What are the barriers to enhancing international environmental governance?

The question assumes an ideal, which certain barriers prevent becoming reality. I take that ideal to be a new and equitable global partnership that protects the integrity of the global environmental system (Rio Declaration, 1992). I argue that the barriers to enhancing international environmental governance are of two types, architectural and contextual. The former concern the constituents of such governance, and the latter the surrounding situation. I then argue that barriers can be identified on two levels: three initial barriers, demonstrated through the lower achievement of actual governance compared to its expected or planned impact (failure); and three more fundamental barriers, which are diagnosed at a broader societal and cultural level. First, I detail the concepts and distinctions used in the argument. Concepts and distinctions Governance is defined by Rosenau to contrast with government1. Rather than a world government wielding hard power, international governance begins with negotiations and treaties between states, which can lead to hegemonic regimes (paradigmatically 1800s Britain or USA after 1950). However, regimes are not only created and participated in by states: as Ruggie argues, international institutions, with associated norms, principles and rules, can also feature in regimes2. In this liberal institutionalist view (e.g. Keohane3), the idea of an institution is a thick concept with ontological weight over and above the states that comprise it. Current international governance does not have just one set of institutions (unlike Bretton Woods). A broader idea of architecture is therefore needed, allowing for different groupings of states, multiple institutions and various regimes, as outlined by Biermann et al (2009, p2). Architecture can also include actors on scales other than the classic nested hierarchy of states and international institutions, such as international NGOs, transnational corporations, and local entities such as cities4. As architecture is such a broad church, this expansion must be limited to those involved in key decisions or who can significantly change the norms or elements of international governance. Changes in and differences between architectures can be identified using the concept of fragmentation. Biermann et al (ibid, p8) argue that the relative degree of fragmentation for a given architecture can belong to three categories (not mutually exclusive): conflictive fragmentation, where various regimes and institutions have different members and (sometimes deliberately) contradicting principles, norms and rules; co-operative fragmentation, where a core institution does not include all important actors and principles, norms and rules are loosely integrated; and synergistic fragmentation, where a core institution includes (nearly) all relevant actors and principles, norms and rules are clearly integrated and regulated. Understanding how international environmental governance (IEG) might be enhanced first requires a criterion of its effectiveness. Andresen (2007, p5) provides three options: output,
1Rosenau (1995) p15 2Ruggie (1982) p384 3Keohane and Martin (1995) p40 4Sassen (2003) p5

outcome, or impact. Output refers to the action of the governing entities, outcome to behavioural change in relevant actors due to that output, and impact to the resulting improvement in the environmental issue. Andresen chooses output in order to measure the effectiveness of institutions and regimes. However, the overall architecture could not have a single output or coherent outcome unless it already had a low degree of fragmentation, and choosing either would beg the question. The remaining criterion is impact, and so I look to identify barriers which prevent IEG from improving the actual condition of the environment. Such barriers can be divided into two kinds, following Mitchell (2003, p10). Mitchell argues that barriers to the effectiveness of institutions are either elements of institution-structure, concerning the arrangement and function of the institution itself, or elements of problemstructure, relating to the context in which the institution functions. In terms of architecture rather than institutions, this division becomes the difference between architectural barriers, which are aspects of the structure and arrangement of those entities that constitute IEG, and contextual barriers, which are elements of the surrounding situation apart from such entities. Due to the sheer range and variety of international environmental issues, identifying barriers to enhancing IEG as a whole would be a complex task. This essay therefore takes as a case study the largest current environmental issue, and therefore that which most requires the enhancement of international governance: climate change. The architecture of International Climate Governance (ICG) I first summarize the key aspects of climate change as an international environmental issue, and trace the evolution of ICG to its current form. This will enable us to identify five failures of ICG in the following section that demonstrate barriers to its enhancement. The current scientific consensus is that, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states, warming of the climate system is unequivocal5. Crucially, this warming is due to rising concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that have increased markedly as a result of human activities6, the most significant being carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels. The likely effect of such warming, even at acceptable7 levels of 2C by 2050, will significantly negatively affect food and water supplies, health, and ecosystems across the world, with a disproportionate impact on poorest countries and poorest persons within countries8. Our starting point for ICG is the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Summit) in 19929. The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994 and has been ratified by 195 countries (Parties to the Convention). The UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, but it was not ratified until 2005, following the World Summit on Sustainable
5IPCC (2007) quoted in Dicken (2011) p458 6IPCC (2007) quoted in Dicken (2011) p459 7Stern (2007) v 8IPCC (2008) slide 16 9All data in this and the next paragraph from UNFCC (2012)

