Command in Support B GL 331 001 FP 001

B-GL-331-001/FP-001
LAND FORCE
COMMAND SUPPORT IN LAND OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)
This publication becomes active on receipt.
WARNING ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
Issued on the Authority of the Chief of Land Staff
B-GL-331-001/FP-001
LAND FORCE
COMMAND SUPPORT IN LAND OPERATIONS

(ENGLISH)
This publication becomes active on receipt.
WARNING ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
Issued on the Authority of the Chief of Land Staff
OPI: DAD 6-2
2008-04-14
Command Support in Land Operations
1FOREWORD 1. B-GL-331-001/FP-001, Command Support in Land Operations is issued on the Authority of the Chief of the Land Staff. 2. This publication becomes effective upon receipt. 3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-331-001/FP-002, Aide au Commandement dans les operations terrestres. 4. Published on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario.
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2008
2PREFACE GENERAL 1. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations is supported by B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations, B-GL-334-001/FP-001 Standing Operating Procedures for Land Operations and B-GL-331-003/FP-001 Military Symbols for Land Operations. AIM 1. The aim of Command Support in Land Operations is to describe the supporting capabilities and theory necessary to enable the doctrine described in B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations. SCOPE 1. This manual is divided into three parts. Part 1 is comprised of Chapters 1 to 3, which describe the fundamentals of command support and the conceptual organization of the headquarters and staff. Part 2, comprising Chapters 4 and 5, presents the information and systems management capabilities needed to facilitate effective control of military operations. Part 3 consists of Chapter 6, which discusses the integration of the command support principles within Battle Procedure. 2. Chapter 1 describes the purpose of the control function and its relationship with command support. The chapter introduces the resources necessary to support command and discusses the elements and forms of control employed by commanders. In addition, Chapter 1 introduces key military terminology used throughout the rest of the publication. 3. Chapter 2 focuses on personnel resources and describes the Land Force staff system at the tactical level. The NATO term coordinating staff is introduced. The concept of advisors is maintained, but has now been grouped separately from the core staff, in recognition of current force generation concepts. The doctrine introduces a Chief of Staff within the Brigade Headquarters (HQ) as well as various staff appointments including a Targeting organization that includes Lethal and Noniii
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Lethal Targeting Officers, Information Management Officer, and Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Coordinator. 4. Chapter 3 discusses the Headquarters construct, including purpose, tactical grouping, components and operation. The HQ model is described along more modular lines to include a central Command Information Centre (CIC) controlling an Operations Centre, an Intelligence Centre, Plans Centre and an Administration element. This model is employed for both the Brigade and Battle Group (BG) level HQ. 5. Chapter 4 defines Information Management and identifies this function as the primary responsibility of the staff. It introduces Information Management (IM) fundamentals, functions and activities. Information Management functions are identified and responsibilities assigned to specific staff appointments. The concept of Information Requirements (IR) is expanded beyond the traditional intelligence usage to include all categories of information. 6. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the systems management capability necessary to support the land force Communications and Information System (CIS) architecture. Detailed technical discussion of this capability is provided under the B-GL-351 CIS and IM series of publications. 7. Chapter 6 discusses Battle Procedure at both the tactical level and the level of its component elements: Planning, Preparation, Execution and Assessment. The chapter expands on the basic construct describing how staffs support the commanders tactical planning efforts. This chapter emphasizes the central role of the commander in planning while placing the staff and HQ CIS in a clear support role. APPLICATION 1. While many of the concepts discussed are applicable to any level of Land Force (LF) command, the focus of the discussion remains at the deployed tactical level. To the extent possible, all LF command and control (C2) nodes should employ the principles and fundamentals outlined in this publication.
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RELATED PUBLICATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 1. The following publications and agreements have been referenced or integrated within B-GL-331-001/FP-001: a. b. c. d. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations; B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations; B-GL-354-001/FP-001 Land Force Information Operations (not yet published) B-GL-352-001/FP-001 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); B-GL-357-001/FP-001 Intelligence Field Manual; B-GL-351 Series: Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and Information Management (IM); B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operational Planning Process (2002-11-6); B-GJ-005-404 Series: Movement; B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 Risk Management for CF Operations; A-AD-121-C01/FP-000 Staff Writing Procedures for Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces; Land Force IS Security Orders (Draft); Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1 Command and Control of Land Forces; ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION 3.3.5 (B) Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War; ALLIED ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLICATION 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions; FIELD MANUAL 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations;
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FIELD MANUAL 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics; MARINE CORPS WAR-FIGHTING PUBLICATION 3-40.2 Information Management; ARMY FIELD MANUAL (UK) VOLUME 1 Combined Arms OperationsPart 8 Command and Staff Procedures, NOVEMBER 1999; DISCUSSION PAPER Canadian Army Tactical Command and Command Support Doctrine, 4 SEP 01; DISCUSSION PAPER System Management of LF Tactical Communication and Information Systems, DEC 01; STANAG 2014 (EDITION 9) Formats for Orders and Designation of Timings, Locations and Boundaries; STANAG 2101 (EDITION 11) Establishing Liaison; STANAG 2116 NATO Codes for Military Ranks; M.J. Ryan. Battlefield Command Systems. Brasseys. London. 2000; Laudon and Laudon. Management Information Systems: Organization and Technology. 4th ed. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1996; R. E. Griffin. Superstitious Rituals-Naive Inductivism in Command and Control Doctrine: Its Causes, Consequences, and Cures. Proposed to 7th ICCRTS, Quebec City, September 2002; and Gary Klein. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1998.
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OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST 1. The Director of Army Doctrine (DAD) is responsible for the content, production and publication of this manual. Direct queries or suggestions to: DAD 6 Command CFB Kingston, Bldg Vimy A-31 PO Box 17000 Station Forces Kingston, ON K7K 7B4
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1TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD PREFACE CHAPTER 1 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. CHAPTER 2 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. ANNEX A .......................................................................... i .........................................................................iii CONTROL AND COMMAND SUPPORT Introduction...................................................1-1 Military Terminology .....................................1-2 Why Control?................................................1-6 Forms of Control...........................................1-7 Enablers for Control ...................................1-10 Capability Requirements ............................1-15 THE STAFF Roles and Functions.....................................2-1 Staff Structures.............................................2-4 Canadian Staff Models .................................2-9 Staff Relationships .....................................2-13 Organization of Staff Work .........................2-14 Staff Officer Qualities .................................2-16 GENERAL CRERARS INSTRUCTIONS TO STAFF OFFICERSHEADQUARTERS 1ST CANADIAN ARMY
Introduction ............................................................... 2A-1 General ..................................................................... 2A-1 Duties Common to All Staff Officers ......................... 2A-3 Visits to Formations and Units .................................. 2A-3 Methods .................................................................... 2A-4 Conclusion ................................................................ 2A-5 CHAPTER 3 301. 302. HEADQUARTERS General.........................................................3-1 Functions......................................................3-1
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303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. CHAPTER 4 401. 402. 403. 404. CHAPTER 5 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. CHAPTER 6
Characteristics ............................................. 3-6 Echelons ...................................................... 3-8 Tactical Headquarters.................................. 3-9 Main Headquarters .................................... 3-12 Forward Headquarters............................... 3-29 Headquarters Administration ..................... 3-30 Alternate Headquarters.............................. 3-31 Security ...................................................... 3-32 Infrastructure and Layout........................... 3-34 Signal Element........................................... 3-36 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT Cognitive Hierarchy and Cognition Cycle .... 4-1 Information Management Functions ............ 4-5 Information Management Activities ........... 4-16 System Management Support to Information Management........................... 4-24 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT Introduction .................................................. 5-1 Scope........................................................... 5-2 General Principles of System Management................................................ 5-2 System Management Command and Control ......................................................... 5-4 Management Functions and Tasks ............. 5-5 The Systems Management Team ............... 5-9 BATTLE PROCEDURE
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................... 6-1 SECTION 2 ASSESS ....................................................... 6-3 601.

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Staff Estimate .............................................. 6-5
SECTION 3 PLAN.............................................................6-6 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. Long-Range Planning ..................................6-7 Mid-Range Planning.....................................6-7 Short-Range Planning ..................................6-8 Tactical Planning ..........................................6-8 Staff Support to Planning ...........................6-15 Staff Support to Preparation.......................6-23
SECTION 4 PREPARE ...................................................6-22 SECTION 5 EXECUTE ...................................................6-25 SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES AND PROCESSES ...................................6-29
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2TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1-1: Command Support Resources .........................1-18 Table 2-1: Staff Information Management Responsibilities ..2-2 Figure 2-1: Generic Staff Model ............................................2-5 Figure 2-2: Canadian Brigade HQ Staff Components.........2-11 Figure 2-3: Example Canadian BG HQ Staff Components.2-12 Figure 3-1: Generic HQ Structure .........................................3-1 Figure 3-2: BG Command ...................................................3-10 Figure 3-3: Brigade Command Element Element ...............3-10 Figure 3-4: Main HQ Model-Brigade ...................................3-14 Figure 3-5: BG Command Information Centre Staff............3-15 Figure 3-6: Brigade Command Information Centre Staff ....3-16 Figure 3-7: BG ISTAR Coordination Cell ............................3-26 Figure 3-8: BG and Brigade ISTAR Coordination Cell........3-26 Figure 3-9: ISTAR Staff Relationships ................................3-26 Figure 3-10: BG Administrative Element.............................3-30 Figure 4-1: Cognitive Hierarchy Model..................................4-1 Figure 4-2: Cognitive Cycle ...................................................4-3 Figure 4-3: Relevant Information Collection..........................4-7 Figure 4-4: Information Displays .........................................4-12 Figure 4-5: Staff Information Management Functions.........4-16 Figure 4-6: Foundation Data Processing ............................4-21 Figure 6-1: The Battle Procedure Model ...............................6-2 Table 6-1: Command and Control Activities........................6-30 Table 6-2: Integration of Command and Control Processes...........................................................6-32
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3CHAPTER 1 CONTROL AND COMMAND SUPPORT
101.
INTRODUCTION
1. Command Support is the integrated system of resources necessary to enable command. If Control is viewed as the means by which command is exercised, this definition encompasses the idea that all resources (human, intellectual, physical) involved in enabling the control of military operations by the commander, when integrated as a system, are considered Command Support. 2. The most significant recent development in the armys command and control (C2) capability has been the increased application of information technologies to military operations. In the past, the staff collected, processed, stored, displayed and disseminated battlefield information using a variety of manual or analogue systems. The signal and administrative communities supported these activities through the use of combat net radio, teletype, manual dispatch services and central registry systems. Battlefield information held by various commanders was often inaccurate and untimely and the subsequent sharing of this information through analogue systems often led to very different views of the battlefield within a given command. This lack of shared and common awareness of the battle space presented a significant impediment and risk to our conduct of military operations. 3. The introduction of networked sensors and information systems within the military and the digitization of battlefield information have blurred the clear dividing line between yesterdays staff and signal systems organizations. Communication and Information System (CIS) networks now link human operators to essential battlefield information through the provision of advanced software applications. The human, intellectual and physical resources employed by the two communities are now becoming part of a single integrated system. 4. The capability generated through the subsequent integration of the staff and signal systems is now referred to as Command Support. The purpose of Command Support is to enable the commander to exercise effective control of assigned
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military forces and operations through the exploitation of battlefield information and CIS. 5. It is important to note that the information required by todays military commander has changed little over the years. The real change has occurred in our ability to effectively manage that information and present it to commanders in a form useful for decision-making. To fully exploit the technology now available to our forces, we must be prepared to rethink our existing command support system from the ground up.
102.
MILITARY TERMINOLOGY
1. Before proceeding, it is necessary to define some key terminology that will be used throughout the remainder of this publication: a. Relevant Information. Relevant Information (RI) is all information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control. Such information provides the foundation of the Common Operating Picture (COP) and answers questions generated by the commander and staff. RI has two major components: Execution Information (EI) and Feedback. Execution Information. EI is information that directs, initiates, or regulates action, conduct or procedure. The primary means of communicating EI is through combat orders and plans. At the tactical level, much of this information can be communicated graphically through the use of standard military symbols. Feedback. Feedback is information that allows the commander to compare the actual situation against expectations, evaluate current threats and decide whether or not to adjust current or future operations. Feedback may relate to planning, preparation or execution activities. Operating Picture. The Operating Picture is a representation of operations that is based on common data and information developed within
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one command and that can be tailored by users. By collaborating, sharing RI and tailoring RI to their needs, separate echelons create a Common Operating Picture. The Operating Picture may include RI drawn from the Recognized Air Picture (RAP) and Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP). e. Common Operating Picture. The Common Operating Picture (COP) is a representation of operations based on common data and information that is shared by more than one command and that can be tailored by users. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational understanding. This description does not imply that all C2 nodes maintain identical visual displays of RI but rather that the displayed information is based on common data. Situational Awareness. Situational Awareness (SA) is the combined knowledge of friendly forces, hostile forces, the environment and other aspects of the battle space. (Note: SA includes blue, red, brown and white situational awareness.) While SA is based on formal information and intelligence holdings, it may also incorporate information collected through personal observation and contacts that has not been digitized. In addition, SA is strongly influenced by other cognitive factors generated through training and experience. SA is not a static or absolute condition. SA varies over time as relevant information and intelligence is synthesized, confirmed, denied or becomes irrelevant or outdated. In addition, the lack of information may also contribute to situational awareness. Situational Understanding. Situational Understanding (SU) is SA to which human judgement has been applied. Situational understanding leads to decisions and action.
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Battlefield Visualisation. Battlefield Visualization (BV) is a commanders clear understanding of the current state of friendly forces with relation to the enemy and the environment, from which he envisions the endstate and the sequence of activities to achieve that end-state. Information Requirements. Information Requirements (IR) refer to all information that must be collected from sources external to the command in order to meet the mission specific requirements of the commander and staff for the successful execution of a specific operation. IR must be related to a specific decision. This definition extends the joint definition, which discusses IR only in the context of intelligence requirements. IR may be related to enemy forces, friendly forces or the operational 1 environment . Requests for Information. Requests for Information (RFI) are specific, time-sensitive, ad hoc requirements for information or products submitted to higher headquarters to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. Commanders Critical Information Requirements. Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are crucial elements of information that are identified and required by the commander and directly affect decision-making and successful execution of the current operation. CCIR are subcategorised as: priority intelligence
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This expanded concept has been drawn from NATO Publication AJP 3.2.1 Command and Control of Land Forces and has been approved by the CA Army Terminology Board. This expanded definition is also in use by the US Army FM 6-0. 1-4 B-GL-331-001/FP-001
requirements and friendly force information requirements. The designation of CCIR is a command responsibility alone. CCIR communicate to the staff and subordinate commanders those elements of information the commander deems necessary for his own decision-making and focus, bind and discipline staff IM and collection activity. (1) Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making. Friendly Force Information Requirements. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) consist of information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions.
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Essential Elements of Friendly Information. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are critical aspects of a friendly force that, if known by the adversary, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation. Therefore EEFI must be protected from adversary detection. The protection of EEFI is a critical element of operational security (OPSEC). A standing information collection task is to confirm or deny that EEFI are in the possession of an adversary. Exceptional Information. Exceptional information is information that would have answered one of the commanders CCIRs if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the CCIRs. This information is reported to the commander immediately by any method available.
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2. Throughout the remainder of this manual, readers must keep one primary fact in mind: the overarching intent of the command support system is to place timely, mission essential information in the hands of decision makers throughout the chain of command. While structured information management procedures are essential, any blind adherence to process or staff duties which contravenes this intent will pose a significant threat to mission success.
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WHY CONTROL?
1. The requirement for control of military operations results primarily from threats to mission success. These threats may arise from adversary, environmental, civilian or friendly forces action or inaction. The control function attempts to minimize the risks posed by each of these threats through a variety of procedural and positive means. Commanders must strike a careful balance between exerting enough control to minimize known or anticipated threats, and over-controlling to the extent that initiative is stifled. This balance can be maintained only if the commander operates within an accurate, timely and relevant information environment. 2. As discussed in B-GL-300-001 Command in Land Operations, there is a direct relationship between military risk and the uncertainty associated with commanders situational awareness. Command uncertainty results from an inadequate, inaccurate or incomplete information environment or a lack of relevant situational experience. These factors may lead to slower decision-making, poorer decisions and ineffective control throughout the command. Command Support exploits and shares relevant battlefield information to improve situational awareness and minimise the need to incorporate assumptions into decision-making. In addition, national training systems provide commanders with focused simulation training that exercises rapid tactical decision-making in a wide variety of scenarios. The expected result is more effective control of military operations as decision-making speed and quality improve.
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104.
FORMS OF CONTROL
1. Control takes two basic formsprocedural and positive control. Military operations require both forms of control to offset each others inherent weaknesses. They can complement each other and enhance military operations. The commander must establish the balance for each situation. 2. Procedural Control. Procedural control uses a combination of previously agreed upon and promulgated orders, regulations, policies, doctrine, and procedures to regulate friendly forces and manage risk. This form of control is most effective in the following situations: a. b. c. d. e. during static operations; when conducting deliberate planning for future operations; when the situation is clear and ordinary; when task identification is easy and reliably made; and when task accomplishment is implicitly understood and conforms to prescribed actions.
OPERATION ATHENA With operations occurring in an increasingly complex battlefield, situational awareness is critical to locate enemy forces, conduct operations and avoid friendly fire incidents. In this context air assets provide critical surveillance, observation and direct fire support, which, when combined, can act as a powerful combat multiplier for the commander. But in order to use these air assets effectively, they must receive the necessary airspace in which to manoeuvre in support of the commanders mission, while simultaneously controlling threats to mission success. Deploying an airspace coordination centre (ASCC) is the best method to guarantee that the airspace is available, therefore during Op ATHENA; Canada deployed an ASCC to provide airspace control and coordination to the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) as part of International Stabilization Force Afghanistan (ISAF) V.
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Before the arrival of the ASCC, positive and procedural controls to control the airspace over Kabul were nonexistent. Multiple users resulted in limited coordination regarding the use of the airspace, affecting the operational plans of the KMNB commander and the overall flight safety within the KMNB area of operations (AO). Frequently close calls occurred. If an air accident were to occur over this AO it would incur major consequences for the ground commander, who acts as the immediate responder. The KMNB ASCC was responsible to create a procedural airspace control system within the entire Kabul AO, as there are no radars providing positive control information within the AO. Additionally, the KMNB ASCC performed the airspace coordination for the Kabul AO, as ISAF headquarters (HQ) was not manned to complete this function. New brigade level airspace coordination standard operating procedures were developed based on a combination of three elements, including relevant NATO airspace measures, US practices currently being adapted to meet the needs of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), as well as new procedures related to unconventional tasks. Through the development of a clear set of orders, regulations, policies, doctrine and procedures, the ASCC increased airspace coordination in the KMNB/ISAF AO to where it is now a procedural control system. Through this procedural system friendly forces use of Kabuls airspace was regulated, via policies on restricted flight areas and times, while risk was managed. Throughout the rotation the ASCC continued to develop and refine the various procedures with the introduction of more airspace users, or conversely, a decrease of users.
Source: Bridgarder General Peter Devlin. Canadian Soldiers Deploy to the Kabul Multinational Brigade, The Bulletin. The Army Lesson Learned Centre, Vol. 10. No. 2. Major M.F. Notaro. Airspace Coordination in Afghanistan, The Bulletin. The Army Lessons Learned Centre. Vol 10. No 6.
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3. Procedural control is less effective for managing risk in unusual situations. Intelligent use of procedural control supports mission command by allowing the commander to initiate and direct the operation while minimizing intervention with subordinate units. Procedural control also allows the commander to focus on actions at decisive points during operations. Examples of procedural controls include Standing Operating Procedure (SOPs), standing reporting instructions and common definitions of terms and symbols in documents and graphic displays. 4. Doctrine provides procedural controls to create a common approach. By its nature, procedural control governs process rather than product or outcome. Doctrine deals with the fundamental principles that guide military actions. Doctrinebased procedures structure the way land forces solve problems or implement decisions. Doctrine contains a common language that enables all other methods of procedural and positive control. 5. Procedural control measures help the commander manage risk by placing selective constraints on subordinates freedom of action. These constraints relate primarily to the subordinates use of time and space and are formally communicated in combat orders. The commander tailors control measures in consonance with the higher commanders intent, the mission, the terrain and the level of operational risk he is willing to accept. To effectively employ procedural control measures, commanders and staffs must completely understand the ramifications each control measure has on subordinates freedom of action and initiative. Successful mission command employs the minimum essential control measures. 6. The availability of networked sensors, modern information systems and friendly force tracking technologies will provide improved and more current visibility of the environment. This will facilitate a commanders ability to assess current risks and opportunities, thereby allowing him to further minimize restrictive procedural controls while providing greater capability to rapidly amend those essential controls already implemented. 7. Positive Control. Positive control requires commanders to actively assess, decide and direct forces within their area of operations (AO). Commanders use positive control to accomplish or direct complex or vague tasks. The use of
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positive control tends to overload commanders with information (or requests for information); increase their fatigue (as they attempt to decide too much or be in too many places); and cause subordinates to rely on commanders to make allimportant decisions. Nonetheless, positive control is most useful in the following situations: a. the occurrence of forecasted events requires a decision to implement one of several possible solutions; the situation is dynamic; task identification by individual subordinates is difficult; and task accomplishment is complex; implementing actions are multifaceted, and several sets of solutions are possible, each explicitly described and involving multiple means.
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8. Examples of positive control include the use of on order tasks in combat orders, altering the resources, concept, or objectives of an operation, or ordering execution of a specific contingency plan.
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ENABLERS FOR CONTROL The enablers for effective control are: a. b. c. information; communication; and structure.
2. Information. Information is the most important enabler of effective control. It allows commanders to give meaning to and gain understanding of the events and conditions in which they make decisions and conduct operations. The digitization and effective management of relevant information simplifies collection, storage, retrieval, display and subsequent dissemination. The ability for widely dispersed commanders to base command decisions on common information and a shared view of the battle space is a significant combat capability.
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3. At higher levels of command, operational complexity and information holdings increase. The command support system actively seeks to defend the commander against information overload by exploiting holdings to generate staff assessments, provide recommendations and resolve directed CCIRs. While information provides an essential foundation for effective control of military operations, commanders will continue to rely on human judgement as the defining means of understanding their operational environment. 4. Communication2. Communication is the principal interaction between commanders and those who influence or execute their decisions. Communications in modern information systems provide the commander with information that is adaptable and responsive to his requirements in terms of both format and timeliness. There are four principal means of communications: personal contact; contact between representatives of commanders; document transfer; and data exchange: a. Personal Contact. This is the most productive means of communication but also the most time-consuming. Commanders brief subordinates face-to-face to ensure that their intent is understood completely and to resolve any issues. Face-to-face meetings are particularly important and effective in fostering trust and mutual understanding. (1) Voice Communications. Voice communication (including telephones, combat net radio, trunk communications, and satellite communications) continues to be a principal means of facilitating near real time control. Voice communication is the only means of communication at all levels of command that permits the commander to communicate intent and project personal will and inspiration at a distance. Voice communication is
AJP 3.2.1 Command and Control of Land Forces.

