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Central Asian Survey

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Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of the Islamic factor

Mohiaddin Mesbahi
a a

Associate Professor of International Relations, Florida International University, Miami, Florida Available online: 13 Sep 2007

To cite this article: Mohiaddin Mesbahi (1997): Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of the Islamic factor, Central Asian Survey, 16:2, 141-158 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634939708400980

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Central Asian Survey (1997), 16(2), 141-158

Tajikistan, Iran, and the international politics of the 'Islamic factor'

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MOHIADDIN MESBAHI

Introduction The 're-emergence' of Islam as a vital sociopolitical and cultural force and dynamics, and its domestic and international role and impact in Central Asia and the Caucasus have been the subject of considerable debate both within academic and policy circles, especially in the West, Russia and in the Muslim world since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This new sense of urgency and attention is in sharp contrast to the Soviet era, when only a few scholars, such as the late Alexandre Bennigsen, kept the 'issue' alive. Although partially driven by scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of nation-building in Central Asia, the new focus on the region is to a large extent a function of the symbiosis of the re-emergence of the old historical rivalry of great and regional powers over the geopolitical direction of the region and the political economy of resources, and the coincidence of the independence of Central Asia with the globalization of the 'Islamic factor' in world politics. This globalization, though preceding the demise of the Soviet Union, acquired a new momentum and intensity thanks to the geocultural and geographical ramifications of the Soviet collapse. The geocultural and geopolitical inclusion of the former Soviet South to the Islamic world, labelled as the 'new Middle East',1 has, for better or worse, placed the domestic dynamics of Central Asia, including its Islam, in the midst of a cross-current of regional and international concerns, thus subjecting Central Asia to external structural constraints and opportunities. This study will look into Tajikistan and the international politics of the 'Islamic factor' in the nexus of the policies and interactions of Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan and the United States. Given the religio-cultural importance attached to Iran's role in shaping, by design or default, the complex of international politics of the 'Islamic factor', the paper will focus on Tajik-Iranian relations. Among the newly independent states of Central Asia, Tajikistan occupies a special place for Iran. Although Tajikistan lacks the economic significance of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan's political weight, for the comMohiaddln Mesbahi is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, Miami, Florida. 0263-4937/97/020141-18 1997 Society for Central Asian Studies

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bined reasons of culture and ideology, its relations with Iran carry a special role in shaping Iran's overall foreign policy in Central Asia. Of all the new 'Muslim' states, Tajikistan is the only Farsi-speaking state with a strong linkage to the Iranian cultural milieu. While Iran continues to claim a cultural/religious relevance in the whole of Central Asia, Tajikistan's linguistic connection with Iran separates it from others and gives it a certain level of closeness and importance to Iran that does not exist with other Central Asian states. In fact, it is this cultural element that presents Tajikistan not only as an opportunity but as a 'burden' or 'responsibility' for the Iranian leadership. The intermingling of culture and religious affinity has created a complex and at times confusing element in Tajik-Iranian relations and in the long-run, this cultural element may prove to be the most enduring element in Tajik-Iranian ties. Furthermore, the Tajik significance also lies in the fact that it was clearly the bastion of the most politicized or active Islamic tendencies among Central Asian states. Tajikistan's Islamic movement started in the mid-1970s and grew under the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the gradual indirect influence of the Iranian revolution through Iranian radio broadcasts to Central Asia throughout the 1980s.2 Nevertheless, the Tajik Muslims have been separated from the Islamic world for decades, and they and other Muslim societies of the former Soviet Union have gone through intense anti-Islamic state propaganda and socialization which has resulted in the general ignorance of the public about Islam, either in its Orthodox forms or the politicized 'Iranian' version. The fact that the majority of Tajik Muslims, with the exception of the Badakhshan Ismailis and an insignificant number of Ja'fari Shiites, are Sunni Hannafi was also not without some significance in relations with Shiite Iran. Moreover, the structure of authority, leadership and relations between the community and religious leaders has generally and historically differed between Shiite and Sunni Islam. Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, the Qozi Kalan of Tajikistan and key Islamic leader of the Tajik opposition, has on several occasions referred to differences between Iran's Islamic experience and Tajikistan's and significantly specified two key obstacles to repeating the Iranian model in Tajikistan: first, the general ignorance of the public about Islam and especially its role as a well-defined political ideology;3 and second, the general disadvantage of a Sunni religious leadership which may not enjoy the position of Imam among its adherents as is possible for Shiite religious leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini. In an interview with Moscow News in September 1992, during the heyday of the Islamicist surge to power, Turajonzoda warned against the premature comparison between Iran and Tajikistan and specifically addressed key differences. Indicating that the Iranian model is not likely to fit Tajikistan, he argued that Iran's Shiite Muslims have a 'unifying factorthe immamate which they obey without demur. We, the Sunnis, have no such centralization, and each mullah and parish can exist on their own, not obeying anyone's ecclesiastical authority'.4 Turajonzoda's qualification about leadership problems, especially when the Islamic-democratic coalition seemed to be gaining ground against Nabiev's 142

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government, underlined one of the key problems facing any attempt by Iran or other actors to push for a nationwide Islamic takeover in Tajikistan. This structural impediment in the leadership of the Tajik Muslim community was further complicated by significant political differences rooted in the region/class nature of the distribution of power between the more urbanized and traditional ruling classes from Leninabad and their new Kulobi allies in the south with strong pro-Communist or secular tendencies, and the more rural and poor inhabitants of the less developed regions, as well as some of the lower socioeconomic groups in Dushanbe, which largely supported the Islamicist movement.5 It is clear that the idea of establishing an Iranian model never became the foundation of a political strategy for the Islamicists and democratic allies. The appearance of more specific Islamic slogans in the critical and bloody days of September and December of 1992 indicated a definite radicalization of Islamicists regarding the idea of establishing an Islamic state. This was reflected not only in the appearance of proto-Iranian slogans in Dushanbe, but in the creation of some ad hoc revolutionary organizations based on the Iranian models. The appearance of slogans such as 'Long Live the Islamic Republic' and 'Death to America' was reminiscent of the Iranian revolutionary days of 1979, and the establishment of Nehzat-e Javanaan-e Dushanbe (Dushanbe's Youth Movement) brought to mind the Komiteh, Iran's revolutionary committees, one of the ad hoc grassroots legacies of the Iranian revolution that played a significant role in that revolution. The Dushanbe Youth Movement had an important role in Nabiev's resignation in September 1992, his eventual downfall, and the early defence of Dushanbe in October and December of the same year against the onslaught of the pro-Communist factions of the Jebhe Khalq, the People's Front.6 This symbolic or real radicalization of the pro-Iranian Islamic agenda, however, reflected not a shift to a well-thought-out or externally inspired takeover strategy, as was claimed by the Communist opposition and their Russian and Uzbek supporters, but a haphazard, reactive sloganism of a grassroots nature, largely outside the realm of planning or direction of the coalition leadership. The Islamic-democratic coalition neither believed in the possibility or desirability of an Islamic alternative nor was it even united in a preference for an ideologically tainted political model for Tajikistan.7 The general principles of the coalition platform referred to a democratic political system based on a new constitution and close relations with Iran and Afghanistan as well as other Islamic states.8 The role of democratic and nationalist groups and the intelligentsia in shaping the opposition platform and in defining the role of Islam in it seemed to be rather significant, though the intelligentsia and democrats numerically did not, and do not, carry a significant organized weight in comparison to the Islamicists or Communists. Their significance lies in the fact that they represent the general political flavour in Tajikistan, which does not support the creation of an Islamic stateat least not in the immediate future. This attitude is either due to a lack of understanding or ignorance of political Islam, or to a preference for a secular 143

