Political Communication, 19:155170, 2002 Copyright 2002 Taylor & Francis 1058-4609 /02 $12.00 + .00 DOI: 10.

1080/0195747029005542 0

Modern Mass Media and Traditional Communication in Afghanistan

SHIR MOHAMMAD RAWAN

This article explores the bipolar structure of communication in Afghanistan, where the latest technological advancements in media coexist with a complex system of traditional communication. After 22 years of civil war and the destruction of most modern media facilities, Afghanistans traditional channels of communication have become even more significant. This article examines the history of the press in Afghan politics and society and asks what roles modern and traditional communication systems and values may play in the future. Keywords Afghanistan, Jergah, journalism, the press, traditional communication, tribal council

The various layers of communication in Afghanistan have a bipolar structure. On the one hand, there are media based on the latest technological advancements which appeal above all to those segments of the population that orient themselves toward the industrialized West. On the other hand, there is a complex system of mass communication along the lines of native traditions. This system is to a large degree defined by face-toface relationships and the standards of social life governing the country (Rawan, 1992, p. 44). Contrary to modern mass communication for which the industrialized society was the basis and from which journalism developed as a necessary building block, traditional communication usually comprises smaller groups within a limited territory (RoschaniMoghaddam, 1985, p. 120). Because the country has been in a constant state of civil war for 22 years and most modern media facilities now lie in ruins, Afghanistans traditional channels of communication have become even more significant. Moreover, the media have been used as propaganda instruments and exploited by whoever was in power for the sole purpose of keeping that power. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the more than 100 opposition publications in existence in 1985 could not take on a decisive role as carriers of information with regard to the organization and mobilization of Afghan resistance against the communist central power and the Soviet Army. Since the majority of Afghanistans population as well as the followers of the various parties were illiterate, they could not participate in the discussions held in the various media. According to Grevemeyer (1985),
This article was translated from German into English by Michael Davidson-Schmich. Shir Mohammad Rawan is Adjunct Professor in the Communication Department at the University of Leipzig. Address correspondence to Shir Mohammad Rawan, Obere Eichstdtstr. 18, 04299 Leipzig, Germany. E-mail: rawan@rz.uni-leipzig.de

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this resulted in the development of institutions and procedures on the local level that allowed ordinary people such as farmers and soldiers to participate at least to some extent in military and political decision making processes (p. 23). Oral propaganda, institutionalized discussions, as well as one-on-one explanations of facts by teachers, clerics, and propaganda officials appointed by the parties played a significant part in the dissemination of information and official goals to the largely illiterate population (Grevemeyer, 1985, p. 23). One of the most important institutionalized political organizations of the Afghan refugees has been the Jergah, a council that discusses everyday questions as well as military issues and also promotes relief measures for refugees (Janata, 1983, p. 125). For the majority of the Afghan population, particularly those living in the countryside, the traditional centers or channels of communication include tribal and village meetings, mosques, bazaars and markets, as well as family gatherings, which are organized in accordance with the inherent needs and necessities of the local population. All of these occasions and many others provide the opportunity to exchange information, point out problems, make complaints, solve conflicts, or contribute to the formation of opinions and find answers to questions which are of common interest to individuals, groups, or society in general (MacBride & Abel, 1984, p. 48). Contrary to the common belief held by Europeans, Afghanistan enjoyed periods of enlightenment of considerable length toward the end of the 19th century. Between 1919 and 1929, there was a period of modernization under King Amanullah Khan. During that period the democratic forces of the country passed the first Afghan constitution. People, at least to some extent, had freedom of opinion, and the king tried to institutionalize the principles of constitutionality. There was also a time of democracy between 1963 and 1973 under King Zaher Shah, who now lives in exile. During this time there were opposition newspapers, and women had the right to vote.

The Afghan Press: Between Censorship and Freedom

Throughout the countries of the Middle East, the development of the media is intricately linked to the development of colonialism and decolonization. Western style newspapers had not been in existence previously. The first newspapers developed as a result of the newly established colonial powers during the 19th century and their administrative need to instruct the local population in the mechanisms of control and dominance (Freund, 1988, p. 264). A historical analysis of the general situation at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century reveals that the development of the first weekly newspaper, the Shamsal-Nehar (Sun of The Day), in 1873 was not predominantly a result of the socioeconomic structures at the time. Instead, responsible for the development of the Shams-al-Nehar were a few individual members of the intellectual elite who had been influenced by the modern ideas of various Islamic states as well as Europes scientific and technical advancements and who now advocated and pressed ahead with the development of modern media. One of the members of this elite was Jamal-al din Afghani. He was politically connected to the court of Emir Sher-Ali Khan and initiated the publication of the Shams-al-Nehar at the end of the 19th century (Rawan, 1992, p. 58). Afghani, considered to be one of the most important reformers of the Islamic world of his time, argued that Islam would remain static as long as religious hierarchies and intolerance prevailed and as long as the Muslim world failed to acquire the body of knowledge that had been developed in Europe in the areas of natural sciences and the humanities (Rawan, 1992, p. 55).