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particularly useful during mission execution, particularly if an operation is fast moving and precludes face-to-face contact. Such communications help maintain the tempo of operations. It should be noted that voice communications are not the preferred means for the transmission of low-level data such as graphical control features, resource holdings and location data. (2) Video Teleconferencing. Video teleconferencing is an effective means of communicating intent and commitment by extending face-to-face contact between commanders and subordinates electronically. Video teleconferencing currently requires large bandwidths and must be centrally managed.
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Contact Between Representatives of Commanders. Liaison Officers (LOs) and liaison teams convey information between commanders while providing context and interpretation of the information. To be effective, the LO or staff officer must understand the operational environment, be proactive and know the mind of the commander he represents and his host commander. LOs may be ineffective if dispersion over-stretches communications or distances preclude travelling. The effectiveness of liaison teams can be greatly enhanced when integrated into the parent HQ command, control and information system (C2IS) network. Document Transfer. Document transfer can take place by courier, postal service, facsimile (fax) and digital communications networks. Document formats include paper, magnetic media (floppy discs, CD ROM, tape, flash drives), digitized message text and electronic file attachments within messages. Fax
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transmission is flexible and reliable where small documents such as notes, sketches, and small overlays are concerned; however, it is not the most efficient means of broadly communicating information. Electronic messages provide a rapid means of communicating unstructured (free-text) information; however, the inclusion of file attachments must be closely controlled to conserve limited bandwidth. d. Data Exchange. For the purposes of this publication, data exchange is limited to those digital capabilities that allow both the sending and receiving information systems to process data automatically. This includes database-todatabase transfers, position and navigation (POS/NAV) data and formatted messages. Data exchange provides the primary means of communicating large quantities of routine information although there are constraints associated with using it. It is particularly difficult to convey intent and can be bandwidth intensive if not carefully controlled.
5. While all these methods remain useful for the future, personal contact and data exchange remain the primary methods of exchanging large quantities of information. The use of personal contact to complement or enhance information communicated through data exchange improves situational awareness by focusing recipients on critical elements of the data and allowing for collaborative information processing among commanders in near real time. 6. Structure. Structure is a defined organization and the procedures that establish the relationships among its elements. Structure has both internal (headquarters or staff structure) and external (command, control and support relationship) components. Structure influences interactions among the elements of the organization, whether units or individual people, and the subsequent flow of information. 7. Information normally moves throughout the command along specific channels, or transmission paths. These include command, staff and technical channels:
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Command channels are direct chain-ofcommand transmission paths that commanders, or authorized staff officers, use for command-related activities. Command channels are used to transmit execution information and rapidly develop and exchange situational understanding. Horizontal communication between subordinate commanders may lead to decision-making without the commander becoming involved, except to affirm, either positively or through silence, the decisions or agreements of his subordinates. The commander must train subordinates to employ command channels effectively so that information is exchanged quickly, decisions are reached rapidly and command nets are made available to others. Staff channels are staff-to-staff transmission paths between headquarters used for controlrelated activities. These channels focus on the coordination of staff work and the exchange of data and information related to the generation of specific elements of the COP such as friendly force track information, target acquisition information and logistic information. Technical channels are the transmission paths between two technically similar units or offices that perform a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels are used to control performance of technical functions. They are not used for the conduct of operations or support to another units mission. Examples of these channels include communications between the CO of the Signals Squadron and the unit Signal Officer regarding technical control of CIS assets or the OC of the Maintenance Company and the unit Maintenance Officers regarding technical control of equipment assets.
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8. It should be noted that while quality information, effective communication and efficient organizational structures
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and procedures facilitate effective control of military forces, they cannot guarantee effective control. Success will be equally dependent on intangibles such as shared situational understanding, common intent and leadership. 9. Threats to Enablers. Our increased dependence on information systems and communications networks to exercise effective control creates potential vulnerabilities. 10. Redundant and reliable methods of communications must be available to commanders to ensure that designated recipients receive essential information. The conduct of offensive and defensive information operations (info ops) may affect the selection of communications means. For example, the imposition of a restrictive emission control (EMCON) state to support deception plans or operations security may degrade the commanders ability to exercise effective control. 11. Information holdings must be physically protected against cyber attack and unauthorized access. Technical and procedural security becomes increasingly important throughout the force as information system networks provide gateways to both attacks and espionage throughout the battle space. 12. Dedicated force protection may need to be assigned to commanders and CIS nodes. Such protection becomes increasingly important as military forces become more dispersed while at the same time increasing their exposure to potentially hostile civilian populations. Commanders must assess the security provided through rapid relocation of highly mobile HQs against the potential disruption to shared situational awareness and battle rhythm as a result of continuous relocation.
106.
CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
1. A Command Support capability is provided through two primary activities: Information Management and Systems Management: a. Information Management. Information Management (IM) is the planning, coordination and control of the acquisition, analysis, processing, integration, distribution, use, safeguarding and disposal of information, and
B-GL-331-001/FP-001 1-15
associated technology and supporting resources. IM ensures that the value of that information is identified and fully exploited. In a military context, IM includes five major processes: collecting, processing3, storing, displaying and disseminating relevant information. b. Systems Management. Systems Management (SM) combines the policies, procedures, tools, personnel and structures that ensure a consistent and robust land force CIS environment is provided to all users. CIS is further defined as An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish specific information conveyance and processing 4 functions . Within this manual, the term CIS encompasses both communications and computer related resources including the associated low level software applications. The addition of high-end software applications to the CIS and used to support C2 comprise the Command and Control Information System (C2IS).
2. Given the complexity and volume of information in todays military environment, the primary enablers of these activities include networked sensors, communications and information systems; well-trained staff and staff teams, efficient organizational structures, simple information handling and processing procedures, and a secure operating environment. All of these supporting elements must be integrated into a single
In the purest sense, tactical information will answer who, what, when and where type questions. This information must still be exploited by human beings, perhaps assisted by technology, to answer why and how type questions. While type of information processing would more properly be classified as Knowledge management, this manual will assume information processing to include all of these questions.
4
AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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1-16
system. An integrated system implies that changes in any one component of the system will require adjustments to the other components within the system. For example, introduction of new computer systems within a headquarters may require adjustments in training for operators and support personnel as well as adjustments in staff and network management procedures. Similarly, an influx of new personnel may necessitate more careful adherence to standardized procedures and may influence the effective use of the C2IS.
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Figure 1-1: Command Support Resources
3. As shown in Figure 1-1, Command Support resources can be divided into four broad, mutually supporting categories: personnel, infrastructure, processes and information holdings: a. Personnel. Personnel resources include people, organizational structure and training systems. Operational staffs exploit information holdings and provide subject matter expertise and advice to the commander. Communications personnel establish and maintain physical communications networks
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that move information throughout the battle space. Information systems personnel maintain the computers, software and networks that store, process and display battlefield information. All personnel will share IM and SM responsibilities. Selection, organization and training of all personnel remain command responsibilities. b. Infrastructure. Infrastructure includes all physical resources within the system. These resources include CIS hardware, software and networks, and the HQ layout and components that provide essential life support and security for the commander. Processes. Standardized processes ensure the effective operation and integration of personnel and facilities and enable the effective management of information and supporting CIS. While their use facilitates training and routine operations, commanders and staffs must not apply them blindly. Processes must reflect changes in command support personnel, infrastructure and information needs. They must also reflect the personal preferences of the commander and the realities of the current situation. Critical elements include: (1) Doctrine. Doctrine encompasses fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. The application of common doctrine, including terminology and symbols, during operations is a key enabler to mutual understanding and shared intent. Standardized Processes. Standardized processes are employed by the operational and CIS staff to control information and system management activities. SOPs,
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c.
(2)
Standing Orders, Communications Electronic Standing Instructions (CESI) and Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI) provide command and staff direction in response to routine events without tying down the commander with details. (3) Information and Information Technology Security. Security processes must be established to protect information holdings from either loss or compromise. Information holdings may be at risk from physical, personnel or procedural threats.
d.
Information Holdings. Information holdings within the HQ are the currency that enables the effective control of military operations. Information holdings may be either analogue or digitized. They may take the form of pure data (such as a real time sensor feed) or a document (such as an e-mail). The specialized experience and knowledge of the command support personnel reflect implicit information holdings within the command. All information should be stored in standard structures to facilitate storage and retrieval.
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4CHAPTER 2 THE STAFF In forming a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only a great professional knowledge and acquaintance with Service routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion. General Bronsart von Schellendorf, Chief of the German General Staff, 1905 201. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
1. Purpose and Authority. Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. The staff exists to support the commander in making and implementing decisions and to provide support and communications to higher and subordinate staffs. The staff supports the chain of command but is not a part of it. It has no authority independent of the commander. Its influence is derived from the commander and is exercised in the latter's name. The staff must never interfere with or impede the commander-to-commander relationship between senior and subordinate commanders. Similarly, the staff shall not reject proposals or requests from subordinate commanders without the commander's authority. All staff activities are undertaken on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a commander. 2. Functions. In recognition of the expanding military information environment, the primary function of the staff is to manage and exploit relevant information for the commander. Table 2-1 provides typical examples of the results of staff information management activities.
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2-1
Information Product Execution Plans Information Orders Regulations and Policy SOPs Threat Warnings Assessments of: Current Enemy Current Friendly Current Environment Future Enemy Future Friendly Future Environment Target Identification Advice
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x x
Feedback
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x
Table 2-1: Staff Information Management Responsibilities
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Disseminate
Process
Display
Collect
Relevant Information Information Management Activity
Store
The Staff
3. Formal information management processes ensure that accurate, relevant information is easily accessible to individual decision makers as required. By developing, processing and exploiting HQ information holdings, the staff is able to execute other important activities: a. Appraise. Staffs analyze information in order to identify existing or potential problems or risks to the mission. While this analysis will be based on an appraisal of each element of information as it becomes available, it must incorporate the staff officers own experience and judgement. This function includes development of staff estimates and may incorporate structured IM processes used to support intelligence production or target development. Anticipate. Staffs anticipate future problems that might influence mission success. Once identified, the staff identifies information requirements and develops supporting collection plans needed to confirm/deny these potential problems. Staffs must always be prepared to initiate or recommend action to resolve or minimize the problem. Inform. Staffs employ CIS networks to disseminate relevant information within their functional area throughout the command. This activity goes beyond the simple dissemination of data to include the results of individual analysis and the application of military judgement. It is this information processing function that generates shared situational awareness and understanding throughout the command. While staffs disseminate relevant information to assist decision-makers, they make their own decisions within delegated areas of responsibility, thereby protecting the commander from irrelevant, distracting detail and data. Recommend. By understanding the commanders future requirements, staffs are
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b.
c.
d.
able to make recommendations to commanders and other staffs. Recommendations are not authoritative but are provided for assistance only. Recommendations might cover areas such as force employment, force limitations, support priorities, acceptable risk, task organization, resource allocation or unit movement. e. Issue directions on behalf of the commander. Staffs disseminate command decisions through the issuance of detailed plans and orders. The commander delegates authority to a single individual within the HQ staff for the preparation and coordination of these directions. Supervise. Staffs supervise the execution of command direction by monitoring unit execution. This supervision helps ensure that command intent is met and risks to mission success are identified. Staff supervision relieves the commander of unnecessary detail and helps ensure the staff maintains situational awareness of ongoing operations. Coordinate. Staff officers coordinate subordinate activities to ensure that all efforts contribute to an integrated and unified effort. This function includes the sharing of coordination information within the staff and the coordination of multi-functional staff activities such as targeting, IPB, deception operations and sensor management.
f.
g.
202.
STAFF STRUCTURES
1. General. Detailed staff structures differ at each level of command based on resource availability, C2 responsibilities and commanders preferences. This section presents a generic staff model that is applicable at BG level and above and has been accepted within NATO and the CF. Section 203 discusses specific modifications to the NATO model for a Canadian army deployed tactical HQ.
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The Staff
2. The staff model shown in Figure 2-1 is based on a Chief of Staff (COS) and three staff groups: Personal Staff, Coordinating Staff and Special Staff. At the BG level, the COS of the BG HQ is the Operations Officer (Ops O)5.
Figure 2-1: Generic Staff Model
3. Personal Staff Group. The Personal Staff Group includes those staff members who work under the direct control of the commander rather than the COS. Members may include executive assistants (EAs), personal assistants (PAs), aides-de camp (ADCs) and the formation or unit Sergeant Major. The commander may also include selected special staff in this group if direct control or access is required or desired. Examples might include the public affairs, political, medical or legal specialists. When fulfilling their duties as special staff, these additional members would normally work through the COS or under a designated Coordinating Staff officer. 4. Coordinating Staff Group. This group assists the commander with the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations and training. It coordinates the combat support, combat service support (CSS) and liaison required to accomplish the mission. Coordinating staff officers are appointed without regard to their military occupations, although some positions may be annotated as more suitable for
For the sake of brevity and where it is unspecified, in the remaining sections of this publication, COS and Ops O are interchangeable. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2-5
officers with particular training, arm or service experience. The NATO coordinating staff is organized in nine staff branches along functional areas of interest. These branches include Personnel and Administration (G1), Intelligence (G2), Operations (G3), Logistics (G4), Plans and Policy (G5), CIS (G6), Doctrine and Training (G7), Resources and Finance (G8) and Civil-Military Cooperation (G9). The principal staff officer in each branch is responsive to the COS and may be required to supervise one or more specialist staff functions. Specific staff branch responsibilities are discussed in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. 5. Specialist Staff Group. Specialist staff would normally be appointed to the HQ by national authorities on deployment. They are not normally part of the HQ establishment. The specialist staff provide the commander and coordinating staff with advice and assistance in specific professional or technical areas. These officers hold designated appointments by virtue of their expertise in subjects such as medicine, law, religion or public information. Although they may be grouped with specific branches of the coordinating staff for administration, they are directly accountable to the COS. Specialist staff are equally responsive to any member of the headquarters who requires their advice or assistance. Their staff responsibility is normally limited to their area of professional expertise. The commander may allow direct access by specialist staff depending on the mission and personal preference. 6. Advisors. Although these officers are not part of the staff, they or their representatives provide important advice and assistance to the HQ. The senior commander or commanding officer of each manoeuvre arm, support arm or combat service support organization has direct access to the commander by virtue of his appointment as a subordinate commander. He may also provide advice to the commander and the commanders staff on the capability and employment of his command through the COS (Brigade) or Ops O (BG). 7. Advisors have the dual task of commanding their troops and providing advice and assistance to the commander and staff. As a result, they are normally represented within the combined arms HQ through a dedicated liaison detachment or coordinating centre. These elements could include artillery, air
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The Staff
defence, air, aviation engineer, EW and medical staff elements among others. 8. Senior tactical advisors may assume particular staff appointments as directed by the supporting commander. These appointments are normally necessary only in the presence of multiple functional units and the absence of a dedicated staff officer. These appointments may include: a. b. c. Provost Marshalcommander of senior supporting Military Police unit; Force Surgeoncommander of senior supporting medical unit; and Force Engineercommander of senior supporting engineer unit.
9. Deputy Commander. The Deputy Commander is the principal assistant to the commander and provides him with another means of extending his influence throughout the area of operations. The commander assigns his Deputy specific fields of interest and responsibility in order to decentralize decision making while maintaining overall command. HQ SOPs should provide initial guidance on the specific fields of interest assigned to this individual by the commander. Staff members do not work for the Deputy Commander unless specifically directed by the commander. Deputy Commanders may request staff assistance through the COS/Ops O at any time. 10. Deputy Commanders assume command when the commander is temporarily absent, requires rest or becomes a casualty. 11. Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the commanders principal staff officer and has overall responsibility for ensuring that the commanders information needs are met. Specific responsibilities include: a. b. c. identifies and tracks the commanders decision and information requirements; establishes procedures to manage all HQ RFI activity; maintains contact with the commander and keeps him informed of critical information;
B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2-7
d.
develops and coordinates formal staff assessment briefings for the commander, as necessary; translates the commanders intent into staff action and oversees all HQ staff activity; develops and approves daily battle rhythm within the HQ; facilitates staff SA through personal interaction and structured Battle Update Briefs (BUBs), as necessary; synchronizes staff work internally and externally to the HQ including directing development of operation orders and plans; provides work priorities to critical HQ capabilities including the Geomatics, Meteorological and Electronic Warfare (EW) detachments; supervises HQ movement; oversees and approves structure and content of the HQ common operating picture (COP); oversees implementation of command safety, security and information operations policies; and oversees organic and assigned liaison officers, detachments and teams.
e. f. g.
h.
i.
j. k. l.
m.
12. It must be noted that the COS is not the Deputy Commander and must not become a barrier between the commander and his subordinate commanders. At BG level, the Ops O assumes the COS function. Detailed terms of reference are included in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. 13. Information Management Officer (IMO). The IMO is a new staff function that has arisen in support of fielded information technologies. Primary responsibilities include: a. b.
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principal staff assistant to the COS/Ops O; operational oversight of data administration functions within the HQ;
B-GL-331-001/FP-001
The Staff
c. d. e.
development and maintenance of the HQ Information Management Plan; HQ subject matter expert on all C2 processes and procedures; and detailed terms of reference are included in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations.
14. Supporting Information Workers. Within the deployed HQ, the staff will form a number of multi-functional teams employed in the work environments described in Chapter 3. Each of the work environments will include one or more information systems operators to track and manage relevant functional area information. Employing the HQ CIS, this group provides the initial human interface between the HQ digitized information holdings and the HQ staff organization. Detailed terms of reference are described in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. 203. CANADIAN STAFF MODELS
1. General. The staff organization within a garrison HQ must undergo significant change when deployed on operations. These changes are mission specific and are normally determined as part of national pre-deployment planning activities. That being said, it is essential that a minimum essential organizational framework be established for BG and Brigade HQ staffs. This standard framework must facilitate the addition and rapid integration of mission specific C2 modules (e.g. specialist staff teams, advisor teams, liaison teams, etc). This requirement implies the need for clear C2 relationships among the framework staff and the assigned staff teams as well as standardized staff procedures within the HQ. 2. Canadian Amendments. Figure 2-2 applies the NATO staff model to a deployed Canadian Brigade staff. In this model, the coordinating staff group includes seven functional areas: Personnel (G1), Intelligence (G2), Operations (G3), Sustainment (G4), Plans (G5), CIS (G6) and Civil-Military Cooperation (G9). The Brigade model absorbs the G7 (Doctrine/Training) functions within the G3 branch while the G8 (Resources and Finance) function (less pay) has been absorbed within the G4 branch. It is this coordinating staff and
B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2-9
their counterparts at BG level, who provide the framework staff organization.6 3. The composition of the Specialist Staff Group will be mission specific and is dependent upon mission and task organization. It can be assumed that as a minimum, the senior tactical HQ will normally include a legal officer, medical officer, chaplain and public affairs advisor. Liaison elements from other advisors would normally be provided only in the absence of functional staff representation at the HQ. For example, at formation level, the CSS advisor would not need to establish a liaison element due to the presence of the G4 staff.
It should be noted that current defence policy envisions the deployment of a Canadian Brigade Group HQ in a multinational context only. The implication is that while this HQ will have a core Canadian component, allied officers will fill many staff positions and liaison detachments. In addition, it may be desirable to revert to the standard NATO staff model to facilitate interoperability rather than maintain the Canadian modifications discussed here. B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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The Staff
Figure 2-2: Canadian Brigade HQ Staff Components
4. Figure 2-3 applies the NATO model to a BG staff. Additional Canadian modifications include assumption of G6 functions by the unit Signal Officer and assumption of G4 functions by the supporting CSS element. In non-manoeuvre unit HQ, the operations branch normally assumes responsibility for the intelligence branch functions as well. The Operations
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Officer assumes the functions of the COS within the headquarters. An independent IMO is appointed within the operations branch. As for the Brigade, peacetime establishments may restrict some staff branches or positions and the presence of specialist staff are dependent on mission and task organization.
Figure 2-3: Example Canadian BG HQ Staff Components
5. Force Generation Concept. At the national level, the generation of these HQ structures is based on a concept of modularity. The Army will employ identical BG HQ and identical
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Brigade HQ as framework organizations. Based on mission requirements, additional supporting building blocks will be generated by the CF before deployment and placed under the operational command of the framework HQ for training and subsequent operations. 204. STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
1. Although a commander sets the pace and is the principal decision-maker, the staff has a vital role in informing him, developing his decisions and making subsidiary ones. The relationship between a commander and his staff should be characterized by a climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative rather than one that is fawning and unquestioning. Independence of thought and timely action are vital. 2. The relationship between the staff and both subordinate and superior commanders and their staffs must be based upon mutual respect and developed through a conscientious, determined and helpful approach to problem solving. Anything less will undermine confidence in the exercise of command. Friendly personal relationships between members of a headquarters and the staff of superior and subordinate headquarters are essential. The creation of an effective and closely knit staff team, both within and between headquarters and units is essential. A staff cannot work efficiently without complete cooperation between all branches and services. There must be no secrets between branches, and no avoidance of responsibilities. 3. The COS/Ops O and other principal coordinating staff officers have a key role in fostering this atmosphere. However, the building of a staff team can be inhibited by frequent changes in personalities, infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational circumstances and differences in professional training and ethos. These inhibitors become increasingly apparent in a multinational HQ during coalition operations. The disruption caused by such real-world problems can be reduced by dedicated team-building efforts and the use of command and staff simulators to sharpen skills. 4. While it is important that a commander remain accessible to all members of his staff, his primary focus must remain with subordinate commanders. At all echelons, a lead
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staff officer must be appointed to coordinate and synchronize critical staff activity in the HQ. While subordinate commanders and personal staff are provided with full access as required, the lead staff officer in the HQ must provide a single voice to the commander for the majority of the staff. Individual access should be determined by the commanders need for specialist advice and assessments during operations. In garrison, these restrictions may be relaxed as decision-making cycles become extended. 5. Involving a large number of staff officers in information briefings can foster personal relationships that are essential to the maintenance of trust within the team. Involving staff in information briefings acknowledges their contribution as well as allowing them to hear the commanders deliberations. Decision briefings, however, may have to be restricted to a smaller group of those who contribute directly to the commanders decisionmaking. 205. ORGANIZATION OF STAFF WORK
1. The COS/Ops O organizes staff work based on the specific needs and preferences of the Commander. The exact nature of this organization will be fine-tuned for each commander, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the current staff. 2. Each member of the staff must maintain visibility of current staff activity and all branches must monitor the current situation to identify relevant information to their functional area and emerging threats to the mission. Frequent informal briefings and conferences are held to enhance shared situational awareness, examine problems and co-ordinate policy and procedures. The widespread use of shared databases, collaborative planning tools and standard information displays facilitate these activities. 3. The staff forms a single whole that is responsible collectively for the quality of advice and assistance provided to the commander, as well as to subordinate formations and units. The actions of individual staff officers, sections or branches reflect on the credibility of the staff as a whole. Staff officers visiting other headquarters or units must be prepared to listen to
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The Staff
problems affecting other branches of the staff and to ensure action is taken as required. 4. The following fundamentals of effective staff work shall be applied consistently: a. Maintain a Sense of Priorities. Routine must not delay urgent information or other priority staff matters. The staff must respond to each task with the urgency appropriate to the subject. If necessary, the chain of command may be bypassed when disseminating critical information. Establish Simple, Flexible Procedures. Staff procedures must account for fatigue, frequent changes in personnel and adverse working conditions. Use Standing Operating Procedures. Standing Operating Procedures detail how forces will execute unit-specific techniques and procedures that commanders standardize to enhance effectiveness and flexibility. Commanders use SOPs to standardize routine or recurring actions not needing their personal involvement. While SOPs cannot possibly prescribe procedures for all situations, they serve as a basis for initial problem solving and provide assurance that friendly forces will operate in a recognizable fashion. In general, SOPs apply until commanders change them to meet altered conditions or practices. Benefits include: (1) (2) (3) (4) d. simplified, brief orders; enhanced understanding and teamwork among commanders, staffs and troops; synchronized staff drills; and accelerated decision-support processes.
b.
c.
B-GL-332-001 Standing Operating Procedures for Land Operations provides a common core of
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SOPs to guide the conduct of tactical land force operations while BGL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations provide SOPs to guide the operation of combined arms HQ at BG and Brigade levels. e. Exploit Command, Control and Information Systems (C2IS). In the past, subordinate staffs were exposed to a constant demand for feedback from higher HQ. The widespread fielding of e-mail compounded this problem by providing a dangerously simple way of overloading the staffs at subordinate HQ. In an attempt to address this issue, tactical land forces employ integrated CIS and sensor networks to automatically collect and process much of the commanders routine information needs. Once digitized, information is automatically disseminated and stored in HQ databases across the command. The staff must learn to exploit these information holdings and avoid burdening subordinate staffs with demands for information that is already available or can be developed quickly through organic C2IS applications. Similarly, staff should consolidate requests on a single subject rather than sending a number of short requests. When time permits requests for information can also be consolidated to be discussed during routine visits or conferences instead of correspondence.
5. Maintain a System of Relief. There must be a system of relief for everyone from key staff officers to sentries. Senior staff appointments must have understudies. Duty rosters must be able to accommodate tactical HQ movement and the requirement to create liaison teams or detachments. 206. STAFF OFFICER QUALITIES
1. Many of the qualities required by commanders apply to staff officers. This applies especially for senior appointments to national, joint and multi-national positions where the staff officer
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may have considerable delegated powers of authority and responsibility. Because staff officers must also work with subordinates and support personnel they must demonstrate leadership on a daily basis. In addition to the core values of duty, honour, discipline and integrity, various personal qualities are essential for the staff: a. Character. A staff officer must be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and supportive of his commander yet, at the same time, he must retain an independence of thought and judgement. He must accept responsibility willingly and stand by his decisions. He advises, consults and cooperates with others, and should be prepared to represent others decisions and to sacrifice self or vested interests. Intellect. No staff officer will succeed unless he is professionally competent. This involves research into, and then mastery of, his area of responsibility. He needs to understand and be capable of using all the command support tools at his disposal. He must be knowledgeable and imaginative. He must be capable of: anticipating, acting and reacting in a flexible manner; thinking and working under pressure; and communicating accurately, both verbally and in writing/drawing, with emphasis on clear, succinct powers of expression. Above all, he must be able to relate his area of responsibility to the larger picture of higher intent and the needs of the entire formation or unit. Selflessness. The measurement of a staff officers success is the ease with which subordinate formations and units conduct operations. Direct rewards or gratitude are seldom given, nor should they be expected. Working conscientiously without recognition or reward demands self-confidence and maturity. Diligence. An important objective of the staff is to relieve the commander of routine and detailed work. This permits the commander more time to be creative and to develop fuller
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b.
c.
d.
understanding. Therefore, despite the requirement for staff officers to demonstrate originality and creativity, the reality of their positions is mostly solid hard work where a methodical, systematic approach and an eye for detail are necessary. If a staff officer is responsible for a team, he must delegate authority to his subordinates, co-ordinate their work, and present a solution based on team effort succinctly, accurately, and on time. 2. From the above, it is obvious that the staff must cultivate a climate of continual self-improvement. Not only must all staff ensure they are aware of the current situation, the information needs of the commander and the commanders intent, they must also develop a detailed understanding of the responsibilities and activities of their superiors as well as the other branches of the staff, thereby widening their professional horizons. Continual self-improvement not only prepares individuals for positions that are more senior or appointments in command or staff but also allows them, if the need arises, to take over from other members of the staff, adding an element of flexibility to a HQ. 3. Annex A contains an extract of General Crerars st instructions to staff officers issued to Headquarters 1 Canadian Army in 1944. The instructions remain as relevant today as they were in 1944.
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1ANNEX A GENERAL CRERARS INSTRUCTIONS TO STAFF OFFICERSHEADQUARTERS 1ST CANADIAN ARMY

