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Oil
OIL CORE
OIL CORE.......................................................................................................................................................................1
**Russia Disad**............................................................................................................................................................3
Russia 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................................4
Russia 1NC
.........................................................................................................................................................................................5
Uniqueness- Prices high..................................................................................................................................................6
Uniqueness- Prices High.................................................................................................................................................7
Uniqueness- Russian Economy OK................................................................................................................................8
Link- Perception..............................................................................................................................................................9
Link- Alt Energy Kills Russia.......................................................................................................................................10
Links- Decreased Demand Lowers Prices....................................................................................................................11
Links- Shifts Disrupt Prices..........................................................................................................................................12
Internal Links- Oil Key to Russia.................................................................................................................................13
Impact- Instability.........................................................................................................................................................14
Impact- US-Russia........................................................................................................................................................16
**Aff**.........................................................................................................................................................................17
Prices dropping now......................................................................................................................................................18
Uniqueness- Prices dropping now.................................................................................................................................19
Uniqueness- Russian Economy Low............................................................................................................................20
No Link.........................................................................................................................................................................21
A2 Prices Key...............................................................................................................................................................22
Impact- High Prices Kill Russian Econ........................................................................................................................23
**Peak Oil**.................................................................................................................................................................25
Theory False..................................................................................................................................................................26
Theory False..................................................................................................................................................................27
Theory False..................................................................................................................................................................28
Theory False- Recoverable Oil.....................................................................................................................................29
Theory False- Tech........................................................................................................................................................30
Theory False- Africa.....................................................................................................................................................31
Theory True...................................................................................................................................................................32
Theory True...................................................................................................................................................................33
Theory True...................................................................................................................................................................34
Peak True- A2 New Reserves........................................................................................................................................35
Peak True- A2 Technology ...........................................................................................................................................36
Peak True- No Fill in.....................................................................................................................................................37
**High Prices Bad**....................................................................................................................................................38
Economy Mod...............................................................................................................................................................39
Economy Ext.................................................................................................................................................................40
A2 High prices key to economy....................................................................................................................................41
A2 High prices key to investments ..............................................................................................................................42
A2 High prices good for poor countries........................................................................................................................43
Energy Mod...................................................................................................................................................................44
Poverty Mod .................................................................................................................................................................45
Poverty Ext....................................................................................................................................................................46
Shocks Bad- Economy..................................................................................................................................................47
Shocks Bad- Economy..................................................................................................................................................48
A2 Venezuela ...............................................................................................................................................................49
A2 Venezuela ...............................................................................................................................................................50
A2 Mexican Econ..........................................................................................................................................................51
A2 Texas Econ..............................................................................................................................................................52
**High Prices Good**..................................................................................................................................................53
Canada Mod..................................................................................................................................................................54
Canada Mod .................................................................................................................................................................55
Texas Econ Mod............................................................................................................................................................56
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**Russia Disad**
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Russia 1NC
Although prices had a small dip, the trend still remains- high prices to continue
Wall Street Journal 7/25 (Finally, Ford Sees the Light,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121694081472082761.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)
Sure, upward pressure on gasoline prices should ease within days or weeks. But they still will be high.
After all, the crude-oil price has dropped back only to where it was two months ago -- when it seemed
almost unbearably expensive -- and still is roughly 70% more costly than a year ago.
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Russia 1NC
Impact is nukes
Steven David, Prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins, 1999, Foreign Affairs
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a
society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line
(earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-
defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current
political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the
Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between
government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic
missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being
used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to
home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's
allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system
that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less
incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by
shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If
Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United
these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely .
States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation
might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe.
Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would
poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet
communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of
control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some
20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to
prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making
weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the
greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than
the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.
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Economy on track
China View 7/5 (Russia's economic growth remains robust, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
07/05/content_8493711.htm)
Russia's economic growth remained robust in the first half of 2008, with major economic indicators
beating expectations. The Russian government has raised its economic growth forecast for 2008 to 7.1
percent from 6.7 percent.
Russia's gross domestic product rose 8.3 percent during January-April from the same period last year,
according to the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
The increase in GDP is mostly spurred by strong investment and consumer spending. In the first four
months, the domestic fixed investment increased 20.3 percent year-on-year and retail sales saw a rise of
15.6 percent.
One bright spot of the economic growth is the sharp rise in foreign trade, which grew 48.4 percent during
the January-April period from a year earlier to 235.2 billion U.S. dollars, with exports rising 51.8 percent
to 150.3 billion dollars and imports up 42.8 percent to 84.9 billion dollars.
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Link- Perception
Any shift in prices triggers the impacts- perception of oil markets is the key internal link
Paul Roberts, energy expert and writer for Harpers,2004, The End of Oil, pg. 95
Within the oil world, no decision of any significance is made without reference to the U.S. market, nor is
anything left to chance. Indeed, the world’s oil players watch the American oil market as attentively as
palace physicians once attended the royal bowels: every hour of every day, every oil state and company in
the world keeps an unblinking watch on the United States and strains to find a sign of anything — from a
shift in energy policy to a trend toward smaller cars to an unusually mild winter —that might affect the
colossal U.S. consumption. For this reason, the most important day of the week for oil traders anywhere
in the world is Wednesday, when the U.S. Department of Energy releases its weekly figures on American
oil use, and when, as one analyst puts it, “the market makes up its mind whether to be bearish or bullish.”
Perception matters
Paul Roberts, energy expert and writer for Harpers,2004, The End of Oil, pg. 93-4
So embedded has oil become in today’s political and economic spheres that the big industrial
governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and
with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil,
and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today’s growth-dependent, energy-
intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stabil-
ity and simple survival than terrorism or even war. In this bleak context, it becomes easier to understand
why nations as powerful and technologically advanced as Japan, Britain, and the United States have such
abysmal records when it comes to long-term energy planning or alternative energy. Indeed, when the
major nations speak of energy policy today, about energy for the future, or about the much-touted energy
security,” they are not talking about depletion curves, or fuel cells, or a hydrogen economy. They are not
talking about fuel efficiency, or solar power, or any of the potentially significant but speculative sources
of energy. Rather, when nations discuss energy security today, what they are really talking about is the
geopolitics of energy — and specifically, the actions, money, and alliances necessary to keep oil flowing
steadily and cheaply through the next fiscal quarter.