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The Shams-al-Nehar covered mainly issues dealing with the importance and necessity of the press, official and unofficial government announcements, local news and news from abroad, and scientific and cultural topics. Moreover, in articles focusing on national ideas and issues, Shams-al-Neharinfluenced by Afghanis pan-Islamic ideas took on the cause of pointing out to the ruling upper class and the religious circles in the country the causes and consequences of Afghanistans backwardness (Ahang, 1970, p. 12). With the beginning of the second Anglo-Afghan War (18781880) and the forced exile of Emir Sher-Ali Khan, however, Shams-al-Nehar ceased publication. Because of its fight for national independence, Shams-al-Nehar could no longer publish under the Emir Abduurahmann (18801901), who was a de facto pro-British ruler and had abandoned Afghanistans basic national interests (Ahang, 1970, p. 17). It was not until 1902 that the situation of the press changed. Responsible for this transformation was Mahmud Ber Tarzi. He was a patriotic reformer and considered by many to be the founder of the Afghan press. After spending considerable time in exile mainly in Europe and TurkeyMahmud Ber Tarzi, upon his return to Afghanistan in 1902, founded Jawanan-e-Afghan (Young Afghans), a reformist movement representing liberal and religious forces opposing Emir Habibullah Khans pro-British regime. Since publishers of Jawanan-e-Afghan were well aware of the power the printed word could provide for the spread of their ideas, they edited their first lithographed newspaper in January 1906, called Seradj-ul-Ahkbar (Luminary of Chronicles). Because it supported the total national independence of Afghanistan, it was immediately prohibited by British authorities (Habibi, 1985). Only in 1911 did Mahmud Tarzi again succeed in publishing a bimonthly newspaper, Seradj-ul-Ahkbar Afghanieh (Luminary of Afghan News). He could do so not least due to his family ties to the court (Rahin, 1988, p. 42). The publication of the Seradj-ul-Ahkbar Afghanieh not only formed the basis of modern media in Afghanistan, but the political views expressed in the paper also formed the basis Afghanistans journalism for decades to come. The importance of Seradjul-Ahkbar Afghanieh cannot be underestimated. It not only provided the first ethical justification for the modernization of Afghanistan, but it also attempted to link modernization, patriotism, and Islam together as indivisible and intrinsic elements of Afghan society (Rawan, 1992, p. 65). In order to overcome the cultural isolation of the country, Tarzi and his newspaper advocated a spiritual and cultural rejuvenation of society. The idea was to transform the traditional and outdated educational and value systems so that they would meet the needs of modern times. This was to be achieved through the mediation of developed countries and the adaptation of their fundamental ideas. In order to overcome Afghanistans political stagnation and its isolation, the newspaper promulgated the idea of a national consciousness which was meant to convey to the people of Afghanistan a sense of unity and solidarity. In Tarzis view, the division and dissention of the Afghan people as well as the prevailing outdated concepts of law and freedom were among the historical factors that had contributed to the state of the Afghan nation up until that time. According to Seradj-ul-Akhbar, the misfortune of the division of the Afghan people was that cities and villages were fighting other cities and villages, tribes clashed with other tribes, and even members of the same family turned against each other. This division was condemned not only on the basis of Islamic rules, which decree that all believers are brothers, but also according to the laws of reason, which held that a society functions best when its members are united and help each other. Afghanistans divided state in 1911 is reminiscent of the current situation (Vartan, 1967, p. 350).

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After Afghanistans independence in 1919, traditional socioeconomic notions and values as well as religious fanaticism slowly started to change. Responsible for these transformations was a class of secular intellectuals who became a major power factor in society. The representatives of this class opposed conservative elements and religious fanatics, advocating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. For King Amanullah and his government, the first prerequisite for an all comprising societal reform was a spiritual and cultural revival of Afghanistan and its society. The educational system and the press were considered to be instrumental in achieving this goal (Moltmann, 1982, p. 12). During King Amanullahs reign (19191928), the quantity and quality of Afghan journalism changed. For the first time in Afghanistans history, Article 11 of the 1923 Constitution provided the legal basis for the right to free speech of every Afghan citizen (Schwager, 1932, p. 10). At the same time, a total of 23 state-owned and private newspapers and magazines appeared in Kabul and some provincial cities (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 99). Also among them was the first womans magazine, Erschad-al-Nasswan (Instructions for the Women), published in Kabul by Queen Soraja in 1922 (Yussufi, 1977, p. 92). The majority of the published articles were about European science, culture, and civilization as well as about Turkey, a relatively developed country. These articles had an impact on Afghanistans intellectuals and, as a consequence, strengthened the power of Amanullahs government. However, the press had no direct impact on the majority of the population. The main reason for the relatively minor impact of the media and the ultimate failure of King Amanullahs reforms, however, was not their objectives. The problem was that the majority of the reforms, which mainly had been adopted from modern Turkey and Europe, contradicted not only the socioeconomic and cultural structure of the population but also the peoples traditional and religious notions (Rawan, 1992, p. 84). Yet, the historical feasibility and lasting impact of Amanullahs education and media policy were later confirmed when, in 1929, Nadir Shah readopted the main concepts of Amanullahs policies. Up until the 1940s, Nadir Shahs (19291933) press policies and those of his son Sahir Shah (19331973) were defined by two basic characteristics. First, there was an emphasis on the historical and cultural identity of Afghanistan. Second, they emphasized the development of a uniform national consciousness among the various Afghan nationalities. Moreover, journalism now represented more of a reasonable compromise with the clerics, which it had not during Amanullahs reign (Rawan, 1992, p. 128). The creation of the first Afghan news agency, Bakhtar, in 1939 represented an important step toward Afghanistans integration into the international information system. This not only created the possibility of exchanging information with the provincial media outlets and Kabul, but also with foreign news agencies such as Reuter, AP, and AFP. In addition, with the help of German technicians, Radio Kabul was expanded in 1940 (Rawan, 1992, p. 194). In the wake of Shah Mahmuds politics of liberalization, a middle-class opposition developed starting in 1946. With the formation of this opposition, called Wish-Zalmian (Awakened Youth), a new period for the state-controlled media also began; it now could enjoy new democratic liberties. Domestic political issues were given broad coverage. As a result of this new course and pressure from the opposition, a new media law was pushed through parliament on January 1, 1951. By and large, the new law abolished precensorship of the press. During 1951 four opposition newspapers appeared, representing the official organs of the political groups that had evolved out of Wish-Zalmian. The significance of these press organs was that they called for citizen participation in the political life of Afghanistan (Rawan, 1992, p. 154).