NOTE SD unchanged from 1944. 2A01. INTRODUCTION 1. Although primarily intended for the guidance of officers on the staff, there is much in these instructions, which applies to officers on the Headquarters of Services. 2A02. GENERAL 1. It is most important that each and every officer on the staff of Headquarters 1 Canadian Army should play his full part as a keen intelligent and comprehending member of a wellbalanced team. The whole purpose of a staff is to translate the doctrine and intentions of the commander into speedy, complete and properly related actions on the part of the formations and units under command. It cannot fulfil that purpose unless every member is seized with the same principles and works to the same rules. This memorandum is issued as a preface to these Standing Orders in order that the necessary principles and procedure should be clearly understood and intelligently maintained. 2. I am first going to touch upon a few of the essential general characteristics of a good staff officer. Considerable army experience permits me to speak on this subject with some acquired knowledge. 3. A good staff officer is, very definitely, an adviser to his commander as well as an agent for the transmission of that commanders views and decisions to subordinate commanders and, through them, to the troops. To my mind, there is no more dangerous situation than that when a commander is furnished with a staff composed largely of yes men. There are many occasions when staff officers are in possession of information, which has not reached their commander. If they are around and about amongst the units of the command, to the extent
B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2A-1
which they should be, this situation must often occur. In consequence, it is the duty of a staff officer to be frank with this commander in the rendering of advice, even if from time to time this entails arguing against expressed intentions, or known wishes, of that senior officer. But, when advice has been given, then the duty of the staff officer is clear; whether the decision is in agreement with personal views of not, the implementation of the commanders decision must then be carried out with complete loyalty and maximum effectiveness. 4. I have stated that I consider a subservient staff as dangerous. I also regard a disloyal staff officer as a thoroughly pernicious individual to have in such an appointment. I know of few more disintegrating influences to the confidence which all ranks should have in their command than a staff officer who criticises and condemns his commander to others, while going through the motions of supporting him to this face. 5. Discretion is perhaps, an aspect of loyalty. It has a wider significance, however, because the lack of it may cause great dangers to the troops. Interchange of information and of views between the various officers of a staff on important and secret plans is usually essential. This can be done without actual or implied disloyalty to the commander. But, discussions must be kept within proper boundsboth as to what is said and to whom it is said. A leaky staff is an abomination which no commander should put up with for one needless moment. 6. Remember also, that while the staff officer may issue orders in the name of his commander, he is the servant of the troops, and in no sense their master. In his capacity as a staff officer, it is essential that he should gain the confidence of subordinate commanders and subordinate staffs. 7. In practice, that means that no reasonable thing can ever be too much trouble for him to do, and that he can never spare himself if by so doing he makes the task of any regimental officer, or man, one bit more difficult than it has to be. 8. A staff officer must try so to organize his work that he can spend some hours of almost every day visiting formation headquarters and units under command. It is often difficult to arrange, but it usually can be done, and generally, must be done.
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Annex A
2A03. DUTIES COMMON TO ALL STAFF OFFICERS 1. I shall turn now from the general, to the particular. The technique of staff work is generally acquired by attendance at one or more of the several staff courses. It is developed mainly by experience as a staff officer on a functioning headquarters. There can be little real knowledge of staff requirements until theory has been proved and driven home by testing experience. 2. Technical perfection is, however, but a mechanical means to a desired endthat end being that the duties of each staff officer are carried out in the most effective manner. And, dominating the technical activities of each staff officer there are general duties, common to all. I shall summarise these general requirements as follows: a. b. to know the intentions and policies of the commander; to keep the commander informed, normally through the head of his branch, of all that is going on of importance, or interest; to get to know all those with whom he should deal; to look ahead and to forestall defects, rather than be required to cure them; and to save paper and to expedite all business.
c. d. e.
2A04. VISITS TO FORMATIONS AND UNITS 1. As I have said, to get out and about, visiting headquarters and units, is an essential duty of a staff officer. In order, however, to be successful in carrying out that duty, the results of such visits must show benefit to the headquarters and personnel receiving them. The first requirement, therefore, is to ensure that those headquarters and formations which are visited by staff officers of Headquarters 1st Canadian Army, realize that such officers come to learn their problems and to help in their solution, if possiblethat they come as friends, and not as critics or spies. In connection with such visits the following points will be borne in mind:
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a.
If special arrangements are required for the visits you have in mind, inform prospective recipients beforehand that you are coming. If a particular activity is on, or operation is being practised, learn all you can about it, including if necessary your commanders views, before you arrive. On arrival, offer help if such would be acceptable and useful. Observe everything but comment rarely, unless your comments are requested or are definitely indicated. In this latter category are useful ideas or activities that you may have noticed when visiting other formations or units. When you return to Army Headquarters, be sure to let formations or units know about questions raised during your visit, and report to the head of your branch what you have learned and what you have done.
b.
c.
d.
2A05. METHODS 1. In the prosecution of your duties as a staff officer, the following methods will be adopted: a. Time spent in thinking out a problem is usually very much worthwhile. Time consumed in the mechanical process of transmitting thought, or initiating action, on a subject from one headquarters or staff officer to another, is time lost. Speed up transmission to the utmost. Intelligent consideration of the problem will reveal many ways in which this can be done. It is not sufficient to transmit an instruction, even though in theory such should be the case. In practice, complete and timely compliance with a stated requirement cannot always be counted upon. Each staff officer at Headquarters 1 Canadian Army must, therefore, maintain a system of checking progress on all matters requiring completion of
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action and concerning which that individual is responsible. c. Place on record decisions reached at meetings or in telephone conversations, also enter in desk and/or personal diary, matters requiring future attention. Communications concerning questions of policy require great care in preparation and should be signed only by the head of the branch or by the Chief of Staff or DA&QMG7. The same remarks apply to letters containing criticism of headquarters of subordinate formations. If requests must be refused reasons should always be given, unless security requirements make this impossible. Staff officers may, inadvertently, commit sins of commission. These are as nothing compared to sins of inaction and omission.
d.
e.
2A06. CONCLUSION 1. Reading through these instructions is not enough. Each officer on the staff of Headquarters, 1 Canadian Army must think them through, fully absorb them, and then apply them in the daily conduct of his duties. Only in this way will this headquarters produce the results, which, all those who together form 1 Canadian Army have full right to expect.
HDG Crerar, General GOC-in-C 1 Canadian Army
Senior Administrative Staff Officer B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2A-5
2CHAPTER 3 HEADQUARTERS
301.
GENERAL
1. The term headquarters is used as a generic term for the organizational grouping of the staff, communications and information systems (CIS) and life support infrastructure that supports the commander. A generic structure is shown in Figure 3-1. It includes a supporting CIS unit, dedicated security forces and a framework staff that organizes itself among five major work environments: Intelligence, Operations, Plans, Command Information and Administration. This chapter describes major functions and organization of these components.
Figure 3-1: Generic HQ Structure
302.
1.
FUNCTIONS A HQ organizes itself to execute four major functions: a. Coordinate Current Operations. This function relieves the commander of routine coordination requirements allowing him to focus on assessment of current operations and development of future operations. Notwithstanding this function, the commander is prepared to exercise positive control of current
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combat operations in the face of unexpected threats or opportunities. Coordinating current operations includes: the dissemination of orders, the synchronization of combat support and combat service support (CSS), and real time battle space management including coordinating the use of allocated airspace, real estate and the electromagnetic spectrum. b. Plan Future Operations. This function develops commanders planning guidance into operations plans, contingency plans and combat orders. The planning group maintains visibility of current operations and ensures that completed plans and orders are fully understood throughout the HQ. This function includes battlefield visualization support such as the conduct of war games and simulations. Develop Intelligence. This function includes management of information collection requirements, development of routine intelligence products in support of the common operating picture (COP) and resolution of commanders priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Standard products typically include enemy current situation displays, intelligence projections and threat risk assessments. This function focuses on higher level information processing related to how, why and if type questions. Support Decision-Making. HQ must be organized to provide relevant information, estimates and assessments to decision-makers throughout the battle space on demand. This function requires close cooperation with higher, flanking, subordinate, supporting and supported HQ to ensure that CIS networks are capable of exchanging the relevant information needed to develop and maintain a COP. This function includes the management of organic and assigned liaison elements.
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d.
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2. A prerequisite to the successful execution of these functions is the collection of information. This overarching function develops and coordinates command level information collection activities. These activities may include the conduct of force level reconnaissance and surveillance, the development and management of human collection networks, the formal control of request for information (RFI) activities and information search/extraction from open source or specialist networks. Collected information is exploited by the entire staff to support the commanders need for situational understanding.
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KABUL MULTINATIONAL BRIGADE IV/V In the absence of one country providing personnel for an entire formation, establishing a multinational headquarters (HQ) is the most likely option for future deployments. In such situations the composition of a force HQ or of a tactical HQ, like the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB), depends on the goodwill of the contributing nations. Unfortunately an HQ composed of numerous nations presents a variety of difficulties that must be addressed. During KMNB IV/V, Canada acted as the lead country, accounting for 64% of the HQ staff. Holding the majority of key positions within the HQ, Canada was forced to tackle issues emerging from a HQ made up of 167 people from 16 different countries. This occurred without joint pre-deployment training between the Canadians and their colleagues from contributing countries. Acting as the lead, the Canadian contingent of the KMNB HQ was forced to coordinate the use of a variety of resources. This presented a challenge as the staff had little or no expertise with many of these assets. For example, these included the AH64 Apache helicopter detachment from the Netherlands, the CH53 Sea Stallion helicopter detachment from Germany and the UH-60 Blackhawks contributed by Turkey. Although coordination between these assets was essential, it had to remain generic for reasons of respective national operational security, forcing Canadian staff to balance competing needs. Intelligence presents an additional challenge in a multinational HQ. The G2 section of KMNB HQ was comprised of 27 members from various nations, some of which were not NATO members. Consequently, various personnel in the intelligence section were unable to receive some intelligence due to their home nations non-NATO status. Consequently, intelligence operators possessed varying depths of knowledge, depending on their nationality, impacting the groups unity and common operating picture.
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Aside from the free exchange of intelligence, security classifications proved to be an obstacle difficult to overcome within the HQ planning process, as usable intelligence was often Canadian, British or American in origin. Unfortunately with a German G2 and Danish (Chief Liaison Officer (Ch LO) both key members in planning sensitive operationsit was often difficult or impossible to include them in all aspects of planning due to security restrictions. Additional restrictions prevented Germanys intelligence staff from sharing obtained information with the main staff. Unity of effort was facilitated through the adopting of NATO procedures with the HQ. Unfortunately knowledge of standardized agreements (STANAGs) amongst the staff officers varied, and in many cases, was inadequate. While knowledge of NATO standard operating procedures (SOPs) pertaining to brigade operations is clearly essential in such an operation, this knowledge was also deficient amongst members. To combat this problem the HQ undertook a review of the existing KMNB SOPs, drafting a detailed document covering all aspects related to the KMNB. All official documents produced were completed in English, which became a source of frustration in the KMNB HQ. While English is inevitably the working language of a multinational operation, staff members from some contributing nations lacked sufficient oral and written skills in English to effectively operate within the HQ. These various language abilities, along with cultural and methodological differences between staff members, increase the possibility of friction within the HQ. Despite these challenges, a multinational HQ can ensure effective collaborations operations. For maximum efficiency to be obtained, an acceptance of cultural differences between contributing nations must occur, while adhering to a joint operations doctrine. Additionally, the implementation of commonly understood and accepted standardized procedures will ease multinational efforts in the future.
Source: Major Dany Fortin. The Challenges of a Multinational Headquarters: The Kabul Multinational Brigade, The Bulletin. The Army Lessons Learned Centre. Vol. 11. No. 3.
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303.
CHARACTERISTICS
1. While the HQ must reflect the level and nature of the command and the type of campaign or operation to be conducted, a number of common characteristics for a field HQ exist: a. Deployability. A field HQ must be structured and trained for rapid deployment to and within a theatre of operations. Supporting infrastructure must be easily and safely transportable by both strategic and tactical lift. SOPs should establish essential support requirements for each element of the headquarters as it deploys, including requirements for CIS, power generation and material support. Continuity of Command. The HQ must enable the commander to maintain continuous control of subordinate elements during both static and mobile operations. Maintenance of control requires adequate numbers of trained staff and support personnel, redundancy in HQ infrastructure, and flexible CIS networks capable of linking widely dispersed commanders. Survivability. HQ and their integral command support resources are high value targets. SOPs must establish both physical and information protection measures. The HQ infrastructure must be survivable under indirect fire and small arms attack. CIS must be redundant and procedures must be in place to rapidly restore data and software configurations during operations. Performance of CIS under stress should degrade gradually and not catastrophically. The division of a headquarters into smaller mobile echelons contributes to survivability on the battlefield. This echeloning must be balanced against operational effectiveness.
b.
c.
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d.
Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. HQ will include elements from multiple arms and services. In many cases, military commanders and staffs will be required to coordinate military efforts with those of Other Government Departments (OGDs). Command and staff effort must be fully coordinated or fused in these cases. The internal layout, manning, staff procedures and CIS infrastructure should facilitate the addition and deletion of specific C2 capabilities. Layouts must consider patterns of information flow within the HQ. For example, the information exchange that occurs within the HQ as sensors acquire targets, engagement assets are cued, fires are cleared and subsequent battle damage assessment is conducted will influence the HQ physical layout in combat operations. Interoperability. HQ must be capable of supporting the commander within joint, combined and interagency operational environments. Interoperability includes the capability to exchange relevant information with higher, flanking and subordinate allied and joint elements as well as with civilian organizations. Interoperability must consider the four primary means of communication: personal contact, contact between representatives of commanders, document transfer and data 8. exchange Size. HQ size must maintain a careful balance between minimum size and maximum effectiveness. The Main HQ in particular, must be restricted to elements considered essential by the commander. While greater size may provide greater flexibility and redundancy, the costs of resource investment, sustainment, decreased security, reduced deployability and
e.
f.
As described in Chapter 1. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-7
mobility may outweigh the benefits. Consideration should be given to consolidating staff functions whenever feasible. g. Modularity. A modular HQ provides flexibility for deployment and conduct of operations. Specific capabilities can be deployed to support the full spectrum of operations. By structuring specific modules as stand-alone entities, the commander has the ability to tailor his C2 capabilities just as he tailors his task organization. Modern day CIS provide the ability to disperse and combine HQ modules as necessary thereby improving survivability. Capacity. The HQ must be provided with sufficient capacity to manage the quantity of information necessary for effective operations in a timeframe that supports the desired tempo. HQ C2 capabilities may need to be augmented by additional CIS, specialist liaison detachments or coordination cells as combat capabilities are added. Range. The HQ communications system must provide sufficient range to provide voice and data to all subordinate HQs to include those subordinate and supporting elements operating outside of the force area of operations (AO). In addition, communications may need to be established with other HQs with whom boundaries are sharedsuch as flanking HQ or in-location forces belonging to higher HQ. Deployed communications networks must also be able to establish links with both national civil and military elements and relevant international or coalition organizations.
h.
i.
304.
ECHELONS
1. Headquarters is typically echeloned according to mission requirements. Headquarters typical echelons might include a Tactical, Main, Forward and/or Alternate HQ. When the commander is co-located with a particular HQ echelon, that
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echelon is designated as the Command Post (CP). Canadian formations and unit HQ normally limit echelon organization to a Main HQ and a Tactical HQ9. A subordinate HQ will normally be prepared to act as an alternate HQ on order.
305.
TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS
1. A commander requires a small, highly mobile, tactical HQ that may be rapidly deployed in the immediate AO. The tactical HQ normally consists of the commander (with supporting staff), a protective party and essential command, control and information systems (C2IS) support. The tactical HQ of other designated subordinate commanding officers (engineer, artillery and surveillance) may also accompany the commander. From this austere facility, the commander exercises a more direct influence over critical parts of the battle for a limited time. When not deployed, the Tactical HQ personnel assist with operations in the Main HQ. Specific responsibilities when deployed include: a. b. c. d. e. control current operations; provide the commander with relevant information and intelligence; relay commanders decisions and directions; backup control station for command nets; and serve as the Main CP as directed when the Main HQ is unable to function.
2. The composition of the command element is shown in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The figures are not accurate representations of the tactical HQ but elements of the tactical HQ are portrayed within.
A Step Up HQ is considered a temporary C2 grouping that facilitates continuous support to the commander during movement of the primary HQ echelon. For the purpose of this discussion, the step-up is considered part of the Main HQ. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-9
Figure 3-2: BG Command
Figure 3-3: Brigade Command Element Element
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INFORMATION SHARING IN A JOINT HEADQUARTERS Information sharing between partners in a joint or coalition environment is essential to creating a common operating picture and obtaining success in battle. This environment demands that the US forces share critical, and often classified, combat information with coalition military organizations. With command support becoming increasingly digitized the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is utilized as the primary communication tool for conducting daily business and information management. Since coalition partners are prohibited from using the US-only SIPRNET, a solution had to be devised to overcome the difficulty of maintaining security while sharing information in a timely manner. While the passage of hardcopy documents and message traffic is possible, it lacks the immediacy of online reports, essential on an ever-changing battlefield. Accordingly the US developed a classified local area network system (CLAN) that coalition partners could access without compromising US-only secret information. Tested in Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL 00, CLAN operated while running parallel to the SIPRNET. This dual network set up satisfied US security requirements while allowing a much faster method of sharing information between coalition partners. Despite being more efficient than sharing hardcopy, CLAN was not without flaw since US sources of information were unable to be shown on the CLAN. Aside from this issue, US forces continuously over relied upon the SIPRNET as it updated in real-time as opposed to the CLAN, which simply portrayed a snapshot in time. New information to the CLAN had to be downloaded and then updated, creating delays in both data collection and management. This was not the only impediment in joint information sharing, as intelligence was not posted until being sanitized to an appropriate release level. This level was commensurate with the country having the least authorized access, resulting in countries with higher levels of authorization being unable to view information they should have access to.
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These problems lead to the creation of a combined enterprise regional information exchange system (CENTRIXS), with the goal of creating a single, global, coalition network that enables secure exchange with multiple, separate communities of interest (COI) from a single workstation. The deployment of a broad multinational coalition in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM led to the accelerated implementation of the CENTRIXS environment. In the war on terrorism, there are three global and three regional operational networks for coalition COI sharing. These networks are completely separate and cannot be interconnected despite being built to the same architectural standard. This separation of networks is required to prevent inadvertent releases of data to nations who are not part of specific information sharing arrangements. Until sufficient, accredited guarding technology exists, nations must maintain separate networks, tunneling through existing communications paths, to ensure information integrity and confidentiality. The vision, once acceptable guarding technology is in place, is to connect these separate networks to form a global CENTRIXS network. When achieved, CENTRIXS will provide a seamless, interoperable, multiclassification level information exchange between the warfighting commands and key multinational players, allowing for timely information sharing and the creation of a common operating picture between allies.
Source: Major Aaron Jarvis. Information Sharing in a Coalition/Joint Headquarters, US Center for Army Lessons Learned.
306.
MAIN HEADQUARTERS
1. The Main HQ is sited close to subordinate HQ. The bulk of the staff and supporting signal element are located here. Main HQ is responsible for the planning, supervision and coordination of the tactical aspects of operations. At the tactical level, the Main HQ is responsible for the planning, supervision and co-ordination of both tactical and combat service support (CSS) activities. Specific responsibilities include: a. development of intelligence for the commander;
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b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j.
management of all relevant information for the commander; monitoring and support of the commanders decision-making; provision of secure facilities for the planning of future operations; monitoring of the execution of all operations; acting as control station for command nets; management of all terrain within the AO; management of all airspace within the AO to the assigned coordination level; production and dissemination of the commanders plans and orders; planning and control of all command level surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance operations; control of current operations if the Tactical or Forward HQ is not deployed; and assumption of functions of the Tactical HQ if it is destroyed.
k. l.
2. The Main HQ staff is a single network organized among four interdependent work environments. These work environments include: Command Information, Operations, Intelligence and Plans. The Main HQ echelon also includes the bulk of the CIS and security organizations. 3. Within a Brigade HQ, the Chief of Staff (COS) oversees the operation of all work environments. Within a BG HQ, this responsibility falls to the Operations Officer (Ops O). Each work environment includes information systems operators who provide a dedicated Information Management (IM) capability to the group. Figure 3-4 provides a conceptual model of the Main HQ.
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Figure 3-4: Main HQ Model-Brigade
4. Command Information Centre. The Command Information Centre (CIC) provides the commander with a single point of access to all information holdings and staff expertise within the HQ. The COS/Ops O leads the CIC. 5. When the commander is in location, the CIC coordinates provision of specialist analysis and briefings as required. The CIC develops command intent and guidance into concrete staff action and monitors and adjusts staff effort as required. The CIC also identifies critical information shortfalls and initiates staff activity to resolve them. It is responsible for development and implementation of the HQ IM plan and oversees the creation and maintenance of the formation COP. When the Tactical HQ is not deployed, the commander controls operations from this location. 6. The CIC is permanently manned by the COS/Ops O, a HQ Information Management Officer (IMO) and an Operations
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Clerk appointed as the HQ Document Manager. The CIC is the normal duty station for the intelligence and operations10 staff team leaders (or their representatives) when the force is in contact. The co-location of the principal staff, together with a common visual and audio display of the battle space, facilitates shared situational awareness (SA) and supports rapid decisionmaking during operations. 7. The CIC also assumes responsibility for coordinating HQ liaison activities, HQ security functions, translator services and essential CIS support to the HQ. Finally, the CIC provides operational oversight of the supporting CIS network including establishing priorities for use of limited bandwidth. 8. 3-6. The composition of the CIC is shown in Figures 3-5 and
Figure 3-5: BG Command Information Centre Staff
At the BG HQ, the Ops O fulfills both the COS and Operations Centre Team leader functions B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-15
10
Figure 3-6: Brigade Command Information Centre Staff
9. Operations Centre. The operations centre is responsible for monitoring, assessing and coordinating combat, combat support and CSS operations. Staff members track and process relevant battlefield information and assist subordinate commanders to synchronize their activities in time and space. It is responsible for managing much of the information needed to build and maintain the HQ COP as directed by the COS/Ops O. 10. The Ops Centre is led by the G3/Ops O. The staff coordinates a number of critical functions. These functions include battle space management, fire support, info ops, information collection, combat support and CSS. The core operations staff provide a framework for the addition of other C2 modules provided by supporting specialist staff (medical,
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psychological operations [PSYOPS], etc) and advisor teams (engineer, air defence, etc). 11. The G3/Ops O personally coordinates those specialist and advisory staff elements that fall outside of the fire support/info ops functional/ISTAR/CSS areas of interest. Assigned information systems operators provide IM support to the operations staff as a whole. 12. The Ops Centre performs specific coordination functions: a. Battle Space Management: (1) Terrain management monitors, authorizes and de-conflicts the use of all terrain within the AO. This includes monitoring ground manoeuvre to ensure critical fire support, sensor coverage and CIS connectivity is maintained. The G3/Ops O oversees this activity through the Operations Duty Officer (Ops DO). Airspace management function monitors and coordinates implementation of the force airspace management plan and coordinates the use of airspace for assigned unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aviation assets. Responsibilities are normally met through the allocation of an airspace coordination centre (ASCC) that is overseen by the G3/Ops O. The ASCC coordinates the use of all airspace within the AO, up to the assigned coordination level and maintains a tactical data link to exchange air surveillance and weapons control information with supporting air elements, while providing the HQ with a gateway to the Recognised Air Picture (RAP). Electromagnetic spectrum management monitors and coordinates
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(2)
(3)
implementation of the force CIS and electronic warfare (EW) support plans. Minute to minute management of the assigned electromagnetic spectrum is the responsibility of the supporting signal element. EW staff may be tasked to support the operations team through both electronic attack or deception capabilities. It should be noted that given the broad range of modern EW capability, assigned detachments could provide essential support to all teams in the HQ. As a result, EW detachments will be directly responsive to the COS/Ops O who will provide the Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre (EWCC) with operational priorities depending on the 11 current need. b. Targeting. This function includes management and oversight of the current targeting plan through a HQ Targeting Board, coordinating execution of time sensitive targets, coordinating post attack assessments through the ISTAR team, and maintaining currency and accuracy of HQ target list information. The Targeting function of a HQ involves the synchronization and coordination of both lethal and non-lethal effects, using assigned elements and organizations. (1) Lethal Targeting. This function plans, monitors and coordinates the employment of force level fire support. This includes the coordination of artillery, air defence, close air support, and attack helicopter. This function is
