FACULTEIT DER MAATSCHAPPIJ- EN GEDRAGSWETENSCHAPPEN

Politicologie
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Separate but Mutually Reinforcing

The Interplay Between Ethnic Nationalism and Sexism During the Bosnian War.
Jos Bartman 24 January, 2012 Supervisor: Dr. L.M. Mugge

Introduction
Soon after the Bosnian War started in 1991 and corpses stockpiled against western television screens, the question under discussion became whether Western powers should intervene in the conflict or not. The thorough reflection on the war in academia followed years later. After the end of the war, with the sign of the Dayton Peace Treaty, the burst-out of a heavy academic debate started. In this debate, the Bosnian War has is often classified as one of the violent ethnic conflicts during the 1990s (Haught, 1995: 11). The fact that numerous conflicts raged in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America paved the way for these simplifications. Conflicts like the Bosnian War, that occurred during the 1990s, were often seen as a result of the decline of security in international relations and the fall-out of the power blocks: the United States and the Soviet Union (Buzan & Waever, 2004: 11). A large part of the analyses on the Bosnian War from a Political Science perspective have been rather generalizing than focusing on internal validity. A striking example of one of these generalizing theories is the standard work From Voting to Violence, in which Jack Snyder (2001) provides his readers with a general theory on the influence of ethnic nationalism on war. Broadly speaking, topdown nationalist propaganda of leaders was a logical way to mobilize people during elections (Snyder, 2001: 171). Especially because institutionalised independent journalism and other core liberal

institutions were absent (Ibid., 2001: 173). The result of this elite persuasion was ethnic violence, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in multiple African countries. Although the theory looks glaringly parsimonious, a crucial part of the Bosnian war is absent in those theories: the role of sexual violence that went hand in hand with nationalism from start to finish. Secondly, the interplay between sexism and ethnic nationalism deserved no place in general theories with a broad range of cases. Moreover, scholars with a realist or liberal epistemology, like Snyder, often do not even mention the effect of war on women or the effect of women on war. This demonstrates that the current flow of International Relations literature lacks the incorporation of a gender analysis. In this thesis I argue that sheer ethnic violence during the Bosnian War is rather myth than reality; a pure ethnic analysis of the Bosnian War is by definition inaccurate. The Bosnian War cant be solely seen as a war between ethnicities, but also as a war against women. I argue that nationalism and sexism are not isolated phenomena but have been inter-connected in various ways during the war. This thesis will show with multiple examples that sexism is not only the result of the war, but also a result of ethnic nationalism itself. Likewise, sexism in some case resulted in more ethnic violence. Position of women during the Bosnian War can only be analysed accurately if we include the interplay between those variables.

Theoretical Framework
The ethnic analysis of the war One of the most influential studies on ethnic nationalism and war is Jack Snyders From Voting to Violence, in which he provides his readers of a general theory on ethnic warfare. He claims that immature democracies are vulnerable to nationalist conflict (Snyder, 2001: 169). Without the presence of objective journalism and checks and balances, politicians can easily steal the elections and design an ethnic nationalist discourse based on fear and exclusivity. This to expend their electoral reservoir. (Ibid., 2001: 179). In the worst case scenario, this leads deep contradictions between different groups in society. According to Snyder, these imposed contradictions are the life fuel of one of the worse types of violence: ethnic warfare (Ibid., 2001: 179). Although Jack Snyder provides a theory that is adopted by many scholars, his thesis about the influence of ethnic rivalries on war is not undisputed. Gagnon (2004) uses the same top-down perspective as Snyder, but points out that not only elite persuasion makes the ethnic rivalries more violent, but that an internal logic of ethnic cleansing does exist (Gagnon, 2004: 40). He argues that the chance of ethnic cleansing projects is higher in ethnically diversified areas (Ibid., 2004: 40). Exactly because of the strength of those bonds, horrible levels of violence and atrocities were the only way to construct and impose new clear borders of ethnicity (Ibid., 2004: 40).

Gagnons theory suggests more than a top-down mode of `ethnic cleansing, it suggests a clear objective of local people to cleanse their area. Even though this cannot immediately be titled as a war-strategy, it suggests a rational way of thinking by the perpetrators. The key question for scholars with a nationalist explanation of the war is whether there also existed a top-down strategy of leaders to enforce ethnic cleansing. Gagnon argues that the strategies of conflict have as their goal a political demobilizing of the wider population as a way of preserving control over the structures of power (Gagnon, 2004: 28-29). This clearly emphasizes a top-down strategy of leaders that fits well in the work of Jack Snyder. He presents ethnic warfare as a tool for politicians to obtain more political power over a certain group of people. An alternative for the top-down theories is given by Ronald Suny. He argues that ancient hatreds truly existed amongst Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs already before the war started (Suny, 1993: 3). This ethnic discourse started during World War II, when the Croatian Nazi-puppet state fought a severe war against etnik monarchists and Partisan communists. According to Suny, these three groups that were initially politically motivated, became ethnically framed after generations of reproduced antagonistic discourses. Villages became often framed as Partisan or Ustaa by local people. According to Suny, these frameworks were not absent during communism, but existed all the time (Ibid., 1993: 3). According to this theory, the rivalries became important after the collapse of Yugoslavia and resulted in almost a predestined ethnic war. The ethnic rivalries were only frozen during the rule of Marshall Tito.

