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This document provides an abstract for a 56-page report that analyzes the best tactical doctrine for using armor in counterinsurgency operations. The report examines armor's role through a framework of five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy. It uses case studies of armor employment in Vietnam and Afghanistan, compares this to current doctrine, and considers implications. The analysis concludes that armor's appropriate tactical doctrine depends on the combat function served within the combined arms team, and these functions can vary based on terrain, organization, and the operational plan. Mechanized forces are generally best employed in small battalion-to-brigade scale search operations where their mobility and firepower can be used for encirclement operations or
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Armor in Low Intensity Conflict What is the Best Tactical Doctrine for Armor in Counterinsurgency
This document provides an abstract for a 56-page report that analyzes the best tactical doctrine for using armor in counterinsurgency operations. The report examines armor's role through a framework of five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy. It uses case studies of armor employment in Vietnam and Afghanistan, compares this to current doctrine, and considers implications. The analysis concludes that armor's appropriate tactical doctrine depends on the combat function served within the combined arms team, and these functions can vary based on terrain, organization, and the operational plan. Mechanized forces are generally best employed in small battalion-to-brigade scale search operations where their mobility and firepower can be used for encirclement operations or
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This document provides an abstract for a 56-page report that analyzes the best tactical doctrine for using armor in counterinsurgency operations. The report examines armor's role through a framework of five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy. It uses case studies of armor employment in Vietnam and Afghanistan, compares this to current doctrine, and considers implications. The analysis concludes that armor's appropriate tactical doctrine depends on the combat function served within the combined arms team, and these functions can vary based on terrain, organization, and the operational plan. Mechanized forces are generally best employed in small battalion-to-brigade scale search operations where their mobility and firepower can be used for encirclement operations or
Авторское право:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Доступные форматы
Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
Accession Number: ADA193292 Citation Status: Active Citation Classification: Unclassified Field(s) & Group(s): 150600 - MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES Unclassified Title: Armor in Low Intensity Conflict: What is the Best Tactical Doctrine for Armor in Counterinsurgency? Personal Author(s): Matheny, Michael R. Report Date: 07 Dec 1987 Media Count: 56 Page(s) Cost: $9.60 Report Classification: Unclassified Distribution Statement: Availablity document partially illegible. Descriptors: *LIMITED WARFARE, *ARMORED VEHICLES, AFGHANISTAN, BATTALION LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, BRIGADE LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, CASE STUDIES, COUNTERINSURGENCY, DOCTRINE, FIREPOWER, FUNCTIONS, MILITARY DOCTRINE, MILITARY TACTICS, PLANNING, RESPONSE, SEARCHING, TACTICAL ANALYSIS, TERRAIN, THEORY, VIETNAM, WARFARE Identifiers: *Low intensity conflict Abstract: This study is a tactical analysis of armor in low intensity conflict. The study begins with a discussion of the theory of armor in LIC. This monograph uses J.F.C. Fuller's five combat functions: protect, find, fix, hit, and destroy, to examine the proper role of armor. Vietnam and Afghanistan are analyzed as case studies of the employment of mechanized forces in counterinsurgency. The results of this analysis are then compared to current doctrine. The study concludes that the most appropriate tactical doctrine for armor in LIC depend upon the combat function it serves within the combined arms team. These functions can vary with terrain, organization, and the operational plan. Mechanized forces are best employed in small cordon search operations from battalion to brigade size. Their mobility and firepower are best used in encirclement operations or as a reaction force. Finally, the near term and future implications of this study are considered under Fuller's combat functions. Abstract Classification: Unclassified Distribution Limitation(s): 01 - APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 23 - DOCUMENT PARTIALLY ILLEGIBLE Source Code: 416090 Document Location: DTIC IlRM.Oll 1)1 LlN IS THE TACTICAL J)f')'"TliI NE COUNTEHI hy MAJ ;1::'chael H, I USA, Although armor was dev81op8d and organized for intensity warfare, in "the Iutur8 low intensity conflict will OH m05L form or war. Since the army haG invested so much or its ('omt)a t, power and force structure into mechanized forces, it should be pr8parect use those forces 1n LIe. '!'his monograph uses J,lt.C. Fuller';; five r:;ornb,.)J, functions: protoct, finc, iix, hit. and ctostro:l, e:(.::.umne ?!'fJPer rote of armor. Vietnam .:.lnd ,1nalyz0.,,:i (1;' .'')1' at fOrGOR Ln :n ooth l.he :Ir"m:ns !11::'CC;':""":;"lT', .... 0 'lIod': t":1 for :\r:.:.oc. in 1.1:'" if, S. l.:':.. .. :.- ..i to :"'d.1:. dIlf" ::lrctl:..'I;!.. tIll) en indicae!: .:irw.':' !:.O of u.rmor. ha.vo tilC!".lG::ll with ari.,:,:ur bec.:l.us/! of terrain, pLan tor A look a.t c:urront dOG"tr 1ne reve:lls the for a. ,:,umbin(:Q d,:-i.<,.:.. lioe-trina .for heavy and U..::;ht forcos in LIC, Curr8nt n1.,:;c 1 nor o:Fldress the most effactive armor or::;ani:J;ation .for tho ot in LI C-- I; he (:aVi) 1r'f l'egi jllen:;. The study C:OllC:Udf::!S tha.t most dppropr-i.:\tr: ar.:;(I:-i:l(' tor in L[C dQponrl::-:; upon t:.:te function '3cr'JOS wlthLn .:.l.rms t8am. Thl::l'38 functi.onc C\lll vary with terrain. ::tn.d th'_' opor.J.tiontll p).:l.n. At t.he armor can prot8ct and IN'hen properly organized and it cun also be to rlnu, fix, (.1nd in Gombinat:on \.,ri destroy insurgent forces, ;{CC!lil:'li:::ed .lro 08!=3t cmpluyt"'!d in ':icalo Gordon 7-cD.rch oDeraticHu:3 '3izG. nnrt firep0',olr.r lJS1..:orl in Dr as ."'1 rh(l ...:'('m .-l!ll"' [U".'i:-e nf rJ.r(:\ und... :r I . I nt r oduc t i on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 11. The Theory of Armor i n LI C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '5 I I I , Hi s t o r i c a l Case St udi e s Viotnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i: ' . Ar ghani st nn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I , ..! i v . Ci i r r ? nt k c l ; r i a c , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '/ I (:i.inciu.,ioii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :, v I . :'3 . . ; np i ?cat: i ti ns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :4<1?5: A. O?cr i i t i on Czdnr ."all:;-.Jiinction Ci t y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A' ? 2, 4i) 1: . Ltinilr Of f ens i ve 1985...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4L Dndnot c s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ : 2 Bi bl i oEr aphv. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Baf,f,le a t Chanh 1, uu. . , . , , , , , , . . , , , . . , . , , , , , , . , , , , , . , , , ,: ' I I, Y t h e j ungl e b ~ c a u s e t he y c:!uirl p r o t e c t . Thc t a n k s cr ushnr i ?:!icir wi i ' r '9ii !;I:;:? 3 s i. . :: L.. 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