ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy

GlobalInsurgencyStrategy and the SalafiJihadMovement

RichardH.Shultz

INSSOccasionalPaper66

April 2008

USAFInstituteforNational Security Studies USAFAcademy,Colorado

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Theviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorand donotnecessarilyreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionofthe DepartmentoftheAirForce, theDepartmentoftheArmy,the DepartmentofDefense,ortheUSGovernment.Thepaperis approvedforpublicreleasedistributionisunlimited. Richard H.Shultz,Jr.holdscopyrighttothispaperitispublishedwith hispermission. ******* ABOUTTHEAUTHOR: RichardH.Shultz,Jr, PhD,isDirectoroftheInternational SecurityStudiesProgramandProfessorofInternational PoliticsattheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,Tufts University. Commentspertainingtothispaperareinvitedpleaseforward to: Director,USAFInstituteforNationalSecurityStudies HQUSAFA/DFES 2354FairchildDrive,Suite5L27 USAFAcademy,CO80840 phone:7193332717 fax: 7193332716 email: inss@usafa.edu

VisittheInstituteforNationalSecurityStudies homepageat
http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss

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TABLEOFCONTENTS Foreword ANewTypeofWar? Insurgency:ConceptsandFrameworks DefiningInsurgency TypesofInsurgency DistinctionsBetweenInsurgencyandTerrorism InsurgencyandHighRiskSocialMovements TheRoleofIdeology IdeologyandOrganization RevolutionaryInsurgencyandItsTransnationalEvolution Background CoreElementsofStrategy TheIncipientStageandtheRevolutionaryInsurgent Trinity PhaseIMobilization PhaseIIIntegration PhaseIIIMaintenance TheCaseoftheVietCong TheProtractedWarStage TheRoleofExternalAssistanceandInfluence TheTransnationalEvolutionofNationalLevel Insurgency RequirementsforaGlobalSalafiInsurgency AGlobalSalafiJihadInsurgency:MythorReality? EmergenceofSalafiIslamismandtheMuslim Brotherhood TheOriginsofSalafiJihadIdeology TheSovietAfghanWar AfterAfghanistan:DecidingontheNextAreaof Operations AfghanistanAgain:TheFoundationsforGlobal Insurgency GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11? VirtualSanctuary 1)PropagatingtheSalafiIdeologyofJihad 2)InspiringandMobilizingtheUmmahto vii 1 3 5 7 13 15 17 19 20 23 26 27 28 29 29 29 34 35 38 42 47 54 59 64 69 75 87 89 91 v

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy JointheJihad 93 3)PsychologicalWarfaretoDemoralizeEnemies 96 4)NetworkingtheGlobalSalafiJihadInsurgency 99 5)OperationalInformationSharingManuals andHandbooks 101 6)OperationalInformationSharingTraining VideosandCourses 104 7)CollectionTargeting 106 SanctuariesinUngovernedTerritory 107 TheIraqiCentralFront 111 FosteringtheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement 113 Notes 120

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy FOREWORD Wearepleasedtopublishthissixtysixth volumeinthe Occasional PaperseriesoftheUnitedStatesAirForceInstituteforNational SecurityStudies(INSS). Whilethisresearchwasnotsponsoredby INSS,itisbothcompatiblewithoureffortsandobjectives,anditis publishedheretosupporttheeducationofnationalsecurity professionalsacrossthegovernment. DickShultzledthepreparationofanearlierINSSOccasional Paper,ArmedGroups:ATierOneSecurityPriority(withDouglas FarahandItamaraLochard),wherehedefined,characterized,and differentiatedinsurgents,terrorists,militias,andorganizedcriminal groups.Inthiscurrentpaper,hefocusesonterroristsandinsurgents, differentiatesandcharacterizesthesetwocategoriesinmoreexplicit detail,andconductsadetailedconceptualandhistoricalanalysisof insurgencyanditscurrentmanifestationonaglobalscalebytheSalafi Jihadmovement.Thisisimportantwork,layingoutthecasethatas terrorismandinsurgencydiffer,recognizingthatthecurrentlongwar isactuallybeingfoughtbytheothersideasaninsurgencymustleadus toamendandadaptourstrategytooneofglobalcounterinsurgency, beyondaglobalwaronterrorismalone. DickShultzisusingthesepapersastextsinhisprogramto educatetheeducatorsofmilitaryofficers,intelligenceanalysts,and othermembersofthegovernmentnationalsecuritybureaucracy.Weat INSSsupportthateffort,andwearepleasedtopresentthisOccasional Papertofurtherthatcause. AbouttheInstitute INSSisprimarilysponsoredbythe StrategicPlansandPolicy Division,HeadquartersUSAirForce(HQUSAF/A5XP),andtheDean oftheFaculty,USAFAcademy.Othersponsorsandpartnersinclude theSecretaryofDefensesOfficeofNetAssessment(OSD/NA)the DefenseThreatReductionAgencyAdvancedSystemsandConcepts Office (DTRA/ASCO)theAirForceInformationWarfareCenter (AFIWC)TheArmyForeignMilitaryStudiesOffice(FMSO)the ArmyEnvironmentalPolicyInstitute (AEPI)theUnitedStates NorthernCommand/NorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommand (NORTHCOM/NORAD)andthe UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy CombatingTerrorismCenter(CTC).ThemissionoftheInstituteisto promotenationalsecurityresearchfortheDepartmentofDefense withinthemilitaryacademiccommunity,tofosterthedevelopmentof strategicperspectivewithintheUnitedStatesArmedForces,andto supportnationalsecuritydiscoursethroughoutreachandeducation. Itsresearchfocusesontheareasofgreatestinteresttooursponsors: vii

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy strategicsecurity andcontrollingandcombatingweaponsofmass destructionhomelanddefense,combatingterrorism,andasymmetrical warfareregionalandemergingnationalsecurityissuesand air,space, andcyberissuesandplanning. INSScoordinatesandfocusesoutsidethinkinginvarious disciplinesandacrossthemilitaryservicestodevelopnewideasfor defensepolicymaking.Tothatend,theInstitutedevelopstopics, selectsresearchersfromwithinthemilitaryacademiccommunity,and administerssponsoredresearch. Itreachesouttoandpartnerswith educationandresearchorganizationsacrossandbeyondthemilitary academiccommunitytobringbroadfocusto issuesofnationalsecurity interest.Andithostsworkshopsandfacilitatesthedisseminationof informationtoawiderangeofprivateandgovernmentorganizations. Intheseways,INSSfacilitatesvaluable,costeffectiveresearchtomeet theneedsofoursponsors.Weappreciateyourcontinuedinterestin INSSandourresearchproducts. JAMESM.SMITH Director

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GLOBALINSURGENCYSTRATEGYANDTHE SALAFIJIHADMOVEMENT RichardH.Shultz

ANEWTYPEOFWAR? IntheaftermathoftheSeptember11,2001attack onstrategic targetsinsidetheUnitedStatesbyalQaeda,scholars,analysts,and policyspecialistsbegantointerpretandframethoseeventswithinthe largercontextofwar.Butwasitwar?Andif itwas,whatkindofwar wasit?AlQaedawasnotastatebutanonstateactor.Manylabeledal Qaedaatransnationalterroristorganization.Couldsuchanonstate armedgroupgotowarwithamajorstateactor? Whatkindofwar coulditcarryout?Therewerenoeasilydecipherable answerstothese questions,foralQaedadidnotreflectoremulate theconductofwaras itwasknownandpracticedin thepast. Within ashortperiodoftimetheUSgovernmentbegantodescribe thepost9/11conflictenvironmentoneinwhichAmericafound itself engagedinafightagainstunconventionalandasymmetricalenemies whocouldposemajor,evenstrategic,securitythreatsasaglobalwar on terrorism.Thisgeneratedagreatdealofdiscussionanddifferences ofopinion.Wasthisanaccurate portrayalofthepost9/11security environmentordid suchacharacterization lackstrategicclarity? Bythesummerof2005seniorBushadministrationofficials expressedseriousdoubtsaboutthisterminology and recasthowthey described thefightagainstalQaeda,itsaffiliates,andotherterrorist groups.IllustrativeofthiswasDefenseSecretaryDonaldRumsfeld.At newsconferencesand inpublicaddresseshe begantospeakofaglobal struggleagainstviolentextremismthelongwarratherthana

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy globalwaronterrorism.Otherseniormilitaryleaders,toincludethe JointChiefsof Staff Chairman,followedsuit. Butthisbeggedthequestion,howshould weunderstandthose conducting thelongwar?Whoaretheyandwhatkindofbattle are theyfighting?Whataretheirobjectivesandwhatkindofstrategyand tacticsdotheyemployinthisfighttoachievethem?Onepossible answerthathasbeensuggestedisthattheUnited Statesanditsallies arenowconfrontedbyaglobalSalafiJihadinsurgency. Thosetakingthispositionargue thatamoreprecisedescriptionof thepost9/11conflictagainsttheSalafiJihadmovement,whichwillbe discussedindetaillater,wouldbetoframeitasaglobalinsurgency onethatchallengestheWesterndominatedstatesystem.Withinthis context,alQaedaandlooselyassociatedgroupsandmovementsare saidtocomprisean evolvingformofnetworkednonstateactorswho operate locally,regionally,andglobally.Ifthisisthecasethata globalinsurgency isunderwaythentheimplicationsforhowto counteritaresignificantandwillrequireimportantchangesinUS policyandstrategy. ButhowdoweknowthataglobalSalafiJihadinsurgencyis underway?Todeterminewhetherthisisthecase,thisstudyposesthe following core researchquestions:

Isadiverseconfederationofarmedgroups,linkedtogether byacommonideology(ornarrative)and strengthenedbynew powerenhancers,conductingaglobalinsurgencyagainstthe UnitedStatesanditsallies? Isthisglobalinsurgencybeingcarriedoutbyaradical Salafi Jihadmovement(anditsalQaedavanguard)anddoesit haveasitsgoalsa)to fosterregimechangelocallyinapostate Muslimstatesandb)internationalsystemtransformation globally?

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Isthestrategyadoptedbythe Salafi Jihadmovementa hybrid oran adaptationoftheinsurgencystrategythat revolutionarymovementsemployedagainststatesduringthe th latterhalfofthe20 century?Ifso,whatdoesithavein commonwiththem andhowdoesitdiffer?
To answerthesecoreresearchquestions,aseriesofcorollaryissues willfirstbeexamined asapreludetoconceptualizing asetof requirementsormodelofahypotheticalglobalinsurgency. Theserequirementswillthenbetestedagainstexistingopensource informationonthe actions,activities,andoperationsoftheSalafiJihad movementanditsalQaedavanguard.Theobjectivewillbe to determinewhetherpreliminary evidencesupportsthepropositionthat thoseactions,activities,andoperations,whenseenthroughthelensof theproposedrequirements,canbedescribed,atminimum,asaglobal insurgency initsincipientstageofdevelopment.Whilethesefindings canonlyserveaspreliminaryindicators,thestudywillprovidethe basisforfurtheranalysis. INSURGENCY:CONCEPTSANDFRAMEWORKS The startingpointforconceptualizingahypotheticalmodelorset ofrequirementsforaglobalinsurgency isareviewofthefollowing conceptsandframeworks:1)definitionsandclassificationsof insurgency2)distinctionsbetweeninsurgencyandterrorismand 3) relationshipbetweeninsurgencyandsocialmovements.Belowarethe summarypointsfromthisreview,followedbythetextfromwhichthey arededuced.
SummaryPoints Fourtypesofnonstatearmedgroupsinsurgents,terrorists, militias,criminalorganizationstodayposemajorthreats(toinclude strategicones)tonationstatesincluding theUnitedStates. Importantdifferencesexistamongthesearmedgroups, particularlybetweeninsurgentmovementsandterroristorganizations.

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Anappreciationofthosedifferencesisessentialtocombateachof thesetypesofarmedgroups. Strategiesemployedbyinsurgentgroups,bothorganizationally andoperationally,aremore multifacetedanddiversethanthoseofits armedgroupcounterparts. Insurgenciesareprotractedformsofunconventionalwarfarethat seektoaccomplishtheirgoalsandobjectivesthroughtheemployment ofirregularmilitaryforcesandillegalpoliticalorganizations. Theinstrumentsofviolenceandinfluenceemployedby insurgents rangefromguerrillaoperations,terrorism,andsabotageto politicalmobilization,politicalaction,psychologicaloperationsand intelligenceactivities. Insurgenciesarestrugglesforpowerandlegitimacy.Insurgents seektodestroythepowerandlegitimacyofthegovernmenttheyare challenging,whileenhancingthepowerandlegitimacyoftheir movement. Thereisnoonetypeofinsurgency.Ausefulwaytocategorize themisbasedontheiraspirationsorobjectives.Oftheseveninsurgent variationsidentified,thegoalsofrevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgentmovements arethemostfarreaching.Eachenvisionsa majortransformationofthepoliticalandsocialsystem.Theformer seekstoadvancetoanidealizedfuture,thelattertoreturntoagolden past. Animportant lensthroughwhichtounderstandthe natureof revolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgenciesissocialmovementtheory. Indeed,thesetwoformsofinsurgencyhave severalcharactersin commonwithhighrisksocialmovements. Socialmovements representgroupsonthemarginsofstateand society thatseektoreformortransform the political system.Todoso theydevelopcomplexpoliticalstrategies,giventheirpolitical marginality. Themorefarreachingthechangesoughtbyasocialmovement, themoremultifacetedthetasksthemovementsorganizationhasto accomplish.Thesameistrueofrevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgencies. Toaccomplishfarreachingchange,radicalsocialmovements engageinhighriskactivism.Likerevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgencies,thisnecessitatesdevelopmentofamassbaseof dedicatedsupporterswhomustbemotivatedtotakeaction.

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Forhighrisksocialmovements,ideologyperformsanumberof vitalfunctions.Tobuilda massbase, ideologyplaysacentralrolein therecruitmentprocessthatattracts newmembers shapestheloyalty ofthese newmemberstoretainthemand servesas atoolforwaging thestruggle. Highrisksocialmovementideologyconstitutesaseriesofframes thatmustcometoresonatewiththetargetaudience.Itisthroughthe movementsorganizationthatitcomestodo so.Ideologyand organizationaresymbioticallyconnectedtooneanother.

DefiningInsurgency Insurgencyisastrategyofunconventionalandasymmetricwarfare executed byoneoffourdifferenttypesofnonstatearmedgroupsthat todayposecomplicated analyticand significantoperationalchallenges to those statesthatareconfrontedbythem.Overthelasttwodecades eachofthese armedgroups,whocarryouttheiractivitiesbothwithin andacrossstateboundaries,haveincreasingly threatenedstate supremacy.Indoingso,theypresentnontraditionalchallengestothe intelligenceandsecurityservicesofgovernmentsthatareunlikethe conventionalonesposedbystates. Armedgroupscan bedividedinto afourparttypology
1 insurgents,terrorists,militias,andorganizedcrime. Whileitisthecase 2 thatthesenonstateactorshaveseveralcharacteristicsincommon,

theyalsohaveimportantdifferencesthatdistinguishonefromthe other.Itisimportantforgovernmentstounderstandwhyandhow insurgents,terrorists,militias,andcriminalorganizationsvary conceptuallyfromoneanotherandtocategorizeandrespondtothemas such.Failuretodosocanresultinseriouspolicyandcombat misfortune. Insurgency,fromanorganizationalandoperationalperspective,is themostintricate ofthefourtypesofactivitiescarriedoutbyarmed groups.Aswillbediscussed,thiscanbeseenwheninsurgent movementsarejuxtaposedwithterroristorganizations.Itislikewise 5

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thecasewhentheyareputsideby sidewithmilitiasandcriminal groups.Insurgentscanattackthestatewith an arrayofpoliticaland paramilitaryinstrumentsbecauseofhowtheyorganizeandoperate. Numerousauthorshaveproposeddefinitionsofinsurgencyascan beobservedintheliteratureonpoliticalviolence.BardONeill,author of InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionaryWarfare,is oneofthemostfrequentlycited.Hedescribesinsurgentsasarmed groupsthatconsciouslyusepoliticalresourcesandviolenceto destroy,reformulate,orsustainthebasisoflegitimacyofoneormore
3 aspectsofpolitics[withinastate]. VariationsofONeillsdefinition 4 abound.

ConsiderthestatementputforwardintheCIAsmid1980sGuide totheAnalysisofInsurgencyInsurgencyisaprotractedpolitical militaryactivitydirectedtowardcompletelyorpartiallycontrollingthe resourcesofacountrythroughtheuseofirregularmilitaryforcesand

5 illegalpoliticalorganizations. Indoingso,insurgentsseektoweaken

and/ordestroythepowerandlegitimacyofarulinggovernment.They also simultaneously aimatincreasingtheirownpowerandlegitimacy. Tothisend,aninsurgentmovement,dependingonitsgoalsand strategy,willdrawonandemployarangeofoperationalinstruments includingguerrillawarfare,terrorism,andsabotage,aswellaspolitical mobilization,politicalaction,intelligence/counterintelligenceactivities, andpropaganda/psychologicalwarfare. Insurgentscanadoptdifferentorganizationalformsrangingfrom thosebasedonpoliticalandparamilitarydimensionstomorenarrowly structuredconspiratorialones.Theclassicorrevolutionaryinsurgent modelfromtheColdWarerawasdesignedtorecruit,indoctrinate,and mobilizesupporterstoestablishan alternativepoliticalauthoritytothe existinggovernment,whileemployingintelligenceandmilitarymeans 6

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy toattackandweakenthatgovernmentthroughescalatingviolence.A conspiratorialvariation,bywayofcontrast,focusesmoreexclusively onusingviolencetounderminethewillofagovernmentoroccupying powertosustainlossesandstayinthefight.Itpaysmuchlessattention tocontrollingaparticularterritory,massmobilizationorbuildinga parallelpoliticalapparatus. Alsoaffectingthe approachtakenbyinsurgentsistheareaor terrain where theycarryouttheiractivities.Theycantakeplaceinan urbanand/orruralenvironment,aswellastransnationally.Eachof theselocationswillhaveanimpactonhowtheinsurgentsapproach eachofthecharacteristicsorelementsofthisstrategy. Onthebasisoftheaboveconsiderations,thefollowingarethe essentialcharacteristicsofinsurgencyasitwillbeapproachedinthis study: Insurgencyisaprotractedpoliticalandmilitarysetof activitiesdirectedtowardpartiallyorcompletelygainingcontrol overtheterritoryofacountry. Insurgentsseektoaccomplishtheseobjectivesthroughtheuse ofirregularmilitaryforcesandillegalpoliticalorganizations. Insurgentsemployinstrumentsrangingfromguerrilla operations,terrorism,andsabotagetopoliticalmobilization, politicalaction,psychologicaloperationsand intelligence/counterintelligenceactivities. Eachoftheseinstrumentsisdesignedtoweakenand/or destroythepowerandlegitimacyofarulinggovernment,whileat thesametimeincreasingthepowerandlegitimacyoftheinsurgent group. TypesofInsurgencies TherewaslittleagreementamongspecialistsduringtheColdWar overhowtocategorizedifferenttypesofinsurgency.Andthisremained trueinitsaftermathinthe1990s.Variousexpertswereanimatedby differentaspectsofthistypeofarmedgroup.Consequently,they 7

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy createdidiosyncraticorderingsortypologiesofinsurgency.Some focusedontheorganizationalandoperationaldimensionsofinsurgent movementstoclassifythem.Othersconcentratedontheiraspirations. Thefollowingexamplesareillustrativeofthesetwoapproaches. Theaforecited GuidetotheAnalysisofInsurgencysetsoutfour broadvariationsofinsurgencyinitstypologypoliticallyorganized,

Organizational Structure Politically organized Extensive, complexpolitical structure developedbefore military operationsare initiated. Strategy Vulnerabilities Other Characteristics

Shadow government createdto undermine authorityof existing regime political consolidation precedes military consolidation ofcontested areas.

Vulnerableto concentrated effortaimedat neutralizingthe infrastructure andestablishing administrative controlin contestedareas.

Protracted warfare tendency towards excessive revolutionary zeal.

Militarily organized Small, decentralized structureof armedinsurgents servingasa catalystfor mobilizing opposition againstan existingregime.

Insurgent groupshope toformfocus fordisaffected population destructionof regime legitimacyby military action military consolidation precedes political consolidation ofcontested

Vulnerableto aggressive militaryaction duringearly stagesof rebellionbecause ofundeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable logisticsand communications networksamong local populations.

Hopeto demoralize regimeand attainpower without extensive conventional warfare.

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areas. Traditionally organized Existingtribalor religious organizational structure.

Nounique strategy commonto allwilladopt strategyof oneofthe othertypes.

Limitedcapacity Recruitmenton forabsorbing basisofethnic economicand exclusivity. military punishment leadership conflictsare commonleaders oftenlack sufficient motivation, experienceas insurgents,and political discipline.

Urban insurgency Cellularstructure Threaten inurban regime environment. legitimacy throughurban disruption.

Restrictedto smallareaand musthidewithin population attritionresulting from military/police pressureandthe psychological stressof clandestinity.

