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Railway Group Standard

GK/RT0063

Issue One Date November 1996

Signatures removed from electronic version Submitted by

Richard Genner Nominated Responsible Manager Approved by

Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Philip Wiltshire Chairman, Train Control and Communications Subject Committee Approved by Synopsis This document defines the safety critical requirements provided to maintain the safety of an approaching train after withdrawal of the authority to proceed and for the provision of Train Operated Route Release. This document is the property of Railtrack PLC. It shall not be reproduced in whole or in part without the written permission of the Controller, Safety Standards, Railtrack PLC. Published by Safety & Standards Directorate, Railtrack PLC, Floor 2, Fitzroy House, 355 Euston Road, London NW1 3AG Copyright 1996 Railtrack PLC

Michael Harwood Chairman, Operations Standards Subject Committee

Authorised by

Dr. M. H. Walter Controller, Safety Standards

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Railway Group Standard

GK/RT0063

Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Issue One Date November 1996 Page 1 of 8

Contents
Section Part A Issue Record Responsibilities and Distribution Compliance Health and Safety Responsibilities Supply Part B 1 2 3 4 5 Appendices A Approach Locking Additional Information 7 Purpose Scope Definitions Approach Locking Train Operated Route Release 3 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 Description Page

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Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Part A
Issue Record
This standard will be updated when necessary by distribution of a complete replacement. Amended or additional parts of revised pages will be marked by a vertical black line in the adjacent margin. Issue 1 Date November 96 Comments New Standard replacing SSP19 and GS/ST0059 which are withdrawn.

Responsibilities and Distribution

Controlled copies of this standard shall be complied with by all personnel who are responsible for new works or alterations where Signalling Scheme Plan approval is given on or after 7 April 1997.

Compliance
The provisions of this Railway Group Standard are mandatory for design and implementation work undertaken on schemes for which the Signalling Scheme Plan is approved on or after 7th April 1997. Retrospective action is not required in respect of existing layouts and Signalling Scheme Plans approved prior to 7th April 1997. Railtrack shall consider the need to adopt the requirements of this Standard on a Signalling Scheme where an alteration to the approved Signalling Scheme Plan is made on or after 7th April 1997.

Health and Safety Responsibilities

In authorising this Standard Railtrack PLC makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with all or any of Railway Group Standards is sufficient on its own to ensure safe systems of work or operation. Each user is reminded of its own responsibilities to ensure health and safety at work and its individual duties under health and safety legislation.

Supply
Controlled and uncontrolled copies of this standard may be obtained from The Catalogue Secretary, Railtrack Safety & Standards Directorate, Floor 2, Fitzroy House, 355 Euston Road, London, NW1 3AG. Telephone: Facsimile: 00 35903 or 0171 830 5903 (BT) 00 35776 or 0171 830 5776 (BT)

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Railway Group Standard

GK/RT0063

Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Issue One Date November 1996 Page 3 of 8

Part B
1 Purpose
To define the safety critical requirements to maintain the safety of an approaching train after the withdrawal of an authority to proceed, and to automatically release the route after the passage of a train.

Scope
This standard covers the application and release of approach locking together with manual and train operated route release for all forms of interlocking systems other than RETB.

Definitions
Approach Locking The locking of any route from a signal, when the driver has seen or may have seen a proceed aspect at a signal that would indicate to the driver that the former signal is displaying a proceed aspect. If the signal is replaced to danger, the approach locking prevents the immediate release of the route because it is possible that an approaching train may be unable to stop. Train Operated Route Release (TORR) A method of releasing a route after the passage of a train without further action from the signalman.

Approach Locking
4.1 Principles of Provision There are many circumstances in which a signalman has legitimate cause to replace a signal to danger even though the driver of an approaching train may not be able to respond to that (or an associated) change of aspect in time to bring his train to a stand at the replaced signal. If such signal replacement permitted immediate release of the controls on the route, there is significant risk that the train would enter a route in which points were free to move or against which a conflicting route could be set. Approach locking is applied to reduce these risks to as low as reasonably practicable. Approach Locking shall prevent, until it is safe to do so, the changing of the route ahead of a signal/indicator once the driver has had an opportunity to observe a proceed aspect at the signal or an aspect at a previous signal that would indicate that the signal had displayed a proceed aspect. Change of route includes: the opening of moveable bridges; the releasing of ground frames/switch panels; operation of derailers, etc.. Change of route also includes the opening of level crossings to road traffic where the level crossing: is interlocked with the signalling, or; is an automatic level crossing with one or more signals positioned between the strike in point(s) and the level crossing.

