Carter P.

Johnson
The most picturesque character in the regiment in those days was Carter Johnson, who remained in it until he was retired at Fort Robinson. The regiment will always cherish his memory and fighting qualities with many a laugh at his eccentricities, adventures and misadventures But he would require a whole book to himself.
Frank McCoy

Lieutenant Johnson and the Tenth United States Cavalry in Arizona, 1888 drawn by Frederic Remington from Harpers Weekly.

Carter P. Johnson Military Service Highlights

The most picturesque character in the regiment in those days was Carter Johnson, who remained in it until he was retired at Fort Robinson. The regiment will always cherish his memory and fighting qualities with many a laugh at his eccentricities, adventures and misadventures. But he would require a whole book to himself.1 Frank McCoy Carter Page Johnson enlisted in the army in Virginia in 1876. He was a sergeant at the time of the 1879 Cheyenne outbreak from Fort Robinson, Nebraska. In 1882 he became one of the few non-commissioned officers to rise from the ranks to become an officer. A year later he was assigned to the Tenth Cavalry and sent to Arizona.2 He later served in Cuba and Philippines. Major Johnson retired from the army is 1909 after 33 years of service. He came out of retirement in 1916 to command Fort Robinson briefly, before his death the same year.

Chasing Indians in Arizona

For most of the troops there was little glory in this campaign. Theirs was the harder duty, to prevent outbreaks, rather than chase the renegades back onto their reservations. Theirs was the dismal duty to guard mountain passes, water holes, and trails that did not lead to glorious lighting. The Tenth and the Fourth were in close cooperation during this campaign. The troops of the Tenth, under Lebo, Bill Davis, Carter Johnson, Ward, Grierson and others, were holding stations at Mescal Sorings in the Whetstones ; at Calabasas, under the Santa Ritas ; at Crhtenden ; at Tempest Mine, just over the line in Sonora, and at La Noria. The Fourth had stations on the south side of the Huachucas, at Bisbee, at Skeleton Canyon and to the east, with a few troops at Camp Bowie. In 1887, about half the regiment pursued the Kid, one of Geronimo's disciples. It was a hard campaign, but unsuccessful. He was never caught ; he may still be running. Lieut. Carter P. Johnson gained commendation by the skill, energy and endurance with which his outfit pursued this outlaw.3

Adventures in Cuba
As 1st Lieutenant, Carter Johnson commanded black soldiers with Troop M of the Tenth Cavalry on a detached assignment with the Cuban forces. Joy came to the old soldiers of Troop M, when Lieut. C. P. Johnson was given a detachment from it and from the other oufits at Lakeland; they were to perform a "special mission" in Cuba. Better, they were mounted With them went General Munez and staff, 375 assorted Cubans, and a great quantity of arms and munitions for General Gomez. They sailed on the Florida, convoyed by the Peoria, on June 21st.4 The Expedition did not get off to a good start The Battle of Tayacoba was a disastrous American effort to land supplies and reinforcements to Cuban rebels fighting for their independence in the Spanish-American 1

War. Repulsed at the port of Cienfuegos on 29 June 1898, the American force aboard the USS Florida went ashore near Tayacoba the following day. Prior to the drop off of mules, men, and materiel, a small landing party was dispatched to provide reconnaissance on Spanish outposts in the area. Rowing onto the beach, the force crept into the jungle but was discovered by Spanish scouts and soon scathed by enemy fire. Unable to retaliate or even protect themselves, the Americans retreated onto the beach only to find that their boats had been sunk by Spanish cannon fire. Out on Florida, Lieutenant Johnson began organizing rescue attempts. The first four were dispersed by heavy enemy fire and forced to retreat, but the fifth, operating under cover of darkness and crewed by only four men of the U.S. 10th Cavalry, successfully located and repatriated American and Cuban survivors. Once the U.S. fighting men were safely aboard Florida, they promptly left the bay of Tayacoba. All four rescuers, Dennis Bell, William H. Thompkins, Fitz Lee, and George H. Wanton, were subsequently awarded Medals of Honor for their heroism. 5 The rest of the mission was more successful. A landing was attempted near Tunas, but the Florida ran aground ; Spanish troops rapidly assembled and poured a hot fire on the two ships. The little gunboat Peoria was quite insufficient. Fortunately the larger gunboat Helena came along, towed the Florida off the sandbar, and gave the Spaniards a few whiffs of shrapnel. The landing was effected at Palo Alto, and made a junction with General Gomez July 3rd. The records cast little light on the doings of this detachment, but they cooperated with the Cubans, without casualties, and the M troopers rejoined the regiment at Montauk in September.6 Some day the regimental history must have the account of his foray in Cuba in the summer of 98 with the picked troop that took in arms and supplies to Gomez, not forgetting the fight at Arroyo Blanco, where he had a fight with General Gomez as well as with the Spaniards, and pulled down the Cuban flag from the flagpole, and having no American flag at hand, ran up his blue blouse as a sign of capture, and threatened to shoot the first man that attempted to lower it.7 There is another view of this flag-rasing incident, from another Regimental history. While most black troops were participating in the actions around Santiago [and San Juan Hill], Troop M of the 10th Cavalry had joined General Gomez of the Cuban Army and took part in several actions. Their activities, once again unheralded, earned the Congressional Medal Honor for four of its enlisted men. "These soldiers of Troop M were isolated from other American forces about three months while they fought with the Cuban insurgent army, they participated in several notable engagements, these cavalrymen would be the only mounted troops during the Cuba campaign, four privates, Dennis Bell, Fitz Lee, William H. Thompkins and George H. Wanton, won particular distinction for staging a daring rescue operation on June 30, 1898 at Tayabucoa. But here again, there was an obstacle to overcome. The whole company came near getting massacred on account of his (1st lieutenant Carter P. Johnson), getting drunk. After the Cubans and his command had taken a fort and a block house, he got a barrel of rum, got drunk, pulled down the Spanish flag and ran up his blouse as the American flag. He was

