REPUBLIC VS. LA ORDEN DE PP.

BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS FACTS: To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion in Legarda street, the Government drew up plans to extend Azcarraga street and offered to buy a portion of approx 6000 sqm of a bigger parcel of land belonging to La Orden de PP. Beneditinos de Filipinas that owns San Beda College. Not being able to reach an agreement the Gov instituted the present expropriation case. 1957 - the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value at P270,000 and authorizing appelant to take immediate possession upon depositing amount. LOPBDF raise the issues: 1. property sought expropriated already for public use. 2.no necessity for exprop. 3.Azcarraga extension could pass through different site -less expense and would not exprop property dedicated to education. 4. present action discriminatory. 5. do not have sufficient fund to push through project. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a necessity for the expropriation. HELD: It is the rule that provate prop may be exprop for pub use and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private prop is justified only if it is for public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, courts have the power to inquireinto legality of the exercise and determine WON ther is a genuine necessity. Isue is a question of fact. Trial court liberally took judicial notice upon other factors not appearing on record. Parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence. REMANDED. PUNSALAN, ET AL.vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA FACTS: This is a suit by two lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist for the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila which imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax. And annulment of the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the ordinance. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by Republic Act No. 409), which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above referred to. Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The lower court upheld the validity of the provision of law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance itself illegal and void on the ground that the penalty there in provided for non-payment of the tax was not legally authorized. ISSUE: 1. WON the ruling of the court is correct or not.

2. WON the argument against double taxation be invoked HELD: 1. The lower court was in error in saying that the imposition of the penalty provided for in the ordinance was without the authority of law. Section 18 of the Manila Charter authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance in express terms which also empowers the Municipal Board. 2. No. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation. The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes. That matter within the domain of the political departments and the courts should not encroach upon it. Moreover, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so it is fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces. Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while professionals with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein are not subject to the tax. The plaintiffs were wrong. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" or "pursuing" in the City of Manila. Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmen Vda. De Castellvi (as judicial admistratriv of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi) Zaldivar, J. Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the AFP (Phil Air Force), occupied the land of Castellvi from Juy 1947 to June 30 1956 by virtue of a contract of lease which is renewable annually. However, upon the expiration of the period, Castellvi refused to renew such contract because of her intention to convert her land to a residential subdivision. The Armed Forces of the Philippines refused to vacate the premises after the termination of the contract. Thereafter, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, informing him that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated w/in 30 days and returned to the same condition before its occupancy. Despite the letter, AFP Chief of Staff replied that it was difficult for the army to vacate in view of the permanent installations and other facilities that were erected and already established. Castellvi brought an ejection case against the AFP on the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. On the other hand, while the ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation proceeding seeking to convert the lands of Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga as part of an airbase. The Republic alleged, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorized the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed the ejectment case filed by Castellvi, upon petition of the parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied on 12 July 1961. The Republics record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . On 11January 1962 the

Republic filed a motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for reconsideration, and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court, and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the trial court approved the Republics record on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal. ISSUE: W/N the taking of Castellvis land occurred in 1947 or in 1959? HELD: the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. Ratio: A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, all of the requisites are not present. AFP merely entered into a contract of lease which implies that their entrance to the property was only for a momentary period (a limited period). The fact that the Republic constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that their entry to the land was transitory. It is claimed that the intention of the AFP was to stay permanently. But this intention cant prevail over the express terms of the lease contract. Also, Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind the landowner. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows: (a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public use; (b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square meter;

(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00 as just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299 square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that

she withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and (f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.