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Impact- Instability
Instability leads to nuclear war
Victor Irsraelyan, Soviet ambassador, diplomat, and arms control
negotiator, Winter, 98'
Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear. Washington Quarterly/ The first and
by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario.Supporters of this option
would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia,"radically change domestic and foreign
policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship
and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside
"enemy." Such
steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use
of nuclear
weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to
ratify both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention; denunciation of the
Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force,
including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple
warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of
these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the
denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, could, according to
proponents, save money by alleviating
the obligations of those agreements. In this scenario, Russia's military planners
would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the
category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will
revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its
unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new
emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway
already. The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances
the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the
means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians
in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military
force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out. Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no
potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so
sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov,
who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path
to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma
members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as
a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the
former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50
million lives. I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but
then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that
economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned
any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be
that
decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven
and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky,
Russian ambassador to Sweden andnformer Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying
that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that
Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. n11 Former
Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear
arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite
dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain
poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote,
"It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses,
it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." n12
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Impact- US-Russia
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**Aff**
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No Link
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A2 Prices Key
High prices mean collapse is inevitable
National Post 7 (John O'Sullivan . June 20, 2007 Wednesday, “RUSSIA CRUMBLES” LN)
Yet as Roger Bootle of Capital Economics in London had warned as early as 2007, high oil prices were
more a threat than a benefit to Russia in the long run. They stimulated government over-
spending, corruption and buying voter popularity. They discouraged moves towards the
transparent markets and genuine democracy needed for long-term economic growth. And they
camouflaged Russia's worsening social problems.
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**Peak Oil**
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Theory False
Peak theory flawed
Economist; 1/5/2008
Economist [Non-Fiction foreign affairs magazine] 1/5/2008 Vol. 386 Issue 8561,
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ulh&AN=28113270&site=src-live
Yetthe fact that not enough oil is coming out of the ground does not mean not enough of it is there. There
are many other explanations for the lacklustre response to the glaring price signal. For one thing, oil
producers have tied their own hands. During the 1980s and 1990s, when the price was low and so were
profits, they pared back hiring and investment to a minimum. Many ancillary firms that built rigs or
collected seismic data shut up shop. Now oil firms want to increase their output again, they do not have
the staff or equipment they need. Worse, nowadays, new oil tends to be found in relatively inaccessible
spots or in more unwieldy forms. That adds to the cost of extracting oil, because more engineers and more
complex machinery are needed to exploit it--but the end of easy oil is a far remove from the jeremiads of
peak-oilers. The gooey tar-sands of Canada contain almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia. Eventually,
universities will churn out more geologists and shipyards more offshore platforms, though it will take a
long time to make up for two decades of underinvestment.
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Theory False
No risk of reaching the peak
Stelzer 4/08’
Irwin Stelzer [business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute] The
Sunday Times (London) April 27, 2008
Production of oil is being constrained by several forces, none of them due to God's failure to put enough of the black
gold under our feet. Several countries that are important sources of supply are in political turmoil, and unable to
bring to market the oil they are capable of producing. Think Nigeria, where security problems have shut down about
20% of the nation's capacity of 2.5m barrels a day and discouraged new investment, and Iraq, where political
paralysis and terrorists have kept production at less than half its potential.
Other countries will not develop the reserves of oil known to lie under their territories.
Russia has made it clear that foreigners who invest in its oil industry might be playing a game with Vladimir Putin
known as heads I win, tails you lose. Find nothing and you lose your money; find substantial reserves and the state
squeezes you until your shareholders' pips squeak. Only companies at least 51% owned by - Russians - read FOPs,
Friends of Putin are allowed to look for oil in the new, difficult areas in which it is to be found. Little surprise that
oil output dropped in the first quarter of this year.
Mexico's president, Felipe Calderon, wants to revive Petroleos de Mexico (Pemex), the world's third-largest oil
producer, by contracting with foreign companies to introduce modern methods of extracting more from existing
fields and finding new ones. But legislation is stalled by left-wingers who have seized and are sleeping at podiums
in both houses of congress.
Saudi Arabia's royal family has announced that it will not expand capacity. Abdallah Jum'ah, chief executive of the
kingdom's oil company, said high prices didn't mean the world needs more oil because such market signals were
"imperfect", and energy minister Ali al-Naimi has announced that there are no plans to embark on a new round of
expansion. The oil is there, but with current production yielding about $120 a barrel, there is no incentive to find
more, especially since new production might drive down prices as demand from the slowing American economy
falls.
Venezuela's oil industry can only be described as a mess. President Hugo Chavez's cronies are inadequate substitutes
for the technicians they have replaced, so production is falling, while foreign investors are reluctant to trust hundreds
of millions in exploration dollars to a regime that treats contracts as the first step in a negotiation.
In America, Congress alternates between calls for "energy independence" and refusals to allow drilling in what it
considers environmentally sensitive areas in Alaska and offshore California and Florida.
There's more, but you get the idea. There is a lot of oil out there to be found and produced, not even including the
vast reserves in Canada's tar sands. We might have reached the age of peak panic about oil supplies, but not of peak
oil.
