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Democratization
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Why did Thailand's middle class turn against a democratically elected government? The information-gap hypothesis
Kai Jger
a a

Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA Available online: 24 Jan 2012

To cite this article: Kai Jger (2012): Why did Thailand's middle class turn against a democratically elected government? The information-gap hypothesis, Democratization, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2011.623353 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.623353

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Democratization 2012, iFirst, 1 28

Why did Thailands middle class turn against a democratically elected government? The information-gap hypothesis1
Kai Jager
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Department of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA (Received October 2010; nal version received April 2011) In 2006, Bangkoks middle-class residents overwhelmingly supported the military coup that displaced the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. Survey research shows that opponents of Thaksin had a stronger commitment to liberal democracy and possibly to royalist values while rural voters supported Thaksin because he fullled their social demands. Opposition to Thaksin was not motivated by economic interests, but rather, there is some evidence that urban middle- and upper-class voters disliked Thaksin because they heard negative reporting about him, which were less available in the countryside. These ndings are compatible with a new theory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes have the means that would enable and encourage them to pay sufcient attention to politics to discover that what they viewed as good government was violated by the ruling party, which could have led to demands for more democracy historically. More recently, however, in Thailand and perhaps other instances in Southeast Asia and Latin America, those with the money and leisure to follow politics closely have heard reports about the bad government of populist, democratically elected leaders, and thus have turned against them. Keywords: Thailand; democratic consolidation; information-gap hypothesis; social movements; middle class; media and public opinion; Thaksin Shinawatra; PAD; military coup

Introduction During the 1990s, Thailand made some promising steps on the path toward democracy. The support that democratic reforms enjoyed among the middle classes and students was consistent with the empirical nding that economic development consolidates democracy. But just one decade later, the rise and popularity of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra changed the attitudes of the middle class radically: the urban bourgeoisie openly accepted a military coup detat against the elected

Email: kai.jager@duke.edu

ISSN 1351-0347 print/ISSN 1743-890X online # 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.623353 http://www.tandfonline.com

K. Jager

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Thaksin government, and even called for electoral reforms to restrict political participation. Thailand is not the only developing country in which urban middle-class groups initiated massive demonstrations against an elected populist government; this has also happened in the Philippines, Bolivia and Venezuela.2 The recent military coup in Honduras against the elected Zelaya administration also shares similarities with the political situation in Thailand, as mostly Honduran middle-class activists celebrated the coup on the streets of Tegucigalpa. And in China, the ascension of the middle class might similarly foil any moves toward democratization, since the urban elite fears a loss in status if the peasant majority would decide who rules.3 Why might the urban bourgeoisie in a developing country turn against majority rule, even though social scientists have argued that this class is the precursor of democracy? Comparative analyses cry out to be done, but in this paper I will restrict myself to trying to explain the case of Thailand to lay the groundwork for future studies. I will begin with a brief discussion of why economic development is associated with sustained democracy. In the following section, I will describe the political development of Thailand and evaluate how economic development affected democratization. Subsequently, the paper discusses four hypotheses that might explain the middle class protest in Thailand. The rst two hypotheses are motivational: the materialistic hypothesis maintains that the opponents of Thaksin are trying to preserve their economic privileges while the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis emphasizes the allegedly irresponsible voting behaviour of the rural masses, in the light of which the anti-Thaksin Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) movement becomes the protector of liberal democracy. A third, royalist hypothesis is based on cultural interpretations and holds that urban dwellers feel a stronger attachment to the traditional elite and that they opposed Thaksin because he challenged the hierarchical political system of the monarchy. Finally, the information-gap hypothesis is derived from empirical ndings of public opinion research and argues that rather than there being a fundamental difference in the political interests or values of rural and urban voters, rural voters supported Thaksin because they did not receive enough critical news about Thaksin. I test these hypotheses by using empirical data from the Asian Barometer Project. The results are analysed and summarized in the conclusion. Economic development and democracy in theory The link between prosperity and democracy was proposed by Seymour Lipset and can be summarized in his formula: the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.4 This modernization hypothesis provoked research afrming the positive effect of economic development on sustained democracy; it also provoked a vibrant academic debate about the intervening variables that might cause this relationship. Lipset himself emphasized urbanization and education as side-effects of prosperity, which encouraged not only the

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attenuation of extremist views, but middle-class demands for political participation through democratic political parties.5 In the seminal work of Barrington Moore, the middle class becomes the decisive factor in democratization: no bourgeoisie, no democracy.6 Moore argues that the path to liberal democracy is determined by the ability of the bourgeoisie to weaken the power of the landed upper classes and the feudal economic system. If the bourgeois revolution succeeds, the result will be a capitalistic democratic state that absorbs the nobility and peasantry as social forces. Several scholars have extended this debate by adding other explanatory factors, such as the strength of civil society, the severity of economic inequality and the role of an egalitarian political culture.7 While the debate about the factors that link economic development and democratic consolidation continues, the existing correlation was conrmed in several large-N studies. Probably the most comprehensive study was undertaken by Przeworski et al., who argue that even though economic development does not lead to democratization, it increases the sustainability of existing democracies.8 This is the nding that has been called into question by recent developments in such countries as Thailand. However, academic literature is not unfamiliar with upper-class resistance against elected governments. Moore and also Rueschemeyer et al. point out that the role of the middle class depends on the balance of class structure. In the case of a strong working class, the middle class feel threatened about losing their status and align with the traditional elites or the military against democracy.9 On the other hand, political scientists have long been concerned about the quality of democracy in some developing countries.10 ODonnell argues that delegative democracies have emerged, in which the elected government has fullled a mandate from the people but ignores or even restricts liberal procedures or civil liberties.11 This worry is congruent with some of the complaints of the antiThaksin forces in Thailand. Besides these motivational explanations, hierarchical political values are often seen as cultural obstacles for democracy. Since they appear to be strongly embedded in Thai political culture, the middle class could have opposed Thaksin because he challenged the hierarchical system of the palace. Thailands democratic development Similar to Japan, a revolution from above accomplished Thailands transition to modernity under the centralized power of the monarchy. The institutions of the modern Thai national state were designed during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868 1910) as a consequence of the dual pressures of international threats and western political ideas.12 In 1932, a coup detat led by a group of western-educated military ofcers transformed the country into a constitutional but undemocratic monarchy. The new regime was labelled a bureaucratic polity by Fred Riggs,13 as politics had become a matter of competition between bureaucratic cliques for the benets of the government.14 The bureaucracy (including the military) had