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Tajikistan in which Islam as a religion and culture will have its proper and even flourishing place. It is important not to confuse this secular tendency with the positions of the pro-Communist factions/clans of the Tajik traditional ruling elite, which, either because of ideological conviction, the inertia of Soviet socialization, or political convenience, have a definite anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian orientation. The 'secular fundamentalists' who fought their way back to power in December 1992, and still retain that power, rely on their anti-Islamic posture as a strategy not only for coming to power, but for perpetuating their political hold in Tajikistan. In contrast, democratic tendenciesthose active in the opposition underground, those in exile in Russia and in Iran, and those now silenced in Dushanbegenerally prefer a democratic polity with Islamic Tajik-Iranian cultural substance to a politicized ideological Islam. The theme of cultural Islam or the linkage with Iran on cultural grounds has been, from the initiation of relations with Iran in January 1992, a significant element shaping Iran's relations with the opposition, the intelligentsia, and even elements in the Tajik government, especially under Nabiev's rule.9 During most of the Tajik official contacts with Iran, the cultural theme has been emphasized while the issue of political Islam, politely or openly, was ignored or rejected. Nabiev's visit to Tehran in June 1992 was in this regard rather symbolic. This was the president of Tajikistan's first trip to any foreign state and took place in the midst of a severe political crisis at home and the initial stages of the armed clashes among the opposition groups. Among the variety of protocols signed by the two countries, the cultural agreements were the most extensive and far-reaching.10 These included cooperation in the areas of language, publication of Persian education books for Tajik schools, student exchanges, scholarships, book exhibitions, and rebroadcasting of Iran's television programmes.11 In his report to the Tajik Supreme Soviet after the visit to Iran, Nabiev was very particular about the cultural emphasis in the shaping of relations with Iran, with which 'until the 15th century we lived in a single state'.12 In an interview with Narodnaya Gazeta, Nabiev characterized Iran and Tajikistan as two countries closely linked 'by hundreds of threads of joint history and culture, unity of language and literature'.13 Particularly symbolic was Nabiev's trip to Shiraz, where he 'conversed in the poetical language of Farsi' and 'worshipped at the holy sepulchres of Shaykh Sa'adi and Khaji Hafiz, whose immortal works long since conquered the hearts of people of East and West'.14 Similar emphasis on cultural links was expressed by Khodaberdi Kholiknazarov, the Tajik Foreign Minister, who argued that while Iran's Islamic model remains a 'complex issue',15 given Tajikistan's diversity and lack of homogeneity, Iran as a 'cultural standard' in 'its broadest sense' has captured the. 'imagination of the greater part of the Tajik intelligentsia'.16 The same view was again expressed even after the resignation of Nabiev in September 1992 and during the short-lived government of Akbarsho Iskandarov. At the conclusion of the all-world forum of Tajiks, Iskandarov emphasized that 'Islamic fundamentalism' will not be a determining factor in the domestic and foreign policy of 144

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Tajikistan.17 Kholiknazarov, reiterated the point that relations with Iran 'will not be based on religious principles' but on historical 'cultural and spiritual roots'.18 It is important to note that the emphasis on cultural rather than religious/ ideological links by the Tajik officials reflected the need to manage the Iranian factor in a less threatening way by channelling it into the less politicized contingencies of the Iranian model. It also signified a genuine need on the part of Tajik officials to deal with critical questions of Tajik national identity and its role in defining Tajik sovereignty. This is particularly important in view of the presence of more than a million Uzbeks in Tajikistan and clear pressure from Uzbekistan on the Tajik cultural life inside Uzbekistan, especially in Bukhara and Samarkhand where attempts at 'cultural cleansing' are being made.19 The issue of Iranian culture as a source of linkage and support has survived to a certain degree even the deterioration of Iranian-Tajik relations after the takeover of the government by pro-Communist factions in December 1992. The government has continued to support the teaching of Persian in elementary schools, and Iran has provided the core of the educational support and facilities, including 250,000 Persian books for elementary and high school students in 1993,20 and 400,000 in 1996.21 In addition, 120,000 Persian alphabet books have been provided by Iran.22 Several Iranian book exhibits in Dushanbe, a project for the joint publication of a weekly journal, and the continuous support of Iran for the development and progress of the Persian language and annual conferences in Persian literature, are part of the joint cultural protocol signed between the Iranian Ministry of Guidance and the Tajik Ministry of Media and News. Muhammadov Bubakhanov Alievich, the Tajik Minister of Media and News, specifically emphasized the important role of Iran in supporting the solidification of the Persian languages, especially in view of the Tajik decision to replace the Cyrillic with the Persian alphabet in Tajik language training.23 Rajab Amanov, the famous Tajik literary figure, also emphasized the significance of Tajikistan's access to 'contemporary Iranian culture'.24 It is worth noting that the issue of cultural linkage with Iran-though still a central theme in Tajik-Iranian relations, even during the coldest period of the relations in late 1993 to early 1994may still, for political reasons, not be welcomed by some of the hardliners in Dushanbe. In a somewhat bizarre parliamentary manoeuvre in 1994, the Tajik Supreme Council passed an unusual amendment to the 1989 Language Act. The amendment states that the Tajik language is no longer Farsi (Persian). Put forward by Shukhrat Sultanov, chief of the Organizational Department of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, 'who himself speaks Tajik with great difficulty', this amendment was 'clearly playing up to the current anti-Iranian mood'.25 The kidnapping and assassination of Muhamed Asemi, a leading scholar of Tajik culture and history and a proponent of the revival of the Tajik language, might indicate a continuing political tension over the issue of language.26 The emphasis on Iran as a cultural link nevertheless has been dialectically affected by the Islamic components of the Iranian model or message. The fact that Iran is an Islamic republic, an Umm ul-qura' (Islamic metropolis), and a 145