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Theory False
Peak won’t happen- 50 years
John Wood (Energy Analyst for Department of Energy) 8/18/2004
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2004/worldoilsupply/oilsupply04.html
In any event, the world production peak for conventionally reservoired crude is unlikely to be "right around the
corner" as so many other estimators have been predicting. Our analysis shows that it will be closer to the
middle of the 21st century than to its beginning. Given the long lead times required for significant mass-market penetration
of new energy technologies, this result in no way justifies complacency about both supply-side and demand-side research and development
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Theory True
abrupt and revolutionary. The world has never faced a problem like this. Without massive mitigation at least a
decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and long lasting.”26 Similarly, the U.S. Army released a major
report of its own in September 2005 stating: The doubling of oil prices from 2003–2005 is not an anomaly, but a
picture of the future. Oil production is approaching its peak; low growth in availability can be expected for the next 5 to 10
years. As worldwide petroleum production peaks, geopolitics and market economics will cause even more significant price increases and security risks. One can only speculate at the outcome from this scenario as world
petroleum production declines.27 Indeed, by 2005 there was little doubt in ruling circles about the likelihood of serious oil shortages and that peak oil was on its way soon or sooner. In its 2005 World Energy Outlook the IEA raised
the issue of Simmons’s claims in Twilight in the Desert that Saudi Arabia’s super-giant Ghawar oil field, the largest in the world, “could,” in the IEA’s words, “be close to reaching its peak if it has not already done so .” Likewise the
In February 2007
U.S. Department of Energy, which had initially rejected Simmons’s assessment, backtracked between 2004 and 2006, degrading its projection of Saudi oil production in 2025 by 33 percent.28
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a seventy-five-page report on Crude Oil pointedly subtitled:
Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in
Oil Production. It argued that almost all studies had shown that a world oil peak would occur sometime before 2040
and that U.S. federal agencies had not yet begun to address the issue of the national preparedness necessary to face this impending emergency. For the GAO the threat of a major oil shortfall was worsened by the political
risks primarily associated with four countries, accounting for almost one-third of world (conventional) reserves: Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. The fact that Venezuela contained “almost 90 percent of the world’s proven extra-
“
heavy oil reserves” made it all the more noteworthy that it constituted a significant political risk” from Washington’s standpoint.29 In April 2008, Jeroen van der Ver, CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, pronounced
that “we wouldn’t be surprised if this [easy] oil would peak somewhere in the next ten years.” Due to a combination of factors including production shortfalls and a declining dollar, oil in May 2008 reached over $135 a barrel (it
The same month Goldman Sachs shocked world capital markets by coming
averaged $66 in 2006 and $72 in 2007).
out with an assessment that oil prices could rise to as much as $200 a barrel in the next two years. Western oil interests were particularly
distressed that the first production from Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field (considered the largest oil deposit in the world outside the Middle East) was eight years behind schedule due in part to waters frozen half the year. By May 2008
the IEA, according to analysts for the New York Times, was preparing to reduce its forecast of world oil production for 2030 from its earlier forecasts of 116 mb/d to no more than 100 mb/d.30
It was alarm about gasoline prices and national energy security (and no doubt the specter of a world oil peak) that induced the Bush administration in 2006 to take a more aggressive stance in promoting cornbased ethanol production
as a fuel substitute. In 2007, 20 percent of U.S. corn production was devoted to ethanol to fuel automobiles. The price of grain spiked worldwide partly as a result. As environmentalist Lester
R. Brown wrote in his Plan B 3.0: “Suddenly the world is facing a moral and political issue that has no precedent: Should we use grain to fuel cars or to feed people?...The market says, Let’s fuel the cars.”31
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Theory True
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Theory True
Peak coming
Papantonio 2008 (Solution to dependence is energy intervention,
http://www.pnj.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080625/OPINION/806250338)
First, Arab sheiks are running out of oil. The term "peak oil" is a reality that this administration has
known about for seven years. They've known that out of 60 of the world's top oil producing countries, 50
have completely run past their peak production capabilities; production is in an irreversible free fall. It is
a development that oil royalty won't acknowledge because they want the U.S. oil addiction to last as long
as possible.
Peak by 2010
Jeremy Wakeford 7/2/06 [Writer for the Africa News]
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T4048009763
In recent years, a handful of petroleum geologists using Hubbert's methodology have been predicting a
global oil peak somewhere between last year and 2016. The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and
Gas, an international network of leading scientists studying fossil-fuel depletion, estimates that "regular"
oil peaked last year and forecasts that all liquids plus gas will peak in 2010.
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oil peaking). Although the resource base is large and technological progress has been able to bring costs down to
competitive levels, the dynamics do not suggest a rapid increase in supply but, rather, a long, slow growth over
several decades.”
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Economy Mod
Nuclear War
Walter Russell Mead, contributing editor to Opinion and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1998, p. M1
Even with stock markets tottering around the world, the president and the Congress seem determined to spend the next six months arguing
about dress stains. Too bad. The United States and the world are facing what could grow into the greatest threat to world peace in 60 years.
Forget suicide car bombers and Afghan fanatics. It's the financial markets, not the terrorist training camps that pose the biggest immediate
threat to world peace. How can this be? Think about the mother of all global meltdowns: the Great Depression that started in 1929.
U.S. stocks began to collapse in October, staged a rally, then the market headed south big time. At the bottom, the Dow Jones industrial average
had lost 90% of its value. Wages plummeted, thousands of banks and brokerages went bankrupt, millions of people lost their jobs. There were
similar horror stories worldwide. But the biggest impact of the Depression on the United States--and on world history--wasn't money. It
was blood: World War II, to be exact. The Depression brought Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, undermined the ability of moderates to
oppose Joseph Stalin's power in Russia, and convinced the Japanese military that the country had no choice but to build an Asian empire, even
if that meant war with the United States and Britain. That's the thing about depressions. They aren't just bad for your 401(k). Let the world
economy crash far enough, and the rules change. We stop playing "The Price is Right" and start up a new round of
"Saving Private Ryan."
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Economy Ext
High prices kill economy- indebted countries
Don Egginton, June 14, 2004, Oil and Gas Journal
High oil prices hurt the world economy's GDP growth. While GDP is not a complete measure of welfare -- it
misses out environmental costs, for example -- slower growth, especially in the HIPCs, is not to be
welcomed. A stronger case may have been made that high oil prices are good for the world's welfare if
McKillop had highlighted the environmental costs of hydrocarbon fuel use. Does this mean that a very
low price is good for the world economy? Again, ignoring the environmental impacts, the answer is: Yes, in
aggregate, the world's GDP will be greater even if the effects on GDP are smaller due to asymmetry effects.