Lladoc vs. CIR No. L-19201 June 16, 1965 Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals. In 1957, the M.B. Estate Inc. of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and predecessor of herein petitioner for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate Inc. filed the donors gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent CIR issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. Petitioner claims that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person known as the Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias and therefore, he should not be liable for the donees gift tax. He further claims, that the assessment of the gift tax against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid because it is a violation of the provision of the constitution. Issue: Whether or not the assessment of the gift tax against the Church is a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the payment of the gift tax. Held: The Supreme Court held that the tax liability is not against the Constitution. However the petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax. On the first issue, the Court stated that the exemption for payment of taxes provided by the Constitution for churches refers only to property taxes and not to excise taxes. The Court further states that a gift tax is a excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute and impairment of the Constitution. On the second issue, the liability for the payment of the gift tax was transeferred to the head of the diocese. Important Issue: The phrase exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kind of taxes. What is covered by the exemption is only property taxes but no excise taxes. De Knecht v CA G.R. No. 108015. May 20, 1998 FACTS: Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht- owners of a land in which they constructed 8houses: 7 leased out , 1 occupied by them. 1979 RP initiated a civil case for expropriation of their property for the purpose of using it to complete the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. CFI of Pasay issued a writ of possession but was annulled for an arbitrary choice for EDSAs extension. 1982 City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for failure of petitioners to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. Spouses Babieras and Spouses Sangalangs were the highest bidders.

1985 they sold the property to Salem Investment Corporation. The property was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension, passed on 1983. 1990 RP filed Civil Case 7327 for determination of just compensation for expropriated properties. Writ of possession was issued by the trial court. 7 of the 8 houses built on the property were demolished. The Knechts refused to leave their house so Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. Court ordered Knechts ejectment. 1991 the Knechts filed for a Motion to Intervene and to Implead Additional Parties after the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all the lands sought to be expropriated by the govt. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision after finding that petitioners had no legal interest over the property. ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to just compensation. HELD: NO. Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1. The complaint.-- The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. "Owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. The Knechts insisted that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings and entitled to a share in the just compensation. 4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327, a case for reconveyance was dismissed with finality which resulted to the Knechts loss of whatever right or colorable title they had to the property. The fact that the Knechts remained in physical possession was based on their claim of ownership, not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since the issue of ownership was put to rest in the civil case of reconveyance, they had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. KER AND COMPANY LIMITED, respondent. G.R. No. 136171. July 2, 2002 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price. Issue: 1. Whether or not the two adjacent sites warrant different valuations 2. Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a fair just compensation.

Held: 1. The court held that there are no substantial distinctions between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant different valuations. 2. The Supreme Court held that the valuation for Site I was excessive and unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint which should be taken into consideration. Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim. Manosca v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 106440 FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, MM, which was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo. NHI, passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of PD 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners argued that the intended appropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia Ni Cristo. ISSUE: Whether or not taking of a private property to be used for historical landmark is under the scope of eminent domain. HELD: Affirmed the decision of the lower courts. Public use, not having been otherwise defined by the Constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. It is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which the condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. GR L-14355 The City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, et al. Facts: - Dec. 11, 1916: Petitioner presented a petition in its CFI, praying that certain lands (within Block 83 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement (extension of Rizal Avenue). - Answer of defendant: 1. It is a corporation under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese community of the City of Manila 2. It owns of two parcels of lands petitioned for expropriation (it had a Torrens title for the land which was used for cemetery purposes) 3. Denied necessity or expediency of the expropriation 4. The expropriation would disturb the resting place of the dead and require a great deal of expenditure for the removal and transfer of the bodies

- Answer of Tambunting (defendant): Offered and still offers to grant a right of way over other land without cost to the plaintiff - Plaintiff appealed from the decision rendered by the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario (who said there was no necessity for the expropriation) Issue: May the courts inquire into and hear upon the the NECESSITY of an expropriation? Held: In this case*, YES. - The power of expropriation is not an inherent power of the City of Manila because it is a municipal corporation. Thus, the judiciary may review whether: (a) it was given authority to exercise such power > Sec. 2429, Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) states that: "the city (Manila)... may condemn PRIVATE PROPERTY for PUBLIC USE. Hence, petitioner was given authority to exercise the power. (b) its exercise of the power is in accordance with law > The land involved was PUBLIC LAND. It was established under Spanish governmental authority for the indigent Chinese. At the time of the petition, the land was being used by the general community (not just by a particular family). > There is NO NECESSITY for the exprorpriation given the public purpose because adjoining and adjacent lands were being offered for free. * The answer would be no if the expropriation was ordered by law.