given just one-hour to leave the fort. He ordered his men to fire upon the Cubans, which they refused to do, as they would have been massacred had one shot been fired.8

Captain Johnson and the Absentee Utes

In October, 1906 Capts. Carter P Johnson and Robert G. Paxton of the Tenth Cavalry were sent from Fort Robinson to investigate and negotiate with a band of about 116 armed Ute Indians that refused to return to the Uintah Reservation. On October 31, Captain Johnson made arrangements through interpreters for a conference with the Utes between the Army and Indian camps near the Powder River. After difficult debate and discussions with Indians, they agreed to go the Fort Meade while a delegation was sent to Washington to request a transfer to the Cheyenne River (Soiux) reservation. Captain Johnson was in immediate charge of the Utes at Fort Meade and oversaw the ultimate transfer of them to the Cheyenne Reservation by June 30, 1907. The division commander, from whose report the above account is summarized, quotes Colonel Rogers report on Captain Johnson's services as follows: I wish to call attention to the excellent manner in which Capt. Carter P. Johnson, Tenth Cavalry, has performed the difficult duty to which he was assigned. Through his good work it has been possible for me to immediately engage the Indians in conference and carry out the instructions of the department commander and the authorities at Washington. Throughout all his work has been tactful, energetic, and resourceful, and since my arrival he has been loyal and invaluable in assisting and supporting me.9

Carter P. Johnson and Fort Robinson, Nebraska

On March 9, 1916, a large force of bandits under Pancho Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico. burning several buildings, killing eleven civilians and nine soldiers, and wounding many others. In retaliation the Punitive Expedition was organized under Gen. John J. Pershing, and additional troops hurried to the border. On March 14 the remaining Twelfth Cavalry troops at Fort Robinson, quickly left the post for Columbus. After the sudden departure, only eleven soldiers and five civilian employees remained at the post. A military station, regardless of its garrison, needs a commanding officer so on March 31, Major Carter P. Johnson came out of retirement to command the almost vacant post. This assignment was Johnson's fifth tour of duty at Fort Robinson. He had been there in 1877 as a Third Cavalry private at the time Crazy Horse was killed. In 187879 he again served at the post with the Third as a corporal during the ill-fated Cheyenne Outbreak. In 1882, he was appointed as a second Lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry and again assigned to Fort Robinson. The next year Johnson transferred to the Tenth Cavalry, where he spent some years with the regiment on duty in the Southwest. After serving in Cuba and the Philippines, Johnson arrived for duty at Fort Robinson with the Tenth Cavalry. Not desiring further overseas service, he transferred to the Eighth Cavalry, just before the Tenth left for the Philippines in 1907. In 1909 after thirty-three years of active duty, he retired at Fort Robinson as a major, and moved to a ranch west of the post on White River. Now, in 1916, he returned as commanding officer, Johnson was

serving in that capacity when he died of heart problems at Alliance on December 12, while returning from a trip to Wheatland, Wyoming. As an efficiency report once said, Carter P. Johnson was an excellent soldier and efficient officer.10 Today, Carter P Johnson Lake is located on the grounds of Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The SCAHMS figure portrays Lt. Carter P. Johnson while he served with the Tenth U.S. Cavalry in Arizona, 1888 and is based on a sketch by Fredrick Remington that appeared in the Harpers Weekly.

The history of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921 compiled and edited by Major E.L.N. Glass, Tenth Cavalry. Letter of Frank McCoy. Voices of the American West, Volume 2: The Settler and Soldier Interviews of Eli S. Ricker, 1903-19192
2

The history of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921 compiled and edited by Major E.L.N. Glass, Tenth Cavalry.
4

The history of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921 compiled and edited by Major E.L.N. Glass, Tenth Cavalry. Chapter IV Cuba and Philippines,1898-1902
5 6

Battle of Tayacoba from Wikipedia.