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self-proclaimed custodian of Islamicism27 is an inescapable reality and a central factor in shaping the relations between the two countries on bilateral (governmental and societal), regional (Russia and the Central Asian states), and international (primarily the United States) dimensions. The 'Islamic threat' has affected these relations in a fundamental way. In Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, the fight against Islamic fundamentalism was the critical factor that brought together a variety of domestic, regional, and international actors. The pro-Communist factions, regional clans, and political and social forces that feared losing their historical grip on political power in Tajikistaneither on ideological grounds or on purely utilitarian considerationsportrayed the crisis of authority in Tajikistan since 1992 as an externally inspired Islamic takeover and fought their way back to the top in December 1992 on an anti-Islamic platform.28 One of the first decrees issued by the new government in Dushanbe in December 1992 was to outlaw any Islamic activities and to ban Islamic parties.29 Uzbekistan's policy of military and political support for the new government was formulated and supplemented under the notion of concern over the Islamic threat and the need for its containment. In fact, President Karimov has been the most outspoken of the Central Asian leaders on the threat of Islam and perhaps the most significant player in the creation of a regional consensus, as might be witnessed from the Uzbek-Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war. A discussion of the Uzbek role in this regard is beyond the scope of this study and has been dealt with elsewhere.30 What is important to note is that the Uzbek anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian stand in Tajikistan has also become a key factor in shaping Uzbek-Iranian relations and the source of their underlying tension. Karimov's policy toward Tajikistan's civil war is intimately connected with his concern over Islamicist-democratic political challenges in Uzbekistan itself, where the suppression of the Islamic threat has been repeatedly used as a justification to curb political opposition to authoritarian rule; a general attitude characteristic of other Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Among the key players in the Tajik civil war, Russia has played the most significant and decisive role. A detailed discussion of Russia's view of the Islamic factor is beyond the scope of this study, yet an outline of Russia's view and policy will be useful. In the contemporary Russian approach toward Islam, the old and historical legacy of both the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods is alive and well. The colonial legacy of the Tsarist period of looking at the region as a legitimate sphere of influence, and the concern over an Islamic threat, 'encirclement', in addition to the ambiguous feeling of certain sociocultural closeness between Russian Orthodoxy and traditional Islam are elements in a paradoxical package which is still present in Russian attitudes, especially among the more traditional 'neo-Eurasianist', Russian political elite. This particular strand in Russia's thinking, shared by ranking officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prominent among which is Foreign Minister Yevgenie Primakov, and other centrist/conservative Russian political figures, including 146

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leaders of Russia's Communist Party, is heavily 'geopolitical' in its view of the Islamic factor. While its concerns are couched also in purely ideological and cultural terms, it is leery of the total alienation of the 'Islamic region' of the former Soviet Union and is especially concerned with being trapped into an alliance with the US in a regional 'anti-Islamic' campaign. The counterbalance to the 'neo-Eurasianist view', the 'Euroatlantist', however, since its early dominance in Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has taken a much more ideological and cultural view of the Islamic factor, advocating a significantly more thorough and sustained containment policy. This view, favoured especially by President Yeltsin and more particularly personified by former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and other pro-Western reformers in the Russian establishment, draws heavily from the predominantly Western, secular and modernist views of Islam as a dangerous geocultural threat, with serious potential for political challenge to Russia's interests. This perspective, which derives its epistemological inspiration from the West, shares, and cherishes the similarities of its policy prognostication of the Islamic factor with that prevailing in the West. The Euroatlantist view thus allocates to Russia an activist role in the Islamic containment; one not just based on traditional Russian practices, but more in tune with the current international climate of undifferentiated policy containment of Islam. The proponents of this view of the Islamic factor have therefore been much more eager to place Central Asia, and in particular Tajikistan, at the cornerstone of their shared vision of the Islamic post-Cold War threat to regional security and Moscow's readiness to play its part in its containment on behalf of the civilized world.31 The Westernizers' more ideological view of the Tajik opposition has instrumentally enhanced Russia's ability to justify and obtain its de facto support from the West for an ever-expanding political-military intervention in Tajikistan since 1992. Russia played a decisive role in shifting the balance of power during the domestic struggle in Tajikistanespecially in the two turning points of the civil war in September and December 1992. In mid-1996, Russia, through its economic, political and military support and presence, is in reality the sole guarantor of the survival of the Emamali Rahmanov regime in Dushanbe, and therefore in virtual control of shaping both the internal and external choices of the Tajik regime.32 The regional 'anti-Islamic' consensus has been riding on a significant US-led international post-Cold War trend that perceives political Islam as a significant challenge to international security. While US policy in Central Asia has other dimensions, including economic interests and concerns over nuclear proliferation,33 containment of the Islamic threat and Iranian influence is the cornerstone of its policy. It is not an accident that other US considerationsboth traditional and proclaimedsuch as promotion of democracy, the linkage between foreign aid and trade, and democratization and marketization have at least temporarily taken a back seat. US regional allies in Central Asia and the Caucasus, namely Israel and Turkey, not only share and advocate the same policy but are instrumental in implementing US-sponsored pilot projects and economic plans in Central Asia, and more specifically in Tajikistan.34 147

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Tajikistan was officially included in discussions of US concerns over Islamic fundamentalism and Iranian penetration in January 1994. During a US Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing, James Woolsey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, accused Iran of supporting terrorism in Tajikistan.35 The charge was repeated in Woolsey's address in September 1994 to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he again accused Iran of supporting 'terrorist organizations and groups operating today from Algeria to Tajikistan'.36 The inclusion of Tajikistan in the realm of the political world of Islam, and the fact that it was discussed in the same context as Lebanon, Algeria, and Egypt by the United States, had several significant ramifications. First, it signalled the nature of US policy in Central Asia in general and in particular in Tajikistan. Second, it gave moral and political legitimacy to those in power in Dushanbe by labelling the opposition as terrorists. Third, it demonstrated a general acquiescence to, if not approval of, Russia's intervention in Tajikistan and its participation in the containment of the Islamic threat. Izvestiya reported the discussion of the Tajik crisis in a Moscow meeting between Yevgenie Primakov, then head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence, and James Woolsey in August 1993.37 Some Russian sources raised concerns about the negative impact of Russian-US collaboration against Islamic movements in Tajikistan on the future of Russian relations with the Islamic world.38 Semen Bagdasarov, a leading Russian specialist on interethnic relations, argued that Tajikistan was the key to control of Central Asia and that the US prefers to see Russia as a key player, instead of Iran, and a partner in the containment of Islamic fundamentalism.39 The coincidence of US and Russian objectives in containing the Islamic/ Iranian influence helped facilitate Russia's military and political involvement, which was not only geared toward cutting off the opposition from its supporters in Afghanistan, but also toward carrying its military campaign against opposition forces inside Tajikistan. US reaction to the political repression exercised by the Tajik government against the opposition was, thus, understandably subdued. The US policy toward the Dushanbe regime was generally supportive and even included providing some direct aid, which, according to the US ambassador in Tajikistan, was in recognition of 'the government's further progress in the area of democracy and human rights'.40 The opposition groups, especially those with democratic credentials, were particularly surprised by and critical of 'the US indifference' to human rights violations and the tacit support of the proCommunist regime in Dushanbe by Washington. The passivity of international organizations such as Amnesty International was also perceived by the opposition as a function of US policy.41 The presence of such wide-ranging and formidable regional and international consensus on the issue of the Islamic threat and Iranian influence in Tajikistan has been a major element in shaping Tehran's attitude toward the Islamic alternative, as well as the relations with the opposition. Thus, Iran's vision of the Islamic factorthat is, the possibility of the emergence of an Islamic state in 148

