SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110701. March 12, 2002]

FORTUNE GUARANTEE AND INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, RTC, BRANCH 20, CAUAYAN, ISABELA, EGDONA R. MADRIAGA, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAUAYAN, ISABELA OR ANY OF HIS DEPUTIES and ISABELA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., respondents. DECISION DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65[1] of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul the twin Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 30430 [2] dated April 19, 1993[3] and dated June 16, 1993, [4] respectively, which ultimately dismissed the petition for certiorari of petitioner Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation that assailed the Special Order dated February 12, 1993 of respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, granting execution pending appeal of his Decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-436. The facts are as follows: On November 11, 1988, Isabela 1 Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ISELCO-I) secured Fire Insurance Policy No. 9216 from petitioner for Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos. This was later on changed to Policy No. 9218[5] with expanded coverage to include typhoons and floods. The period covered by the said amended insurance policy is from 4:00 oclock p.m. of November 11, 1988 to 4:00 oclock p.m. of November 11, 1989. The properties covered are all of ISELCO-Is distribution lines, electric posts/poles, transformers and its accessories, towers and fixtures installed and/or specifically situated in the towns of Alicia, Angadanan, Cabatuan, Cauayan, Cordon, Echague, Jones, Luna, Ramon, San Isidro, San Mateo, Santiago, Reina Mercedes, San Guillermo and San Agustin all in the Province of Isabela. [6] During the subsistence of the insurance policy, the insured properties of ISELCO-I were destroyed by two (2) typhoons in 1989; first by typhoon ELANG on July 9 and second by typhoon TACING on October 19 of the same year. ISELCO-I filed successive claims with petitioner. Notwithstanding the several demands made by ISELCO-I, however, petitioner refused to pay the claims. On March 19, 1990, ISELCO-I, through its representative, filed a complaint against petitioner for a sum of money in the amount of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela. The case which was assigned to Branch 20 presided by respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, was docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 20-436. In answer thereto, petitioner claimed, among others, that since the total value of the entire properties insured was Thirty-Six Million (P36,000,000.00) Pesos, it thereby rendered ISELCO-Is properties underinsured by the Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos insurance policy. Thus, according to petitioner, ISELCO-I was entitled to payment of only a fraction of the policys face value or only One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Five Pesos and Seventy-Three Centavos (P183,785.73) instead of the Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos claimed by ISELCO-I. On June 17, 1992, after trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO-I, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the defendant Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation to pay to the plaintiff Isabela- 1 Electric Cooperative, Inc., (ISELCO I) TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with interest at the rate of 14% per annum from March 19, 1990 up to and until said amount shall have been fully paid, attorneys fees in the amount ofP200,000.00 plus P2,500.00 honorarium. Costs against defendant. SO ORDERED. [7] On June 22, 1992, ISELCO-I filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal[8] alleging good reasons for its allowance. On July 13, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [9] of the Decision of the trial court. On July 23, 1992, ISELCO-I filed its Opposition to the said Motion for Reconsideration; [10] and on November 13, 1992, petitioner filed its Opposition [11] to ISELCO-Is Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the ground that ISELCO-I had no good reasons and no clear right to a writ of execution pending appeal as the subject amount is enormous.

