connivance and/or collaboration of Israeli authorities. For Migron, the whole story begins in 1999 with the complaints of a group of settlers on the bad reception of their cellular phones. The company, Orange than agrees to set up a cellular antenna on the hilltop selected by the settlers; this being a same hilltop which previously was claimed on archeological grounds from the excavation of which no result apart from the naming of the site was achieved. Israeli Defense forces permitted the construction of the cellular antenna on the private land of some Palestinian farmers because according to them cellular antennas formed part of security measures. The construction company after setting a mast connected the hilltop to the central electricity and water services. As the construction of the antenna followed a slow pace, the settlers erected a fake antenna and got a military permission to hire a private guard, which than put his trailer together with his family and connected his house to the water and electricity services already present there. Other families soon joined them, and hence was formed the settlement of Migron, around a cellular antenna, the biggest of the 103 settlements scattered around the West Bank at the time of the authors writing its story. Migron, however was not the only settlement built in this fashion. The story of the settlement of Migron is two-fold: from the point of view of Israelis, it is another moment of the foundation and realization of the Zionist dream of Eretz Israel. The Palestinians on the other hand live it as another instance of the violation of their life, property and political rights on an ever shifting environment of unpredictability. This unpredictability may be the most difficult part of the lot the Palestinians have to endure as adapting to different circumstances while possible, is always more difficult than enduring a stable status quo. However, as argued above, keeping the situation unresolved and indeterminate is the constant policy of the Israeli

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state. This policy is in its most visible in the construction of the separation wall between the West Bank and Israel proper, which according to the Israeli state, was a transitory measure for security purposes aimed at separating the two peoples in the first place. Eyal Weizman underlines the malleability of the wall and points to the different actors involved in the shaping of its route, including the Israeli settlers, the UN, the Israeli Court of Justice the International court of Justice as well as local and international NGOs. Weizman calls this process as the diffused authorship of the project made possible by its elasticity. (Weizman, 2007, p. 163) Frenzy for new settlements such as Migron described above stemmed from the settlers desire to influence the Walls path by seeding the terrain with anchor points around which it might loop (Weizman, 2007, p. 167). The result effect is of course the nibbling away of more territory from the Palestinian side.

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Weizman than gives examples of the rerouting of the Wall, demolished and reconstructed at several instances following petitions and court decisions. Settler petitions for falling at the Israeli side of the Wall, environmentalists

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campaigns in case where the construction could bring in environmental damage as well as the Israeli Court of Justices decisions for balancing human rights against security are among the actors resulting in the Walls rerouting. Weizman states that it is at the interest of Israel of cooperating for solving the immense humanitarian problems as it serves deflecting the fundamental political and legal illegitimacy of the entire project. (Weizman, 2007, p.174) Hence Weizman puts that although the Israeli court of Justice seemed to adopt an adversarial position towards the government by underlining the importance of balancing security needs against human rights, took in fact part in the Walls construction by ordering its rerouting several times, which means its acceptance of the project as legitimate. Weizman throughout his book underlines the elasticity of the entire construction project, subject to change through the agency of different actors. This very malleability and indeterminacy is characteristics of Israeli borders in general as we have argued above. It is a function of the colonialsettler character of Israel, which continues without much change from the first waves of immigration into Palestine to this day. The logic of continuous expansion and accommodation of new waves of immigrants require indeterminate borders capable of furthering territorial expansion. However there is a little problem, in the fact that the land which is subject to our calculations here, is a land already populated by its native inhabitants. As Edward Said succinctly put, the founders of Israel wanted the land without its people. The same logic is at interplay today as one-state solutions to the conflict bring about specters of Israels losing her Jewish character and of becoming a minority. Israel has been built on the idea of the non-existence of the Palestinians but their existence as the defining other of Israel is also indispensable. Furthermore, although Israel refrains more and more from using Palestinian labor force, Palestinian labor is still very important to the Israeli economy. How does Israel deal with this dilemma? I think that one of the Israels solutions for this simultaneous existenceinexistence of the Palestinians is the locking in of the Palestinians within

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small enclaves where they are settled. Those enclaves although under the Palestinian authority are incontiguous which make it impossible for them to constitute a politically or economically viable entity. The Gaza Strip itself is such an enclave, and is called as the World Largest Prison Camp. Gaza is one of the most densely populated tracts of land in the world and is home to about 1.3 million Palestinians, about 33% of whom living in United Nationsfunded refugee camps. The area is under severe lack of basic human necessities such as a functioning sewage system as well as clean water, the provisions of which Israel continuously sabotage. As stated above, Gaza is controlled by land, sea and air by Israel, which put under question the credibility of her unilateral disengagement. The West Bank on the other hand, is divided up into several enclaves which makes impossible any socio-economic integrity within such a configuration. Ghazi-Whalid Falahs discussion on the Projection of the West Bank Final Status Map (Falah, 2005, p. 1363) makes it clear what is the Israelis vision for an independent Palestine within the framework of a two-state resolution to the conflict. This map known as Baraks generous offer to Arafat divides up the area under Palestinian control into three bigger and one smaller chunk, creating three incontiguous enclaves surrounded by Israeli territory, the corridor between them and Jordon remaining transitorily under Israeli control for undefined security purposes. Though it is projected that the future transfer of this corridor to the Palestinian authorities was expected to unify the territories under Palestinian control, Falah shows that one should not be deceived by this clause as temporary measures in the case of Israel always turn to be permanent ones. This generous offer has been refused by Yasser Arafat resulting in his political exile in Ramallah until his death. However this has not been the end of the enclavization of Palestinian territories through the so-called security measures such as the construction of the Separation Wall or the

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establishment of new settlements into the heart of Palestinian territories. One example discussed by Weizman is the founding of an outer ring of Jewish settlements to the Eastern Jerusalem in order to cut off his latter from its hinterland within the West Bank and to turn it into a small enclave within Israeli territory. Within this ever-changing geography of numerous controls, checkpoints, clashes over settlement areas, separation walls; the ordinary Palestinian struggles to live and to assert his existence through various adaptation and resistance measures. Such geography fundamentally undermines the Palestinian travel rights, and even if the West Bank itself would not be separated into further enclaves, the problem of contiguity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are of prime importance under any prospect of two-state solution.

