Decisions made in Berlin from 1900 determined the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 How far do you

agree with this opinion? Explain your answer, using evidence of Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy
The debate over the origins and causes of the First World War is one that has inspired many historians and has led many to very different conclusions. Fischers argument that Germany was the most dissatisfied of the great powers and therefore, the most eager to alter the status quo with War was controversially published in his book Germanys Aims in the First World War in 1967. Some historians like Berghahn agreed with the view that Germany should shoulders sole responsibility for the war, shown when he states the historian does not any longer have to undertake a round-trip through the capitals of Europe to locate those primarily responsible. They were sitting in Berlin. Alternatively, in the 1920s and 30s, the widely accepted view after the conclusion of the First World War was that stated by Lloyd George- The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war. Moreover some conservative German historians have suggested that the war was an offensively conducted defensive war by Germany resorting to a preventive strike as an attempt to break free from the pressures brought about by diplomatic isolation and the threatening power of Russia. Furthermore in the 1970s the structuralists view arose that believed domestic pressures in Germany played a fundamental role in the outbreak of war. It is clear the debate surrounding the outbreak of World War One is one that is both diverse and controversial with numerous different view points that could be explored. From the early 1900s Germany made the decision to put much of her time into domestic policies and foreign affairs; including pursuits such as Weltpolitik and Flottenpolitik. In Berlin, decisions were made by the Kaiser, Chancellor and political elite and there are ways in which these decisions could have determined the outbreak of war in August 1914. Wehlers interpretation in Source 1 broadly agrees with much of the question, however also expands on this view, hinting at an underlying aggressive German intent. Ferguson offers the view that anything could have happened in 1914 and that nothing was predetermined by previous decisions or plans. Keegan presents the view that many of the European powers had plans for war and that the Kaisers role in the outbreak of the war was paramount. It could be argued, as Wehler does, Germanys moves on the chess board determine the rules of the game up to 1914, and therefore decisions made in Berlin determined the outbreak of war in 1914. Wehler states that from the 1890s, German policy embarked on a collision course with Britains vital interests when the decision was taken to expand the battle fleet. This implies that Germanys decision to pursue Flottenpolitik from 1897 created tensions with Britain and led to the development of the naval race that ultimately led to the creation of Britains first dreadnought in 1906 and Germanys response of two naval laws passed by the Reichstag in 1906. Germanys decision to embark on Flottenpolitik hinted at preparations for war that Wehler stated to be carefully concealed yet with an aggressive intent. Wehler talks of the domestic political dimensions of the Tirpitz-Plan, the decision to pursue the so called Tirpitz plan reflects a way in which decisions made in Germany determined the outbreak of war, it once more emphasised German preparations for war, which did not go unnoticed by other European powers. The plan was formulated by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, and was Germany's pre-World War One strategic aim to build one of the largest navies in the world, thereby advancing itself as a world power through naval power, while at the same time addressing domestic issues. Keegan agrees with the view that domestic German decisions and issues could be a cause of the outbreak of the First World War. He states that the sovereign system disastrously took its most extreme form in Germany, this demonstrates that the imperial government and decisions it undertook such as the Tirpitz plan, ultimately led to war. This corroborates with Fergusons opinion in source two; he states that many of the military and political elite were all on holiday; from this we can infer that by not being in Berlin to make decisions, the elites lost control of the domestic situation and ultimately the decision to go on holiday may have determined the

outbreak of war. Wehlers final statement Germanys moves on the chess board determined the rules of the game up to 1914 agrees with the view that decisions made in Berlin from 1900 determined the outbreak of war. It does however imply a more aggressive intent from Germanys behalf and the game could imply other European powers had a role in the road to war. Ferguson talks of when the Kaiser issued his famous blank cheque, this along with Keegans statement that in the crisis of 1914, the Kaiser, when he alone might have put the brakes to the inevitable progression of the Schlieffen Plan; demonstrates the emphasis on the autocratic nature of the German system. It demonstrates the weight of the decisions the Kaiser made in Berlin, which could lead to war. The imperial constitution meant the Kaiser had substantial powers including; - final word over the direction of foreign policy, the ultimate decision to declare war and the final say over any dispute over interpretation constitution. As a consequence decisions made by the Kaiser in Berlin would be extremely important and therefore could determine the outbreak of war. Ferguson also states that Neuhof was advised to step up surveillance of Russian military activity, again emphasising how German decisions determined the outbreak of the First World War, by pushing Russia to feel that mobilisation was essential. Ferguson states that the Kaiser issued his famous blank cheque; this was a telegram Bethmann-Hollweg sent to the German Ambassador in Vienna. The telegram effectively offered Austria-Hungary a 'blank cheque' in terms of German support for whatever action Austria-Hungary chose to take in punishing Serbia for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914. This was a decision which could easily have determined the outbreak of war because Austria-Hungary knew they had the support of Germany if they chose to declare war. Keegan talks of the inevitable progression of the Schlieffen Plan; the plan clearly demonstrates a decision that led to war. It was originally created in Berlin in 1905, as a result of Germany feeling threatened by Russia, France and Britain, the plan clearly offers support to the opinion stated in the question. Overall there is a great deal of evidence in all the sources, but especially source 1 to support the view that decisions made in Berlin from 1900 determined the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. It could alternatively be argued that members of the political elite in Germany were uncannily relaxed, as stated by Ferguson; to have been planning a war for 1914, and that war simply became an unavoidable reality for Germany. Ferguson states that many of the key players in German politics were all on holiday (in separate resorts), this was when the blank cheque was issued which can be viewed as an event likely to cause war. Fergusons statement however offers the impression that political players offered their support to Austria-Hungary without the intention or expectation of war; it could be argued that Germany felt, with her support powers would feel more threatened and less likely to initiate war against Austria Hungary. Ferguson also lists many army and naval leaders as being away such as Tirpiz, it is unlikely Germany would initiate war with many of their key military players, let alone not present but also not together to make plans. The lack of preparedness Germany appeared to have right before the outbreak of war is also shown through Keegans view. Keegan states that the Kaiser panicked and let the Schlieffen Plan determine events, he offers a view that makes the Kaiser seem caught off guard and unprepared for war; not a man who had been preparing for war for over a decade prior to this event. In 1904 France and Britain signed the Entente Cordiale, as a result German military began to fear the possibility of a combined attack from France, Britain and Russia so completed the Schlieffen Plan as a way of defending herself. Yet it does not appear that the Kaiser was ready to enforce the plan in 1914, Keegan states that the Kaiser did not understand the machinery he was supposed to control. The Kaiser as well as other elites did not seem to be expecting war, which is also demonstrated by Fergusons statement that Nicolai was not back at his desk for another two days. The elites seem relaxed, they are not hurrying to any urgent work, nor do they appear to be planning for anything which therefore gives the impression that war was not planned. All three sources were published after Fischer published his view so all may have been influenced by such views; in particular Wehler who was a supporter of much of what Fischer had stated and believed in. Overall there is evidence and corroboration within the sources to demonstrate that Germany had not been planning a war but that she was taken by surprise with the outbreak of war. There is evidence to support the view that the overall corrupt nature of the imperial government alongside involvement from other countries was what ultimately led to the outbreak of war in 1914.