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Tajikistanreflects a sceptical optimism, indicating scepticism in practice and substance and optimism in the realm of possibilities. Iran's scepticism further reflected the subtle yet important shift in the Iranian foreign policy approach after the war with Iraq, which indicated some adjustment in the interbalance and relationship between Iran's national interests and its internationalist/Islamic aspirations or obligations. Protecting the Islamic experiment in Iran and safeguarding the territorial integrity were to be given more explicit emphasis, an emphasis that was clearly reinforced by concerns over the severe domestic need for post-war economic reconstruction, the change in the international balance of power, and increasing instability all around the Iranian borders. While the Iranian post-war (1989-present) policy has reflected the continuous tension and difficulty of creating the 'right' mix between principles of pragmatism and revolution, especially in the Middle East, it has been much more consistent in the Central Asian/Caucasian front, and most clearly so in the Tajik case. In Tajikistan, Islamic possibilities clearly existed, yet Iranian policy, especially in the critical months between May and October 1992, when the opposition might have had a chance, was hesitant if not passive. This hesitation not only reflected Iran's awareness of Central Asian geopolitical realities, but further signified the general belief in Tehran that the clash in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, while couched in ideological terms, reflected tribal, regional, and ethnic differences, rather than an immediate receptivity to an Islamic alternative.42 The promotion of an Islamic revolution, given the 'unreadiness' of Tajikistan, could have undermined the less threatening and unique instruments of Iranian influence, namely the cultural linkage with Tajikistan. The pragmatic argument in Tehran was driven by the fact that Iran, through its cultural linkage, is Tajikistan's natural partnera window of opportunity that a risky revolutionary strategy threatened to close. Iran's hesitation regarding revolutionary experimentation was also reflected in the peculiar absence of a serious attempt at tactical ideological mentoring of the Tajik Islamic opposition by its 'Iranian big brother'. While some cosmetic similarities in slogans and organizations appeared in the heyday of the crisis in mid-1992, the tactical approaches adopted by the opposition in terms of obtaining power were anathema to an Iranian model or preference. This was particularly evident in the opposition's cooperation with the government during 1992 and reliance on the Communist reformers, and especially the calculation of getting support from democratic Moscow and the international community against the old Communist forces in the republic. These were strategically wrong calculations and mistakes now repeatedly admitted by the leadership of the opposition, both Islamic and democratic, as key contributing factors in their setback.43 Cooperation with Communists and reliance on international support for 'democracy' might have sounded like a reasonable strategy for the opposition, but not an acceptable and advisable strategy to Iran. Islamic models of revolutionary struggle, especially the one practised by Iran itself, have historically been fundamentally based on self-reliance and the assumption of hostility 149

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of international forces (Russian or American). This strategic mistake indicated an absence of mentoring, tactical disconnection, and independence of opposition forces from Iran. Iran's scepticism was also clearly reflected in the tension between the opposition and Tehran in terms of unmet expectations. Iran refused to provide arms to the opposition when it mattered most,44 and was clearly deficient in providing direct rhetorical support for the opposition through diplomatic means, media coverage, or polemics against the Dushanbe regime. Iran continued to portray the crisis in Tajikistan in non-ideological terms as an internal conflict with disturbing regional consequences. This absence of ideological support became the subject of continuous open criticism of Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the more 'radical' Iranian press, which accused the official policy of being defensive, ineffective, and lacking in its moral standing in view of Iran's Islamic internationalist obligations. The radical press further provided a forum for the Tajik Islamic opposition to voice its frustration with the lack of adequate support from Iran. References were made to the ghorbat (an emotionally loaded Persian word for loneliness) of the Islamic opposition and the absence of any support from the Islamic countries for their cause.45 Iran's lack of support for pushing an Islamic revolution as a strategic choice thus entailed certain costs in further alienating its domestic constituency in addition to losing credibility with Islamic opposition groups. In fact, the cost in credibility is one of the intricate dilemmas of Iran's pragmatism as a reluctant revolutionary state. This dilemma is exacerbated by the ambiguity of the reward structure of pursuing a pragmatic moderate foreign policy. Pragmatic or revolutionary, Iran continues to have difficulty in reaping the benefit of the former, while still feeling the overwhelming weight and the baggage of the latter. A pragmatic Iran will still be perceived and treated as revolutionary. This dilemma is driven by the twin factors of the inherent tension between the revolutionary symbolism of Iranian imageries and the pragmatic substance of its policy on the one hand, and the utility of a threatening Iran as a source of policy justification for a host of regional and international actors on the other. The Iranian/Islamic threat is an instrumental force for building consensus, overcoming differences, and making strange bedfellows a political normalcy. Conclusion The crisis in Tajikistan is not a direct byproduct of the presence of the Islamic opposition. The interaction of historical dynamics such as Soviet gerrymandering in Tajikistan, the long-term Uzbek regional challenge to Tajik national development, and the resultant localism (mahal'lageroi) as the defining characteristic of the Tajik political power structure are organic factors.46 Yet the role of Islam in the politics of Tajikistan remains significant and detrimental for two reasons. First, while not immune from the 'natural' characteristics of the Tajikistan polity of mahal'lageroi, the Islamic opposition and its democratic coalition represents the only genuine Tajik political movement with a truly national perspective for 150