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It is where Israel produces fantastic measures in order to overcome this problem of incongruity the great part of which she herself created. There emerges an absurd archeology geography of the Kafkaesque fashion as

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shown by Weizman. A number of different road projects show the geographical imagination of the Israeli state as told by Weizman: they are based on the complete geographical separation of two people on the same territory: a three dimensional approach is adopted for ensuring the separate travel of Israelis and Palestinians through a combination of viaducts and tunnels; with various separate checkpoints at crossroads. Weizman quotes from the architects of one such road praising on one of the merits of the project as ensuring the travel of Israeli commuters without being aware of their Palestinian counterparts driving the road below: we are again encountered with the simultaneous existence and non-existence of the Palestinians both necessary for Israel. The three dimensional approach is also adopted by this latter for the dividing up of different landscapes and resources on a vertical basis, such as the administration and use of the Western Bank water aquifer: the deeper levels which contain the most precious water sources are secured for Israeli use whereas the Palestinians can only make use of the seasonal groundwater. Following this system of enclavization, there are a number of analogies between the South African Apartheid regime and the situation of the Palestinian people both within the Green line and in the occupied territories. Bernard Regan in his article The State of Israel and the Apartheid Regime of South Africa in Comparative Perspective shows that calling the present situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories as an apartheid regime can be misleading. In the case of Israel, the Law of Return and the Absentees Property Law denied the return of Palestinian residents and their claim to property. According to the first, residents not registered in the Population Register in 1952 could not return with a claim of citizenship. The property law applied similarly by declaring absentee anyone residing outside the area of Israel. In fact, the exodus of the Palestinians was completed in 1949, just after the declaration of the Independence of Israel, and the two laws were stripping off all claims of return and citizenship as well as of property of the great majority if not the total of the Palestinians who fled the country. The objective of the [Israeli] legislation was to take the land but not the

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people. The objective of the apartheid system was to take the land and the people but to confine indiginous black citizens to a tightly constrained geographical and political space within the country,(Regan, 2008, p.207) summarizes Regan in his article. In fact, under the aparheid regime, the non-whites were citizens but second-class ones as they were subject to lesser rights and liberties. The Palestinians living on the Occupied Territories are not Israeli citizens but however are often subject to Israeli military administration and legislation, in fact Israel seems not to know what exactly to do with this population. In the words of Regan: The state of Israel remains a colonising state unwilling or unable to define its own nature or its own borders because it refuses to recognse the right of the Palestinian people to be treated and recognized as a national entity. (Regan, p. 211) Before finishing this discussion of the spatial politics of Israel, I would like to introduce another spatial logic of colonialism with which maybe we are more familiar in the case of Egypt. Egypt provides an example of exloitation colonialism. Timothy Mitchell in his book Colonising Egypt shows how the management of the space used new forms of control and surveillance in order to get the maximum efficiency from the population in terms of agricutural production . These methods in Egypt dates back to Ottoman modernization, continuing through with more intensity to the time of Khedive Mehmet Ali Pasha and the to direct British colonisation. The key words used by Mitchell are enframing, ordering and exhibition. Those are the technologies through which the Egyptian population was governed via strict surveillance. To draw a comparison, in this case, the colonisers wanted both the land and the people. In both cases, the colonisers treated the native peoples inhabiting the colonised territory as subhuman. But in Egypt, we ecounter a totally different spatial politics, first of all marked by order. This different set of policies brings into light further characteristics of the spatial dynamics of Israel. First of all, it is nothing but orderly. Elya Weizman names the process of the construction of the Wall as a structured chaos. The setting up of new

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settlements through a range of workarounds for getting the permits, allegedly ad hoc and temporary security measures such as the demolition of the houses in the Rafah settlement, all seem to perfectly fit within this designation of the structured chaos. Israel seems rather to have adopted a military geographical imagination, subject to changes according to the developments on the ground. Whether or not the peace negotiations continue, Israel seems more committed to this process of fighting a semidefined enemy than to a final resolution finishing the conflict. Reference List: Alatout, S. (2009). Walls as Technologies of Government: The Double Construction of Geographies of Peace and Conflict in Israeli Politics, 2002Present. Annals Of The Association Of American Geographers, 99(5), 956968. Currie, K. (2008). Gaza, the World's Largest Outdoor Prison. Against The Current, 23(2), 37-38. Falah, G.-W. (2005). The Geopolitics of 'Enclavisation' and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Third World Quarterly 26(8), 1341-1372. Regan, B. (2008). The State of Israel and the Apartheid Regime of South Africa in Comparative Perspective. Holy Land Studies: A Multidisciplinary Journal (Edinburgh University Press), 7(2), 201-212. Said E. (1979). The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/W ESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21946232~menuPK:294370~pagePK:2 865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:294365,00.html http://www.arij.org/images/stories/pictures/maps/Geopolitical%20map %20of%20the%20west%20bank%202009.jpg http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/wbgs_campdavid.html

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