Critique on the nationalist analysis of the war The theory of Suny is the most fatalist account of the war, however, it appears ignorant of the high level degree of tolerance among groups in Yugoslavia. Several statistics contradict this bottom-up view on the war. Most people in Yugoslavia avoided religious designations and were comfortable with their identity as Yugoslav or resident of Sarajevo before the war (Evangelista, 2011: 88). Before the start of the war most people considered themselves non-religious. Although the ethnic diversity was high, with Muslims making up 43.7 % of the population, Serbs 31 % and Croats 17.3 %, in a survey on ethnic composition, a large share of the respondents claimed no religion; 46 % of the population claimed not to be religious (Ibid., 2011: 91). The proportions of people being Islamic, Orthodox Christian and Roman Catholic was only 16,5, 20, and 15 % respectively. This survey from 1990 shows that the presence of religious identities is overrated (Ibid., 2011: 91). These statistics suggests that a top-down process has been present during the war. A-priori ethnic nationalism was not present among the population. Snyder was right with the analysis that leaders enforced ethnic nationalism successfully. However, there are two things that seem to lack in the nationalist analysis of the war. First of all, it does not pay any attention to the role of microstructures

which were important during the war; the execution of rape did for instance not only take place under clear command of military or political leaders, but also as a result paramilitary or civilian action (OByrne, 2003: 178). In line with this, rape in war is often considered an unfortunate result of a war by realist and liberal scholars. Brownmiller writes that those scholars consider rape an unfortunate but inevitable by-product of the necessary game called war. Women, by this reasoning are simply regrettable victims-incidental, unavoidable casualties (Brownmiller, 1975: 32). That brings us to the second point of the critique on the ethnic nationalist analysis of the Bosnian War: The lack of a gender analysis. As Robert Cox once powerfully described: A theory is always for someone and for some purpose (Cox, 1981: 126-155). The main weakness of the nationalist view on the Bosnian War, is not about what these scholars wrote, but what they did not write. Questions about how women relate to the war are not being asked. Some data clearly show that women were not at all part nationalist elite persuasion described by Snyder and Gagnon. Before the war, Serbia had only 1.6 % women in the parliament, the lowest rate in Europe (Evangelista 2011: 99). The nationalist discourse that was propagated among political leaders was simply not accessible for women. Moreover, outside of the representative spectrum feminist organizations tried to fight the nationalist discourse. The feminist Womens Lobby in the Former Yugoslavia resisted nationalist pressures before the elections of 1990 (Mladjenovic & Hughes, 2001). They openly opposed the idea of having more babies for a greater Serbia (Ibid., 2001). Although it seems that women were not part of the nationalist discourse like men were, the question is whether a feminist view on the Bosnian War succeeds in explaining the Bosnian War at all.

The feminist analysis on the war As opposed to the nationalist analysis of the war, a popular gendered reading of the Bosnian War sees all man as potential misogynistic rapists and women as potential victims. Cockburn points out that the Bosnian War seems more a war against women than a war against ethnicities (Cockburn, 1999). Camilia Paglia (1990) tries to explain the mechanism behind the war on women in general, with the concept of the Sexual Personae. According to this theory, the conduct of rape and mass rape is the result of a Dionysian danger in human nature. Irreducible elements in male sexuality result in rapes and other gendered types of violence (Paglia, 1990). She describes these irreducible elements in human nature as chaotic forces. The Bosnian War seems an example that fits well into this view; with the UN-estimated 20-000 to 50.000 rapes, the Bosnian War is a clear example of a gendered war

(ECHA, 2008).1 The use of rape during the Bosnian War can be seen as a result of the fall out of rules that normally contain these dangerous elements of male sexuality. The concept of the sexual personae succeeds in taking the individual psyche into account. However, the weakness of this theory is the fact that rape is mostly considered being an individual matter, that results from individual desire. Hence it underestimates the political motivation of rape. As opposed to the sexual personae view on the war, several scholars argue that the Bosnian War was indeed a war on women but was politically driven from start to finish. The rape that took place were not a result of individual sexual desire. Stiglmayer (1994) and MacKinnon (1989) argue that rape is a political contingent. It is part of a war strategy and results of a political plan. Stiglmayer writes: The most popular and effective myth is that rape has to do with an uncontrollable male drive that is unfortunate, to be sure, but also unavoidable (Stiglmayer, 1994: 55). She argues that the war on women in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia and Serbia was an important element in the war against each others culture. Both Stiglmayer and MacKinnon emphasize the reproductive role of women in a culture. Women were the ones who reproduce cultural difference (Ibid., 1994: 55). They were the ones passing on language, cuisine and custom to the next generations (Evangelista, 2011: 104).The destruction of each others culture and ethnicity, started with targeting women. The cited events of the scholars like MacKinnon and Stiglmayer consist mostly of large-scale Serbian rape-camps. In these, women were raped continuously and were detained to force maternity. Several documents highlight the plan of Serbs to produce `little Serbs, by forcing maternity of Muslim women after being impregnated (Evangelista, 2011: 110). This shows that the rapes had a double biopolitical effect. First by destroying the reproductive force of a culture that is embodied by women, second to make sure that these women give birth to `Serbian` babies and not Muslim babies. With these examples Stiglmayer and MacKinnon show that gender-based violence is not necessarily the result of individual desire, but of a political strategy. The statement that gender-based violence is per se politically motivated is doubtable. Officially the Serbs were the only warring faction that used the rapes as a `tool of war` (Park, 2007: 16). There are numerous documents about victims of unorganized mass rapes, even by neighbours or relatives (OByrne, 2003: 178). There is evidence suggesting that gender-based violence is both a result of individual sexist behaviour and political motivations. Feminist scholars show that in any case, the Bosnian War is a gendered event. The question is whether a feminist analysis of the war is complete. Some crucial elements of the Bosnian War are not addressed in the feminist approach of the war. In the feminist analysis, rape and