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Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Where a train movement can be observed by the signalman or other person controlling the movement and risk assessment shows that approach locking need not be provided, it may be omitted subject to the approval of Railtrack. 4.2 Principles of Applying and Releasing Approach Locking Approach Locking shall usually be applied consistently throughout each installation to all signals carrying interlocking with points, level crossings, moveable bridges and derailers, etc. Approach Locking shall be effective immediately upon display of a proceed aspect. Approach locking release shall take account of all risks associated with premature replacement of the signal and release of the route. A manual request by the signalman to cancel the route ahead of a signal shall be stored until release of the approach locking is obtained, however the signal shall be replaced to red immediately. Approach locking shall be released, after replacement of the signal to danger, by either:

or

the train detected passing the signal such that the route or track locking is effective for the route ahead of the train (refer to Appendix A2); a reasonable assurance being obtained that any approaching train has come to a stand at or before the replaced signal (refer to Appendix A3);

or

proof of no train approaching being obtained (refer to Appendix A4).

The acceptable method(s) of release after premature replacement by the signalman shall ensure that the risks are reduced to as low as reasonably practicable. The release shall take into account appropriate elapsed time based on the type and speed of traffic or, where it would be operationally expedient, to have proof of no train approaching. Where shunting signals are cleared as part of a main route (preset shunts) the release of approach locking on the shunting signal shall be inhibited. Route release shall require the release of the approach locking on the main signal. Detection of approaching trains shall cover a minimum of 45 m (50 yards) approaching the signal. Where such train detection is not provided, the release condition must assume that a train is present. 4.2.1 Release by Train Having Passed Signal Proof of a train having passed the signal shall require the sequential operation of train detection at the signal in the direction of traffic, protected against irregular release due to power, transmission or other failure.

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GK/RT0063

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Issue One Date November 1996 Page 5 of 8

The approach locking release by a train passing the signal shall be held until a separate cancellation or release of the route is obtained either by:

or

a manual request by the signalman (if the signalman has previously replaced the signal this will be satisfied); train operated route release where provided.

4.2.2 Release by Elapsed Time The minimum time release shall not be less than 30 seconds. An indication of the approach locking awaiting a timed release shall be given to the signalman after a manual request. Where there is no separate overlap track circuit, the distance from the signal in rear to the point at which route locking ahead of the replaced signal becomes effective shall be taken into account to determine the length of time delay. Suitable time delays for the release of approach locking under a variety of different conditions are included in Appendix A.

Train Operated Route Release

5.1 General Principles Train Operated Route Release (TORR) shall be provided at the request of Railtrack to avoid the need for the signalman to cancel the route after each train. Automatic Route Setting Systems shall require the provision of TORR. TORR shall be inhibited if a signal is set to work automatically. If automatic operation is cancelled and the route remains set, TORR shall operate for the next train movement. The design of TORR shall take into account all the relevant risks to ensure safe operation. Generally these will be the same risks as considered for the release of approach locking for the signal. Specifically, where a combination of short track circuits, short trains and high speeds present a significant risk that a required sequence may not operate correctly (due to inherent delays in the train detection devices and their inputs into the interlocking) it is permitted for two adjacent track circuits to be treated as a single track circuit for TORR applications. Alternatively other means of train detection may be used. Specifically, also, sequential operation of train detection shall require protection against irregular release due to power, transmission or other failure. 5.2 Minimum Requirements TORR shall only release a route after the entry of a train into that route. The following conditions shall be met for all routes for which TORR is to operate:

the signal controls were OFF at the time the train passed the signal; the signal is disengaged and thus prevented from reclearing after the train movement has taken place;

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Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

the signal is not set to work automatically; the signalman has not initiated the release of the route; the approach locking for the route has been released.

5.3 Additional Requirements for Running Movements One additional sequence of train detection (TISP Train in Section Proving) or condition (over and above that required for release of approach locking) shall be satisfied to initiate the release of the route in addition to the requirements of section 5.2 if: the route or any route conflicting with it controls passenger movements; or the speed over any portion of the route which conflicts with other routes exceeds 15 mph; or the speed of any conflicting route at the point of conflict exceeds 15 mph. The sequence or condition shall be one of the following; occupancy of two adjoining track circuits in the direction of travel followed by clearance of the first;