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In 1953, Mohammad Daud, a cousin of Zahir Shah, was appointed Afghanistans new prime minister. An ever increasing number of educated specialists and graduates led to an increased interest in technical knowledge as well as an interest in current news on foreign events and domestic reform measures (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 307). For one thing, Daud recognized the existing need for information among Afghanistans intellectuals, which led him to the speedy development of newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasting. On the other hand, Daud was considered to be the first Afghan politician who consciously used journalism to reflect his economic and foreign policies. Between 1953 and 1963, 31 new trade journals were edited and disseminated by various ministries, state institutions, and educational agencies. Accordingly, the government started to train people in journalism (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 310). In 1963, for the first time the appointed prime minister came from a middle-class background. Yussuf introduced a new domestic policies course as well as new media policies. These new policies expanded the concept of free speech, extending it far beyond past policies. The decrees of the new constitution, modeled after the French constitution, and the new laws governing the media, ratified in 1965, represented a continuation of the political development abandoned in 1952. The understanding that the press of a given country should also reflect existing differences of opinion led to private initiatives of editors and publishers (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 312). That the governments media policies were about to change could also be seen in the fact that, for the first time, there was an attempt to extend these policies beyond the capital to the provinces. To integrate the population living outside Kabul into the communication system, the government strived to extend the modern means of communication and to provide guidance in regard to the interpersonal and traditional communication of this part of the population. In order to achieve this, the Modiriat-e Konferenzha (Department of Conferences) was founded in 1964. Its main task was to organize conferences and meetings at provincial centers and villages with the objective of increasing the level of information and adding to the local populations enlightenment concerning various societal issues (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 316). The media policies introduced by Prime Minister Yussuf in 1973 had positive effects on Afghanistans media not only in Kabul but also in the provinces. At the end of the monarchy, Afghanistan had a total of 70 different dailies, weeklies, trade publications, and tabloids; 16 of these were daily newspapers. The total volume of all publications was approximately 220,000 copies. According to Ahang and Siddiq (1972), who researched the history of Afghanistans journalism, one copy of a given publication was shared by four different readers. Accordingly, it can be assumed that in 1970, out of a total of 13.5 million Afghanis (Prakke, Lerg, & Scholke, 1970, p. 12), 880,000 read these publications (Ahang & Siddiq, 1972, p. 41). There was no considerable transformation of the media or of the governments media policy during the military putsch under Mohammad Daud Khan in 1973 and the consequent proclamation of the Republic of Afghanistan. However, the structural and political dimensions of Afghanistans mass media changed after the military takeover of the country in 1978 by the Democratic Peoples Party of Afghanistan (DVPA), which in 1990 changed its name to Hezb-e-Watan (Party of the Homeland). After the takeover, the DVPA was eager to propagate its political and ideological views. Especially during the 1980s, the DVPA started with the technical improvement of the press, increased circulation of the various publications, and, at the same time, took over and thus controlled the majority of media outlets (Rawan, 1992, p. 200). Up until Najibullahs pro-Soviet regime was overthrown in 1992, there were 4 national

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daily newspapers in Afghanistan (Anis, Hewad, Payam, and The Kabul News Times) with a total of about 111,200 copies; 8 central weekly papers with a total volume of 235,000 copies; and 18 provincial newspapers with a total of 600,000 copies published in Pashtu and Dari, the two official languages of Afghanistan (Khaydary, 1994, p. 64). After 1992, the press basically collapsed. A few newspapers and magazines were published irregularly and had a new political and religious profile. Some of the former newspapers, for example the Anis, Hewad, and The Kabul News Times, continued to be published under Taliban rule. However, with only four pages each, the quality was at best modest, and they resembled flyers more than newspapers.

