CDT Sean Blouin Military Science Paper 09MAY11

The Battle of Anzio

In times of war, the outcomes of battles and engagements are dictated by several key factors, that can prove detrimental if overlooked. The successes and failures of the Allied Forces during World War II are attributed to the ability of leaders to plan, adapt, and control resources. The proper application of these resources, both human and non-human, are what determined victories and defeats. There are many examples in history, particularly in World War II history, from which military leaders can draw a wealth of knowledge from, and apply those learned lessons in military operations today. One such example, the Battle of Anzio, raises awareness of deplorable decision making and poor leadership which lead to the deaths of many soldiers. The battle also offers military leaders many insights on areas for improvement, and how to avoid a disaster like Anzio. In order to fully analyze and learn from the Battle of Anzio one must examine its history, military and political leadership, tactics, weapons and technology, and terrain to see how these factors affected the outcome of the battle. The Battle of Anzio was fought from January 1944 to May 1944, and was a part of the invasion of the Allied forces into Italy. On September 9, 1943, the Allies landed in Salerno and began their invasion into the north. They fought at great cost, inching their way northward in hopes of taking Rome. As they pushed north, the Allies were halted at the Gustav line, which was the primary line of German defense. The Gustav line ran across Italy just north of where the Garigliano River flows into the Tyrrhenian Sea in the west, through the Apennine Mountains to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic coast in the east. The Line was a very strong defensive position that ran through jagged mountains, and was packed with mines, barbed wire, and pillboxes which were manned by machine gunners. Right before the Allies reached this major obstacle, Allied Commander in Chief, General Dwight Eisenhower, called an end to

the futile trudge through the southern mountains of Italy, deciding that the mountain warfare was too costly. On November 8, 1943, General Eisenhower gave the command to General Harold Alexander to launch a seaborne attack on the Italian beachheads, effectively moving the Allied forces around the mountains and past the Gustav line (Parrish, 24). This broad flanking maneuver would move the forces much closer to Rome, and would disrupt the German's defensive position, which was located in between Rome and just south of the beaches of Anzio. Anzio was to be the the Allies' new location to launch an invasion. This mission was named Operation Shingle, which became one of the most monumental blunders of WWII and proved to be one of the most disreputable operational failures in the history of warfare. After receiving the orders from General Eisenhower, General Alexander gave the mission to Lieutenant General Mark Clark, commander of the U.S. Fifth Army. General Clark and the 5th Army were to continue attacking along the Gustav Line to draw enemy forces further south while the U.S. VI Corps under Major General John Lucas landed at Anzio. From there, General Lucas was to push northward, taking Rome and threatening the German rear. This would disrupt and scatter the Germans, effectively preventing those who were fighting in northern Italy from receiving reinforcements from the German troops in southern Italy. The German troops in southern Italy would be too preoccupied repelling General Clark's aggressive attacks along the Gustav Line to provide reinforcements to the main front. Likewise, the Anzio invasion would also allow for the breakthrough of the Gustav line because the Germans defending the line would not be able to be reinforced from the North. However, as planning for the invasion proceeded, it became apparent that the troops put ashore at Anzio would be too far removed from General Clark's 5th Army to prevent an early linkup. In other words, the beaches of Anzio were too far from the main effort and it would take too long for a large fighting element, such as the U.S. VI Corps, to merge with them. If an early linkup was not established, the Germans would be able to close in on the beachhead and wipe out the entire Allied force. This led Clark to believe that the best alternative to a smaller and more vulnerable element would be a much

larger force, possibly two or more corps' (Hickman). Faced with that reality, the invasion of the Anzio beachhead was delayed, and later called off by Eisenhower. Even though the invasion of Anzio was called off, the 5th Army was still fighting laboriously in southern Italy towards the Gustav Line in effort to break the line of defense and continue on to Rome. After a month had passed since the original planning of the Anzio invasion British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, insisted that Operation Shingle be executed in order to seize Rome. For many leaders, including General Clark, the capture of Rome from the Germans became an obsession (Parish, 24). In the mind of General Clark, and especially that of Winston Churchill, the desire to be in the headlines and go down in history as the savior of the Holy City superseded the importance of the mission. The mission was to divide the German forces in half, effectively destroying the Gustav Line along with the Germans defending it, which would allow for the passage of the U.S. 5th Army and the U.S. VI Corp further into northern Italy. After receiving more and more pressure from the British Prime Minister the decision was made by the Allies to launch the Anzio Invasion only a month after the invasion was originally terminated. The invasion was reinstated despite the knowledge shared by both General Clark and General Lucas that they would be leading their troops into a hostile environment with insufficient troops (Hickman). On January 17, 1944, British and American troops attacked German forces along the Garigliano River in an effort to withdraw forces out of the Anzio area; this effectively emptied Anzio of German troops. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, one of Nazi Germany's most skilful and feared commanders, immediately responded to the Allies' attack on the Garigliano River by moving both of his reserve divisions from Rome to the Gustav line in order to fight off the attacking Allies. This emptied the entire area around Rome, which included the beaches of Anzio, a short 20 miles away from the city. As a result, the U.S. VI Corps under General Lucas along with a few American and British divisions came ashore at Anzio on January 22, 1944 with very little opposition. The landings were concentrated on a 15 mile stretch of Italian coastline, centering on Anzio-Nettuno (Bishop and McNab