Oftenin supportof wider insurgency wagedinrural areas.

militarilyorganized,traditionallyorganized,andurbanorganized.
6 Belowisabriefsynopsisofwhateachentails:

Ascanbeseen,inthiscategorizationtherearetwokeyordefining variables,theorganizationalstructureandoperationalstrategy employedtoachieveintermediateandlongterminsurgentobjectives. Othercharacteristicsreceiveconsiderationinthetextaccompanying thisdelineationideology,motivation,leadership,cadrebackground butorganizationalstructureandoperationalstrategyarethekey 9

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy variablesusedtodifferentiatethepolitical,military,traditional,and urbanvariations.AsimilarapproachcanbeseeninChristopher

7 ClaphamscategorizationofinsurgenciesinAfricainthe1990s.

BardONeill,ontheotherhad,concentratesoninsurgent aspirations.In InsurgencyandTerrorismhe identifiesseveraltypesof insurgencymovements.Foreach,theirprinciplegoalorobjectiveisthe centralvariables.Henotesthatbydoingsoimportantdistinctions emerge.Moreover,Ifwefailtoseethefundamentaldifferenceswith respecttogoals,wemakeamajormistake becausedifferentiating amonggoalshasnotonlyacademicvaluebutsomeveryvitalpractical implicationsforthoseinvolvedin[countering]insurgents.8 For instance,thiswouldbetrueintermsofwhetheraninsurgentmovement orelementswithinitareopentonegotiationandpoliticalcompromise. Basedonaspirations,ONeillsinglesoutseventypesofinsurgent movementsanarchist,egalitarian,traditionalist,pluralist, secessionist,reformist,and preservationist.Eachoftheseprototypes focusestheiractivitiesandoperationsprincipallyatthenationalor nationstatelevel.However,atleastinthecaseoftwoofthem,the insurgentsmayseetheirmovementaspartofalargerinternationalone basedonatransnationalideology. Thefirsttypeanarchisthasfarreachingbutunrealisticgoals. Theyseektoeliminateallinstitutionalizedpoliticalarrangements becausetheyviewthesuperordinatesubordinateauthorityrelationships
9 associatedwiththemasunnecessaryandillegitimate. Toaccomplish

thesegoals,anarchistcellstendtorelyonwhathasbeencalled propagandaofthedeedviolentstrikesagainsttheauthorityfigures
th oftheregime.Whileprevalentattheturnofthe20 century,inthe

aftermathofWWIIexamplesofthisvariantarescant.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thesameisnotthecaseforegalitarianorwhatmoreaccurately shouldbetermedrevolutionaryinsurgentmovements.Inthisapproach, theinsurgentsseektoimposeanewpoliticalandsocialorderonthe statebasedonavaluesystemthatcallsfordistributionalequality.To doso,theinsurgentleadershipcreatesacentrallycontrolledapparatus ororganizationthatmobilizesthepeopletoradicallytransformthe

10 socialstructurewithintheexistingpoliticalcommunity.

IntheaftermathofWWIIanumberofcommunistrevolutionary movementsindifferentpartsofthedevelopingworldadoptedthis approach.PerhapsthemostillustrativeexampleoftheseColdWar revolutionaryinsurgencieswasthatinVietnam.Itwasable,in succession,toforce firsttheFrenchandthentheUnitedStatesto negotiatetheirwithdrawalfromtheconflict.Andaswillbediscussed later,theNationalLiberationFrontorVietCong(VC),whichthe United Statesfought,establishedahighlydevelopedversionofthis insurgentorganization.Whilefocusedonseizingpoweratthe localor nationstatelevel,nevertheless,theVietnameseandotherlikeminded insurgenciessawthemselvesaspartofalargercommunistinternational
11 movement.

A traditionalinsurgencyalsohasasitsgoalfundamentalchangeof thepoliticalandsocialorder.However,whatsuchmovementsplanto replacetheexistingsystemwithisonethatseekstoreturntoand restorearegimethatexistedineithertherecentordistantpast.Inthe caseofthelatter,the ancienrgimeisrootedinancestraltiesand religion.ONeillreferstothissubtypeasreactionary.Amore analyticallypreciseandobjectivecharacterizationistodescribethem asMillenarian. Millenarianmovementsareonesinwhichreligious,social,and politicalgroupingsenvisionacomingmajortransformationofsociety 11

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy and areturntoanidealizedpast.Suchmovementstypicallyclaimthat thecurrentregimeanditsrulersareirreparablycorrupted,unjust,and otherwiseirredeemable.Moreover,suchmovementsoftenbelieveina supernaturalpowerandpredeterminedvictorythroughtheintervention ofGodorothermetaphysicalforces. Millenarianmovements,generally,seetheworldthrough Manichaeanlensesaholywarbetweentheforcesofgoodandevil. Andtheyaretransnationalinscopeaswell.Revolutionaryand millenarianinsurgentmovementshavemuchincommonwithrespect toadogmaticcommitmenttoanideologybasedonaperceptionofthat ideologyasreflectingabsolutetruth. PostWWIImillenarianismismostoftenidentifiedwithcertain conceptionsofradicalIslamism.Inthe1950s,theMuslim Brotherhood,foundedbyHassanalBannain1928asareligious, political,andsocial/revolutionarymovement,wasthemostactive.The globalSalafiJihadmovementisitsforemostoffspring today. Thefinalinsurgentvariantwhichseeksarevolutionary transformationofthepoliticalsystemPluralististheonlyonethat isnotauthoritarianinorientation.Theirgoalistoestablishasystemin whichthevaluesofindividualfreedom,liberty,andcompromiseare emphasizedandinwhichpoliticalstructuresaredifferentiatedand autonomous.ONeillnotesthatWhilethehistoryofWestern civilizationismarkedbyanumberofsuchuprisings[armed insurgencies]inrecenttimestherehavebeenfewofanywecould classifyaspluralist.12 Whilethisistrueofarmedmovements,there areanumberofexamplesofmovementsemployingnonviolent
13 strategiesthathavethesamepluralistpoliticalobjectives.

ThefifthtypeofinsurgencySecessionistseekstobreakaway fromthestatetowhichitisformallyapartandestablishan 12

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th independentpoliticalcommunity.Inthelatterhalfofthe20 century,

secessionistinsurgentmovementsburgeoned.Buttherewasno uniformityinthetypeofpoliticalsystemtheysoughttoestablish. Someoptedforasystemthatreflectedtheirethnicandreligious traditions,whileothersplannedformoremodernformsofgovernment. Nonearetransnational,seeingthemselvesaspartofalargerorglobal movement. ThefinaltwotypesofinsurgencyReformistand Preservationistarelessambitiousintermsoftheiraspirations.The formerseeksamoreequitabledistributionofthepoliticaland economicgoodsofthesystem,notaradicalreorderingofit.Thelater seeksevenless.Itseekstomaintainthestatusquo,becauseofthe relativeadvantagesitderivesfromit. DistinctionsBetweenInsurgencyandTerrorism Scrutinyrevealsimportantdifferencesbetweeninsurgent movementsandterroristorganizations.Understandingthese dissimilaritiesisnotonlyanacademicsprerogative.Suchan appreciationisessentialforthosegovernmentsfacedwithhavingto combateachofthesetypesofarmedgroups.Terrorismandthose armedgroupswhoseoperationalactivitiesarelimitedtothisformof politicalviolencehavebeendefinedinamyriadofways.Moreover, beginninginthe1960sterrorismcametobeusedpejorativelyto discreditanddelegitimizevarioustypesofarmedgroups. Themonikerterroristwasemployedbygovernmentsfor propagandaandpoliticalwarfare purposesagainstinsurgentor resistancemovements.Theobjectiveindoingsowastodebasethe reputationofthemovement,renderitscauseillegitimate,andportray itsmethodsasoutsidethelawsofwar.TheUScharacterizationofthe VietConginthe1960sisillustrative.However,fortheVietCong, 13

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy whileterrorismwasemployed,itwasdonesoasonetacticwithina
14 morecomplexpoliticalmilitarystrategy.

Inthe1970s,anumberofarmedgroupsdidemergethatnarrowed theiroperationalapproachto arelianceonterroristtactics.Examples includedtheBaaderMeinhof Gang(theRedArmyFaction),theItalian RedBrigades,andJapaneseRedArmy.Theyhadlittleornoapparent desire(orcapacity)toestablishamasssocialmovement.Rather,these terroristgroupswerecomprisedofsmallcellsofalienatedindividuals embeddedwithinnationalsocieties.Thefollowingaretheirkey characteristics: Terroristgroupsseekthedeliberatecreationandexploitation offearthroughthethreatand/oruseofthe mostproscribedkindof violenceforpoliticalpurposes. Theactisdesignedtohaveafarreachingpsychologicaleffect beyondtheimmediatetargetoftheattack.Theobjectiveistoinstill fearinandintimidateamuchwideraudience. Thetargetsofterroristgroupsincreasinglyarenon combatants,andlargenumbersofthem,whounderinternational normshavethestatusofprotectedindividualsandgroups. Basedonthesecharacteristics,itisobservablehowterroristgroups differfrominsurgentmovements.Forinstance,importantdistinctions existwithrespecttotacticsandtargeting.Asnotedabove,itisthecase thatinsurgentuseofviolencecanincludeterrorismaswehavedefined it.Buttheyalsorelyonguerrillawarfaretacticsdefinedhere as irregularsmallunitattacksagainstthestatesmilitaryandsecurity forcestoharass,exhaust,andforcethemtooverextendtheirresources. Inconjunctionwithviolence,insurgentsalsouseanumberof politicaltacticstoreallocatepowerwithin thecountry.Theymaydoso, asnotedabove,forrevolutionaryobjectivestooverthrowandreplace theexistingsocialorder.Ortheymayhavefarlessgrandiose aspirationsoverthrowanestablishedgovernmentwithoutafollowon 14

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy socialrevolutionaryagenda,establishanautonomousnationalterritory, causethewithdrawalofanoccupyingpower,orextractpolitical concessionsthatareunattainablethroughlessviolentmeans. Thesedifferencesarecapturedgraphicallyinthediagrambelow. Herewecanseethatthereissomeoverlapbetweenterrorismand insurgency,buttherearealsolargeareaswheretheydonotintersect.

InsurgencyandHighRiskSocialMovements Anadditionallensthroughwhichtounderstandthenatureof revolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgencystrategyissocialmovement theory.Indeed,thesetwoformsofinsurgencyshareseveral characteristicswithsocialmovements.Itisparticularlyrelevantwith respecttotherelationshipbetweentheorganizationalcharacteristicsof suchinsurgenciesandtheirworldview,ideology,andprograms.And byusingthislensweseehowtheterroristmonikercanconcealmore thanitrevealsaboutarmedgroups. Socialmovementsoftentaketheformof largescalegroupingsof individualsand/ororganizationsfocusedonachievingsomedegreeof politicalorsocialchange.Broadlydefined,asocialmovementis comprisedofanelementorgroupingofthepopulationwithinastate 15

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy acollectivitythatchallengesthedominantinstitutionalorderand proposesanalternativestructuralarrangement. Socialmovementsrepresentgroupsthatareonthemarginsofstate andsociety.Outsidetheboundariesofinstitutionalpowertheyseekto changethesystem,ofteninfundamentalways.Givenitspositiononthe marginsofstateandsocietyasocialmovementhastodevelopa sophisticated strategytoachieveitsobjectives. Socialmovementscomeinanumberofdifferentforms. Sociologistsdistinguishbetweenreformandradicalvariations.The formerincludesatradeunionseekingtoincreaseworkersrightsora greenmovementadvocatingnewecologicallaws.Radicalvariations includetheAmericanCivilRightsMovementwhichdemandedfull civilrightsandequalityunderthelawforallAmericansorthePolish Solidarity(Solidarno)movementwhichcalledforthetransformation ofthecommunistsystemintoademocraticone. Socialmovementsarealsodistinguishedbytheirmethodof operations.Someemploypeacefulmeansothersengageinhighrisk, highcostactivism.The laterofteninvolvesarmedviolenceand
15 undergroundorganizations. Revolutionaryandmillenarian

insurgenciesareillustrative. Whydoindividualsjoinhighriskmovementsandoncetheydoso howaretheyretained?Socialscientistshavefocusedonthosefactors thatfacilitateparticipationincollectiveaction.Answersaresoughtto thefollowingquestions:One,whatexplainshowanindividualinitially becomesinterestedinasocialmovement?Whatleadshimtobewilling toexposehimselftoanewway ofthinking?Two,onceexposed,how doesthemovementconvincehimthatitisalegitimatealternativeand persuadehimtoacceptitsworldview?Three,howisheconvincedto

16

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy engageinhighriskactivity.Four,howdoesthemovementretainhim tocontinue todoso? Highrisksocialmovementshavetoestablishstructured organizationswithconsciouslyconceivedgoalsandprogramsfor achievingthosegoals.Theyadoptcharacteristicsofaformal organization(evenwhentheyareclandestine).However,theydiffer fromotherorganizationsinthattheyexistexplicitlyforbringingabout majororsystemicchange.Andthemorefarreachingthatproposed change,themorecomplexthetasksasocialmovementorganization hastoaccomplish.Thisisespeciallytrueforsocialmovementsthat taketheformofrevolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgencies. TheRoleofIdeology. Akeyelementof ahighrisksocial movementistheroleplayedbyideologyinshapingitspurpose, programs,andoperations.Ideologicalappealsarecentraltotheir existence,torecruitmentstrategiesthatattractnewmembers,to a membersloyaltyandretention,andastoolsforwagingthefight. Ideology[A]nemotionladensystemofideas,beliefs,myths, andvaluesbindsamovementtogether.Animportantfeatureof ideologyisitsappealtoemotion anditselicitingofanaffective response.Andthemythsandvaluesofideologyare communicated throughsymbolsthatcapturelargeexpansesofmeaningand
16 communicatethatmeaning. Withinthiscontext,theideologyof

highriskmovementsperformsthefollowingactivities: Itprovidesacomprehensivecritiqueoftheexistingsocialand politicalorderasimmoralandinhuman,andinstillsinindividualsa powerfulsenseofmoraloutrage.Suchideologiespaintasituation inblackandwhiteterms.Therearenograys. Itprovidesanidealizedandsuperioralternativeorderasa substituteforthestatusquoandasetofvaluesthatwillserveas thebasisforanewidealizedsocietyorforthe returntoanearlier goldenage. 17

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Itservestomobilizeindividualstojointhemovementand givesthosewhobecomemembersasenseofunity,solidarity, cohesion,andsenseofpurpose. Itidentifiestheplansandprogramsbywhichthemovement intendsto reachitsobjectives,relatingspecificpatternsofactionto therealizationofitsvisionandvalues. Itisthroughtheseactivitiesthatamovementsideologicalappeal resultsinsuccessfulrecruitment.Ideologybuildsaseriesofframesthat describe thesocialandpoliticalproblemsrequiringimmediateand drasticactionandprovidesaroadmapforredressingthem.Ideology includesadiagnosticframethatdescribestheproblem,detailingthe graveinjusticethathastranspired.A prescriptiveframethatasserts whatmustbedonetorectifyit,proposinganewidealizedsystemthat willreplacethedepravedone.Andamotivational/mobilizationframe spellsoutthestepstobetakenthestrategytobefollowedtobring
17 tofruitionthe prescriptiveframe.

Revolutionaryandmillenarianideologiesnotonlyprovidean individualwithnewbeliefsbutanewidentityandreality.Theprocess amountstoaconversion.Therecruitcomestoseethesocialand politicalorderashighlyunjust,adoptsanewholisticworldviewto replaceit,andreceivesaplausiblestrategyforchangingit.Below,an examinationofoneofthemostsuccessfulpostWWIIrevolutionary insurgencymovementsrevealsthatthisis,toamajorextent,alabor intensiveprocessthatinvolveseducationandindoctrination. Mobilization,integration,andretentionconstituteaprocessfor reconstructingidentityandreality.Therecruitisconvertedtothecause andintegratedintoasocialnetworkofbelievers.Highrisksocial movementsthatadoptinsurgencystrategiesmobilizeindividualsinto groupsthatstruggleandfighttogethergotowartobringabout socialandpoliticalchange.

18

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy IdeologyandOrganization. Theideologyofhighrisksocial movementscomprisesaseriesofframesthatmustcometoresonate withthetargetaudience.Itisthroughthemovementsorganizationthat thisisachieved.Ideologyandorganizationaresymbiotically connected.Asillustratedbelow,organizationisthemechanismthrough whichtheideologicalframesaremediatedwiththetargetaudience. Theinteractionbetweenideologicalcommitmentandorganizational structurecanbeseenparticularlywithrespecttomembership, leadership,andinstitutionalization. Asahighriskmovementbecomesembodiedinamore elaborate andstructuredorganizationalapparatus,theprocessesofmobilization, integration,andretention likewisebecomemoreformalized.Thelines betweenhardcoremembersandthosewhosympathizeand/orpassively supportthemovementaresharpened.Boundariesaredrawn and reinforced.Signsorsymbolsareestablishedtodemarcatemembers fromnonmembers.Thiscantakemanyformssuchasspecialwaysin whichmembersgreetandaddressoneanother. Inhighrisksocialmovementsmembershipbecomesfully socializedintoaninsularandideologicallybasednetworkwherethe demandsassociatedwithparticipationareunbending.Themembers placeintheorganizationandtheactivitiesheisexpectedtoengagein becomethecenterofhisexistence.Theinternalstrengthofsucha movementistheresultofintenseorganizationalworkthroughwhicha massbaseofsupportiscreatedoutof indoctrination effortsdirectedby aleadershipthatconsidersoneofitsmostimportanttasksthe translationofideologyintoaction.Onceinstitutionalized,highrisk socialmovements(toincluderevolutionaryinsurgencies)become professionalized.Theorganizationisabletooutliveitscharismatic founder(s)andbecomeroutinized. 19

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy REVOLUTIONARYINSURGENCY ANDITS TRANSNATIONALEVOLUTION ThroughoutthepostWWII erathedevelopingworldwasthescene ofextensiveconflict,instability,andinternalwarfare.Thepressures andchallengesunderlyingthatviolenceweretheresultofthede colonializationprocess,crisesofstatelegitimacy,redistributionof power,sectariandisputes,andsecessionistpressures.Inallofthese conflictsstateswerepittedagainstnonstatearmedgroups,thelatterof whichemployeddifferentirregularwarfarestrategies. Ofthosedifferenttypesofpoliticalmilitarystrife,themost comprehensive wasthatcarriedoutbynationalliberationmovements employingrevolutionaryinsurgencystrategy.Duetothiscomplexity, theywereoftenmisconstruedintermsof theirideology,narrative,and operationalactivities.Thissectionreviewsthecoreelementsofthat strategy,itsdifferentstages,theroleofexternalassistanceandthe operationalevolutionofrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategyontothe transnationalstagebeginninginthelatter1970s.Belowarethe summarypointsfromthatreview,followedbythetextfromwhichthey havebeendrawn.
SummaryPoints Ofthedifferenttypesofpoliticalmilitaryconflictinthe developingworldfollowingWWII,the mostcomplexwasthat conductedbynationalliberationmovementsemployingrevolutionary insurgencystrategy. Revolutionaryinsurgentstrategycombinedunconventional paramilitarytacticswithpoliticalandpsychologicaloperationsto establishacompetingideologicalstructureandwarfighting organization.Itsimmediate goalwas regimechange,whichservesas preludeforpoliticalandsocialtransformationofthestate. Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesemployedgrand strategies thatimplementedanintegratedoperationalplanofactionbasedonthe followingelements:ideology,leadership,massbase,logistics, organizationalapparatus,political,psychological,guerrillawarfare, paramilitarytactics,andexternalassistance.

20

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
Whileeachelementisnecessaryforsustainingarevolutionary insurgency,the interrelatedelementsof leadership,ideology and organization lieatitscore.They constitute the remarkabletrinity of revolutionaryinsurgencystrategy. Leadershipisindispensable.LeadersofpostWWIIrevolutionary insurgenciesperformed key fundamentaltasks,mostimportantly devisinganeffectiveideologyandorganization. Tomobilizefollowersasuccessfulrevolutionaryinsurgency requiredanappealingideologythatplayedthe centralrolein attracting newmembersshapingtheirloyaltytoretainthemand servedas a vitaltoolforwagingthe politicalfightforlegitimacy. Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesinstitutedorganizational infrastructuresthatwere extensive andfunctionally multifacetedto1) broadenpolitical appeal, influence, andcontrol and 2)createawar fightingcapability sustainedthrougharobustcommand,logistical,and financialsystem.

Theincipientstageofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesfocusedon
buildingamassbaseofsupporters.Thiswasthefirststepin establishinganorganizationalinfrastructurecapableofconducting protractedrevolutionarywarfare. Recruitingamassbasetostaffaninsurgentorganizationwas difficult.Traditionalsocietieswerenotreceptivetosuchactivities. Therevolutionary leadershiphadtoshift traditionalloyaltiesand inducepeopletobecomerisktakers.Theyhadto acceptnewroles, integrateintonewsocialpatterns,follownewauthority,andtolerate thestressesinherentinprotractedwarfare. Todoso,leadership, ideology,andorganizationestablisheda process todrawandbindpeopletotherevolutionaryinsurgent movement. That processinculcatedthe movements ideologyand narrative intothoserecruited.The processconsistedofthreetasks mobilization,integration,andmaintenance. Mobilization beganthe processofconvincingindividualstobreak withexistingsocialandculturalcontextandacceptanewonesetout inideologyandnarrative.Thefirststage endedwithacceptanceof membership.Itconsistedmainlyofpersuasion throughideologicaland nationalisticappeals,thepromiseofrewards,selfsatisfaction, revenge,andadvancement.These methodscouldbeaccompaniedby morecoerciveones. Inthesecondstageintegrationtherecruitwassocializedinto theinsurgentmovement, broughtinto conformitywithitsgoals, convincedtomakea majorcommitment,andcametobesynchronized

21

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
withandcontrolledbytheorganization.Newrecruitsdidnothavethis levelofcommitmentwhentheyjoined.Achievingitnecessitateda carefulsocializationandindoctrinationcourseofaction. Thefinal stagemaintenance orretentionfocusedthe highly stressfulnatureofprotractedwarandthechallengeof keeping membersinthefight.Maintainingcompliancewiththeleaderships authority,stayingloyaltoandidentifyingwiththemovements ideologyandnarrative,andsustaininginstitutional bondsrequired carefultending. TheVietCongapproachtothe mobilization,integration,and maintenance illustrateshow nationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsdevelopedamassbaseofsupportduringthe incipient stage. The processwasalocalized,individualized,handson,faceto face,andlaborintensiveexercise. Followingtheincipientstage, revolutionaryinsurgenciesentered into longperiodsofprotractedirregularwarfare.Insurgentsfought longwarsthatdemandedestablishing andstaffing warfighting organizations thatcouldsustainpolitical,psychological, guerrilla warfare,andotherparamilitaryoperationsoverlengthytimeperiods againststrongeropponents.Oftenprotractedirregularwarfare proceededthroughseveralstages. Becauserevolutionaryinsurgencieswereradicalsocial movements,politicaloperationswerevitalforfightingthestate. Throughparallelhierarchiesorshadowgovernmentthese activities tookdifferentformstoincludeincorporatingvarioussocialgroupings tobroadentheinsurgent apparatusandinstitutionalizeitsmassbases. Political operations includedtwoothercriticalactivities: 1) addressing thematerialandsocialinequalitiesthatwereimportant causesoftheinsurgency.Parallelhierarchiesprovidedsocialservices and2)establishingthemeansofproducingoracquiringwarfighting capabilities. Otherkeyoperationalactivitiesemployedbyrevolutionary insurgentstoexecute protractedirregularwarfareincluded1) propaganda,politicalwarfare,andpsychologicaloperations to propagate theirnarrativeinternally andinternationallythrough informationcampaigns2)intelligenceandcounterintelligenceand3) paramilitaryoperations(terrorism,guerrillawarfare,sabotage,and mobileconventionaltactics). Finally,revolutionaryinsurgentmovementsduringtheColdWar soughtand receivedexternalsupportmainlyfromtheSovietUnion. Theydidsobecauseofthepoweroftheregimestheywerefighting. Buttheyalsosawthemselvesaspartofaglobalideologicaland

22

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
revolutionarystruggle.Still, thesewerefirstandforemostnational levelinsurgencies. Inthelatter1970scertainnationallevelgroupschallengingstate authoritythroughinsurgency warfarebegantoextendthebattlefieldto thetransnationalleveloutofoperationalnecessity.Intheforefrontof thisevolutionofinsurgencystrategywasthePLO.Theyintroduced twoimportantoperationalinnovations1)theyextendedtheirareaof operationstoattacktargetsinotherregions,primarilyEuropeand 2) throughtheseoperationsthePLOsuccessfullyexploitedpropaganda ofthedeedtopropagateitsmessage transnationallyto mobilize much widersupportforitscause. ThesePLOoperationalinnovationswithrespecttotheconductof insurgency wereemulatedby otherarmedgroupsduringthe1980s. Moreover,aswillbedescribedinalatersection,theseinnovations alsohadanimportantimpactonhowalQaeda plannedand conducted globaloperationsinthe1990s andbeyond.

Background PostWWII revolutionaryinsurgenciesgenerallywere basedon variationsofMarxismandnationalism.However,withinthecontextof theColdWarandtheEastWeststruggle,theformerwasoftenseenas ofgreaterconsequence thanthelatterand aslinkingthesenational levelconflictsto aglobalmovement.Becausetheideologyofnational liberationmovementsemployingrevolutionaryinsurgencystrategy tendedtobeavariationofMarxism,theywerefrequentlyseenas appendagesofaSovietledinternationalcommunistmovement.While theUSSRdidprovideassistancetoseveraloftheseinsurgencies,byno meanswasitthegeneralstaff thatdirected aglobalrevolutionary insurgency againsttheWest. Tobesure,worldrevolutioninternationalsystemchangewas theoriginalgoaloftheCommunistInternationalorComintern. FoundedinMoscowin1919,itwasestablishedbyLenintolayclaim tothe leadershipanddirectionoftheworldrevolutionarymovement. Anditdidprovidesome assistanceto localcommunistinsurgency movements.Lenin sawtheCominternasthegeneralstaffofaworld 23

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy revolutionwhichwouldoverthrowtheinternationalcapitalistorder. However,becauseofdeepinternaldivisionsandlackofcapabilitiesit

18 nevercameclosetoachievingthatloftygoalduringitsexistence. The 19 CominternwasofficiallydissolvedonMay15,1943,byStalin.

DuringtheColdWartheSovietUnion reestablishedapolicyof supportingnationalliberationmovements,mostnotablyunder Brezhnev.Thisbegan inthelatter1960swithmajorassistancetothe NorthVietnameseandVietCong.Intheearly1970s,MiddleEastern andAfricanmovementslikewisereceivedparamilitaryaid.Bythe

20 decadesenditwasextended toLatinAmerica. Severalofthese

movementscametopower.ButMoscowsassistancewasnotthe principlereasontheywereabletodoso. Whileitisbeyondthescopeofthisstudytogointothedetailsof whyandhowthistookplace,two issuesareimportanttohighlight. First,Sovietpolicyappearstohavebeen drivenmorebythe superpowerconfrontation,internationalbalanceofpower,and expansionismthanbyacommitmentto communistinternationalism andworldrevolution.Ofcourse,itwasframedintermsofthelatter, buttheconsensusamongspecialistsistheformerwasthecentral
21 imperative.

Second,insurgentmovementsthatreceivedassistanceandcameto powerattheendofthedayenactedpoliciesthatreflectedtheirnational interestratherthan communistinternationalism.Theywerenotspokes inthewheelofworldrevolution.Consequently,itwouldbeamistake toseetherevolutionarywarsofthepostWWIIeraandtheiroutcomes aspartofaglobalcommunistinsurgency. TheinsurgencystrategythatpostWWIIrevolutionarymovements employedwasfrequentlymisconstrued,andequatedwithguerrilla warfaretacticsandterrorism.Whilethese tacticswerepartofthis 24

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy variationofinsurgency,theywerenottheessenceof it.Revolutionary insurgentstrategycombinedunconventionalparamilitarytactics guerrillawarfareandterrorismwithpoliticalandpsychological operationstoestablishacompetingideologicalstructure andwar fightingorganization.Itsimmediategoal,regimechange,served as preludetoamoredefinitiveobjectivepoliticalandsocial transformationofthestate. Thisvariationofinsurgency,whoserootslieintheChinese Communistmovementofthe1930s,required agrandstrategytobe successful.Inessence,anoperationalplanofactionthatincludedthe followingelements:ideology,leadership,massbase,logistics, organizationalapparatus,political,psychologicalandparamilitary tactics,andexternallinkages/assistance. Whileeachwasnecessaryformountingandsustainingprotracted warfare,thecloselyinterrelatedelementsof leadership,ideology, and organizationlieatthecoreofpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgent strategy.Theyplayedavitalroleineachphaseofconflict.Andthey wereparticularlycrucialintheincipientorinitialperiodofactivity.It isinthisembryonicmomentthatleadersmustemergeandshapean ideology andnarrativethatrespondstobothrealdomesticgrievances corruption,repression,unemployment,poverty,insufficientsocial services,anddisrespectfortraditionalnormsaswellasto thedesire forabetterandmoresecurewayoflife.Likewise,intheincipientstage thefoundationfortheinsurgentsorganizationalinfrastructureislaid. Thesethreeelementsleadership,ideology, and organization arecrucialtothe implementationofanoperationalplanofaction that seeksfirstandforemosttowoothepopulationovertothesideofthe insurgencymovement.Thepopulationisthevitalelementforinsurgent success.Theyhavetowinthepopulationovertoitsside. 25

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy CoreElementsofStrategy Effective leadershipwasakey aspectof successfulpostWWII revolutionaryinsurgentmovements.Leadersperformedcertain vital tasks.Theseincludedestablishing ideologyandorganization.Without effectiveleadershipthatwasabletodoso,ideologyandorganization were likelytobeineffectual. Withoutarelevantideology andnarrative,mobilizationofthe necessaryfollowerstojointheinsurgentmovementwillnotoccur. Lackinganappealingideology,massmobilizationwillnotgetoffthe ground.Forhighrisk socialmovementslike thesepostWWII revolutionaryinsurgencies,ideologyplayedakeyroleinestablishing supportforthemovement,itsleaders,objectives,andactions.Effective leadershipandideologymaximized appealtothepopulation,thevital elementkeyingredientforsuccess. While leadershipandideologywere necessary,alonetheywerenot sufficientformobilizationofamassbase totakeplace.Akeyenabling componentwasanorganizationalinfrastructurethatfacilitated cross cuttingsocialandpoliticalstructuresthatextenddowntothelocal level.Thisbroadened amovementsappeal,influenceandcontrol.And thatorganizationalsocreated awarfightingcapability. In OnWar,Clausewitzreferstothesymbioticrelationshipamong threeelementsofwhathecoinedtheremarkabletrinity:themilitary, thegovernment,andthepeople.Heproposedthatacentraltaskofthe strategistwastodevelopandmaintainabalancebetweenthem.Itwas essentialtosuccessinwar.We wouldproposethattheremarkable trinityforrevolutionaryinsurgencymovements,the sinequanonfor successisan effectiveinterrelationshipbetween leadership,ideology, and organization.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheIncipientStageandtheRevolutionaryInsurgentTrinity Toimplementarevolutionary insurgentstrategy,the leadershipof nascentmovementsduringtheColdWarrequired acapacitytorecruit thenecessary personnelfromwithinthepopulation.Withoutitthey wereunable toexecutetheoperationalactivitiespertinenttoeachofthe functionalelementsoftheirstrategy. Thecontemporaryhistoryofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesreveals thatthey succeedwhensupportedbyasufficientpartofthe population. Therefore,inthe incipientstage,leadershad tobeabletorecruit supportersbuildabaseforthemovement.Thiswasthefirststepin establishinganorganizationalinfrastructurecapableofconducting protractedrevolutionary warfare. Intheincipientstage,leadersestablished themeanstobring individualsfromvarioussocietalgroupingsintothemovementtostaff theinsurgentorganizationandexecuteoperationalactivities.Butthisis difficulttoaccomplish.Why?Traditionalsocietiesthelocationwhere postWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgenciestookplacewerenotreceptive tosuchactivities.Thismeantovercominglocalpredispositionsthatdid notlendthemselvestorisktakingandrecruitment.Traditionalculture revolvedaroundvillagelife,localsocialpatterns,andloyaltiesthat werenoteasilyaltered. Torecruitmembers,traditionalloyaltieshadtobebroadenedto inducepeopleto become risk takers.Unlesstheywerewillingtoaccept newroles,integrateintonewsocialpatterns,follownewauthority,and toleratethestressesinherentinprotractedwarfare,insurgent organizationscouldnotestablishabase fromwithinthepopulation and didnotmaintainthemselvesforlong.Therevolutionaryorganization hadtocreateenduringbondsbasedontheadoptionofideologyand narrative. 27

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Howdidthey bringthisabout?Leadership,ideology,and organizationestablishedaprocess abletodrawandbindpeopletothe insurgentmovement.Thatprocessprovidedthoserecruitedwithsocial psychologicalcompensationforhighrisktaking.Itcreatedmotivation. Ideologyandnarrative were inculcatedthroughthisprocess.Therank andfilethatconstituted the baseof successfulinsurgenciesdidnot automaticallyacceptideologyandnarrative.Itwasonlythroughthe processdescribedbelowthattheycametocommittoit. Thisprocessconsistsofthreetasksmobilization,integration,and maintenance (orretention).Eachisbrieflydefinedbelow,followedby acasestudyhighlightinghowtheNationalLiberationFrontorViet Congemployedthesemethodstobuildarevolutionaryinsurgent organization.Arguably,inthepostWWIIperiodtheyprovedtobe among themostproficientatit.And,aswillbeunderscored,itwasa handson,facetoface,laborintensive exercise. PhaseIMobilization. Mobilization(orrecruitment)wasthe startingpointwhereanindividualhadtobeconvincedtobreakwiththe existingsocialandculturalcontextandacceptanewonesetoutin ideologyandnarrative.Joiningthemovementtypicallywasnotasingle actbutaprogressionthatbeganwiththe individualsexposure tothe movementgenerally by someonewhowasalreadyanestablished member. The endofthe firststagewasacceptanceofmembershipinthe movement.Mobilizationorrecruitmentconsistedofvariouskindsof activitiesthatsoughttopersuadethrough ideologicalandnationalistic appeals,thepromiseofrewardsandstatus,selfsatisfaction,revenge, andadvancement.Thesemethodscouldalsoincludemorecoercive onessuchasgrouppressure,threats,andforcedinduction.

28

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy PhaseIIIntegration. Inthesecondstageintegrationthe recruitwassocializedintotheinsurgentorganization.Through integrationtheindividualwasbroughtintoconformitywiththe insurgencysgoalsandconvincedtomakeaseriouscommitmentto theirachievement. Through integrationmethodsanindividualcametobe inharmony withandcontrolledbytheorganization.Achievingitnecessitated a carefulsocializationandindoctrinationcourseofaction.Throughthese techniquesnewmemberslearned totake ordersandfollowthe guidancetheyweregiven.Therecruitwasembeddedinthe organizationand agreed toperformthose tasksthatwere assigned. PhaseIIIMaintenance. Thefinalstageinvolved maintenance orretention.Giventhehighlystressfulanddangerousnatureof protractedwar,keepingmembersinthefightrequired attention. Maintainingcompliancewiththeleadershipsauthority,stayingloyal toandidentifyingwiththemovementsideologyandnarrative,and sustaininginstitutionalbondsrequiredcarefultending. Buildingandretainingabaseofsupportersthroughthe processof mobilization,integration,andmaintenance affordedpostWWII revolutionaryinsurgentmovementstheopportunitytodevelopthe meanstoconductprotracted irregularwarfare.Theywerenowableto movebeyondtheincipientstageto1)engageinbothunderground political,social,andinformationaloperationsand2)activatearmed elementstocarry outparamilitaryoperationstoincludeguerrilla warfare,sabotage,andterrorism. TheCaseoftheVietCong. TheVietnamese NationalLiberation Front(NLF)orVietCong(VC)followed the mobilization,integration, and maintenanceprocessduringitsincipientstage.DouglasPike,inhis study VietCong:OrganizationandTechniquesoftheNational 29

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy LiberationFrontofSouthVietnam noted:WhenIfirstapproachedthe subjectoftheNationalLiberationFront,Iwasstruckbytheenormous amountoftime,energy,manpower,andmoneyitspenton communicationactivities.Itseemedobsessedwithexplainingitself. Theneteffect,wrotePike,wasthattheybroughttothevillagesof SouthVietnamsignificantsocialchangeanddidsolargelybymeans

22 ofthecommunicationprocess. Throughittheyexposedtraditional

villagerstonew ideas,newmethods,andnewsocialstructures. AccordingtoPike,Thegoal[duringtheperiod]wascontrolof the populationandthroughthatcontrol,theorganizationofthepeopleinto aweaponagainstthegovernment,andlateragainsttheUnited

23 States. Todoso,theVChadtochangeattitudes,create an alternative

belief system,andestablish anewsocializationpattern. Whatfollowsisabriefdescriptionof howtheyemployedthe mobilization,integration,and maintenanceprocess.Executionofit wasextensive,localized,andpersonalized.Itfocusedontheindividual whowasintroducedtotheNLFthroughavarietyofmeansand eventuallyrecruited.Andoncerecruitedtheindoctrinationandtraining workbegan inordertoturn theindividualinto acommittedmember. AsPikeintimatesabove,the processwaslaborintensiveandutilized
24 indoctrinationefforts,sharedsocialmyths,andleaderledrelations.

Mobilizationwasthefirststepincreatingamystiquethatservedasthe foundationofanewidentityfortheindividual. Mobilizationbeganwithaninitialexposureto VCrecruitmentand culminatedwithacceptanceorrefusalofmembership.Theapproach taken wasbasedondetailedpersonaldossiersofindividualsina village.VCagentslookedforthosevulnerabilitiesthatwouldmakea potentialrecruitsusceptibletooneofitsmessages.Successcame

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy throughanunderstandingoftheindividualandthecircumstances surroundinghislife. Basedonthatunderstandingoftheindividualoneormoreofthe following approachescould beusedbyarecruitertopersuadehimto considerjoiningsocialpressure (friendsorfamilywhowerealready memberswouldbeusedtobringpressure)emotionalappeals(the targetwasyoungandcouldbeconvincedthroughproselytizing, convincinghim thathecouldachievehonorandglory)personal susceptibility (thetargetwasdissatisfiedwithhiscircumstancesand withvillagelife)personalrewards(thetargetsoughtsocial advancementandprestige) injusticesexperienced (thetargetandhis familyorfriendshadbeenabusedbythegovernment)nationalist sentiments(thetargetwaspatriotic)and ideologicalattraction (the Frontsnarrativewaspersuasiveanditsidealisticgoalsconvincing). Insum,theNLFwasanactiveagentthatsoughtoutrecruits.While itwouldusecoercionwhennecessarytogainaccesstovillagers,once accesswasgained,positiveformsofpersuasionweremostoften employedtoconvincethemtojoin.Avarietyoforganizational activitiesweredirectedtowardscreatingasettingconduciveto mobilization.Theseactivitiesvariedfromareatoareaandindividualto individual. Therecruitwasplacedintoasettingwherethroughintensive indoctrinationandtraininghewouldcometobe embeddedintothe revolutionarymovementandpreparedforanewroleandanew identity.Thiswasthesecondphaseoftheprocessintegrationofthe individualintotheNLF.Thegoalwastoinstillintotheindividual thosenormsandvaluesthatwouldbindhimtotheorganization.He wastocometo believetheideology andnarrative,becomecommitted topoliticalandsocialchange,and adoptaprescribedcodeofbehavior. 31

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Commitmentwasmeasuredintermsofobediencetotheorganization andallegiancetoitscause.The integratedrecruitwaswillingto sacrificehimselfforthecause ofthemovement,and submittothe leadershipandunityofitsorganization. TheVCpaidagreatdealofattentiontoturningthenewlyrecruited intoacommittedcadre.They expendedconsiderableresourcesto imbuesocializeandindoctrinateitsmembers.Attheendoftheday, thenewrecruithadanewidentitythatwasverydifferentfromthatof thepeasantintheVietnamesevillage.PaulBermansumsupthis transformationasfollows:Ratherthanacceptanceofnature,thereis masteryoverfateratherthandenialofemotion,thereishate, enthusiasm,andzealotryratherthanpoliticalapathy,thereis politicizationratherthanselfinterest,thereisselfsacrificeratherthan devotiontothefamily,thereiscommitmenttotherevolutionary
25 organization.

Retainingtheindividualin therevolutionary insurgentorganization wasthethirdstepinthe process.HerealsotheNLFcommitted considerableresourcesandeffort.Ithadtobecauseitwasinalong protractedwarwithasuperpower.Mobilizingandintegratingwasnot sufficient.Therevolutionaryorganizationhadtotakeactivestepsto

26 maintainitself. Thisincludedan aggressiveuseofinformationand

propagandatoconvincetherankandfilethattheywouldprevail. RecallwhatPikesaidabouttheinordinate amountoftimeand effort thatwentintotheFrontsuseofinformationandcommunication. Additionally,arangeofmoreproactivetechniqueswereusedto helpmemberscopewiththestressesoffighting.Theseincluded individualandgroupmoralebuildingprogramstoreinforcethe messagesfosteredin informationandpropaganda.Rewardswere likewiseused.Forthosefightingtheseincludespromotions, 32

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy commendations,andmedals.Materialprivilegesandotherformsof gratificationalsofortifiedcommitment. Maintenancealsotookplacethroughraisingthecostsofdissension and leaving.TheNLFdidsothroughconstantsurveillanceofits members,andtheuseof sanctionsandpunishmentsif warranted.The latterrangedfromreprimandsandreeducationfordesertionto executionfortraitorousbehavior. Insum,theVietCongapproachtothe mobilization,integration, and maintenanceprocessillustrateshow arevolutionaryinsurgent movementdeveloped amassbaseofsupportduringitsincipientstage. Itwasalocalized,individualized,handson,facetoface,andlabor intensiveexercise.Throughmobilizationandextensiveeffortsat integrationtheyproducedthepersonnelthatstaffedacomplexpolitical andmilitaryorganization,onecapableofprotractedwarfare.Their mobilizationandintegrationefforts,accordingtoseveralassessments,
27 werequiteeffective. Maintenanceofthatorganizationintheperiod 28 aftertheincipientstageprovedmuchmorechallenging fortheNLF.