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a high level of autonomy, which allowed it to ignore pressure from outside groups and satisfy the interests and designs of those who staffed state agencies.15 Since the economy was run by state-owned monopolies, access to economic resources was solely mediated by the bureaucracy, often to the disadvantage of the Chinese minority. As a consequence, entrepreneurs were dependent on the state elite, with which they developed close personal relationships.16 Until the end of the 1950s, Thailand was still an agrarian country with stagnant economic growth rates. This changed under the military rule of Generals Sarit (1959 1963) and Thanom/Praphas (1963 1973), who abandoned economic nationalism and introduced a market liberalization and industrialization programme supported by US military and economic aid.17 These military regimes were prototypes of developmental dictatorships, as human rights were violated and opposition parties and newspapers were banned.18 This era also marked the revival of the monarchy in Thai politics. Described as a network monarchy, King Bhumibol and his Privy councillors (most notably Prem) actively interfered in the political process in order to place the right people in the right places in politics and in state agencies. Even though this network was essentially conservative, it supported several liberal reforms as well.19 The rapid transformation of the Thai economy, which achieved unprecedented growth rates in the 1960s and 70s, altered the power structure of the society signicantly, as the emerging middle class attained the economic resources that could in future be used to engage in politics.20 The middle and working classes grew signicantly and the number of university students reached 100,000 in 1972 a more than vefold increase from 18,000 in 1961.21 Their political role became apparent in the political revolution of 1973: students and urban classes successfully demanded democratic reforms and the abdication of the military in bloody demonstrations. Nonetheless, the crucial forces for this social revolution to materialize were King Bhumibol, who convinced Thanom and Praphas to resign, and General Krit, who refused the command to deploy more troops against the demonstrators.22 Even though the democratic period was only ephemeral, as the military regained power in 1976, the old bureaucratic polity had been weakened by a civil society revolution.23 In the 1980s, under the administration of General Prem Tinsulanonda, intellectuals and social movements became convinced of the desirability of democratization and political liberalization, leading to the peaceful replacement of Prem in the election of 1988.24 Economic development also had two more ambiguous effects on democratization. First, the economic gains of development were distributed unequally. Bangkok and the immediately surrounding area reaped the benets of industrialization, while the rural north and northeast had to bear the cost of the sectoral decline of agriculture. Policy-makers were mostly unwilling to respond to the needs of rural regions and the exclusion of these populations from economic development created a situation of potential social conict.25 Second, the economic transformation offered business new opportunities outside the old patronage system, and this increased the importance of business

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in politics. Business interest groups gained entry to the political process as they could offer technical expertise for regulatory policies. According to Anek, the political inuence of business associations grew accordingly whenever a democratic reform took place.26 Consequently, the number of businesspeople in parliament had already become three times as high as the number of state bureaucrats between 1983 and 1988.27 A further indicator of this shift in power is the declining number of ministers with bureaucratic backgrounds. While 184 out of 232 ministers were former bureaucrats between 1932 and 1958, entrepreneurs accounted for 159 of 196 ministers during 1992 and 1996.28 In order to be successful in an election campaign, a candidate needs an extensive network with other powerful elites, because the crucial factors for voters in the Thai political system are the candidates, not their short-lived party platforms.29 Businesspeople started to be more successful in forming these alliances because they had more economic resources to effectively trade wealth for power.30 These economic networks also dominated the election process, as they distributed money to local leaders and canvassers who mobilized voters, especially in rural areas, based on traditional patronage relationships. Politics attracted these local businessmen because they could use the state to gain economic privileges.31 Vote-buying and money politics reached a new national culmination under the elected Chatichai administration from 1988 to 1991, as the networks expected economic returns for their investment in vote-buying.32 The military, under General Suchinda, used this widespread corruption to justify a coup detat in 1991. Thai intellectuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and urban classes initially showed little resistance to this putsch, and at least one scholar argues that without their severe criticism of the Chatichai government, the coup would not have been possible.33 In 1992, however, mass protests against the junta erupted, due to the impression of selshness and doubledealing by Suchinda, who had reneged on his promise not to become prime minister. As a consequence, many middle-class Bangkokians now viewed the coup as greedy, self-interested, and corrupt.34 But Suchinda suppressed these demonstrations by force, causing the death of hundreds of protestors. These Black May events prompted King Bhumibol to intervene directly, leading to the resignation of Suchinda and eventually to the restoration of democracy. After this upheaval, a loose alliance of members of the urban middle class, civil servants, academics, and NGOs continued to push for further democratic reforms. These heterogeneous groups were united in their belief that the country needed a stronger parliament based on a new constitution in order to restrict the undemocratic excesses of money politics and vote-buying.35 This effort faced strong opposition but eventually succeeded in 1997, as democratic reformers blamed corruption and patronage for the unprecedented economic depression that was precipitated in Thailand by the Asian Financial Crisis.36 The constitution of 1997 was often called the Peoples Constitution, as it codied human rights and democratic participation, strengthened political parties, and reformed the electoral system to provide functioning checks and

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balances against money politics.37 After this institutional success, political liberalism was becoming the new commonsense among strategic elites and it seemed to notably advance under the second Democrat government of Chuan Leekpai (1997 2001).38 The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra But with the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais love Thais; TRT) almost all hopes that once rested with the political reform project seem[ed] to have been lost.39 Thaksins governing style reminded many Thai liberals of developmental authoritarianism: he used the executive power to support his business interests and those of his allies and denounced the check and balance system of the new constitution as constraining the will of the people. Subsequently, Thaksin effectively eliminated these checks by placing relatives in high positions. He also tried to restrict freedom of the press through intimidation and by building up his own biased media empire, even using the Anti-Money Laundering Ofce to threaten critical journalists.40 Furthermore, Thaksin was widely criticized for human rights violations in the majority Muslim southern provinces and in his war on drugs and dark inuences, that is, the extra-judicial killing of alleged insurgents and drug dealers.41 On the other hand, the Thaksin administration achieved a record of responsiveness. TRT advocated popular economic policies for the rural poor in their campaigns (like debt relief, funds for villages, affordable general health care) which were a novelty in Thai politics, as parties usually do not compete on policy terms.42 The government quickly fullled these promises and the new social programmes were open to all. This gave people especially the rural poor the feeling of empowerment, as Thaksin responded to their needs with tangible projects.43 Nonetheless, this policy responsiveness cannot explain Thaksins success exclusively. Thaksin one of the richest tycoons in Thailand had enough money to lure a signicant number of former Members of Parliament (MPs) from traditional political networks into TRT.44 Although TRT members engaged in vote-buying, it did not seem to be a decisive factor for their election, because the new Election Commission vigorously ordered re-elections in proven cases of electoral fraud, and because these cases probably did not exceed the vote-buying in past elections.45 Since Thaksin also tried to break the royal inuence in state agencies by employing his allies in top positions there, he directly challenged the power of the network monarchy.46 And although questioning the monarchy is illegal in Thailand, Thaksin and his supporters verbally attacked the Privy Council and its president, Prem, which was taboo before.47 This conict eventually led to the military coup detat of 2006, in which the Head of the Privy Council Prem was a key player.48 The ideological legitimization for this putsch was decisively facilitated by anti-Thaksin demonstrations of the PAD which called for Thaksins dismissal.49

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After the pro-Thaksin Peoples Power Party (PPP) party won the rst election held after the coup, in December 2007, the PAD started to rally again, culminating in the illegal seizure of Bangkoks international airport. Eventually, the constitutional court banned the PPP over a case of vote fraud, and the PAD-friendly Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva gained power. The violent quarrel between pro- and anti-Thaksin movements solidied, with the pro-Thaksin forces wearing red and their opponents, yellow. This is the background to the violence in Thailand in 2010, prompted by red-shirt demands for new elections.