There would be losers, of course, including the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, but in principle at least they can be compensated for their losses through transfers from the increase
in the world's GDP. In particular, low oil prices would have significant benefits for HIPCs and, given the
predicament of these countries, a rise in their GDP would have to be a welcome development.
General Motors and the U.S. economy in general are seeing a short-term disruption in growth caused by
rising oil prices. Fortunately for General Motors, we are a global producer, and we're well positioned in
the rapidly growing economies of China, Russia, India and Latin America. And while we experience
growth in those markets and position ourselves for a resurgent U.S. economy, we're going to increase our
R&D spending to expand alternative fuel solutions and advanced technology solutions to lessen and
ultimately eliminate everyone's dependence on petroleum.
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High oil prices are bad for the global economy and indebted nations
Don Egginton, June 14, 2004, Oil and Gas Journal
The answer to the question, How much will high oil prices hurt? depends on how high oil prices rise,
how long they rise for, and which country is examined. The IMF study previously cited provides the
following estimates of a $ 5/bbl increase (20%) in the oil price. The rise in oil prices leads to a loss of
GDP over a protracted period. Moreover, although the losses in the developing countries are initially
smaller than in industrialized countries, the real impact on the poorest countries is masked by the
presence of oil exporters within this category. IMF estimates that, for the 29 most heavily indebted poor
countries (HIPC), the loss of GDP in the first year after the simulated 20% oil price rise will exceed the
0.1% fall shown in Table 2 for 28 of these countries. The average decline in GDP will be 0.8%, and for
Laos the decline would be 2.2% in the first year of the simulation.
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Energy Mod
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Poverty Mod
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Poverty Ext
Poverty leads to terrorism
Lawrence Korb, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Arnold Kohen, international
coordinator of Global Priorities, and Peter Prove, member of the Lutheran World Federation's office for
international affairs and human rights, International Herald Tribune, August 22, 2002
In the last two years alone the military budget of the United States has increased by $80 billion. Partly
in the name of the war against terrorism, European nations are also being urged to augment their defense
budgets. But to the extent that vast resources are diverted from meeting human needs, we are only
postponing the day of reckoning. Worsening poverty throughout the world can only create conditions of
desperation that may lead to more terrorism. The substantially increased military spending that was
already taking place did not prevent the heinous terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Even more military
spending in the future is no guarantee of success in the war against terrorism. Redressing the imbalance
between military spending and efforts to reduce poverty would create vast resources to tackle pressing
human and social needs. Such efforts would create a better quality of life for people on a worldwide
scale and foster a more harmonious global community. In concert with secular allies, religious
communities can play a vital part in addressing these disparities.
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A2 Venezuela
The Venezuela economy sucks regardless of oil
Washington Post 8/26/2004 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35980-2004Aug26.html
Chavez has done little to diversify the engines of Venezuelan economy. In the hemisphere, Venezuela
ranks only above Haiti in deregulating and reducing bureaucratic processes to facilitate starting or
running a business, according to the World Bank's Doing Business Project. This is very significant considering that 57
percent of the work force in Latin America is employed by micro, small or medium-size enterprises.
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A2 Venezuela
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A2 Mexican Econ
Oil not key- consumer credit drives its economy and it’s tanked now
Mexidata 2008 (June23, Consumer Credit Card Debt Chilling the Mexican Economy Frontera NorteSur,
http://www.mexidata.info/id1885.html)
A serious trouble zone is emerging in the consumer credit sector, which has helped drive the Mexican
economy during the last four to five years.
New numbers from the federal government's National Commission for the Protection and Defense of
Financial Services Users (Condusef) report that the percentage of bank issued credit card debts in arrears
reached 7.6 percent in April of this year. The figure follows a steady rise in bad credit card debts from
June 2005, when only 3 percent of such loans were overdue.
Mexican officials have issued mixed messages about the slide of many consumers into unmanageable
debt. In 2007, Condusef President Luis Pazos predicted bad credit card debts would reach the 7.1 percent
threshold in June 2008, a number that was surpassed two months ago. Speaking last year, Pazos warned
that a 7.1 percent bad debt load would be dangerous to the health of the Mexican banking system.
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A2 Texas Econ
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Canada Mod
High prices are key to the Canadian economy
Prolifer Magazine 2006
(“Oil and Gas Dynamo Drives Economy,” http://www.nickles.com/MarketPlace/pdfs/OilGasDynamo-
gps06.pdf)
Well, we got another chance — and this time the boom is greater than anything ever experienced in the
Canadian oilpatch — with all the usual economic indicators, from Gross Provincial Product, to unemployment rates, to
housing prices, showing growth far beyond what was experienced during the Middle Eastern oil embargo days of the 1970s,
when oil prices increased five-fold and Calgary oil entrepreneurs drove Cadillacs with real gold trimming. Now the vehicles are
more likely to be Hummers or Lamborghinis and the million dollar mansions that were front page news in the 1970s are
commonplace. The Calgary Real Estate Board reported this spring that the average price for all residential real estate in the city
was $341,838, up 37.18% from the same period last year, with the average single family home priced at $376,726, up from
$273,953. At the current pace, housing prices will eclipse every major Canadian city. While the oil and gas boom is benefiting
other energy producing areas of Canada, including British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and the north, Alberta is
getting the lion’s share of the impact. So much so that, for the first time in Canada, financial service firms have launched Alberta
centred closed-end funds. It’s commonplace for fund managers to have country-centred funds or funds concentrating on certain
regions of the world, but the five firms that recently launched Alberta-focused funds are voting with their pocketbooks. “It’s not
hard to come up with a compelling story (for a fund emphasizing Alberta companies),” said Dean Orrico, managing director and
portfolio manager for Toronto-based Middlefield Capital, which recently launched the Alberta Focused Income and Growth Fund
(the first of the five Alberta-focused funds to go the market). One measure, compiled by Statistics Canada, says it all. The average
after-tax family income last year in Alberta was $61,800 a year, $12,000 a year more than the average for all the other nine
provinces. So what is driving this boom? Well, despite Alberta having a more diversified economy than in