On October 7, 1992, the trial court denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, on November 3, 1992, petitioner seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court. On February 12, 1993, the trial court resolved in a Special Order[12] the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal in favor of ISELCO-I, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the motion for execution pending appeal to be meritorious as there are good and valid reasons in support thereof, let a writ of execution of the decision of the Court for the principal claim ofP2,000,000.00 be issued upon plaintiffs filing a bond in favor of defendant in the amount of P1,817,742.8 to answer for damages that defendant may suffer by reason of the writ if it is later on adjudge that plaintiff was not entitled thereto. SO ORDERED. [13] Aggrieved by such Special Order, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction with Temporary Restraining Order,[14] with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing the Special Order granting execution pending appeal. On April 19, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[15] dismissing the said petition. The motion for reconsideration of petitioner was likewise denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated June 16, 1993.[16] Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following as errors, to wit: I RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS THEREOF AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE ACTUATIONS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE WHO, KNOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE BEFORE HIM CLEARLY PROVED THAT THE SUBJECT INSURED PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS VALUED AT P36,052,061.15, AND NOT P2,000,000.00, HENCE UNDERINSURED, HE BIASLY AND IMPROPERLY APPLIED JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PIERCED THE SAID AMOUNT OF P36,061,052.15 (SIC) BY DIVIDING IT INTO TWO AND DECLARED THAT P2,000,000.00 PORTION THEREOF REFERS TO THE VALUE OF THE INSURED PROPERTIES AND THE P34 M COVERS OTHER PROPERTIES, TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE INSURED PROPERTIES WERE NOT UNDERINSURED AND THEREFORE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN CLAIM THE WHOLE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF P2,000,000.00 WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. II RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HASTILY DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY DELIBERATELY IGNORING PETITIONERS REJOINDER TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMENT ATTACHING THERETO (REJOINDER) TWO SETS OF DOCUMENTS TO CORROBORATE THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT ITS INSURED PROPERTIES WERE VALUED AT P36,061,052.15 AND NOT P2,000,000.00, HENCE, UNDERINSURED. THUS, THE APPEAL OF PETITIONER IS NOT DILATORY. III RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SPECIAL ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE GRANTING EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL AGAINST PETITIONER FOR AN ENORMOUS SUM OF P2,000,000.00 WITHOUT GOOD REASONS THEREFOR. At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioner adopted the wrong mode of appeal in bringing this case before us. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[17] This was clearly addressed by this Court in Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo vs. CA[18] where we held that as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45.[19]

Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case, his petition may be dismissed outright. However, in the interest of substantial justice, the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on the merits.[20] Thus, while the instant petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45. First of all, It is at once apparent that the first two (2) assignments of errors in this petition behoove this Court to review the finding made by the appellate court that the properties of ISELCO-I were not underinsured. This we cannot do for the simple reason that it would require us to go into the merits of the decision rendered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. Br. 20-436, which decision in the main case is now subject of a separate appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. Thus, despite the parties insistent submission of the question of underinsurance for our resolution in this petition, we must reiterate the well-established rule that the merits of the case should not be determined at this stage of the proceedings, in advance of the main appeal taken by the aggrieved party from the judgment rendered by respondent court.[21] It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals, in resolving the petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent Judge in granting execution pending appeal per his said Special Order, dwelt on the merits of the principal action, and held in part that: On the central issue of whether there was underinsurance, the respondent judge made the following findings which we sense to be persuasive: The third issue is whether or not the properties of the plaintiff are underinsured. It is the contention of the defendant that because the total value of the properties of the plaintiff is P36,000,000.00 but the insurance taken is only P2,000,000.00, its properties are under insured. The contention is not well taken. In the first place, while the total value of the properties of the plaintiff is P36,000,000.00, not all its properties were insured with the defendant. The only properties of the plaintiff insured with the defendant are its distribution lines, electric posts/poles, transformers and its accessories, towers and fixtures installed and/or situated in the covered areas. Its buildings, vehicles (which the court takes judicial notice of) and other properties are not insured with defendant. The value of the properties insured is only P2,282,765.00, more or less, as may be seen from the summary of claims filed by the plaintiff dated November 21, 1989 and marked as Exhibit C. The properties insured are not under insured. (Annex G of Petition) [Underscoring supplied][22] The above-quoted obiter dictum of the Court of Appeals with respect to the issue of underinsurance must be disregarded as the ruling of the Court of Appeals cannot be duly extended to expand the main thrust of its subject Resolutions beyond their true import.
[23]