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nation-building in Tajikistan. The movement now not only incorporates in its ranks representatives from many local 'ethnic' groups, but also Uzbeks. Second, the sensitivity (manufactured or real) of a host of regional and global players to Islamic sociopolitical alternatives for Tajikistan has placed Islam at the core of not only Tajik domestic politics, but its regional and international dimensions. The confluence of the domestic viability of the Islamic opposition as a serious contender in shaping the future of the new republic and the sensitivity of the external actors has given the Islamic factor much prominence in the dynamics of the Tajik civil war and its eventual political settlement. The political settlement, when and if it comes, will not, however, be the end of the political crisis in Tajikistan as different regions and political groups will engage in political intrigue and infighting for power and security. The bloody and brutal memory of the civil war will continue to cast its considerable weight on the future development of political alignment in the republic. To the extent that Islamicist groups remain united and a viable political force, Iran will remain an important political player, either as a mediator or an important source of external support. In a peaceful Tajikistan, Iranian diplomatic relations will be enhanced by a higher level of state-to-state relations, while on the societal plane, in addition to Islamic groups, those socialpolitical forces that value Iran on non-ideological but cultural grounds will become the source of Iranian attention and effort. One of the key obstacles to Iran's further influence in Tajikistan, in addition to challenges from other actors, will continue to be Iran's economic and technical limitations. The most tangible economic assistance so far to Tajikistan was a 50-million-dollar credit that Dushanbe received in 1992.47 This limited level of economic and financial assistance to Tajikistan was driven by both Iran's own financial difficulties, especially in the area of hard currency, and its unwillingness to provide such assistance to a regime with an opposing, if not hostile, ideology. An effective and influential role by Iran in Tajikistan will continue to depend not only on Iran's cultural linkage, but on its ability to become a source of material and development support for an impoverished state. A friendlier regime in Dushanbe will facilitate further financial commitment and aid, though the essential weakness of Iranian economic resources is likely to remain a major obstacle for the rest of the 1990s. Iranian officials have complained on occasion about the lack of interest among Iranian business circles to engage in economic trade activities in Tajikistan. In comparison, however, Iran's business community is much more active in other Central Asian republics such as Turkmenistan.48 Iran's economic limitations, especially in view of a significant Russian role in the economic survival of Tajikistan, will be an important modifier of its influence. In fact, in this regard not only Russia, but other actors such as the US, Uzbekistan and China may play a more significant role than Iran. Tehran will thus try to compensate its limitations on bilateral economic assistance by developing trade and through involvement in multilateral projects. In the final analysis, however, Iran's limited material resources are hoped to be 151

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compensated for by its unique cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to Tajikistan, a new state in search of not only economic development but an independent national sense of identity.49 Islam will continue to be an important factor affecting Iranian-Tajik relations. To the extent that Islam remains a viable political force in Tajikistan, relations with Iran will be affected by a sense of apprehension. This negativity has proven to be a useful tool in the hands of the Tajik leadership to cultivate support from other actors who share concerns over the Islamic threat; in addition to traditional like-minded players such as Russia and Uzbekistan, the role of the US in this regard could become increasingly important. The US may not have a particularly significant interest in Tajikistan to justify an active presence: its determined policy of containment of political Islam in addition to the ability to provide or facilitate financial assistance, however, will increasingly make it a distant yet significant player. While Russia shares with the US a common ground in the ideological threat perception, Moscow will be wary of US penetration in Russia's historical sphere of influence. It is thus ironic that Russia will simultaneously look to Iran's anti-Americanism as a base for political cooperation in blocking the expansion of the US presence.50 The Cold War ideology might have been buried, but the elements of great power competition that have roots in geopolitical calculations have survived in the Russian policy toward the southern region. In fact, Russia's view of the US presence in Central Asia/the Caucasus and the adjacent regions, like the Persian Gulf, does not significantly differ from that held by Iran.51 Under Primakov and his team, the Islamic world will have a much more significant place in Russian foreign policy. His appointment signals two important changes on the intellectual and policy levels. Intellectually, Russia will not completely share the Western conceptualization of the Islamic movement/ Islamic states, i.e. the undifferentiated approach towards political Islam and its reduction to religious extremism and 'rogue states'. Russia will differentiate between 'Islamic fundamentalism', and 'Islamic extremism'.52 The former is perceived as a return to Islamic roots and traditions, a characteristic trend of the Islamic revival in most of the Muslim world. While these movements can pose political and security challenges to regional and global powers, including Russia, they can neither be frontally opposed nor isolated, as they represent a 'legitimate' political phenomenon and can possibly be accommodated. Furthermore, given the hostile relations between the West and these movements, they carry the potential and characteristics that might create a conduit for rapprochement and cooperation with Russia. This is particularly evident in Russia's critique of the US concept of 'rogue states', as being ideologically narrow and politically counterproductive.53 Russia, according to Primakov, would oppose the US attempts to isolate these countries, i.e. Iran, Sudan, etc. Given the strategic significance of Iran for Russia, and especially the impact of Russian-Iranian relations on Central Asia and the Caucasus' geopolitical and geocultural environment, Russia's attempts at theoretical reformulation are indicative of not only a genuine intellectual/philosophical divide with the West 152

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over the issue of Islamic movements, but more so of a political flexibility that suits Russia's geopolitical needs in its post-Soviet transition to great power status. In view of the growing significance of the Russian-Iranian rapprochement in recent years54 and the continuous hostility between Iran and the US, Tehran may prefer a Russian rather than a US presence in Tajikistan. Recognition of Moscow's interests in Central Asia is also shared by the Islamicist opposition leaders who have been categorical in the necessity of maintaining close relations with Moscow.55 While Russia is the most significant supporter of the current regime in Dushanbe, it remains to be seen to what extent this subtle, though important, shift in Russia's perspective of Islam on a global level will have an impact on Russia's political preference and strategy towards the Tajik Islamic opposition and the political settlement of the crisis. Primakov's intellectual innovation could well be a more sophisticated neo-Eurasianist view of Islam in which the global importance of Islam with its anti-Western connotations would be accommodated while its regional, i.e. anti-Russian, ramifications in Central Asia and the North Caucasus will be opposed; a reinvention of the policy of double-standard towards external and internal Islam characteristic of the Soviet period. Thus, an accommodation of Islamic Iran need not necessarily go hand in hand with an accommodation of the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Russia's potential change of policy towards the Islamic opposition would not only be a function of an intellectual shift, but perhaps more significantly of factors, such as the extreme vulnerability of the current regime to an open political process (i.e. free elections), which might include the Islamic opposition, and Russia's attempt to contain excessive Uzbek influence in the domestic politics of Tajikistan.56 Thus, Russia's position is underscored by the dilemma of supporting a vulnerable political ally, which cannot on its own deal with the opposition, either politically or militarily, and the eventual necessity of incorporating the Islamic opposition into a comprehensive Tajik national reconciliation. The overall and long-term impact of the Islamic factor in the final analysis, however, in addition to the role of external actors and their preferences, will be the function of the domestic sociopolitical impact of Islam in shaping Tajik society and polity, and whether Islam is a viable political and social force or a transient hype.57 The role of Islam in politics has been categorically rejected and legally banned by the Tajik government and the ruling elites, as it has been in other Central Asian states. According to Tajik officials, the Islamic leaders of Tajikistan should look to Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Alexy of Russia as models for their civic responsibility and not their Iranian counterparts.58 The political platform of the two presidential candidates in Tajikistan was marked by the conspicuous absence of direct reference to the word 'Islam'; instead the candidates made reference to the need for 'spirituality' in personal life.59 As elsewhere in the post-colonial Muslim world, Islam as an ideology will continue to have an appeal for those sociopolitical forces in Tajikistan that either through conviction or convenience look to religion as a principal organizing vehicle for political mobilization. The Iranian revolution and its political model are to a large extent particular to Iranian history and political culture and may 153