the 1970s, with a petrochemical industry that didn’t exist before then, a growing manufacturing sector, and a strong retail sector,
the economic growth still comes primarily from energy. Just how much of an economic engine the oil and gas
industry is can be illustrated by a number of statistics and studies. For instance, a study of the profitability of the upstream oil and
gas sector by Calgary-based ARC Financial Corporation, commissioned by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
(CAPP) late last year (the study only looked at the exploration and production sector and not at oilfield service companies or
refining and marketing), illustrates how far the industry has come in the last five years. Similar studies were conducted in 2001,
2002 and 2003. ARC points out that since its February 2003 study, crude oil and natural gas prices had risen 80% and 60%
respectively (as of March, 2006). “Such dramatic price appreciation, in a short period of time, has substantially jolted the normal
course fiscal dynamics of the Canadian oil and gas industry, and given momentum to trends like oilsands and unconventional gas
development, constrained services and cost inflation,” says ARC in its analysis, led by well known energy industry economist
Peter Tertzakian. After the last Canadian oil boom went bust, it was common to see bumper stickers in Calgary pleading for
another chance at oil riches. The study concludes that the upstream oil and gas industry, which generated $100
billion of revenue for the first time ever in 2005, will be able to sustain that level through to 2008. Although
ARC predicts oil prices will moderate to the $52 per barrel range by 2008, from levels in the mid $70 range earlier this year, it
says rising production volumes, mostly from the oilsands, will allow the industry to continue generating $100 billion in annual
revenue or more through to 2008. Other observations and conclusions include: Rising oil and gas prices have roughly
doubled government revenues from crown royalties, land sales and cash taxes paid by exploration and production
companies, adding up to an estimated $27 billion in 2005, up from $14 billion in 2003. That doesn’t include taxes paid by oilfield
service firms and other peripheral activity; While revenue is up dramatically for the industry, so are its costs, with oilfield
services, wages, office space, pipelines and land costs rising at 15% a year for the last three years; The oilsands area of northern
Alberta now accounts for 33% of total crude production, or one million barrels a day. Over the next 10 years there are expected to
be over $60 billion of direct capital expenditures into developing the oilsands, as compared to $93 billion in conventional oil and
gas development up to 2008. Oilsands production is expected to rise to 2.7 million barrels daily by 2015; Momentum is also
growing behind unconventional natural gas production, with coalbed methane grabbing an increasing share of exploration
expenditures. For example, of the 21,925 wells drilled in 2005 (a tripling from levels in the 1990s), 70% targeted natural gas and
20% of those, or 3,000, were pursuing coalbed methane; ARC also notes the growing role of royalty trusts in the Canadian oil
and gas industry. For instance, it notes that in 2003, when its last report was published, trusts controlled 513,000 barrels of oil
equivalent per day, representing nine percent of all Canadian production (including the oilsands). Today there are over 35 trusts,
producing about 800,000 BOE/d, or about 14% of Canadian production. ARC expects those levels to remain constant through
2008; The oil and gas industry is the most profitable sector in Canada, with an average return on capital averaging 13% and
return on equity averaging 19%. However, ARC warns that much of that profitability stems from earlier discovered, lower-cost
production, saying the higher costs now being experienced by the industry will eventually lead to lower margins. That warning
aside, the industry has never seen better times, as statistics gathered by Nickle’s Energy Group show. The most telling
figure is the one measuring industry cash flow, the key metric the industry uses to gauge its success. In 2005 the combined cash
flow for the industry was up 35% from 2004, hitting $49.3 billion (more than $12 billion above the previous 2004 record).
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Canada Mod
Cont…………
Meanwhile, capital spending by those same producers hit $52.007 billion, a seven percent increase from 2004, even though
spending on acquisitions declined to $10.7 billion from $17.41 billion in 2004 (when there were several major takeovers). Those
dollars definitely trickled down to the oilfield service sector, with producers having invested over $39 billion on field work such
as drilling, land and facilities last year, a 41% increase from the $27.66 billion in 2004 (and an indication also of the worrisome
cost increase ARC warns about). Despite natural gas prices being down by more than half from a peak of around $15 per mcf last
year, producers have announced plans to spend about $47 billion this year on exploration and production. And no wonder, since
profits in the sector hit a record $22.7 billion in 2005, 30% more than the previous all time high of $16.7 billion in 2004. In the
last quarter of 2005 alone, thanks to surging oil and gas prices, the industry recorded profits of $10.2 billion, accounting for 45%
of the total annual profits in 2005. The new century has brought a bonanza for the oil and gas sector, with
Nickle’s records showing Canadian producing companies achieving over $86 billion in profits and over $193 billion in cash flow
between 2000 and 2005. By comparison, over the decade of the 1990s, profits totaled only $15.4 billion and cash flow amounted
to $83.8 billion. Capital spending by the Canadian oil and gas sector has been a huge driving force in the
total Canadian economy, with investments of $214.5 billion in the five years through to 2005, compared to $111.9 billion in
the 1990s. Those benefits to the country’s economy don’t include the returns experienced by investors in public companies and
trusts from dividends and distributions and share and unit appreciation. Of course, this bonanza can be largely attributed
to high oil and natural gas prices. In an industry that had to cope with prices as low as $10 a barrel in the early 1990s,
average crude prices of $56.12 a barrel and gas prices of $9.07 per mcf was welcome news. While all boats were lifted by the
rising tide, some floated far above the rest. For instance, in terms of year-over-year growth in production per share, stand-outs
included Rock Energy Inc. (264% growth in production per share), Galleon Energy Inc. (160% growth), ProEx Energy Ltd.
(141% growth), Storm Exploration (140% growth), Cyries Energy Inc. (129% growth) and Rider Resources (100% growth). As
an illustration of how the good times are rolling, Calgary-based EnCana Corp. recorded the highest profit ever achieved by a
Canadian producer last year, over $3 billion. In addition, three other producers, Imperial Oil Ltd., Shell Canada Ltd. and Husky
Energy Inc. topped the $2 billion profit mark. Another five producers recorded profits over $1 billion, including PetroCanada,
Talisman Energy Inc., Suncor Energy Inc. Nexen Inc. and Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. Although the ARC analysis — and
those by others looking forward — suggest the good times for the Canadian energy industry won’t continue at the same frenzied
pace as last year, they also don’t envision a collapse, like that which followed previous energy booms. Given that scenario, it’s
likely those benefiting from the newest energy good times, including the citizens of all of Canada’s producing provinces, will
have several years before they have to worry again about exhausting the wealth now flowing into their economies and
pocketbooks.