RadioThe Most Widespread Informational Medium

The basis for Afghanistans radio broadcasting system was laid by Amanullah Khans government in 1925 with the purchase of two radio broadcasting systems. After the systems had been imported and a broadcasting studio had been established in Kabul, the first station was ready to transmit its program in 1928 with a 360-m wavelength and a total power of 200 W, allowing the programs to be received as far as Kandahar. The second transmitter was supposed to be installed in Kandahar. However, most likely due to emerging unrest and the failure of Amanullah Khans government, it never materialized (Yussufi, 1977, p. 143). In 1963, the Supreme Council for the Industrialization of Afghanistan decided to purchase a medium-wave band transmitter from Germany with a total booster wave capacity of 20 kilowatts. At the same time, officials in charge pushed ahead with the construction of the transmission facilities in Yakatut, a small village 5 km south of Kabul, and a building housing the future broadcasting studio Pul-e-Bagh-e-Umumi in the center of Kabul. A few students were also trained in radio technology. In 1939, the two transmitters were finally imported from Germany, and, after they had been assembled, the first program was broadcast with the help of German technicians on August 23, 1940, at 7:30 a.m. Whereas previously programs could only be broadcast on an irregular schedule and also were limited to the Kabul area, Radio Kabul now possessed the technological means to transmit its programs all over Afghanistan (Malyar, 1977, p. 2). The program of Radio Kabul consisted of news from Afghanistan, the most important world news, agricultural recommendations, government and other official announcements, as well as Oriental and European music (the latter, however, only sporadically). The program was broadcast both in Pashto and Persian. The newly created and independent Office for Media Affairs was responsible for the format of the program by Radio Kabul. The Ministry of Postal Services was responsible for the technical aspects up until 1945. After that the Public Relations Office took over responsibilities (Stegmann, 1941, p. 25). Under the government of Mohammad Daud (19531963), radio broadcasting saw improvements in its technology and its range of listeners. Daud tried to utilize radio broadcasting as a means of propaganda for his domestic and foreign policy. With that in mind, Radio Kabul improved its technical facilities and also its program. To serve its domestic listeners, a 10-kilowatt Siemens transmitter was installed in 1958, followed by a 50-kilowatt transmitteralso made by Siemensinstalled in Kabul a year later. Programming time thus could be increased from 6 to 14 hours. In addition, Radio Kabul started daily programs of 30 minutes each in English, French, Arabic, Russian, German, Urdu, and Balutschi (Rawan, 1992, p. 187). These program additions extended the narrow scope that broadcasting stations had provided since 1939. For this reason, Dauds government included in its 5-year plan the

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construction of radio studios in Ansariwat, a village near Kabul. They were completed in 1964 and consisted of seven recording studios, two concert studios, and a large auditorium. In the same year, Radio Kabul was renamed Radio Afghanistan (Khaydary, 1994, p. 66). Yussufs government also considered radio broadcasting an important vehicle for propagating and explaining its program of democratization. Accordingly, attempts were made to revamp radio broadcasting in Afghanistan along the lines of the governments new social and political course. In the governments opinion, the old radio programs did not do justice to this new course. During the opening ceremony for the new studio in Kabul in 1964, Yussuf criticized the technical backwardness of the various radio programs and consequently demanded that the Ministry for Culture and Informational Services and all other ministries strive for better cooperation among themselves and improve the broadcasting programs (Rawan, 1992, p. 198). In the following year, the Ministry for Culture and Informational Services established the mission of the broadcasting system. The core of this mission was to spread national ideas, to enlighten peoples critical thinking, to satisfy the need for information according to the educational levels of the various classes of society, and, last but not least, to entertain the listeners (Rawan, 1992, p. 189). In order to extend educational programming and to improve transmission to all parts of the country, a 100-kilowatt mid-wave transmitter, a 100-kilowatt shortwave transmitter, and a second 25-kilowatt mid-wave transmitter started to broadcast from Kabul in August 1966. Programming time now increased from 15 to 16 hours, and new programs were broadcast (Mokhtar Zadah, 1972, p. 122). During the mid-1980s, the former USSR handed over a total of 27 TYP RoB 10 transmitters and amplifiers to the Afghan government, which guaranteed the broadcasting of radio programs all over the country. Moreover, these new technical devices now formed the basis for the development of local radio stations in the provinces (Khaydary, 1994, p. 67). In 1990, Radio Afghanistan was the only state-owned radio station in the country broadcasting with a total of 50 programming hours. These programs were free of charge all over Afghanistan and could also be received abroad. According to some estimates, in 1990 there were about 5 million listeners across the country and a total listening audience of 10 to 12 million (Khaydary, 1994, p. 68). In the 1990s, radio was also used for political and ideological propaganda purposes by the various mujahedin groups in Kabul and the provincial cities. Under the reign of the Taliban, Radio Afghanistan was renamed Radio Shariat. On November 18, 2001, it resumed its previous name Radio Afghanistan. Similar to many developing countries, radio broadcasting in Afghanistan was considered the only mass media. However, owing to the fact that it was controlled and administered by the government, it lacked credibility. To obtain credible information, Afghans intellectuals and the people in the countryside very often listened and continue to listen to radio programs in Pashto and Dari on BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, as well as to the radio stations of neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. There have been no polls to measure which foreign radio stations have the most listeners in Afghanistan; however, judging from my own experiences, the most popular probably are the programs in Pashtu and Dari of Radio BBC and Voice of America, followed by those on Deutsche Welle. At the moment, the Afghan people consider these radio programs the most important informational sources concerning the events on and after September 11 and the countrys development in general.