or occupancy of three adjoining track circuits in the direction of travel followed by sequential clearance of two track circuits; or sequential train detection employing a treadle if track circuits are insufficient in number or are of such a length that the initiation of TORR would be unreasonably delayed; or proof of no train approaching the signal at the time TORR is to be initiated. All sequences or conditions shall include checks wherever practical to ensure that an irregular sequence of events has not occurred between successive steps. If an irregular sequence of events is detected, the operation of TORR for that signal shall be inhibited for the current movement. 5.4 Special Operating Conditions If a long train may come to a stand at the next signal without completing the TORR sequence, Railtrack may specify that a sequence shall also be provided which initiates TORR after the train has passed the signal and come to a stand. This sequence shall be provided in addition to the normal TORR and TISP sequences for movements which clear the route. If the train stops before the whole train has passed the signal (but has not reached the next signal) TORR shall not be be permitted to operate, regardless of the time the train stands. If the train then sets back so that it clears the route originally set by moving behind the entrance signal, Railtrack may specify that controls shall be provided to permit the original route to release once the set-back move is proven to have taken place and the train is fully behind the signal.

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Railway Group Standard

GK/RT0063

Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

Issue One Date November 1996 Page 7 of 8

Appendix A Approach Locking Additional Information

A1 Application of Approach Locking As a minimum, approach locking shall be effective immediately upon display of a proceed aspect The actual time of application of approach locking may therefore be earlier in the route setting, locking and aspect clearance sequence. The earlier in this sequence that approach locking is applied, the greater the possibility that unwarranted impediment to operations will be introduced. The benefits of simplified circuit design/data preparation must therefore be balanced against any operational difficulties arising. The time of application of approach locking will generally be determined by the technology being used (in the case of new signalling schemes) or the current practice (in the case of alterations to existing signalling). There may be specific operational reasons where approach locking is applied prior to clearance of the signal. A specific example is where the signal to be cleared is within the strike in point of an automatic level crossing. In such cases, aspect clearance may be delayed while the level crossing sequence progresses to a suitable point but the approach locking is applied immediately to maintain protection for the level crossing. Such special applications shall be agreed with Railtrack. A2 Release of Approach Locking by Train having Passed Signal Proof of a train having passed a signal requires sequential operation of train detection. Generally sequential operation of train detection shall be applied to the first and second track sections beyond the signal, requiring:

first and second track section occupied, followed by: first track section clear with second track section occupied. Where application of this sequence causes operational difficulties, alternative sequences/conditions shall be considered (and shall, if necessary, be subject to risk assessment) and shall be agreed with Railtrack. Typical alternatives are: 1) Berth and first track section occupied, followed by berth track section clear with first track section occupied eg. where a second track section does not exist. 2) All track sections in the route occupied with final track section of route occupied for a time eg. where a (long) train is standing at the exit signal of a (short) route occupying the entire route and it is required to release the overlap ahead of the exit signal. A3 Release by Elapsed Time The following approach locking release times shall generally be used for the conditions, types of signal and type of traffic described. However, these may need to be adjusted according to the specific risk associated with each signal.

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Approach Locking & Train Operated Route Release

a) On mixed traffic lines where the distance between consecutive signals is:

not more than 825 m (900 yds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 minutes; 826 1650 m (901 1800 yds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 minutes; over 1650 m (1800 yds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 minutes;

b) On lines usually carrying only passenger traffic where the distance between consecutive signals is:

not more than 1470 m (1600 yds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 minutes; over 1470 m (1600 yds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 minutes;

c) Terminal or Bay Platforms and other signals at which trains always start from rest:

usually . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 minute; long trains standing ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 minutes;

d) Major Through Stations or Critical Junctions:

main aspect approach controlled from red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 minutes; with max 275 m (300 yds) berth TC occupied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 minute; delayed yellow aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 minute;

e) Signals reading from a siding where no berth track circuit is provided f)

. . . . . . . . 1 minute;

Signals reading from a siding where a berth track circuit is provided . . . . . . . . 30 seconds;

g) Position Light Signals not associated with a main aspect (except where cleared automatically as part of a main route or already covered above) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 seconds. A4 Proof of No Train Approaching For running signals, the minimum requirement is for all track sections clear from the signal to the sighting point of the outermost signal in rear which would change from green to a cautionary aspect. This distance may be extended (as far as the first signal not changing aspect) where agreed with Railtrack. This will generally be done to avoid additional track sections being provided solely for the purpose of approach locking release. For shunting signals, the extent of the approach track sections requiring to be proved clear shall be agreed with Railtrack but shall be not less than 45m (50 yds) (as detailed in section 4.2). A5 Agreement with Railtrack Unless Railtrack directs otherwise, in the above, where the agreement of Railtrack is required, this shall be obtained through approval of the approach locking controls expressed in the signalling control tables.

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