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Pipeline Mod
Low prices delay the Beku-Ceyhan pipeline
Panorama, BBC, 11-10-2001
Sometimes one can hear references to recent statements by American officials on their support for the project (as if such statements were not
made before). There are also more serious arguments which appear to give grounds for reviving interest in the project.
These can hardly be said to include the positive results of exploratory operations in Kashagan Kazakh offshore oilfield , at least for the
moment: even if these positive signs are confirmed, it will take too long for the question of transportation to international
markets to become a pressing one for the oil from the shelf. The prolonged period of high oil prices is more likely to
provide such grounds. But the current slump in these prices changes the picture, and if this becomes a long-term
trend you can forget about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Nor is it clear yet where the oil to fill the pipeline will come from, although
supporters of the project traditionally assure us that this issue can be resolved, as, for example, the US ambassador in Kazakhstan said at the
latest Kazakhstan International Oil and Gas Exhibition and Conference. It is possible that the problems surrounding the launch of the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium recently completed project to build pipeline linking West Kazakhstan with Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk also
provide certain hope in this regard to the supporters of the Caucasian route.
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Mexico Ext
Low prices destabilize
Paul Roberts, energy expert and writer for Harpers,2004, The End of Oil, pg. 97
Because price is so critical, players are forever seeking to manipulate it. Big importers like the United States and
Europe, whose economies are built on cheap oil, do everything they can to keep prices on the low side and will
routinely bring diplomatic pressure to bear on OPEC when prices get too high. (The United States will also
pressure OPEC when oil prices are too low, because low prices hurt U.S. oil companies and destabilize oil-depend-
ent allies like Mexico.) Oil companies, too, try to manipulate the market, exploiting everything from rumors to
artificial disruptions in supply to move prices and make money. In a tactic known as “squeezing the market’ for
example, oil companies will buy up twenty or thirty tanker loads of a particular grade of oil, such as Arab Extra-
Light, or West Texas Intermediate. Such a move can temporarily drive up prices for that particular grade by as
much as five dollars per barrel — and allow oil companies to make a tidy profit when the “squeezed oil” is sold.
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Mexico Ext
High oil prices are spurring Mexico’s economic growth
LA Times, 5/26/2004
Mexico, the world's No. 8 oil exporter, plans to boost crude oil exports to 1.95 million barrels a day this year, up
from the current level of 1.88 million barrels, Energy Minister Felipe Calderon said Tuesday. The move would
take oil exports up to the level fixed by Mexico's congress for 2004, helping to ease some of the pressure on oil
markets as the OPEC oil cartel keeps the world guessing about whether it will increase output at a June 3 meeting.
The increase in exports also will mean more money for the Mexican government, which depends on oil sales for a
third of its revenue. Robust oil revenue is bolstering Mexico's foreign reserves and economic growth but also is
stoking inflation. The U.S. benchmark price of crude oil closed Tuesday at $41.14 a barrel on the New York
Mercantile Exchange, after hitting a record Monday of $41.72 a barrel amid concern that rapid growth in demand
for fuel would outpace supplies. U.S. crude oil futures prices are up 41% from a year ago. Mexico, whose chief
customer is the United States, isn't a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. But
Mexico has kept its crude oil exports at about 1.88 million barrels a day since Feb. 1, 2003, under a price-
stabilization deal with the cartel.
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Renewables Mod
Consumers will only turn to renewables if it is apparent that high oil prices are permanent
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 4/20, 2002
Oil prices have steadily risen since the start of this year, at one point even going beyond 28 dollars per barrel,
and while this is worrisome to most people, one sector of German industry is expectantly rubbing its hands:
the renewable energy companies. "An increased use of regenerative energies and a change in consumer
behaviour...will first set in when the 30 dollar (per barrel) mark is exceeded," says Norbert Allnoch,
director of the International Economic Forum for Regenerative Energy (IWR). Only when the expectation
sets in that "over the long term will there be higher oil prices" can a change in consumers' habits be expected, adds
Allnoch of the Muenster-based think tank. Regenerative energy is a grab-bag term to cover a wide range of
alternatives to fossil or nuclear fuels, including solar cells, hydroelectricity, wind power and bio-gas.
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Economy mod
Nuclear war
Walter Russell Mead, contributing editor to Opinion and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1998, p. M1
Even with stock markets tottering around the world, the president and the Congress seem determined to spend the
next six months arguing about dress stains. Too bad. The United States and the world are facing what could grow
into the greatest threat to world peace in 60 years. Forget suicide car bombers and Afghan fanatics. It's the
financial markets, not the terrorist training camps that pose the biggest immediate threat to world peace. How can
this be? Think about the mother of all global meltdowns: the Great Depression that started in 1929. U.S. stocks
began to collapse in October, staged a rally, then the market headed south big time. At the bottom, the Dow Jones
industrial average had lost 90% of its value. Wages plummeted, thousands of banks and brokerages went bankrupt,
millions of people lost their jobs. There were similar horror stories worldwide. But the biggest impact of the
Depression on the United States--and on world history--wasn't money. It was blood: World War II, to be exact. The
Depression brought Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, undermined the ability of moderates to oppose Joseph
Stalin's power in Russia, and convinced the Japanese military that the country had no choice but to build an Asian
empire, even if that meant war with the United States and Britain. That's the thing about depressions. They aren't
just bad for your 401(k). Let the world economy crash far enough, and the rules change. We stop playing "The
Price is Right" and start up a new round of "Saving Private Ryan."