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TelevisionRebuilding After the Taliban

TV has only been in existence since the early 1970s. Plans to develop an Afghan television system were first established under the government of Prime Minister Daud, and in 1975 a Japanese company began implementation of a PAL-system (Rawan, 1992, p. 201). At the start of operations, the television center in Kabul had two studios, editorial offices, a graphics department, and a small video library. All of the studios technical equipment and that of the transmitter stations were made in Japan, including cameras; several video recorders; 16-mm film projectors; recording, copying, and control equipment; and the equipment for the master control room and the cutting rooms. Up until 1978, there were merely broadcasts for testing purposes. At the end of 1978, daily 1hour broadcasts were started in Kabul (Khaydary, 1994, p. 70). At the beginning of the 1980s, Kabul TV had increased its broadcasting time to 6 hours daily. About 2 million people in and around the capital were able to receive these programs. In 1982, with the support of the Soviets, the satellite station Shamshad was put into place, enabling Kabul TV to exchange programs with countries abroad using the Intersputnik system. Moreover, the satellite station formed the basis for a 2-hour program by Kabul TV broadcast to 11 provincial cities during the mid-1980s. Among the cities with local TV stations were Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Farah, Khost, and Fayzabad. Parts of the broadcast were also produced at these local stations (Rawan, 1992, p. 201). In 1992, the total daily broadcasting time of the central station in Kabul was 6 hours. There was an additional program between 9 p.m. and 12 a.m. on Fridays. On January 1, 1978, there were between 30,000 and 35,000 TVs in Afghanistan. By Janaury 1, 1987, the number had increased to 800,000, of which 250,000 were color TVs, most of them in Kabul (Khaydary, 1994, p. 72). After the fall of Najubullahs government and once the mujahedin (freedom fighters) had taken over the capital of Kabul, the broadcasting of TV programs was anything but regular. And as soon as the Taliban conquered Kabul in 1996, they prohibited watching TV in accordance with their strict interpretation of Islamic law. As is common knowledge, the orthodox followers of Islam in general condemn the graphic representation of living beings. Accordingly, up until the early 1960s religious scholars deemed photography unacceptable. Then and now, they consider photography a reproduction of human beings, and all those who imitate Gods creations will be severely punished by Allah on judgment dayeven though the Koran does not explicitly forbid the portrayal of human beings. To a certain degree, todays clerics still condemn the graphic depiction of humans. Even today, ultra-religious Muslims in rural regions of Afghanistan refuse to pray in rooms that are adorned with man-made depictions of living beings. They argue that angels will never enter a room decorated with a human tswr (picture) (Mhlbck, 1988, p. 95). This orthodox interpretation was put into practice by the Taliban in that they forbid TV and photography. After a 5-year break, broadcasting in Kabul began again on November 18, 2001, albeit on a provisional basis. Most of the transmitters either have been destroyed or are totally outdated. Currently, the daily 3-hour program for Kabul consists of news, culture, and entertainment. Whereas foreign radio stations enjoyed a fair number of Afghan listeners, the majority of the Afghan people do not watch TV stations such as CNN or Al-Jazeera. For one thing, satellite dishes were illegal under the Taliban government. In addition, households in most parts of the country were not hooked up to the electric grid. Moreover, language barriers exist, with the majority of intellectuals unable to understand either English or Arabic.

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It has been established that the development of journalism during the last decades has been influenced mainly by the socioeconomic development of Afghanistan. This is true for all of the various governments that have used journalism as a means of enforcing their policies. On the positive side, we find that every government, and this is especially true for the post-WWII period, pushed for the development and proliferation of journalism. Unlike the European press, the media in Afghanistan considered its primary mission and objective the publication of educational, instructional, and technical and scientific material. The immediate political and ideological reverberation of modern media (print, radio, and TV) was mostly limited to a small class of intellectuals. For the majority of the population, the most important sources of information have been and still are the traditional means of communication.