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supported through an assigned Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC). (2) Non-Lethal Targeting. This function plans, monitors and coordinates implementation of the force information operations support plans. A Non-Lethal Targeting Officer assumes responsibility for the coordination of assigned CIMIC, PSYOPS and public affairs capabilities within the context of the targeting plan, as well as force level direction finding and electronic attack effects. At Brigade level, this function is also supported by dedicated G9 (CIMIC) staff. Assigned Tactical CIMIC Detachments (TCD) or CIMIC Company, and Tactical PSYOPS Teams (TPT) or Tactical PSYOPS Detachment (TCD) will normally collocate with the supported HQ. The TCD or CIMIC Coy provides a dedicated liaison capability between the military force and the civilian populations and organizations in the 12 AO. The TPT or TPD provides the force with a capability to communicate to approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. TPT leaders may participate in HQ planning activities in support of the Info Ops Coordinator. Team leaders will have direct access to the commander but will typically be responsive to the Info Ops Coordinator on a day-to-day basis.
12
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c.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Coordination. This coordination function is the responsibility of a dedicated ISTAR staff. The ISTAR staff provide minute-to-minute sensor coordination through the co-located sensor liaison teams or relevant HQ staff. The ISTAR coordination cell is responsive to the Intelligence Centre, Ops Centre and the CIC. Force Protection Coordination. This function provides coordination and control of force protection elements and measures including engineer support, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRND) support and military police (MP) support: (1) Engineer Support. This function develops, monitors and coordinates implementation of the force mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and general engineer support plans. Included within these support plans are details on the management of explosive ordnance threats, hazards and incidents and the management of engineer intelligence (including terrain analysis, environmental conditions and hostile engineer capability). This staff element will normally be provided to the HQ from the supporting engineer formation, unit or sub-unit. The engineer staff represent the engineer commander and, as such, are authorized to provide advice and support on his behalf. The engineer staff element has the capability to
d.
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respond and provide advice to respective HQ work environments.13 (2) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Operations. This function includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) warning and reporting as well as functional area IM and analysis. The CBRND staff function is responsible to the G3/Ops O for disseminating all CBRN related messaging, coordinating and synchronizing the employment of all force decontamination assets, tracking consumable CBRN supplies and liaising with civilian emergency management services to provide warnings and advice relating to CBRN and Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) threats. The CBRND staff capability is generated through specialist training to selected Ops DO staff. Based on national threat assessments, this capability may be augmented by the allocation of a CBRND coordination centre. Military Police. The MP staff oversees police and traffic control functions within the force.
14
(3)
e.
Combat Service Support Coordination. This function monitors and coordinates implementation of the force logistics and
Detailed responsibilities of this staff are discussed in B-GL-361001/FP-001 Land Force Engineer OperationsVolume 1 and B-GL331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations. At Brigade HQ the CSS coordination function is the responsibility of the G4 staff. At BG HQ this function is normally assigned to the firstline CSS sub-unit or a collocated CSS liaison team from the supporting CSS element. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-21
14
13
administrative support plans. It also includes facilitating shared SA between the supporting CSS HQ and the supported HQ. It manages relevant information related to operation of the force replenishment system, land equipment management system, personnel support service system and health services support system. 13. Intelligence Centre. The Intelligence Centre is led by the brigade G2 or the BG Intelligence Officer (IO) and is comprised of a framework intelligence staff and generated intelligence capabilities. These assigned capabilities may include Intelligence Support Teams (IST) providing all source analysis, requirements management and IM capabilities, CRIMINT Teams, IMINT Teams, HUMINT Teams and selected strategic capabilities such as a Deployed Signals Intelligence 15 Support Team (DSST)that provides SIGINT.
As a general guideline, intelligence analysis and management capabilities will be coordinated by the intelligence staff while data/information collection capabilities will be coordinated by the ISTAR staff. In the near term, the intelligence staff may be required to coordinate some strategic collection assets if assigned, e.g. HUMINT Teams or DSST. 3-22 B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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One of the primary tasks the CIC engages in is the debriefing process when troops return from patrol. While this is standard practice, the CIC are members of the returning company themselves and have a personal acquaintance with the returning soldiers, thus knowing who to press for information. Gathered patrol reports are then collated with reports from higher intelligence sections and input into a computer database, which allows the CIC to keep the map of the companys area of operations (AO) constantly updated. This allows the CIC to track small changes that, while appearing insignificant to higher-level intelligence troops concerned with the big picture, may indicate that the enemy is up to something. This information is in turn used to brief the company commander and the troops before they depart on patrol in their given area. While tracking small changes in the AO may alert troops towards the enemys orientation, it also provides additional benefits. The CIC is able to track changes, or lack thereof, in troop movement while on patrol, thereby preventing patrols from falling into patterns the enemy can exploit. The CIC also acts as a liaison mechanism with battalion and upper level intelligence sections, sharing their respective products, furthering the argument that they be located elsewhere so to avoid groupthink. Is this emerging formation the way of the future for intelligence analysis at the tactical level? It appears to be for the US infantry whose company commanders are discussing changing the infantrys orientation to include a CIC in each company. While offering clear benefits the CIC requires qualified personnel, with a strong aptitude for intelligence collection and analysis, without detracting these skills from the brigade or battalion intelligence centres. It also requires using soldiers from within the company organization, thereby reducing the number of troops to tasks.
Source: Infantry Company Intelligence Centers http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/articles/20060629.aspx
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14. The Intelligence Centre is responsible for intelligence planning, collection management, analysis and IM. It produces all source intelligence that facilitates the commanders situational understanding. This intelligence includes correlated enemy current situation displays, INTREPs, INTSUMs, projected situation displays and High Value Target lists. The staff works closely with the ISTAR coordinator to ensure current collection plans are synchronized with the information requirements (IR).16 15. In addition to the information generated through active ISTAR efforts, additional information is pushed from other staff including engineers (terrain and threat mobility/counter-mobility tactics), info ops (CIMIC, PSYOPS and open source media reports), medical, command net, etc. 16. In some multinational operations, releasability constraints may require the Canadian National Commander to exercise command and control of some strategic intelligence collection assets. In those situations the tactical commander will be provided with resulting intelligence products directly through the national chain of command. The national intelligence staff will also sanitize the resulting intelligence for subsequent release to the coalition intelligence staff. 17. ISTAR Coordination Cell. The ISTAR Coordination cell operates in direct support of the intelligence centre. This cell plans and oversees the implementation of those force level reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition tasks needed to resolve command information requirements. The ISTAR Coordination cell is based on an operations staff framework. The staff is responsible for coordinating the sensor liaison elements co-located with the Main HQ. This coordination cell provides a hub for the C2 elements of dedicated force level collectors and facilitates cross cuing of sensors within and external to the HQ.
16 B-GL-352-001 ISTAR describes the Intelligence and ISTAR cell capabilities and operation in detail. The current edition of this manual addresses both the Intelligence Centre and ISTAR functions under the general heading of the ISTAR CC. This doctrine continues to rapidly evolve with capabilities and experience.
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18. Information collection requirements are passed to the ISTAR coordination cell through the intelligence staff Collection Coordination Information Requirements Management (CCIRM). The ISTAR staff selects the appropriate means and coordinates subsequent tasking and tracking of the selected sensor(s). The staff is also responsible for initial collation and dissemination of relevant information to both the intelligence and targeting staffs, coordinating sensor handoff to/from other HQ, and monitoring and managing all sensor related information (disposition, status, capabilities, etc) within the AO. 19. The availability of specialist liaison detachments is dependent on the force level ISTAR assets available and the current task organization of these assets. The core staff team provides the team leader and assumes the lead for ISTAR planning activities within the HQ. The liaison detachments provide detailed coordination and tasking of individual sensors as directed. Potential liaison detachments could include representatives from subordinate surveillance, reconnaissance, EW, UAV, counter battery/mortar, aviation, combat camera or strategic collection assets. Analysts17 may be included within these teams to provide single source analysis (pre-processing) capabilities. 20. The ISTAR team also includes collators to provide collation and IM capabilities to the team as a whole. 21. The staff composition of an ISTAR Coordination cell is shown in Figures 3-7 and 3-8.
17 As CIS capabilities improve, it may be possible in the future to physically disperse these elements while collaboration is effected over a dedicated network controlled through the commanders tactical CP.
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Figure 3-7: BG and BDE ISTAR Coordination Cell
22. The coordination relationships among the various ISTAR staff components are shown in Figure 3-8.
Figure 3-8: ISTAR Staff Relationships
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23. Plans Centre. The Plans Centre assists the commander in the development of operational plans and orders. This includes deliberate planning prior to the start of hostilities, tactical planning during on-going operations, the conduct of war games and simulations and the continuous assessment of future enemy, friendly and environmental dispositions, capabilities and activities. 24. The planning team is formed around a core staff element that is augmented by specialist support planners as required. The core staff is led by a designated G5 staff officer and includes representatives from each of the staff branches and selected representatives from the specialist staff / advisors. Support elements may include a geomatics support team and a meteorological detachment. A dedicated information systems operator provides IM functions. During deliberate planning, the COS/Ops O will normally assume the staff planning lead and will coordinate the involvement of other specialist staff support as required. When the force is out of contact, the commander, supporting advisors and principal staff will assume a more direct role in the planning process. 25. Typically the planning team is required to form ad-hoc groups to deal with specific issues. These subordinate groups would normally include a targeting team and an intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) team. Team membership will 18 be directed in HQ SOPs and coordinated through the COS/Ops O. a. Targeting Board. The Targeting Board is responsible for development of the HQ targeting program. The team composition will be directed in SOPs but will normally include the G3/Ops O, Targeting Officer and staff, FSCC representative, intelligence planner, PSYOPS Team Leader or Det Comd, CIMIC Det or Coy Comd or G9, CIS Planner, IMO, EWLO, Engineer Ops, legal advisor and a public affairs representative. Additional representatives could include subordinate unit LOs and special operations representatives.
18
See B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-27
Other staff may be incorporated as required. The Targeting Officer is responsible for overseeing implementation and coordination of the targeting plan, including all lethal and nonlethal targeting and effects. The non-lethal realm includes all offensive and defensive info ops within the AO. Specific responsibilities for non-lethal targeting include integration of operational security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI), military deception, PSYOPS, counter-PSYOPS, Computer Network Attack (CNA) and special information operations (SIO) support into operational planning. b. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Board. The IPB effort is led by the intelligence planner who is responsible for continuous development of intelligence assessments and projecting future threat dispositions and activities within the AO. Board members normally include all combat support planning representatives. Engineer, artillery, aviation and EW team members will provide specialist expertise on counterpart threat capabilities through the team coordinator.
26. While the planning team is normally co-located with the Main HQ to facilitate communication and security, modern CIS may allow this function to be moved to an alternate location if necessary. The secondary function of the Plans Centre is to provide a step-up capability to facilitate subsequent movement of the Main HQ. 27. System Support Detachment. This detachment links the staff to the higher-level systems and life support capability of the supporting signals organization. The detachment is normally co-located with the Main HQ and includes a CIS Help Desk manned by a CP Sig Op and a CP Sgt from the supporting signal unit to deal with life support issues. The detachment includes IS workstations to support printing services, CIS problem tracking and magnetic media security scans. The HQ facility controllers may also be co-located with the detachment. The addition of specialist CIS capabilities to
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the HQ (e.g. SPARTAN/TITAN networks) should include dedicated specialist CIS support as well. 28. Liaison Detachments. Orders or SOPs may include the requirement for liaison detachments from adjacent and higher formations to be exchanged between HQ. Headquarters that have established a temporary supporting relationship may also provide specialist liaison. Oversight of military liaison officers rests with the COS/Ops O. In specific situations, the commander may exercise direct control over his liaison representatives. In the near term, as land forces transition to fully digitized operations, HQ may be required to deploy liaison teams to some non-digitized subordinate HQ to provide limited one way IS gateways into the COP. Each HQ must also be prepared to exchange liaison teams with other government and non-government agencies. In multinational operations, the HQ would typically be allocated dedicated Intelligence LO teams. Day to day coordination of these teams is exercised directly by the G2/IO.
307.
FORWARD HEADQUARTERS
1. The Forward HQ provides the brigade commander with an adequate local capability and full remote access to all functionality required to command, manage and plan full spectrum operations. The Forward HQ can be Canadian or multi-national, depending on the mission. The commander will use it when the Main HQ is not operating (e.g. moving) or, more likely, there is a requirement to command from a forward location for several days up to a month. The Forward HQ will contain all the functionalities of the Main HQ, but staff members will be minimized to ensure a manoeuvrable capability for the Forward HQ, and capitalize on reach-back to the Main HQ. The manning of the Forward HQ is distinct and separate from the manning of the Main HQ, thus providing the commander with the flexibility to deploy C2 assets throughout the battlefield without compromising his ability to exercise effective command and control. The Forward HQ can be generated depending upon mission and task requirements. As directed, it can fulfil the capability of an alternate HQ, however this detracts from its primary function of providing the commander with a focused C2 capability facilitating flexibility in command in the contemporary operating environment. Because a BG HQ is manoeuvrable by
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its nature, a Forward HQ is not foreseen to be generated for a BG CO.
308.
HEADQUARTERS ADMINISTRATION
1. Administrative support to a tactical HQ is normally provided through a small orderly room element. The typical composition of this element is shown in Figures 3-9 and 3-10.
Figure 3-9: BG Administrative Element
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Figure 3-10: Brigade Administrative Element
309.
ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS
1. An alternate HQ ensures continuity either when a HQ echelon is not in operation or because the primary HQ is moving. The creation of an alternate HQ becomes increasingly important as commanders and staffs become more reliant on the HQ C2IS to manage battlefield information. Headquarters C2 capabilities may be disrupted by physical attack and by such means as cyber attack. 2. An alternate HQ contains the minimum staff, C2IS and infrastructure necessary to replicate all capabilities of the Main HQ for an indefinite period. Except when moving, an alternate HQ is located in a position from which the commander can command the formation if necessary. 3. To avoid simultaneous destruction or neutralization, alternate HQ may not co-locate with main HQ. To minimize the risk of detection when it is not active, the alternate HQ monitors the tactical situation but maintains the appropriate emission control state to the maximum extent practicable. 4. The commander typically identifies a subordinate HQ to be prepared to assume this function on order. Alternatively, the commander may accept some risk and assign be prepared tasks to his Forward HQ or Tactical HQ to assume this responsibility until the Main HQ is re-established. Headquarters SOPs must establish procedures to replicate and
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disseminate information holdings to this designated HQ on a routine basis during operations.
310.
SECURITY
1. Security Forces. While all members of the HQ share responsibility for the physical security of the HQ, dedicated HQ security forces are normally provided. These security forces normally include three major elements: a. Military Police. An MP element provides close protection to the command element and organic criminal investigative support to the force. Defence and Security. Defence and Security (D&S) is provided by a dedicated infantry element. This element provides protection of HQ facilities (Main, Forward, Tactical and StepUp), close protection to HQ staff elements (including trained cover teams for specialists, HUMINT teams, CIMIC teams, etc) and augments close protection of the command element as required. Security Coordination. These capabilities are coordinated through the CIC, and could be assigned as the primary or secondary responsibility of a HQ staff officer. This officer would normally be appointed as the HQ Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) and be responsible to the COS/Ops O for HQ security issues.
b.
c.
2. In the absence of assigned resources, the supporting CIS element oversees physical security of the HQ facilities employing organic resources. Alternatively, it may be possible to co-locate subordinate manoeuvre elements with the HQ during rest periods. 3. Regardless of allocated security forces, ground defence plans must employ every member of the HQ and account for remote HQ elements. Based on the threat assessment, plans must integrate both passive and active security measures such as wire obstacles, berms, point air defence assets and camouflage. All entrances and exits to an HQ complex should
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be concealed and controlled. In complex environments, security forces must be prepared to counter adversary surveillance efforts. This may require active patrolling in the vicinity of the HQ and the use of anti-observation screens at critical locations. 4. General physical security principles follow: a. Main HQ facilities will be organized as controlled areas and will include a number of clearly discernible restricted zones that progressively restrict personnel access. The enclave perimeter will define an operations zone where access will be limited to authorized and properly escorted visitors. Signed entry points/exit routes/control posts will be established. Passwords (and other control signals) will be distributed daily to authorized personnel. Since tactical level HQ are relatively small, personal recognition may also serve as a reliable, physical control. Headquarter vehicles will constitute security zones within the operations zone. Access to vehicles will be limited to authorized personnel and to authorized and properly escorted visitors. Security zones will normally be manned on a 24/7 basis and access will be monitored by personnel employed in the vehicles.
b.
c.
5. Unless designated otherwise, operational information displayed within the HQ is classified SECRET. Information displays will be secured from unauthorized viewing and access to the HQ complex will be limited to essential and authorized personnel only. Intelligence facilities may be subject to special 19 security arrangements. 6. The keys to the efficiency, responsiveness and the survival of tactical level HQ are to minimize its size and to
19
B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations provides additional guidance on information security. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-33
establish SOPs for tactical movement and defence. If allowed to grow too big, or to become too dependent on complicated CIS or staff procedures, the effectiveness and survivability of the HQ will be impaired. There is continual pressure for nonessential elements to co-locate with HQ. However, the larger it is, the more difficult the HQ is to conceal, defend and move. The pressure to increase the size of the HQ should be resisted, even when this entails accepting minor operational risks and administrative inconvenience.20
311.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND LAYOUT
1. Formation HQ functions will typically be executed from within fixed or temporary structures (modular tent, shelters, etc). Headquarters armoured vehicles will be co-located with the structures to serve as individual workspaces and provide immediate protection for the staff. This reduction in mobility is offset by the increase in effectiveness achieved through face-toface communication. 2. Unlike a Brigade Main HQ, BG HQ must be capable of operating completely under armour if necessary. The physical HQ layouts must account for a variety of C2 detachments provided by supporting HQ and multinational liaison elements. 3. The following factors should be considered in laying out any HQ: a. Communications. The layout should enable the rapid installation and removal of the HQ internal CIS. Staff Coordination. While the staff is organized along functional areas of interest, they are employed in multidisciplinary teams within the HQ. Therefore, HQ layouts must facilitate this team activity by co-locating staff with similar employment responsibilities and
b.
As C2 technology evolves, these enablers will provide increasing opportunity to reduce HQ sizes by cross training unit and formation level staff to support planning and coordination of multiple combat capabilities. 3-34 B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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Headquarters
establishing collaborative work areas for the teams. These work areas need not be sophisticated but must provide access to common visual and audio displays for the team members. c. Modular Organization. The HQ layout must facilitate the integration and deployment of supporting C2 components. These components include the tactical HQ when not deployed, liaison detachments and additional arms advisors who must remain immediately available to the commander. The addition or deletion of these elements must not interfere with ongoing operations within the HQ complex. Garrison HQ establishments typically undergo radical change when deployed in support of contingency operations. Not only will staff branches be augmented to enable 24/7 operations, but, specialist capabilities will be added from national or allied resources. The command support organization must be prepared to incorporate these personnel and capabilities into an integrated whole. This integration process should extend to include staff training and familiarization with SOPs and supporting CIS.
d.
4. Support Facilities. The following support facilities must normally be considered when laying out the HQ: a. Signal Centre. The signal centre includes the trunk node facilities, facility control and associated C2 of the supporting signal unit. It maintains direct communications with the system support detachment and may include the line detachments, special dispatch service (SDS) and vehicle park. Information Post and Visitor Vehicle Park. These should be adjacent to each other near the entrance to the HQ and en route to the operations centre.
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b.
c.
Landing Site. There should be concealed ground approaches to the helicopter-landing site. Ideally, the site should be within easy walking distance of the HQ facilities. Radio Park. The radio park is usually deployed in a remote location, its location dependent upon the terrain and threat. Administrative Areas. Administrative areas should be arranged around the HQ complex to afford it some protection from ground attack, yet be far enough away to avoid crowding. Rest areas should be separate from administrative facilities and activities.
d.
e.
312.
SIGNAL ELEMENT
1. The supporting signal organization of the deployed force has primary responsibility for establishing, maintaining and securing all HQ facilities, equipment and CIS networks. The signal unit provides three major capabilities: signal command, CIS support, and CSS. Specific responsibilities of these elements are as follows: a. Signal Command. Signal Command implements signal policy and provides technical control of communications, such as the issue and control of frequencies, communicationselectronics operating instructions (CEOI), and cryptographic codes and equipment. In the absence of dedicated G6 staff within the HQ, the senior Signal Officer provides CIS technical advice and force level planning support to the commander and staff. Signal Command is also responsible for managing relevant CIS information in support of the COP. Communications and Information Systems. The CIS element provides CIS services to enable information exchange within the supported HQ and between the supported HQ and its subordinate, flanking and higher C2 nodes. Communications support may include
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combat net radio, video, trunk communications and SDS. General IS support tasks include provision of a service desk capability within the command, maintaining status of all IS equipment and facilities, restoration of CIS services, installation of hardware and software, maintenance of CIS configuration in accordance with national policies, maintenance of C2IS gateways with allies during operations, managing connectivity with allocated national IS, and IS security.21 c. Combat Service Support. The CSS element provides logistics and personnel administrative support to the HQ as a whole, including close support for IS maintenance.
This capability is discussed briefly in Chapter 5 and more fully in appropriate procedural documents. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 3-37
21
3CHAPTER 4 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
401.
COGNITIVE HIERARCHY AND COGNITION CYCLE
1. Given the fundamental reliance of Command Support on effective information management, it is useful to provide a theoretical understanding of how information is processed by an individual. 2. The cognitive hierarchy is a description of the stages by which an understanding of the situation can be achieved. It is a generic model that, as Figure 4-1 illustrates, consists of four related elements: data, information, knowledge and understanding.22
Figure 4-1: Cognitive Hierarchy Model
3. Figure 4-2 applies the hierarchy to a cognition cycle that includes both a deductive and inductive component: a. Deductive. The commanders understanding of the situation is based on his current
22 Within the domain of Knowledge Management, this model is often attributed to Professor Russell Ackoff (Ackoff, R.L From Data to Wisdom, Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, Volume 16, 1989 p3-9.) Prof Ackoffs model employs the concept of Wisdom vice Understanding.
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knowledge and understanding, which is normally incomplete and subject to continuous confirmation. This uncertainty results in the deduction and articulation of specific information requirements and subsequent data collection tasks for the command support system. b. Inductive. Collected data must be processed back through the hierarchy by the command support system in order to resolve the predefined information needs of the commander. The synthesis of this information generates new knowledge that confirms or denies the commanders original understanding and re-initiates the cycle. NOTE At some point in this cognitive cycle, the commander considers the risk posed by his current level of uncertainty to be acceptable and a decision may be made without further input or analysis.
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Figure 4-2: Cognitive Cycle
4. Data. In the cognitive hierarchy, data is unprocessed observations, inputs or raw signals from the operational environment. These include incoming combat orders and signals detected by a sensor or collector of any type. While data on its own may generate a limited degree of situational awareness (SA), it normally must be processed to provide meaning and value23. For the purposes of this publication, data may be sub-classified as foundation data or operational data. Foundation data is data normally collected before the start of operations that supports planning and subsequent mission execution. Examples include digital terrain data and data relating to friendly and enemy unit organizations including equipment capabilities and vehicle and personnel establishments. Foundation data may be collected from strategic, operational, tactical or intelligence sources and
23 An exception to this is combat information. Combat information is that frequently perishable data gathered in combat by, or reported directly to, units that may be immediately used in battle or in assessing the situation. Examples include single source reports that support target acquisition or battle damage assessment activities.
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remains relatively static during operations. Operational data is data collected from the commanders area of interest during operations. Examples of operational data include current unit dispositions; target detection, weather conditions, and combat supply holdings. Operational data tends to be extremely dynamic during operations. 5. Information. On the inductive side of the cognitive cycle, information is processed data that reduces uncertainty. Processing includes filtering, fusing, formatting, organizing, collating, correlating, plotting, translating, categorizing and arranging data in such a way as to give it meaning. Standard intelligence products or situation reports would be viewed under this category. Processed data is useful to avoid threats, acquire targets or initiate other immediate actions. Relevant information forms the basis of the common operating picture (COP). On the deductive side of the cognitive cycle, the staff attempts to reduce command uncertainty by deducing specific information needs which if resolved will confirm or deny the commanders battlefield visualization (BV). 6. Knowledge. On the inductive side of the cognitive cycle, knowledge is analyzed information that provides meaning and value. Knowledge is generated through the cognition of the commander and staff. Cognition includes the act of learning and integrating various elements of information to understand the relationships between current events, the environment and opposing forces. New knowledge leads to a new understanding of capabilities and intentions. In addition, because of the way it is generated, knowledge identifies the degree of uncertainty, and thus risk, within which decisions must be made. While the development of knowledge may be assisted by technology, it is primarily a human process. Some knowledge may also be represented within the COP. On the deductive side of the cognitive cycle, knowledge can be viewed as the articulation of those key elements that the commander considers essential to his SA. 7. Understanding. In the cognitive hierarchy, understanding is the synthesized knowledge to which human judgement has been applied. Judgement is a purely human skill and is based on the individuals experience, training and intuition. Understanding applies to a specific situation and allows the commander to gain a deeper level of SA with respect