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Economy Ext
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A2 Economy
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Venezuela Mod
Decreased production guts the Venezuela’s economy
Time Magazine 7/26/2004
The curtain is rising this summer on Rodriguez's most interesting act yet: a five-year, $37 billion PDVSA plan to
revive and expand oil production while budgeting almost $2 billion a year for antipoverty initiatives ranging from
potable-water to literacy projects. Making PDVSA (called Pedevesa) an oil firm cum development agency will be
daunting, even with crude prices hovering near $40 a bbl. Venezuela's oil industry has been waylaid by political
turmoil, including a reckless near shutdown by anti-Chavez managers and other employees at PDVSA in 2002 and
2003, intended to paralyze the industry and force Chavez's resignation. The stoppage, which Rodriguez calls
"sabotage," at one point slashed the nation's oil output to a scant 50,000 bbl. a day and cost the economy well over
$7 billion. It dented U.S. imports for months and ended in the dismissal of 19,000 PDVSA employees, half the
company's work force. Though Rodriguez insists that PDVSA is pumping more than its prestrike level of 3.1
million bbl. a day, analysts say the company is barely reaching 2.5 million bbl. a day. "The market," says a U.S. oil
analyst, "is watching Ali Rodriguez perhaps more closely than any other oil executive in the world right now."
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A2 Shocks- No impact
No internal link- oil doesn’t impact the economy
Cait Murphy, Fortune, March 20, 2000
Relax: This is not an oil shock. It is not even an oil tremor. It is something along the lines of an oil belch: Not
particularly appealing to experience, with an unpleasant aftertaste--but hardly threatening. How can that be? The
price of a barrel of oil has tripled over the past year--surely, that has to be a problem. Ah, but when it comes to oil,
self-evident truths vaporize like a tank of gas in a '67 Chevy. The bottom line is that the recent run-up in oil prices
will hurt a few people for a little while, such as truckers and residents of drafty, old, oil-heated homes. The rest of
us will shrug it off. The price shock has been a couple of years in the making. In 1998 everything went wrong for
oil exporters. Consumption rose only 0.1%, far less than anticipated, because of a mild winter and unexpected
economic crises in Asia and Russia. OPEC, in a ludicrously awful bit of timing, had just turned on the taps,
agreeing in November 1997 to increase production. Lots of supply, low demand. The result: Prices crashed. In
1999 the opposite happened. Asia's unexpectedly robust recovery led an increase in demand for oil; the U.S. winter
was cold. And OPEC, in a remarkably adept bit of timing, had coaxed production cuts. As supplies and inventory
waned, prices rose, hitting $ 31 the first week of March. Because the oil shock of the 1970s had such a massive
effect on the public psyche, there is a knee-jerk fear whenever prices rise a lot. But this time prices tripled from
abnormally low, even derisory levels (see chart); in real life, $ 30 a barrel is not outrageous. Besides, oil ain't what
it used to be. As a share of the U.S. economy, oil accounts for only 3% of GDP, down from almost 9% in the late
1970s. More wealth is being generated by industries that don't use much oil, like IT. For each dollar of GDP
America generates, it uses half as much oil as a generation ago. (For more, see The Web Page.) Even
manufacturing appears untroubled. Many companies hedge their energy risks through futures contracts. Few plants
use oil for power generation anymore, and those that do often have the ability to switch to another source
(typically gas) if prices soar. "Given that we got through the Asian crisis hardly breaking stride, I think $ 30 oil
isn't really a problem," says Joe Kennedy, economist at the Manufacturers' Alliance.
No impact
Pietros Nivola, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 2/11/2001, Los Angeles Times
Alas, this critique did not pause to ponder an obvious puzzle. In 1973, when this country imported little
more than a third of the petroleum it consumed, why did the economy prove far more, not less, exposed to the
shock of rising international oil prices than it did last year when those prices soared while our dependence
on foreign oil reached an all-time high? Economic security is not a function of how much energy a nation
produces domestically or buys from abroad. Britain, for instance, produces more oil than it needs. Yet Britain's
self-sufficiency scarcely shielded British consumers from the sudden spike in gasoline prices last summer. The
reason: Petroleum prices everywhere are set in a world market, and no country, even a net exporter, can readily
repair to an energy policy that says, in effect, "Stop the world. I want to get off." More consequential for
economic stability than the share of fuel supplied by foreign sources is a nation's level of energy consumption
and susceptibility to inflationary pressures. The United States today is much more energy efficient than it was in
1973. All things being equal, our economy now is roughly half as vulnerable to the effects of energy price
increases. The economy is also far less inflation-prone than in the 1970s. Consequently, even the tripling of
global crude-oil prices between 1998 and 2000 did little damage.
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**Dependency Good**
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Terrorism Mod
Extinction
John Steinbruner, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, chair of the committee on international
security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997
That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a
singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay
rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is
detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level
of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The
use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely
controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act
swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to
have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use -
the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to
another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten
the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global
contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.
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Terrorism D
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Nuclear War
John Steinbach. “Israeli Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to Piece.” 3 Mar. 2002.
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control
and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East
again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last
resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining
momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the
major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite
images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in
1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control
negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and
dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the
familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the
deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."
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Economy Mod
Saudi Oil investments key to the economy
John Bacher, chair of the Niagra River Restoration Council and past president of the Preservation of
Agricultural Lands Society, 3/22/2002, Earth Island Journal
Increasing the affordability of solar power is critical to phasing out fossil fuels. Politicians in Congress who are
allied to oil interests understand this quite well -- in a negative sense. The successful battle to keep oil drilling out of
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and its two complementary Canadian national parks shows that, in a fully democratic society, oil power
ultimately loses when confronted by a strong environmental movement. The deadly trinity of oil, war and dictatorship presents the greatest
challenge to humanity at the start of the new millennium. Fortunately, with conservation and by replacing fossil fuels and nuclear energy with
renewables, it is possible to foster instead a holy trinity of peace, human rights and environmental sustainability Bush's Petrodollar Conflict
There is a flip-side to the oil equation that Big Oil and the White House would like to keep hidden: the US money
that flows to foreign Petrotyrannies that is reinvested in the US economy. Saudi billionaires have invested an
astonishing $ 600 billion in the US economy -- in banks, defense, telecommunications, shopping malls and real
estate. Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal has invested nearly $ 10 billion in Citigroup and nearly $ 1 billion in AOL
Time Warner. If these Middle East billionaires suddenly decided to "disinvest" in the US, the impact on the US
economy would be devastating.