It is imperative that we allow the main appeal to take its normal course. In the case before us, therefore, we shall purposely limit ourselves to resolving only the wisdom of the trial courts exercise of discretion in ordering the execution pending appeal.[24] The assailed Special Order of respondent Judge granting execution pending appeal reads as follows: For resolution is a motion to execute the decision pending appeal filed by the plaintiff, through counsel, based on the following good reasons: x x x that the withholding of payment by the defendant is fraudulent and malicious in that it delayed payment and made business with the money due to the plaintiff while the case was pending. That since the happening of the event insured against in June 1989 and October 1989, the consumer-members which include the municipalities of Alicia, Angadanan, Cabatuan, Cauayan, Cordon, Santiago, Reina Mercedes, San Guillermo and San Agustin all in the province of Isabela have suffered untold sufferings because while the lines were repaired the repairs made on the damage on (sic) transmission lines and backbone lines of the plaintiff were not repaired as desired for lack of funds; That the plaintiff need badly the amounts adjudged in the decision for the use of said plaintiff in the repairs of its transmission lines, electric posts, transformers and its accessories, towers and fixtures within its area of coverage; That to delay the payment of the claims of the plaintiff which is valid will cause irreparable injury and sufferings to the consumermember who expect the best service from the plaintiff; xxx that the plaintiff is willing to put up a bond to be fixed on the discretion of the court to guarantee payment of damages to the defendant if the court finds that it was wrongly issued. In the joint affidavit of Rolando P. Garcia and Lyn M. Octubre, OIC General Manager and Chief Management Internal Auditor, respectively, of the plaintiff submitted in support of plaintiffs motion, declared, among others, that:

4. That the destruction had to be repaired immediately and as the cooperative had no money at the time, the cooperative had to borrow cash from private persons and entities; 5. That up to the present the indebtedness of the cooperative aforecited is not fully paid to the present. xxx xxx xxx

After a careful consideration of the case, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff constitute good and valid reasons for the execution of the decision pending appeal. It must always be borne in mind that the plaintiff is a cooperative of the people within the area of its coverage. It is engage in the business of retailing electricity to its members - a commodity basic to the welfare and vital to the industries of the people. Its business is thus impress with public interest. To deliver electricity to the people, its electric lines, posts, transmissions, transformers and other accessories must always be maintained in good order and condition. This entails big amount of money. Thus, plaintiff must have insured its properties against the risk of their being damaged or destroyed by typhoons so that it shall have sufficient funds for their repair. But when the plaintiff went to the defendant to demand payment of the proceeds of its insurance, it refused to pay. It wanted to pay only partially. Plaintiff had to repair its properties because it can not escape its duties and responsibilities to the people. It borrowed money to make the repairs which for lack of funds leave much to be desired. Plaintiff needs the amount adjudged for the repair of its transmission lines, electric posts, transformers and accessories, towers and fixtures. Posting of a bond by the plaintiff to secure payment of damages to the defendant should the appellate court later on adjudge that plaintiff was not entitled to the execution pending appeal, is a good reason as held by the Supreme Court in several cases (Lu vs. Valeriano, 111 SCRA 87; Delos Reyes vs. Capulong, 122 SCRA (631; Roxas vs. CA, 157 SCRA 370; City of Manila vs. CA, 72 SCRA 98).[25] Petitioner claims that the respondent Judge abused his discretion in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal despite the fact that its appeal is clearly not dilatory. It likewise argued that since the evidence shows that electricity was immediately restored in the affected localities, the reasons posited by ISELCO-I are not the good reasons contemplated by law for the extraordinary grant of execution pending appeal. We disagree. As a general rule, the execution of a judgment should not be had until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution shall issue as a matter of right. Execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39[26] of the Rules of Court is, therefore, the exception. [27] The requisites for the grant of a motion for execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.[28] Being an exception to the general rule, the requisites of execution pending appeal must, therefore, be strictly construed. [29] Thus, anent the requisite that there must be good reason justifying the execution of the judgment pending appeal, we have consistently held that such good reason must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. [30] Beyond the guideline set by jurisprudence, however, statute does not determine, enumerate, or give examples of what may be considered good reasons to justify execution pending appeal. What these good reasons are must, therefore, necessarily be addressed to the discretion of the court, and in the case of City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals[31] we said that: xxx If in the mind of the court, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, good reasons exist, the exercise of the power to issue immediate execution of the judgment cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion. Provided there are good reasons for execution according to the judgment of the trial judge, such judgment should generally not be interfered with, modified, controlled, or inquired into by the appellate court; the latter should generally not substitute its way of thinking for that of the trial court, otherwise, the discretionary power given to the trial court would have no meaning. The appellate court may, however, interfere with that discretion lodged in the trial court only in case of grave abuse or in case conditions have so far changed since the issuance of the order as to necessitate the intervention of the appellate court to protect the interests of the parties against contingencies which were not or could have not been contemplated by the trial judge at the time of the issuance of the order.[32] We find that there is neither grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge nor a change in circumstances so as to warrant a setting aside of the assailed Special Order granting execution pending appeal.