Cansuchaprocessbereplicatedattheinternationalleveltomake possibleaglobalinsurgency?Whatmethodswouldhaveto be substitutedforthelocalized,individualized,handson,facetoface onesemployedbytheVCandotherpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgent organizations?Aswewilldiscusslaterinthispaper,duringthelatter 1970sanevolutioninthenationallevelinsurgencymodelbeganto takeplace.Nationallevelmovementsbegan togotransnational.This wasthefirststepinanevolutionaryprocessthat,asweshallsee,will begreatlyaffectedbyglobalizationand the informationrevolutionof the1990s.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheProtractedWarfareStage Followingtheincipientstage,nationallevelinsurgenciesentered longperiodsofprotractedirregularwarfare.Thisprovedtobehighly demanding.Insurgentorganizationsfoughtlongwarsthatcould proceedthroughseveralstages.Thesewerefirstformally conceptualized byMaoTseTung,basedontheChineseCommunist

29 experience. WhileMaoprovidedasetofguidelinesforprosecutinga

protractedwar,in thefieldthereprovedtobenooneformula.A numberofvariationstookplace inpractice.Comparativeanalysisbares

30 thisout.

Because revolutionaryinsurgencieswerealso socialmovements, politicaloperationswere avitalpartof strategyforfightingthese long wars.Thesetookanumberofdifferentforms.Theyincluded incorporating varioussocialgroupingsreligious,occupational, women,writers,farmers,youthintotheinsurgentinfrastructure.That allowedarevolutionaryorganizationto broadenitsapparatusand institutionalizeitsbaseofsupporters.Indoingso,insurgentleaders wereabletoinvolvedifferentsegmentsofthepopulationinthe movementthroughavarietyoflocalpoliticalandsocialactivities. Politicaloperationsalso includedprovidingsocialservicesinareas wheretheinsurgentshad amajorpresence.Finally,politicaloperations involvedraisingfundsandmanagingfinancialstructures,aswellas establishinglogisticalnetworksforprocurementof warfighting and othersuppliesfromexternalsources. Asecondsetofoperationalactivitiescanbegroupedunderthe rubricofpropagandaandpsychologicaloperations.Thesewerewars forlegitimacy,andsuccessfulinsurgenciesputagreatdealoftimeand effortintopropagatingtheirnarrativeinternallythroughnewspapers, pamphlets,radiobroadcasts,rallies,meetings,andoneononesessions. 34

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Inmanyinstancestheylikewisecarriedoutthese information campaignsexternallythroughfriendlygovernments,international organizationswheretheyweregivenforums,andfrontorganizations. Intelligenceoperationswereathirdimportantcomponentofthe warfightingcapabilitiesofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesduringthe protractedwarstage.Withintheinsurgentapparatusspecialdivisions wereestablishedforbothintelligenceandcounterintelligence. Finally,theuseofviolencemanifesteditselfindifferentkindsof paramilitaryoperations.Thisincludedtheuseofterrorism,asitwas definedearlier.PostWWIIinsurgentsutilizedittodifferentdegrees. However,theprimarywayoffightingwasguerrillawarfare operations directedagainstthemilitaryandpoliceforcesoftheregime.The objectivewastoharassandunderminetheirwillingnesstofight.Only whenthebalanceofforcesbeginsto shiftwerelargerand more quasi conventionalunitsintroduced tofightpositionalbattlesanddefend thoseareaswhere theyestablished sanctuary. TheRoleofExternalAssistanceandInfluence RevolutionaryinsurgentmovementsduringtheColdWarsought andreceivedexternalsupportmainlyfromtheSovietUnionandits surrogates.Thereason theysoughtthisaid,inthefirstplace,hadtodo withthepracticalrealitiesofthe conflict.Tooffsetthesuperiorpower ofthestatestheywereconfronting,eveninsurgentmovementsthathad establishedamassbaseandorganizationalinfrastructurecapableof executingtheoperationsdescribedintheprevioussectionrequired additionalresourcestoaccomplishtheirobjectives.Externalhelp was evenmorecriticalforthose insurgenciesthathadnotreachedthis degree ofeffectiveness. Giventhattheideologicalbasisforrevolutionaryinsurgenciesat thattimewasMarxism,they soughtoutsideassistanceofvariouskinds 35

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy fromthemajorcommunistpower.WhydidtheUSSRcometoprovide it,particularlyinthelatter1960s? Aswasnotedearlier,therewas considerabledebateatthetimeoverhowtointerpretthemotives underlyingexternalassistance.WewouldconcurwithONeillthatit principallyhadtodowiththepostWWIIsuperpowerconfrontation. Thegreatestimpetustoexternalsupportforsuchinsurgent movements[was]thecontinuousrivalrybetweenthemajor

31 communistpowersandtheWestsincethelate1940s.

Sovietexternalsupporttooktwobasicforms.First,political instrumentstoincludepropaganda,theuseoffrontorganizations,and politicalaction inside internationalorganizationswereutilizedto championthecauseandobjectivesofrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsontheworldstage.Thegoalwastobuildsupportforthe justcauseofinsurgents,whiledelegitimizingtheincumbentregime

32 (andtheUnited Statesifitwasbackingit)theywere fighting.

Second,paramilitaryassistancewasalsoprovidedtoimprovethe fightingproficiencyof theinsurgentforcesagainsttheirpoliceand militarycounterparts.Theprinciplekindsofhelpincludedthetransfer ofweapons,traininginsurgentmembers,andproviding advisory support(mainlythroughsurrogates).TheSovietUnionnotonly providedparamilitaryassistanceonitsown,butalsocalledon itsEast EuropeanandCuban alliestodothesame. Inprovidingthisassistance,the USSRassertedthatitwasitsduty tomateriallyassistlocalrevolutionaryinsurgentmovementsthatwere ideologicallysimpaticowiththecauseofworldrevolution.Inother words,theselocalmovementsweresaidtobepartofaworld movementthataimedatinternationalsystemchange. ThisbegsthequestiondidthesumtotalofpostWWII national levelrevolutionaryinsurgenciesamounttoaglobalinsurgency under 36

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thedirectionoftheSovietUnion?Tobesure,theyallrhetorically assertedthey adheredtothesame ideologythatcalledforregime changelocallyandinternationalsystemtransformationglobally.And theUSSRasserteditwassupportingnationallevelrevolutionary insurgenciesonthatbasis.Thus,localinsurgencieswereframedaspart of aglobalstrugglebetweencompetingideologicalsystems.These nationallevelinsurgencieswere characterized bythemselvesandby theUSSRasmembersofaworldwide revolutionarymovementthat wasatwarwiththeWest.Butwasthisreallythecase? Formany revolutionaryinsurgenciestheideology andnarrative thattheyfoundedtheirmovementsonincluded,oftenmore importantly,nationalismandnationalidentityframes,aswellas contextualissuesrelatedtolocalpoliticalandsocialconditions.In otherwords,whilewecannotdiscountthefactthatthey themselves framed theirstrugglewithinthecontextoftheEastWestglobal ideologicalconfrontation,theirimmediatepoliticalobjective overthrowoftheregimetheywereatwarwithwasofparamount importance.Therefore,nationalandcontextualissueswereof preeminentimportanceinframingideologyandnarrative.Andoncein power,theydidnottakedirectionfromtheUSSRorcommitsignificant resourcestoconductingaglobalfight. Likewise,withrespectto theSovietUnion,thedecisiontomore activelypromotewarsofnationalliberationthroughpoliticaland paramilitaryassistance inthelatter1960sdoesnotappeartohavebeen basedonthegoalofestablishing anexistentialoridealinternational endstatethroughaglobalinsurgencystrategy.Rather,itwasmore aboutthebalanceofpowerandSovietexpansionism.Moreover, Moscow sawtheUnitedStatesasvulnerable intheaftermathof Vietnam,unwillingtouseforceorassistregimesthreatenedby 37

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy revolution.Therefore,theUSSRwasmorewillingtoprojectpowerand influence intowhatittermedthenationalliberationzoneofthe developingworld.Bythemid1980s,itfoundthecostsofmaintaining

33 thispolicyincreasinglyprohibitive.

TheTransnationalEvolutionofNationalLevelInsurgency Inthelatter1970scertainnationallevelgroupsandmovements challengingstateauthoritythroughunconventionalwarfare began to extendthebattlefield tothetransnationallevel.Theydidsomostlyout ofoperationalnecessity.Thecounterinsurgencymeasuresofthestates theywerefighting hadbecomeincreasinglyeffective,preventing the establishmentof aclandestineinfrastructureorshadowgovernmentin theareaofconflict.Becauseofthesedevelopments,the chancesof successfullygainingcontrolofterritorywithinthestateandinflicting realdefeatsongovernmentsecurityforceswereremote.Therefore,to continuethefightanewvariationorapproachtoinsurgencywas required. Amongthe firstarmedgroupstoextendthebattlefield transnationally werePalestinianonesfightingagainstIsrael.This transpiredovertheperiodfromthelate1940stothemiddleofthe 1970s.RecallthatduringtheArabIsraeliwarof1948manyPalestinian Arabslefttheirhomesforneighboringcountries,fleeingvoluntarilyor beingforcedtoleavebyIsraeliforces.Thiswasthebeginningofthe PalestinianDiasporacommunitiesthatexisttoday. LocatedinJordan,Syria,Lebanon,andEgypt,itwasfromthese refugeecommunitiesthatnewarmedpoliticalgroupsbegantoemerge. TheirleadersassertedthatifthePalestiniansweretoretaketheir homeland,theywouldhavetotakeresponsibilityfordoingso.The PalestinianLiberationOrganization(PLO)wasestablishedin1964for thispurpose.UnderthegeneraldirectionofYasserArafat,thePLO 38

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy servedasanumbrellaorganizationforseveralconstituentgroups. TheseincludedAlFatah,Force17,HawariGroup,PLF,andPFLP. Eachhaditsown fedayeenorcommando assaultunitsthatcarriedout crossborderstrikesagainstIsraeliterritoryfromthosecontiguous stateswherethePalestinianshadrelocated.Theseguerrillawarfare andterroristoperationsintensifiedintheaftermathofthe1967war. IsraelnotonlydefeatedthearmiesofitsArabneighborsin sixdays butalso seizedcontroloftheWestBankandGaza.Asaresult,the exodusofPalestiniansthathad begunin1948increaseddramatically especiallyto thenearsanctuariesofJordan andLebanon. Consequently,infiltration attacksacrossthebordersofthesestates againstfortifiedKibbutzs,militarytargets,andpublic facilities escalated.And JordanandotherArabstatesprovidedincreased support fortheseoperationsasanalternativemeanstoconventionalinterstate warfaretorecoverlostterritoryandadvanceothergoals. Israelcounteredbydevelopingarobustborderdefense system.It includedremovalofPalestinianvillages,smallunitpatrolling,rapid reactionoperationstoincludehotpursuitofinfiltratorsseekingtoflee backtotheirsanctuaries,and airartillery attacksagainstthose sanctuariesandthemilitaryforcesoftheregimesthatprovidedthesafe haven.Inthe caseofthelatter,Israelsobjectivewasto raisethecosts tothoseprovidingsupportforfedayeenoperations.Thiswascertainly trueforhowitdealtwith Jordan.In1968Israelbeganlaunchingairand artillerybarragesagainstJordanianarmypositions.Thesereprisals resultedinconsiderablemilitarycasualties. ForJordan,these attacksbyIsraelonitsarmywereonlypartofthe priceforbackingfedayeen operations.Asecondcostwasthe emergenceofthePLOasahostile statewithinastateinsidethe kingdom.In1969thisledtoseveralhundredviolentclashesbetween 39

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thePalestinianforcesandJordaniansecurityforces.Actsofviolence againstJordaniansecurityforcesincludedkidnappingsandritualistic murders.ByFebruary1970fightingwastakingplacebetween JordaniansecurityforcesandthePalestiniangroupsinthestreetsof Amman,resultinginabout300deaths.Thisescalatedthroughthe summermonthstoincludeseveralassassinationattemptsagainstKing Hussein.Therestoftheyearsawintensefightingthatresultedin thousandsofdeaths.Bythesummerof1971thePLOwasdrivenoutof Jordan,and hadtoreestablishitself inLebanon. HavinglostitsbasesinJordanandincreasinglyconstrainedin attackingcrossborderfromLebanonduetoIsraelicounterinsurgency tactics,thePLOturnedtotransnationaloperationstoextendthe battlefieldbeyondthe localregion.PLOoperativesbegantraveling fromtheMiddleEasttoEuropeinordertocarryoutattacks.Andthose operationsincreasinglybegantotargetcivilians.The foremostearly exampleofthiswastheattackbythePLOsBlackSeptember OrganizationonIsraeliathletesatthe1972MunichOlympicGames. Whiletheoperationactuallyfailedtoachieveitsimmediateobjective, itneverthelesswasamajorsuccessintermsofcapturingthe imaginationofthePalestinianDiaspora.Andinitsaftermaththousands ofPalestiniansrushedtojointhePLO.Otheroperationsensued inthe 1970sincluding skyjackings,hostagetaking,letterbombs,and assassinationsinvariouspartsofEurope. These attackswerepartofanewapproachwhich,accordingto JohnMackinlayandAlisonAlBaddawy,reflectedanimportant connectingfactor.Eachact,usuallyinitsfinalstages,becamehighly visibleandoften bydesignencouragedreporters,pressphotographers, and televisionandfilmcoverage.Theattackswereirresistibleasnews storiesbecausetheyweresovisuallysensationalbutalsobecausethey 40

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy werecarriedoutwithsuchdesperateconviction.Becauseofthemedia coverageofthesetransnationaloperationsthePLOleadership wasable toreach severalimportantaudiences:largenumbersoftheirown nationalsinforeigncountries,Arabstates,theMuslimcommunity worldwideandWesternstates,somewhichpreferrednottothinkabout

34 Palestine.

WiththeeffectivenessofIsraelicounterinsurgencytactics,thePLO hadtofindawayotherthan localized guerrillawarfaretoreachthese audiences.Itdidsothroughinternationalterrorismattacksmainly againstwhatinternationallawdesignatesasprotectedcategoriesof peoplethatareofflimitsinwar.Buttounderstandtheseattackssolely onthosetermsmisconstruesthepropagandaandpoliticalmobilization featuresoftheoperations. MackinlayandAlBaddawy describetheirsignificanceandhow theytransformedtheconductofinsurgency,introducinganew variationofthisformofwarfare.ThePLOgraspedthat[W]eare livinginaneraofviolentactivismthatacceptsthatweareanimatedby thepropagandaof thedeed,ratherthanthemilitaryvalueofthedeed itself.ThePLOadapteditscampaigntothisrealityandsucceededin gettingthemselvesandthePalestinianissueontotheglobalagenda. Theresultwasthattheseoperationscametobewidelysupported, clandestinelybyArabstatesandovertlybyradicalizedMuslim communities.Thesewere nottheactsofpoliticallyisolated
35 extremists. Rather,theywerekeyelementsofanewPalestinian

strategy,onethatthroughtransnationalterroristoperationssuccessfully exploitedpropagandaofthedeedtopropagateitsmessageand mobilizesupportforitscause. Insum,thePLOintroduced twoimportantoperationalinnovations duringthisperiodwithrespecttotheconductofinsurgency thatnot 41

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy onlyservedasaninspirationforotherarmedgroupsduringthe1980s but,asweshalldescribelater,alsohadanimportantimpactonhow al Qaedaconductedglobaloperationsinthe1990s.First,theyextended theirareaofoperationstostrikeatUStargetsacrosstheglobe.Second, theobjectiveofthoseoperationsbecamepropagandaofthedeed, ratherthanthemilitaryvalueofthedeeditself.Attackswereplanned andexecutedfortheirvisibilityandpropagandavalue.Inthe1990sthe mediabecamethepropagatorofalQaedasmessage.Andbytheendof thedecade itwasdoingthepropagatingofitsactivitiesandideology notonlythroughthemediabutbywayofitsownInternetnewsshows andonlinepublications. REQUIREMENTSFORAGLOBALSALAFIJIHADIST INSURGENCY IstheSalafiIslamistJihadmovementexecutingprotractedglobal insurgency warfare? Aretheyutilizingaglobalversionofthenational levelrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategy and/oritstransnationaladaptation asdescribedintheprevioussection?Toanswerthese questionsitis firstnecessarytoidentifythe requirementsorconditionsof aglobal insurgency.Fiveprimaryrequirementsare proposed.Theyare deduced from 1)thestrategyemployedbynationallevelrevolutionary insurgent
th movementsduringthelatterhalfofthe20 century,2)howinsurgent

groupsbeginning inthelatter1970sextendedthatbattlefield transnationallyandthroughterrorismexploitedpropagandaofthedeed, and3)thekeydistinguishing characteristicsofthe SalafiJihad movement.Belowarethemain summarypointsfromthereview, followedbythe accountfromwhichtheyare taken.
SummaryPoints FortheSalafiIslamistJihad movementtoexecuteaglobal versionofthenationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategyitwould havetomeetfiverequirementsorconditions.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
FirstrequirementConceptualizeanideologythatperformsthe samefunctionsasthoseadoptedbyhighrisksocialmovements.This entailsdevelopingaseriesofframesto:1)describethesocialand politicalproblemsrequiringimmediateanddrasticaction2)proposea newidealizedsystemtoreplacethedepravedonethatresonatedwith thepopulationand3)identifystepstobringthistofruition. SecondrequirementAninnovativeleadershipthatcan conceptualizethatideologyandestablishanembryonicorganization capableofoperationalizingittobegintoattractandrecruitacritical massofsupporters.Intheincipientphaseofinsurgencytheseare first ordertasks. ThirdrequirementEstablishaninfrastructurecapableof fightingaprotractedglobalinsurgency.Todoso,a process isneeded todrawandbindindividualstothemovement.Thatprocess inculcates themovementsideologyandnarrativeintothoseattractedtoit.Todo so,newfacilitatorsorenablersglobalization,informationsystems, andnetworkedorganizationshavetobesubstitutedforthisnormally localized,facetofaceapproach. FourthrequirementAstheincipientstageproceeds,aglobal insurgency(aswithitsnationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgency counterpart)entersaperiodofprotractedorlongwar.Indoingso,it hastosetoutforitself1)whereitintendstofight(theareaof operationsorAO)and2)howitintendstodoso(the organizational infrastructure and warfightingtacticstheyintendtouse). Fifthrequirement ToexecuteaglobalinsurgencytheSalafi Jihadistswouldhavetoemployanarrayofpolitical,psychological, and paramilitarymethodswithintheir areasofoperationsthattarget bothnear andfarenemies.