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Explaining middle-class attitudes towards Thai democracy Initially, economic development had a positive effect on democratization in Thailand. The urban middle class expanded relentlessly and was a major driving force in pro-democratic demonstrations. But the rise of the Thaksin movement seems to have changed the attitude of the urban middle classes, which strive now for elite rule and restricting democratic participation. This section will discuss some of the available hypotheses for explaining this radical change in the political consciousness of the Thai middle class.

The materialist hypothesis Newspaper reports as well as several scholars have argued that the middle and upper classes are mostly concerned about their nancial well-being. They contend that the middle class feared that it would have to pay for Thaksins redistributive policies, and that it had supported democracy only as long as it was conducive to their own freedom and the freedom of the market.50 Giles Ungpakorn asserts that the military revolt was a coup for the rich supported by the middle class in order to preserve their wealth and social status.51 However, this argument rests on several unproven assumptions and appears to misrepresent the driving force of the PAD movement. First, it cannot simply be taken for granted that the middle class votes selshly rather than sociotropically. Public opinion research in Europe and the United States suggest that at least in western democracies, people do not follow their economic interest at the ballotbox but rather vote for what they perceive to be the common good.52 Second, an examination of the PAD suggests that Thaksins pro-business policies were actually one of the main objects of the yellows criticism. PAD leaders argue that these economic measures served Thaksins corporate interests at the expense of the country: their speeches have an explicit anti-capitalist character in which they hail the sufciency economy philosophy of King Bhumibol.53 These attacks on capitalism seem to be rooted in religion and pre-modern conservative thought as one of the ve main leaders of the PAD, Chamlong Srimuang, is also the leader of the Buddhist sect Santi Asoke which preaches austerity and moral awareness and opposes egoism and consumerism.54

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It is possible, however, that there is a gap between leaders and followers. Public opinion research shows that even the most politically active members of the electorate may not be receiving the messages of party leaders,55 and may, in general, have no idea of the meaning of the terms of discourse among political leaders, journalists, and scholars of politics.56 Some yellow leaders may therefore have anti-capitalist reasons for opposing Thaksin,57 even while their followers are defending their economic privileges. The liberal-proceduralist hypothesis Several Thai academics and PAD supporters argue that Thaksin has turned the Thai political system into something more like populist authoritarianism than a liberal, constitutional democracy, and that the military coup was actually the only way to save the latter.58 The political scientist Anek Laothamatas argues that Thailand is a tale of two democracies, in which the rural voters tend to be self-interested, localist, and prone to vote-selling. The educated urban classes, however, tend to be concerned about transparency and legal democratic procedures. They are frustrated by the rural voters support for corrupt and populist politicians like Thaksin and their disregard for human rights violations.59 The PAD movement presented itself as a safeguard for liberal democracy rather than representing a break from the prodemocratic past of the middle class.60 Consequently, the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis implies that the upper urban classes supported the removal of the democratically elected Thaksin in order to protect liberal proceduralism from a populist, authoritarian leader. Indeed, eld research conrms that there is a fundamental difference between urban and rural political culture. Walker argues that the susceptibility of rural voters to vote-buying has to be seen in the broader framework of rural political values. Rural dwellers generally prefer local politicians, with the expectation that a politician will support the local village and keep his campaign promises. For many rural voters, TRT was the most attractive party because it met these criteria, but TRT supporters did not cast their votes blindly: several TRT candidates were not re-elected when they failed to satisfy the criteria.61 This analysis does allow that rural voters mostly ignore human rights questions and broader national issues. Meanwhile, survey research shows that city dwellers use more legalistic criteria in voting, as Bangkokians put relatively more emphasis on the qualications and integrity of a candidate, while localism does not play a signicant role.62 The proceduralist view of the yellow shirts is challenged by their tolerance for the illiberal policies of the military junta after it took power. The junta initiated massive media and internet censorship and established a special operations force to restrict anti-coup political activities and any opposition voices before the referendum on its new constitution.63 Most of the urban bourgeoisie tended to stay silent about these authoritarian measures and PAD leaders even openly supported the policies of the military on their TV shows.64 Moreover, PAD proposed a parliamentary reform of 30 elected representatives to every 70 representatives

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appointed by independent institutions.65 But there could be many explanations for this behaviour. For instance, they could be still liberals who thought that their principles were more likely to survive under the military or a restricted democracy than under Thaksin. The royalist hypothesis The rst two hypotheses are challenged by cultural interpretations that emphasize the hierarchical character of Thailands political culture. PAD activists swathe themselves in yellow the colour of the monarchy to demonstrate their support for the king. Michael Connors has called the Thai version of liberalism royal liberalism to emphasize its elitist characteristics. Royal liberalism is shaped by fear that a tyranny of the majority will reign if an uneducated populace is manipulated by demagogues.66 Consequently, democracy should be curtailed by the traditional elite of aristocrats allied with the monarchy, and this tutelage has to continue until the lower classes are economically self-reliant enough not to be available for vote-buying, and politically educated enough to resist demagogues.67 Other scholars have focused on the role played by traditional Thai values of hierarchy and paternalism as well, which remain strongly embedded in Thai political culture. Modern Thai nationalism demands loyalty to the three basic institutions of nation, religion and kingdom. This belief system takes inspiration from sakdhina, a centuries-old hierarchical system in which everyone knows his place based on birthright, occupation, age and education, and each respects his superiors, with the king superior to all. Industrialization, urbanization, and the emergence of a middle class may well have failed to erode this concept of unequal social structures because sakdhina is routinely reinforced in the media, by intellectuals, and by the primary education system.68 In a study of Thai culture, the anthropologist Niels Mulder argues that Thais are early socialized into viewing Thai identity as fundamentally hierarchical: Inequality is not only natural; it is moral too. This type of thinking is subsequently applied to all sorts of relationships.69 This hierarchical system which treats people by different moral standards could explain why PAD activists blame Thaksin for his wealth while supporting the sufciency economy approach of King Bhumibol who is said to be the worlds richest monarch. Unlike the materialistic interpretation, which argues that the upper classes resist Thaksin due to their nancial self-interest, the royalist hypothesis maintains that they sincerely believe in the superiority of the traditional royal hierarchy and that their attitude toward democracy is shaped by this commitment. But if all Thais are taught this value system, how could it explain the sharp division between the mostly urban yellows and the mostly rural reds? Although rural citizens love the king, they focus on localism as shown above while Bangkok dwellers pay greater attention to legalistic criteria which in Thailands unique political culture includes the royal hierarchy. This disparity in values might