The history of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921 compiled and edited by Major E.L.N. Glass, Tenth Cavalry. Chapter IV Cuba and Philippines,1898-1902
7

The history of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921 compiled and edited by Major E.L.N. Glass, Tenth Cavalry. Letter of Frank McCoy
8
9 10

A Unit History of the 10th Cavalry Regiment an Article by Anthony L. Powell Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, Vol. 3 1907. Fort Robinson and the American Century, 1900-1948 by Thomas R. Buecker

The New York Times article - Published: November 2, 1907

'

T H E A R M Y WAR COLLEGE
IN RERY

REFER Ip

WASHINGTON,

D C. .

/
-

The University of Oklahoma, NO=, Oklahoma. Id! dear Captain Crrmpbell: Replying t o your cormunication of July 18th, inquiring a s t o information given i n War Departmnt reports concerning the Absentee Utes of 1906, and Captain Carter P john son*^ connection with the incident, . the following i s quoted from the Bnnual Report of Brigadier General Edward S. Gotlf'my, Cammanding the Departmnt of the Missouri, dated August 12, 1907: *BBSmEE UTE INDIrnS. In October, 1906, nernrspaper reports gave infozmation of t h e feaPs of s e t t l e r s i n t h e S t a t e of Wyoming regarding roving Ute Indians near the toan of G i l l e t t e , About the 17th of the month the statement was made t h a t the Governor of Wyoming had called on the President f o r troops, Taking action on thia information, the Department Coa9nen&er sent preliminary telegramar t o the commanding o f f i c e r s a t Forts Robinson and Meads ordering the preparation of one scpadron of cavalry a t each post f o r f i e l d duty and i n s t i t u t i n g sueh preliminary action a s would enable these troops t o take the ii&&d i n the ahorteat poarsible t i m e i f orders ~vhc&,d ieme* 4 b pssSi cr items were f u r t h e r informed t h a t one o r mm competent o f f i c e r s o l i a r with Indian affairs .rsou;Ld be sent t o suitable points t o interview the Indiana, quiet apprehensions of a i t i z e n s and have conferences with In3im parties. On October 19th a t 7 p.m, telegraphic instructions were received frornEeadquarters Northern Division eoamntnicating the orders of the President to cause a suitable force of cavalry t o proceed to the scene of disturbance t o secure the peaceful and l a x f u l return of t h e Indians to the lands a l l o t t e d to them a t the Uintah reservation i n Utah. A fW.1 report of t h e operations ensulng upon these instruction81 and culminating i n the conduct of the Indiana t o t h e Fort Wade Military Reservation was s u b s r i t t d under date of December 8, 1906, by the Cormanding General, Northern Division, aho was at the same time t h e A b r i e f summary is a l l t h a t s e e m t o be Department Commander, necessary a t t h i e time. Captains Carter P. Johnson and Robert G. Paxton, 10th Cavalry, uere sent from Fort Robinson t o G i l l e t t e t o learn the exact s i t u a t i o n and t o report the location of the Indians, t h e i r numbers, supplies, m a n s of transport, ernd any information which might be of IPo troops of the 10th Cavalry value fa dealing with t h e situation, under eommand of Major Charles & Grierson were ordered t o go by . r a i l t o the same place as soon a"& transportation could be assembled. These orders were given l a t e i n the evening, October 19th. OaPing t o a severe blizzard and d i s ~ l l ~ a n $ i nof t h e railway t r a i n s , g Captains Johnson and P&on did not reach G i l l e t t e u n t i l the night Despite the heavy snow and bad w a t h e r , they of October Zlst. attwted nc?rthward on the morning of October Whrd and a f o r t y mile r i d e tha* day brought them t o the Indian c a p . A% %he ctonfere~cat