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not be mechanically imported or emulated. The significance of the 'Iranian model' for Tajikistan, in this context, should therefore be measured not necessarily for its direct relevance, but for its atmospheric meaning and implications. The Tajik Islamic movementweak or strongis in general part and parcel of similar trends taking place elsewhere in the Islamic world where authoritarian secularism is under attack by religious activists. In Tajikistan, as elsewhere in the Islamic world, secularismor one might say secular fundamentalismis in power and there is little indication that in the short run, especially given external support, its hegemony could be effectively challenged. Its long-term domination and control, however, requires more than just repressive measures; it calls for breaking out of its authoritarian political culture and venturing into risky yet more promising ways of broadening political representation. This will be a large task, one that given both distant and recent authoritarian history (reinforced by the not exactly democratic presidential elections of 1994 in Tajikistan) has proven to be too challenging for the Tajik ruling forces. In the absence of a broadening political base of representation, and under repressive measures, political Islam, though unproven as a successful model of economic and political development, could be an effective source in political mobilization and change. Iran, pragmatic or not, may be a peripheral factor in such an eventuality. The 'politicking' with the Islamic factor in Tajikistan also points to the broader and deeper global problematique of Islam as a polity, culture, and idea at the century's end. The 'life processes' of Tajikistan's 'Islamic' opposition, reflect an experience shared with other Islamic movements from North Africa to Central Asiaa hopeful inception, tragic growth, and ambiguous future. Its birth was not unexpected. It developed with a sense of urgency and anticipation as a response to the internal desires of ordinary people to regain the lost identity and has grown in the midst of the extremely inhospitable and unforgiving symbiosis of domestic and international environments, and matured into a full fledged politico-military movement. It is offered 'futures' by the Tajik government and its external supporters which, like similar Islamic movements elsewhere, only range between physical elimination or a marginalized presence. The opposition's repeated blueprint for national reconciliation, which has been increasingly modified and moderated since 1994, includes a commitment to a secular state and is cognizant of the deeply clannish Tajik society as it anticipates the participation of different regions and clans in a coalition government.60 These proposals have been repeatedly ignored during the numerous and highly anticipated mediation meetings held from 1994-1996 in Tehran, Moscow, Almaty, Islamabad, and Ashqabad. The inflexibility of options presented to the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan, more than any other case in the Islamic world, is the direct result of international factors, i.e. balancing dynamics of external actors' preferences, than a viable domestic challenge put forward by the state (as in the case in Algeria and Egypt). The primacy of the role of external actors and their 'view' of the Islamic factor plays a significant part in shaping the current and future dynamics of 154

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Tajikistan in general and the Islamic opposition in particular. In a post-Cold War and interdependent world, where not only economies, but 'threats', are globally defined, shared and reacted to, the Central Asian societies, and especially Tajikistan, face the typical dilemma endemic now to most Islamic countries with viable Islamic oppositions.

Notes and references

1. B. Lewis, 'New Middle East', Foreign Affairs, 1993. 2. On the role of Iran's Islamic broadcasts and their impact on Central Asia and Tajikistan, see Ettela'at (Persian), 16 July 1992, pp 23, interview with Iran's ambassador to Tajikistan, Ali Muhammed Shabestari; Al'Alam (Arabic, London) September 1993 interview with leaders of Tajik opposition including Haji Akbar Turajonzoda (partially reproduced in Hamshahri (Persian) 29 September 1993, p 9). 3. Al'Alam (Arabic) 7 September 1994, interview with opposition leaders. This point was specifically reiterated by Shadman Yusef, the leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. 4. Moscow News, No. 36, 6-13 September 1992, p 1. 5. For background information regarding the regionalism of Tajikistan, see Davlat Khudonazar, 'The conflict in Tajikistan: questions of regionalism', in Roald Z. Sagadeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds, Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995). 6. For an interesting discussion of the Tajik crisis in September-November of 1992 and comparison between the komiteh and the Dushanbe Youth Movement see 'Tajikistan: uncertain developments and ambiguous future', Keyhan Havai (Persian) 11 November 1992, p 22. It is perhaps noteworthy that this weekly publication usually reflects a much more radical position than that taken by the Iranian official policy. 7. This point was made by one of the top leaders of the Tajik opposition, Haj Akbar Turajonzoda (who has been the qozi, or chief Islamic cleric, of the Tajik Muslims since 1988), during an interview with the author. New York, 5 February 1995. 8. See interviews with Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, Dr Shadman Yusef, and Dr Taher Abduljabbar (head of the Rastakhiz Party) in three issues of Hamshahri (Persian) 29 September, 3 October and 4 October 1993. 9. During the Nabiev period, Iran's cultural activity flourished very quickly. Some Iranian sources argued that Nabiev's accommodation was due more to his vulnerable political base than to a general interest in cultural links with Iran. See Salam, 8 October 1993, p 8. 10. For coverage of the Nabiev trip to Iran see ITAR-TASS 30 June 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 1 July 1992; IRNA 28 June 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 24 June 1992, pp 28-29; IRNA 30 June 1992, in FBIS-NES 6 July 1992, pp 66-67. 11. For issues concerning the cooperation on TV programming and also technical cooperation, see Keyhan Hava'i, 29 July 1992, p 3. 12. 'We should develop our ties mainly in literary, culture and scientific areas', Narodnaya Gazeta, 18 July 1992, pp 1-2. 13. Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992, pp 1, 2. 14. Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992, p 1. Shiraz, a city in the south of Iran, the capital of Fars Province, is one of the most traditional Iranian cities and famous for its romantic and literary traditions and contribution to Iranian culture. Hafiz and Sa'adi are the two greatest Iranian poets with influence not only among Iranians, but in the Iranian cultural milieu of Central Asia and the Asian subcontinentIndia and Pakistan. It is interesting that Nabiev at Hafiz's tomb completed his cultural journey by taking a 'fall' (fortune telling) from the Divan (collection of poems), where he received a 'good sign' indicating the fruitfulness of his trip to Iran and a better relationship between the two countries; Narodnaya Gazeta, 7 July 1992, p 2. 15. See his interview with Nezavismaya Gazeta, 11 July 1992, p 3. 16. Holos Ukrayiny, 12 August 1992, p 8; FBIS-Sov, 21 August 1992. 17. Interfax, 18 September 1992 in FBIS-Sov, 21 September, 1992, p 56. 18. Ibid. 19. The Uzbek authorities are sensitive to this issue in particular, in view of strong influence of Tajik-Persian culture in Samarkhand and Bukhara where more than a million Tajiks reside. Establishment of Turkish cultural complexes, the prevention of Tajik TV broadcast to Uzbekistan while transmitting Uzbek programming to Tajikistan, and other activities signifying the subtle cultural tension between the Uzbeks and Tajiks, a tension which goes beyond limited local cultural conflict and points to the larger picture which involves the power relationship between the two ethnic groups, and issues of sovereignty and

