Theory of Politics HT week 4 Max Goettler Q: Do liberal states need a concept of civic virtue?

05/02/2012

In this essay I will argue that liberal states need a concept of civic virtue, though only a very limited one. In addressing the question it is important to distinguish between essential needs and other desirable attributes. This distinction will bring me to the conclusion that while liberal states need only a bare minimum of civic virtues such as informed political participation and respect for laws, a broader range of civic virtues might be desirable such as solidarity and interest in the public good but these are not per se necessary for the existence of the liberal state. I will start my essay from the idea of the liberal state and what we mean by it. In the most general definition a state can be called liberal if it cares about liberty, usually that of it citizens. Yet this is where the first problems of the definition arise, that is, what conception of liberty should be adopted for the liberal state. It seems appropriate to use a widely accepted and limited conception of negative liberty from which we can then move on to more farreaching and controversial conceptions. Negative liberty is concerned about constraints on the freedom of the individual and traditionally the focus is on legal constraints originating the state. In order to protect the individuals freedom from state intrusion liberal states are built on a constitution of liberal rights which protect important areas of personal freedom or specific principles that restrict the areas which the state has a right to regulate (e.g. the Harm Principle). If we adopt this idea of a liberal state then the inevitable question arises of how we can ensure that the state will stick to its principle of negative liberty and not become more invasive into the lives of its citizens over time. In theory the institutions of the liberal sate might be self-sustaining and hence ensure that the state will not drift towards illiberalism. However, this idea is very questionable and history is full of example of states that looked perfectly liberal in their design but became illiberal over time. In general this will be the results of the people that occupy the institutions of the state, whose dominating selfinterest can corrupt the institutions of the state. This problem has already been recognized by Aristotle in his Politics where he distinguishes between healthy forms of government and corrupted ones. If we want to ensure the durability of our liberal political state we have to ensure that some of the ideas on which the liberal state was built will be preserved in the people occupying the institutions of the state over time. In this context we might speak of virtuous people ruling the state. This could be in the form of a liberal and virtuous king or by a virtuous ruling class through an aristocracy. Thus if we can ensure that the king or the ruling class maintains some concept of virtue over time then it would be possible to secure the liberal state without a need for widespread civic virtue in the general public. However, this does not only seem risky but also leaves the general public at the mercy of a virtuous ruling class which does not sound very appealing either. This is where the republican conception of freedom comes in and tries to explain what is wrong with such a setting. Modern republicanism points at the unequal power distribution in the society which is dominated by the ruling elite and argues for liberty as a form of nondomination. However, before we move on to a discussion of republican freedom it is worth sticking with the conception of negative liberty and the effect that civil virtue would have on it.

If we adopt a general notion of civic virtue which identifies its meaning as a disposition to further the public over the private good in action and deliberation (Dagger, chapter 2) then we can derive from this the effects for our state concerned about the negative liberty of its citizens. It seems obvious that such a state would require far less legislation due to the fact that people will generally behave more virtuous. Thus a state might not require legislation that bans littering in public because this behaviour would be effectively regulated by the prevailing civic virtue in society. Thus it appears as if a concept of civic virtue could increase our negative freedom through reducing the scope of legislation required for an effective running of the state. Yet, this is only true if we accept that constraints from law have a stronger effect on our freedom than constraints from the prevailing civic virtue in society. We might agree with this assumptions since constraints based on civic virtue do not involve legal punishment but Mill might disagree. In his On Liberty he points towards the constraining nature of custom which is often invisible and more constraining than law itself through its moralistic appeal. Instead of fearing legal punishment we risk losing our reputation in the society. Thus it is far from obvious that a concept of civic virtue can increase our negative liberty since the constraints emanating from the civic virtue might be as limiting as those originating from law. I will now turn to a discussion of republican liberty and the role of civic virtue under it. Before we start we have to look closer at the different accounts of republican liberty available. One can at least distinguish between two different forms, one based on the Aristotelian philosophy which regards civic virtue as an intrinsic part of our freedom and a more modern account of republican liberty under which civic virtue has a more instrumental value for freedom. The Aristotelian account relies on strong assumptions about the human nature and holds that in order to be free we have to realize the characteristic features of our human nature through participation in the community of the city state. It is obvious that this is a very controversial account of freedom which relies on very strong assumption therefore I focus more on the account of freedom as non-domination which has more intuitive support and is less controversial. This account of liberty refers to freedom from domination which is often taken to mean freedom from arbitrary rule (see Pettit). In our example above this could mean freedom from the arbitrary rule of a ruling elite or king. In order to overcome this arbitrariness we have to base our society on law which gives us security over the ways the state is run. Moreover we will require some control over the making of the law to ensure that it cannot be seized by an arbitrary ruler. This is where the role of civic virtue comes in through two distinct channels. On the one hand civic virtue can ensure compliance to the law through spreading respect for the law so that we can be sure that law is not just a legal construct but actually an effective mean of ruling our society. Moreover the respect for law will help to make legal and penal system effective because only if citizens respect the law will they report breaches of it and thus allow for proper enforcement of the law. Thus it can be said that civic virtue which establishes a certain degree of respect for the law in the state can ensure an effective legal system which allows for a non-arbitrary rule. On the other hand civic virtue can help to guarantee widespread participation in the political process which can effectively control the legislative apparatus through regular elections. The accountability of the legislators ensures the non-domination because any attempt to seize extra power by the government can be answered by the general public at the ballot box or through the public discourse. For this control mechanism to be effective it is required that citizens participate in the political debate