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to relationships and future implications. In military operations, perfect knowledge will not be attainable. Therefore, the commanders understanding will always involve some uncertainty. Commanders must always balance the need to gain greater situational understanding against the need to maintain an operational tempo that denies situational understanding to the opposing commander. As can be seen in Figure 4-2, understanding is continuously evolving as new knowledge is synthesized.
402.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
1. General. Just as the movement of money drives a nations economy, the movement of relevant information drives the command support system. Effective management of this information flow ensures that the value of all information is identified, fully exploited and placed in the hands of commanders in a timely fashion. Effective information management (IM) allows the commander to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify concepts, or re-allocate resources. 2. Information Management Plans (IMPs) that identify how relevant information (RI) is to be managed internally and externally must be developed. The IMP assigns IM responsibilities to specific staff, describes information requirements, provides guidance to system management organizations on requirements for voice and data communication links, as well as command guidance with respect to information currency requirements and information protection needs. 3. There are five major IM functions: collecting, storing, processing, displaying and disseminating. 4. Collecting. As shown in Figure 4-3, collecting is the continuous acquisition of RI about the battle space by any means, including direct observation and other organic resources. Collection relies on database queries, the use of standard reporting mechanisms, routine reconnaissance and surveillance activities and submission of formal requests for information (RFIs) to higher HQ to gather information. In addition, shared SA within the force will enable other
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commanders to identify and share information they consider relevant to mission success. 5. Collection may be accomplished through two systems: information push and information pull: a. Information Push. In an information push system, the collector pushes all information from the source to the user as it becomes available or in accordance with a predetermined schedule. This type of system is best used for collecting routine feedback that is not time sensitive. This system minimizes the distraction incurred by subordinate units when reacting to constant RFIs from higher HQ. The major disadvantage to this type of system is that it is difficult to anticipate all of the commanders information needs. As a result, there is a risk of information overload as sources push both relevant and irrelevant information to the users. In addition, the transmission of irrelevant information consumes the limited bandwidth available within the communications networks. Routine information needs should be documented in SOPs and augmented or modified as necessary in orders. Ideally, the collection mechanisms are automated or require only a single point of manual entry. This automation allows commanders and staffs to more easily identify information shortfalls and focus subsequent collection efforts. To the extent possible, routine information should be digitized and formatted to permit automated processing and dissemination by HQ information systems (IS). Information Pull. In a pure information pull environment, the user identifies all information requirements in advance and collection sources simply react to the demand. This system requires continuous generation of formal information collection tasks. HQ may task organic collection assets directly or submit a formal RFI to higher HQ. This type of system is
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best used to collect mission specific feedback. It has the advantage of focusing scarce collection assets on critical information needs and ensures that only RI is collected. Its flexibility also supports the collection of exceptional or unforeseen information needs. The major disadvantage is the time penalty in that the information search does not begin until a specific request is made.
Figure 4-3: Relevant Information Collection
6. An effective command support system will employ both systems of collection. The use of common command and information system (CIS) networks and public databases allows collectors to push both routine and mission specific information to a central location as it becomes available. All authorized users are then free to pull the information as needed and display it in the desired formats. 7. Processing. Processing is raising the meaning of information from raw data to understanding. Typically, data must be processed both mechanically and cognitively. At the lower or mechanical level, the HQ command, control and
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information system (C2IS) assists the information users to organize, collate, plot and arrange collected data. Once organized into a useable format, the information must be analyzed and evaluated by cognitive methods in order to facilitate SA. This cognitive processing integrates RI with the individuals training, experience and intuition. This processing enables individuals to interpret what is happening in the battle space and determine what needs to be done to minimize any risks to mission success. While this level of processing can be supported by technology, it is primarily a human activity requiring well-trained and experienced analysts and staff. Processing also includes the ability to filter, fuse and prioritize information. Information systems provide assistance in filtering information while fusion and prioritization are primarily, although not exclusively, human activities: a. Filtering. Raw data must be filtered according to specific criteria in order to identify RI. RI must be timely, accurate, useable, complete, and precise. RI must relate to the commanders overall information requirements. Filtering ensures that the information has been assessed and that information that is not relevant or important is not allowed to enter the COP. Filtering also ensures that information received from higher and adjacent sources is assessed for relevance to subordinate and supporting HQ. For example, while the disposition and activity of all friendly sub-units in an adjacent area of operations (AO) may be of interest to a unit HQ, only those sub-unit locations within observation and direct fire distance of the unit boundary may be of interest to subordinate sub-units. This may require the unit staff to filter this data before disseminating to their subordinates. Fusing. Fusing is the act of logically integrating several pieces of information into a useable form at an appropriate level of detail to give a single piece of representative information. For example, an intelligence analyst may monitor several individual contact reports. Based on other information sources as
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well as the analysts training and intuition, the information is fused and a single adversary unit is entered into the HQ COP. Analysts and staff should use multiple sources of information when fusing information. The use of multiple sources normally improves accuracy but may also increase network traffic. c. Prioritizing. Prioritizing information ensures that critical information is processed, disseminated and displayed in a timely manner. Although the commanders critical information requirements (CCIRs) are the primary tool for accomplishing this prioritization, analysts and staff must be guided by the commanders intent and their own insight when assessing priorities.
8. Included in this processing activity is the initial processing of digital information entering the HQ on specialist networks. In the near term, it is likely that information collected from these specialist sensor platforms (airborne surveillance, electronic warfare [EW], target acquisition [TA] radar, etc) will not enter the HQ in a format suitable for automated storage in HQ databases. As a result, specialist staff must pre-process this information to determine those information elements that must be shared with non-specialist users. 9. Storing. Storing retains RI in any form, usually for orderly, timely retrieval and documentation until it is needed for exercising command and control (C2). Storage is required as not all collected information can be processed or displayed at once nor is all collected information relevant at all times. Information storage must be highly structured to ensure that information can be quickly retrieved and manipulated as it becomes relevant to current decision-making. Tactical land HQ will store the bulk of their information holdings in three related information environmentsoperational, document and geomatics: a. Operational. This information environment includes information relating to organizations, facilities, geographical and control features, personnel and material. This information contributes directly to development of the COP and supports decision-making by allowing
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commanders and staffs to pull relevant information during planning, preparation and execution activities. Most of this information can be linked to a specific geographical reference and is stored in highly structured databases. Typically, these databases include an operational database that holds information relating to friendly/neutral forces and terrain/weather, and one or more intelligence databases to hold information relating to hostile or unknown forces. b. Documents. This information environment includes digitized text, flat graphics, images and video. This material must be logically organized into a structured document repository. HQ SOPs establish procedures for submission, archiving and retrieval of documents based on existing IS technologies within the HQ. The C2IS should allow electronic links to be established between individual documents and related battlefield entities within the operational database environment (e.g. a graphic object depicting a terrorist event linked to a series of scanned newspaper reports or digital photographs describing the event). Classified imagery may be held in its own database. Geomatics. This information environment includes both specialist and non-specialist terrain data used within the HQ IS. Data is used to generate map displays, support specialist and non-specialist terrain analysis, and facilitate terrain visualization.
c.
10. Information holdings may be private or public. Public information holdings include relevant information needed to support command and organizational decision-making. Examples include organizational information, information from geographic information systems (GIS), orders, and plans. Public information holdings also support collaborative work by ensuring that multiple users employ common data to execute multi-functional staff activity. The employment of standard HQ
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databases structured on a common data model24 is essential for effective IM. 11. Private information holdings are of relevance to only a portion of the command (e.g. a single individual or staff cell). Typically, this information takes the form of working or draft information. The individual or staff cell must continually evaluate their private information holdings to determine what is relevant to current organizational planning and decision-making and so must be stored in the public domain. 12. Standardized IM procedures and practices must be employed to ensure that both private and public information holdings can be stored and retrieved quickly and coherently by appropriate users. Both public and private information holdings must be rapidly recoverable in the event of electronic or physical attack. IM policies identify what information must be backed-up and when, while system management policies identify procedures directing where and how to back-up private information, replicate shared databases and secure baseline software loads. Typically, backed-up information will be stored with the designated alternate HQ. 13. Displaying. Displaying is representing RI in a useable, easily understood form tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the COP for decision-making and exercising C2 functions. Information displays must reflect the results of information processing rather than simply data collection. As shown in Figure 4-4, displays may take the form of written reports, verbal narrative reports or graphic displays. All three forms should maintain standardized formats that facilitate rapid development by the originator. 14. Modern CIS allows users to rapidly share and use common data. The availability of common data both horizontally and vertically permits users at widely dispersed
24
A data model is a standardized model that specifies the way data is structured and the relationships between the data. Within the LF, the operational database employs the Land Force Data Model (LFDM). This model is based on the NATO Land Command and Control Information Exchange Data Model (LC2IEDM) thereby facilitating C2IS interoperability with allies. Custodianship of the LFDM resides within the Land Staff. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 4-11
locations and various levels of command to recreate common displays. When combined with traditional voice or video communication, these common displays assist commanders to rapidly analyze military problems, develop collaborative solutions and control operational tempo.
Figure 4-4: Information Displays
15. Graphic displays are useful in visualizing relationships among large quantities of operational data (current situation displays, overlay orders) or in visualizing trends over time (charts and graphs). Displays should: a. b. c. d. e. f.
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Employ doctrinal symbols, graphics and terminology; Represent RI only; Be clear and understandable to the user; Be accurate, reliable and current; Enable rapid distribution to higher, lower and adjacent units as necessary; and Enable tailoring to support individual command requirements.
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16. The quality of the information displays will have a direct impact on the ability of the commander and staff to synthesize and process the information. Good displays allow the commander to rapidly focus on critical areas, identify gaps in RI and enable him to easily communicate direction to subordinate commanders and staff. 17. The most common information display within the tactical HQ will be situation maps developed by the staff. These information displays should be capable of integrating all RI within the commanders area of interest with priority given to the AO. Operational display priorities should be described in SOPs and will normally include: a. b. c. d. Map background including all relevant obstacle/facility information; Current disposition of friendly forces; Current disposition of threat forces; Current disposition of control features (battlefield geometry) extracted from operations orders including fire support and airspace coordination measures; and Links to staff estimates, orders, combat effectiveness assessments (current and future), CCIR status, information sources and information currency.
e.
18. Disseminating. Disseminating is communicating RI of any kind from one person or place to another in a useable form by any means to improve situational awareness or to initiate or govern action. Dissemination takes two basic forms: broadcast or point-to-point dissemination: a. Broadcast. Broadcast information is disseminated simultaneously over a common information network to a broad audience. This form of dissemination has the advantage of getting information to the greatest number of people in the shortest period. The major disadvantage is that information cannot be tailored for a specific user and as a result must be further processed by the recipients.
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Information aimed at improving SA is normally disseminated using this method. b. Point to Point. Point-to-point dissemination targets a specific user or users. Information is then passed sequentially from one user to another. Originators can tailor the information to suit specific recipients. The major disadvantage of this method is that information reaches a broad audience slowly and the chances for distortion increase each time the information is re-transmitted. Information aimed at initiating or governing action (execution information [EI]) is normally disseminated using this method.
19. The quality of the COP is highly dependent on the techniques used to disseminate and integrate RI. General guidance for dissemination of the information needed to develop and maintain the COP includes the following: a. Broadcast Situation Reports (Feedback). In order to improve information currency, subordinate HQ should broadcast feedback information throughout the command rather than use point-to point dissemination. Examples would include the sharing of threat data among peer HQ concurrently with higher HQ, or passage of individual command assessments over the higher command voice net. This technique allows information processing to proceed concurrently at multiple HQ and ensures that a minimum level of common operational data exists at various locations within the command. Filter Information Before Dissemination. Information gleaned from sources not accessible to subordinate HQ must be assessed for relevance before point-to-point dissemination. Blindly relaying or repeating information received from higher HQ will invariably lead to information overload at subordinate HQ and mask critical information of real relevance.
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c.
Avoid Feedback Loops. Information Management procedures must be established to ensure that information received from subordinate HQ is not disseminated back to subordinates as consolidated reports. Dissemination of information from higher HQ to subordinate HQ should be limited to execution information, the results of staff analysis or RI gleaned from sources not accessible to subordinate HQ. Push Combat Information. Critical, timesensitive information (combat information) must be pushed to appropriate decision makers directly. This may require bypassing traditional internal and external chains of command. If this occurs, both the sender and receiver must ensure that intermediate echelons are informed after the fact. Exploit Data Exchange. To the extent possible, routine feedback should be disseminated in a form suitable for automated processing. By automating the dissemination of routine operational information, staff are freed for higher-level IM tasks. Data replication also frees voice nets allowing commanders to use these nets to complement or add context to the operating picture information or to pass combat information. Validate Critical Information. All critical information disseminated outside of the HQ should be validated in advance to prevent the display of inaccurate or irrelevant information within the COP. Validation might include spot checks of specific data or cross checks against other sources. Incomplete information that supports the answering of a CCIR can still be useful.
d.
e.
f.
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403.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
1. General. All information users have basic IM responsibilities. Dedicated staff can best manage some IM responsibilities while other responsibilities may be assigned as additional duties to existing coordinating or specialist staff. Figure 4-5 shows a generic model for staff IM functions.
Figure 4-5: Staff Information Management Functions
2. Control of Information Activities. The information required to support decision-making will vary among commanders due to differences in mission, environment, experience, training and intuitive abilities. As a result, commanders must lead the information collection process by identifying, prioritizing and clearly enunciating their information requirements on a continuous basis. Other command responsibilities include approval of the various supporting plans within the operation order (IM plan, information security plan
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and supporting CIS plan), provision of guidance on information displays and control of information protection functions. 3. The Brigade Chief of Staff (COS) or BG Operations Officer (Ops O), as the commanders principal staff officer, is responsible for overseeing the information and system management resources within the HQ to meet the commanders information needs 4. Information Management Planning. The Information Management (IM) Planning function comprises development and maintenance of an IM plan for the HQ and command as a whole. The COS, assisted by an appointed Information Management Officer (IMO), is responsible to the commander for all IM planning. 5. Effective IM plans ensure that critical command and staff information needs are met in a timely fashion. Information Management plans provide detailed guidance to the staff and subordinate commanders on information collection, processing, storage, display and dissemination requirements during all phases of operations. The IMO works closely with the staff principals to ensure designated IM procedures and architectures facilitate development of the COP. 6. Common Operating Picture Management. Common Operating Picture (COP) Management is concerned with management of the information needed to create the force operating picture and oversight of the information exchange processes needed to create and maintain the COP among the networked commanders. Related tasks include: a. Control of information collection activities, including coordination of surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance operations, management of Requests for Information (RFIs), dispatch and receipt of liaison detachments and routine reports and returns. Control of information storage activities including establishment and maintenance of standard information storage structures. Establishment and oversight of effective management procedures to ensure that
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b.
c.
information remains accurate, relevant and current. d. Control and tailoring of standard information displays within the HQ including establishment of standard formats for briefings, military correspondence and graphic overlays. Control of information dissemination activities aimed at maintaining SA within the HQ and the command. This includes managing HQ battle rhythm, managing routine reports and returns, conducting video tele-conferences (VTCs), and identifying user requirements for communication links with other HQ.
e.
7. While the operations staff manage this effort on a minute-to-minute basis, the COS/Ops O has primary responsibility for integrating this function. The dynamic and rapidly changing nature of most battlefield information requires a shared effort among the entire HQ staff for generating and maintaining the COP. 8. Staff principals support this function by: a. Identifying and sharing RI that is within their area of interest and that supports the CCIRs and other information requirements. Establishing internal staff section IM processes and procedures. Ensuring subordinates are trained to execute basic IM responsibilities including information security. Identifying staff branch requirements for mission specific C2IS support. Appointing an individual (Staff Section Information Manager [SSIM]) to serve as a single point of contact for all IM matters within each of the work environments (Command Information Centre, Intelligence Centre, Operations Centre and Plans Centre). The SSIMs form a network within the HQ staff for managing e-mail traffic, hard copy documents,
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d. e.
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voice traffic and operations logs. The SSIM also serves as subject matter expert on internal IM procedures and branch specific C2IS applications, and receives additional training on relevant HQ C2IS. f. Training C2IS operators who are responsible for the currency and accuracy of all functional area information entering the COP.
9. Request for Information Management. It will not always be possible to resolve the CCIR using organic resources, current information holdings or resident subject matter experts. In this event, a formal RFI will be submitted to higher HQ. Requests for Information will be centrally managed in order to establish priorities, eliminate redundant requests and ensure that critical questions are answered in a timely manner. 10. To execute the RFI function, the HQ appoints two RFI managers. The intelligence centre will control intelligencerelated RFIs through their Collection, Coordination Information Requirements Management (CCIRM) element while the operations centre will control operations-related RFIs through the Operations Duty Officer (Ops DO). Specific management responsibilities include: a. Receive, validate and prioritize submitted functional area RFIs; b. Submit RFIs to the appropriate authority for resolution; and c. Develop and manage an RFI tracking system to ensure that questions are resolved in a timely manner, responses are disseminated to the originator and entered into the central HQ 25 database. 11. It must be noted that the RFI function is aimed at resolving critical information shortfalls that have an immediate impact on decision-making. While these RFIs will normally be initiated as a result of the commanders personal information requirements, they may come from any member of the staff.
25 B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations details the responsibilities and processes for RFI management.
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This formal function is not meant to replace routine information exchange between HQ staffs. 12. Data Administration. Data administration is defined as a special organizational function for managing the organizations data resources, concerned with information policies, data planning, maintenance of data dictionaries, and data quality standards. 26 In a military context, data administration is concerned with how we manage the orderly storage and extraction of information within the C2IS. 13. All individuals within the HQ who employ C2IS applications have standing responsibilities related to this function. These responsibilities include management of HQ information holdings in accordance with established procedures and adherence to all established information security orders. The major data administration tasks include development of information holdings for users, administration of information holdings and provision of data to support decision-making. Operational oversight of these activities is provided by the IMO. 14. Develop Information Holdings. Before the start of operations and as part of the initial planning process, the staff must identify requirements for initial or foundation data for every database within the HQ. As a minimum, this includes requirements for geospatial data, organizational data relating to national, coalition and adversary forces (when and if available), as well as essential documentation such as operation orders, operation plans and policy papers. 15. At the tactical level, management of this development process becomes the responsibility of the appointed IMO. Headquarters SOPs establish procedures to distribute and manage foundation data. Specific procedures will cover version control, back-up, conduct of error recovery and database rebuilds in the event of corruption. 16. National foundation data may be accessible through garrison IS (e.g. personnel data) or may need to be requested from the Land Staff before deployment. The actual collection, formatting, packaging and loading of the identified data records
26
Laudon and Laudon, Management Information Systems: th Organization and Technology, 4 ed. Prentice-Hall, 1996. B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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will normally require the assistance of trained database administrators (DBA). Provision of national foundation data could utilize a national data services capability. This service should be capable of accessing multiple CF databases, collecting relevant database records, formatting and packaging the records for use on tactical IS and disseminating the record packages to the senior deploying HQ. 27 Figure 4-6 depicts the basic concept.
Figure 4-6: Foundation Data Processing
17. When preparing for coalition operations, the senior IMO is responsible for providing operational direction to the systems management organization. This direction includes: a. Identifying the national foundation data that must be shared with the lead nation HQ;
An element of this national organization could potentially deploy with the National Command Element in order to maintain a technical communication link between the deployed force and the national Data Service organization. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 4-21
27
b. c.
Identifying the coalition foundation data that is required from the lead nation HQ; and Identifying recipients and procedures for dissemination of coalition foundation data throughout the Canadian contingent.
18. At the tactical level, management of geospatial data is the responsibility of the Geomatics Support Team. Tasks specific to the management of geospatial data include requesting and receiving data, processing and converting data into the correct format, managing the geospatial databases, disseminating geospatial data, providing version control and updates, and producing hard copy maps. Distribution and storage of Commercial Imagery Base (CIB) data is handled in a manner similar to other geomatics products, whether received from higher sources or created internally. Imagery may be stored in specialist GIS databases or the Electronic Document Database. Classified imagery, however, has unique handling procedures. 19. Administer Information Holdings. The intent of administration activity is to ensure that all information holdings remain current and relevant throughout all phases of military operations. Related tasks follow: a. Establish Staff Procedures. Standard IM procedures must be employed across the army to facilitate operation of task-tailored staff 28 structures. Procedures must cover the creation, version control, back-up and transmission of operational data. Share Information. This task includes the routine preparation and exchange of information with national and allied HQ before, during and following military operations. In coalition operations, the systems management organization will implement information exchange across national boundaries through a series of IS gateways. The IMO is the staff point of contact and is responsible for
b.
28
See B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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identifying information exchange requirements with each participating non-Canadian HQ. c. Manage Document Repository. This task comprises the establishment and management of an electronic document database within the HQ. While this is primarily a clerical function, appointed individuals are responsible to the IMO rather than to a staff principal. Management of HQ Website. Headquarters IS may include access to Internet and/or intranet capabilities. These capabilities provide an efficient information exchange mechanism with external organizations (joint, civilian, allied). If a command web site is established, the commander of the supporting signal element will appoint a HQ webmaster. The webmaster will be responsive to the IMO with regard to IM issues and to the commander of the supporting signals unit for technical issues. Life Cycle Management. Information holdings will be subject to life cycle management processes including appropriate disposal or archiving in accordance with national policy.
d.
e.
20. Extract Information Holdings. This activity is carried out in direct support of user and decision-making information needs. It includes such tasks as document retrieval and the use of automated reporting tools to extract information from databases. 21. Protect Information. This function includes establishing essential elements of friendly force information (EEFI) to be protected, the physical security of information holdings, personnel security standards for all users, the creation and enforcement of procedural security measures, and the development of information security (INFOSEC) training programs. 22. The implementation and management of information technology security (ITSEC) standards falls within the realm of defensive information operations and is controlled by the Systems Management organization.
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404. SYSTEM MANAGEMENT SUPPORT TO INFORMATION MANAGEMENT29