For more statistics on rape during the Bosnian War, see: Human Rights Watch. (1995) cited in: M. Hynes & B. Lopes-Cardozo, Sexual Violence Against Refugee Women. Journal of Womens Health and Gender-based Medicine Vol 9, num. 8, (2000). 819-23.

sexism is only a result of war. It overlooks the interaction between sexism and other social forces, like ethnic nationalism itself.

Methodological considerations

Critique on Monism The nationalist approach of the war mainly tries to explain the question whether ethnic nationalism was pushed upon people by elite national propagation or whether it existed before. The main concern of the gender analysis is whether gender-based violence is a politico-military strategy or the result of chaotic forces like individual lust. Both epistemologies however, are monist by nature and assume that each social category, like sexism and ethnic nationalism, can be adequately understood or analysed separate from each other. This leaves blind spots in the investigation of the position of women during the war. The nationalist approach by paying no attention at all to the position of women and the feminist approach by overlooking the interplay between ethnic nationalism and sexism. This thesis shows that inter-sectionality provides a better framework to obtain a comprehensive view of the position of women during the war.

Intersectional Approach The usage of the inter- sectional methodology has scientific value for several reasons. First of all it explores the interplay between sexism and ethnic nationalism during conflict. These two variables play an important role in a broad range of post-modern violent conflicts. Inter-sectionality exposes how categories such as sex/gender and race cross (Weldon, 2008: 195). I argue that sexism and ethnic nationalism interact and are part of a larger matrix of oppression that decides the position of women during the war. This matrix consists of the separate influence of both ethnic nationalism and sexism, but also the interplay between those variables. Second of all, the inter-sectional approach deepens on our understanding of the Bosnian War. This thesis shows that, counter-intuitively, the inter-sectional analysis of the war succeeds better in analysing the position of women during the war than an unblended feminist methodology. The historical value of a comprehensive understanding of the Bosnian War is of great importance. In particular if it comes to the understanding of the position of women during the war and the effect of the war on women. Third of all, the application of the inter-sectional research method helps us understanding the general double problem of women during conflict: being both the victim of ethnic nationalism and of sexism.

The intersectional approach originally derives from the black feminist movement in the United States which argued that their double problem of being both discriminated because of their colour and because of their sex was not represented by either feminist movements or black civil rights movements (Weldon, 2008: 193). For them, gender as a category had no meaning without other classifications like race (Ibid., 2008: 193). In this thesis, the inter-sectional methodology is used to reveal the double problem of women during violent conflict. Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina became both the victims of sexism, often by the ultimate misuse of the womens vulnerability for sexual violence. But also of ethnic nationalism, as they many times were killed or expelled from their home towns because of their ethnicity. Gender and ethnicity are not the only relevant structures during conflict. Class, sexual reference and other social structures are equally important multiple cases. The amount of social parameters is endless and will eventually lead to the single individual (Weldon, 2008: 193). However, social structures are a macro-level phenomena, so a choice between structures needs to be made. In the case of the Bosnian War, there are two reasons for choosing ethnic nationalism and sexism as dominant structures. Class could be another important structure, but the case of the Bosnian War has shown that women during the war were equally vulnerable for sexism and ethnic nationalism (Mladjenovic & Hughes, 2001: 3). Gender-based violence was conducted against women in all social echelons (Ibid., 2001). As seen before, the Bosnian War is a suitable case if it comes to the impact of ethnic nationalism and sexism. UN-estimated 20-000 to 50.000 rapes, the Bosnian War is a clear example of a gendered war. Next to that, the war was marked by extreme ethnic violence. This is the reason why the sexism and ethnic nationalism as the most important variables. If the intersectional approach is applied on a single case: the Bosnian War. The intersection between sexism and ethnic nationalism must be added to the separate influences of sexism and ethnic nationalism to obtain an intersectional view of the Bosnian War. The complete model can be illustrated schematically as follows:

Y= a + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x1 * x2 + c + e Weldon, 2008

This is the separate but mutually reinforcing model that will be applied qualitatively to the Bosnian War. The influence of ethnic nationalism and sexism on the position of women during the war is combined with the interplay between those variables. The interplay will be analysed in the empirical sections of the thesis. Applied to the case of the Bosnian war, I present the theoretical model as follows:

Ethnic nationalism

Position of women during the Bosnian War

Sexism
Figure 1.