Wehler states that commercial rivalry in the worlds market increased dramatically, Ferguson states that Germany had tension travellers to establish whether war preparations are taking place in France and Russia; and Keegan states that in Germany, Russia and Austria, the systems were beset by secretiveness and jealousy. All three historians offer some evidence to suggest that Germany was not the only player who made decisions that determined the outbreak of war in August 1914. Ferguson talks of Germanys concerns with France and Russia, this along with Wehlers mention of Germany embarking on a collision course with Britain offers some support to the conservative historians view that Germany felt threatened and pushed to war. The Triple Entente was formed between Britain, Russia and Germany in 1907, this agreement encircled Germany and made her feel threatened and isolated from all fronts. This offers support to the sources view that decisions between other European powers were affecting the tensions in Europe and were affecting the role and decisions of Germany. Keegans statement about the political systems of Germany, Russia and Austria being ultimately corrupt due to the fact that the military system answer directly to their leader offers support for the view that it was not only Germanys political system or decisions that led to the outbreak of war. Keegan does however then go on to say the system, disastrously, took its most extreme form in Germany, this agrees with source two that puts the emphasis on the Kaiser when stating the Kaiser issued his famous blank cheque. Both sources touch on the autocratic nature of Germany and the possible effects this may have on German decisions. Ultimately the Kaiser had final say, he controlled the Chancellor so when Bethmann-Hollweg sent the blank cheque to Austria-Hungary, it is likely it was checked by the Wilhelm. Moreover as the Kaiser was commander- in chief of the military he will have had control over military decisions. The imperial government was riddled with problems that meant at some point the problems would become too much for the system to survive; perhaps war became unavoidable as domestic Germany problems pushed Germany into war. The inability of the Kaiser to make the correct decisions at the time of war is clearly demonstrated by Keegans statements that the Kaiser did not understand the machinery he was supposed to control and that he panicked and let the Schlieffen Plan determine events. This means the Kaiser appears to have not had full control over the country, nor did he appear to understand the importance and weight of the decisions he was making. The Kaiser and his inability to understand the seriousness of the situation Germany was in could have ultimately been the cause of the outbreak of war. Overall the sources give evidence that show it there were other key European players involved in the outbreak of war and moreover, Germanys authoritarian nature may have been a cause of the outbreak of war. In conclusion, it is clear that Sources 1 to 3 offer a wide array of evidence to suggest alternate views on the outbreak of war in August 1914. There is much evidence across all three historians views to support the opinion that decisions made in Berlin from 1900 determined the outbreak of war. Wehler mentions the naval race that Germany involves herself in, Ferguson talks of German tension travellers investigating other countries and therefore causing suspicions within their governments as to the possibility to war. Ferguson does seem to offer much support for Fischers side of the debate but at the same time offers a more structuralist view, this is shown by his statement that Germanys moves on the chess board determined the rules of the game up to 1914. There is also evidence to suggest that Germany was not aiming for a war in 1914 and that decisions she made did not determine the outbreak of war. Ferguson argues that for men who have been accused of planning a war, the senior members of the German General Staff were uncannily relaxed, Keegan also offers evidence to suggest that Germany appeared unprepared and unsuspecting of war when he states that the Kaiser panicked and let the Schlieffen Plan determine effects. There is also evidence that the autocratic nature of Germany along with the influences of other European powers could have had an impact on the outbreak of the First World War. The triple entente made Germany feel threatened so she wanted to arm herself in case of war which then led to the naval race with Britain. At many times Germany felt threatened by other European powers that seemed to be preparing for a war with her. Overall, it is clear that much of the evidence provided gives support to the view stated that decisions made in Berlin from 1900 determined the outbreak of war in 1914 and it is clear that Germanys role in the outbreak of World War One was both substantial and paramount.