JergahPolitical Communication of a Different Kind

For centuries, there has been the tradition of advisory bodies called the Jergah. There are two types of Jergahs, one being the Quawmi-Jergah (the council meeting of the tribe) and the other the Loyah-Jergah (the large council meeting). The Quawmi-Jergah functions as an advisory or mediating body concerning important affairs of the village, the clan, parts of the tribe, or the entire tribeeverything except family matters. One member of each family or community, most of the time an experienced Spinziri (Elder), sits on the council. Usually, the Jergah takes place on the village plaza in front of the mosque. The affair to be decided upon has already been discussed before the meeting, and political alliances play an important part in those discussions. The actual Jergah then is merely an exchange of opinions. And even though each member of the Jergah has the right to present his individual opinion to the assembled council, the usual procedure is that the Khn/Malek or Spinziri presents an opinion that has been arrived at by the group prior to the Jergah. Decisions in the Jergah are made not by a majority vote but through consensus, reached when there are no more objections by any of the attendees (Kortenbusch, 1994, p. 76). According to Frembgen (1990), these characteristrics are a reflection of the Pashtuns notions of equality (p. 109). In addition to solving conflicts within its tribe, the Jergah also maintains relationships between the Pashtun tribe and other nationalities or ethnic groups as well as the government. Each new development reaching the tribe from outside is spread within the tribe by the Jergah. Then the council decides whether to reject or to adopt it. Once the Jergah has arrived at a decision by consensus, it is irrevocable, and violators are threatened with severe punishment. Quite obviously, with its power to mediate conflicts and pass judgments, the Jergah still functions today as a court of law within the Pashtun tribes, even though the physical and material penalties differ from one Pashtun area to the next. Usually, the Loyah-Jergah (large council) is made up of tribal leaders and representatives of all ethnic and religious groups in the country. The role played by convening the Loyah-Jergah is not new but has a long tradition. Most recently, with the end of the Taliban rule and the confirmation of the future government of Afghanistan, the function of the Loyah-Jergah has become the frequent focus of Western media. What was the political significance of the Loyah-Jergah within the history of Afghanistan? The Loyah-Jergah is deeply embedded in Afghan history. Whenever a united front was needed to solve a problem or conflict, the Loyah-Jergah was convoked. In 1747, the ruler of the country was murdered, which caused a severe conflict within the country over succession. In order to solve this conflict, Nor Mohammad Khan, a high military

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official, suggested the convocation of the Loyah-Jergah. The council consisted of members from the most important ethnic groups in Afghanistan: the Pashtuns, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras. A representative of the clergy was appointed chairperson of the Loyah-Jergah. It was also decided that all of the ethnic groups of the country had to obey the decision of the Loyah-Jergah. Thus, the first king of Afghanistan was elected in 1747 by the Loyah-Jergah, which had united the tribes of the Pashtuns, Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras. It was also the first time that a king was made head of state in a peaceful process by the decree of the Loyah-Jergah (Ghubar, 1967, p. 559). In the same year, the country was named Afghanistan. During the first Anglo-Afghan War (18391842), the Loyah-Jergah convened in 1841 to decide on a successor for Dost Mohammad in order to organize the resistance of all Afghan nationalities against the British colonial power. Dost Mohammad had been deprived of his powers by the British and was then deported to India. At the Loyah-Jergah convention, Sardar Akber Khan was appointed leader of the army and was also appointed to lead the countrys resistance against the British. In 1842, the rebellion/uprising organized by the Loyah-Jergah was successful, and the British were defeated (Ghubar, 1967, p. 355). With the outbreak of WWI in 1914, Afghanistan had to make up its mind about its role in this war and its stance toward Great Britain. To this end, Emir Habibullah convened the Loyah-Jergah in 1915. Participants, however, were mainly clerical leaders of the country, who had been chosen by the Emir himself. During the Loyah-Jergah, Habibullah was declared the absolute ruler of the country. This decision by the Loyah-Jergah, which was forced and did not reflect the interest of the wider population, was controversial among those tribal lords who had been excluded from the Loyah-Jergah. Those opposing Habibullah argued that the people of Afghanistan could have more easily achieved their independence, since the British had been weakened by their engagement in the war (Ghubar, 1967, p. 737). In February 1919, Habibullah paid for his pro-British policy with his life. In contrast to his father, Habibullahs son Amanullah started to implement a more progressive political course in 1919. His objective was to fundamentally reform and modernize the country, and again the Loyah-Jergah was one means to this end. Moreover, tribal Jergahs were convened across the country with the objective of uniting all forces against the British colonizers. Both institutions, the Quawmi-Jergah (tribal council) and the Loyah-Jergah, played an important role in the organization and mobilization of the tribes against the British colonial power. After Afghanistans independence was recognized in 1919, King Amanullah retained these traditional institutions in support of his domestic and foreign policies (Ghubar, 1967, p. 799). In order to define and strengthen his position on foreign policy, Amanullah in 1921 convened yet another Loyah-Jergah, whose members consisted of tribal representatives and clerics from Afghanistans provinces. At this time the Loyah-Jergah passed the Russian-Afghan agreement on good neighborly relations. One year later, Amanullah submitted to the Loyah-Jergah the first written constitution and his plans for reforming the country; both were confirmed by the Loyah-Jergah. The Loyah-Jergah had an active role not only in the ratification of Afghanistans first constitution in 1923 but in the ratification of subsequent ones in 1939 and 1964. The Loyah-Jergah also determined and supported Afghanistans politics of neutrality during WWII (Rawan, 1992, p. 49). During the course of its history, resolutions and decisions by the Loyah-Jergah have always been final, because these decisions are reached by the personalized, traditional process of opinion formation among members of the public. This means that important decisions have not been dispersed by the various mediawhich the majority of the

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population would not be exposed to anywaybut above all through interpersonal communication by individual tribal representatives or the representatives of the various ethnic groups. The persuasive power of personal communication thus grew, a fact that encouraged the publics support of government policies. Even today, a Loyah-Jergah could help to overcome the political, religious, and ethnic differences of the various rival groups in Afghanistan.