Key concepts, hypothesis and research question The central question of this thesis is: How did the interplay between sexism and ethnic nationalism influence the position of women during the Bosnian War in 1991-1995? The hypothesis is that the interplay between sexism and ethnic nationalism affected the position of women during the war. To verify this, clear definitions of key concepts are needed. First of all, sexism is a far-reaching concept that must be specified. Sexism in this thesis is defined as the discrimination based on sex. In this thesis that means the application of the believe that the function in a society depend on ones gender. Sexism may play a role in society through informal rules and institutions, but can also be an interpersonal matter. It is however not an individual matter but by definition a relational matter. Either on the interpersonal level, the institutional level, or the domestic level. Rape and gender-based violence is seen in this thesis as the ultimate application of sexism. Rape is the sexual intercourse without valid consent, (World Health Organization, 2011: 149) by exploiting the difference in physical fragility between man and women. This definition relates rape to sexism. A necessary condition of rape is the willingness to exploit physical differences by force. Therefore, rape is not seen as result of sexism, but as the ultimate act of sexism itself. The second factor in this thesis is ethnic nationalism. Social scientist have made many attempts to circumvent this concept in a satisfactory manner. Still it remains a disputed concept. However, there is consensus about the fact that in the case of ethnic nationalism, membership of the nation is mostly hereditary. (Congleton, 1994: 74) This is combined with what Snyder calls collective appeals that are based on common culture, language, shared historical experiences, religion and the myth of shared kinship (Snyder, 2001: 169). This definition is relevant in the case of upcoming ethnic nationalism in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These collective appeals were not present in the same degree; religion was the primary ethnic marker during the civil war (Evangelista, 2011: 87). Despite this, the other characteristics were present as well in some places and some moments during the war. Therefore this

thesis includes also the non-religious markers like the collective appeals based on historical experiences and common culture. Now the two independent variables of this thesis are defined, the dependent variable, the position of women during the war, must be clarified. The Bosnian War is specifically chosen for this research, because of its high level of gender-based war crimes (Ward, 2006: 2). The war started when BosniaHerzegovina voted for succession at a referendum in 1991, and ended with the Dayton Peace treaty. Although in some places the war still simmered through, the Dayton peace treaty forms the border of this research. The main actors during the Bosnian War, that started in 1991, were Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.2 All of the mentioned actors committed war crimes. Geographically, the most important places were Bosnia, Republika Srpska and Serbia, that supported the Republika Srpska politically and militarily (YCTY, 1999). Although multiple outside actors got involved in the war, like Greeks, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Russia, Soudi-Arabia and finally NATO, these are not part of the thesis, since they are not a part of the upcoming ethnic nationalism during the 90s. This thesis focusses on Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. More specific, on the position of women. Concluding: the position of women during the Bosnian War means in this thesis the position of Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian women in the period 1991 1995.

Methods of collection and analysis

To answer the research question and sub-questions of this thesis, a qualitative content analysis of multiple documents will be conducted. To answer the question to what extend women were part of

the ethnic nationalist discourse in Serbia and Bosnia during the war, a historical analysis is accompanied with an interview of the coordinator of the psycho-social program of Vive ene.
To answer the question how ethnic nationalism prior to the war effect sexism on the family level, reports and data of SOS-hotlines are used. To answer the question how gender-based violence, conducted during the war, effected nationalism within the families of victims, information of rape victims is needed. Therefore, Documents of the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG) and the ICTY will be subject of a qualitative content analysis. Both the SOS-hotlines and The IHRLG are NGOs that did extensive research on the attitudes of women that were victim of rape or gender-based violence. The SOS-hotlines collected data of domestic gender-based violence before and during the Bosnian War. Women could call for free to the hotline and were asked to describe the context, motives experience of the violence. The IHRLG

These classifications are not based on citizenship, but on etnicity. Equivalents for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians.

interviewed women that were victim non-domestic rape during the war and did extensive interviewing with victims, in which attitudes of victims and their families are captured. To guarantee the validity of the qualitative content analysis, all documents are selected on the basis of the content having gone through an integrated gender analysis. This means that personnel of the International IHRLG and the SOS-hotlines were trained to deal with barriers like: shame, guilt and fear of victims. This training was given in order to increases the validity of the victims answers and to decrease socially correct answers. To guarantee the authenticity of the documents, only those documents are used that can serve as evidence at the ICTY. Besides that, the complete versions of documents of the IHRLG and the SOS-hotlines can be found in the ICTY library and can be seen in on request. To increase the representativness of the analysis, the documents of SOS-hotline and the International IHRLG which form the base of the analysis, are complemented with several ICTY and UN documents. The reason for this is the wish to complement the prior documents with new information and to see if they are in agreement with the documents of the SOS-hotlines and the International IHRLG. Furthermore, the two primary documents will be cross-checked with the same objective. If there is an overlap of content in the documents of the IHRLG and the SOS-hotlines, it will be analysed to what extent they are in agreement.