Development (Rio+10 or the Johannesburg summit) in 2002 and the G8+5 meeting in Gleneagles in 2005. The notable non-signatory was the US, and the implementation period was 2008 2012. The Kyoto Protocol bound developed countries to carbon dioxide emissions reductions, allowed developing countries (including China and India) to increase such emissions, and created a market mechanism for trade in emissions permits (so countries below their targets could sell spare emissions to those over the limit). Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it also allowed developed countries to invest in reducing emissions in developing countries, thereby earning emissions reductions to add to their own targets. Three Conferences of the Parties (Copenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010, and Durban in 2011) attempted to continue emissions reductions following the conclusion of the Kyoto period in 2012. Copenhagen resulted in no firm commitments and was widely regarded as a failure10. Cancun postponed commitments until Durban and created a Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) to assist developing countries but with no agreed pledged amounts 11. Following Canadas withdrawal from and Russia and Japans refusal to renew the Kyoto Protocol12, Durban agreed to implement a new protocol or similar legal instrument including emissions reductions for both developed and developing countries by 202013. Finally, as well as the UNFCCC framework, there are three other major elements of ICG. The first is the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) of the World Bank, piloted in 1991 and tasked following the Rio Summit, which complements the CDM in its role of financing emissions reductions in developing countries14. The second are groupings of states involved in the UN conferences and agreements, including the European Union (EU), the Alliance Of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the G77. The third is the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP), in existence from 2005 to 2011 and including the US, Australia, Japan, India, China and Canada. The APP is regarded to have had little impact on emissions reductions15, but is significant as an alternative to and competitor of the UN-led initiatives. Failures of ICG I now examine five areas of failure: whereby ICG did not reduce emissions as much as it was expected to or planned to. In the next section, it will be argued that these are symptomatic of underlying barriers to enhancing ICG. The first area of failure is the absence of key countries from agreements; in particular, the absence of the US, contributing 18% of world emissions16, from the Kyoto Protocol. Krajnc
10Guardian (2009) and Fisher (2010) p11-17 11UNFCCC (2012) 12BBC (2011) 13UNFCCC in Guardian (2011a) 14Porter et al (2008) p22 15Van Asselt et al (2009) p3 16All emissions percentages calculated from data in CDIAC (2008)