1. Information System Security. This function is concerned primarily with achieving and maintaining IS accreditation. It comprises the day-to-day security management of the assigned CIS, responsibility for enforcing user compliance with CF security policies and orders, and provision of IS security advice to the commander. The commander will appoint a single individual, the Information System Security Officer (ISSO), from within his coordinating staff to manage this function. The ISSO works closely with the supporting signal HQ on ITSEC issues. 2. CIS Plans and Policy. The G6 staff principal is responsible for developing CIS management plans and policy on behalf of the commander.30 Specific IM responsibilities include: a. b. c. d. Publish CIS plans, annexes and operating instructions. Assign responsibility for lateral communications between subordinate HQ. Validate requirements for lateral communications between subordinate HQ. Staff CIS network requirements for each HQ echelon as identified by users and recommend supporting architectures. Coordinate all network services, including interoperability requirements, with higher national and operational HQ.
e.
The systems management functions are described in greater detail in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations, while systems management responsibilities are provided in Chapter 5. The Commanding Officer of the supporting signal unit is responsible for implementing these plans and policies. Detailed direction to subordinate elements of the signal unit will be provided through the unit operation order (op O) and not the formation op O. 4-24 B-GL-331-001/FP-001
30
29
f.
In conjunction with the IMO, plan the CIS network architecture within the formation/unit to facilitate exchange of operational information. Identify to the supporting signal HQ all mission specific CIS support requirements for the force as a whole. Requirements may include CIS equipment, networks, Internet accounts, e-mail accounts, user lists, naming conventions, etc. Identify requirements for deployment of CIS detachments to other national or service HQ.
g.
h.
3. Network Interoperability. The creation of the COP is based on the exchange of RI between military HQ and supporting civilian organizations. An integrated information environment will require the deployment of CIS detachments to enable the automated exchange of RI. These detachments must be located in a secure location that may or may not be collocated with the HQ. The supporting signal HQ is responsible for the deployment and employment of these detachments as identified by the G6. Typically, these detachments will deploy to other HQ with a liaison officer or team. Specific responsibilities are described in other CIS doctrine. 4. CIS Help Desk. The Help Desk function provides the first level of systems management support to all users. The Help Desk function is normally carried out by a Command Post (CP) Signals Operator (Sig Op) at each formation, unit and subunit HQ. Information Management responsibilities include assisting in the maintenance of tactical data including back-ups, archiving and restoration, and assisting with geospatial data, mission preparation and system initialization. 5. Facility Control. The Facility Control function is managed by the supporting signal HQ and includes the following IM responsibilities: a. Responsible to the IMO for loading and disseminating all operational foundation data and non-specialist GIS data within the formation/unit. Oversight of the Help Desk function at each HQ and track all work requests.
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b.
c.
Responsible to the ISSO for the day-to-day security functions of the HQ IS network. The System Support Operators (SSO) and the CP Sig Op support him in this function.
6. A specialist facility control function includes the management of IS Gateway Detachments during coalition operations. Specific responsibilities include the implementation of information exchange contracts with other national HQ. These contracts are developed by the IMO and identify what HQ information is disseminated to other nations as well as what information is required from other nations. It is closely linked to the database administration function. 7. Database Administration. The Database Administration function operates in direct support of the IMO to assist with extraction, formatting, packaging and loading of operational data from strategic and operational level sources. Trained database administrators will be provided by the supporting signal HQ to oversee this activity.
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4CHAPTER 5 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. Arthur C. Clarke
501.
INTRODUCTION
1. Systems Management (SM) in the context of this chapter refers to the management of both the communications and the digital information systems (IS) in use by the Land Force (LF). The communications and information systems (CIS) are the sum of the radios, communication networks, computers, computer networks, software, databases and supporting procedures and personnel. Systems management deals with the administration, management and maintenance of the entire CIS, not with the actual use of CIS by the operational community. Systems management is therefore the discipline that enables the CIS components, acting in concert, to provide the commander the technical means to exercise command and control (C2). This chapter will cover SM in broad terms and will not address procedures for the actual operation and maintenance of specific systems. 2. The C2 process has changed little since the days of the Second World War. Significantly, however, todays command, control and information system (C2IS) can reduce the amount of time required to complete high-level generic tasks thereby speeding up the C2 process. Computer screens and databases are replacing maps and filing cabinets and will ultimately make them outdated. As with information management, system management is conducted using an integrated system of personnel, facilities and processes. 3. Systems management is discussed in the context of a single CIS network. This is a significant but necessary change from previous doctrine as the demarcation between these communications and IS networks has become increasingly difficult to discern. Systems management transcends traditional boundaries and looks to establish and maintain a single CIS environment across the LF.
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502.
SCOPE
1. Systems management is defined as the policies, procedures, tools, personnel and structures that ensure a consistent and robust LF CIS environment is provided to all users. Systems management is primarily a Signals responsibility; however, the nature of modern CIS forces basic users to perform system management tasks to ensure that the CIS remains effective. As a broad description of its scope, SM can be seen as management and administration of the relevant CIS in four areas: a. b. the digital communications network that disseminates the data; the computer applications running on the network devices that process and display the data; the databases that store the data; and the planning, directing and monitoring of the CIS network itself.
c. d.
2. Organizationally, SM includes the entire effort from lowest deployed level through to the provision of policy and life cycle materiel management (LCMM) at the strategic level. It encompasses the entire scope of tasks required to ensure a consistent and robust C2 environment. While this will largely be the role of signals officers and NCMs, some SM responsibilities and tasks must be carried out by users; to this extent, they are therefore considered as part of the SM function. Inclusion of users to this extent is necessary for several reasons: at some levels no signals personnel are available to carry out hands-on administration; most of the CIS is directly operated by users; and a shared responsibility necessarily exists for the management of data.
503.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
1. The general principles of system management include capacity, economy, flexibility, mobility, reliability, security, simplicity and timeliness.
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2. Capacity. The SM capability should be built on a modular basis to permit it to cater to a variety of force structures across the entire spectrum of CF operations. System management tools and procedures should be scalable, allowing an increase in the size of the supported HQ without an equivalent increase in system workload. 3. Economy. The limited availability of highly qualified support personnel suggests that service desk functions should be centralized with the senior deploying HQ. System support capabilities should allow for remote management of distant devices. Best industry practices in information technology (IT), where this is possible and sensible, are used. These include a tiered structure with junior (i.e. less experienced) personnel acting as initial points of contact with access to more specialized resources provided when the situation warrants. This bottom up approach is harmonized with the fact that CIS plans are developed from the top down. That is, the SM concept is integrated with existing and developing staff and signals doctrine. 4. Flexibility. The mature SM concept addresses the entire spectrum of operations from war fighting through peace support operations (PSO) to domestic operations and through the five phases of operations; i.e. a single support concept for garrison and deployed forces is the goal. In addition, CIS must be robust such that the loss of any single workstation, server or communications means has the minimum operational impact. 5. Mobility. Headquarters must possess a high degree of strategic and tactical mobility to facilitate flexible C2. System support capabilities must possess the same degree of mobility. Hardware repair (primarily through replacement of faulty communications or computer components) should be carried 31 out as far forward as possible. Software repair (less data and quick-fix issues) is normally carried out as far back as possible.
Software repair in this context refers to issues such as adjustments to computer code and development of software patches. Software problems that can be resolved through simple re-installation of applications are carried out on site. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 5-3
31
6. Reliability. Users will become increasingly dependent on the availability of C2IS systems and associated information holdings. Untimely or lengthy failures in communications, software or hardware will pose significant operational risks. Software configurations should have maximum standardization, reliability and maintainability to improve operational availability. 7. Security. Communications and information security considerations must be an integral part of all systems management doctrine and training. 8. Simplicity. Open interfaces should exist to simplify management of networks, messaging and software applications. 9. Timeliness. Restoration of service to the current baseline operational environment, including operational data, is the highest priority task for system management. Rapid fault identification and equipment replacement or software restoration is essential.
504. SYSTEM MANAGEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The formation CIS is managed by the following organizations: a. System Executive and Planning. The System Executive and Planning (SEP) is the staff cell located at the senior tactical HQ responsible for overall planning of national CIS resources within the assigned area of operations (AO). At the Brigade level, the G6 staff will carry out the SEP function. Operational System Control. The Operational System Control (OSC) manages all assigned facility controllers in the formation and has technical and tactical control over the CIS resources within the assigned AO. The OSC ensures compliance with the SEP-issued communications instructions and assumes dayto-day responsibility for establishing and
b.
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maintaining information technology security (ITSEC).32 Within a Brigade, the signals squadron carries out the OSC function and is responsible for providing feedback to the SEP. c. Facility Control. Facility Control is the management level that is responsible for the direct technical and practical control of signal and information system assets within a HQ local data network (LDN). The Facility Controllers (FC) put into effect the orders for CIS facilities received from the supervising OSC and provide feedback to the OSC. Facility Controllers are provided to brigade HQ, unit HQ and area trunk nodes. Detachment Members. Signals Operator (Sig Op) detachment members deal with local hardware and software problems within their local area network (LAN). They provide technical feedback to their FCs. Supervisors. Other signal leadership (Command Post Sgt, Troop WO, etc) continue to provide both tactical and technical leadership. They provide feedback to Sig Ops at brigade or to the unit signals officer.
d.
e.
2. Signal Unit organizational structures for units and brigades are described in B-GL-351-001 Signals Support in Land Operations.
505.
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AND TASKS
1. CIS management functions and tasks exist at six levels: network; equipment; operating system; messaging; applications; and data. Security and information protection are considered
32 ITSEC includes computer security, transmission security, emission security, network security, cryptographic material security and communication security components. Additional elements include failure and disaster recovery activities, information assurance, technical inspections and information control (INFOCON) reporting schemes.
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pervasive elements affecting all levels and therefore are not considered separately. 2. A number of system management tasks are applicable to all six levels. They include: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. 3. operating a Help Desk; maintaining status of equipment and facilities; fault finding and system restoration; installing and upgrading software and hardware; conducting performance management and optimization; conducting configuration management; supporting transfer of control between HQ elements; operating international IS gateways; managing connectivity with all HQ IS; managing information systems security; and employing HQ IS to perform system management tasks.
The specific tasks for each level are described below.
4. Network Level. At the network level, tasks include setting up, monitoring and maintaining the networks that, combined, support the CIS. 5. The backbone for any CIS is a sophisticated and capable system of networks. In domestic operations, commercial telecommunications facilities are exploited in linking commercial and garrison networks. In deployed operations, ruggedized, secure, integrated, hierarchical tactical radio and multi-channel fibre optic and radio relay equipment usually provide the LF commander his communications links. 6. These links must include both data and voice and cover virtually the full spectrum of radio frequencies. They must function as an integrated system capable of interconnection with allied military and civilian systems when required. Network
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management activities should be as transparent as possible to the elements that they support. The result must be the maintenance of a continuous and reliable communications system despite dispersion of resources, hostile activity, frequent tactical moves and planned connectivity changes. For these reasons, the network management tasks include the following: a. Provide the operator interface to enable implementation of the signals plans and instructions. Monitor the operating status of the CIS network, either automatically or under operator control. Give users immediate assistance in diagnosing simple communications problems and a hierarchy of service desks to resolve more complex problems of communication systems and their interaction with HQ IS. Adjust, under operational control, the CIS equipment and system configuration to maintain acceptable levels of performance in an environment of changing demand and combat damage. Provide automated tools to: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) plan, manage and control the CIS network; manage the battlefield frequency spectrum; manage cryptographic material; and Manage the network to C2IS application interface; and ensure LF communications systems can interface with allied military and civilian communications systems, incorporating existing telecommunications standards in their design at defined interface points.
b. c.
d.
e.
7. Equipment Level. At the equipment level, tasks include setting up and maintaining hardware devices. They also
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include the testing, back-loading, repair, and replacement of non-serviceable equipment. 8. Operating System Level. Tasks include setting up and maintaining the tactical computer operating systems, setting up and maintaining the servers and administering services that support the various C2IS applications. The security aspects of these activities are particularly important. 9. Messaging Level. LF C2IS includes the capability to transfer data by both user-originated and automated means. Tasks at this level include set up and maintenance of user messaging and addressing, managing of message stores and managing the message gateway to national and allied systems. 10. Application Level. At the Application level, SM personnel are responsible to set up and manage software loads on workstations and servers, and to set up and maintain the major applications and their associated supporting software. Signals personnel will provide assistance in areas such as back-ups, database management, messaging and data archiving; however, assistance with other applications will be limited. Designated staff (Staff Section Information Manager [SSIM] and Information Management Officer [IMO]) will provide more complex advice concerned with leveraging the applications to support staff processes. 11. Data Level. Management of IS that employ databases is a complex issue that continues to evolve. The critical functions include data planning and modelling, database administration and data administration. The management of data constitutes a significant part of the system management work and responsibility will be shared between the user and signals communities. a. Data Planning and Modelling. The nature of IS employing databases demands that the Land Staff must plan issues of data modelling, data requirements, data usage and data storage across the entire LF. In addition, data interoperability must be established with allies and other services to ensure that relevant information holdings can be exchanged accurately and reliably. Appropriate input from field forces into this activity is necessary.
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b.
Database Administration. This activity relates to the technical aspects of managing data including database (DB) design and maintenance. Related tasks associated with this activity includes maintenance of DB management software, developing DB structure and content, developing security and access rules, developing data queries and conducting information quality assurance (ensuring data integrity), optimizing performance, managing replication activities, carrying out appropriate backup and restoration and extracting and correcting information in appropriate DBs. System management activities generally restore service by returning systems to the current baseline configuration. It is equally important, however, that the data resident on the system is also restored to a state as close as possible to that which existed at the time of failure. Data Administration. Data administration is concerned with how we manage the orderly storage and extraction of information within the C2IS. All individuals within the HQ that employ C2IS applications have standing responsibilities related to this function. These include management of HQ information holdings in accordance with established procedures and adherence to all established information security orders. The major data administration tasks include developing information holdings for users, administering information holdings and provision of data to support decisionmaking.
c.
d.
506.
THE SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT TEAM
1. As discussed throughout this chapter, the operational users and specialist signals personnel share systems management responsibilities. The operational users are the
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experts in the specific applications and perform many of the systems management tasks related to those applications. 2. Signals officers and NCMs are intimately involved in all phases of CIS systems management planning and implementation. At formation HQ, they provide leadership and direction via the SEP, OSC and FC and at the unit via the FC organization. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the CIS SM tasks that specific personnel could be expected to perform. 3. C2IS Users: a. perform routine backup of all working documentation in accordance with approved HQ procedures; and report of all CIS problems to the Help Desk. advise users on routine information backup requirements; advise users on employment of C2 software applications; advise users on file transfer procedures over HQ LDN; and assist users with simple software configurations.
b. 4. a. b. c. d.
Staff Section Information Manager:
5. Communication Facility Operator. The communication facility operator is a Sig Op found at the unit and brigade levels, employed at radio nodes, trunk facilities or their respective FCs, and is responsible for maintaining the communications system. This level receives support from the FC organization and has in-depth knowledge of the radios, communications software and crypto systems. 6. Command Post Signal Operator. The Command Post Signal Operator (CP Sig Op) function is carried out by a Sig Op. The function provides the first level of SM assistance to users in a sub-unit, unit or brigade level HQ. The CP Sig Op has access to the Service Desk software to ensure that users deal with the SM organization only once on a specific CIS problem. With
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appropriate SM training, the CP Sig Op provides the first level of support in a wide variety of areas including: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. initial Help Desk support to users in the CP for CIS issues; assistance in the maintenance of tactical data including backups, archiving and restoration; assistance with geospatial data mission preparation and system initialization; configuration and management of software loads on workstations; configuration and maintenance of operating systems; set-up of designated data devices within the HQ and configuring print services; fault finding and system restoration; and assistance in change of command between HQ.
7. Where problems are outside of the CP Sig Ops knowledge or authority, resolution of the problem would be escalated to the appropriate FC. 8. Unit and HQ Facility Controllers. Facility Controllers are Sig Ops located at the unit and brigade HQ, responsible for managing and controlling the CIS. Beyond the CP Sig Op skills discussed previously, the FC is trained in specialty communications systems software and operating systems and is responsible for management of the LDN and the Tactical Message Handling System (TMHS) within the HQ. In addition, FCs are trained in the management and control of the major IS within the supported HQ and their underlying structure (servers, databases, etc). 9. The FC establishes a Service Desk to coordinate SM support to both IS and communications systems. The Service Desk provides the second level of assistance to users supported by the CP Sig Op and the first level of assistance to others. It records and tracks problems to resolution, provides on-line access to detailed technical information, permits remote access throughout the HQ and provides a comprehensive record of problems for later processing and exploitation. The
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unit FC is the first level to document a System Problem Report (SPR) and does not provide hands-on support to other users. If unable to solve the reported problem, the FC assigns the problem to a technician who pursues the problem, either remotely or by visiting the affected site, until it is resolved. At each stage in the resolution process, the SM organization enters its actions into the Service Desk software.33 10. International Gateway Controllers. Specially trained FCs are located at each international CIS gateway. These controllers are responsible for establishing and maintaining the physical connectivity with corresponding coalition gateways and for implementing the information exchange contracts as directed by the IMO. 11. System Support Operator. A Sig Op provides on-site, on-line, on-system support at both unit and brigade HQs for issues beyond the capability of the CP Sig Op or the appropriate FC. This specially trained System Support Operator (SSO takes action to fix communications and/or IS problems as identified by the FC. The SSO uses portable diagnostic tools, virus tools and using a bulk memory drive, and maintains a problem database for tracking problems and solutions. In essence, the SSO carries out the more advanced system administrator functions while taking trouble calls from the FCs. 12. System Repair Vehicle Technician. An LCIS Tech provides off-site, off-line, off-system technical support in the tactical environment. The System Repair Vehicle Technician (SRV Tech) provides IS and communication system repair and support as identified by the FC and carries out hardware, firmware and software support in isolation using a full suite of test and support equipment. Repairs, modifications and upgrades that are beyond the capabilities of the SRV Tech will be back-loaded to Fourth Line or a contractor facility.
33 Related FC systems management tasks are described in B-GL-331002 Staff Duties for Land Operations.
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3CHAPTER 6 BATTLE PROCEDURE An important difference between the military operation and a surgical operation is that the patient is not tied down. But it is the common fault of generalship to assume that he is. B.H. Liddell Hart Dont delay: The best is the enemy of the good. By this, I mean that a good plan executed violently now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good. General George S. Patton Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemys plan; next best is to attack his alliances; next best is to attack his army; the worst policy is to attack his strongholds. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemys army without fighting is the acme of skill. In war, the way to avoid what is strong is to attack what is weak. Sun Tzu SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Battle Procedure is the entire military process by which a commander receives his orders, makes his plan, issues his orders, prepares and deploys his troops, and executes his mission34. It is the process by which command is exercised and, as such, is facilitated through an integrated command support capability. Conducting it properly is an essential skill that must be mastered at all levels of command. The essence
34
B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations B-GL-331-001/FP-001 6-1
is that battle procedure at all levels is command led. As the scale and complexity of military operations increase, commanders are assisted with increasingly sophisticated command support capabilities.35 2. Figure 6-1 models battle procedure as a continuous process of planning, preparation for and execution of an operation or mission, with each element subject to assessment against the commanders intent, represented by the command and control centre. Decision-making and problem solving occur throughout battle procedure. This chapter will discuss each element of battle procedure as it applies to tactical operations; staff support to the commander, particularly in support of planning; and, some procedural tools available to the staff.
AS SE SS
AS SE SS
PLAN
SS SE AS
ASSESS
Figure 6-1: The Battle Procedure Model
35
Readers should note that the ongoing implementation of automated command, control and information systems (C2IS) might lead to the automation of some components of the procedural tools described in this chapter. Numerical calculations, time estimates, terrain analysis and some war-gaming steps are just a few of the areas that may be subject to automation. Over time, the processes themselves may change as the technology is exploited. B-GL-331-001/FP-001
6-2
ASSESS
PR
EP AR E
COMMAND and CONTROL
SS SE AS
U EC EX TE
Battle Procedure
3. Fundamentally, a commander exercises command and control (C2) by planning for a mission or operation, enabling preparation activities, and directing the execution of the mission or operation. Throughout, the commander continually assesses activities against the ever-changing operating environment in order to make the best decisions possible. The commander, here depicted as the instrument of command and control, is the focus of command and command support activities with the commanders influence impacting the planning, preparation and execution activities that occur throughout Battle Procedure. At the lower tactical levels, C2 resides solely with the commander; at the higher echelons of command, the staff provides the commander with the means to exercise control. 4. Planning, preparing, and executing do not necessarily have distinct start and end points. Planning is continuous. While preparing for or executing one mission, the unit is planning (at least refining plans) for branches and sequels to the current mission or for the next operation or mission. Preparation is also continuous anytime a unit is not executing an operation. Preparing for a specific operation starts with receiving a warning order for that operation, and it always overlaps with planning and continues through execution for some subordinate units. Assessing is continuous and influences all activities. SECTION 2 ASSESS 1. Assessing is the continuous monitoringthroughout planning, preparation, and executionof the current situation and progress of an operation and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. 2. Assessing consists of two distinct tasks: monitoring the current situation and progress of the operation, and evaluating the operation against criteria of success. These tasks take different forms during planning, preparing, and executing. Together, the two tasks assess the reality of the situation against expectations and progress of a plan in a specific situation. 3. Monitoring is continuous observation of the common operating picture (COP) to identify indicators of opportunities for success, threats to the force, and gaps in information. The
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commander and staff develop a plan based on various facts and assumptions. They monitor these to ensure they remain valid and to seek new facts and assumptions that will affect planning and current operations. Often, at lower tactical levels, reports and returns are adequate for monitoring. Sometimes simple reports or communication through a liaison officer may suffice. However, the complexity of operations at higher echelons may require an explicit plan for monitoring. The synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) provide a starting point because they show key points of synchronization and events to monitor. Modern C2 systems allow monitoring to a greater level of detail at higher echelons than before, but the best monitoring is the least intrusive to the unit or event. 4. Evaluating is comparing relevant information (RI) on the situation or operation against criteria to determine success or progress. The COP is used to measure, analyze, and report the performance of forces against these criteria to identify variance from the plan or its assumptions, and to forecast trends. The commander and his staff continuously evaluate the current and projected situation to determine if changes are necessary. One aid to evaluation is the following list of questions: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. Can the force meet the commanders intent? Where is the enemy? Doing what? How? Where are friendly forces? Doing what? How? What is the posture of the enemy force now? What will it be? Where will the friendly force be? What are the enemys problems, and how can we exploit them? What are our problems, and how can we correct them? What are the enemys opportunities, and how can we deny them? What are our opportunities, and how can we exploit them?
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j.
Are any changes needed to our concept? Our task organization? Our mission?
5. By evaluating the answers to these questions, the commander and staff determine the variances and their significance. Determining the significance of variances is necessary to decide what to do. Commanders should not view the task of making adjustments as a problem. In any operation, the enemy is actively trying to defeat the friendly effort. Sometimes the enemy makes an unexpected move or friendly actions are ineffective. Sometimes the environment changes, affecting the performance of both enemy and friendly forces. In all cases, the commander considers adjusting his plan if the variances are or could become significant. 6. Variances are differences between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. There are two forms of variance. The first is an unexpected threat to mission accomplishment or the force. When a threat is recognized, the commander adjusts the plan to eliminate the enemy advantage and restore the friendly advantage or initiative. The second form of variance is an unexpected opportunity to accomplish the mission more effectively. In evaluating variances, the commander recognizes opportunities and threats in time to react effectively. Mission command, guided by the commanders intent, creates and allows earlier recognition of opportunity or threat and faster reactions. 7. The commander uses his visualization as his primary evaluation method; the staff uses its continuously updated staff estimates.
601.
STAFF ESTIMATE
1. A staff estimate is a staff sections continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is progressing according to plan and if future operations are supportable. The staff estimate is the means by which a staff section considers the effects of new information and its impact resulting in updated conclusions and recommendations. The staff estimate assesses the following factors within the staff sections area of expertise and with respect to current and planned operations:
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a. b. c. d.
friendly force capabilities; enemy capabilities; civil considerations; and, environmental effects.
2. During planning, staff estimates initially focus on assessing which course of action (COA) is supportable. Once the commander selects a COA, the staff assesses the status of resources within its area of expertise. During preparation, estimates continue to track resource status. The priority for assessment is on answering commanders critical information requirements (CCIR) that fall within the staffs area of expertise. During execution, staff estimates focus on identifying variances, assessing their effect on achieving the end-state, and recommending corrective action to keep the conduct of the operation within the commanders intent. Assessment during execution also addresses the supportability of possible sequels and future operations. SECTION 3 PLAN 1. The LF utilizes two planning processes that enable the commander to develop a plan: the operational planning process (OPP); and the estimate. The OPP is generally suited for operational or campaign planning, although it has merit for application within tactical planning. Both the estimate and the OPP provide a logical assessment of factors that impact upon and thus shape the selection of a course of action (COA). The OPP is a staff dependent process. The combat estimate is generally performed solely by the commander, although staff can support the formal estimate process under the guidance of the commander. Regardless of the planning process used, the outcome is the provision of a set of instructions to subordinates that reflect decisions for the subsequent preparation and execution of operations. The LF recognizes both intuitive and analytical approaches to problem solving and decision-making. The commander employs both approaches throughout battle procedure depending on the nature of the problem, the available information and the time constraints he faces. 2. This publication will not describe OPP or the estimate process, as they are both engrained within other publications.
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Because command support provides the resources necessary to enable command, it is important to recognize how the staff can support a commanders planning activities. In order to support planning, the staff must be familiar with OPP and the estimate process. The Operational Planning Process is detailed within the CF joint publication B-GJ-005-500/FP-00 CF Operational Planning Process. The estimate process is described within B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations.
602.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
1. Operations begin with an overarching design that guides forces from their current state to the end state. Longrange planning may consider contingencies weeks to months out. As such, it may produce both plans and orders. At the start of a campaign or major operation, long-range planning normally addresses shaping operations to set conditions for success and might involve selecting and prioritizing targets. Plans and orders describe the operations end state, conditions necessary to achieve it, objectives, and broad schemes for achieving them. They provide the starting point for an operation, including the initial task organization, resource allocation, and other control measures. 2. Long-range planning at lower levels may focus on an end-of-rotation end state that represents success for the tour. Setting end-of-rotation end states is more common in campaigns involving large-scale stability operations than in those involving major combat operations. 3. Long-range planning occurs in the plans centre. If a full operations order is required, the plans centre performs OPP as time and commanders guidance allows and prepares the order. The plans centre conducts a handover briefing when responsibility for integrating the order passes to the operations centre. Normally, this occurs during the preparation stage of battle procedure.
603.
MID-RANGE PLANNING
1. Mid-range planning is focused at the next decisive point and may range from hours to days and weeks. Mid-range
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planning includes branch planning and refinement of products from long-range planning, such as branches in concept form and op plans. 2. Mid-range time horizons address planning for shortrange operations not anticipated in the long-range plan. These operations may last weeks or a few months. This horizon includes major branches of ongoing operations. They are frequently separate, clearly identifiable missions with a distinct mission statement, starting time and end state. They require the OPP to develop courses of action and control mechanisms for the operation. Mid-range planning remains the responsibility of the plans centre.
604.
SHORT-RANGE PLANNING
1. During execution, commanders and staffs perform short-range planning to modify the current order based on the commanders assessment of changes in the situation. Shortrange planning focuses on the immediate future. The main product is the fragmentary order (frag O). The operations centre normally performs short-range planning although the plans centre may perform short-range planning in exceptional situations; however, this detracts from the organizations longand mid-range planning capability. 2. Short-range planning involves incorporating branch or sequel plans36 (that may or may not be fully developed) or supporting the commander in making an adjustment decision to counter an unforeseen threat or exploit a friendly opportunity. Nonetheless, short-range planning is normally done in a timeconstrained environment.
605.
TACTICAL PLANNING
1. Planning is the process of deciding beforehand the manner and order of applying actions in order to reach a
Branch PlanA contingency option built into the basic plan for changing the disposition, orientation or direction of movement and for accepting or declining battle. SequelOperations based on the possible outcomes of current operationsvictory, defeat, or stalemate. 6-8 B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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desired goal. Mission command requires plans that provide commanders the flexibility to exploit opportunities and respond to threats. The measure of a good plan is not whether it transpires as designed but if it facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Planning can be a detailed, systematic analysis and evaluation of all factors relating to an operation that provides insight into what might occur to produce an optimum course of action (COA) for mission accomplishment. All planning takes time and must facilitate generating or maintaining tempo. 2. Frequent warning orders and collaborative planning should be used to facilitate parallel planning with subordinates. The main benefits of collaborative planning come as much from engaging meaningfully in the process as from the product itself. While the plan may convey the decision, participating conveys the context of the decision, as well as understanding the available options and the relationships among forces. 3. Receiving a task or mission, or deriving one from an ongoing operation, initiates planning. The commander completes an initial analysis of the requirements by making reference to his task(s) and superior commanders intent or, less formally, to the situation in which he finds himself. It will be necessary for the commander to consider the work of his staff and provide guidance/direction accordingly to focus the staff effort. At a minimum, the commander may consult with his COS/Ops O and his specialist advisors. By the completion of mission analysis, the following must have been determined: a. b. c. d. the time by which a decision must be made; the priorities for staff work, in the form of the commanders planning guidance; the establishment of the commanders critical information requirements (CCIR); and, other time-critical activities may also be initiated.
