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Student No.

33229696

Digital Photography in Computational Media Culture


In computational media culture, does it still make sense to talk of digital photography? Has the aesthetical and cultural significance of the image and its relations to memory and perception, changed?
With the advent of digital imaging processes, no longer can the photographic image be reduced to a perceived or potential series of truths. Where the analog image was typically thought of as representing reality, the digital image exists within the structure of manipulation: a continual reconfiguration and recodification of the image-object within an expanding network of digital storage machines. The digital image in networked culture generates new meaning for the experience and understanding of what an image is and how it functions both culturally and aesthetically. The externalization of a collective image-memory into technical databases where the act of recollection occurs as a series of clicks, downloads, and media transfers alter the traditional role of memory and perception (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:343). Within the ubiquitous networks of computational media culture a new structure for memory and perception emerges where the duration of time is no longer based in linearity, extending from past into future, but in virtuality, where past and future exist simultaneously in the space of the present (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:353). The digital image, in this way, functions as a virtual representation that blurs the boundaries between subjective and objective reality in a hyperspace where matter can be reduced to a binary series of zeros and ones. From the innocence of the analog image to the instability of the easily manipulated digital image emerges a cultural anxiety; a crisis in how to perceive the function of digital photography within computational media culture and its relationship to other new media objects including video, cinema, television and computer games. This paper briefly traces the practical and theoretical differences between analog and digital imaging processes and argues that digital photography cannot be considered as an autonomous object outside of the larger stream of new media objects. Furthermore, digital photography will be considered as a processual and interactive medium that alters the structure of memory and perception resulting in what Bernard Stielger calls a mnemotechnic (or tertiary) memory, and negotiates a new platform for the witnessing and retrieval of images: that of a search culture within the database architecture of digital images (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:65). i. Analog v. Digital Imaging:
With the arrival of the digital image, the image/reality relationship is shattered nearing the time when no one will be able to say if an image is true or false
(Clayssen,1995: 72)

forever.

Were

In the film Momento by Christopher Nolan, the main character, Leonard, suffers from anterograde amnesia and is unable to store short-term memories. In order to remember, he tattoos messages onto his body and uses Polaroid photographs as visual aids. The film is shot in two opposing sequences: black and white scenes that progress chronologically and color scenes that go backward in time. By creating an external database of image-memories, Leonard attempts to understand the events of his past. The film opens (in color) on the image of a developed photograph depicting a man shot in the head. As the scene progresses into the past, the image fades away and the photograph is retracted back into the camera. For Leonard, the photographic image denotes a system of truth where representation is a stand-in for perception. The Polaroid photo in this film is a symbol of the dependency and accuracy of the analog image. Traditional analog imaging uses continuous data to make representations of the world that presented a set idea of reality. At its beginnings in the mid 19th century, the photographic image was considered a reliable method for the transmission of truth, an accurate and even unbiased source that could provide a confirmation of the existence of an image or event. Photography was a chemical process in which light was recorded onto film capturing one specific moment in time and space producing a

Student No. 33229696 faithful document of an event (Kember 1998: 21). What Barthes refers to as the that really existed or the intentionality of a photograph, is a fundamental characteristic of the analog photograph (Stielger, 1995:226). The beginning of the mechanically reproducible image brought about its own controversy for the meaning of images, as Hansen (2004) puts it: Once it (the image) had become reproducible