Mosque and BazaarThe Most Important Channels for Information

Traditional Islamic society has always considered the mosque and the bazaar as the most important pillars of traditional and interpersonal communication. This is not only the case in rural areas. Here the cities have their common meeting point, here you get in touch with others, here relationships grow stronger and deeper or they break. Here, people negotiate with each other, they pray to God, they exchange information (Naficy, 1993, p. 13). During the time when there were no modern mass media in Afghanistan, the mosque was not only the center for spiritual communication, but up until the end of the 19th century it also represented the countrys only institution of learning. To some extent, the mosques have retained this dual function to the present, especially in the countryside. In terms of the development of Afghan society, the communicative significance of the mosques can be compared with the role of the church in medieval European society. Biblical events were used to explain the real world; religion justified societal norms; the church was the absolute and dominant ideological power. The priest, acting as a spiritual herdsman for the residents of villages or the cities, guided their daily lives by pronouncing the churchs doctrine. The priest was the central figure in societally integrating communication in feudal society (Poerschke, 1988, p. 17). This also applies to the predominantly feudal structure of Afghan society, since the Islamic religion, as the dominant worldview, is deeply rooted in all Afghan social strata. The considerable influence of the Mullah along with that of the Khn/Malek (tribal lords) in rural communities is also based on the numerous other duties that he performs, for example, at official ceremonies at the mosque, at the five daily ritual sermons, as well as at the Friday sermon and all other religious festivities (Snoy, 1972, p. 170). He is responsible for the spiritual life of the villagers, helps them solve day-to-day problems, andafter the prayer in the mosquetalks about the conflicts in the village and the region (Ahang, 1970, p. 3). After the sermon, especially the Friday sermon, the Mullah provides the village people with the latest news. Government agencies also take advantage of this gathering to pass on to the villagers administrative decisions and any other pertinent news. These religious meeting places provide an opportunity for the population to exchange information and news from the city and the countryside. Up to the present time, the role of the mosque as the traditional center for communication has changed little. On the contrary, to this day the most important political decisions of the Afghan clergy both in Kabul and in the provincial cities are usually announced after the Friday sermon in front of hundreds of people. Only then are they broadcast on the radio and published by the press. The Oriental bazaar (Persian bzr or Arabic sq), usually situated in the center of the town, represents the traditional business district of the Islamic town. Moreover, it consists of solid building facilities serving mainly economic needs and, except for some

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holidays, is open daily. Aside from its economic function, however, the bazaar also has political and religious significance and an important role as a place for entertainment. For city and town dwellers alike, the bazaar represents the dominant center of communication and the point of crystallization of the public life of the community and surrounding areas (Grtzbach, 1979, p. 153). Aside from the Oriental bazaar, we find the so called market days in the rural regions of these countries. Their function is primarily economic, yet they also provide opportunities for entertainment, meeting new people, and the exchange of information. In contrast to the bazaar, the Oriental market is a large open-air area without solid structures or buildings in place. Moreover, it is used (on certain days) by the population of the surrounding region for the purchase and sale of goods. In general, market days and periodic markets tend to take place either once or twice a week. In northern and northwestern Afghanistan, for example, market days are twice a week. In most regions of the South and Southwest, on the other hand, market days are only once a week. In Afghanistan, the day of Jumaa holiday in Islamic countriesis a favorite market day. Once the market closes down for business, visitors can visit the mosque for the main Friday sermon. At a traditional market, the doors usually open between 7 and 8 a.m., and all trading activities cease during the midday hours. Afterward, people who visited the market may go to one of the numerous tea houses and small restaurants where they can catch up with the latest news, discuss communal affairs, and negotiate weddings, contracts and the like (Fischer, 1984, p. 221). Owing to the recent military conflicts and the consequent destruction of the technical media equipment and facilities, the importance of the bazaars as centers for communication has increased. Foreign journalists have confirmed this: When they asked people in northern Afghanistan whether they knew about the events of September 11, 2001, the most common answer was that they had heard about them at the bazaar.

Opinion Leaders and Traditional Communication

Traditional and religious opinion leaders, such as the Khn (tribal lord), the Mlek (tribal leader) and the Mullah, all play a decisive role in the formation of opinion within Afghanistans traditional communication framework. The only difference between them is that the Khn usually owns more land. In general, there is no difference in their political position or in their influence on political decision making. The Khn/Mlek is the declared holder of authority within a given group. The Khns power is based on his personal qualities, above all on his economic dominance and on his followers. Second in the line of opinion leaders is the Mullah, the village cleric in the Pashtun community. He is paid by the village, and in some communities he is on the same pay scale as mosque barber, tender of the parish, and musician (Steul, 1981, p. 70). As members of the upper class, and due to their material, religious, and traditional standing, Khn, Mlek, and Mullah are the dominating spokespeople within their respective communities. They come from established families, are well connected and oriented beyond their region, and are also in contact with other members of their class outside their region. Thus, they hold leadership positions at the local as well as the regional level. Because of their prestige within the hierarchical society, the majority of the people seek their advice in all sorts of matters. The informational behavior of these opinion leaders is also based on sources beyond the regional level. In part, their information comes with the job and the position they hold, comparable to trade or religious information (Wiebe, 1978, p. 190).