Respondent judge exercised sound discretion in granting execution pending appeal on the grounds that: (1) ISELCO-I is a cooperative of the people within the area of coverage that is engaged in the business of retailing electricity to its members - a commodity basic to their welfare and vital to the industries of the people; and (2) to deliver electricity to the people, its electric lines, posts, transmissions, transformers and other accessories must always be maintained in good order and condition. To restore electricity in the areas affected, ISELCO-I had to borrow money from private persons and entities, which money, however, was insufficient to repair all the damage that had been caused to ISELCO-Is properties. Hence, while it is true that ISELCO-I was able to immediately repair its lines and restore electricity to the areas affected by the typhoons, the damage to its transmission lines and backbone lines was not repaired due to lack of funds. But it is not the fact of ISELCO-Is indebtedness that is propounded as the good reason for execution pending appeal but the fact that, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, to delay payment of the claims of ISELCO-I would cause irreparable injury to the consumers-members of the cooperative who expect the best service from ISELCO-I. Finally, it must be stressed here that respondent Judge granted execution pending appeal based upon the evidence of those factual circumstances mentioned above. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals affirmed those factual findings and respondent Judges conclusion that the same constitute good reasons contemplated by law for granting execution pending appeal. It bears reiterating, therefore, that it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. In the same vein, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule, and this, petitioner has failed to prove.[33] WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and June 16, 1993 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the resolution of the appeal on merits now pending in the Court of Appeals; and for that purpose, let the record of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 134462 October 18, 2004