through mechanical procedures such as photography...art underwent a fundamental metamorphosis, losing its status as a unique object tied to a single time and place (its aura), but gaining in return a newfound flexibility, a capacity to reach a larger, indeed mass audience, and to effect a hitherto unimagined political impact. The analog image, or chemical photograph, contained within itself a linear
narrative of memory, a straightforward snapshot in the way images and realities were perceived, collected, and recycled into the cultural media stream. This, however, does not give a complete account of the analog image, which also has a demonstrated ability to be falsified through manipulation. Take, for example, the Stalin era photographs of the 19th century where entire figures were inserted or removed, text with propaganda slogans were added to signs in the background, and images were enlarged or cropped to present different contexts of an event than what had actually occurred (Newseum, n.d.). Here, the analog image data has been cut up, reorganized, erased, and in some cases altogether fabricated to alter an existing image for a political agenda- an image that tricks the viewer with the presentation of a false memory, a contrived image used to manipulate and deceive rather than to report or present an event or occurrence. Take also for example the technique of photomontage, the method of making a single image out of a combination of multiple images. The images are cut and paste together and then re-photographed to create a seamless final composite image, where all the visual information contained appears continuous. The combined images need not be related to each other and often result in the uncanny mixture of elements: surrealist landscapes with figures floating in the sky or (Gersh-Nesic, 2012). This mixture of uncanny elements into a perceived reality predates the digital image in its break with the straightforward presentation of reality. It is important here to note one of the key differences between digital and analog image: the speed and lack of trace that altering a digital image allows for. Modifying or retouching an analog photograph was a time consuming process that left visible traces of the changes that had been made (Kember 1998: 20). A digital photograph can be changed immediately and without detection or trace of the original image (Kember 1998: 20). Furthermore, a digital image can be entirely produced from scratch, using the building blocks of numerical codes to create a simulation of any image as realistic as a its original (Kember 1998: 21). How then, can we discuss the emergence of digital technologies and imaging processes and their purported death of the photograph in which the real is no longer a straightforward account provided by the photographic evidence of the analog image? If the analog image has always been available for manipulation, how can we consider the digital image, with its discrete and malleable data storage, and account for the emergence of a new structure for memory and perception? On the one hand, the analog image is a symbol for an accurate and direct recording of images, and on the other, the boundary between what is true and faithful in the analog blurs into the underlying theme of the digital; the easy and swift manipulation and (re)creation of any image, anywhere. ii. The Image in Networked Digital Systems:

You really do need a system if youre gonna make it work.(Momento)


Leonard organizes the photographs he takes as a networked system of images. He attempts to make sense of the images by assembling them into a map on his bedroom wall. The photographs, tattoos, handwritten notes, and papers he has collected act as a database of his memories and perceptions. By searching through the database he is able to retrieve and assemble bits of information, gathering clues into the murder of his wife. Leonards database in the film Momento serves as a