134-136). Since most of the the German troops had been mobilized to the south in order to reinforce the Gustav line in the Garigliano River area the Allied landings were virtually unopposed. By midnight, over 36,000 Allied troops along with over 3,000 vehicles had landed on the Anzio beaches at the cost of only 13 soldiers being killed (Hickman). Now that the Allies had successfully landed in Anzio the priority was for Lucas to mobilize his troops as soon as possible out of the Anzio beachhead and to push north towards Rome. This would be done in effort to reach a more suitable area to establish an area of operations. From that location, the Allies would be able to strike quickly at the unprotected German rear. Rather than do this, General Lucas decided to consolidate and obtain reserve troops, and to move supplies and equipment ashore before departing from the Anzio beachhead. This proved to be the major error that lead to the demise of Operation Shingle. The beachhead of Anzio was surrounded on all sides by natural barriers; hemmed in by the Alban Hills and large mountain chains directly to the front, with the Tyrrhenian Sea closing in on the rear. After landing at Anzio, General Lucas should have led the Allies immediately out of the enclosed region and into the Alban Hills, which were 20 miles inland. This would have given the Allies a protected area to reconsolidate as well as moving the Allies out of the Anzio danger zone. Instead, General Lucas chose to maintain his positions for another two days, which allowed for the Germans to reconsolidate. By January 28, nearly a week later, the Allies were still encamped in the danger zone and had not moved from the beaches. The force had grown to about 70,000 troops by this time with 508 guns and 237 tanks, but still received no orders from General Lucas to move forward. This proved to be a disaster, for while the Allies encamped on the beaches the Germans had units deployed from all over northern and central Italy to contain Lucas and his troops. Within a week, 8 German divisions had taken positions all around the Anzio beachhead and had trapped the Allies within the immense fishbowl. Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions were also placed all around the beachhead, which laid down suppressive firepower on the trapped Allies with ease. The Germans also employed the use of the Krupp K5E, earning its nickname Anzio Annie (Bishop 134-135). The K5E had a long

distance range of 50 kilometers, so the Germans were able to fire upon the Allied forces from the protection of the Alban Hills, the very location the Allies should have immediately acquired. During this bombardment from the German artillery, Lucas received reinforcements from the U.S. 45th Infantry Division and the U.S. 1st Armored Division. On January 30, Lucas launched a two-fold counterattack with the British, attacking up the Via Anziate northward to the Alban hills while a Ranger force with the U.S. 3rd Infantry simultaneously attacked the small town of Cisterna. The Rangers were to seize the town from the Germans, and then hold it until the main effort could continue moving out of Anzio. During the fighting that ensued, the Rangers sustained significant losses; only 6 of the 767 Rangers returned, along with only one man from the 3rd Recon Division, for an overall loss of 803 men. The Germans had somehow discovered the infiltration movement of the Rangers beforehand and had an ambush prepared for them at Cisterna, complete with Panzer tanks. After this substantial loss, the Allies' predicament continued to worsen as they lost more and more troops to artillery fire and increased attacks from the Germans. The Germans were taking on fresh reinforcements daily, which pinned down Lucas and his troops even more tightly. By February 16, the German forces at Anzio outnumbered the Allies by about 125,000 troops to 100,000 (Baudot and Bernard 135). The German attacks continued throughout most of February and by the end of the month the Germans had pushed the Allies back by a considerable amount, forcing them closer to the sea. With a depth of only 8 miles left to the Anzio beachhead, the U.S. 45th Division was able to repel the Germans and hold the little shred of beachhead that the Allies had left. It was the courage of these men that prevented a total disaster at Anzio, and the complete eradication of the Allied forces. After this Allied victory it became apparent that a stalemate had taken effect and that neither side was going to win. The Germans suffered nearly 5,500 casualties alone as a result of the fight at Cisterna. The body count for both sides had grown alarmingly high since January. On February 29, German Field Marshal Von Mackensen ordered all offensive activity against Anzio to cease, due to the unsustainable losses (Bishop and McNab 137). Nearly three months later the stalemate continued, with the Germans

reverting to siege tactics. In mid May, the British 8th Army had reached the Allied positions in southern Italy and launched a massive offensive on the Gustav Line. The line was finally broken by British, American, Polish and French troops, who pushed on northward, defeating the Germans at Monte Cassino and pushing them out of the territory surrounding the Anzio region. On May 23, 1944, with the Germans in retreat of the main battlefront, the U.S. VI Corps managed to finally break out of Anzio and linkup with the main effort, ending one of the most savage and valueless battles of WWII. The aftermath of the Battle of Anzio saw the Allied forces sustain over 7,000 casualties and over 36,000 wounded or missing soldiers. The Germans sustained similar losses. Much of the slaughter could have been prevented by the leadership had they used common sense. General Lucas and General Clark failed to consider the terrain of Anzio, time constraints, available resources, and use of tactics while planning for Operation Shingle. As a result of this failure, thousands of soldiers that were placed under their responsibility were massacred. The mission was eventually a victory, but a poor one at best. The success of the mission was certainly blighted by the tremendous failures and shortcomings of the leaders, who could have led this to a more favorable outcome.

Bibliography Bishop, Chris and Chris McNab. Campaigns of World War II Day by Day. 1st ed. London, UK: Amber Books, 2003 Parrish, Thomas. Anzio. The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978 Baudot, Marcel and Henri Bernard. Italy. The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1980 Winchester, Kenneth. WWII. New York: Time-Life Books, Inc., 1989 Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millet. A War To Be Won. Massachusetts: First Harvard University Press, 2000 Hickman, Kenneth. World War II: Battle of Anzio. About.com Guide, Military History