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explain why Thaksin became popular in the countryside while urban dwellers viewed the national popularity of a politician as a threat to the traditional order.70 The information-gap hypothesis It is possible that all of the previous explanations are too deep, and that the rural urban political division that seems denitive of the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces is merely a consequence of different levels of political information among Bangkok residents versus Thais living in the countryside. The uneven economic development of Thailand may have produced an urban middle class that has access to, the means to purchase, and the leisure to follow politically oriented media sources such as newspapers that simply are not available or affordable in most villages. University education may also encourage the consumption of political information. If this results in different levels of political knowledge, then there is ample evidence from public opinion research that it could result in different political preferences. Scott Althaus has shown that highly informed voters make different choices than those who are less highly informed, controlling for other variables, as has John Zaller.71 Even if urban voters and rural voters share the same liberal-proceduralist or royalist values, they would have to be exposed to political news reporting that is critical of Thaksin to realize that Thaksin is supposedly violating these values. According to Thongchai, even the urban Thai bourgeoisie tends to be uninformed and ignorant72; an observation which is congruent with the general nding that Thais show little interest in reading political news.73 Given this high level of public ignorance of the Thai electorate, it is unlikely that especially rural voters had much exposure to critical information about Thaksin, as the audio-visual media were heavily controlled by Thaksins network before the coup. Major television and radio channels were owned by families of high-ranked TRT members; symptomatic is the case of iTV, a formerly independent news channel that was bought by Thaksin and turned into a popular entertainment channel full of soap operas but devoid of critical news coverage.74 The remaining TV and radio news coverage was strongly biased in favour of Thaksin and his party, both in what was reported and in what was not.75 Thaksin not only dominated radio and TV coverage in quantitative terms his method of communication was unprecedented in Thailand. In his weekly television and radio shows, Thaksin talked in detail about what he was doing for the people in the countryside. He organized mobile cabinet meetings in rural areas in which villagers had the opportunity to talk with Thaksin about their needs. These events were presented live on television as a form of reality show, which dramatised Thaksin bringing government to the people, and were rewarded by increased popularity.76 The largest market share in the newspaper market is held by Thai Rath and Daily News, two boulevard newspapers which tended to be in favour of Thaksin but have been keeping a distance since the anti-Thaksin movement started to

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grow.77 In addition, however, there were several sources of critical news coverage that were available in the city but not in the countryside. First, there are Thaksincritical magazines and newspapers such as Khao Sod and Matichon, whose political language is pitched to those with higher education. These Bangkok-based papers cannot be obtained in every village or only reach the countryside with delay. Local newspapers are available in the provinces but they are infrequently published, mostly concerned with low-quality affairs and local news, and were often owned by local politicians who tended to be part of the TRT-network in the North and Northeast.78 Second, many operators of community radios opposed the Thaksin government, most notably Democrat Wave Community Radio in Bangkok.79 But these stations have only a small range of coverage, and many operators in the north and northeastern regions are biased toward Thaksin, so any anti-Thaksin effects of community radio were probably conned to Bangkok. Third, critical information about Thaksin was available on the internet. However, a media survey reveals that only a small proportion of rural dwellers (6%) use the internet for political information.80 The information-gap hypothesis does not imply that urban Thaksin opponents are better informed than rural Thaksin supporters in the sense that their knowledge also approximates the truth. Rather it suggests that they have a greater exposure to political information as conveyed by their cultural surroundings. An empirical assessment of the hypotheses A survey by the Asian Barometer Project months before the coup detat allows the testing of the hypotheses for the general public. Since this is a representative survey of the population, it is still possible that red and yellow activists differ from the electorate in their motivation to support or oppose Thaksin.81 The 1546 respondents for this survey were chosen in April/May 2006 through a three-stage cluster sampling of eligible voters from the whole country, which allows for a minimum condence interval of + 2.5% at the 95% condent level. This survey was conducted in face-to-face interviews and it drew on one of the most elaborate opinion samples ever taken in Thailand, but it contains no direct data about yellow or red voters because the survey asks about voting behaviour in the national election of April 2006 a snap election called by Thaksin to deect yellow protests. This election was boycotted by all opposition parties and since the only alternative to Thaksins TRT was to cast a no vote or abstain from voting, it is impossible to determine the extent to which no-voters or abstentions were sympathizers of PAD or were outside the red-yellow cleavage. Instead, the survey item satisfaction with the Thaksin administration is used to measure the support for Thaksin. Factor analysis of the relevant survey questions is used to compose a measure of support for liberal democracy (eight questions) to test the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis and an index for the perception of functioning democracy (nine questions) which is relevant for the information-gap hypothesis.

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An examination of the missing values of these two indexes reveals that nonrespondents are signicantly more likely to be satised with Thaksin at the 99% condent level. This group might be more reluctant to answer these kinds of questions, but it could also mean that these Thaksin supporters are unfamiliar with the concepts of democracy and good governance and thus the meaning of the questions, which would be evidence for Aneks tale of the unsophisticated Thaksin supporters.82 If observations with missing data would be eliminated from the indexes, the total number of observations available for this analysis would drop by about 35 to 50%. Since these missing values also seem to be systematically biased, this study applies multiple imputation to deal with the missing data.83 In the rst step, the valid observations of the respective indexes are used as algorithms to impute the missing values for m 5 datasets. Subsequently, these datasets are pooled together to obtain combined parameter estimates which also takes the variation across the ve datasets into account. All other dependent and explanatory variables are also particular survey items. Since survey items are technically ordinal scales, this analysis is based on logit regression models. In this model specication, the coefcient estimators show the direction of change and the qualitative effects of the explanatory variables. However, these ndings do not directly display the substantial signicance of the explanatory variables. Therefore, an estimation procedure is required to show how strongly the explanatory variables affect the probability of variation of the dependent variable. These probabilities are obtained in the following way: To account for estimation uncertainty, the Stata programme Clarify is used to generate 1000 sets of simulated parameters from the variables of a particular logit regression model. Additionally, rst differences of signicant explanatory variables are generated. While holding all other variables constant at their mean, an estimate of the substantial impact on the dependent variable is obtained by increasing a particular explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum.84 For a better comparison of the probabilities, all dependent variables are transformed into dichotomous variables. The results of Table 1 are relevant for the materialist hypothesis. The rst column shows that those with higher incomes were signicantly less satised with Thaksin. Measured in probability, the highest income quintile is about 11% less likely to be very or somewhat satised with Thaksin relatively to the lowest quintile while controlling for other socio-economic factors. But the second column undermines the materialist hypothesis, as there is no substantial difference between the income classes in supporting economic equality. Nonetheless, the materialistic interpretation might still have some value in the analysis of how the benets of economic development were distributed among the income classes. The next three models (columns 4 6) show how the economic situation has improved in the last four years for all respondents, villagers and city dwellers alike. While there are not any differences for the whole sample, there is a signicant divergent development within the country. Poorer villagers

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Table 1. Logit regression analyses for the materialistic hypothesis.