Student No. 33229696 container for the image-memories of his experiences as well as a reference to the increasing function of the way images are utilized and organized in networked systems. Immersed in a digital network system, the image is liberated from its fixed position in stillness, free to travel across media. With the synthesis of the Internet, mobile phone, and snapshot camera, photography becomes a networked process, the camera a networked object, both inseparable from the web of media objects from which they are constituted (Parisi, 2011). The digital image is simply a shortcut, providing a digital image file directly usable in a digital graphic chain (Vaissaud, 1995: 36). No longer dependant on silver-halide chemical processing and the transferring of a captured image from film to paper (negative to positive), the digital image is immediately available for use and able to enter directly into the digital network in multiple formats (Vaissaud, 1995: 36). The digital graphic chain, as Vaissaud puts it, describes the vast stream of images linked together within the database architecture of digital media objects. The term database architecture refers to the structure of a computational system; the way data is organized, utilized and processed (Parisi, 2011). For example, Google is an object-oriented database that allows users to retrieve images and information from across the Internet, displaying the results in a hierarchal list. Search engines like Google and image hosting sites such as Flikr and Instagram function like open containers, where anonymous image-memories become collective experiences existing in virtual spaces. Anyone can contribute material to these sites and users can act as both consumers and producers of image content. Search and retrieval become the new apparatuses for a cultural anatomy subsisting on interconnected networks of digital storage machines. Lev Manovich (1996) deconstructs the function of the digital image through the apparatus of cinema. For him, it is within the iconography of the cinematic structure that the photographic solidifies its new role in visual culture: that as a nostalgic object of the pre-digital (Manovich, 1996: 58). Cinematic codes are rehashed in new digital media objects: computer games and QuickTime software both rely on the modes and structure of cinema. In CD-Rom games the user navigates a narrative through an interface of realistic image-sets, characters and camera angles (Manovich, 1996: 58). Furthermore, the photographic is fetishized with graphic functions that simulate the traditional granular look of analog film (Manovich, 1996: 58). It is in this way that the digital image serves to preserve and propagate the cultural codes of film and photography even though, through digitization, it has been completely broken out of the traditional structural apparatus of the image-object, signsignified relationship (Manovich, 1996: 59). Here, a new threat to the witnessing of images occurs where the aura of the image isnt just reduced through reproduction, but through digitization it is split out in entirety from the traditional network of semiotics and manner of display from which it is generally situated in visual culture (Manovich, 1996: 57). Manovich determines the logic of the digital image as paradoxical in that it breaks with older modes of visual representation while simultaneously reinforcing these modes (Manovich, 1996: 57). The digital image annihilates photography while solidifying, glorifying and immortalizing the photographic (Manovich, 1996: 57). The digital photographic image serves first and foremost as a representation of photography itself (Manovich, 1996: 57). Though the digital image no longer remains in its traditional fixed context, it is re-lived in homage to the photographic past, as represented through its own simulation. iii. New Perception in New Media
Changes in the nature of how the world is imaged are taken (however problematically) to be changes in how the world is seen. And these ideological changes in turn are thought to relate to shifts in how the world is known...and to the identities of those who do the seeing and knowing.
(Lister 1995: 4)

With digital images and networked systems come changes in how the image is perceived, what it means, and how it affects the broader perception and understanding of our individual selves and our relationship to the world. In his 1989 book titled The Reconfigured Eye, William Mitchell declares the

Student No. 33229696 beginning of the post-photographic era (Mitchell, 1992:225). Referring to the digital processes that have replaced traditional photographic methods, he claims that a worldwide network of digital imaging systems is swiftly, silently constituting itself as the decentered subjects reconfigured eye (Mitchell, 1992:85). The reconfigured eye disembodies the viewer, displacing human vision into machinic processes of algorithmic coding, data-processing, pattern recognition and statistical sampling in which visual perception is no longer a haptic sense grounded in the physical but a virtual sensation organized by the machine (Hansen, 2004:xiv). This machinic vision, in turn, threatens the dematerialization of the observer altogether by aligning human vision on the plane of the machine (Hansen, 2004:xiv). This is similar to Kittlers theory of digital convergence, where human perception becomes obsolete as information (now abstract and decontextualized) runs on an endless loop in disembodied form (Hansen, 2004:xx). Katherine Hayles takes the idea a step further and conceives of a posthuman-cyborg according to which there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily

existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot technology and human goals (1999:3). In the post-photographic era of the digital machine, the post-human is a seamless hybrid of human and machine intelligence (Mitchell, 1992, 225 and Hayles, 1999:3).
In contrast to the disembodiment theories of Mitchell and Hayles, Mark Hansen, interpreting the works of Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson and Walter Benjamin, focuses attention on the affective, proprioceptive, and tactile dimension of visual media where the body is the active framer of an image (Hansen, 2004:xviii). Hansen describes the digital image as an interactive techno-sensorimotor hybrid, where only in the combining of the senses of the body with the technics of the machine is information made perceivable (Hansen, 1965: xxii). Hansen maintains his idea of technesis, a strategy that aims to preserve the integrity and autonomy of thought and representation by compromising the materiality of the technological object (Hansen, 2004:xix). These ideas are similar to Bernard Stiegler (1995) who states that analog-digital technology is the leading element whereby todays perception occurs primarily through perceptual prostheses (Stiegler 1995: 226). For Stiegler, perception must be considered within the expanse of the technological tools, or artificial aids that condition our experience of the world. Technology is a prosthesis that interacts with the body affecting what it means to be embodied human agents, and though it reconfigures perceptual senses, the body remains active as a source of meaning (Hansen, 2004:xx). For Hansen, there is no image or information without the perception of the embodied subject that gives it form. iv. Memory in Networked Culture