on the following morning, a l l the Chiefs were present with 116 The remainder of" the Indians were packed ready t o armed Utes. A t t h i s council thsy refused t o return t o the Uintah march. Reservation, t o send any Chiefs t o G i l l e t t e f o r further conference, They were going t o Cherry o r t o remain i n camp f o r another t a l k , Creek on the Sio7ur Reservation o r t o the Big Horn E,lountains. C a p t a n Johnson reported t h i s conference, and the probable movements of the Indians, t o these headcumtars. Major Griersonrs command consisted of Troops A and D, 10th Cavalry, t o t a l ll3 men, with f i v e wagons and a pack t r a i n , The remainder of h i s squadron mas ordered t o join him, leaving Fort He was directed not t o move h i s command Robinson October 25th. from G i l l e t t e , a s i t was not desired t o press the Indians nor cause them t o continue t h e i r movement northward. With a view of i n t e r cepting them i n case they should s t a r t northward o r eastward, Colonel Alexander Rodgera, 6th Cavalry, at Fort Meade, was directed t o have s i x troops of h i s ragimernt ready t o move at short notice i n a northwesterly d i r e c t i o n as rapidly a s possible t o a point north of the Black H i l l s , and from there a s circumstances demanded, closing on the Indians, wheraver they might be. The order f o r this movement was given on October = & the next morning Colonel Rodgers I and , moved f r o m Fort Meade with six troops accompanied with pack and wagon t r a i n s carrying r a t i o n s f o r 1 5 days, forage, etc. Although the storm had l e f t the roads, where there were any, i n execrable condition, yet Colonel Rodgers marched h i s command no l e s s than 140 miles i n Pour days, October 25th t o 28th, a remarkable performance, the character of the country and roads being considered. From information obtained from Captain Johnson on October X t h , it aeemd probable the lndians would go northwest t o the Northern Cheyenne Reservation instead of continuing down the Powder Taking action on River, or turning eastward t o the Black H i l l s , t h i s information, the remaining portion of the garrison at Fort Robinson was put i n the f i e l d under comand of Colonel Jacob A. being t o proceed by r a i l t o Augur, 10th Cavalry, h i s i n s t ~ ~ c t i o n s Sheridan and march thence down the Tongue River to Ashland, Montana. In addition, a detachment of the Signal Corps was sent under command of Captaln Leonard D Wildman from Fort Camha t o Sheridan t o maintain . communication betmen these Headquarters and Colonel Augur's command, and a s f a r a s practicable between columns of troops i n f i e l d , and a detachment of t h e 4th Infantry mas sent f r o m Fort Mackenzie t o Arvada on the Burlington Railroad t o have charge of a supply depot a t t h a t place. On Captain Johnson's recommendation Major Griersonts comand was a t the same time ordered by r a i l from G i l l e t t e , westward t o Arvada, and from there northward down the Powder river. In g@a~?ection with these movements, the Commanding General, Northern &r%di6ii, d i r e c t e d the Commanding General, Department of Dakota, t o send from Fort Keogh a l l available r a t i o n s under escort of two troops, 6 t h Cavalry, belonging a t t h a t post, the instructions f o r t h i s command being t o move up the Tongue r i v e r t o Ashland, with a view of providing rations and grain t o Colanel Rodger's command, i f the l a t t e r arrived i n t'lct vicinity. The Indians,did not, however, move west of Powder r i v e r , and t h e r a t i o n s were delivered t o him there.

On October 29th Colonel Rodgers suceesded i n establishing communications with Major Griersonts column, and the junction of these two conanads on Powder r i v e r was e f f e c t e d on October 31st. On t h i s day, also, Captain Johnson, 10th Cavalry, m d arrangements ae through i n t e r p r e t e r s f o r a conference with the U t e s on the following The conditions on the morning day, t o be held between the camps. of November 1st did not appear favorable t o e. peaceable solution, a s the Utes, divided i n opinion, were mangling among themselves. Colonel Rodgers i n s i s t e d on a meeting, as had been agreed the day before, and the Utes f i n a l l y yielded, bringing one hundred o r more There was m c h talk regarding grievances Indians t o the conference. and wishes, and t h e Utes f i n a l l y asked t o send Chiefs t o Washington t o obtain permission $ G s e t t l e on some Sioux Reservation. They were asked i f they would r e t u r n to t h e i r homes on the Uintah ReserIt was evident vation, t o which they answered t h a t they would not. t h a t t h i s was the f i n a l decision, a s they :load not even discuss the question. Captain Johnson, through Sioux Indians and i n t e r p r e t e r s , who had been s e n t t o him, had found t h a t it was p r a c t i c a l l y c e r t a i n the Utes would f i g h t and break up i n t o - 1 bands, burning and 1 murdering, r a t h e r than go beck. Colonel Rodgers, concurring i n t h i s opinion, refrained from pressing t h i s question. While expressing himself sympathetically i n favor of the Indians, he then t o l d them t h a t under h i s orders the e n t i r e force of the Indians must go with Though t h e r e was considerable difference the troops t o Fort Heade. of opinions i n the following U t e debate, tbe Indians f i n a l l y prorcised t o go. Arranging t h a t Major Grierson should scout the whole country between Powder and L i t t l e Powder r i v e r s t o t h e i r junction t o a r r e s t any Ute s t r a g g l e r s , Colonel Rodgers s t a r t e d with h i s command f o r He placed Captain Johnson i n charge Fort Meade on November 4th. of the Ute b a d . The country was rough and :kLe t r a i l bad, owing 0 recent snow and r a i n , so t h a t the march was slow and d i f f i c u l t , On November 25th the troops and Indians reached Fort Meade. The Division CommrnOer, f r o m whose r s p o r t the above data has been taken, mentions the pronptness and efficiency of Colonel Augur, the judgment, t a c t and a b i l i t y of Major Grierson, and r e f e r s t o Colonel Rodgers and Captain Johnson a s follows: "In h i s f i e l d operations i n tha Ciplomatic treatment of t h e Indians and i n h i s adminiawative handling of the e n t i r e campaign, Colonel Alexander Rodgers, 6 t h Cavalry, displayed q u a l i t i e s of a high character and h i s services deserve the highest commendation, * and quoting Colonel fiodger's report of Captain Zohnson's services, concurred i n the following: *I wish t o call a t t e n t i o n t o the excellent manner i n which Captain Carter P. Johnson, 10th Cavalry, has performed the d i f f i c u l t duty t o which he was assigned. Through h i s good work it has been possible $or me t o immediately enpage t h e Indians i n conference and carry out the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the Depwtment Commander and the a u t h o r i t i e s a t Washington. Throughout a l l h i s work has been t a c t f u l , energetic and resourceml, and since my a r r i v a l he has been l o y a l and invaluable i n a s s i s t i n g and supporting me."