To what extend were women part of the ethnic nationalist discourse in Serbia and Bosnia during the war?
The nationalist discourse that preceded the war, is often described as the main cause of the war. Snyder (2001) points out that political leaders played the national card in order to gain power during elections. In the case of Yugoslavia, this is the elections of 1990. Although proving a causal relationship is problematic, it is known the nationalist propaganda started, most people claimed no religion in Yugoslavia (Evangelista, 2011: 91). Short after the propaganda started, this changed. Some scholars that try to explain the role of women in this ethnic nationalist discourse that came up before the war, point in the direction of the women Biljana Plavsi. Plavsi took active part in the polarizing ethnic discourse, by using her authoritative position as a university professor in Biology. She approached the differences between Bosniaks and Serbs in a racial, gene-biological way. Once she established her political career in Karadis political party Srpska Demokratska Stranka, she publicly stated: It is the habit of the Muslims to live this way, they like to live on top of another. Its their culture. We Serbs need space (Evangelista, 2011: 106). As a public intellectual and politician, she was one of the most active myrmidons of Miloevi and Karadi, the two initiators of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia. With that, she can be seen as part of the ethnic nationalism.

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The question is if the single example of Plavsi proves the involvement of women in the public discourse. When Plavsi was elected for the Bosnian-Serb Parliament, she was one of the rare women in parliament (Evangelista 2011: 99). This shows that the nationalist discourse which was propagated among political leaders was simply not accessible for most women. Outside of the representative spectrum, feminist organizations tried to fight the nationalist discourse. The feminist Womens Lobby in the Former Yugoslavia resisted nationalist pressures before the elections of 1990 (Mladjenovic & Hughes, 2001: 1). Although this lobby was the biggest organization, numerous feminist organizations were found before the war. Only in Belgrade SOS-hotline, Womens Lobby, Womens Parliament, Women in Black, the Womens Studies Research and Communication Centre; the Autonomous Womens Centre Against Sexual Violence, the Centre for Girls, the feminist publishing house, called: 1994, the Incest Trauma Centre, the Counselling Centre for Women, two houses for single women refugees from Krajina, called Lastavica, Women on Work, an organization that supports womens enterprise initiatives, Out of the Circle, and Bibija, the Roma Womens Centre (Mladjenovic & Hughes, 2001:2). Those organization all supported the democratization of Yugoslavia, but opposed the rise of ethnic nationalism and militarism. Most organizations published their voting advise in print. The organization zene u crnom (Women in Black) wrote: Do not vote for the Serbian Socialist Party, Serbian Radical Party, Serbian Peoples Renovation and all other nationalist, Fascist, warrior parties (mladjenovic & Hughes, 2001: 2). They also wrote, always disobedient to patriarchy, war, nationalism and militarism (Women in Black, 2011). All feminist organizations had their own individual goals, but they were in strong agreement with each other in one thing; all organizations opposed nationalism and militarism. This shows that women in civil society were active in the ethnic nationalist debate, by opposing it strongly. It must be understood that this all these feminist movements were ignored, by initiating a civil war. Nationalist leaders were simply too powerful by controlling most media. However, the effort of women in civil society to resist the war was enormous. Plai in this context, must be seen as an exception to the rule. She is the only female public figure that tried to boost ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism was a men cause.

How did the institutional changes, resulting from nationalism prior to the war, effect the position of women on the society-level?
To understand how ethnic nationalism resulted in institutional changes that effected the role of women on the society level, three institutions of the former-Yugoslav societal are reviewed in this section: the army, the political spectrum and motherhood. The army because it had been an important employer in

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the former-Yugoslavia. It says something about how women are represented and accepted in the labour force. The is political spectrum is analysed because it represents power. At last, the analysis of motherhood an institution says something about how a pure female institution changed over time.

Army The Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav National Army) accepted female combatants

from the start of its existence. Before the foundation of the JNA, 2 two million women embraced violent resistance to Nazi occupation during the 1940s (Cockburn, 1998: 156-157). The majority of those women fought in the Anti-Fascist Front of Women (Ibid., 1998: 156157). The incorporation of women in the army was a result of historical processes as well as with ideological reasons. During WOI there was a need for female soldiers to fight for the Austrian-Hungarian empire and the South-Slav state. Women believed that trough this they could obtain equality after the war. The reason to keep women in the army, even after the war, was explained by communist Yugoslav leaders with the Marxist idea that emancipation can only be achieved by womens equal participation with men in the paid labour force (Evangelista, 2011: 97). The army was one of the key institutions of the state and a logical place to start this equality. The ethnic-nationalist rise in the 90s made an end to this female participation in the army. The participation was eliminated after the decease of Tito, when Miloevi took power. The institution that symbolised equality was abolished This abolition of women in the army emphasizes the patriarchy that went hand in hand with ethnic nationalism and put pressure on the public role of women. The role of women in the labour force declined, just as in the political spectrum.