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MOHIADDIN MESBAHI nation-building. For a reflection of Iranian awareness and sensitivity in this issue see Ettela'at, 16 July 1992, p 7. Keyhan (Persian), 25 September 1993. Ettela'at, 19 July 1996, p 2. These books were provided as a result of a Tajik request and have been prepared with the cooperation of Tajikistan's academics. They will be used at the elementary and secondary levels in a special language programme entitled Zaban-e Niyakan (the language of the forefathers). Hamshahri (Persian), 20 August 1993, p 10. According to Bubakhanov, the government plan has envisioned a complete 'Persianization' of the alphabet (i.e. conversion to the Arabic alphabet) by 1995-96. See Hamshahri (Persian), 28 August 1993, p 10. Amanov, who made the remarks at a special ceremony of his 70th birthday at Dushanbe, specifically reiterated the uselessness of the negative 'atmosphere' surrounding Iran in the republic and emphasized the cultural and literary and educational links, especially in the area of children's books. Iranian cultural work in this area also includes the translation of Persian books to Tajik (in Cyrillic) for immediate use. See Jumhuriyeh Islami (Persian), 29 September 1993. Also see Salam (Persian), 29 August 1993, p 2. Oleg Panfilov, 'Officials are conducting a new experiment with the Tajik language', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 July 1994, p 3. Asemi, a former member of the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, had numerous publications on the history, culture, and language of Tajikistan, and was head of a Farsi-speaking association and an international organization for teaching Central Asian civilization. Ettela'at 30 July 1996, p 1. For a discussion of the concept of Umm ul-qura' (the Islamic metropolis) see Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Gorbachev's new thinking and Islamic Iran: from containment to reconciliation', in H. Amirahmadi and N. Entessar, eds, Reconstruction and Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf (London and New York: Routledge, 1992). For an early account of this view, especially just before the start of the main stage of the civil war, see V. Belykh and N. Burbyga, 'Hostages of terror', Izvestiya, 9 September 1992, pp 1-2, which includes an interview with Sangak Safarov, the leader of the armed groups of the People's Front; and Oleg Blotskiy, 'Tajikistan: the Green and the Red', Literaturnaya Gazeta, 4 November 1992, p 11. Keyhan Hava'i (Persian), 16 December 1992, p 4. See Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Russian foreign policy and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus', in Central Asian Survey, Vol 12, No 2, 1993. Ibid. For the Russian policy see ibid. The issue of Tajik uranium and the possible interest of Islamic countries in it was raised in January 1992 in the Russian press. Nabiev's government, however, categorically denied the reports of any negotiations with Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and other countries on selling uranium and reiterated his government's position in a no-sale policy. Interfax, 7 January 1992, in FBIS-SOV, 8 January 1992, p 70; and A. Komrakov, 'Was there a bomb?' in Trude, 9 January 1992, p 3. For a good overview of Israeli policy in Central Asia, see A. Ehteshami and E. Murphy, 'The non-Arab Middle East states and the Caucasus/Central Asian Republics: Iran and Israel', in International Relations, Vol 12, No 1, April 1994. For views of Tajik Islamic and democratic opposition groups, see Al'Alam (Arabic), 7 September 1993, partially reproduced in Hamshahri (Persian), 29 September 1993, p 9; for an Iranian commentary on Israel's policy in Tajikistan, see Salam (Persian), 16 October 1993, p 3, and Ettela'at, 2 November 1994, p 2. For James Woolsey's testimony, see the Hearing of the Select Intelligence Committee, United States Senate, 25 January 1994, cited in Federal News Service (FNS) in Nexus databank. R. James Woolsey, 'Challenge to peace in the Middle East', in MEES, 38:1, 3 October 1994, pp D2-D3. Izvestiya, 10 August 1993, p 3. See, for example Russia's former Minister of Justice Nikolai Fedorov's article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 May 1993, p 4, which criticizes the use of force against Islamic movements by Russia as counterproductive; also see Vladimir Koznechevskyi, 'Victim of the Islamic roulette desperately wanted', or 'In search of those threatened by Islamic fundamentalism', Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6 August 1993, p 1. Semen Bagdasarov, 'There is a CIS border in Tajikistan. It is a Russian border, too', Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 3 September 1994, pp 1, 6. This remark was made by Stanley Escudero, US plenipotentiary and extraordinary ambassador in Tajikistan at the ceremony of the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between Tajikistan and the United States. Dushanbe Radio, Tajikistan Network in Russian, 29 July 1994, in FBIS-SOV, 1 August 1994, p 51. For the opposition groups' position on US policy, especially their critical attitude toward the US, see Akbar Turajonzoda's, 'Tajikistan: lonely and alien', in Salam (Persian), 22 August 1993, p 12; Akbar Turajonzoda, 'Tajikistan: burning in Bolshevik's fire of animosity', Jehan-e Islam (Persian), 19 August

20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

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28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