argues that key reasons for US refusal are the lack of emissions targets for developing countries, especially China, and also the 2001 change in administration (Krajnc 2003, p4). As van Asselt et al note, US absence from Kyoto led to the APP as an alternative mechanism for ICG, deliberately in conflict with UN-led initiatives (van Asselt et al 2009, p1). Also, China and India were excluded from emissions reductions targets under Kyoto, and so their contribution (23% and 6% of global emissions respectively) was not addressed. The agreement of Kyoto points to another area of failure: the necessity of compromise in the targets agreed. Grubb argues that the emissions targets for key parties were lowered in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol (Grubb 2003, p149). For example, the EUs original aim of a 10 15% reduction below 1990 levels was lowered to 8%. Further, the choice of 1990 as a baseline means that most emissions reductions in the EU occurred between 1990 and 1999 in the post-Soviet bloc17, and so EU targets were less stringent than if they had adopted a later baseline. A third area of failure, once targets were agreed, was simply failure to meet them. For example, Canada agreed to a 6% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020 under Kyoto but in 2011 was predicted a rise of 16 30%18. Other countries that failed domestic Kyoto targets include Australia, Spain, and New Zealand19. This failure to meet targets not only directly lessens the impact of ICG, but also casts doubt on the likely success of voluntary emissions targets, to which many large emitters are committed until 202020. Fourthly, another failure is the long timescales on which ICG operates, compared to the necessity for immediate action. The Stern Review argues that delay in taking actionwould make it necessary to accept more climate change andhigher mitigation costs. Weak action in the next 10-20 years would put stabilisation [at acceptable levels] beyond reach (Stern 2007, xv). Therefore both the 10 year negotiations over Kyoto, and the postponement of legally binding targets at Durban until 202021, are sufficient delays to significantly decrease ICG impact overall. The final area of failure is the provision of financial assistance to developing countries to reduce emissions (tunnel through the environmental Kuznets curve22). Porter et al identify the two main weaknesses of the existing funding system as the following. Firstly, the level of funding allocated to the GEF ($2.2 billion with a cofinanced total value of $14 billion) was not sufficient to leverage transformational change in developing economies (Porter et al 2008, s2.4). Secondly, in 2008 there were at least twelve existing funds to combat climate change, with another added in Cancun in 2010. This resulted in a disjointed approach to the

17EEA (2011) 18BBC (2011) 19Olivier et al (2011) p25 20New Scientist (2011) 21Guardian (2011b) 22Dauvergne (2004) p381

detriment of effectiveness and efficiency23, which has consequently lessened the impact of ICG. Initial barriers to enhancing ICG Following identification of five problems with ICG exclusion, compromise, missing targets, long timescales, and inadequate funding I now use these to illuminate the initial barriers to enhancing ICG, both architectural and contextual. In the next section I argue that these initial barriers are dependent on three more fundamental barriers. The first initial barrier is architectural: the above five problems are partly due to the high level of fragmentation in the ICG architecture. Following Biermann et al, we can locate ICG as lying somewhere between conflictive and co-operative fragmentation, as follows24. Firstly, the exclusion of key countries from binding international agreements (i.e. Kyoto), and the creation of alternative forums with no binding commitments, such as the APP, corresponds to conflictive fragmentation (the existence of different regimes with sometimes deliberately conflicting rules and principles). Conflictive fragmentation can also be seen in the existence of multiple funds for developing country assistance, although Porter et al note that the initial duplication is now avoided through pipeline reviews at the GEF and UNFCCC, and there remains no strategic control25. The other three problems are illustrative of high, but nonetheless co-operative, fragmentation. First, significant compromise on targets (from the EU in particular) shows that although agreements were reached, parties did not share views on the necessity of emission reduction. Second, Canada and others failure to meet self-set targets demonstrates a willingness to engage with the core institution, but an inability or lack of deeper commitment to change. Third, the long timescales agreed at Durban and stalemate at Copenhagen show the degree to which the norms and principles of the core institution are, in Birmann et als terms, only loosely integrated. This can be contrasted with international action taken to rescue the financial sector in 2007, which was swift and comparatively well-coordinated, displaying a much lower degree of fragmentation. The other two initial barriers are contextual. The first is the asymmetry between population and consumption patterns in the major emitters, and can be seen through closer examination of US exclusion from Kyoto. This was, as stated above, largely due to the lack of obligations on China; more specifically, it was due to a disagreement concerning the capacity of each to reduce emissions. China argued that the US had a greater number of emissions per capita, and so had more capacity to reduce emissions, while the US argued that China, as an overall emitter of similar size to the US, should have at least some obligation to reduce emissions26. The issue becomes more complex if one calculates emissions by consumption rather than production.