If you have a piece of information which is vital, writing it on your body instead of on a piece of paper can be the answer, its just a permanent way of keeping a note (Momento)
Everyday, Leonard has to re-remember his past. His memory functions exclusively within the archive of image-objects he has put together. In considering memory in computational networked culture, the film Momento demonstrates the way in which memory utility has become externalized, no longer a process that occurs within the body but a technical act that takes in the structure of digital storage devices. Computational networked culture connects digital storage devices across the world, acting as external containers of human memory (Parisi, 2010: 345). In altering the structure of perception, the digital network likewise transforms the structure of memory. Perception and memory are linked together and operate through images (Parisi, 2011). Stielgers work on memory suggests that the Internet age is fundamentally transforming the industrial model of memory (Hansen, 2010:64). The iPod, smart phone, GPS navigators and Internet are some of the technical memory aids that displace human memory into technical storage devices (Hansen, 2010:64). The act of remembering, now embodied in the machine, changes Platos notion of anamnesis (the embodied act of remembering) to what Stiegler identifies as hypomnesis, the technical exteriorization of memory (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:64). These digital hypomnemata are unlike the industrial technologies of analog photography,

Student No. 33229696 phonography and cinematography in that consumption is no longer separate from production. Rather, receivers are placed in the position of senders (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:64). Relating this idea to the idea of writing where an individual who can read can also write, Stiegler argues that the digitallyliterate citizen incorporates a procedural logic that facilitates a dual understanding of both sending and receiving, consuming and producing (Hansen and Mitcehll, 2010:64). For example, an individual who can produce and upload digital photographs to the Internet is likely able to receive and consume them. The idea of an external memory in relation to technology isnt entirely new. Stielger traces the relationship between the human and technics in the work of paleontologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan and takes fossil evidence of primitive tools as an example of an essential factor of the evolving human in externalizing itself in tools, artefacts, language and technical memory banks (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:65). Following Derridas idea of grammatization where memory is inscribed in external marks, Stiegler determines distinct epochs of the exteriorization of memory including those of the stone tool,

of ideogrammatic writing, of the alphabet, of analog and digital recording, and now of digitization and the Internet (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:66). Human memory has always been finite, requiring artificial
memory aides to expand memory storage.

Bernard Stieglers (1995) concept of mnemotechnics is invaluable here for two reasons. Firstly, it helps explain how experience can never be taken as something that is had independently of techniques and technologies of one kind or another. Human being is technical being. Our technicity distinguishes us from other kinds of being even if we can never be completely opposed to animal being. Technicity is characterized by the fact that our technical artifacts effectively carry forward experiences and knowledge from a past that we have not ourselves lived. Every tool, cup, spear, garment, building, and so forth, is an exterior memory on the basis of which culture and ethnicity form, reproduce and evolve. Specific tools and techniques, based on this characteristic of all art factuality, and dedicated to this task of recording and preserving experience are what Stiegler calls mnemotechnics, from carvings and sculpture, to imaging, graphic inscription and printing, to photography, cinema, video and digital communications.
From the mnemotechnics of the industrial era where individual memories are artificially stored in external technologies to the mnemotechnologies of today, where memories are embedded in technologies that use their own logic to systematically store and organize human memory (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:65). The film Momento depicts an extreme case of finite memory and Leonard devises his own mnemotechnical tools as a method to increase his memory storage. The tattoos that Leonard inscribes on his body function, in this way, as a mnemotechnique; the tattoo serves as an artificial container in the externalization of his memories. Self-organizing systems of mnemotechnologies brings the threat of dependence on artificial aids and makes users vulnerable to culture industries who capitalize on the human consumer as passive recipients of pre-packaged and standardized commodities (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:65-66). On the one hand, these technologies increase human memory and indicate the increase in human production they simultaneously signify a dependence on the products of capitalistic industries (Hansen and Mitchell, 2010:66). Furthermore, the exteriorization of memory threatens the total dependence of human memory on technical objects, potentially displacing memory entirely into the structure of the digital machine. v. Bergsons Theory of Memory and Perception Bergson (1988) in his text, Matter and Memory, conceives of a pure perception where the knowledge of a thing is derived from within the thing represented (Lawlor, Stanford, 2011). Matter is defined as an aggregate of images, an image whose existence is halfway between the thing and the representation- in other words, the image is less than a thing but more than a mere representation (Bergson, 1988:9). The image, in this case, does not refer exclusively to a picture, but also includes any