The Indisns were held and provided for at Fort Meade during the winter. Their request to send Chiefs to Washington to consult with the President and authorities of the Indian Bureau was acceded to, and finally arrangements were made by &ich they were transferred in June, 1907, to lands on the Moreau River in . the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation (Sioux). Captain Carter P Johnson, 10tb Cavalry, was immediately in charge of the Indians during their encampment at Fort Meade, while Colonel Rodgers was responsible for holding tham and for administrative questions in connection with them. They were conducted to their new lands by Captain Johnson, leaving Fort Meade on June loth, 1907. The operation was a difficult one to accomplish successfully on account of the high water in the streams due to heavy storms, to the shortage of transportation, and to the reduced condition of the Indian stock. 6 Assistance was given by a party of Sioux with 1 wagons from Cherry Creek, With this aid Captain Johnson was enabled to reach Cherry Creek Station on June mth, and effected the transfer of the Indiana to the custody of the Indian Agent at the Cheyenne River Agency on the date which had been set, J u e 30, 1907," (File AGO W D 1280609 ~ep.10,1907). ..

Concerning your inquiry as to Captain Carter P Johnson, this . officer was retired from active duty in the U.S.Brmy on April 1, 1910, with the rank of Major, and died at Alliance, Nebraska, on December 12, 11 96 His junior officers in Troop I 10th Cavalry, in October and , November, 1906, were First Lieutenant Benjamin 0. Davis, at present a Colonel of Cavalry, on ROTC .... duty at Tuskegee Insti-fate, Tuskegee, Alabama; and Second Lieutenant Daniel D Tanrpkins, at present a Colonel . of Cavalry, assigned to the 63d Cavalry Division, his address being 15 Smith-Yaung Tower, San Antonio, Texas.

5,

4
J

Very truly yours, For the Chief: Major, Field A r b 1ll!y , Acting Secretary, Historical Section, A,W.C.

THE UTE UPRISING IN SOUTH DAKOTA

from a paper written by David Laudenschlager The White River band of the Utes made two noteworthy efforts to register their contempt for the reservation life and the reduction of their lands. The second major act of defiance attempted by the Utes was played out (1906-1908) in an exodus of a large number of Utes to South Dakota. The Utes moved in typical plains Indian fashion, by horse and travois. Their procession strung out for miles on the Wyoming plains. They were in no great hurry, making no more than 15-20 miles each day. Captains Johnson and Pacton, with two troops of Tenth Cavalry from Fort Robinson, caught up with the Utes on 22 October, finding them camped .... about forty miles north of Gillette, Wyoming. They held council with Chief Appah's band the next morning. They found him with about 300 followers, 150 of them men fully armed. The Utes stated they had harmed no one and it appeared the only law they had broken was killing game. The Utes were taken to a site on the U. S. Military reservation about two miles south of Fort Meade. In January of 1907, [a] promise made to the Utes, concerning airing their grievances in Washington, was kept. A delegation of Utes visited our Nation's capitol. Captain Carter P. Johnson accompanied the group, as he was liked by the Utes. President Roosevelt granted the Utes an audience. Roosevelt stressed the point that they would have to do something to support themselves, but he was willing to show consideration and kindness. This conference with the President ended on the note that the Utes could negotiate an agreement with the Cheyenne River Sioux for a place to live in South Dakota. The importance of this meeting, however, was not the permission to negotiate with the Sioux, but Roosevelt's position that the Utes were to work. Finally, in March 1907, Johnson negotiated an agreement that would allow the Utes to remain in South Dakota. The plan provided for the leasing of four townships of land [in northern Ziebach County] from the Cheyenne River Sioux. The Utes would pay the Sioux four and one-half cents an acre for the land annually. The land was to be leased for five years, beginning on 1 July 1907. The cost was to be deducted from the Ute's annual annuity funds. All parties consented to this arrangement, so by 11 June 1907, the last of the Utes were en route from Fort Meade to the Thunder Butte Country. The Utes were actually relocated at the juncture of the Moreau River and Thunder Butte Creek. The Utes were unhappy at Thunder Butte, almost from the time of their arrival. The reason being that (Colonel Thomas) Downs, the agent in charge (of Cheyenne River Agency), insisted on their compliance with the wishes of President Roosevelt to work and to have their children attend school. He informed the Utes from the beginning of their stay on the Cheyenne River Reservation, that these requirements were to be met. The Utes, on the other hand, remained adamant in their refusal to meet these requirements. Though they did permit some of their children to attend the Day School at Thunder Butte Station, they feared sending them to a boarding school because they felt they might die there. They said they had seen too many children die in boarding schools in Utah.