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Change of own economic situation Satised with Thaksin Income D Income min(0) N Pseudo R2 max(4) 1268 0.29 1281 0.06 1355 0.01 870 0.03 489 0.04 20.22 (0.10) 211.2% Support for greater income equality 20.01 (0.12) Whole sample 20.05 (0.05) Rural residency 20.28 (0.07) 229.2% Urban residency 0.22 (0.08) 17.4%

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Notes: p , 0.10; p , 0.05; p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The rst row shows the regression coefcient of income, the second row the change in probability when income increases from its minimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean. Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables for Age, Gender, Education, and Religiosity are included in all models, for urban residency and regions in the rst two models.

have signicantly improved their economic conditions relative to higher-income villagers. For urban residents, the results are reversed, as higher income classes have signicantly beneted relative to poorer city dwellers. These ndings might show that economic self-interest could explain why Thaksin enjoys strong support among impoverished rural dwellers, but it fails to explain the behaviour of the urban bourgeoisie, which has strongly opposed Thaksin even though it beneted economically under his government. Table 2 is relevant for the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis. Support for liberal democracy correlates very negatively with satisfaction with Thaksin, lending evidence to the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis: Increasing support for liberal democracy from its minimum to its maximum reduces the probability of being very or somewhat satised with Thaksin by 42.7%. However, two survey items were removed from the liberal democracy index due to lack of intercorrelation with the other items, namely whether the respondent would support a government
Table 2. Logit regression analyses for the liberal-proceduralist hypotheses. Satised with Thaksin Support for liberal democracy Support majoritarianism Oppose stronger political role of the educated Subjective support for democracy 21.05 (0.16) 0.49 (0.09) 0.21 (0.08) 0.01 (0.05) N 1405 1299 1368 1284 Pseudo R2 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.00 DXi min(1) max(4) 242.7% 23.1% 10.4%

Notes: p , 0.10; p , 0.05; p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The last column shows the change in probability when a particular explanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum.

14

K. Jager

that serves the interest of the majority and whether they would oppose a stronger political role of the educated. Respondents who answered no on both questions were signicantly more often dissatised with Thaksin, which may either undermine the liberal-proceduralist hypothesis or strengthen it, depending on how the respondents thought of democratic procedures. Under ordinary circumstances, liberal proceduralists might have responded afrmatively to these questions, yet the particular context in which the survey was conducted might have made them oppose democratic service of majority interests and equal political inuence for the uneducated because the majority supported Thaksin who undermined liberal procedures. An alternative explanation for these attitudes among Thaksin opponents is the royalist hypothesis. Unfortunately, no survey items are available that address support for the monarchy. Table 2 also shows that those who were dissatised with Thaksin did not differ in their subjective support for democracy (row 4), indicating that they did not reject democracy but might have had a different concept of democracy that includes hierarchical components. Hence, these empirical results do not show yet whether liberal-proceduralist convictions, or other factors, inuenced the decision to oppose Thaksin. Table 3 tries to answer this question by evaluating which explanatory variables have the strongest substantial impact on satisfaction with Thaksin in a multivariate framework. This analysis answers whether the Thaksin opponents feared the uneducated majority for liberal-procedural reasons, by controlling the model for variables that imply the perception of good governance. If the signicance of the two items that were removed from the liberal democracy index remains in these models, it suggests that opponents of Thaksin feared rule by the uneducated majority even if they did not perceive any violations of good governance by Thaksin. Hence, this fear could not be explained by concerns about liberal proceduralism. This framework also allows for an evaluation of how access to information directly determines satisfaction with Thaksin. The rst model of Table 3 shows that the signicantly negative relationship between support for liberal democracy and satisfaction with Thaksin disappears through the inclusion of the perception variables of good governance, suggesting that liberal-proceduralist values did not automatically lead to opposition to Thaksin. Instead, the perception that democracy was not functioning well, that the government was not responsive toward voters demands, that corruption was rampant, and that the economy was doing poorly determined dissatisfaction with Thaksin. The next model includes the variables that could be of importance for the royalist hypothesis. The remaining signicance of support for majoritarianism shows that dissatisfaction with Thaksin cannot be completely captured by concerns about liberal democracy, although this item has only a slight substantial impact of below 1% on the probability of being satised with Thaksin. The third model provides some evidence for the information-gap hypothesis as the combined effect of greater media access directly affects the probability of

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Table 3.

Logit regression analyses for determining satisfaction with Thaksin. Satisfaction with Thaksin 1 2 20.15 (0.24) 1.04 (0.30) 0.42 (0.17) 0.20 (0.14) 0.49 (0.11) 0.22 (0.13) 0.09 (0.13) 1.54 (0.34) 20.72 (0.33) 20.32 (0.08) 3 4 20.14 (0.25) 0.81 (0.33) 0.42 (0.18) 0.24 (0.15) 0.50 (0.12) 0.23 (0.14) 0.08 (0.13) 1.47 (0.35) 20.57 (0.35) 20.26 (0.09) 29.7% 14.6% Model 4: DXi min max

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X1: Support for liberal democracy Perception variables X2: Perception of functioning democracy X3: Perception of gov. responsiveness X4: Perception of gov. honesty X5: Perception of national economy Value and status variables X6: Support majoritarianism X7: Oppose stronger political role of the educated X8: TRT partisanship X9: Opposition (democrat) partisanship X10: Social status

20.19 (0.22) 1.07 (0.26) 0.37 (0.15) 0.33 (0.13) 0.53 (0.09)

Democratization

8.1% 26.1% 7.6%

1.41 (0.31) 20.73 (0.30) 20.22 (0.07)

11.7% 27.4% 228.1%

(Continued )

15

16

Table 3.