4. The commanders planning guidance and CCIR will prompt staff activities that will lead to development of one or more courses of action for consideration. Development of a course of action (COA) will demand information requirements that will determine the viability of a COA. Not all information
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requirements or questions can be resolved. Questions regarding issues such as future enemy or civilian activity, surprise, risk and casualties cannot be answered in advance. Evidence can be collected only during execution. For example, if surprise is identified as an essential element for success, the loss of surprise during execution should serve as a trigger to abort the current plan and adopt an alternate COA. Similarly, the success or failure of a particular COA may hinge on a requirement to have a designated level of combat power available during a later phase. The lack of this combat power might again serve as a trigger to modify or abort the plan. These types of questions are identified as CCIR and must be closely monitored during execution. 5. If, following COA development, multiple COAs remain under consideration, it is necessary to compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of each in relation to the aim. Military judgement must be exercised when comparing potential COAs. Criteria/characteristics may be empirical or nonempirical and may be weighted to account for the relative importance placed on each by the commander. a. Empirical Comparison. COAs are compared against measurable criteria. For example: COA 1 puts me on the objective faster than COA2. COA 3 requires less rail and air transport than COA 1. COA 2 costs less than COA 3. Non-Empirical Comparison. COAs are compared against non-measurable criteria. For example: COA1 provides greater security than COA 2 if the enemy launches a spoiling attack. COA 3 provides greater opportunity to exploit the counterattack than COA 1. COA 2 presents greater risk of collateral damage than COA 1.
b.
6. The normal outcome of this comparison is the selection of a single COA. Regardless, the commander may still want to maintain a number of potential COAs for more detailed analysis. In this case, COA comparison may be used to narrow the number of options to be considered for subsequent analysis. The COAs maintained at this point are subject to further refinement as planning proceeds.
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7. A COA is normally articulated as an outline plan. An outline plan describes a COA in a format suitable for subsequent development into a formal order or plan. The essential elements of an outline plan include: a. b. c. d. the mission statement; the commanders intent; an initial allocation of combat power to each subordinate HQ (task organization); a narrative description of the COA (concept of operations), including identification of the main effort; assignment of essential tasks within the concept of operations to subordinate combat and combat support HQ; essential control measures; essential elements of combat service support concept; and essential elements of the command and information systems (CIS) support concept.
e.
f. g. h.
8. While the purpose of planning is to reach a reasoned decision, there may be a requirement in some situations to present the results of the process to a superior commander. Regardless of how the results of the estimate are presented, the originator must ensure that all assumptions used during the planning process are clearly identified to the individuals responsible for execution. The results may be presented verbally or in writing. a. Verbal Presentations. Verbal presentations are normally used during on-going military operations. Written Presentation. The use of formal written estimates is normally reserved for use by staff officers in complex and non-time constrained environments. The general format normally includes the following paragraphs: (1) Paragraph 1Aim (mission statement and intent).
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b.
Paragraph 2Evaluation of Factors (describes each COA developed). (3) Paragraph 3COA Comparison (describes relative advantages and disadvantages of each COA). (4) Paragraph 4Decision (or Recommendation). 9. The commander must ensure that the detailed plan, including the issue of subsequent directives or orders, is completed in sufficient time to allow the completion of the remainder of battle procedure. This imperative for timely decision-making applies down to the lowest level of command to ensure that soldiers are properly prepared before being committed to action. Thus, a running check on the time available to make a decision and to issue orders must be maintained at every level of command. 10. The one-third/two-thirds rule, whereby one level of command takes only one third of the time remaining before committal for decision-making and the issue of orders, is a good rule of thumb. However, this guide must not be applied inflexibly. Decisions will normally need to be made as quickly as possible. 11. The selected COA is communicated to subordinates as an operation order or plan. It may be disseminated orally and/or as a collection of text and graphic documents. It should be noted that detailed planning generally provides the greatest benefit to the early phases of tactical operations. Given the increased uncertainty associated with later phases of any operation, it is generally desirable to provide broader direction and subsequently refine the concepts after operations begin. 12. Assessment during planning focuses on three tasks: a. developing situational understanding; b. establishing criteria of success, normally measures of effectiveness (MoE) or measures of performance (MoP); and c. evaluating COAs for the commanders decision.
(2)
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UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN UGANDA AND RWANDA 1994 When leading the multinational United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda (UNAMIR), General Dallaire was forced to adjust his planning process due to ill-defined goals and the operational environment. UNAMIR suffered from a multi faceted, complex and unclear mandate, which included but was not limited to, ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitoring the ceasefire agreement; assisting with mine-clearance; and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations. Additionally, nations were reluctant to contribute experienced personnel to the mission, resulting in a staff that was inexperienced with formal planning processes. With such unclear goals and lacking experienced personnel, a change to the traditional planning process was necessary. Accordingly General Dallaire undertook the mission analysis and initial estimate himself, to focus his thinking and to develop realistic options in relation to the broad mandate. He then passed the process to his senior staff, who flushed out the essential details before back briefing him. Undertaking the planning process in such a manner was essentialas General Dallaire was provided with a weak staff from contributing nations, suffering from a lack of experience and training, as well as language limitations. Additionally General Dallaire was frequently the only one aware of both the policy and strategic level objectives; often forced to work on both the operational and tactical level simultaneously. While this process worked well in this complex environment, it is unlikely that it would be ideal in the typical Canadian Forces (CF) operation, with a contingent comprised of four levels of command, each with their own supporting staff. Still, the ability to overcome obstacles to the traditional planning process in such situations is essential, both in the commander and his staff.
Sources: Dallaire, Romeo. Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2004. Comments by Major Brent Beardsley, 14 August 2006. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 6-13
OPERATION ATHENA Every nation in a multinational brigade, including Canada, sends its contingent with a National Command Element, undeclared national assets, and operational caveats. These national constraints impose significant challenges, as the brigade commander must consider, respect or challenge national caveats in all operational planning. When planning, the commander and staff must also address different capacities, cultures, histories, communications limitations, capabilities and standard operating procedures (SOPs) of participating nations. These problems were clearly in Afghanistan under the International Stabilization Assistance Force, where 38 different NATO and non-NATO nations participated under the NATO umbrella. Here the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) was forced to deal with nations operating under very different concepts of national interest, SOPs, and areas of operation. Unfortunately while all allies signed NATO rules of engagement, each operated under their own national caveats, with some nations failing to inform the KMNB command of precisely what those caveats were. Additionally some nations retained troops and resources under national control, even though they were not restricted from falling under KMNB control, which would have allowed greater unity of effort. Operations not included in the initial tasking, or outside the limits of the Kabul area of operations, posed an additional challenge to planning. Units would have to refer to their national contingent commanders for authorization to engage in additional tasking, who in turn, would likely contact their home nations for approval for operations outside Kabul. Individual nations speed in receiving authorization for missions from their home governments varied dramatically, ranging from forty minutes to many days. This curtailed the planning process, as nations with the requisite capabilities to undertake a mission often could not receive authorization in time, or until minutes before the operation commenced.
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To respond to these problems, the Canadian commander and his staff engaged in an unconventional exercise. Distributing a number of scenarios to the contributing national and tactical commanders, they posed numerous questions regarding each forces ability. These included: what are the national caveats that KMNB headquarters should know about? What are the constraints of your government for each of those scenarios? Where are you going to be when this scenario occurs? In doing so the commander and his staff were better able to ascertain the limits of different national forces at the onset of the mission, thereby assisting the operational planning process. Staff was then able to easily allocate duties to nations who were able to complete the required tasking, as opposed to assigning missions only to learn that the recipient nation was restricted from undertaking such operations.
Source: Interview conducted by Colonel Bernard Horn with Brigadier General Peter Devlin, Commander KMNB, Operation ATHENA ROTO 0
606.
STAFF SUPPORT TO PLANNING
1. The complexity of military operations, the lack of specialist expertise and the need to develop a detailed plan as rapidly as possible lead to a requirement for an increased command support capability in the form of staff, CIS and structured procedures. In general terms, the staff support the commanders planning by providing him with relevant information that he might otherwise overlook; confirming the feasibility of potential COA; identifying risks associated with potential COA; and ensuring that operation orders and plans have sufficient detail to enable execution by subordinate commanders. It should be noted that the commander has the final decision on what information he chooses to incorporate into his own decision-making. 2. Staff procedures employed during the OPP are described in more detail in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. The OPP is the planning process that is normally employed at unit and formation level. The commander can direct in his planning guidance whether an abbreviated OPP is to be employed or to what degree the staff is to support
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completion of the commanders estimate, should he choose that planning option. In a command-centric environment, the general principal is that commanders create solutions while staffs develop and confirm solutions. Since the OPP is staff dependant, what follows is related to the staff support required for each stage of the OPP as they relate to planning (initiation, orientation, COA development, plan development) and preparation (plan review). 3. Initiation. The HQ planning team will process the superior commanders order concurrently with the commander. This allows the planning team to support the commanders initial visualization by providing him with a deeper understanding of the functional area constraints and tasks as required. Following his initial read of the superior commanders order a commander must issue preliminary guidance to the staff. This may include: a. Direction for the staff to prepare and issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting HQ. Critical timings to include when he wants to issue his operation order. The COS/Ops O will base his planning timeline on this information. Direction on liaison officers to dispatch. Any additional tasks the commander requires the staff to accomplish including the collection of additional information required to answer any questions arising from his reading of the operation order.
b.
c. d.
4. Orientation. Orientation includes the commanders mission analysis and subsequent orientation of the staff towards the commanders requirements for the new operation. The commander may seek staff support to assist him in answering essential questions regarding the content and implications of the superior commanders order and to complete his estimate. This support may be solicited informally through discussions with relevant staff officers or formally through a mission analysis briefing. An example format for a mission analysis briefing is contained in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. 5. The outcome of the commanders visualization process was one or more COAs described in an outline plan format.
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As operational complexity increases, the level of uncertainty increases. The OPP recognizes this difficulty and the staff must be prepared to receive commanders planning guidance that ranges from the very general to the very specific. 6. At one extreme, the staff may be required to develop multiple COAs based solely on the commanders intent and limited functional area guidance. At the other extreme, the commander may provide the staff with a single relatively welldeveloped COA. In either case, the commander will communicate the initial results of his mission analysis in the form of commanders planning guidance. 7. The commanders planning guidance provides the framework for all subsequent planning activity by the staff. As a minimum, the commanders planning guidance to the staff will include: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. The mission statement. The commanders intent. The level of acceptable risk. Confirmation of the commanders area of interest. The commanders initial information requirements (CCIR). The commanders current assumptions. Any critical constraints or restraints to be incorporated by the staff. Examples include critical timings, C2 arrangements, guidance on the reserve or direction on sustainment. When planning during ongoing operations, a description of one or more potential COAs will normally be included to focus subsequent staff efforts.
h.
8. COA Development. The purpose of COA development is to refine the concept(s) presented by the commander in his planning guidance. Staff activity will be aimed at developing one or more COAs in sufficient detail to enable subsequent decision-making by the commander. Each planning team member:
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a. b. c.
Develops initial support concepts for each COA based on the commanders planning guidance. Confirms the feasibility of each COA within his area of staff expertise. Identifies potential functional area threats to each COA and recommends refinements to mitigate these threats. Ensures that operational functions within each COA are synchronized and integrated. Updates information collection plans to confirm/deny planning assumptions or to resolve designated CCIR. Provides feedback to the commander as COA development proceeds and information requirements are resolved.
d. e.
f.
9. During COA development, a variety of activities and processes may/will be performed that will support the staff in developing relevant COAs. Some activities and processes are essential to the completion of the OPP while the use of others is discretionary. 10. War-gaming is a simulation of military operations, by whatever means, using specific rules, data, methods and procedures. The staff employs war-gaming to visualize the interaction of friendly forces, enemy forces and the ground within a single COA. This visualization assists the staff in testing the viability of COA(s) by assessing: a. b. c. Suitability (does it accomplish the mission and commanders intent). Feasibility (force structure and resources to mount and sustain). Acceptability (does it account for constraints placed on the operation, does it account for the limitations on risk articulated by the commander). Completeness (does it address all operational functions). This becomes an iterative process
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d.
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as the planning team analyses and refines options. 11. War-gaming enables the staff to identify potential threats to the mission if a COA is adopted. The staff then refines the COA or develops branch plans to mitigate the threats. If multiple COAs are under consideration, war games provide a common framework to compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of each COA. A full discussion of war gaming is included in B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. 12. Risk management is the process of identifying and assessing risks arising from operational factors, and implementing reasonable controls to reduce threats. The objective of risk management is not the elimination of risk but rather the identification and removal of unnecessary risk. Risk management is an integral element of military planning. The process of weighing risks against opportunities and benefits increases the probability of success. 13. The risk management process consists of identifying potential threats through a threat assessment and then analyzing their severity and probability to determine overall risk. Controls are developed or identified to mitigate the level of risk until it becomes acceptable to the commander. Once implemented, follow-up action is essential to ensure the level of residual risk remains acceptable. While the completion of various assessments in the risk management process is a staff responsibility, the ultimate decision to accept the level of risk involved in a mission belongs solely to the commander. 14. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) complements the OPP and at its most fundamental level is integral to planning at all levels of command. A detailed discussion of IPB and its relation to the OPP is included in BGL-357-001/FP-001 Intelligence Field Manual. IPB is a graphical form of an intelligence estimate and describes a structured process that can be used to infer probable future enemy activity. At unit level and above, intelligence staffs lead this activity. Intelligence staffs are supported by specialist staff that provides subject matter expertise as required. The results of this process are normally displayed as doctrinal products (e.g. situational templates, event templates). IPB is a continuous process that is conducted throughout battle
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procedure and products must be maintained. These products are used by the planning team to assist with COA development and for identification of information collection requirements. Operations staffs also use them as battle tracking tools once preparation and execution activities begin. 15. Targeting is a vital component of the conduct of operations. Within the contemporary operating environment, it is vital that the concept of what constitutes a target and the ensuing targeting process be broad enough to include and consider targeting through physical and intellectual activities on both the physical and moral planes. The targeting process involves more than the application of fires; it is the process of selecting, prioritizing and creating effects. This is achieved through the execution of the appropriate activity to create that effect and assessing the result. In doing so it accounts for the operational environment and force capabilities. Targeting has utility across the spectrum of conflict, on both the physical and moral planes, utilising lethal and non-lethal activities. The targeting function links targets with effects throughout the battlespace and provides a logical process that ensures consistency with the commanders intent. The targeting process supports commanders in decision-making. 16. The targeting cycle provides a systematic approach to enable the generation of the right activities at the right times against the right targets, to create the desired effects. It is a dynamic process that allows activities to be rapidly adjusted to meet changing situations when required. Targeting is based on the commander and his targeting board performing a continuous cycle of steps: decide, detect, track, deliver and assess. The targeting cycle and the entire planning process should be supported by staff officers whose function is to harmonise and synchronise planning and targeting on both the physical and moral planes.37 17. Brainstorming is a creative thinking technique that encourages members of the staff to exchange their ideas in an
37
The targeting process is described within B-GL-300-001 Land Operations, while detailed staff procedures related to the targeting process are described within B-GL-331-002 Staff Duties for Land Operations. B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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open and informal manner and is particularly useful in resolving complex, ill-defined problems. The brainstorming session begins with the team leader describing to the participating staff the problem under analysis. Team members attempt to generate as many potential solutions as possible without considering feasibility. While many of the resulting ideas will prove of little value, those that remain are often very helpful. 18. A staff check is an information collection and/or processing activity aimed at answering a specific question. Staff checks are differentiated from other information collection activities in that there is normally no requirement to deploy reconnaissance or surveillance assets to collect the information. Many of these staff checks are facilitated through the C2IS tools. Geographic information system (GIS) databases may resolve questions regarding feasibility of crossing sites, intervisibility between proposed battle positions, and general time/space calculations. Intelligence databases may resolve questions regarding enemy doctrine or specific unit/equipment capabilities. Access to near real time personnel and logistics databases facilitate movement and transportation staff checks. When time permits, review of lessons learned databases might assist staffs in identifying problems encountered during similar missions and their subsequent solutions. 19. Operational research (OR) can be used before and during operations. It is particularly useful when applied to problems that lend themselves to mathematical measurement. Important applications include the determination of force ratios (OR techniques allow for an assessment of qualitative differences) and the evaluation of plans. Historically, OR has also been used with success to recommend tactical or operational techniques for exploiting enemy vulnerabilities or protecting our own, particularly in circumstances where an opponent has no previously recognized doctrine. OR also has an important role in the production and validation of data used in war-gaming. 20. Plan Development. Plan development may include: a. b. Presenting results of the war game to the commander for selection and approval. Identifying and resolving any issues or shortfalls identified by the supported commander.
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c.
Preparing the text and graphical documents (operation orders and plans) that communicate the command decisions. Developing branch plans and sequels, if deemed necessary. Submitting planning documents for final approval. Approval authority may be delegated on a case by case basis to the principal staff officer (COS/Ops O). Disseminating the orders and plans. SECTION 4 PREPARE
d. e.
f.
1. Preparation activities will vary from mission to mission and echelon of command but encompass the following: a. Rehearsalsan act or process of practicing an activity in preparation for the actual performance of that activity. One or more of the following rehearsal types can be employed: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.
6-22
confirmation brief; back brief; combined arms rehearsal; support rehearsal; drill or SOP rehearsal;
Inspections. Preliminary movement. Subordinate planning and preparation. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) activities. Security. Force protection. Revisions and refinement to the plan. Coordination and liaison.
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Battle Procedure
j. k.
Training. Computer information systems preparations.
2. Preparation creates conditions within which friendly forces improve their chances of success. During preparation, commanders update and validate their visualization as they receive relevant information and assessments from staff estimates. As new information is received, the situational awareness changes: assumptions may prove true or false; intelligence may confirm or deny enemy actions or environmental conditions; the status of friendly forces may change. As judgement is applied, the significance of the changes and the possible impact on the operation is determined. Significant new information requires one of the following assessments to be made with respect to the current plan/order: a. b. c. the new information validates the current order or plan; the new information requires adjusting the order; or the new information invalidates the current order.
607.
STAFF SUPPORT TO PREPARATION
1. Plan Review. Normally, the outline plan(s) is subject to further refinement or revision. These refinements may lead to new or amended tasks, control measures, or resource allocations to create a more effective plan. Review of the plan is driven by the integration of new information collected and/or processed by the commander. Relevant information may be collected from a wide variety of sources or processes including personal or subordinate reconnaissance, rehearsals, staff checks, war-gaming and liaison teams. Plan review: a. Ensures that all essential direction needed by subordinates to enable successful execution has been included (e.g. the detailed allocation of logistic stores). Ensures that the plan remains feasible as original assumptions are confirmed or denied.
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b.
c.
Ensures that the plan is refined to mitigate new risks as they emerge or are identified. Plan refinement includes the development of branch plans.
2. The developed plan/orders will be handed over to the operations centre, which then becomes responsible for its integration and execution. The handover from the plans centre to the operations centre may occur before or after a rehearsal, depending upon the situation and established standing operating procedures (SOP). 3. During preparation, the staff continues to update and refine products produced during planning. a. The intelligence cycle focuses on providing an updated picture of the environment and threat based on new information gathered through collection and processing. The intelligence staff also ensures that products are available and disseminated to subordinate units. Reconnaissance and surveillance activities often begin during planning in order to fill information gaps identified during mission analysis. Once a plan is developed, ISTAR activities continue to fulfil the need to gather required information and intelligence, however the continuation of certain ISTAR activities should be evaluated against operational security considerations in order to ensure the plan is not compromised. The targeting process continues with a focus on detection and tracking. Target acquisition assets gather information and report their findings to their controlling headquarters, which passes pertinent information to the tasking HQ. Not all information benefits targeting but it may contribute to developing the overall situation. Situations arise where the attack of a target is either impossible or undesirable. In these cases, critical targets are then tracked to maintain contact in order to facilitate attack later.
B-GL-331-001/FP-001
b.
c.
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4. Internal and external coordination and liaison continues after planning to ensure synchronization. An established battle rhythm assists in facilitating ongoing HQ activities and processes. The battle rhythm provides a schedule for the commander and staff that coordinates routine meetings, working groups, and reports and returns. 5. Rehearsals are the means by which a commander can ensure that his staff and subordinates understand the commanders intent and concept of operations. Rehearsals assist the staff to confirm the battle rhythm and update synchronization matrices. Rehearsals also identify key points and times requiring coordination or solve previously unidentified coordination problems. 6. Once the operation order has been distributed, receiving units will implement directed force protection activities. The effectiveness of the force protection activities is subjected to supervision and review throughout. Supervision is required to ensure force protection activities are properly implemented, required changes are identified, corrective action is taken to correct ineffective force protection activities and that risk and the effectiveness of force protection activities are reevaluated when conditions change. Force protection supervision is the responsibility of the operations staff. After force protection activities are applied, a review must be conducted to determine if risks and the mission are in balance. 7. Assessment during preparation consists of: a. b. Determining friendly force readiness to execute the mission. Determining changes in the threat and civil considerations from those developed during planning. SECTION 5 EXECUTE 1. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish a mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and
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adjustment decisions38. While the exercise of command and control (C2) during planning and preparation is essential, its real focus is the execution of operations. 2. Decisions made during execution fall into two general categories: a. Execution Decisions. If the plan remains valid, these decisions dictate what needs to be done next in order to meet mission success. Included here are decisions to activate branch plans and sequels. The decision support template (DST) provides a valuable tool to monitor and activate specific execution decisions. Adjustment Decisions. These decisions are aimed at exploiting unforeseen opportunities or eliminating unforeseen threats to mission accomplishment. These decisions are guided by the commanders intent and result in changes to the current plan. While the information necessary to recognise these opportunities or risks is provided through established feedback mechanisms, recognition and subsequent decision making is often driven by intuition.
b.
3. During execution, the commander is faced with continuous change in his operating environment. Some of these changes have been anticipated and accounted for in his current or branch plans, while other changes are unforeseen. These changes may represent opportunity or risk and in either case must be recognised at the earliest opportunity. Anticipated changes normally provide sufficient time for an analytical response represented by branch plans, while unforeseen changes tend to drive the commander to a more rapid intuitive response. 4. The commander and staff monitor the feedback information held in the common operating picture (COP) to identify both anticipated and unforeseen variances in the
38
AJP 3.2.1 Command and Control of Land Forces (Draft) B-GL-331-001/FP-001
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situation as originally envisaged by the commander. The commander and staff assess the impact on mission success of these variances. If the situation confirms the visualization or requires only minor adjustments, execution of the plan proceeds. If the situation shows the visualization to be unrealistic, the visualization and plan must be adjusted. Adjustment may require modification of the commanders concept of operations or, in drastically changed situations, modification to his mission and intent. The follow-on effects of these modifications include amendments to CCIR, updating of ISTAR plans, and adjustment of success criteria and dissemination of orders to ensure synchronized action. Once amendments are made, execution and assessment continue. 5. The execution of any plan requires that certain critical functions be constantly maintained. These ongoing functions include: a. Focus on the Decisive Operation. As adjustments are made, the commander and staff must ensure that resources that are now irrelevant or out of position are refocused or repositioned to support the main effort and commanders intent. b. Continuous Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be continuously employed. These resources are a critical source of information to identify both opportunity and threat. c. Security Operations. Commanders must continue to look beyond assigned security tasks to identify new threats and tasks. d. Force Protection. Sustaining and support actions, although not directly engaging the enemy, are necessary to support those forces that are. These actions must be protected and preserved. Force protection, if not planned and executed accordingly, may jeopardize success. e. Adjust Information Collection Requirements. The information collection plan must be continuously adjusted as questions are answered and new questions arise. While the priority of these collection tasks is command
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f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
driven, the staff must maintain situational awareness and manage the collection efforts. Adjust Control Measures. Control measures may be adjusted in situations where there is significant force movement. This is particularly important for those control measures relating to fire support. Battle Tracking. Battle tracking is defined as monitoring designated elements of the COP that are tied to the criteria for success. Battle tracking is a primary responsibility of the Operations Centre. It applies to the progress of both ground and air manoeuvre. Specific battle tracking tools include current situation displays, decision support matrices, attack guidance matrices and information collection plans. Monitor Airspace Control Measures. The Operations Centre must maintain awareness of current airspace control measures to determine their effects on ground operations and in turn, to determine the effect of ground operations on airspace control measures. For example, specific artillery fire missions or training activities may require the adjustment of transit routes for assigned aviation. Continue Liaison and Coordination. Plan adjustments must be synchronized both internally and externally between units and combat functions. Written or graphical orders will rarely be sufficient and personal contact through liaison teams and staff coordination will remain essential. Commanders and staffs must understand the impacts created on flanking and higher HQ operations because of adjustments and ensure that potential friction is minimized. Targeting. Target information and selection must be continuously updated to support adjustments in the plan. Manage Movement and Positioning of Combat Support and Combat Service Support Elements. The ability to mass combat
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l.
power at the decisive points may be constrained if manoeuvre assets are left without the necessary combat support and combat service support (CSS). Sufficient time must be provided to position these assets in support of decisive operations. Terrain Management. While the C2IS will assist staffs in terrain management through the provision of accurate position information, this remains an essential HQ activity. Headquarters must manage terrain in both time and space to allow sufficient terrain for manoeuvre and to control the use of limited routes.
SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES AND PROCESSES 1. Table 6-1 encapsulates the command and control activities that occur during Battle Procedure. Throughout, coordination and management functions must occur in order to provide the mechanisms for effective control. Specific staff branches or elements perform these functions, with the commander providing appropriate guidance and direction as required.
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ASSESS PLAN
Estimate Operational Planning Process
PREPARE
Rehearsals Inspections Preliminary Movement Subordinate Planning and Preparation ISTAR Activities Security Force Protection Revisions and Refinements to the Plan Training Coordination and Liaison Command and Information Systems Preparation ONGOING C2 ACTIVITIES Battlespace Management
EXECUTE
Assessing the current state and forecasting progress of the operation Making execution and adjustment decisions to account for unforeseen enemy actions and to exploit opportunities Directing actions to apply combat power to accomplish the mission.
Information Operations Coordination Fire Support Coordination Force Protection Coordination Combat Service Support Coordination Information Management Systems Management Table 6-1: Command and Control Activities
2. Table 6-2 outlines the aspects of the key command and control processes that occur during Battle Procedure. By doing so, it showcases the linkage between key activities by highlighting the concurrent and interactive requirements of the processes when exercising command and control.
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Battle Procedure
ASSESS PLAN PREPARE EXECUTE
INITIATION -Receive Initiating Directive -Comds Initial Direction -Issue Preliminary Warning Order (wng O) ORIENTATION -Conduct Mission Analysis -Deliver Mission Analysis Brief -Issue Comds Planning Guidance Operations Planning Process COURSE OF ACTION PLAN REVIEW DEVELOPMENT Ref: B-GJ-005-Plan Review -Analyse Factors 500/FP-000 CF -Plan Evaluation -Develop COAs Operational Planning Process -Deliver Information Brief -Validation -Decision Brief -Concept of Operations (CONOPS) PLAN DEVELOPMENT -CONOPS Approval -Develop Plan and Annexes -Plan Approval -Issue Plan/Operation Order DECIDE -Identify Target Types -Identify Target Areas -Establish Target DETECT Accuracy Land Force Targeting Process -Input to Intelligence Collection Plan TRACK -Establish Criteria for Success -Develop Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)
DELIVER ASSESS
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ASSESS PLAN PREPARE EXECUTE
COLLECTION -Information DIRECTION Gathering -Identification of the -Delivery of Intelligence Problem Intelligence Cycle and Priority Intelligence Information Ref: B-GL-357PROCESSING Requirements (PIR) 001/FP-001 -Collation -Intelligence Intelligence Field Estimate/IPB -Evaluation Manual -Intelligence Planning -Analysis -Collection -Integration Management -Interpretation DISSEMINATION ISTAR Process Ref: B-GL-352001/FP-001 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Risk Management Process Ref: B-GJ-005502/FP-000 Risk Management for CF Operations -Draft Named Areas of Interest/Target Areas of Interest -Draft High-Value Targets (HVT)/HighPayoff Targets (HPT) -Draft ISTAR Overlay -Finalize ISTAR Overlay, HVTs, HPTs -Complete ISTAR Matrix -Identify Threats -Assess Threats -Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions -Implement Controls Information Collection by Sensors Assessment of Information Information Disseminated
Battle Damage Assessment (as required)
Supervise and Review
Table 6-2: Integration of Command and Control Processes
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COMMAND SUPPORT IN LAND OPERATIONS