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THE 'ISLAMIC FACTOR' 1993, p 4; Ajami, 'A letter from a Tajik Muslim to the custodians of human rights', Jumhuriyeh Islami (Persian), 8 August 1993, p 12; and Al'Alam (Arabic) 7 September 1993. For a good elaboration of this view, see the article, 'Ethnic conflict in Central Asia: an inheritance from blind nationalism', Ettela'at (Persian), 24 August 1993, p 7. For a detailed and interesting elaboration of key mistakes of the opposition in their political strategy, see the interview with A. Turajonzoda, S. Yusef, T. Abdul Jabbar (head of the Rastakhiz Party) in Hamshahri (Persian), 29 September, 3 October, 4 October, 1994. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi informed the Russian ambassador in Iran, Vladimir Gudev, that Iran had refused to accept the requests for arms of several opposition groups in Tajikistan; ITAR-TASS, 28 October 1992 in FB1S-SOV, 30 October 1992, p 11. For a sample of this theme see A. Turajonzoda, 'The lonely Tajikistan: burning in the fire of the Bolshevik animosity', Jehan-e Islam (Persian), 8 August 1993, p 4; Shamsol'haqh, 'The painful diary of a Tajik Muslim', Jumhuriyeh Islami (Persian), 12 August 1993, p 14, Ajami, 'A letter from a Tajik Muslim to the custodian of human rights'; A. Turajonzoda, 'Tajikistan: lonely and alien', Salam (Persian), 22 August 1993, p 12. Turajonzoda's articles are specifically replete with bitter complaints about the absence of media coverage and the lack of 'even humanitarian' support for the Islamic opposition. For a good discussion of this issue see Sergei Gretsky, 'Civil war in Tajikistan: causes, developments, and prospects for peace', in R. Sagadeev and S. Eisenhower, Central Asia: Conflict Resolution and Change (Maryland: CPSS Press, 1995). For a polite expression of Tajik disappointment about the level of economic aid by Iran; see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 July 1992, p 3, interview with Kholiknazarov. See the interview with Muhammad Shabestari, Iran's ambassador in Tajikistan, in Ettela'at, 8 September 1993, p 8. The issue of cultural linkage seemed to have survived the critical political differences between Dushanbe and Tehran. A short yet impressive list of these links included the establishment of three schools to teach the Persian script, a major cultural centre, providing copies of Persian translations of the Koran, 200 language teaching manuals, 7,000 books for Tajik scholars, the opening of a 20,000-volume reading library, and the hosting of more than 70 delegations from Tehran (about 1,200 academics, artists, athletes, and so forth). Interestingly, these cultural activities also include 20,000 copies of Ayatollah Khomeini's famous collection of poetry, 'The Wine Goblet and the Confidante'. See Ettela'at, 8 September 1993, p 8. The concern over a US activist role in Tajikistan and the need to court Iran has been expressed in Russia during the talks in Islamabad. See Izvestiya, 2 November 1994, p 3. See especially an exclusive and significant interview with Tertiyakov, the Russian ambassador in Iran, with Abrar (Persian), 10 August 1993, pp 2, 4, where the ambassador clearly outlines the common aspects of Russian-Iranian relations and views about the US military and political presence in the Persian Gulf and the southern regions of Russia. Primakov has hinted about a shift on Russia's perspective on Islam, Islamic movements and 'rogue states' in several interviews. Primakov criticized some in the West for 'preserving' the 'enemy image' in the post-Cold War period by 'distorting Russia's policy, erasing the difference between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic extremism and deliberately keeping some black-listed countries in the risk zone ... Much is being done to make sure these countries will never see light at the end of the tunnel'. See, for example, an excerpt of his remarks to an international forum on NATO's expansion, Interfax, 5 April 1996, in FBJS-Central Eurasia, 8 April 1996, pp 13-14. Ibid. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Iran's emerging partnership with Russia: US pressure and Iran's regional role', Middle East Insight, 11:5, July-August, 1995, pp 84-87. Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, characterized Russian-Iranian relations as being at their highest level in his visit to Moscow in early March 1996. For coverage of Velayati's meeting with Primakov and Yeltsin, see IRNA, 7 March 1996, in FBIS-Central Eurasia, 7 March 1996, p 12, and IRNA, 7 March 1996, in FBIS-Central Eurasia, 8 March 1996, pp 13-14. See also the interview with Tertiyakov, Russian ambassador to Iran, in Rossiskaya Gazeta, 2 March 1996, p 15. See, in particular, Abdullah Nun's interview with Izvestiya, 18 June 1994, p 4. Nuri argues that Russia could be a friend as well as the guardian of the Tajik border, but not an actor in the internal affairs of Tajikistan. While Uzbekistan was the key to suppressing the Islamic opposition in the initial stages of the civil war and the coming to power of Emamali Rahmanov's regime, there has been considerable estrangement between the current regime, which signifies for the first time in Tajik history a sharing of power by the Kulobis (represented by Rahmanov) with the traditional Tajik political elite, the Khujandissupported by Uzbekistan. Thus, Russia's support for a Kulobi-dominant regime in Dushanbe represents an intricate

42. 43. 44. 45.

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50. 51.

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53. 54.

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MOHIADDIN MESBAHI Russian policy of (a) consolidating its own position within the complex of Tajik regional, local politics by supporting the Kulobi new comers, and (b) curtailing Uzbekistan's regional ambitions in Tajikistan by depriving the traditionally pro-Uzbek elite from Khujand from dominating political power. For a discussion of these issues see Gretsky, 'Civil war in Tajikistan: causes, developments, and prospects for peace', pp 232-236. It is thus not surprising that the Uzbek government, the staunch enemy of the Islamic opposition and the key promoter of 'Islamic threat' in the region, now more recently has tried to promote a rapprochement with the Islamic opposition with the hope of balancing Russian dominance. President Karimov invited Qozi Akbar Turajonzoda for a meeting in Tashkent which took place in April 3, 1995, hoping perhaps to become a mediator between the Islamic opposition and the Khujandis against the Kulobis and the Russians. In this regard, while Tajikistan has its own particularities, the politics of its Islam resemble in general the rest of the Islamic world, of which Central Asia is now part and parcel. See Emamali Rahmanov's address to an extraordinary session of the Supreme Council in Dushanbe, Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan, in FBIS-SOV, 8 September 1994, p 48. For Rahmanov's presidential manifesto, see Narodnaya Gazeta, 19 October 1994, p 1. For the views of the only other presidential candidate, Abdullojonov, who is Tajikistan's ambassador to Russia, see his election manifesto in Narodnaya Gazeta, 19 October 1994, p 1. Turajonzoda discussed in some details the proposal in a lecture at the Council on Foreign Relations (3 February 1995), monitored by the author. The Qozi reiterated the details of the proposal for national reconciliation in an interview with the author, New York, 5 February 1995. For a synopsis of his lecture, see Akbar Turajonzoda, 'Tajikistan -politics, religion and peace: a view from the opposition', in Problems of Post-Communism, July/August, 1995, pp 22-28.

57.

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