Continued. Satisfaction with Thaksin 1 2 3 0.20 (0.13) 20.48 (0.22) 20.13 (0.05) 0.17 (0.19) 20.40 (0.19) 0.47 (0.11) 1143 0.40 219.1 20.6 4 0.06 (0.16) 20.52 (0.25) 20.08 (0.06) 0.00 (0.23) 20.33 (0.23) 0.12 (0.14) 884 0.49 83.0 27.4 25.5 20.1 Model 4: DXi min max

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Information variables X11: Trust in TV X12: Newspaper X13: Internet frequency X14: Radio X15: Witnessed corruption X16: Change own econ. situation N Pseudo R2 1. Model: 2. Model: 3. Model: 4. Model: 1126 0.41 90.8 988 0.47 86.1 25.8

25.5%

K. Jager

max DX2 5 min max DX2 5 min max DX11 15 min max DX6 min

Notes: p , 0.10; p , 0.05; p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The last column shows the change in probability when a particular explanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean in model 4. Control variables for urban residency and region are included in all models. 1. Model: Combined change of all perception variables from their minimum to maximum while all other variables are kept constant at their mean. 2. Model: X6 and X8 are kept at their minimum, and X9 and X10 are kept at their maximum. 3. Model: Combined change of all signicant information variables from their minimum to maximum while all other variables are kept constant at their mean. 4. Model: Change of X6 from its minimum to maximum while all signicant perception variables are kept at their maximum.

Democratization

17

disapproval of Thaksin by 19% while controlling for partisanship, social status and geographical factors. The last model which incorporates all variables shows that the perception variables explain most of the variation in satisfaction with Thaksin. A combined shift from the minimum to the maximum in the perception of good governance increases the probability of being very or somewhat satised with Thaksin by nearly 83%. Even in a scenario of opposition partisanship, highest social status and hierarchical conviction, this shift in good governance accounts for a 27% higher probability to feel satised with Thaksin. Furthermore, newspapers tend to convey additional negative information about Thaksin beside the perception of bad governance. However, the substantial impact of opposition partisanship (7%) and higher social status (28%) on opposition to Thaksin indicates that these respondents had reasons to oppose Thaksin that were not captured by the perception of good governance and media access. The royalist hypothesis suggests the possibility that these Thaksin opponents felt a stronger loyalty to the monarchy, but other explanations are possible as well and lack of data renders a nal interpretation impossible.85 Table 4 examines the extent to which these perceptions were determined by level by different media sources. The regression analyses show that some media sources are signicantly associated with changes in the perception of good governance while controlling for partisanship, social status and regional variables. Newspaper readers had negative perceptions of functioning democracy and government responsiveness whereas the former applied to internet users. Those respondents who had witnessed corruption by a politician or government ofcial (or had heard about it from family members or friends) tended to think that the Thaksin administration was performing poorly on responsiveness. The substantial signicance of these media access variables is rather modest and ranges from 5 to 11%. Apparently, television broadcasts had the opposite effect, as shown by the substantial impact of trust in television (ranging from 17 to 38%) on positive perceptions of good governance and radio users were signicantly more likely to perceive national economic improvement. In addition, respondents of high social status tended to have a less favourable view about the national economy. Remarkably, an individuals economic situation had the strongest explanatory power for all perception variables, especially, for the perception of the national economy. Keeping all other variables at their mean, survey respondents who stated that their individual economic situation had improved in recent years were substantially more likely to think that democracy was functioning well, that the government was responsive and honest and that the national economy was improving compared to other respondents. This suggests that Thaksin enjoyed unprecedented popularity for a Thai politician because the disadvantaged felt that their situation had improved under his administration and used this as a heuristic to evaluate Thaksins democratic performance. At the same time, access to various media sources was crucial in acquiring negative information about Thaksin. Table 5 reveals that a combined shift in

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18

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Table 4.

Logit regression analyses for the information-gap hypothesis. Perception of functioning democracy DXi Perception of government responsiveness DXi max 17.4% 25.0% 211.1% Perception of government honesty DXi max Perception of national economy DXi max 17.1%

bi
Trust in TV Newspaper Internet frequency Radio Witnessed corruption Change own econ. situation TRT party feeling Opposition party feeling Social status N Pseudo R2 0.35 (0.11) 20.32 (0.19) 20.13 (0.05) 0.27 (0.16) 0.015 (0.171) 0.53 (0.09) 20.04 (0.22) 20.43 (0.28) 0.10 (0.07) 1216 0.25

min

bi
0.53 (0.10) 20.30 (0.15) 20.07 (0.04) 20.09 (0.13) 20.287 (0.143) 0.35 (0.08) 0.40 (0.18) 20.01 (0.28) 0.03 (0.05) 1107 0.14

min

bi
0.28 (0.10) 20.23 (0.17) 20.00 (0.05) 20.19 (0.15) 0.065 (0.159) 0.32 (0.09) 0.28 (0.19) 20.52 (0.28) 20.06 (0.06) 1091 0.25

min

bi
0.03 (0.10) 0.01 (0.15) 20.01 (0.04) 0.30 (0.13) 0.223 (0.144) 0.84 (0.08) 0.17 (0.17) 20.24 (0.28) 20.12 (0.05) 1200 0.18

min

max

37.5% 27.2%

6.9%

K. Jager

27.2% 34.0% 9.4%

36.4%

26.1%

68.3%

211.4%

224.3%

Notes: p , 0.10; p , 0.05; p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The column DXi shows the change in probability when a particular explanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum while keeping all other variables constant at their mean. Control variables for urban residence and region are included in all models.

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Table 5.

Logit regression analyses of access to and processing of information. Newspaper Internet frequency max Radio max Witnessed corruption max

bi
X1: Income X2: Education X3: Urban residency DX1 3 min N Pseudo R2 max 1374 0.25 0.42 (0.06) 0.24 (0.03) 0.71 (0.13)

DXi min 38.0% 49.5% 17.3% 78.6%

bi
0.36 (0.07) 0.59 (0.04) 0.32 (0.15) 1368 0.40

DXi min 23.2% 78.9% 37.8% 91.1%

bi
0.20 (0.06) 0.10 (0.03) 0.18 (0.13) 1374 0.06

DXi min 19.8% 20.8%

bi
0.39 (0.06) 0.08 (0.03) 20.19 (0.14) 1204 0.08

DXi min 35.6% 15.2%

max

Democratization

38.9%

49.2%

Notes: p , 0.10; p , 0.05; p , 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are in parentheses. The column DXi shows the change in probability when a particular explanatory variable increases from its minimum to its maximum.