Politics The position of women in the political system before the rise of ethnic nationalist is far from equal of men, but differs from the position of women after the ethnic nationalist uprise. The upcoming nationalism had a negative effect on the political power of women. It is pointed out that the post-1990 parliament of Serbia consisted of 1.6 per cent only. This is however uneasy to compare with the Titoera, in which democratic institutions were absent. The military service during the first and second world war was a way to reach more participation in the labour force but not result in the wished equality for women. When communism came up, even before Tito took power, feminist organizations supported the communist ideology in politics. The

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Conference of Socialist Women symbolized this growing need for this ideology. Despite the absence of democratic institutions, women fulfilled important roles in the Yugoslav political system and held prestigious positions within the Communist Party. Examples are the women who all served as a Prime Minister in the Party: Savka Dabcevi Kuar (19671969), Latinka Perovi (1968-1972), and Milka Planin (1982-1986). In the delegate-system in Yugoslavia, that was established in 1974, roughly half of the delegates were women (Rener, 1985: 348). The higher delegates however, were mostly man. Despite this, it opposes the complete lack of female representation in the post-Yugoslavian era. The complete absence of women in the new nationalist political spectrum, contrasts with the relatively large presence of women in Yugoslavia.

Kindergarten abortion After the collapse of Yugoslavia nationalist leaders increasingly appealed to the national task of women. A member of the Serbian parliament once stated: I call upon all Serbian women to give birth to one more son in order to carry out their national debt (Korac, 1996: 137) One of the classic women rights is right of free parenthood. In the Constitution of Yugoslavia (1974) abortion was guaranteed as a human right by Article 191 (Evangelista, 2011: 100). It was described in the Constitution as the human right to decide about the birth of ones own children. As ethnic nationalism grew on the eve of the Bosnian War, the article was abolished under nationalist pressure. Nationalists repeatedly argued that Serbia needed more babies in order to expend their culture. Article 191 of the Constitution was eliminated with the argument that minorities were over-reproducing and Serbs were endangered (Schiffman, 2002: 8). Abortion was officially under the circumstances of life threatening situations, however, it was never covered by any insurance. This start of the nationalist view on parenthood was also the moment ethnic nationalism and religion went hand in hand. The Orthodox church in Serbia and Islamic leaders in Bosnia took part in propagating the same policy towards women. The patriarchal revival was complete with the marriage of the political and religious leaders. In an interview with the coordinator of the organization Vive ene, the coordinator of the psychosocial program for women states that Nationalism also has gone

together with a revival of religion and led to a diminishing the role of women in politics in general, i.e. in political parties, in parliament, in the government, in municipal and cantonal structures. But also if it comes to position as a parent. What we can conclude is that equality was never reached in before ethnic nationalism came up, but that the role of women in important institutions declined as a result of ethnic nationalism.

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How did ethnic nationalism prior to the war effect sexism on the family level?
To answer the question how sexism prior to the war affected sexism on the family-level, data of the NGO SOS-hotline, that was found in 1987, is used (SOS-hotline, 1990-1993). SOS-hotline was the largest organization in the former Yugoslavia where women could report gender-based violence before and during the war. Some 3.000 calls were registered by the hotline between 1990 and 1993. During these calls, trained staff of the NGO filled in data forms. A portion of the surveys was not completed as a result of lack of time or in case of emergency. Still, 770 completed surveys led to a rich data source that covers the eve of the war just as the period of warfare. These reports enable us to answer the question whether and how upcoming ethnic nationalism, instead of only war, influenced sexism, including gender-based violence. After the analysis of the reports from the SOS-hotline, other hotlines from other parts of former-Yugoslavia are analysed to see if their findings are in agreement with the findings of the Belgradian SOS-hotline.

Reports of Gender-Based violence as a result of ethnic nationalism As seen in the latter section, the rise of capitalism and the decline of social values were a result of nationalist persuasion. A new call for religious values and `old values took place. One of the examples of the call for old values is the nationalist propaganda that was seen on television. The ethnic nationalist ideology was partly constructed by media propaganda about aggressive and violent masculinity (Korac, 1993 & Zajovic, 1991). The question is how this nationalist propaganda effected sexism on the family-level. The SOS-hotline started to receive more calls on the eve of the Bosnian War, when Serbian ethnic nationalism was on its zenith. In all these cases Gender-Based Violence was reported. When it comes to the perpetrator husbands accounted for 64.9% of the cases, former husbands for 13,2%, and partners for 5,1% (SOSHotline, 1990-1993). Partners and (ex-)husbands account for 83,1 %, the majority of the cases. The remaining perpetrators were sons and fathers. In 70,5% of the cases the reason for calling was physical violence (SOS-Hotline, 1990-1993). The most striking thing is not only the fact that calls from abused women started with the rise of ethnic nationalism but that it increased steadily before the war. The amount of calls to the hotline was increasing every month between 1990 and 1991. (SOS-Hotline, 1990-1993). In 1991 the amount of calls tripled in comparison to the year before. An interesting example of the direct link between ethnic nationalism and sexism is the fact that the amount of calls of women that were battered increased during and short after news and special broadcasts (SOS-hotline, 1990-1993). In these broadcasts, Serbian suffering was shown, focussing on Serbian women being raped by Albanians. But also showing the other forms of national suffering that even dated back to the rivalry