The Utes claimed they had been promised full rations for each day of the year, that they would not be required to work, and that the school and storehouse erected at Thunder Butte would be on the land they leased. Downs' position was that they were to receive rations equivalent to nine months of a year and would be required to work to pay for the additional three months rations. Also, that the buildings erected at Thunder Butte Station were to be on the Sioux land and used jointly by the two tribes. Downs' continued insistence on all three conditions brought on showdown. He met in early October with a representative Ute Council, headed by a chief called Yellowstone. The Yellowstone commission was informed that unless they chose to obey the rules set down, their rations would be cut. Agent Downs, after conferring with his superiors in Washington, ordered the daily rations be cut in half. The crisis had reached the point of no return. The Indians were angered to the extent that they threatened to fight if forced to obey. Downs returned to the Cheyenne River Agency and wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs requesting that the Utes be disarmed at once and returned to Utah, as he feared their disobedience would spread to the Sioux. He also ordered a detail of fifteen policemen sent to the agency to maintain order. On 21 October 1907, the situation became critical. Red Cap, one of the Ute Chiefs and two other Utes went to Baker's house and asked why the policemen were at the Station. Baker told them that the policemen had come to build a barn. Red Cap rejected Baker's answer and said that "they had come to take their children to school, but if there were as many police as Utes, they could not take their children to school." On this same day, a Sioux Indian by the name of Iron Lightning, came to the Thunder Butte Day School where his daughter attended and asked permission to take her to another Station. He indicated that there was going to be trouble. Iron Lightning later met a rancher on the way to Bear Creek Station and told him that the police at Thunder Butte were preparing to drive the Utes back to Utah. Other ranchers, grazing their herds along the Moreau, saw Sioux families leaving the area. The ranchers interpreted this to mean that the Sioux had no desire to take part in the Ute Uprising. Agent Downs returned to Thunder Butte Station on the afternoon of 21 October 1907. He was informed of the situation by (Walter) Baker, Boss Farmer, and Mr. (Sidney) Corbin of the Day School. Mr. Corbin told him that his wife had been warned by Iron Lightning that the Utes were about to destroy the government buildings at the Station and that all whites at Thunder Butte were in great danger. That afternoon, Downs met with the Utes again; but they refused again to obey the demands laid before them. Somehow, Downs averted violence and managed to slip away from the Station on the 23rd and telephone this message from White Horse Station on the morning of the 24th: "Send at once all the armed men that can be had at and near the agency, and also telegraph Fort Meade for three troops of cavalry.'' The clerk Rastall was able to enlist the support of about fifty men in Forest City, South Dakota. The group was halted about four miles east of Thunder Butte Station, by a messenger sent by Downs. Downs ordered the group to return to the agency, fearing their appearance might trigger violence. The entrance to the station was a bend of the Moreau River. It appears that the Utes had taken up positions in this area. Meanwhile, the Army had been reviewing the agent's request for assistance. Troops

were now being dispatched to Thunder Butte from Fort Meade, Fort Des Moines, and Fort Robinson. (Captain) Johnson was rushed from Nebraska by rail to Gettysburg, South Dakota. He traveled from there by horse, arriving at Thunder Butte on the 29th (of October). Johnson found that the situation had quieted down. The volunteer force had been withdrawn and only nine agency police were on duty. He counciled with the Utes, who were delighted to see him, and found their grievances to be the reduction in rations and the threat of being separated from their children. They also said they would obey all regulations prescribed. Downs was infuriated by Johnson's reception, and he refused to consider the Ute's promise to comply with his orders. He indicated that some sort of punishment should be given the Utes, as he feared the precedence set would cause problems for him among the Sioux. Troops were now arriving on the scene and the force grew to a strength of near one thousand. An additional company of infantry was stationed at Gettysburg. The troops were prepared for war. Some of the units were furnished with machine guns. All indications were that the Army was prepared for a winter campaign. Captain Johnson continued to argue in support of the Utes, but his words fell on deaf ears. The Ute's lease was now considered terminated and their only recourse in light of the odds was to agree to the conditions set before them by Agent Downs. Red Cap, his family, and about one hundred of the Utes were transferred to the Rapid City area in late November, where the men worked under the supervision of Charles Dagenet. Some of the Ute children attended the boarding school in Rapid City. The remainder of the Indian encampment at Thunder Butte spent the winter on the banks of the Moreau. They were sadly in need of tents, clothing and stoves. The stoves finally arrived on 30 January 1908. The rest never came. During the winter of 19071908, food supplies also were short at times. The Army stayed that winter at Thunder Butte, but in reduced numbers. They were quartered in about a dozen dugouts on the perimeter of the Ute encampment. In the spring, the humbled Utes requested that they be allowed to return to their Utah Valley Reservation. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs concurred and in late June 1908, Captain Johnson, the Ute's old friend, ten troopers of the 10th Cavalry, and the Utes began the 1,100 mile return to their reservation in Utah. Their departure from Fort Meade in late June 1908 brought an end to the so-called Ute Uprising. The Ute's confrontation with the Army was the last of its kind for the plains Indian.