People vs. Fajardo, et al. PONENTE: BENGZON, J. Facts: Juan F. Fajardo, former mayor,and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, violated Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. Sec. 1 Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. Sec. 3 x x x If said building destorys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. Fajardo and Babilonia sought to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. They filed a written request, but the same was denied. However, they proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living on leased property. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is one of police power or eminent domain. Whether or not the issuance of such ordinance was within the province of the issuing authority. Held: The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive the persons affected of the right to use their own property; it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a

taking of appellants property without just compensation. The state may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To do so would let the lands of the persons affected by the ordinance to remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. The power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits or set standards for the kind of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not promulgated under the sec 2243 of the revised administrative code, and hence the issuance was beyond the authority of the municipality to enact. Said ordinance is NULL AND VOID. G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY (CFI Judge of Cebu ) & SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: San Antonio Development Corporation owns 4 parcels of land in the City of Lapu-lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu. Upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1811, EPZA offered to purchase this property from the respondent for the establishment of an export processing zone. The petitioner filed for the expropriation of the respondents property to the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge resolved this petition by ordering the condemnation of the land in favor of the petitioner and appointed certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Thereafter, the 3 commissioners recommended the amount of P15/sq meter as the fair and reasonable value for the just compensation of the said land. However, the petitioner contended that PD 1533 has already superseded Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (appointment of commissioners who will assess the appropriate value) and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by PD 1533. The trial court denied his petition. ISSUE: WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining the just compensation in PD 1533, is valid and constitutional. HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed this petition and declared that PD 1533 (and that of PD 96,464 and 794*) on just compensation, as unconstitutional and void. The method of ascertaining just compensation on the Presidential Decree cited renders the Court inutile. It impairs the courts independence in ascertaining as to what is just and fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute a judge in the determination of just compensation. The trial court correctly stated that the decree may serve as a guiding principle, but cannot substitute to the courts judgment as to what amount should be awarded. Just Compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be well considered. In the present case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as the basis for just compensation were made, long before martial law when the assessed values of the properties constitute a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the said property at that time. To keep the value of the lots on the basis of the documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Tax values can serve as a guide but can never be absolute substitute for just compensation. It is violative of the due process, to deny the owner, the opportunity to prove that the valuation of the tax is wrong. It is contrary to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a clerk to prevail over the judgment of the court only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments were presented and after all the factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

*the basis for payment of just compensation shall be, the lower value between the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator; and that of the market value determined by the Assessor (they basically have same content-PD 96,464 & 794)

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA 43 SCRA 360 G.R. No. L-26400 Feb 29, 1972 Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF The ordinance provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote

the general welfare. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Expropriation, requires payment of just compensation. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC v. PLDT Jan. 27, 1969 FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines set up its own Government Telephone System through the Bureau of Telecommunications, which was created (under EO 94, July 1,1947) pursuant to a state policy reorganizing the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant and for promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation. This was done by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the defendant PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The application for the use of trunk lines was in the usual form, containing a statement that the Bureau will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT (on file with the Public Service Commission), one was that it prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948. On Mar. 5, 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc. (not a party to the case, an american corporation authorized to transact business in the country and is engaged in reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages as well as broadcasting, radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services) for joint overseas telephone service. PLDT sent a notice to the Bureau complaining for violating its conditions because the latter had used the trunk lines not only for government offices but also served private persons or general public, which makes it in competition with its business. As the defendant received no reply, it disconnected the rented trunk lines which resulted to the isolation of the country from the rest of the world except U.S. Then the Bureau proposed that they enter into an interconnecting agreement in which PLDT was willing to enter provided that the former would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission. It was not accepted by either party. ISSUE: W/N the Bureau has the right to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, in order for the former to utilize its lines and facilities. HELD: The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract without agreement as to its principal terms and conditions. However, while the Republic may not compel PLDT to enter into a contract, in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain, it may require PLDT to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the governement service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Said power can be availed of even without loss of title, imposing only a burden upon the property owner. Under Art. XIII sec.6, the State may, in the interest of the national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation. The condemnation would be for public use as its beneficiaries would be the users of both telephone systems. Moreover,the theses of PLDT that Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition and was guilty of fraud and abuse are untenable because they were merely hypothetical and PLDT'S acceptance of the payment of rentals implies assent to its extended public use. The main reason for PLDT'S objection was the