23Porter et al (2008) p13 24Biermann et al (2009) p16 25Porter et al (2008) p15 26Krajnc (2003) p4

Much of the Chinese emissions total is due to sale of goods and therefore consumption patterns in the US and the EU, and so they are to some extent responsible for Chinese emissions27. This asymmetry was acknowledged by UNFCCC with the idea of common but differentiated responsibilities (CDR). For climate change, this consists of three elements: the common task to cooperate to reduce emissions; the differentiated responsibility for production of emissions; and the differentiated capacity of countries to reduce their emissions. It is important to recognise that although this barrier has been illustrated using architectural examples the negotiation between US and China, and the idea of CDR in the UNFCCC - this is not an architectural barrier. CDR does not itself prevent greater emissions reductions, but is an attempt by the ICG architecture to overcome the underlying asymmetry, which is a contextual barrier. A second contextual barrier is a further asymmetry: the fact that the major emitters (those who have so far caused and in the near future will cause the majority of climate change) are not most vulnerable to its effects28. Superficially, this asymmetry merely emphasises another aspect of the third element of CDR above: the differentiated capacity of countries to mitigate the effects of climate change. More interestingly, OBrien and Leichenko use this asymmetry to argue for the phenomenon of double exposure, whereby developing countries are exposed to the negative effects of both climate change and economic liberalization29. Their argument depends on an analysis of globalization which is unnecessary for our purposes: the key point is that a lack of economic parity multiplies the already uneven effects of climate change, and that this is institutionalized in the international economic architecture. Architectural manoeuvres to combat this asymmetry include the CDM and GEF finance initiatives, and the principle of sustainable development at Johannesburg. At the core of sustainable development is the idea that the best way to improve environmental protection, including climate change, is to enable such countries to reduce poverty levels and trade on an even footing in the world economy. Again, this asymmetry in the effects of climate change, combined with economic imbalances, is a contextual barrier for which sustainable development, CDM, and GEF are attempted architectural remedies. Fundamental barriers to enhancing ICG So far, three initial barriers to enhancing ICG have been demonstrated: an architectural barrier, in the form of fragmented governance architecture; and two contextual barriers, in the form of asymmetries between consumption and production patterns of major emitters, and between those emitters and countries severely affected by climate change. I now argue that these initial barriers are themselves due to three more fundamental barriers. The initial barriers to the enhancement of ICG are not static; like the constituent parts of ICG they change with the surrounding context and evolving state of affairs. For example, until the IPCC report and the UKs Stern Review in 200730, a significant barrier to enhancing ICG was the contestation of the science supporting climate change in academic and more importantly in
27Dauvergne (2004) p373 28IPCC (2008) 29OBrien and Leichenko (2000) p227 30Stern (2007) and IPCC (2008)

policy circles31. However, some barriers are more permanent, as they stem from wider societal and cultural factors. The first of these fundamental barriers is the international arrangement of power. This can cause the fragmentation of ICG architecture, in that the US would not have been able to refuse Kyoto and create the APP if it had not had the negotiating power of a (former) hegemon; conversely, Canada, which is less powerful internationally, signed Kyoto even though it could not meet Kyoto targets. Due to the international arrangement of power against them, the small island states (represented by AOSIS), even when joined with the G77, and arguing in the same direction as the EU, could not prevent the Durban implementation being pushed back to 2020. These power imbalances are noted by Vigje (2011, p7); it is not only power inequalities between states that prevent institutional reform, but also between organizations that are part of ICG. Vigje uses these power inequalities to argue for institutional reform, i.e. a World Environment Organization or similar, to provide strategic control and binding emissions reductions (as do others, e.g. Whalley and Zizzimos 2001). This is opposed by Haas, who argues for a decentralized network model [where] the performance of discrete functions by multiple actors yield[s] more effective global coordination32. In fact, both sides miss the point, but by doing so illustrate why such power inequalities are a fundamental barrier to ICG reform, not merely an initial architectural barrier. Whether there is a single organisation or a group of global networks, such binding agreements and effective coordination are not possible unless international power is distributed in a specific way. Even in successful agreements such as Durban, power relations are key influences on their result33. The counterfactual of this is demonstrated by the Doha round of the WTO, begun in 2001, which is a powerful international organisation but which has not concluded due to power relations that make differences between members intractable 34. The second fundamental barrier is the cultural dependence of the North and West on fossil fuels and their products (illustrated in the size of ecological footprints in OECD countries35). Without this cultural dependence, the consumption pattern of the US and the EU would be more flexible, and therefore the first asymmetry above, between consumption patterns of major emitters, would not present as much of a barrier to enhancing ICG. However, this fundamental barrier appears to be expanding: countries not currently as reliant on fossil fuels are becoming so (e.g. China, due to population size despite green investment36), and those that could exploit fossil fuels in the future show all intent to do so (e.g. Somalia37).