The SalafiJihadmovement,inthefirstplace,shouldbeunderstood asamillenarianmovement.Itseeksamajortransformationof the existingpoliticalstatusquo and areturntoanidealizedpast.TheSalafi Jihadistscharge thatcurrentregimesand rulerswhodominate the Ummah (communityofbelievers)areirreparablycorrupt,unjust,and repressive.Theylabeltheminfidelsand apostates. Second,likemedievalmillenarianstheSalafiJihadistsbelieveina supernaturalpowerandpredeterminedvictorythroughtheintervention
36 ofGod. They seetheworldthroughManichaeanlensesholywar

betweentheforcesofgoodandevil. 43

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Third,theSalafiJihadistsaretransnationalactors.Theirplanof actioncallsforholywarto 1)expelthe UnitedStatesfromIraq,the ArabianPeninsula,andMiddleEast2)eliminate thestateofIsrael3) overthrowapostategovernmentsin theMuslimworldand 4) re establishtheCaliphate,thehistoriccommunityofIslamwhich expanded beyondtheArabianPeninsulafollowing thedeathofthe prophetMohammedandcametoencompassintheseventhcentury bothIranandEgyptandbytheeighthcenturyNorthAfrica,theIberian Peninsula(SpainandPortugal),India,andIndonesia. Giventhesefarreachinggoals,the firstrequirementthattheSalafi Jihadistswouldhavetosatisfyto beinapositiontoinitiate aglobal insurgencyistoconceptualizeanideologythatsuccessfullyperforms the samefunctionsasthoseadoptedbyhighrisksocialmovements. Recallthatthisentaileddevelopingaseriesofframesthat1)described thesocialandpoliticalproblemsrequiringimmediateanddrastic action2)proposed anewidealizedsystemto replacethedepravedone thatresonatedwiththepopulationand 3)identified stepstobringthis tofruition thatappearedachievable. Alsorecollectthatconceptualizinganeffectiveideologywasa considerablechallenge fornationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgencies becausetheirideologyhadto attractandsustain amassbaseofsupport fromwithinsocietiesthatweretraditional,insular,anddiverse.That challengeismagnified fortheSalafiJihadistmovementgivenitsglobal areaofoperation.Whatwasdemanding toestablish atthenational level,itwouldseemreasonableto suggest,iseventougherto accomplish atthetransnationallevel. The secondrequirementisan innovative leadershipthatcancreate thisideology andestablishanembryonic organizationcapableof operationalizing itto begintoattractand recruitacriticalmassof 44

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy supporters.Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesintheirincipient phase (andlaterprotractedwarfarestages)werecommandedbyleaders whoperformedthesefirstordertasksofdevisinganeffectiveideology andestablishinganembryonicorganization. Thesecoreelements,intheincipientstageof revolutionary insurgencies,concentratedon recruiting amassbaseofsupporters.This wastheinitialstepinestablishinganorganizationalinfrastructure that wouldbecomecapableoffighting protractedrevolutionarywarfare. Thisisthe thirdrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement. Todoso,nationallevelinsurgenciesestablishedaprocesstodraw andbindindividualstotherevolutionaryinsurgentmovement.That processsoughtto inculcate themovementsideologyandnarrativeinto thoserecruited.The process, asoutlinedabove,consistedofthree tasksmobilization,integration,and maintenance.Itwascarriedout, forthemostpart,withintheboundariesofthestatethe revolutionary movementwaschallenging. TheVietCongcasestudy illustrated theextenttowhichcarrying outthisprocesswaslocalized,individualized,handson,labor intensive,andfacetoface.Canaglobalinsurgencymovement replicatethe mobilization,integration,and maintenanceprocess atthe transnationallevel?Hasthe SalafiJihadmovementbeenabletodoso? Aretherenew facilitatorsorenablerssuchasglobalization,information systems,andnetworkedorganizationsthatcan be substitutedforthis localized,facetoface approach? Asthe incipientstageproceeded,nationallevelrevolutionary insurgentmovementsenteredtheperiodofprotractedwarfare.These werelongwars.Andtheareaofoperations(AO),asdefinedbythe insurgents,wasfirstandforemostwithintheboundariesofthenation state.Thatwaswheretheinsurgentsmainenemywaslocated andit 45

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy waswherethey builtandemployedtheirguerrillawarfighting organization.Tobesure,therecouldbe internationaltargetsaswell. Thiswasespecially the casewhere anoutsidepowerwasinvolvedin an internalwar.However,theinstrumentsusedbytheinsurgentson thesedistantbattlefieldsweremostoftenthoseforpoliticalwarfare. Thisbegantochange,aswasdescribedintheprevioussection,in thelater1970s.AtthattimethePLOextendedthebattlefieldoutof necessitytothetransnationallevelandnarroweditsparamilitarytactics topropagandaofthedeedthroughterroristoperations. Howwould aglobalinsurgencyduringtheprotractedwarfarestage defineitsareaofoperations,thecompositionofitswarfighting organization,andthetypeofviolenceitwouldemploy?Doingso isthe fourthrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement.Ithastosetout 1)where itintendstofightthegeographicalspaceand2)howit intendstodosothewarfightingorganization andtypeofoperations theyintendtoemploy.Towhatextenthavethe SalafiJihadmovement anditsalQaedavanguarddoneso? Tofightlongwars,revolutionaryinsurgentmovementsestablished andstaffedwarfightingorganizationsthatemployedpoliticaland paramilitary instrumentsoverlengthytimeperiods.Theseinstruments werepartofastrategy.Aswasnotedearlier,theirwarfighting apparatusemployedthesemethodsprimarilywithintheboundariesof thenationstate.ThatwastheirAOuntilgroupsstartingwiththePLO extendedtheAOtothetransnationallevel.Toexecute aglobal insurgencytheSalafiJihadistswouldhaveto carryoutsimilarpolitical, psychological,guerillawarfare,andotherparamilitaryoperations withinitsareasofoperationsthattargetbothnearandfarenemies. Thisisthe fifthrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement.

46

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AGLOBALSALAFIJIHADINSURGENCY: MYTHOR REALITY? HastheglobalSalafiJihadmovementthatemerged sincetheearly 1980sdevised andinitiated aglobalinsurgency strategy?To determine whetherthisisthecase,theactions,activities,andoperationsofthe SalafiJihadmovementanditsalQaedaleadership areexamined throughthelensofthe fiverequirementsofaglobalinsurgency identifiedabove.Arethey consistentwith those five requirements,and ifsotowhatextent?Isthe SalafiJihad insurgencyintheincipientstage orhasitprogressedfurther? Hasitdevelopedadoctrineand capabilitiestocarryoutgloballyalong Jihad? Toanswerthesequestionsthe stagesthroughwhichtheSalafi Jihadmovementevolvedareexamined,employing achronological narrativeformat.Thenarrative canbedividedintothefollowingsix phases:1)Emergenceof SalafiIslamismandtheMuslimBrotherhood 2)ConceptualizationofSalafiJihadIdeology3)TheSovietAfghan War4)AfterAfghanistan:DecidingontheNextAreaofOperations 5)AfghanistanAgain:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgencyand6) GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11. Belowarethekeyfindingsforeachofthesixstagesthroughwhich theglobalSalafiJihadmovementevolved.Ontheeveof9/11,itcanbe argued itwasinthe early incipientstageofaglobalinsurgency.Next, thefindingsdescribehowalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave attemptedto reorganizethrough fourstrategicadaptationsto recover fromits2001setbackand continuetofacilitateaglobalmillenarian insurgency.Followingthesummaryofthefindingsisthenarrative fromwhichtheyaredrawn.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy SummaryPoints
HastheglobalSalafiJihad movementthatemergedintheearly 1980sbeenabletofightitsnearandfarenemiesthroughaglobal insurgencystrategy? Thisstudyproposesthreeconclusions. First,as9/11approached,aglobalSalafimillenarian insurgencywasinitsembryonic stage,carryingoutguerrilla warfareandotherparamilitaryoperationsagainstbothnearand farenemies. Second,OperationEnduringFreedomwasastrategicsetback forthatglobalinsurgency.Itnowfacedthechallengeofadapting torecoverwhatitlost.Overthelast severalyearsalQaedaand theSalafiJihadistshavesoughttodosothroughfourstrategic adaptations. Third.Howsuccessfultheyhavebeenandtheextenttowhich theyareabletofightthelong Jihadrequiresmoreresearchand aninnovativeanalyticeffortthatwasbeyondthescopeofthis study. Thesejudgmentsarededucedfromananalysisofthe sixphases thatconstitutetheevolutionoftheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement. Whatfollowsarethekeyfindingsforeachofthosephases. I.RevivalofSalafiIslam,theMuslimBrotherhoodandSalafiJihadism
th SalafiJihadistsarepartofa20 centurySalafiIslamicrevival. ThelatterisoneofIslamsmostpuritanicalforms.

TheSalafisseektoreturnIslamtoitsrootsbyimitatingthelife andtimesoftheProphetandhisimmediatesuccessors.Theydraw theirunderstandingofIslamfromaliteralinterpretationoftheQur'an andtheHadith. TheyrejectallsubsequentIslamicreinterpretationsand innovationsas Jahiliyya,astateofmoralignorance. TheSalafirevivalarguedthattheMuslimcommunitythe Ummahhadfalleninto Jahiliyya. Tosavethem,itwasnecessaryto reeducatetheUmmahintheoriginalpracticesoftrueIslam. ThisSalafirevivalbecamepoliticalthroughtheMuslim Brotherhood,foundedin1928.TheBrotherhoodwastoserveasa vanguardpartyforpoliticalchangeandsocialjustice. Asitgrew, Jihad entereditspoliticallexicon,callingforarmedstruggletoliberate Muslimlandsfromcolonialoccupationandlaterfromapostate Muslimregimes.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
II.TheOriginsoftheSalafiJihadMovement Inthe1950s,Salafi Jihad ideologybeganto takeshape.Itskey theoristwasSayyidQutb.HebelievednearlyallofIslamwasin Jahiliyya,havingbeenpollutedbyWesterndecadence,materialism, andfaithlessness. Islamiclawandreligiousvalueswerebeingsubvertedbyapostate Muslimregimes.He calledforJihad tooverthrowthem.Qutbcoupled apuritanicalinterpretationofIslamwithaviolentpoliticalideologyof revolt. QutbsawthecrisisinMuslimstateswithinthecontextofaglobal ideologicalbattlewiththenonMuslimworld,inparticularWestern civilization.TheWestwaspushingtheMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya. HepaintedanextremelydehumanizingpictureoftheWestas soulless,immoralanddepraved. QutbproposedatransnationalideologytomobilizetheUmmah forJihad againstnearenemies(apostateMuslimregimes)andfora globalfightagainsttheWest.Toleadthestrugglehecalledfor creationofaMuslimvanguard. ThefirstrequirementtoinitiateaglobalSalafiJihadist insurgency isconceptualizingauniversalideologythat1)describesthedepraved conditionrequiringJihad,2)proposesanidealizedsystemtoreplace it, and3)identifiesstepstobetakentobringittofruition,Qutb providedthisdoctrinalfoundation. III.TheSovietAfghanWar TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistangaveafledgingSalafiJihad movementasacredcausetomobilizebeyondthenationallevelto liberateapartoftheUmmahfromaforeigninfidelinvader. ThosewhocamefromtheMuslimworldtoresistaggression againstdaralIslam(thehouseofIslam)becamethe firstgenerationof transnational Jihadists.Theirvictorywasempoweringandinspiring forthemselvesandothers. InAfghanistantheelementsof leadership,ideology, and organization formountingaguerrillainsurgencymaterialized.Leaders espousedanideologythatbroughttogetherQutbsMuslimvanguard toleadtheUmmah. ThekeyleaderwasAbdullahYusufAzzam.Heimplemented Qutbsideas.TheSovietinvasionwasinfidelaggressionagainstdar alIslam.HeissuedafatwacallingMuslimstofightaJihad through guerrillawarfaretoexpelthem.Majorreligiousfiguresagreed.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
Azzamestablishedaninfrastructureforvolunteersfromaround theMuslimWorld.Afghanistanbecameatraininggroundtobreeda globalresistanceoftensofthousandsofmilitant Jihadiswhobecame skilledinguerrillaandotherparamilitarytactics. These AfghanArabsbecamethevanguardaninternational brigadeforcarryingoutglobalJihad.Afghanistanwasthe beginningthestartingpointforaglobalSalafiJihadist insurgency. Acorecadrenowexistedforit. IV.AfterAfghanistan:DecidingontheNextAreaofOperations Followingthewarthe AfghanArabsdebatedwherenextto fightfortheIslamiccause.Wherewasthenextareaofoperationsand who wastheenemy?Thesequestionsformedthebasisofastrategic reassessment. OnegroupproposedliberatingotherMuslimlandsoccupiedby infidels(e.g.,Bosnia).ThatwasthenewAO. Othersproposedreturningtotheirhomecountriestooverthrow apostateMuslimregimes.Among AfghanArabsitwaschampioned bytheEgyptiancontingent. IraqsinvasionofKuwaitaddedanotherdimensiontothedebate. TheSaudisallowedtheUSmilitary todeploytotheKingdom.Bin Ladenlabeledthattreason.ItallowedIslamsmostholyterritorytobe occupiedbyinfidels. ExiledtoSudan,binladenandalQaedaconcludedinlate1994 thatthenewAOandtargetshouldcenteronthe UnitedStates.If SalafiJihadistsweretorealizetheirglobalgoals, Americahadtobe defeated. Bythemid1990s, anewtargetingdoctrineforglobalinsurgency wasset.ToimplementitalQaedahadtoestablishanorganizationthat couldemploypolitical,psychological,guerrillawarfare, andother paramilitarytechniquestofightalong Jihad.Itwasattemptingtodo soinSudanwhenforcedtoleave. V.AfghanistanAgain:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgency AfghanistangavealQaedaanopportunitytobuildatransnational organization.TensofthousandsofSalafiorientedMuslimswere trainedandindoctrinated.They constitutedthe secondgenerationof internationalholywarriors. Duringthelatter1990s thefoundationwasestablishedbyal QaedaforinitiatingaglobalSalafiJihad insurgencythatreflectedthe fiverequirementsidentifiedinthisstudy.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
Doctrinewasrevisedtoemphasizeaglobalwarfightingmission thattargetedtheUnitedStatesthefarenemy. Beyonddoctrine,alQaedasorganizationgrewinsizeand complexity,allowingittoplanandexecuteterroristattacks againstUS targetsacrosstheglobe,whilenationallevelaffiliatesfoughtguerrilla warsathome. InAfghanistan,alQaedaestablisheditselfasthevanguardofthe globalJihad throughanetworkoflinkageswithascoreofnational levelIslamistgroups,manyemployingguerrillaviolenceagainsttheir governments. RadicalIslamistgroupsappearedtofunctionthroughnine regionaltheatresofoperations.AndalQaedaemergedastheir vanguard,seekingtoinspireandintegratethemintoatransnational SalafiJihad movement. Severalenablers,mostimportantlytheAfghansanctuary, enhancedalQaedascapacitytodrawnationallevelgroupsintoa broaderJihad networkthatontheeveof9/11reachedtheincipient stageofaglobalmillenarianinsurgency. VI.GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11? Following9/11, alQaedasAfghaninfrastructurewasdestroyed, astrategicsetbackfortheSalafiJihad vanguardandtheembryonic globalinsurgencyitwasfacilitating.Itnowfacedthechallengeof adapting torecover. SincethenalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshavesoughttodoso throughfourstrategicadaptations 1) employingtheInternetto establishavirtualsanctuary,2)makinguseofungovernedterritory,3) exploitingtheIraqconflict, and4)maintainingnationallevelJihad activitiesthroughthenine regionaltheatres. Thisstudyfocusedonestablishingavirtualsanctuaryonthe Internet.UtilizingungovernedareasandexploitingIraqconflict receivedbrieferattention.Particularsonthenine regionaltheaters werebeyondthestudysscope. TheextenttowhichalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshavebeen abletosuccessfullyimplementthese fourstrategicadaptationsto fightalong Jihadrequiresalevelofresearchbeyondthisstudy. VirtualSanctuary AlQaedaandassociatedJihad groupshavesoughttoreplicateon theInternetthosefacilitiesandcapabilitieslostinAfghanistanin

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2001.InthefollowingsevenwaystheInternethasbeenutilizedasa substitutesanctuary: 1)PropagatingtheSalafi Jihad ideology. Thisisthefirst requirementtoinitiateaglobalinsurgency.ThroughWebbased activitiestheSalafiJihadistsexecutethisfunctionglobally.They disseminateideologicalframesandmessagestoinstillintheUmmaha powerfulsenseofmoraloutrageandcommitmenttoholywar. 2)InspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointhe Jihad. Itis onethingtoagreetoideologicalmessages,anothertobeinspiredto action.AlQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistsuseaplethoraofInternet methodstoachievethisend.Onekeywaytheydosoisbycelebrating theachievementsandsacrificesofthoseonthefrontlinesoftheglobal fight. 3)Psychologicalwarfaretodemoralizeenemies. Theflipsideof inspiringtheUmmahtojointhefightisto demoralizenearandfar enemiestoconvincethemtogiveupthefight.TheinsurgencyinIraq isillustrative.AnumberofInternettacticsareemployedtodemoralize theAmericans,Iraqis,andforeignersworkinginIraq. 4)NetworkingtheglobalSalafiJihad insurgency. Lossofthe Afghansanctuaryledtotheuseoftheinternetfortrainingand operationalactivities,toincludeorganizingvirtualcells.Foreach, securecommunicationswereneeded.Newmethodshavebeen employedtoprotecttheseactivitiesfromdisruptiveUSintelligence tactics. 5)OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks. AlQaedaandassociateshaveestablishedanonlinelibraryofmanuals andhandbooksforirregularwarfare.Theserangefromdoctrinal guidestoinstructionsonhowtocarryoutaparticulartacticoremploy aspecificweapon.ReceivingthewidestattentionistheImprovised ExplosiveDevice. 6)OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses.NewInternettechniquessince9/11havebeenadoptedbythe SalafiJihadistsforonlinetrainingprograms.Overthelastthreeyears professionallyproducedtrainingvideoshavebeengenerated.Aglobal programintheartofterrorism(GPAT)nowexists. 7)CollectionTargeting. TheInternetprovidesSalafioperational unitswithdataontargets.ThroughWebbaseddataminingtheybuilt folders/filesonarangeoftargetsfromgovernmentfacilitiestonuclear powerplants.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
UngovernedTerritory Beyondthisvirtualsanctuary,alQaedaappearstohaveattempted tocarryoutinlargelylawlesstribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan borderactivitiesitexecutedduring19962001inAfghanistan. Theextenttowhichithasbeenabletodosoisunclear.Jihadis aretravelingtotheareatojointhefightmuchliketheirpredecessors didinthe1980sand1990s.Butadetailedpictureremainselusive,at leastinopensources. TheAfghanPakistanborderisnottheonlyungovernedterritory inwhichalQaedaand/orregional Jihadigroupshavedevelopeda presence.TheAlgerianbasedGroupforPreachingandCombat (GSPC)hasmovedintotheSahelregionofAfricatoestablishbases. TheIraqFront AlQaedaandothertheSalafiJihadgroupsseeIraqwithinthe contextofalong Jihad.Itisthemainfront,theforwardedge ofthe globalbattle,onwhichtoengagethefarenemythe UnitedStates. Theyhopetoinflictadefeatofstrategicconsequencesonit. TheSalafiJihadistsalsobelieveIraqaffordsthemavital opportunitytospawna thirdgenerationofskilledholywarriorswho aftertheyleaveIraqcanfightintheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inthe st firstdecadesofthe21 centurythese IraqiArabscanservethe th samepurposethe AfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century. IraqhasbecomeanintegralpartofhowalQaedaand Salafi Jihadistshavesoughttoadaptfollowingthestrategicsetbackin Afghanistantocontinuetofosteraglobalinsurgency. FosteringtheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement AlQaedasfourthadaptationfocusedonreestablishing its roleas vanguardofthe globalSalafiJihadmovement,arolethatwassetback asaresultofOperationEnduringFreedom. Developingadetailedmosaic ofwhatisnowreferredtoasal QaedaandAssociatedMovements(AQAM)wasbeyondthescopeof thispaper. Onlythe broad contoursofAQAMarehighlightedandkey questionsthatremaintobeaddressedidentified. Aslateas2005,USofficialswerestillstrugglingtounderstand therelationshipbetweenalQaedaanditsaffiliates,andtheextentto whichthose linkageshadbeenreestablished. In2006, key USnationalsecuritydocumentsbegantousethe termAlQaedaandAssociatedMovements(AQAM)torefertothis

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rejuvenatedrelationship.USCentralCommandsposturestatementfor fightingthewarin2006wasillustrative. Animportantway alQaedasoughttoreestablishlinkageswith localSalafiJihadgroupsisthroughitsvirtualsanctuary.Recent analysisofthisactivity depictsit asverystructured.Ahandfulof primarysourceJihadist Websitesdisseminateofficialcommuniqus, doctrinaltreaties,strategyandoperationaldocuments througha far reachingnetworkofotherWebsites,messageboards,egroups,blogs, andinstantmessaging services. Thisnetworkisatoncedecentralizedbutrigidlyhierarchical. WebsitesatthecenterofthenetworkcomprisealQaedaandgroups closelyassociatedwithit.Since2006, theirwebbasedactivitieshave beencoordinatedanddistributedthroughanewvirtualentitythe Al FajrCenterto secondaryandtertiary Websitesthatcomprisethe network. Akeyfollowonquestionaboutthisfourthadaptationinneedof attentioniswhocomprisesthe localaffiliatedgroupsofAQAMand onwhatbasisdotheyviewthemselvesasapartofAQAM?One recentstudyhassoughtto identify fourcriteriaformembershipin AQAM. Moreattentionneedstobefocusedonthisadaptationinorderto developadetailedmosaicofanditsAssociatedMovements(AQAM).