MAYON ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA ALTURA, LEOPOLDO LEONARDO, ISIDERIO CATLI, JOSE BOCATO, POLICARPIO FERRER, TERESITA PEREGRINO, PRIMITIVO RIVERA, TEOFILO NAPAO, JESUS VERZOSA, JR., ELISA PANGILINAN, ROGER CANZON, NORMAN ALTURA, ROMUALDO DE BELEN, and RAYMUNDO DE GUZMAN, respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42602 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. Petitioner Mayon Estate Corporation, Everlasting Estate Corporation (EEC) and NBC Agro-Industrial Development Corporation (NBC) were co-owners of a residential land known as the Peafrancia Hills Subdivision, with an area of 150 hectares located in Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 310001 to 310946; TCT No. 317488; TCT No. 240606; TCT No. 417624; TCT No. 341357 and TCT No. 338897.3 On May 6, 1976, the corporations filed a civil suit for forcible entry and damages4 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, against Eladio Medina, for himself and in his capacity as President of the Concerned Citizen Farmers Association, Inc., and Ranulfo B. Buensalida, for himself and in his capacity as VicePresident of the Doa Flora Farmers Association, Inc. with 1000 members, more or less. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 890. On June 26, 1979, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, EEC and NBC. The fallo of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, defendants and all other persons acting in their behalf are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question and remove all the improvements they constructed thereon, and to restore the possession of the lots to the plaintiff. Further, ordering the defendants to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED. 5 When the decision became final and executory, the petitioner, EEC and NBC moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which the MTC granted on April 26, 1980.6 However, the sheriff failed to implement the said writ because the defendants therein refused to vacate the premises.7 Left with the problem of a final judgment which had not been executed for five (5) years since the writ of execution was issued, the petitioner and its co-owners filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition with the MTC. The MTC granted the same, pursuant to its Order8 dated January 2, 1985. The demolition was partially implemented with 42 houses destroyed.9 On October 25, 1985, the respondents 10 filed before the RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, a Petition for Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages11 against Judge Romeo de Leon, the petitioner and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, to enjoin the enforcement of the January 2, 1985 Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC, on the ground that the same was issued beyond the fiveyear period during which a judgment may be executed by motion. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 739-A. It was also alleged that the June 26, 1979 judgment of the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 should be enforced by an independent action and not by a mere motion. For failing to file a responsive pleading, the petitioner was declared in default, while the respondents were allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order,12 because of which the sheriff was not able to fully implement the writ of demolition in Civil Case No. 890. On July 28, 1986, the RTC rendered a Decision13 in Civil Case No. 739-A in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: Accordingly, the Court has no alternative but to give due course to the instant Petition for Prohibition. Let the corresponding Writ of Prohibition be issued to prevent respondents from enforcing the decision of the respondent Court in Civil Case No. 890. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. 14 No appeal was taken by the petitioner, thus, the decision became final and executory. Entry of judgment was made of record on August 4, 1987.15 The court issued an Order16 dated June 15, 1988, for the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition. However, the Clerk of Court failed to issue the said writ. Meantime, the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 739-A notwithstanding, the petitioner filed, on May 20, 1988, a Motion for a Second Alias Writ of Demolition in Civil Case No. 890. The court granted the motion and issued a second alias writ of demolition17 on May 27, 1988. The sheriff was able to demolish only sixty percent (60%) of the houses, because the RTC of Antipolo, Branch 71, had issued a temporary restraining order in another case, Civil Case No. 1193-A, entitled "Lungsod Silangan Residents Association, Inc. et al. vs. Judge Romeo C. de Leon, et al."18 Worse, the occupants reconstructed their houses.19 On motion of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 739-A, the RTC issued an Order20 on June 15, 1988, directing the issuance of a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the MTC decision in Civil Case No. 890. However, no writ was issued. On March 31, 1989, the MTC issued a Third Alias Writ of Demolition. 21 This time, the sheriff was able to demolish almost ninety-five percent (95%) of the houses. 22 On September 12, 1990, the Branch Clerk of Court finally issued a Writ of Prohibition 23 in Civil Case No. 739-A, conformably with the June 15, 1988 Order of the trial court. Nevertheless, on August 20, 1991, the petitioner filed a motion in Civil Case No. 890 for the issuance of a fourth alias writ of demolition. 24 The court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to enable the parties to settle the matter amicably.25 However, no settlement was reached by the parties. On October 20, 1995, the respondents filed a Motion to Lift/Dissolve Writ of Prohibition26in Civil Case No. 739-A before the RTC, Branch 71, to enable the sheriff to fully execute the decision in Civil Case No. 890. The RTC issued an Order27 granting the motion on December 15, 1995. In lifting the writ of prohibition, Judge Felix S. Caballes held, inter alia, that: Firstly, in Civil Case No. 890, the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo issued within the 5-year reglementary period a writ of execution on April 26, 1980 to enforce its decision dated June 26, 1979, a copy of which decision was received by the

defendants therein on August 20, 1979. The alias order of demolition is only an incident of the writ of execution timely or seasonably issued earlier. Indeed, as succinctly expressed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his concurring opinion in Torralba vs. De Los Angeles (96 SCRA 69, 76): "I concur. Since the writ of execution was served upon the petitioner within five years from entry of judgment, the trial court could issue the order of demolition (an incident of the writ of execution) even after the expiration of the five-year period (Albetz Investment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-32570, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 310, 317)." Albetz Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (75 SCRA 310) adds to say that "the law does not specify the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out."28 The petitioner and its co-owners forthwith filed a motion in Civil Case No. 890 reiterating its motion for the issuance of a fourth alias writ of demolition29 which was granted by the MTC in its Order30 dated March 20, 1996. The petitioner, in turn, filed a motion31 in Civil Case No. 739-A before the RTC for the reconsideration of the order lifting the writ of prohibition, but the trial court issued an Order32 dated October 24, 1996, denying the said motion for lack of merit. The court even set aside its decision granting the petition for prohibition of the respondents herein.33 The respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a Petition for Certiorari/p>rohibition with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order,34 claiming that the RTC Orders dated December 15, 1995 and October 24, 1996, which in effect set aside a decision that had long become final and executory, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. On March 13, 1998, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition and setting aside the assailed orders. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated 15 December 1995 and 24 October 1996 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. 35 The appellate court held that the decision of the RTC granting the petition for writ of prohibition had long become final and executory; hence, immutable and can no longer be set aside. A motion for reconsideration36 was filed by the petitioner which the CA denied per its Resolution37 dated July 2, 1998. The Petitioner filed its petition at bar contending that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT HON. JUDGE FELIX CABALLES COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED HIS ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 15, 1995 AND OCTOBER 24, 1996 DISSOLVING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND DENYING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON QUESTION OF LAW IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 15, 1995 AND OCTOBER 24, 1996 ISSUED BY HON. JUDGE FELIX CABALLES. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS "FINAL" AND TAKES PRECEDNCE OVER THE EARLIER FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO.38 Anent the first and the second errors, the petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the writ of prohibition. It argues that the writ of demolition and the subsequent alias writs of demolition issued by the MTC were valid and effective, since the five (5)-year period within which to execute a court decision by mere motion was tolled or suspended by the obstinate act of the respondents in refusing to vacate the premises. Hence, in lifting the writ of prohibition, Judge Caballes was merely correcting a manifestly erroneous decision earlier issued by his predecessor, Judge Patricio M. Patajo. It posits that the July 28, 1986 Decision of the RTC which gave due course to respondents petition for prohibition and which ordered the issuance of the writ of prohibition was patently erroneous because it prohibited the enforcement of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 which had already become final and executory.