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Dull Knifes bands succeeded in crossing into Nebraska together, they parted ways in mid-October, 1878, under the increasing pressure from the federal troops.121 Little Wolf wanted the people to remain together and to continue north to the Powder River country. Dull Knife preferred to head to the Red Cloud agency near Fort Robinson, where some of his people had relatives among the Oglala Lakota.122 C. The Capture of the Northern Cheyenne by Federal Troops and their Subsequent Attempt at Escape Dull Knife led roughly 149 people toward Red Cloud, not realizing that the Agency had been closed. On October 23, 1878, Dull Knife and his followers met with federal troops and reluctantly surrendered to them, agreeing to be led to Fort Robinson. Dull Knife, Wild Hog, and other leaders attempted to negotiate an agreement to allow them to join the Oglala Lakota at their new agency, but Captain Johnson, the military leader on site, refused.123 The military forced the Cheyenne, now considered prisoners of war, to Fort Robinson and placed them in barracks. Military officials informed the Cheyenne that they would have to stay for three months while the government decided whether to return them to the Indian Territory or allow them to settle with the Sioux on one of the northern reservations.124 For the first two months of captivity, conditions were tolerable and the Northern Cheyenne remained optimistic that, upon their release, they would be permitted to stay in the North.125 Relations between some of the soldiers and the Northern Cheyenne were mutually respectful and friendly, occasionally even playful.126 Yet plans were being made behind the scenes to return Dull Knife and his people to the Indian Territory.127 The state of Kansas wanted the Northern Cheyenne turned over to them for temporary custody while they investigated the killings in Decatur County and elsewhere, and eventually the Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz, agreed.128 He sent orders to Fort Robinson to march the Northern Cheyenne back to Kansas, for eventual return

121. See id. at 10910. 122. See id. at 110. 123. See id. at 113. 124. See id. 125. See id. at 11617; see also , supra note 110 (describing the beginning of the Northern Cheyennes captivity at Fort Robinson as a positive change from the preceding, harrowing journey). 126. See supra note 68, at 116 (quoting Sergeant Carter P. Johnson, one of the guards at Fort Robinson, as recalling that the Northern Cheyenne were comfortable enough and that they would often stick their heads out of the windows and talk with the guards outside. They had a club . . . which they had pulled out of the barracks. They would sometimes stick this out and wave it, in fun) (citation omitted). 127. Id. at 117. 128. See id.

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to the Darlington Agency.129 Dull Knife and Wild Hog refused to go, asserting: That is not a healthful country, and if we should stay there, we would all die . . . . No, I am here on my own ground, and I will never go back. You may kill me here; but you cannot make me go back.130 In the face of resistance, Captain Henry W. Wessells, temporary commander of Fort Robinson, issued two orders. The first, on January 5, 1879, cut off food and firewood to the Cheyenne to force them to comply. The second, on January 8, cut off all water.131 The Northern Cheyenne, now confined full-time to their barracks, still refused to comply. Instead, they plotted an escape, planning to use the handful of weapons that they had concealed from the soldiers by hiding them in womens dresses and floorboards.132 On January 9, 1879, the roughly 125 weakened Northern Cheyenne, mostly women and children, burst forth from the barracks shooting and prepared for death: They prepared to make a dash for freedomor death. George B. Grinnell states that it was Little Shield who said, Now, dress up in your best clothing. We will all die together. Said another, according to Grinnell, We may as well die here as be taken back south to die there. Yet another Cheyenne, according to Grinnells interviews, said, It is true that we must die, but . . . we will die fighting.133 Many did die. The escape from Fort Robinson was fantastic yet doomed. Women fled while carrying their children; the ones who survived the initial rounds of bullets hid in bluffs and caves. Many were found and bludgeoned or killed at close range, sometimes by civilians who had enlisted themselves in the battle.134 Yet it took Captain Wessells and his soldiers until January 22 to subdue the last of the escapees. On that day, eighteen men and older boys, as well as fourteen women and young children, resisted in a final battle against nearly 150 soldiers.135 The Northern Cheyenne were hunkered down in a pit behind a shelter they had constructed. Toward the end, the ferocity of their determination not to give in was evident in the following agonizing details: After ordering a cease fire, Captain Wessells called out for the Indians in the pit to surrender. . . . During this lull in the fighting a young girl raised a carbine over the rim . . . as a signal to the soldiers that she wanted to come out. . . . But she never had the chance to escape, for in the next instant her mother caught her by the hand and slit her throat, screaming that they would never surrender.136

129. 130. 131. 132. 133 134. 135. 136.