and are informed on the issues in question. Thus in summary it can be said that we require a concept of civic virtue which fosters informed political participation and respect for the law so to ensure a liberal state built on the idea of liberal rights and non-domination. This seems like a reasonable demand on the citizens of a state but many philosophers have argued for a more extensive concept of civic virtue that encompasses more areas of public life and demands more duties from its citizens. Similar to Daggers definition of civic virtue quoted above these definitions require some form of solidarity and interest in the common good. I will argue that while these are reasonable demands for a society they are not essential to the very nature of the liberal state. It is realistic to assume that a stronger disposition towards the public good will increase the solidarity within society but it is not obvious how this solidarity will increase the liberty of the citizens in the state. Pettit argues that it will foster trust and cooperation, which are of course both valuable on their own, yet it is not apparent how they contribute to liberty in society. It will be more helpful to keep the concepts of solidarity and freedom distinct instead of attempting to find a definition of freedom which is able to include all other characteristics we desire for our state. Dagger argues that civic virtue will help to establish a civil society which can help to reduce our dependence on the state, an argument similar to the on from above regarding the relationship between civic virtue and reduced need for legislation. However, the idea of the civil society appears only to shift or dependence from one collective to another. Moreover there are often cases which we are rather dependent on the state than our civil society because the state is might be less partial and command more authority e.g. in the case of policing. If we take a closer look at the specific civic virtues that are proposed by for example by Dagger we can see that not only is their contribution to freedom more than questionable they might in fact threaten negative liberty in the state. One of the six virtues that he lists is active participation. While this might take the form of simple political participation in elections it could also imply stronger forms of community service. Another of his civic virtues is fair play which might require us to perform action that we do not really want to do. We could imagine a scenario in which a neighbour starts sweeping the street weekly even if we do not think this is necessary our duty to contribute our fair share might demand that we have to do the same. Hence we can see how the civil society and civic virtue might become a burden on our freedom especially if it becomes too extensive in scope. The same might be true for a minority member who lives in a very homogenous community. Thus for example the duty for an atheist to actively participate in the activities of his strictly religious community might be seen as a constraint on the individual. What these examples show is that it is important that civic virtue in a society is balanced with the demand for individual freedom and that once the concept of civic virtue gets out of hand it can have limiting effect on individual liberty. Thus in conclusion it can be said that while it might in theory be possible to found a liberal state on a virtuous ruling elite we would prefer to have it based on a limited concept of civic virtue encompassing the ideals of informed political participation and respect for the law. Other more extensive concepts of civic virtue might offer more desirable characteristics for our society such as solidarity and cooperation but are not by itself necessary for a liberal state. Moreover an extension of the concept of civic virtue can in effect open the door for a more intrusive state and put our individual liberty at risk as we have seen.

Bibliography: Dagger, Richard, Civic Virtues Aristotle, Politics Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy Mill, On Liberty Pettit, Philip, Republicanism (1997) Rawls, Theory of Justice (1971) Skinner, Quentin, Liberty Before Liberalism (1998) Thucydides, Pericles Funeral Oration, in his History of the Peleponesian Wars.