Student No. 33229696 sensory impression, precept, or idea (Parisi, 2011). Bergson argues that matter is not a thing able to produce a representation and therefore cannot be reduced to the representations that are derived from things (Lawlor, Standford, 2011 and Bergson, 1988:10). In this way, Bergson positions his theory between the opposing poles of idealism and realism: where the idealist conceives of an object existing exclusively as a representation within the mind, the realist attributes the characteristics of an object within the object- as the object exists independent of the mind, as a self-existing image (1988:10). In considering matter apart from the disconnection between existence and appearance, the difference between image and representation can be seen as a difference of degree and not of kind (Lawlor, Stanford 2011 and Bergson, 1988:10). The perception of an image of a material thing creates a representation; a representation that at all times exists virtually in the image (Lawlor, 2011). With the act of perception an image is transformed from existing independently as image-itself to existing interdependently as image-within-me (Lawlor, Stanford 2011). The image, filtered through the body, is remade as image-perception. Representation is the bodies act of subtracting from an image that which is necessary for its use (Lawlor, Standford 2011). In other words, conscious representation results from

the suppression of what has no interest for bodily functions and the conservation only of what does interest bodily functions (Lawlor, Stanford 2011). It is in this selection and slicing up of the collective images of material things that the transition of image to pure perception occurs (Lawler, Stanford 2011
and Bergson, 1988:38). For example, Leonard selects from the aggregate of images or all the possible images that he could photograph, only that which is necessary and of use to him. He photographs the objects that have a meaning to his future use in recollecting the events that have gone past. The image of the body, the action of an image upon a body, and the bodies action upon an image is a prominent factor in Bergsons theory. Bergson states: All seems to take place as if, in this

aggregate of images which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body...I call matter the aggregate of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular images, my body (Bergson, 1988: 18,22). In his essay on Bergsons notion of memory, AnsellPearson relays Bergsons theory by stating, the body is in the aggregate of the material world, an image that acts like all other images, receiving and giving back movement. The body is a center of action and not a house of representation. It exists as privileged image in the universe of images in that it can select, within limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives (Ansell-Pearson, 2010:65). Bergsons idea of perception refers to the action of filtering what is relevant from the universal flux of
images, where the body itself is an image. Perceptions are the individual images selected and filtered by a particular body (Bergson, 1988:19). The body does not serve to produce representations but to receive stimulation (Ansell-Pearson, 2010:65). The perception of matter thus refers to the actual, potential, or virtual action of a body on the collective of images that constitute the material world (Ansell-Pearson, 2010:65). For Bergson, there is no information, no image, without the indeterminate centre of the body; perception is an affection of the body and occurs as an embodied process (Bergson 1988:20). The visual image depends entirely on our biological capacity to extract a message from the light

rays that are all around us. In other words, we only perceive what we are biologically capable of perceiving (Rohellec, 1995: 52). Perception occurs only when the path of light is interrupted and
reflected off of a surface (Bergson, 1988:37). Only in its disruption, can light reveal an image. Bergson states: To perceive is not to throw light on the object, but to obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it