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There are numerous examples that substantiate the significance of traditional opinion leaders within the communication process, in both the dissemination and hindrance of new ideas and technologies. To list them all in full detail would go beyond the scope of this article. An empirical study by Frhlich (1969), an expert on Afghan history and ethnography, carried out at the end of the 1960s on the role of Radio Paktia in a regional village revealed that the population was not supportive of the governments program for political and economic renewal broadcast over the radio. The government had failed to take into consideration the influence of the traditional opinion leaders, such as the Mleks, the Mschrs (Eldest), and the teachers. The reasons for this, according to Frhlich (1969), were a patriarchically organized tribal structure, on the one hand, and the concentration of village radios among the opinion leaders, on the other (p. 205). Even today, the traditional opinion leaders are considered the dominant forces in the opinion forming process of the tribe or village. I can corroborate the general significance of the opinion leader within the communication process. During field studies in northwestern Pakistan in 1995, participants were questioned about the reliability of information disseminated by the media. It turned out that with regard to political decision making processes the opinion leaders were more trustworthy than the modern media. Thus, the role of religious and traditional opinion leaders in Islamic countries should not be overlooked in research on traditional communication processes. On the one hand, they simply must be taken into account when it comes to developmental improvements and the organization of a modern state. On the other hand, the majority of the population will not be able fully to understand and to comprehend information that is disseminated by mass media alone. In the near future, people will therefore be dependent on the opinion leaders and their interpretations, and it is fair to say that their interpretation will have priority for years to come. Based on my experience in rural Afghanistan, even radio broadcasting, which most communication researchers consider extremely important in the implementation and development of a political system within developing countries, is not necessarily an adequate means for mass communication. For one thing, the majority of the population cannot afford to buy a radio. In 1982, there were 1 million radios for 17 million Afghans (Rawan, 1992, p. 201)most of them in the cities and some in rural areas owned by a few wealthy people. Aside from financial considerations, and quite incomprehensible for Europeans, intellectual communication problems pose a serious obstacle. Since the radio programs are mostly in Pashto or Dari, they are basically incomprehensible to other ethnic nationalities residing in Afghanistan, among them the Baluchi, Uzbeki, and Turkmen. Moreover, the Pashto and Dari spoken in Kabul differ from the respective dialects spoken in the countryside. And the standard language spoken in Kabul, with its intellectual nuances, goes way over the head of the common listener (Grevemeyer, 1985, p. 33).

Prospects
In the opinion of the author, the basic challenge of developing Afghanistans communications has to be seen in the formation of adequate media structures and media content, while strictly considering traditional, economic, ideological, and communicative structures. In order to transform Afghanistans political, social, and economic fabric, those responsible for the media should be well informed about and understanding of the

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political culture of the areas to be developed. Unless new cultures are slowly integrated into the existing culture, media policy has but a slim chance. Most important, people must be given a chance to participate in this process. This can be achieved only if every attempt is made to bring together the differing cultures to forge a forward-looking community. The development and the future tasks of Afghanistans modern media are based on the current state of Afghanistans society, which is mainly characterized by ethnicity, language, religion, family relations, settlement forms, social and economic strata, and value systems. Because of this, the modern media should be concentrated not only in the capital but also in the various regions of Afghanistan. The proliferation of the individual media should be done in stages. Moreover, the main criteria must center around the question how much information the population of a given area or region can process. At present, this approach would involve the development of radio broadcasting as a first step, followed by the press and finally television. Within the scope of the three main tasks of media (information, entertainment, and the dissemination of knowledge), regional media should always reflect ethnic and cultural peculiarities as well as various languages and dialects. However, coverage of national and international news should not dominate on the regional level, since the average person living in the countryside has still little interest in national political affairs or, for that matter, in any foreign signals that do not correspond with his or her needs. As society develops, however, local media have the possibility of increasing coverage of national topics by tying them in with regional topics and thus increasing peoples national awareness. Past and present events in the multinational state of Afghanistan show that the lack of a uniform identity not only hinders the development of Afghan society but also the proliferation of a statewide communication system. At the same time, local media have to make use of the traditional means of communication and, with citizens rights and duties in mind, have to contribute jointly to education and knowledge as well as to the uncovering of social and economic inequalities. Change can be achieved more easily if we observe and respect habitual modes of behavior and ways of thinking, traditional ideas as well as traditional/folk wisdom. In addition, we have to take into consideration existing leadership structures. The dissemination of modern ideas vis--vis the traditional value system and religious ideals of Afghan society is considered to be a decisive factor in the effectiveness of media contents. This goes all the way to the journalistic tradition of Afghani and Tarzi, who saw the development of society intricately linked with national ideas such as patriotism, Islam, and modernization. Nationalist flare-ups must be avoided, and, following Afghanis and Tarzis ideals, Islam should be viewed as a cultural force able to integrate and to create identity rather than an ideology for political power, a view held by the Taliban. The technical knowledge and journalistic experience of the industrialized states can be of great help for the development of Afghanistans national media. As part of the plan to rebuild Afghanistan, the industrial countries should do all they can to support the various media outlets as soon as possible. The development and proliferation of modern mass media is not only a decisive factor in the modernization process of Afghan society but must also be viewed as a major contributing factor for the proliferation of economic and cultural cooperation on the international level. However, the only way Afghan media will be up to such a task is if they are guaranteed the same freedoms that the media usually enjoy on the international level.

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