Nuclear war
Walter Russell Mead, contributing editor to Opinion and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1998, p. M1
Even with stock markets tottering around the world, the president and the Congress seem determined to spend the next six months arguing
about dress stains. Too bad. The United States and the world are facing what could grow into the greatest threat to world peace in 60 years.
Forget suicide car bombers and Afghan fanatics. It's the financial markets, not the terrorist training camps that pose the biggest immediate
threat to world peace. How can this be? Think about the mother of all global meltdowns: the Great Depression that started in 1929.
U.S. stocks began to collapse in October, staged a rally, then the market headed south big time. At the bottom, the Dow Jones industrial average
had lost 90% of its value. Wages plummeted, thousands of banks and brokerages went bankrupt, millions of people lost their jobs. There were
similar horror stories worldwide. But the biggest impact of the Depression on the United States--and on world history--wasn't money. It
was blood: World War II, to be exact. The Depression brought Adolf Hitler to power in Germany, undermined the ability of moderates to
oppose Joseph Stalin's power in Russia, and convinced the Japanese military that the country had no choice but to build an Asian empire, even
if that meant war with the United States and Britain. That's the thing about depressions. They aren't just bad for your 401(k). Let the world
economy crash far enough, and the rules change. We stop playing "The Price is Right" and start up a new round of
"Saving Private Ryan."
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A2 Hurts Economy
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A2 Iran prolif
Nuclear Iran creates stability and dialogue in the Middle East preventing future warfare.
Ehsaneh I. Sadr (graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University
of Maryland, College Park) SUMMER 2005 “THE IMPACT OF IRAN’S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL” MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 2
The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The
doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect
their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers
are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are
also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear
warfare. The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons upon Israel’s regional interests is less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has
ever been a feasible alternative given current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary. Iran may indeed be empowered to
pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many
years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an
expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects
for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be
imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside
the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of
relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood.
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**Dependency Bad**
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Economy Mod
Dependency kills the economy- multiple reasons
Victor, Deutch, Schlesinger 2006 (National Security Consequences of .S. Oil Dependency,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf)
The growing worldwide demand for oil in the coming decades will magnify the problems that are already
evident in the functioning of the world oil market. During that period, the availability of low-cost oil
resources is expected to decline; production and transportation costs are likely to rise. As more
hydrocarbon resources in more remote are a saretapped, the world economy will become even more
dependent on elaborate and vulnerable infrastructures to bring oil and gas to the
markets where they are used. For the last three decades, the United States has correctly followed
a policy strategy that, in large measure, has stressed the importance of markets. Energy markets, however,
do not operate in an economically perfect and transparent manner. For example, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), quite notably, seeks to act as a cartel. Most oil and gas resources
are controlled by state-run companies, some of which enter into supply contracts with consumer countries
that are accompanied by political arrangements that distort the proper functioning of the market. These
agreements, such as those spearheaded by the Chinese government in oil-rich countries across Africa and
elsewhere, reflect many intentions, including the desire to ‘‘lock up’’ particular supplies for the Chinese
market. Some of the state companies that control these resources are inefficient, which imposes
further costs on the world market. And some governments use the revenues from hydrocarbon sales for
political purposes that harm U.S. interests. Because of these realities, an active public policy is needed to
correct these market failures that harm U.S. economic and national security. The market will not
automatically deliver the best outcome.
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More ev
SENATE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTER 8
Senate Democratic Communications Center for Congressional Documents and Publications, U.S. Senate
documents. “Bush Republican Policies Have Weakened America's Energy Security”. May 5, 2008.
Lexis.Bush Has Failed to Reduce the Nation's Oil Dependency. "America's oil addiction has worsened.
Since 2001, America's dependency on foreign oil has steadily increased even as the cost of oil has more
than doubled. The Bush administration's approach to this challenge has been to concede that there is a
crisis while opposing new policies or strategies that would change the status quo. In his 2006 State of the
Union address, President Bush declared that America is addicted to oil, but in the days and weeks that
followed his administration failed to adopt a new energy policy or support adequate funding for new
initiatives that would significantly reduce the country's oil dependency." [Center for American Progress,
8/06] High Oil Prices Can Cripple the American Economy "America now faces a crisis of historic
proportion: a liquid transportation fuels crisis. Oil, the lifeblood of our economy, is in increasingly short
supply and oil and derivative product prices have recently soared to record levels." [Southern States
Energy Board, Building a Bridge to Energy Independence and to a Sustainable Energy Future, 7/06]
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Terrorist will attack our reserves collapsing the economy- 2005 proves
Cohen, phd, 2006 (Reducing U.S. Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil, heritage foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/NationalSecurity/bg1926.cfm)
The oil market operates today without cushions of additional production capacity or significant strategic
petroleum reserves beyond the U.S. reserves. For example, al-Qaeda’s February 24, 2005, attack on the
Aramco facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia, sent shock waves through the world’s financial markets. On the
same day, the price of oil on international markets jumped nearly $2, despite the attack’s complete failure.
(The terrorists and two security guards were killed.)[11]
Most analysts agree that this attack and an averted attempt on March 28 were merely trial runs in a much
longer campaign designed to disrupt the global economy, particularly the oil and gas industry.[12] As the
September 2001 World Trade Center attacks demonstrated, al-Qaeda tends to return to the scene of the
crime, so another strike on Abqaiq and other oil targets is likely.
Both Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have repeatedly called for attacks on key Western
economic targets, especially energy sources.[13] In a tape aired by Al Jazeera, Zawahiri said:
I call on the mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims’ stolen oil, most of the revenues of which
go to the enemies of Islam while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our
countries.[14]
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Terrorism Mod
Extinction
John Steinbruner, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, chair of the committee on international
security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997
That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage
occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even
before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of
radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an
extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant
drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens -
ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the
risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be
capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population.
The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.
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