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between the Ottomans and the Serbs. Women reported to the hotline that their spouses became enraged after watching nationalist propaganda and beat them up as a way to avenge their national pride (SOS-hotline, 1990-1993). The hotline reports for example that a women called to the hotline because the police didnt take her serious. She once urged her husband to put off the nationalist program so their child could watch her program, the man became angry and beat the woman until she was covered in blood. She escaped and called the police. When the police arrived the man said she was crazy and was always making trouble for him. He said she hit her own head on the wall just to provoke him and get him in trouble. He offered the police brandy. The police and the perpetrator sat down together, drank and talked. When the police left they warned the woman not to disturb a decent man anymore (SOS-hotline, 1990-1993). The fact that women reported more gender-based violence during and short after ethnic nationalist broadcasting shows the clear influence of ethnic nationalist propaganda on sexism. To see if these conclusions are corresponding with other data sources, it is useful to compare the results with another SOS-hotline. In a report of the ICTY in which the collected data of the SOShotline in of Croatia is examined, it can be clearly seen that the results are in agreement. The same type of violence as the SOS-hotline of Serbia illustrates is observed. This hotline reports increasing numbers of gender-based violence, short after television news on Channel 1 (ICTY: Domestic Violence against Women in the Condition of War and Economic Crisis). This was the channel that broadcasted the type of propaganda that can be compared with the propaganda which was shown on public Serbian channels. It can also be read that some of the women stated that is was the first time in their live that they were beaten by their husbands (ICTY: Domestic Violence against Women in the Condition of War and Economic Crisis). Although this is not mentioned in the SOS-hotline reports of Serbia, it gives new information about the subject. It means that some cases, family-level violence did not ever take place before the start of the nationalist propaganda. In these cases ethnic nationalist propaganda resulted not in the increase of gender-based violence, but in the emergence of it. A special problem in the families emerged in case of a mixed marriage. The SOS-hotlines both report that violence often became more drastic in case of the wife belonging to a different ethnic group (ICTY, Domestic Violence against Women in the Condition of War and Economic Crisis). The ethnic nationalism was not only present in politics but was also reflected in the family. Wives reported that they felt themselves becoming the symbol of the other and were the closest enemy target of their husbands (ICTY, Domestic Violence against Women in the Condition of War and Economic Crisis).

Sexism as a result of nationalism and sexism as a result of war As argued in the theoretical framework of this thesis, gender-based violence is seen as the sum mum of sexism. It is pointed out that the search for old values led to institutionalised sexism, but in this

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section another type of sexism is exposed: family-level gender-based violence. The SOS-hotlines show that gender-based violence was often a direct result of ethnic nationalist propaganda. This makes it impossible to see sexism only as a direct result of the war. The increasing amount of calls to the hotline started before the war started, not after. Sexism on the family-level can only be understood if upcoming ethnic nationalism is included as an influencing factor.

How did gender-based violence conducted during the war effect ethnic nationalism?
Several documents suggest that the fact that women were raped during the war created more extreme ethnic nationalism and aggression among their spouses and within their families. This section shows that this eventually resulted in a situation of even more gender-based violence (IHRLG, 1993: 2). In this section, documents and reports of the ICTY and the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG) are analysed to answer the question how sexism affected ethnic nationalism on family-level. By answering this question, the interplay between ethnic nationalism and racism is analysed in the opposite sequence. The documents which are analysed are produced by delegates of the IHRLG during a fact finding mission in Bosnia - Herzegovina. To make sure that sexism is not underrepresented in these documents, traumatized women are approached by female delegates who are trained to interview them in the most careful way. This is a necessity since rape is still a taboo in the Balkans (Karabegovic, 2010). As seen in the latter section, also the SOS-hotlines take notion of gender-based violence as a result of ethnic nationalism (Mladjenovic, 1992: 54). The period of the war however, was also characterized by gender-based violence between different ethnic groups. The UN estimates that between 20.000 and 50.000 women in the former Yugoslavia were raped. However, the estimation of the amount of rape is problematic (ECHA, 2008). Evidence exists of Serbian rape-camps, but less organized rapes are simply less documented (IHRLG, 1993: 23). Moreover, a share of rape victims is most likely killed after the act of rape. Women were also often raped in their own house, when paramilitary groups from another ethnic identity invaded. Since their husbands were often fighting at the front for a certain period, the women found themselves unprotected. Survivors of these kind of acts explain that this process was mostly repeated. Sometimes women were raped for moths in their own house (IHRLG, 1993: 26). In one interview with a 19 year old girl, she explained that she was raped five to six times a day for a period of four-and-one-half months in a row (IHRLG, 1993: 26). These rapes were in some cases conducted by their neighbours or other people from their village from different ethnic groups. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, thousands of women were raped in their own homes while their husbands served in the army. The question is what effect these rapes had on their families.