See id. Id. at 118 (quoting See id. at 120. See , supra note 68, at 125. Id. at 124. See id. at 13037. See id. at 14950. Id. at 15152.

418 (1982)).

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Another mother also attempted to kill her child and then herself rather than give up to the soldiers.137 In the end, both daughters survived, but when one of the soldiers offered to assist one of the mothers, who was bleeding profusely, she grasped his hand and spit into his face in one last act of hatred and defiance.138 Several Midwestern and East Coast newspapers covered the Northern Cheyennes treatment at Fort Robinson, and their courageous and ill-fated flight.139 Word got back to the public and Washington, D.C., and galvanized support for the Northern Cheyenne, despite the negative publicity following the Kansas killings. The following editorial in the New York Times provided extensive detail about the Cheyenne odyssey from start to finish, and though critical of the Northern Cheyenne in some respects (and in particular with regard to the killings in Kansas), it nonetheless reserved the harsher judgment for the federal government: The bloody affair at Fort Robinson is, let us hope, the final scene in an Indian drama which, from beginning to end, has been a disgrace to the Government and the people. The Cheyenne bands of Dull Knife and Old Crow are not, it is true, the sort of Indians to excite sentimental sympathy. . . . They committed many outrages, on their road through Kansas . . . . Nevertheless, it is a demonstrable fact that the Government had been shamefully remiss in its treatment of these Indians, and thus tempted them to the revolt which has had so bloody a course and ending. .... That the dead of Winter should be chosen for their return to the Indian Territory was quite worthy of a Governmental policy which has repeatedly picked out this season for such purposes; that their refusal to go should be followed by disciplining them with starvation was perhaps not unexpected, because the Government first agrees to give Indians specific annual rations as a consideration for going to the Indian Territory, and then, when they have gone, cuts down the rations unless they will work. It had been intended to give up a good part of these Indian warriors in Kansas, on the way back, so that they might be tried and hanged; and it should not be surprising that they preferred to die in battle rather than at the end of a rope. These dead Indians have been officially abused with consolatory vigor as lazy, trouble-making, hoe-hating red rascals, who would rather hunt buffalo than draw rations, and who would rather die than obey department circulars; but is there, after all, in this whole miserable business anything but a

137. See id. at 152. 138. Id. at 153. 139. See, e.g., Shooting Down Fleeing Indians, Jan. 11, 1879, at 1 (reporting from Nebraska on January 10 and recounting the escape by Dull Knifes band from Fort Robinson).

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shameful record for the country and for the white race?140 The Government itself, in a sense, eventually agreed with the sentiments in the editorial. President Hayes expressed concern over alleged unnecessary cruelty at Fort Robinson, and the army ordered an investigation of the events even before the remnants of the Northern Cheyenne were subdued.141 Most of Dull Knifes people were allowed to remain north, with the Oglala Lakota at Pine Ridge. Dull Knife and his immediate family had never been captured, and they too ended up at Pine Ridge, where Dull Knifes descendants live to this day as enrolled members of the Oglala Lakota.142 Kansas succeeded at having Wild Hog and six other Northern Cheyenne turned over to the state for prosecution, although it was never clear that these seven men were implicated in the civilian deaths.143 Indeed, a Kansas jury acquitted Wild Hog and the others for insufficient evidence against them.144 In part, their successful defense was due to a change of venue from western Kansas to Lawrence, in the east, where sentiment concerning the Northern Cheyennes actions had evolved.145 Wild Hog and his codefendants apparently also benefitted from an arguably incompetent and distracted prosecuting attorney, who neglected the case in favor of pursuing his romantic interests.146 Favorable press, along with persistent Northern Cheyenne advocacy, also eventually helped to secure a reservation in Montana for the tribe in 1884.147 A series of withdrawals and subsequent executive orders expanded the tribes land, and in 1900 the name was changed from the Tongue River Reservation to the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, which it remains today.148 Although it is unclear whether Wild Hog was able to return north himself, his testimony during senate hearings on the Northern Cheyenne Odyssey was particularly compelling and helped to sway public opinion in favor of his people.149

140. Editorial, The Cheyenne Tragedy, , Jan. 12, 1879, at 4. 141. See , supra note 68, at 147. 142. See 3 (Univ. of Neb. Press 2002) (1995). 143. See , supra note 68, at 17375. 144. See id. at 18182 (2001). 145. See id. at 181 (describing how eastern Kansas newspapers, influenced by changing attitudes of the army toward the events and coverage by the northeastern press, had begun to report the conditions at Darlington Agency and other facts sympathetic to the Cheyenne defendants to the exclusion of covering the alleged crimes). 146. See id. (describing one historians account of how the district attorney fell in love with a New York woman during late summer of 1879, and therefore neglected his prosecutorial duties that fall). 147. See id. at 193. 148. See id. 149. See id. at 184.