Emergenceof SalafiIslamism andtheMuslimBrotherhood TheSalafiJihadistsare anoutgrowthof,butnotsynonymouswith,

th amuch larger20 centurymovementofSalafiIslam.ThetermSalafiis

commonlyusedtodescribeperhapsthemostdoctrinaireor fundamentalistformofIslamicthought.Likeothermajorreligions, Islamhasanumberofdifferentvariants.TheSalafimovementconsists ofSunniMuslimsdrawnmainly (butnotexclusively)fromtheHanbali School,and theWahhabielementofit.OfthefourSunnitheological schoolsthatincludetheHanafi,Maliki,andShafii,the Hanbaliare consideredthemoststringentintermsoftheirconservative approachto thepracticeofIslam. TheSalafimovementiscomprisedofmanyofthemostpuritanical groupsintheMuslimworld.Thedifferentpartsofthemovementare

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy allunitedby acommonreligiouscreed.Theconceptof tawhidorthe unityofGod isthecentralelementoftheSalaficreed.Itincludesthose conceptsthatSalafisconsidernecessarytobeacceptedasatrue Muslim. To safeguard tawhid,Salafisbelieveinstrictly followingtherules andguidancefoundintheQuranandtheSunna(thepathfollowedby theProphetwhenhewasalive).Theyseek toreturnIslamtoitsroots by imitating thelifeandtimesoftheProphetandthatof thefirstthree generationsofMuslimsthecompanionsorSahabahoftheProphet, theirimmediatefollowerstheTabiin,andthefollowersoftheTabi'in. TheSalafisdrawtheirunderstandingofIslamfrom aliteral interpretation ofthe Qur'anand the Sunna.Thelatterconsistsof the deeds,sayingsandactionsofMuhammadduringthetwentythreeyears ofhisministry,asrecalledbythosewhoknewhim.Theessenceof SalafismissummarizedbyQuintanWiktorowiczasfollows: Toprotecttawhid,SalafisarguethatMuslimsmuststrictly followtheQuranandholdfasttothepurityoftheProphet Muhammadsmodel.Thelattersourceofreligiousguidance playsaparticularlycentralroleintheSalaficreed.Asthe Muslimexemplar,heembodiedtheperfectionof tawhidin actionandmustbeemulatedineverydetail.Salafisalsofollow theguidanceoftheProphetscompanions(the salaf),because theylearnedaboutIslamdirectlyfromthemessengerofGod andarethusbestabletoprovideanaccurateportrayalofthe propheticmodel(thetermSalafisignifiesfollowersofthe 37 propheticmodelasunderstoodbythecompanions). TheSalafiapproach rejectsallsubsequentIslamic cultural practices,reinterpretations,extrapolation,andinnovationsthat transpired sincethetimeof theProphet.Illustrativeofthisopposition arethe teachingsof MuhammadIbnAbdalWahhab.Itisbeyondthe scopeofthispapertoexaminetherootsoftheWahhabmovement (memberscallthemselvesMuwahhidun)whichbeganover200years
38 agoinArabia. Sufficeittonote,however,thatatthattimehe

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy preachedagainstsuchcustomarypracticesasbreechesofIslamiclaws andlabeledthem Jahiliyya,thesametermusedtodescribethe

39 ignoranceofArabiansbeforetheProphet. Theywereunbelievers,had

fallenintoastateofmoralignorance,andshouldbe puttodeath. MuhammadibnAbdalWahhabsmostimportantconvertwas MuhammadibnSaud,headofoneofthemostpowerfultribesonthe ArabianPeninsula.Thisassociationconvertedpoliticalloyaltyintoa

40 religiousobligation. SincethenSaudrulehastovaryingdegrees

enforced compliance with theWahhabiinterpretationsofIslamic valuesonSaudiArabia. ItisimportanttonotethatmanySalafiIslamistswhoadhere tothis strictinterpretationofIslamarepeaceful.Whiletheybelieve inthe rulesandguidancefoundintheQuranand thattheimitationofthe behavioroftheProphetandhisclosestcompanionsshouldbethebasis forsocialorder,theydonotassigndeathsentencestoallthosewhodo notaccepttheirbeliefs.Rather,theybelievethebestwayof implementingtheSalaficreedisthroughpropagationofthefaith and religiouseducation,notviolence.TheseSalafistgroupsbelieveGods word shouldbespreadby dawa,nonviolentproselytizing.
41 Inthefirsthalfofthe twentiethcentury aSalafirevivalbegan.

ThoseinvolvedinitarguedthattheMuslimcommunitythe Ummahhadfallenpreytodeviationsfrom originalIslamicteachings. Indeed,theywerenowlivinginastateof Jahiliyya.Iftheyweretobe savedfromthiscatastrophiccrisis,itwasnecessarytoreeducatethe Ummah in theoriginalpracticesoftheProphetandhisearlyfollowers andreestablishtrueIslamtoitsdecisiveroleinpoliticalandsociallife. Thus,whattheSalafirevivalsoughttoaccomplish,firstandforemost, wasreembedding trueIslamintotheheartsofMuslimsandforthemto turnthosebeliefsintoalivingreality.Theywoulddosoby 56

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy acknowledgingonly the sovereigntyofGodandhissacredlaw(Sharia) inallspheresoflife.Thiswouldliberatethemfromhumanrulersand theirlaws,values,andtraditions. ThisSalafirevival,inpart,tooktheformofpoliticalparties. AmongthemostnotableofthesewastheMuslimBrotherhood,

42 foundedinEgyptin1928byHassanalBanna(19061949). Whenal

BannamovedtoCairo intheearly1920stoattend teachertraining school,he becamedeeplydisturbedby theeffectsofWesternization andtheconcomitantriseof secularism,thebreakdownoftraditional values,andthedeclineofIslamasthefoundationofpoliticaland social behavior.He eventually cametoadvocate thecreationofaMuslim state inEgyptbasedon Qur'aniclaw.TheBrotherhoodwasto serveas avanguardparty forbringing aboutthispoliticalchange. However,initsearlyyears,theBrotherhood resembledmoreof a socialwelfaresociety championingthecauseofdisenfranchised peoplesthrougheducationalandcharitablework.Duringthe1930s,the Brotherhoodpropagated an Islamicdoctrine thatemphasizedsocial justiceandclosing thegapbetweenEgyptianclasses.Italsosoughtto bringaboutanIslamicrenewalandassertedthatIslamshouldnotbe confinedtoprivatelife.Rather,itshould serveasthe foundationfora thoroughreformof theEgyptianpolitical,economic,andsocialsystem. TheBrotherhoodsconceptionofpoliticsandnationalismwasIslamic. Itbecamepoliticallyactive,identifyingwiththeEgyptiannational movement.Inthe1930stheoutcomeofthiswasanenergeticcampaign againstcolonialisminEgyptandotherIslamiccountries. AstheBrotherhoodgrewintheyearsleadinguptoWorldWarII, theterm Jihad begantoenteritspoliticallexicon intwoways.One,as aninnereffortthatMuslimsneededtomakeinordertofreethemselves andtoimprovethewellbeingoftheIslamiccommunity.Two,within 57

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thecontextofaneedforarmedstruggletoliberateMuslimlandsfrom colonialoccupation.There wasdisagreementovertheuseofforce withintheBrotherhood.Manyofitsleaderspubliclyremained committedtoanonviolentapproach.However,therewereelements, particularlyamongyoungermembers,whopushedhardforthe establishmentofasecretorclandestinearmedwing thatcouldemploy sabotage,assassination,andotherirregularwarfaretactics.AlBanna finallyagreed. TheBrotherhoodcontinuedtogrowrapidlyinthe1940sreaching anestimatedmillionmembers.AfterWWIIitplayedanimportantpart inthenationalmovement,aligningitselfwithseculargroupsand factions.Anditsclandestinearmedunitscarriedoutterroristattacks. Theorganizationbecame increasingpopularandcametobe seenasa seriousthreatbyEgyptian rulingelites.Asaresult,alBannawas assassinated in1949. TheBrotherhoodsupported themilitarycoupthatoverthrewthe monarchyin1952,havingformedacloserelationshipwiththeFree OfficersMovementintheperiod leadinguptotheirseizureofpower. ManymembersoftheBrotherhoodexpectedNasser,onceinpower,to form anIslamicgovernmentbasedontheirinterpretationsofIslam.But soon theBrotherhoodfounditselfatoddswith the policiesofthejunta. ItbecameincreasinglyclearthattheIslamictenetsoftheBrotherhood werelargelyincompatiblewiththesecularideologyofGamal'Abdal Nasser.In1954,therewasanattempttokillhim.Asaresult,the Brotherhoodwasdeclaredillegal.Awaveofrepressionensuedwiththe imprisonmentandtortureof thousandsofitsmembers. Thisrepression,inconjunctionwith domesticpoliciesthatwere seenastheantithesisoftrueIslam,ledtothechargeof Jahiliyyaby membersoftheBrotherhood andthecallto wage Jihad againstthe 58

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Egyptiangovernment.ThenewEgyptianleaderswereconsidered apostatesbecausetheywererulingbysomesetofprinciplesorsystem otherthanthosebasedonSharia. Itshouldbenotedthattherewasandremainsdisagreementamong variousSalafifactionsastowhethertheycandeclareincumbent Muslimrulersapostates(aprocessknownastakfir).Accordingto Wiktorowicz,debateoverthisissuerepresentsoneofthemost prominentsourcesoffissurewithintheSalaficommunityand exemplifiestheimpactofcontextualinterpretationonfactionalization. Althoughthefactionsshareasetofcriteriafordeclaringsomeonean apostate,rootedintheSalaficreed,theydifferoverwhetherthese criteriahaveactually beenmetwithregardstorulersintheMuslim
43 world.

TheOriginsof SalafiJihadIdeology Inthe1950san ideologyofSalafiJihadismbegantotakeshape.As itevolvedoverthenexthalfcenturyitcametoreflectthe characteristicsandrolethatideologyplayedintherevolutionary insurgenciesoftheperiodfollowingWWII.Indeed,thereareimportant parallelsbetweenthem. Thekey earlytheorist,whoarticulatedan adaptationofthe traditionalSalaficall,ashighlightedabove,wasSayyidQutb,a
44 memberofEgyptsMuslinBrotherhood. Hisinfluenceonwhathas

becometheglobalSalafiJihadmovementwascrucial.Whileinprison between1954and1964aspartofNasserscrackdownonthe Brotherhood,Qutbproduced importantworkswhichhavecometobe seenasdoctrinaltreatiesforSalafiJihadism.Theseincludedalong commentaryon the QuranIntheShadeoftheQuran(Fizilalal Qur'an)andamoreactionorientedmanifestoforJihadMilestones( Ma'alimfilTariq).Theseworkscapture Qutbsradicalandanti 59

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy establishmentviews.Theyarebasedonhisinterpretationofthe Qur'an andIslamichistory,assessmentof thesocialandpoliticalillsofEgypt, and anevaluationof thepollutingimpactofWesterndecadence, materialism,andfaithlessnessonthe cultureofIslam.In1964,having beenreleasedfromprison,Qutbpublishedtheseworks.He was subsequentlyrearrested,accusedofplottingtooverthrowthestate, foundguilty,andon29August1966,executedbyhanging. QutbcametobelievethatnearlyallofIslamwasindire decline, devolvingintoastateofignorance equivalenttothatwhich characterizedtheeraofpreIslamicArabia.Hedrewthisconclusion,in part,fromtheworkofMawlanaabualAlaMaududi,whofoundedthe
45 IslamicSocietyofIndiain1941. Maududifirstproposedthatanew

JahiliyyahadtakenrootintheMuslimworldduringthe1920s.He calledfortheestablishmentofaMuslimstateruledunderSharialawas aprescriptionforit.Maududiadvocatedareligiouscleansingofall Muslimsocieties.HeassertedthattheyhadbeeninfectedbyWestern ideasandpractices.Forexample,hearguedthatthetypeof governmentstheWestfoistedontheMuslimworldtookpoweroutof Godshandsandputitinthoseofman.ThisviolatedtheQuranwhich recognizedonlythepartyofGodandthepartyofSatan. Qutblikewise appliedtheconceptof Jahiliyyato Muslimstates andto Egyptinparticular.InQutb'sview,Islamiclawandreligious valueswerebeingignoredbythesepostcolonialapostateregimes, leavingtheirMuslimsocietiesinastateofdebasedignorance.These regimeswere,in Qutbsview,nonIslamicandtherefore illegitimate. Allsocietiesruledbysuchgovernmentswere likewise notIslamic,and Muslimslivinginthem werereligiouslyobligatedtoopposetheruling elitesandtorejecttheirpoliticalauthority.Thisresultedinhiscallfor themtocarryoutJihad tooverthrowsuchhedonistic regimes.Indoing 60

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy so,Qutbcoupled afundamentalistinterpretationof theQur'anwitha radicalandviolentpoliticalideology forarmedrevolution. Asnotedearlier,herewecansee inQutbsthoughthowSalafi JihadistsdifferfromthelargerSalaficommunity.Unlikethe latter, QutbandtheSalafiJihadistswhofollowedinhisfootstepsmoved the useofforceholywarto such apositionofimportancethatitwas equatedasequaltothefivepillarsofIslam.Oncearegimewas characterizedastakfiranditsleaderslabeledinfidels(kufi),thenarmed violencewasalegitimatewayofdealingwithit. Qutbswritingslaidthefoundationforthisinthe1950s.Rulers suchasNasser,throughtheirapproachtogovernanceandrule,revealed aconsciousdisbeliefinIslam.AndNasserspersistenceindoingso,in spiteofwarningsfromscholars,wasclearevidenceaboutwhathe believedanddidnotbelieve.Hisactionswere unIslamic.Thathe persistedinbehavinginthismannerdemonstrated thathebelievedit wasabetterwaythanIslam.Therefore,hewasanapostateanda legitimatetargetforwarfare. Likerevolutionaryinsurgents,Qutbscalledfortheoverthrowof antiIslamicMuslimgovernmentsthroughinsurrection astheprelude forradicalchangeof theentiresocialandpoliticalsystem.Thus,Qutb's understandingofIslamwasinextricablylinkedtohispoliticaland socialprescriptions.Islamwasacompletesocialsystem,andtherefore itsettherequirementsforgovernmentthatitshouldtaketheformofan Islamictheocracy.He deducedtheserequirementsfromhisreadingof theQur'an,includingitsinsightintomorality,justice,andgovernance. Morebroadly,Qutbsawthe crisisinEgyptandotherMuslim stateswithinthecontextofaglobalideologicalconfrontationwith the nonMuslimworld,inparticularWestern civilization.TheWestwas pushingtheMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya.Hepaintedanextremelyde 61

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy humanizingpictureoftheWest,characterizing itassoulless,greedy, arrogant,barbarous,immoral,anddepraved.Westerncivilization fosteredidolatry,themostheinousof sins.Theinfusionof Western waysintotheMuslimworldhadtobereversed,saidQutb,withallthe mighttheIslamistscouldmuster.Hesaw thisconfrontation inmore thanpoliticaltermsitwasacosmicstruggle betweenthosewho worshiped idolsandthosewhoworshiped God.ItwasaManichaean battleinwhich twoindependentrealms,onerepresentinggoodthe otherevil,werepittedagainstoneanother. Qutbprovidedthefoundationsof atransnationalideologyto mobilizetheUmmahforJihad againstbothnearenemiese.g.,the Egyptianregimeandforthe globalfightagainsttheWest.Andasthe abovesuggests,hesawthetwoasinextricably connected.Tocarryout thisstruggle Qutbproposed thecreationof aMuslimvanguard
th organizationin Milestones.Hisconceptwasconsistentwithhow20

centuryrevolutionarythinkers,beginningwithLenin,definedtherole ofavanguardparty inrevolution.Maoassignedthesamerole tothe vanguardparty forleadingwhathecalledPeoplesWar,whichwe referredtoabove asrevolutionary guerrillainsurgency.ForQutb,the Muslimvanguardwasaneliteorganizationcomprisedofeducatedand motivatedindividualswho weretoleadthemassesonthepath, marchingthroughthevastoceanof Jahiliyyawhichhasencompassed theentireworld.Thiswasacallto Islamicmilitancy andarmed revolutionarystruggle asthemeansforseizingpoliticalpowerfromthe state.46 AlongwithMawdudiandalBanna,Qutbisseenasoneofthe mostinfluentialtheoristsof radicalpoliticalIslamism.Histhinking influenced thewritingsandmanifestosofthosewhoshapedthe Salafi JihadmovementfollowingtheSovietAfghanwarofthe1980s.Thisis 62

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy trueof Qutbsconservative interpretationofIslamicprinciplesasfound IntheShadeoftheQuran,hisideaofmakingJihad apersonaland permanentdutytodefeatJahiliyyaandfosterpoliticalandsocietal change,andhisnotionofatransnationalUmmah andtheinevitability ofglobalideologicalconflictbetween"IslamandtheWest."Fawaz summarizesQutbsimpactasfollows: More thananyoneelse,SayyidQutbinspiredgenerationsof JihadistowageperpetualJihad toabolishinjusticeonearth, tobringpeopletotheworshipofGodalone,andtobringthem outoftheservitudetoothersintotheservantsoftheLord. [J]ihad forQutbwasapermanentrevolutionagainstinternal 47 andexternalenemieswhousurpedGodssovereignty. TheimpactofQutbsdoctrinalconceptsgreatlyinfluenced the leadersofsubsequentJihadgroupsinEgypt,mostimportantly MohammedAbdalSalamFarajandAymanalZawahiri.Theformer wastheideologicalandoperationalleaderinthe1970sofwhatcameto bewidelyknownasJama'atalJihad (theEgyptianIslamic Jihad).Faraj calledforholywar,recruitedfollowers,andcreatedanunderground organizationthatcarriedouttheassassinationofAnwarSadatin1981. ThisattackwaspersonallysanctionedbyFaraj.TheEgyptiansecurity forcesreactedswiftlyagainstalJihad'scampaignofterror,andFaraj himselfwasexecutedinApril1982. Farajwas areligiousnationalist,writesGerges,who assertedthat fightingthenearenemymusttakepriorityoverthatofthefar enemy.Jihadsfirstpriority [accordingtoFaraj]mustbetoreplace
48 infidelrulerswithacomprehensiveIslamicsystem. Ayman al

Zawahiri,asecondimportantdisciple ofQutbs,concurredwithFarajs focuson Jihad againsttheEgyptianregime,thenearenemy.However, Zawahirispositionwillchange inthevortexof the AfghanSovietwar anditsaftermath.

63

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Ifthe firstrequirementtheSalafiJihadistshad tosatisfyto initiate aglobalinsurgencywastoconstructauniversalideologythat1) described thedepraved socialandpoliticalconditionsrequiring Jihad, 2)proposed anewidealizedsystemto replacethisdepravedone,and3) identified stepstobetakento bringittofruition,Qutbprovidedthe doctrinalfoundation forit.HisinterpretationofJihad anditsrolein fosteringpoliticalandsocietalchange againstnearenemieslikethe secularandcorruptregimeinEgyptunderNasser,hisnotionofa transnationalUmmah,andtheinevitabilityofideologicalconflict between"IslamandtheWest"allcanbefound inthe globalSalafi JihadmovementthatemergedaftertheSovietdefeatinAfghanistan. However,beforewe examinethose ideologicalandoperational developments,itisimportanttohighlighthowthe eventsin Afghanistaninthe1980sprovidedthecontextforthe amplificationof SalafiJihadism andtherecruitmentofitsfirstgenerationoffighters. TheSovietAfghanWar TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistangave the fledging SalafiJihad movementthe sacred causeitneededtomobilizebeyondthenational level.Therewasnowanopportunitytoestablishaleadershipforthe worldwideUmmah,andinAfghanistan tohelpliberateapartofthat Ummah fromaforeigninfidelinvader.ThebattleinAfghanistan was portrayed asonebetweenMuslimsandkufarsorinfidels.Those who camefrom acrosstheMuslimworld todefendtheAfghansandresist aggressionagainstdaralIslam (thehouseofIslam)becamethefirst generationoftransnationalJihadists.Andtheirselfproclaimedvictory inAfghanistanthedefeatofasuperpowerwasempowering and inspiring forthem.Itcausedmanyinthisvanguardtothink andact globally,taking theirIslamistrevolutionontotheworldstage.