19

20

K. Jager

urban residency, higher income and education level from the minimum to the maximum increases the probability to use newspapers by 79%, the internet by 91% and the radio by 39% to acquire information. There is also a signicant positive association of higher income and education with those who stated that they (or their friends or family members) have personally witnessed corruption. Possible explanations for this nding might be that upper classes had a narrower concept of corruption, or that they had signicantly more contacts with other people and government ofcials, which in turn affected the possibility of becoming aware of cases of corruption.
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Conclusion Thailands economic development diminished the power of the traditional bureaucratic elite, but what arose in its place was not a western-style party system but networks of businessmen who engage in politics for the sake of economic gain. Moreover, the benets of economic development were distributed very unevenly, leading to a growing income gap between Bangkok and the rural periphery that seems to correspond to a possible information gap. These two outcomes of Thai capitalism are crucial to understanding the rise of Thaksins TRT Party. First, Thaksin had the economic resources to dominate the political system, and he employed state power to support his business interests in an authoritarian manner. Second, he gained unprecedented popularity by fullling the social demands of the economically disadvantaged. And third, he used his wealth to gain control of the television broadcasts that would provide the main sources of political news accessible in the countryside. The empirical analysis has shown that the opposition to Thaksin cannot be explained by economic self-interest. Upper income classes did not substantially differ in their concerns about economic inequality. There was also no difference in subjective support for democracy between Thaksin supporters and opponents, but there was a disparity in their conceptions of democracy: Thaksin supporters tended to identify democracy as majority rule and believe that good governance prevails if the government is responsive to popular demands. On the other hand, opponents of Thaksin seem to have been liberal elitists: they tended to be supportive of liberal democratic values but they were also more likely to fear the political power of the uneducated majority and their disapproval of Thaksin might grow out of Thailands unique political culture of royal hierarchicalism. The empirical analysis has shown that attitudes about Thaksin were mostly determined by the perception of his performance: those who thought that democracy was functioning poorly under Thaksin, that his government was unresponsive and corrupt and that the national economy was stagnating strongly opposed his administration. But if Thaksins voters did not get enough negative information about him, they would have no reason to oppose a prime minister who responded to their localist demands. Several sources of critical news existed but they were

Democratization

21

signicantly less available in the northern and northeastern countryside where nearly all Thais receive their political information from the television broadcasts that were dominated by Thaksin before the coup. The empirical data only consists of absolute information whether a certain media was used to acquire political information. Not all media sources conveyed negative information about Thaksin and this makes it difcult to evaluate the validity of the information-gap hypothesis because of the potential cancel-out effect of pro- and anti-Thaksin news receptions on the macro level. Clearly, pursuit of the information-gap hypothesis would require that one more closely investigate the circulation numbers of different media, perform content analysis of their messages and measure whether the messages inuence the recipients or, instead, whether the recipients choose to read, watch, or listen to outlets purveying the content they already favour. Despite these difculties, the hypothesis has broader interest and therefore might be worth pursuing comparatively, because it is compatible with a new theory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes tend to have the means, and in some cases the prompting from their higher education, that would enable and encourage them to pay enough attention to politics to discover through media reports that good government dened in whatever way the societys culture denes good is being violated by the corrupt practices of the regime in place. This information might historically have led to demands for more democratic participation. In Thailand, however, as in the Philippines, Bolivia, Venezuela and Honduras, the rebellion against corruption and other violations of local political norms has taken the form of repudiating a democratically elected government. Indeed, in Thailand the basis for this repudiation may have been the clash between the democratically elected government and the monarchy. There is, of course, no reason to assume that the same factor is at work in all of these cases. But Thailand does not seem to be the only country in which a middle-class rebellion against democracy and in favour of good governance may draw on cultural values in dening the latter. The Philippine middle-class protest that successfully demanded the dismissal of Joseph Estrada in 2001 for charges of corruption was led by church activists who despised Estrada for his violations of Catholic norms.86 In Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic parties did well among the urban middle class in the last national election by campaigning against corruption and for transparency implemented through Islamic law. The possibility that there is some general phenomenon at work in Asia and Latin America would have to be investigated case by case. But there are enough of these cases that the comparative method might be fruitful in analysing them.

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Notes
1. Data analysed in this article were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2005 2008), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwans Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and

22

K. Jager
National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Ofce is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. He also thanks Jeffrey Friedman, Tom Scotto, Jens Meiners, Sophie Jiseon Lee, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and Phimpnhapha Permsirisansook and Piyakan Jittanonda for excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are the authors own. Kurlantzick, The Bourgeois Revolution. Unger, Chinas Conservative Middle Class. Lipset, Political Man, 31. Ibid., 51. Moore, Social Origins, 418. See, for example, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development; Putnam, Making Democracy Work; Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization. Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. For a further discussion, see also Boix and Stokes, Endogenous Democratization; Acemoglu et al., Income and Democracy. Moore, Social Origins; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development; see also Nun, Middle-class Military Coup. See, for example, Gills, Rocamora, and Wilson, Low Intensity Democracy; Ottaway, Democracy Challenged; Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies. ODonnell, Delegative Democracy. Murashima, The Origin, 83 9. Riggs, Thailand. Wilson, Politics in Thailand, 277. Painter, Thaksinisation or Managerialism?, 28. Ockey, State, Bureaucracy and Polity, 144. Thailand received about $1 billion in economic aid and $2 billion in military aid from the USA between 1950 and 1988, of which $2 billion of the total amount was received between 1965 and 1975 alone (see Glassman, Thailand at the Margins, 37; Fineman, A Special Relationship). Thak, The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. McCargo, Network Monarchy. The Chinese capitalist class played a crucial role in this transformation. See Sidel, Social Origins of Dictatorship, 129 33, 135 7. Anderson, Withdrawal Symptoms, 16 17. Handley, The King Never Smiles, 209 13 Girling, Interpreting Development, 20; Ockey, State, Bureaucracy and Polity, 1445. Connors, Democracy and National Identity, 219. Motonishi, Why Has Income Inequality. Anek, Business Associations, 33. Girling, Interpreting Development, 32. Riggs, Thailand, 312 3; Bidhya, Thailand, 286. Nelson, Institutional Incentives, 132. Ockey, Business Leaders, 96. Sidel, Siam and its Twin, 36 52. Girling, Interpreting Development, 38. Anek, The Mobile Phone Mob. Englehart, Democracy and the Thai Middle Class, 261. Connors, Goodbye to the Security State, 432. Baker and Pasuk, A History of Thailand, 255. Ibid., 253.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

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8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Democratization
38.