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The experience of victims In Bosnia-Herzegovina rape is a strong taboo. Victims express that they fear the reactions of their spouses and other family members. Rape is stigmatized in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Croatia and Serbia (IHRLG, 1993: 23). the mass-rapes committed to further ethnic cleansing often committed in public settings - also bring up shame upon the survivors' families and community, and indeed calculated to have precisely that effect (Ibid., 1993: 75). Besides their shame, fear was in most cases one of the prevailing attitudes. Women often told their husbands the truth about their rape, which they declared to lead to violent situations. Most man became more orthodox in their nationalism and hate towards other ethnicities, but also often expressed their anger about their wives having had intercourse with a man belonging to the other ethnicity. In several cases this led to violence. Women explained in interviews that they had the feeling they experienced the war again, by referring to the situation in which they were raped during the war. Husbands that found out that their wives or partners were raped during the war, often battered them because they blamed the rapes on their wives. Some women clarified that they were not only beaten up or yelled at; often husbands put the blame of being raped on them directly. Also men sometimes forced their wives to have sex with them (Ibid., 1993: 23). Women that underwent this process describe this themselves in most cases as `rape.` Two things come forth from the interviews that Women Rights Law Group held with survivors of rape during the war. First of all, the fact that husbands became even more hateful towards other ethnicities as a result of their wives being raped during the war. Second of all, men often reacted on their wives with violence. Battering, rape and accusation were common appearances. This made women experienced the process of violence and rape again on family-level (Ibid., 1993: 69). The fact that their husband returned did not make them feel safer.

Attitudes of men and feminization The IHRLG, like most of the NGOs that study the attitudes of victims of rape, do not pay attention to the attitudes and motives of men (Piccard, 2011: 2). This makes it difficult to understand the mechanism behind men abusing their raped wives. An explanation of the violent domestic behaviour can be found in the process of feminization. In one of the rare documents that perceives the attitude of men after conflict, a study of International Fellowship for Reconciliation (IFOR) (2010), men state that they often experience the feeling of being disempowered after conflict (IFOR, 2010: 26). The fact that men were unable to exert their role of protector leads to a men feeling feminized and disempowered. A possible explanation is that family-level violence is a method of reaffirming a mens power over their spouses. To further analyse this, more information of mens attitudes is necessary.

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Information about mens motives to rape and use violence as a result of their spouses being raped lacks (Ibid., 2010: 26).

Cyclical experience of increased hatred and sexism An analysis of the responses of female Bosnian War victims shows that two things emerged as a result of rape. First of all, men became even more ethnic nationalistic and became more insulting towards other ethnicities. Second of all, a share of the interviewed women point out that they often got beaten as a result of this. It seems that the fact that women were raped during the war, effected women in two ways: they suffered mentally as a result of the rape, sometimes with suicidal tendencies. Also, they suffered on family-level because rape is a strong taboo and a share of women became victims of more gender-based violence conducted by their spouses. Therefore, the influence of sexism on ethnic nationalism cannot be seen as a clear-cut process. When men returned to their homes the process became rather cyclical: sexism and racism were alternating and keeping women in the position they were in during the war. This finding shows that women during conflict cannot be simply seen as victims of rape. Women are a victim of men in general, not only men of other warring factions.

Conclusions
The analysis of the position of women during the Bosnian War cannot be analysed by using a sheer ethnic or feminist analysis. Both paradigms leave out the interplay between sexism and ethnic nationalism. The intersectional methodology succeeds in filling this gap and integrates the nationalist and feminist analyses. It shows how the interplay between ethnic nationalism and sexism effect the position of women during the Bosnian War. The fact that women were not part of the ethnic nationalist discourse shows that the incorporation of a feminist analysis is important. Ethnic nationalism led to sexism in two ways: it led to institutionalised sexism and decimated the position of women in the public and political sphere. It also led to an increase in family-level gender-based violence. In the opposite direction, the intersectional approach shows that sexism led to even more ethic nationalism, and after that even more sexism. This can be seen as a cycle that resulted in the constant experience of violence by women, initiated by warring factions, but also repeated in many cases by their own spouses. These conclusions are essential in describing the position of women during the Bosnian War. Women were victim of ethnic nationalism, sexism, but also of the interaction between those factors. This shows that women of Bosnia-Herzegovina were rather victims of a matrix of domination that can be positioned schematically as follows:

Ethnic nationalism 18

Interplay between ethnic Nationalism and sexism

Position of women during the Bosnian War

Sexism

figure 2.

If it comes to the analysis of women during the Bosnian War, this model provides the most complete framework. It shows that the situation of women during the war can be seen a result of the separate effects of ethnic nationalism and sexism and the interplay between those two variables. This immediately answers the question whether women in Bosnian-Herzegovina faced their own double problem. They did by belonging to a targeted ethnic group and belonging to a targeted gender. Despite the fact that the Bosnian War is a unique case, this model can be applied to other cases. In order to obtain a more complete analysis of the position of women during war, the intersectional methodology can be applied to other presupposed ethnic wars.

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Mladjenovic, L. & Hughes, D. (2001) Feminist Resistance to War and Violence in Serbia ch. 20 in M. Waller, ed., Frontline Feminisms. New York: Routledge, 2001. http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/warvio1.html 22 January, 2012. Brankovic, B. (2007) When Silence Screams; A contribution to the analysis of gender-based violence in Serbia. http://rs.one.un.org/groups/11/When_Silence_Screams.pdf. Visited: 16 January, 2012. Karabegovic, D. (2010) International Justice, ICTY; Struggle to Overcome Male Rape Taboo.

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Interviews
Interview A. Raghmanovic, coordinator psycho-social program Vive ene. 15 January 2012.

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