fact that the Bureau's telephone system expanded rapidly and to uphold its contention would be to make the needs of the general public subordinate to its right to derive profit from futrure expansion. Decision appealed is affirmed but the petition to compel PLDT is dismissed. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority GR 147511 Jan 20, 2003 Puno, J: Facts: in 1977, NHA filed complaints for the expropriation of former sugarcane lands (namely Lots 6450, 6448E, 6198-A and 6199) belonging to petitioners in the CFI of Cavite, the stated public purpose of which is to relocate squatters from Metro Manila. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of expropriation and ordered respondent to pay just compensation, with the expropriation court issuing an Order in Feb 24, 1989 instructing the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer in NHA's name the lots mentioned, ordering respondent to pay just compensation and ordering the defendants to pay capital gains tax on the properties. In 1992, petitioners filed a case for forfeiture of rights before the RTC of QC alleging that NHA had not relocated squatters from Metro Manila on the expropriated lots in violation of the stated public purpose of the expropriation and that they failed to pay just compensation. They are praying that the rights vested upon the NHA be forfeited in favor of the condemnees and that NHA should be enjoined from disposing said lands. NHA answered, stating that expropriation cannot prosper on account of the defendant's failure to pay capital gains tax and other fees and expenses for the transfer of title to NHA and that they have spent large sums paying just compensation.Trial court dismissed the complaint in Sept. 29, 1995. On appeal, the CA also dismissed the complaint in Sept 29, 2000. Hence the case at bar. Issues: WON CA has erred in ruling that as expropriation court did not include a condition that should property be not used for intended purpose, it reverts to condemnee, as action to declare the forfeiture of rights under expropriation jufgement cannot occur. WON CA erred when it ruled that non-payment of just compensation is not a ground for forfeiture. WON CA erred in ruling against forfeiture in light of the usage of the property for a different purpose than that stipulated. Held: The court is not impressed with merit. The concept of "public use" is not limited to clear cases of use by the public, as public use is now synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit" and "public welfare". Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban develpment is for a public purpose even if said lands are sold to private entities and is considered a furtherance of "public use", not a deviation therefrom. Also, the Constitution allows the state to undertake "A continuing program of urban land reform and housing" for the nation's needy in furtherance of the social justice provision under Sec. 1, Art XIII. Court also ruled that when land has been acquired for public use unconditionally in exchange for just compensation, former owners retain no rights therein and non-payment of compensation cannot lead to a case of recovery in favor of former owners. This is so as the lands are still appropriated for public use despite non-payment. As long as the purpose of taking is for public use, eminent domain comes into play. However, as the expropriation judgment states that paying of JC is not subject to any condition, the court found the CA erring in not awarding interest computed from the time property is acquired to when compensation is fully paid.The court ordered NHA to pay the unpaid balance of P1,218,574.35 with interest of 12%/ annum computed from the time of taking in 1977 untl fully paid, as well as the petitioners to pay CGT and to surrender the dup;icate certificates of title for the expropriated lands. Phil. Press Institute, Inc. v. Comelec 244 SCRA 272 Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space and at the same time process raw data to make it cameraready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely

established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space, the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidates utilization of the Comelec space procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid. Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy. WENCESLAO PASCUA vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals, which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. HELD: Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature is without power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the instructions and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads where private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being subject to the following condition: "The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for no other purposes

whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)" which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. The decision appealed from is reversed.