64

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy However,theeventsunfoldinginAfghanistaninthe1980swere onlyanopportunity.TheemergenceofQutbsvanguardpartywasnot agiven.Asnotedearlier,tomountandsustainrevolutionaryinsurgent warfare necessitatesthecloselyinterrelatedelementsof leadership, ideology, and organization.Eachplaysavitalroleineachphaseof protractedconflict.Andthisisparticularlythecase intheinitialperiod ofactivity.Inthisembryonicmomentleadersmustemergeandadopt anactionorientedideologythatrespondstobothpracticalgrievances andtoadesire foranidealizedandutopianfuture.Ifthiswastruefor postWWII revolutionaryinsurgency,itwaslikewisethecasefora radicalIslamistmessianicone.Suchleadersmustbringtogetherwhat QutbidentifiedastheMuslimvanguard,anelitegroup comprisedof highlyeducatedandmotivatedindividualswhoweretoleadthe Ummah inarmedinsurrection. ThecentralfiguretoplaythatroleduringtheAfghanSovietwar wasAbdullahYusufAzzam,alsoknownasShaikhAzzam.Bornin 1941intheprovinceofJeninontheWestBankoftheJordanRiverin theterritorythenadministeredundertheBritishMandateofPalestine, heattendedDamascusUniversityand earnedadegreeinSharialawin 1966.Afterthe1967warandIsraelsmilitaryoccupationoftheWest Bank,AzzamjoinedthePalestinianMuslimBrotherhoodand tookpart inguerrillawarfare operationsagainstIsrael.Itwasherethathefirst learnedabouttheseirregularandasymmetrictacticsforfightingmore powerfulenemies.However,hesoonbecamedisillusioned withthose Palestiniansleadingthe armed resistance forideologicalreasons.In particular,heopposedthePalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)and itschief,YasserArafat,rejectingtheirsecularandMarxistorientation. Azzam optedoutandcontinuedhisIslamicstudiesatCairos Al AzharUniversitywhereheearnedaMastersdegreein1970,andhis 65

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Ph.D.inIslamicJurisprudencein1973.DuringthistimeinEgypt,he metmany MuslimBrotherhoodfollowersofQutb,includingAymanal Zawahiri.Moreover,AzzamcametoadoptQutbsideasincludingthe beliefinaninevitableglobalclashbetweentheIslamicandnonIslamic worlds.NotabletoteachinJordan becausePalestinianmilitantswere notwelcomeKingHusseinhadexpelledthePLOduringwhat becameknownasBlackSeptemberhemovedtoSaudiArabia and a positionatKingAbdulAzizUniversity.OsamabinLadenwasenrolled asastudentand itwastherethatSheikhAzzamfirstmethim. TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistanwas,forAzzam,akufaror infidelaggression againstdaralIslam.Heimmediatelyissueda fatwaDefenseoftheMuslimLands,theFirstObligationafter Faithwhich calledallMuslimstofightaholywartoexpelthe
49 invadersfrom thehouseofIslam. Majorreligiousfiguressuchasthe

GrandMuftiofSaudiArabia,AbdalAzizBinBazz,concurred. Subsequently,atthepeakoftheAfghan Jihad,Azzam published Join theCaravanwhichbecameoneoftheprincipalinspirationsfor

50 drawing thousandsofMuslimsto fightinAfghanistan. Thus,inthe

1980sAzzamemergedastheinspirationalideologistandacentral figureinwhatweretheinitialstepsin thedevelopmentofthemilitant Islamistresistancemovement.Azzamhadcharisma,andhiswords drewmanytothefight. ButAzzamsrole wasmorethan thatofinspirationalideologist.He alsoknewhowtoorganizeandlead.AfterrelocatingtoPakistanin 1980heestablishedMaktabalKhadamat(ServicesOffice)toorganize asupportinfrastructure inPeshawartohousethosewho cametobe knownasAfghanArabsJihad volunteersfromaroundtheMuslim world.Inthemid1980sbinLadenprovidedfinancialassistanceto expandthateffort.TheinfrastructureestablishedbyAzzam included 66

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy campsfortraininginguerrillaandparamilitarytacticstoprepare internationalrecruitstofightonan unconventionalandasymmetric battlefield.Accordingto Greges,Azzam createdamilitarycollegeto providevolunteerswithmethodicalmilitarytrainingandtoprepare seniorofficerstolead Jihadistoperationsanywhere.Bydoingso,the AlFaruqMilitaryCollegefosteredtheemergenceofnewprofessional Jihadistcadres.51 TorecruitfightersandraisemoneyforthecauseAzzamtraveled throughtheMuslimworld,aswellastoEuropeandtheUnitedStates. Hisgoalwastoawakenthe Ummah toitsdutyinAfghanistan.Andhis charisma,prose,andpoliticoreligiousproselytizingdrewmany.He playedakeyroleinestablishingnetworksforfinancing,recruiting,and trainingradicalMuslimstofightthe Jihad inAfghanistan.ButAzzam sawAfghanistan,accordingtoRoy,asmorethanthedefenseofthe Ummah there.Itwasalsotoserve asatraininggroundtobreedthe vanguardthatwouldsparkanoverallresistanceagainstthe encroachmentoftheinfidelsontheUmmah.Jihad inAfghanistan
52 wasaimedatsettingupthevanguardoftheUmmah.

RoynotesthatTensofthousandsofmilitantswenttoAfghanistan
53 throughthese Islamicnetworksfortrainingand Jihad. They

respondedtothecallandpassedthroughtheparamilitarytraining infrastructure establishedbyAzzam,andlaterbybinLaden.According to Marc Sageman,theycamefromallover:coreArabcountriessuch asSaudiArabiaandEgyptMagrebArabcountrieslikeAlgeriaand MoroccoSoutheastAsiacountriessuchasthePhilippinesand IndonesiaandtheMuslimimmigrant[ordiaspora]communitiesofthe

54 UnitedStatesandEurope.

Those whowenttoAfghanistanestablishedbondsofsolidarity amongthemselvesthatwentbeyondthatconflict.Theybecamea 67

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy potentialvanguardaninternationalbrigadeforcarryingoutglobal Jihad.Sagemanwritesthat,theglobalSalafiJihadevolvedthrougha processofradicalizationconsistingofgradualselfselectionand recognitionofthesinglecommontargetofthe Jihad.AndRoyadds thatthevolunteersinAfghanistanexperiencedaconcrete internationalizationbasedonpersonalcontacts,thebrotherhoodof comradesinarms,friendshipsandaffinities.Theylearnedtoknow otherpeopleandotherlanguages.InAfghanistan,theyfoundanew
55 communityandbrotherhoodwithwhichtoidentify.

Theyalsobecameskilledinguerrillawarfare tactics,having learnedthatartfromtheindigenousAfghan Mujahideen who,ineight yearsofprotractedandbloodyirregularwarfareinamountainousand ruggedland,woredownthemightySovietArmy. Intheirbook, AfghanGuerrillaWarfare:IntheWordsoftheMujahideenFighters, GrauandJalalichroniclethedaytodayguerrillatacticsperfectedby Afghanwarriorsduringtheconflict.Itwastheseirregularwarfare methodsthatenabledtheriflewieldingMujahideentodefeatafully
56 armoredSuperpower. Thiswasanimportantlessonthatthe

internationalJihadistsexperiencedupclose. Nothingcaptured thedaytodaytacticalbattlebetterthanthe Mujahideensinnovativeuseofambushandhitandruntacticsin mountainousterrain.Itwasclassicguerrillawarfare,anditworked. DuringtheeightyearwartheMujahideenresponsetothepresenceof theRedArmyinAfghanistanwastoutilize these traditionaltribal warfaretacticstoinflictcasualties,cutsupplyandcommunication lines,anderodetheSovietwilltooccupyAfghanistan.Between1985 and1987alonetheMujahideenconductedover10,000ambushes.They usuallyattackedatnightorinthefadinglight,utilizingdenialand deceptiontacticsandemployingmines,machineguns,grenade 68

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy launchers,andsniperfiretotakefulladvantageofthecoverofferedby Afghanistansrocky terrain.Intheend,itwasthenatureoftheAfghan tribalandclansocialstructureanditstraditionalirregularmethodsof warfarethatallowedaguerillaforcetorendertheSovietsconstantly

57 vulnerableandeventuallycausedtheirwithdrawal.

Insum,Afghanistan wasthebeginning,the startingpointfora globalSalafiJihadistinsurgency.Whenthatwarcametoanend,acore cadre ofinternationalJihadwarriorsexistedforit.In theaftermathof Afghanistan theyemergedequippednotonlywiththerequisite ideologicalandorganizationalframework,buttheguerrillaand irregularwarfaremethodsforconducting asymmetricalfightsagainst superiorenemies.However,wheretheywouldfightnextwasunclear asthelastunitsoftheRedArmyrolledacrosstheFriendshipBridgeon theAfghanUzbekistanborderonFebruary15,1989. ForAzzamandhisfollowers,thevictoryinAfghanistanwasnot theendbutonlythebeginning.A journalarticlepublishedin1987by Azzammadethisclear.In AlQaedaalSulbahorTheSolidBase, heenvisionedaMuslimvanguardorganizationthatwouldoverthrow apostateregimesintheMiddleEastandestablishIslamicrule.The conceptforthiswasdrawnfromQutb,whowasAzzamsspiritual guide.ThisvanguardwoulddirecttheenergiesoftheAfghan mujahidinintofightingonbehalfofoppressedMuslims.Heviewed Jihad asareligiousobligationindefenseofIslamandMuslimsagainst adefinedenemy,whetherlocalunIslamicrulersoroccupyingoutside
58 infidels.

AfterAfghanistan:Decidingon theNextAreaofOperations? Duringthe incipientstage,nationallevelrevolutionary insurgent movementshavetoconsiderstrategicdecisionsaboutwheretocarry outthearmed strugglewithin theboundariesofthenationstate.In 69

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy otherwords,theareaorareasofoperations(AO)hadtobedetermined. ForpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgentsthemainenemywaslocated withinthenationstate.Thatwaswheretheinsurgentvanguardhadto buildandemploytheirwarfightingorganization. IntheaftermathoftheSovietAfghanwarmanyoftheAfghan ArabsAzzamsJihadvanguardwerefacedwiththeissueof whether,andifsowhere,tonextfightfortheIslamiccause.Where wouldthatAObe?Andwhowasthe nextenemy?In1989,these questionswereatthecoreof whatamountedtoastrategicre assessment. BeforehewasassassinatedinNovember1989,Azzamproposed thatthe JihadiswhohadhelpedousttheSovietUnionfrom Afghanistanusethesamefightingmethodstodo soinotherpartsof daralIslam(thehouseofIslam)occupiedbyinfidelse.g.,Kashmir, Somalia,andBosnia.Theyshouldhelpliberatethoseareasaswell. AndAfghanvetssoughttodo sointhe1990s.Forexample,the declarationofBosniaHerzegovinaindependenceinOctober1991 openedupanewethnicandreligiousconflictin theheartofEurope. BesiegedontwofrontsandseeminglyabandonedbytheWest,the Bosnianregime,withitsMuslimmajority,acceptedhelp from wherevertheycouldgetit.Thus,theywelcomedArabveteransofthe Afghanwar.However,attemptsbythese JihadistoIslamicize the Bosnianpopulation anduseofexcessiveviolence appearstohavenot
59 beenopenly welcomed.

OtherJihadveteransadvocatedreturning totheirhomecountriesto overthrowwhatcametobecalledthe"nearenemy."Thesewere characterizedasdistortedMuslimregimeswhose repressive,corrupt, andsecularnaturepreventedthecreationofatrueIslamiccommunity

70

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy andwayoflife.Thepriority forthese Jihadinationalistswastorestore Islamathome.ThatwasthenextAO. Thiswascontroversialbecauseitadvocated fightingandkilling otherMuslims.AmongAfghanArabveteransitappearstohavebeen championedbytheEgyptiancontingent.Andtheyattempted inthe 1990sunsuccessfullytofightitoutwiththeMubarakregime.In doingso,theyemployedguerrillawarfareandterrorismtacticsto achievetheirobjectives.However,theywerenomatchforEgyptian governmentforcesthatkilledorarrested somanyoftheircommanders andkeyoperativesthatthe Jihad campeventually splitunderthe pressure.Onefaction,theEgyptianIslamicGroup,initiatedaunilateral ceasefire.Theleadershipoftheotherfaction,EgyptianIslamic Jihad,
60 fledthecountry.

TheAlgeriansweretheothernationalcontingentthatfollowed theirparticipationintheAfghanSovietwarwithfullscale irregular warfareagainsttheirhomegovernment.Andtheviolencecarriedout bythe EgyptianspaledincomparisonwiththatemployedbytheArmed IslamicGroup anditssuccessor,theSalafistGroupforDawahand Combat.However,inthe endtheAlgeriansecurityforcescontainedthe
61 threatthroughabrutalcounterterrorismcampaign.

Finally,yetotherAfghanArabsstayed behind inAfghanistan and Peshawarand continued tocontemplatehowandwheretoextendthe Jihad tonewareasofoperations.Asthiswastakingplace,Iraqinvaded andoccupiedKuwait,adding anewdimensiontothedebateoverthe futureAOforthe Jihadists. ThepossibilityoffurtherIraqiexpansionfromKuwaitintoSaudi ArabiacreatedacrisisofmonumentalproportionfortheHouseof Saud. InthefaceofamassiveIraqimilitarypresence,SaudiArabia's ownforceswerehopelessly outnumbered.Inthemidstofthis 71

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy predicament,binLadenoffered toprotectSaudiArabiafromtheIraqi armybydeploying100,000Mujahideento theKingdom.IfSaddam chosetoinvade,heassuredKingFahd,theywould berepulsedbythe Mujahideenusingthesameprotractedguerrillaandirregularwarfare tacticsthathadbeenemployedtoousttheRedArmyfromAfghanistan. AfterthinkingitovertheSaudiMonarchdecidedto refuse binLaden's offer.Aprotractedeightyearguerrillawarlikethatfoughtin Afghanistanwashardly an attractiveoption.Instead,heopted toallow theUnitedStatesandalliedforcestodeployonhisterritory anduseit asalandbridgetodrivetheIraqiarmyfromKuwait. BinLadenconsideredthisahereticalact.Hechargedthatthe presenceofinfideltroopsinthe"landofthetwomosques"(Meccaand Medina)wassacrilegiousanddesecrated sacredsoil.Itwasalso confirmationofwhatQutbandotherSalafitheoristshadassertedabout thecomingglobalconfrontationbetweentheMuslim worldandthe West.NotonlywastheWestdriving theMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya, itnowoccupied itsmostholyterritory.Afterpubliclycastigatingthe Saudigovernmentforallowingthistohappen,binLadenwasforced intoexilein SudanandhisSaudicitizenshipwasrevoked. Paradoxically,itwasintheaftermathofthissetback thatthe organization binLadenhelpedfoundinAfghanistan begantoemerge asatransnationallyfocused organizationwith linkagestoJihadigroups inAlgeria,Egypt,Libya,Oman,SaudiArabia,Tunisia,Jordan, Lebanon,Iraq,Morocco,Somalia,andEritrea,amongotherplaces, severalofwhichwerefightingprotractedinsurgencies.AlQaeda forged tieswithmanyofthesemilitantIslamistgroups. WhileinSudan,alQaedabacked thesenationalfocused Jihadists withtraining,arms,andfunding.Todoso,itestablishedweapons cachesandtrainingcampswheretheguerrillaandirregularwarfare 72

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy methodshonedinAfghanistanweretaught.AlQaedaalsomaintained itstrainingcampsinAfghanistan forthesamepurpose.Sudanese intelligenceofficersaidedalQaedabyprovidingfalsepassportsand shippingdocuments.Atthattime,theoperationalroleofalQaedawas principallytoprovidesupportthroughfunds,training,andweaponsfor nationallevelattacksby Jihadistgroupsitwasalignedwith.However, aswewillhighlightbelow,thefirstattacksonUStargetsalsooccurred duringtheSudanperiod,andotherswereplanned. AsalQaedaspresence inSudangrew,itsleadersengaged in discussionsovertheareaofoperationsandwhichenemiesshouldbe targeted.Withrespecttothelatter,thesedeliberationsrevolvedaround whathasbeen coinedthe nearandfarenemies.Uptothispointthe targetingfocus,asnotedabove,hadbeentwofold:1)liberating occupiedMuslimterritoryfrominfidelforces(e.g.,Afghanistan),and 2)attacking andoverthrowing localMuslimgovernmentsthatwere apostateregimes.Bylate1994athird targetandnewAOwasunder considerationthefarenemy. Ifthe definitiveobjectiveoftheSalafiJihadistmovementwastobe realizedinternationalsystemtransformationwiththere establishmentoftheCaliphate,thehistoriccommunityofIslamthen themainimpedimentto thataspiration hadtobetargetedanddefeated. Sagemanexplainsthatthosewhochampionedthisnewtargeting doctrinearguedthemaindangerfortheworldwideIslamistmovement wastheUnitedStates,whichwasseenasmovinginonMuslimlands suchastheArabianPeninsulaandEastAfrica.Itwastheheadofthe snakethathadtobekilled.[T]hepriorityhadtobeswitchedfrom
62 thenearenemytothefarenemy. Bythemid1990sbinLaden

andhistopcollaborators,includingAymanalZawahiri,adopted this importantchange. 73

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Moreover,itappearsthatbeforethiswasformally espoused and laterrecordedbybinLadeninfatwasissuedin thelatter1990s, operationswere carriedoutbyalQaedaagainstUStargets.In1993 thereissomeevidence thattrainersweresenttoSomalia.Aslearned since9/11,binLadensawUSinvolvementthere asanextensionofits presenceinSaudiArabiaand otherGulfstatesthatgrewoutofthe 1991wartoexpelIraqfromKuwait.HebelievedthatWashingtonwas followinganimperialpolicyoftakingoverpartsoftheMuslimworld. Consequently,in1993oneofbinLadenstoplieutenants, MuhammadAtef,traveledtoSomaliatodeterminehowalQaedamight attackUSforcesstationedthere.HearrangedtoassistAididsmilitia. Subsequently,oneofalQaedascommandersandasmallnumberof Mujahideen,veteranIslamicHolyWarriorswhohadfoughtin Afghanistan,weredispatchedtoprovidemilitaryassistanceand training.ThetrainingincludedtacticslearnedintheAfghanWarfor fightingagainstheavily armedhelicopters.Aididsgunnersweretaught themosteffectivewaytoshootdownahelicopterwastouserocket propelledgrenades(RPGs)riggedwithtimingdevicestotakeoffthe
63 tailrotoroftheBlackHawk,itsmostvulnerablepart.

Theoutcomeischronicledin BlackHawkDown,MarkBowdens
64 accountofthatbattle. Inastrictmilitarysense,theTaskForceRanger

raidwassuccessful.TheAididlieutenantsthathadbeentargetedwere captured.Butthehumancostsoftheoperationwerehigh:nineteen Americansdeadandmissing,seventeenfromTaskForceRanger,and eightyfourwounded.OneMalaysianwasalsokilledandsevenwere wounded,alongwithtwowoundedPakistanis.Manyhundredsof Somaliswerekilledandwounded. AlsoduringtheSudanperiod,atleastoneofthetwoattacksin SaudiArabiainthemid1990smayhavebeentheresultofthisnew 74

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy targetingpolicy.ThosewhocarriedoutthebombingoftheNational GuardtrainingcenterinRiyadhconfessedtohavingbeentrainedbyal QaedainitsAfghancampsandwereinspiredbybinLaden.Atleast thatiswhattheSaudishavereportedbeforetheywereexecuted. Finally,duringthisperiod building theinfrastructurenecessaryto attackmajorUStargetsinEastAfricawasinitiated.Seniormembersof alQaedaweredispatchedtoKenya. Insum,bythemid1990sthetargetingdoctrinetosupportaglobal insurgencywasinplacetosupportastrategywhichhadasitsdual objectivestofostera)regimechangeslocallyandb)international systemtransformationglobally.Toaccomplishthesegoalsboth near enemiesandthe farenemyhadtobeattacked.However,todosoal Qaedahadtoestablishandstaffwarfightingorganizationsthatcould employanarrayofpolitical,psychological,guerrillawarfare,andother paramilitary techniquestofightalong Jihad. InSudan,itappearsthatalQaedawasattemptingto establish those capabilitieswhenitwasforcedtoleave.In1996,binLadenwasasked todepartthecountryaftertheUSpressuredtheSudanese government toexpelhim,citingpossibleconnectionstothe1994attempted assassinationofEgyptianPresidentMubarak whileinAddisAbaba, Ethiopia.BinLadenand200ofhiskeysubordinatesleftinlate1996, returningtoAfghanistan. Afghanistan Again:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgency ReturningtoAfghanistanprovedfortuitousforalQaeda.Itwas given anopportunitytoaccelerate building atransnationalwarfighting organizationithad begun to form inSudan.Nowalliedwith the Taliban,whohadabelief system similartothatofbinLadenandal Qaeda,Afghanistanprovidedanidealbase todoso.Itturnedintoan everexpandinginfrastructureandsafehaven,farfromAmerican 75

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy politicalinfluenceandmilitarypower.Accordingtothe 9/11 CommissionReport, The Talibanseemedtoopenthedoortoallwho wantedtocometoAfghanistantotraininthe [alQaeda]camps.The alliancewiththeTalibanprovidedalQaedaasanctuaryinwhichto instructandindoctrinatenew fightersandterrorists,importweapons, forgetieswithotherJihadgroupsandleaders[globally],andplotand
65 staffterroristschemes.

Between1996andtheattacksonSeptember11,2001,Salafi orientedMuslimsfromaroundtheworldtraveledtoAfghanistanto receive irregularwarfare trainingandindoctrinationinthese facilities. Howmanydidsoishardtodetermine.Estimatesvarywidely.The 9/11 CommissionReportnotedthatU.S.intelligenceestimatesputthetotal numberoffighterswhounderwentinstructionin binLadensupported
66 campsinAfghanistanfrom1996through9/11at10,000to20,000.

Othersproposemuchhighernumbers.Forexample,accordingto Germanpolice testimonyinthe 2006retrialofMouniralMotassadek, aMoroccanaccusedofinvolvementinthe9/11attacks,over70,000 receivedparamilitarytrainingandreligiousinstructioninalQaedas

67 campsinAfghanistan. Whateverthenumber,aconsiderablecorpsof

secondgeneration holywarriorstraveledtoAfghanistanfromsome fiftyormorecountries. AnassessmentofdevelopmentsinAfghanistanbetween 1996and theSeptember11,2001attacksontheUnited Statessuggestthatthe foundation wasbeing established byalQaedaforinitiating aglobal SalafiJihad insurgencythatreflected therequirementsidentifiedearlier inthisstudy.AlQaedasexpanding infrastructureinAfghanistan allowedittoundertakeseveralactivitiesthattracked withthese requirements.