The petitioners contention has no merit. There is no denying the fact that the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 890 had long become final and executory when the respondents filed their petition for prohibition with the RTC in Civil Case No. 739-A. What the respondents sought to prevent was the enforcement of the MTC decision, on their claim that such decision could be effected only via an action to enforce the decision of the MTC, and not by mere motion. Whether right or wrong, the decision of the RTC granting a writ of prohibition in Civil Case No. 739A had long become final and executory; hence, immutable, beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC to amend, modify, or reverse.39 Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.40 The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.41 The only recognized exceptions are the corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, in which case no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.42 Anent the third error, the petitioner contends that, contrary to the appellate courts ruling that there are two (2) final and executory judgments in Civil Cases Nos. 890 and 739-A, there is but one immutable judgment, that which was rendered in Civil Case No. 890. The petitioner maintains that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 739-A can never attain immutability because the said case was merely an adjunct to the ejectment suit in the MTC and has no independent existence apart from the said ejectment suit. It argues that "to hold otherwise would result in an unjust and absurd situation whereby the prevailing party on the merits in the main case will be forever barred, by the simple expedient of the other partys obtaining an incidental writ of prohibition, from executing the judgment in the core case favorable to it and from enforcing a right and a demandable obligation from the losing party." We do not agree with the petitioner. A special civil action of prohibition is an original and independent action and not merely a continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.43 Neither is such an action ancillary or substitute to the action against which the supervisory authority of the appellate court is sought and directed. It bears stressing that an action for prohibition or certiorari, for that matter, does not divest the inferior or trial court of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before it; it is merely an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory power over the lower court to insure that the lower court acts within its jurisdiction. 44 If the lower court errs in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal in due course from an adverse judgment of the trial court, absent grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner posits that if we uphold the decision of the CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 890 will only be phyrric. It laments that it has to go back to square one, as it was, and begin all over again. We do not think so. The petitioner may still file an action to revive the decision of the MTC under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. Besides, one may commiserate with the petitioner, ultimately, it has no one else to blame but itself. After being declared in default in Civil Case No. 739-A, it did nothing to regain its legal standing in court. Incredibly, it did not even lift a finger after the RTC had rendered its decision and permitted the statutory period within which to file an appeal to elapse, consequently allowing the trial courts judgment to become final and executory. By its own negligence, it is guilty of laches and is now precluded from assailing the validity of the RTCs final and executory judgment and the writ of prohibition issued pursuant thereto. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The impugned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524 FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present : CABACUNGAN, Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J. PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO and GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondents. Promulgated : September 14, 2005 x-----------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA, J.: Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen. In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively. In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.[1] The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper. In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15 th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for

reconsideration [3]which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. [5] This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6] Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.[7] On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further: Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.[8] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000. In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE

SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. [9] The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal. First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides: Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied) Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. [12] As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998. What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR? In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time? Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the

notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration. In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,[16]premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18] Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read: Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37. But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. [19] (emphasis supplied) According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice. In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25] The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30] Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be

construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998). To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.