23

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

Connors, Goodbye to the Security State, 433. However, Privy Council member Prem played a crucial role in the elite bargaining that led to the formation of this coalition government and the military never lost its political inuence during this period (McCargo and Ukrist, The Thaksinization, 133 4). Nelson, Thaksins 2005 Electoral Triumph, 6. See, for instance, Chambers, Evolving Toward What?, 5134; Nelson, Thailand and Thaksin Shinawatra, 23. Mutebi, Political Consolidation, 105. Albritton, Thailand in 2004, 169 71. Nelson, Thaksins 2005 Electoral Triumph, 15. Case, Democracys Quality, 630 2. See also Pasuk and Baker, Thaksins Populism, 68. Somchai, The Thai Rak Thai Party, 108 12. Case, Democracys Quality, 629. Ukrist, A Different Coup dEtat, 127. Bell, Thai Protesters. Hewison, A Book, the King and the 2006 Coup; Ukrist, A Different Coup dEtat; Thongchai, Toppling Democracy. While the PAD is often portrayed as an upper-class urban movement, it is worth mentioning that it initially also consisted of several political groups who emphasized different social and political issues (Pye and Schaffar, The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement). Chai-Anan and Parichart, Beyond Transition in Thailand, 156. See also Pasuk and Baker, Thaksins Populism, 78; Kurlantzick, The Bourgeois Revolution. Giles, A Coup For the Rich. Lewin, Self-Interest and Public Interest, 29 60. Pye and Schaffar, The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement, 55; Thongchai, Nationalism. Chamlong also founded the Phalang Dharma party in 1988 to strive for Thai values and against corruption. Notably, this party performed especially well in Bangkok, winning 32 of 35 seats there in the national election of 1992. The party collapsed after a conict between Chamlongs temple faction and the political faction which was, ironically, led by Thaksin. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Converse, Attitudes and Non-Attitudes. At least in the case of Sondhi Limthongkul, it seems that selsh economic reasons caused the opposition to Thaksin. Initially, Sondhi was a business partner of Thaksin but falling out with him, Sondhi turned against Thaksin (Ukrist, A Different Coup dEtat, 131). Thongchai, Toppling Democracy, 30 1. Anek, A Tale of Two Democracies; Anek, Thaksin-style Populism. Chang, The Persistent Myth; Chang, Giving Up On Democracy. Walker, The Rural Constitution; Somchai, The Thai Rak Thai Party. Albritton and Thawilwadee, Developing Democracy. The distinction in this particular sample between urban and rural is obtained by analysing responses from different provinces (changwat). See, for instance, RSF, Reporters Without Borders; The Nation, Secret Military Division Deployed; The Nation, Politicking. Bangkok Post, Goings on at Channel 9. Supalak, New Politics. PAD has never specied the independent institutions and announced later that the xed formula was just an example of how money politics should be replaced and is still open for discussion. Connors, Article of Faith, 144 5. Anek, Thaksin-style Populism, 177 83. Albritton and Thawilwadee, The State of Democracy.

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24
69. 70.

K. Jager
Mulder, Thai Images, 308. Ockey, Making Democracy, 183. However, not all rural provinces supported Thaksin and especially the south was a stronghold of the anti-Thaksin movement. For a detailed discussion of Thaksins unpopularity in the southern provinces, see Askew, Performing Political Identity. Althaus, Collective Preferences; Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Thongchai, Toppling Democracy, 26. McCargo, Politics, 29: On days other than the publication of the bi-monthly lottery results, only one out of 30 Thais bought a newspaper during the mid-1990s. This ratio was considerably lower than comparable data from Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and the USA. Ubonrat, Close your Ears. The Nation, Poll Finds TRT Gets Quantity and Quality in Live News Time. Pasuk and Baker, Thaksins Populism, 67. Medhi, Political Crisis. McCargo, Politics, 23 4. Francese and Needham, Community Radio. IRI, Thailand National Public Opinion Survey. Less than 5% of this sample have ever engaged in any political activism like signing a petition or participating in a demonstration. Anek, Thaksin-style Populism, 177 83. For an overview, see King et al., Analyzing Incomplete. For an explanation of Clarify, see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, Clarify; see also King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, Making the Most. The continuous signicant impact of the party variables might be a conrmation that partisan conviction was a form of ideological constraint as shown in public opinion research. See, for instance, Taber and Lodge, Motivated Skepticism; Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, Do the Facts. Some scholars argue that the events in the Philippines should be rather seen as a soft military coup for which the middle-class activists provide an ideological legitimization. See Abinales, Philippines in 2009.

71. 72. 73.

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74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

Notes on contributor
Kai Jager is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Duke University.

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Althaus, Scott L. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Anderson, Benedict. Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, no. 3 (1977): 13 30. Anek Laothamatas. Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. [The Mobile Phone Mob]. Bangkok: Matichon, 1993. Anek Laothamatas. Anek Laothamatas. A Tale of Two Democracies: Conicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand. In The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R.H. Taylor, 201 33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. [Thaksin-style Populism]. Bangkok: Matichon, 2007. Anek Laothamatas. Askew, Marc. Performing Political Identity: The Democrat Party in Southern Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008. Baker, Christopher, and Pasuk Phongpaichit. A History of Thailand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Bangkok Post. Goings on at Channel 9. Bangkok Post, March 8, 2007. Bell, Thomas. Thai Protesters Storm Interior Ministry. Telegraph, April 12, 2009. Bidhya Bowornwathana. Thailand: Bureaucracy Under Coalition Governments. In Civil Service Systems in Asia, ed. John Burns, 281 318. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001. Boix, Carles. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. Endogenous Democratization. World Politics 55, no. 4 (2003): 517 49. Case, William. Democracys Quality and Breakdown: New Lessons from Thailand. Democratization 14, no. 4 (2007): 622 42. Chai-Anan Samudavanija, and Parichart Chotiya. Beyond Transition in Thailand. In Democracy in East Asia, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 147 67. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Chambers, Paul. Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today. Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3 (2005): 495521. Chang Noi. The Persistent Myth of the Good Coup. The Nation, October 2, 2006. Chang Noi. Giving Up On Democracy In Thailand. The Nation, November 27, 2006. Connors, Michael K. Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change. Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no. 4 (2003): 43148. Connors, Michael K. Democracy and National Identity in Thailand. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2007. Connors, Michael K. Article of Faith: The Failure of Royal Liberalism in Thailand. Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 1 (2008): 14365. Converse, Philip E. Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue. In The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems, ed. Edward Tufte, 16889. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1970. Englehart, Neil A. Democracy and the Thai Middle Class: Globalization, Modernization, and Constitutional Change. Asian Survey 43, no. 2 (2003): 25379. Fineman, Daniel. A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 19471958. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Francese, Justin, and Jay Needham. Community Radio in Thailand: An Interview with Ubonrat Siriyuvasak (12 April 2006), http://www.archive.org/details/041206_thai_ com_radio (accessed November 3, 2010). Giles Ungpakorn. A Coup For the Rich. Thailands Political Crisis. Bangkok: Workers Democracy Publishing, 2007. Gills, Barry, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson. Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order. Boulder, CO: Pluto Press, 1993.

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