by the greater part of itself, so that the remainder, instead of being encased within its surroundings as a thing, should detach itself from them as a picture...Perception therefore resembles those phenomena of reflexion which result from an imploded refraction; it is like an effect of mirage (1988:36-37). For
example, consider the material object of an apple. When light is deflected off the surface of the apple its image is perceived, only when the object interrupts the stream of light does it become an image capable of being perceived. The images perceived from the interruption of light are virtual, existing in pure memory, containing traces of the past but not the actuality of it (Parisi, 2011). The previously perceived images that Leonard photographs do not exist in actuality, but in virtuality, as an imagememory of the past.

Student No. 33229696 Bergson writes: There is no perception which is not full of memories...However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves consequently an effort of memory which prolongs one into another a plurality of moments (Bergson, 1988:24-25). For Bergson, time is conceived of in the space of duration where the prolongation of the past bleeds into a coexistence with the present (Ansell-Pearson, 2010:62). Past images are preserved in motor mechanisms and in independent recollections that serve the needs of the present (Ansell-Pearson, 2010:66). AnsellPeasrson explains: A lived body is one embedded in a flux of time, but one whose constant movement

within the dimension of the past and along the horizon of the future is informed by the requirements of the present (2010:66).
Bergson (1988) writes:
Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself all along a virtual existence, a mirror-image. Every moment of our life presents two aspects, it is actual and virtual, perception on the one side and memory on the other. Each moment is split up as and when it is posited. Or rather, it consists in this very splitting, for the present moment, always going forward, fleeting limit between the immediate past which is now no more and the immediate future which is not yet, would be a mere abstraction were it not the moving mirror which continually reflects perception as a memory.

Remembering is the act of recalling a past perception (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:353). Yet memories are not fixed or stored in the brain, but reside virtually at the intersection of mind and matter (AnsellPearson, 63 and Bergson, 1988:13). Remembering occurs in the realm of this intersection in which the past coexists virtually (in potential) with the present (Goodman and Parisi, 2010, 353). In his essay Images after Images, Stiegler makes reference to the Greek work epokhe, meaning suspension or interruption, a central concept in Barthes phenomenological study of the photograph and suggests that photography constitutes an epokhe in our relationship with time, with memory and with death (1995:226). Stiegler uses the terms mental image and image-object to describe memory; the former being the ephemeral image contained in memory, the latter being the material object from which the image is derived (1995:226). A photograph represents an image-object of the past that is no longer present. The analog photo transforms daylight into what Barthes describes as the night I have not lived (Steigler, 1995:232). From the daylight of the present to the dark night of the past, the analog photograph already implies a subversion of materiality and experience, a conversion of the image-object to image-memory, where the natural movement of time is suspended in a fixed state of representation. But the digital image, comprised of the de-composed light of digital data, is symbolic with a nocturnal light and no longer comes from a day become night (Steigler, 1995:232). The digital image breaks the chain, it brings manipulation at the level of the specturm, and at the same time it

blurs the ghosts and the optical illusions. The photons become pixels made up soley of zeros and ones, on which diverse and unrelated mathematical operations can be performed. Fundamentally indubitable in analog form...the that really existed becomes fundamentally dubitable when digitized; it is its nonmanipulation that then becomes adventitious (Stiegler: 1995:234).
From a cybernetic conception of memory, Gooodman and Parisi (2010) posit a postcybernetic conception where the database does not archive fixed representations, but matter itself functions as an archive of potentiality, where the past and the future coexist in the present (353). The past remains with the present in potential for engaging with the present (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:353). The phenomenon of dj vu, the sensation that a moment you are experiencing has occurred before, suggests a recollection of the present and argues against the chronological structure of memory-afterperception (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:353). Instead, memory can be understood as concurrent with perception (Goodman and Parisi, 2010:353). The film Momento exemplifies a post-cybernetic conception of memory, where time progresses in a loop, not a straight line. As the film progresses the ending circles back to the beginning and it is in this circling back that the narrative is resolved and Leonard is able to construct a totality out of the network of individually stored memory-images and perceptions. For Leonard, his past is always relived