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Issued on the Authority of the Chief of Land Staff

COMMAND SUPPORT IN LAND OPERATIONS

This publication becomes active on receipt.

Issued on the Authority of the Chief of Land Staff

OPI: DAD 6-2

Command Support in Land Operations

Command Support in Land Operations

Command Support in Land Operations

Command Support in Land Operations

Command Support in Land Operations

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................... 6-1 SECTION 2 ASSESS ....................................................... 6-3 601.

Staff Estimate .............................................. 6-5

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3CHAPTER 1 CONTROL AND COMMAND SUPPORT

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Control and Command Support

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Control and Command Support

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Control and Command Support

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Control and Command Support

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Control and Command Support

AJP 3.2.1 Command and Control of Land Forces.

Command Support in Land Operations

Control and Command Support

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AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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Figure 1-1: Command Support Resources

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Table 2-1: Staff Information Management Responsibilities

Relevant Information Information Management Activity

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Figure 2-1: Generic Staff Model

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Figure 2-2: Canadian Brigade HQ Staff Components

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Figure 2-3: Example Canadian BG HQ Staff Components

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1ANNEX A GENERAL CRERARS INSTRUCTIONS TO STAFF OFFICERSHEADQUARTERS 1ST CANADIAN ARMY

Command Support in Land Operations

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Senior Administrative Staff Officer B-GL-331-001/FP-001 2A-5

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Figure 3-1: Generic HQ Structure