31Guardian (2010) 32Haas (2004) p1 33Guardian (2011c) 34David Cameron in the Telegraph (2012) 35Dauvergne (2004) p374 36Olivier et al (2011) p10 37Guardian (2012)

The significance of the second asymmetry, between emitters and those affected, also depends on this expanding cultural dependency. This can be seen if sustainable development is treated as more than a narrowly economic concept. Rather than meaning merely growth strategies for developing economies that do not raise emissions to the same levels as developed ones, it would then incorporate the need for a change in culture, so developing countries would not adopt the cultural dependency on fossil fuels that has led to high levels of emissions in the North and West. Unless this happens, the second asymmetry will continue to present a barrier to enhancing ICG due to its roots in the more fundamental barrier of cultural dependency. The third fundamental barrier is best explained through a criticism of the above analysis, which has been focused on states, groupings of states and institutions in ICG architecture. Instead, the notion of architecture can include other types of actors as long as they are involved in key decisions or can significantly change international governance. A number of authors have argued for governance from below incorporating the diverse activities by NGOs and social movements (Paterson et al 2003, p2): from inclusion at specific events like Copenhagen (McGregor 2011) to a wider push for global social movement activism (Ford 2003, p121). On the other side of the fence, Levy and Newell set out the centrality of business in negotiating and implementing IEG (Levy and Newell 2002, p1), and Krajnc (2003, p12) includes entities at local scales, such as cities (Krajnc 2003, p12). Actors on scales other than the international therefore have a key role in reducing emissions, through NGO campaigns, transnational corporation decisions, private finance in the GEF, and their influence on the parties at international negotiations and on the negotiations themselves. It is also recognised that they somehow influence the international system by the Commission for Global Governance, which includes all of the above in defining its task38. The final fundamental barrier to ICG, then, is that such actors do not also have a clear and transparent role in environmental governance as well as participation. This last barrier is architectural, but in the widest sense: it does not concern how to arrange ICG architecture, or how fragmented it is, but what should be included in it altogether. Conclusion I have identified five failures with international climate governance (taken as a case study of international environmental governance): exclusion, compromise, missing targets, long timescales, and inadequate funding. I have argued that these failures are symptomatic of three initial barriers to enhancing ICG: the architectural barrier of high fragmentation (lying between cooperative and conflictive), and the contextual barriers of asymmetries between consumption and production patterns of major emitters, and between those emitters and countries severely affected by climate change. Finally, I have concluded that these three initial barriers are in turn due to three more fundamental barriers to enhancing ICG: power imbalances between the elements of ICG; the expanding cultural dependency on fossil fuels; and the homogeneity of actors in ICG, i.e. how best civil society and business should contribute to international climate governance, as well as to emissions reductions. Finally, I locate this argument in the wider context of IPE, with its traditional worldviews of realism, liberalism, and Marxism. The first step, which identifies failures in ICG, can be seen as most realist, as it requires only an analysis of the interactions of states and their proxies or constructs. The subsequent demonstration of three initial barriers, by examining UN attempts to address these barriers, subscribes to the dominant liberal environmental tradition (Bernstein
38CGG (1995)

2002). Finally, the third section, including barriers on cultural and societal levels, can be seen as based on such critical theory as developed from Marxism (Ford 2003). Thus, while the three worldviews can all interpret governance problems emerging long after their conception, the solution required to overcome these barriers depends on how far the analysis is taken.

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