Student No. 33229696 in the present as his databank of image-memories steers his perception into navigating the future. The database functions as an archive of future potentiality and past memory. For Leonard, as in the experience of time in the digital network, a moment does not recede once it becomes the past, but together, future and past coexist virtually with the present. Memory is an externalized function and exists as a mnemotechnique, stored artificially (outside of the body) as a network of images and information in the architectural structure of a database. Bibliography Barthes, R. 1980. Camera Lucida. London: Random House. Benjamin, W. 1968. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Translated from German by H. Zohn. New York: Schocken Books. Bergson, H. Matter and Memory. 1988. Translated from French by N.M Paul and W.S. Palmer. Cambridge, Mass.; London: The MIT Press. Clayssen, J. 1995. Digital Photography: Entire unto itself or something entirely different?. In: Art/Photograpie Numberique: Art/Digital Photography. Marseille: Cypres, Ecole DAix-EnProvence. Gersh-Nesic, B. 2012. Photomontange. Available through: http://arthistory.about.com/od/glossary_p/a/p_photomontage.htm. [Accessed 02 January 2012]. Hansen, M.B.N. 2004. New Philosophy for New Media. Cambridge, Mass.; London: The MIT Press. Hayles, K. 1999. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Kember, S. 1998. Virtual Anxiety: Photography, new technologies and subjectivity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Lawlor, Leonard and Moulard, Valentine, "Henri Bergson", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available through: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/bergson/. [Accessed 08 January 2012]. Lister, M. ed., 1995. The Photographic Image in Digital Culture. New York: Routledge. Manovich, L. 1996. The Paradoxes of Digital Photography. In: Amelunexen, H.v., Stefan, I. and Rotzer, F. eds., 1996. Photography after Photography: Memory and Representation in the Digital Age. G+B Arts. Available through: http://www.manovich.net/TEXT/digital_photo.html. [Accessed 02 January 2012]. Mitchell, W.J. 1992. The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the PostPhotographic Era. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Mitchell, J.T. and Hansen, M. eds. 2010.Terms for Media Studies. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, Ltd. Available through:http://www.arts.rpi.edu/century/nmt11/Stiegler%20Memory.pdf. [Accessed 02 April 2012]. Momento. 2000. [DVD] Christopher Nolan. USA: New Market Capitol Group. Newseum. (n.d.) The Commissar Vanishes. Available through: http://www.newseum.org/berlinwall/commissar_vanishes/news.htm. [Accessed 08 April 2012]. Parisi, L. 2011. Lecture Notes. Networked Image, CU71007A. Interactive Media and Critical Theory, Goldsmiths, University of London, unpublished. Radstone, S. and Schwarz, B. 2010. Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates. New York: Fordham University Press.

Student No. 33229696 Roberts, B., 2006. Cinema as Mnemotechnics: Bernard Stiegler and the Industrialisation of Memory. Angelaki, 11(1), pp.5563. Available through:http://scim.brad.ac.uk/staff/pdf/blrobert/roberts-cinemaasmnemotechnics-prepress.pdf Rhoellec, J. 1995. Constructing the Visual Image. In: Art/Photographie Numerique: Art/Digital Photography. Marseille: Cypres, Ecole DAix-En- Provence. Steigler, B. 1995. Images and after-images. In: Art/Photographie Numerique: Art/Digital Photography. Marseille: Cypres, Ecole DAix-En-Provence. Visaud, M.1995. Reinventing the Image. In: Art/Photograpie Numberique: Art/Digital Photography. Marseille: Cypres, Ecole DAix-En-Provence. Wombell, P. ed., 1991. PhotoVideo: Photography in the age of the computer. London: Rivers Oram Press.