76

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Firstofall,duringthisperiodbinLaden revisedalQaedas ideologyanddoctrinetoemphasize aglobalmissionfortheSalafi Jihadmovement.HedidsobyfocusingontheUnitedStatesthefar enemyandthedangersAmericaposedforthe very survivalofthe Muslimworld.Thisrecastingofdoctrinecanbeseenmostsuccinctly inhis1998fatwa,entitled,"DeclarationoftheWorldIslamicFrontfor Jihad againsttheJewsandtheCrusaders."TheUnited Stateswas attempting todestroyIslam,andMuslimswereinacataclysmicbattle withtheWest.AmericasoccupationofSaudiArabiahadhad a humiliatinganddebilitatingimpactontheUmmah.Accordingtobin Laden,"SinceGodlaiddowntheArabianPeninsula,createditsdesert, andsurroundeditwithitsseas,nocalamityhaseverbefallenitlike theseCrusaderhoststhathavespreadinitlikelocusts,crowingitssoil,
68 eatingitsfruits,anddestroyingitsverdure."

AnditwasnotjustSaudiArabiathatwasendangered.TheUnited States,byorchestratingUNsanctionsagainstIraq,wasannihilating Muslimsthereaswell.BinLadenassertedthatWashingtondidnotrest afterthe"slaughter"oftheGulfWarbutinsteadsoughtthe "dismembermentandthedestruction...ofwhatremainsofthis

69 people. Ininterviewsduringthelate1990s,he also includedthe

plightofMuslimsinKashmir,EastTimor,Sudan,Somalia,Chechnya, andelsewhereinthismessianicvisionof awarof survivalforIslam againstthe WestledbytheUnitedStates. ThroughanassessmentofbinLadensfatwas,otherwritten statements,andinterviewsduringthissecond periodinAfghanistan,it isevidentthatherevisedalQaedasideology anddoctrineforaglobal SalafiJihad againsttheUnitedStates.Thus,inthe1998fatwa,after specifyingtheAmericancrimeofoccupationoftheholyplaces,the waritwaswagingthroughsanctionsagainsttheIraqipeople,and 77

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AmericassupportofJewishaggressioninPalestine,binLaden assertedthattheUnitedStateshaddeclaredwaronGod.Therefore,it wasthedutyofeveryMuslimto killtheAmericansandplundertheir moneywhereverandwhenevertheyfindit."Thefatwachargedthatto killAmericans,bothcivilandmilitary,isanindividualdutyforevery Muslimwhoisable,inanycountrywherethisispossible,untilthe

70 USdepartsfromallthelandsofIslam.

Civiliansareofflimitsundertheinternationallawsofwar.Butfor binLadenallAmericanswereinonewayoranothercomplicitwiththe policiesoftheirgovernmentandthereforelegitimatetargets.Itwasa millenarianoutlookthatsawtheworldthroughManichaeanlensesa holywarbetweentheforcesofgoodandevilthateschewedthe distinctionsofinternationallaw.Recallthatmillenarianmovementsare onesinwhichreligious,social,andpoliticalgroupingsenvisiona comingmajortransformationofsocietyandreturntoanidealizedpast. Suchmovementstypicallyclaimthatthecurrentregimeanditsrulers areirreparablycorrupted,unjust,andotherwiseirredeemable.They havetobecompletelyvanquished. Insum,binLaden asserted thatsinceMuslimseverywhereinthe worldweresuffering atthehandsoftheUnitedStates,theUmmah mustwageholywaragainsttheirrealenemy,andnotonly actto rid itselfofunpopularandapostate regimesbackedbytheAmericans.It wasthedutyoftheMuslimcommunity toprotecttheirfaith.BinLaden declared thattheUnited Stateswasvulnerableandcouldbedefeatedin warbymujahideen inthesamewaytheUSSRsufferedahumiliating defeatattheirhands. Beyonddoctrine,importantorganizationaldevelopmentstook placeduringthelatter1990saswell.AlQaedaasanorganizationgrew insizeandcomplexity.Thiswasdue,inpart,tothefactitwasableto 78

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy selectandaddpersonnelfromthethousandsofindividualsthatflowed throughitstrainingcamps.Ithadaverylargepoolfromwhich to screenandevaluatecandidatesfrom itstrainingprogramfor membershipinitscoreorganization.Alsofacilitatingthis organizationalevolutionwasthesecuresanctuarythatalQaeda enjoyedinAfghanistan. AlQaedawasable duringthelatter1990stoexpandits hierarchicalapparatusandformalizeitsstructure,withbinLaden,the
71 emirgeneral,atthetop,followedbyotheralQaedaleaders. Below

binLadenashuramajlisorconsultativecouncilwasestablished,with fourcommitteesreportingtoit.Amilitarycommitteerecruitedfighters andranthetrainingcampsinwhichtheywereinstructedinthe guerrillaandirregularwarfaremethodslearnedinAfghanistaninthe 1980s.Indeed,inhis1996DeclarationofWaragainsttheAmericans Occupying theLandoftheTwoHolyPlaces,binLadensingledout theimportanceofthesetechniquesforfightingconventionallysuperior enemies.Hestated:[I]tmustbeobvioustoyouthat,duetothe imbalanceofpowerbetweenourarmedforcesandtheenemyforces,a suitablemeansoffightingmustbeadopted,i.e.,usingfastmoving, lightforcesthatworkundercompletesecrecy.Inotherwords,to initiateaguerrillawar,wherethesonsofthenation,andnotthe
72 militaryforces,takepartinit.

Themilitarycommitteealsoplannedand launchedglobalstrikes againsttheUnitedStates.Finally,itoversawotherclandestine functionsincludingaspecialofficeforprocuring,forging,oraltering identitydocumentssuchaspassportsandvisas. Afinancecommittee establishedaglobalfinancialnetworktoraise the resourcesnecessarytosustain alQaedasexpandingapparatusand activities.Itsfinancialnetworkwasbasedonredundancy.AlQaeda 79

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy secureditsmoneythroughtheWesternbankingsystem,theIslamic bankingsystem,andthetraditionalhawalasystem.Thisnetworkwas linkedtoanumberofmoneysourcestoincludeMuslimcharitable organizations,which alQaedainfiltrated andused tocollectandmask thefundsitneeded.TheseincludedtheInternationalIslamicRelief Organization(IIRO),theBenevolenceInternationalFoundation,theal HaramianIslamicFoundation,BlessedReliefFoundation,andthe RabitaTrust.Theseorganizationshavebranchesworldwideandengage inactivitiesrelatedtoreligious,educational,social,andhumanitarian programs.Buttheyalsoknowinglyorunknowinglyassistedin financing alQaeda.Wealthyindividuals,particularlyintheArabian Gulfstates,likewisewereasourceoffunds,aswerealQaedarun businesses. Justifying itsactionsbyissuingrulingsonSharialawwasthe responsibilityofthereligious/legalcommittee.Italsohadarolein indoctrinatingthosemanythousandMuslimswhowenttoAfghanistan tobetrainedforholywar.Finally,amediacommitteedisseminated informationinsupportofalQaedaspoliticalandmilitarygoalsand activities.In the latter1990s,alQaedabeganusingtheInternetto publicizethose goalsandactivities,todisseminateinformation,to inspireandrecruit,andtogatherandshareinformation.However,this wasonlyinitsembryonicstageatthispoint.Asweshallseelater,the useoftheInternetburgeoned after9/11foralQaedaandtheSalafi Jihadmovement. ThisgrowthofalQaedasorganizationinAfghanistanallowedit togooperationalinawayitcouldnotduringitsSudanphase.Itnow wasabletoplanseveralterroristoperationstostrikeattheUnited Statesacrossthegloballandscapeandhadthecapacitytodirectand deployclandestineunitstoexecutethoseoperations.Andtheyhad 80

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy threemajorsuccessesasaresult.Theseincluded 1)theattacksonUS embassiesinNairobiandDaresSalaam,inAugust19982)the suicideattackontheUSSColeinAden,inOctober2000and 3)the strikesagainsttheWorldTradeCenterandPentagononSeptember11, 2001.Additionally,asisnowknown,alQaedahadplannedand deployedpersonneltocarryoutotherattacksaswell.However,for variousreasonsthesewerenotsuccessful. FromitsAfghanistansanctuary,alQaedaatthispointintime also soughttoestablishitselfmorebroadly asaheadquartersandvanguard fortheglobalSalafiJihadmovement.Recallthatthe1998fatwa instituted aWorldIslamicFrontforJihad.ThepurposeoftheFront wasto create atransnationalorganizationwithaworldwidepresence andlinkagewithnationallevelradicalIslamistaffiliatesinnumerous countries.Itsultimategoalswerefourfold:1)tounitetheUmmah2)to overthrow allcorruptandapostateMuslimgovernments3)todrive Westerninfluencefromthosecountriesand 4)toabolishstate boundariesand establishtheCaliphate. Tothisend,duringthe19962001phaseofdevelopment,aglobal networkoflinkageswasestablishedby alQaedasWorldFrontwitha scoreofnationallevelmilitantSalafiandotherradicalIslamistgroups aroundtheworld,manyofwhomwereemployingunconventionaland asymmetricviolenceagainsttheirhomegovernments.TheWorldFront emergedasanumbrellaorganizationthatsoughttotie theselike minded,nationallevelpartiesandsmallercellularunitstogetherfora commonpurpose,asdescribedinthefourfoldobjectivesnotedabove. These affiliatesandtheirlinkstoalQaedawerefirstdelineated ina comprehensiveway by RohanGunaratna.In InsideAlQaeda: AGlobal NetworkofTerror,heidentified onesinPakistan,SaudiArabia, Yemen,Sudan,Uzbekistan,Egypt,Syria,Lebanon,Jordan,the 81

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Palestinianterritories,Algeria,Libya,Eritrea,Somalia,Bosnia, Chechnya,Indonesia,thePhilippines,Malaysia,Germany,Britain,and

73 theUnitedStates.

Anexaminationofnationallevelgroupssuggeststhatwhilethey havedifferencesthatare shapedby thelocalcontextinwhichthey operate andfight,they appearto adhere tothesamegeneral ideological/religiousprinciplesandSalafiJihadistorientation.And whiletheyhave localobjectivesto includeoverthrowing apostate governmentsand expulsionofoutsideforces,they seetheirfightwithin alargercontextand subscribetothe broadergoalofaglobalIslamic reorderingof the internationalsystem sothatitisnolongerUS dominated. Anumberofspecialistshave suggesteddifferentframeworksfor delineating theglobalSalafiJihadmovementthatemergedduringthis 19962001period.Oneofthemoreconceptualandanalytic assessmentswasputforward byDavidKilcullen.Heproposesthata worldwidemilitantIslamistmovementappearsto functionthrough regionaltheatresofoperation ratherthanasamonolithicbloc. Islamistgroupswithin thesedifferenttheatresfollow general ideologicalorstrategicapproachesthatconformtothepronouncements of alQaeda,andshareacommontacticalstyleandoperational lexicon.However,Kilcullencontendsthatthereisnoclearevidence thatalQaedadirectlycontrolsordirectsJihadistsineachtheatre. [R]atherthanbeingasinglemonolithicorganization,the [emerging]
74 globalJihadmovementappearstobeamorecomplexphenomenon.

Withinthiscontext,alQaedawassaidto resembletheCommunist International(Comintern)ofthe 20thcenturyaholdingcompanyand

75 clearinghouseforworldrevolution. Inotherwords,alQaedawas

moreofavanguardthatsoughtto inspire andintegratethesenational 82

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy levelgroupsandtheirlocalgrievancesintoabroadertransnational SalafiJihad ideologyandtolinkthesedisparategroupstogether throughitsAfghansanctuary,emergingglobalcommunications, finances,andtechnology. Nineregionaltheatresare identified byKilcullen.Inthreethe Americas,WesternEurope,andAustralia/NewZealandSalafiJihad groupshadengagedprimarily in subversion,fundraisingand organizationaldevelopment.However,duringthelatter1990s,afew terroristoperationswere attempted intheseregionsthroughalQaedas forwarddeployedclandestineoperationalunits.Andsince9/11,other localcellshavealsoexecutedoperationsorbeenuncoveredinthe processofpreparingtodoso,aswillbediscussedlater. Theremainingsixregionaltheatersallexperienced,according to Kilcullen,varyingdegreesof armedviolenceinwhich localradical IslamistandSalafiJihadistarmedgroupsemployedthesamecommon methodsofguerrillaandirregularwarfare tacticsagainstlocalregimes. AlQaedacouldalsobeactiveinthesetheatres.Thefollowing, summarizedfromKilcullensassessment,highlightsthese developments,which bothpredateandpostdate9/11: The GreaterMiddleEasttoincludeTurkey,theLevant, Israel/Palestine,Egypt,and theArabianPeninsulaisthemost activetheatre.Duringthe1990s,andfollowing9/11,ongoing insurgentviolence bylocalIslamistarmedgroupshastakenplace inIraq,Jordan,Egypt,SaudiArabia,Yemen,Turkey,Lebanonand Israel/Palestine.Thisincludedbombings,suicideattacks, kidnappings,andraids.AlQaedaalso establishedregional affiliatesin severalpartsof theregion.However,muchofthe insurgentandterroristactionin theatreisnotdirected,controlled, orcarriedoutby alQaeda. The Maghrebstates,toincludeAlgeria,Mauritania,Mali, Niger,Morocco,andTunisia,allhaveexperienced terroristand insurgentviolencecarriedoutbyradicalIslamistarmedgroups.Al Qaedaalso hasapresencein severalstatesinthetheatre. 83

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy EastAfricaexperiencedalQaedaterrorismin1998withthe bombingsof USembassiesinKenyaandTanzania.Kenyasuffered asubsequentattackinMombassain2002.Thereislikelyongoing alQaedapresence inKenya,Somalia,Eritrea,andEthiopia.The EastAfricaandMiddleEasttheatresoverlap,withconnections betweenYemen,Sudan,andtheHornofAfrica. SouthandCentralAsiahaslong beenatheatreofradical Islamistviolence.AfghanistanwasalQaedassanctuaryuntil9/11. Andremnantsofitremain holdup alongthePakistanborder.Both Pakistan andIndiahaveexperiencedIslamistinsurgency and terrorism.TheinsurgencyinKashmirhasIslamistelements,and theareaisabase foralQaedaaffiliates.TheCentralAsian republicsofthe FSUhaveseenIslamistlowlevelinsurgency. SoutheastAsiahasradicalIslamistinsurgenciesinIndonesia, thePhilippinesandThailand,and lowerlevelactivityinSingapore andMalaysia.ThemaingroupintheatreisJemaahIslamiyah(JI), whichoperatesacrosstheregion,maintainslinksto alQaeda, cooperateswithlocalmovements,andhaslinksintoothertheatres. The Caucasusregionhasseen separatistinsurgenciesturn increasinglyIslamistwiththeseelementsalliedto alQaeda.This clearlyhasbeenthecaseinChechnya.Ithasbecomealaunching padforradicalIslamistattacksintoRussiasincethelate1990s. Thesehaveincludedsuicidebombings. WhatcommonthemesandfactorsdrewalQaedaandtheselocal groupstogether? Howdidlocalgroupscometoseetheirsituation withinthecontextofalQaedasglobalconstruct? Whatroledidal QaedasideologyandactivitiesfromitsAfghanbaseplayin facilitatingthesedevelopments? Perhapsthekeyoverarching themethatdrewlocalgroupsto identifywithalQaedasglobalmessage wastheproposition thatIslam wasincrisis.Ofcourse,thisthemeisacentraltenetofalQaedas SalafiJihadistideology and,asnotedearlier,wasfirstpromulgated by Qutb.Thecrisisischaracterizedasoneaffecting theentireUmmah. Thus,Muslimsliving inArabandMuslimcountrieswho feelastrong senseofalienation because theybelievethattheirgovernmentdoesnot

84

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy trulyrepresentIslam andisfailingpoliticallyandeconomically, perceive theirlocalsituationnotasuniquebutpartofalarger phenomenon.Thus,radicalIslamistgroupsfightingagainstthese conditionsatthelocallevelseetheirstruggleinaglobalcontext. AddingtothiscrisisofIslam,andplayingamajorpartinit accordingtoalQaedasideology,wasWestern andparticularly American aggression anddomination.Thedimensionsofthisincluded USandotherWesternoccupationofMuslimlandseitherdirectlyor throughIsraelcollaborationwithdespotic,apostate,andpuppet regimessuchasEgypt,Jordan,andSaudiArabiaappropriating MuslimresourcesandtheultimategoalofhegemonyovertheMiddle Eastpolitically,economically,andculturally. Furtherfacilitating thespreadofSalafiJihadistdoctrineandthe riseof alQaeda,whichlikewisecontributed totheidentificationof localgroupswithaglobalmovement,waswhatone specialistdescribes asthe reachofWahhabismapuritanformofIslamvirtually synonymouswithSalafismtoasmanycountriesaspossible beginninginthe1970s.Overthenextthreedecades,thekingdom wouldmustersome$70billioninoverseasaid,overtwothirdsof whichwasdestinedforIslamicactivitiessuchasthebuildingof mosques,religiouslearninginstitutions,orWahhabireligiouscenters. Whatthisresultedinwasadiffusionofindividuals,institutions,and financialassetsthathelpedto radicalizeyoungMuslimsandpromote
76 Jihad intheircountriesagainstapostateregimes.

Insum,alQaedasideologyconstitutedacomprehensivenarrative withwhich localJihadgroupscouldfindcommonground.Inaddition, therewereseveralotherenablersthatpermittedalQaedatodraw nationallevelarmedgroupsintoabroaderglobalSalafiJihadnetwork that,asSeptember11,2001approached,canbecharacterizedasan 85

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy embryonicglobalmillenarian insurgency.Anddifferentelementsof thatnetworkwereexecutingoperationsagainstbothnearandfar enemies,employingtherangeofguerrillaandotherirregularwarfare tactics. Wehavealready identifiedthemostimportantoftheseother enablersalQaedassanctuaryinAfghanistan.Throughthatsafe haven,alQaedawasabletoexpandandaddto itsfirstgenerationof JihadiststhosewhofoughttheSovietUnionasecondgeneration thatwastrained byalQaedaduring19962001.Bothgenerationscame fromthenine regionsidentifiedabove.Manywerealreadymembersof nationallevelIslamistorganizations.Throughtheseindividuals, relationshipswereestablishedthatlinked the alQaedavanguard and its WorldFronttonationallevelmovements.Anetworkof acquaintance, friendships,andmutualobligationsdevelopedthatstretchedworldwide betweenandamong these groupsandthealQaedavanguard.Similarly, within these theatres,groupscameto cooperateanddevelopbondsof sharedexperienceandmutualobligation.Commonexperiencesand historiescementedrelationshipsbetweenthevariousmembersofthe globalJihad network. Threeadditionalenablersalso enhanceditspotentialtodraw nationallevelgroupsintoabroaderSalafiJihad networkthatcanbe characterizedasintheincipientstageofaglobalmillenarian insurgencyonagloballevelontheeveof 9/11.They included globalization,informationagetechnologies,andanetworkbased approachtoorganization.Eachaugmented alQaedascapacitytodo so. Globalizationerodedthetraditionalboundariesthatseparatedand securedthenationstate.Itallowspeople,goods,information,ideas, values,andorganizationstomoveeasily acrossinternationalspace 86

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy withoutheedingstateborders.Moderntransportationand communicationssystems,inconjunctionwith thepostColdWar breakdownofpoliticalandeconomicbarriersaroundtheworld, accelerated theglobalizationprocess. Informationagetechnologiesarecentraltoglobalization.Theseare thenetworksthroughwhichcommunicationstakesplaceona worldwidebasis.Cellularandsatellitephonesallowcontactbetween themostremoteandthemostaccessiblelocationsoftheglobe. ComputersandtheInternetaretheotherpillarsoftheinformation revolution. Totakeadvantageofglobalizationandinformationage technologies,alQaedaadoptedaneworganizationalapproach thatwas lesshierarchicalandmorenetworkedtolinkgroupsintheninetheatres together.Indoingso,theyfollowedtheleadoftheinternational businesscommunity,whichwasintheforefrontofsuchchange.Small andlargecorporationsdevelopedvirtualornetworkedorganizations thatwereabletoadapttotheinformationageandglobalization. Globalization,informationagetechnology,andanetworkbased approachtoorganization,inconjunctionwith the aforementioned enablerofasecuresanctuary,contributedinimportantwaystothe
th appearanceattheendofthe20 centuryofaglobalmillenarian

insurgency,initsincipientstageofdevelopment,thatwascarryingout guerrillawarfareandotherparamilitaryoperationsagainstbothnear andfarenemies. GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11? Intheaftermathof 9/11theUnited Stateswenttowarwithal

th Qaedaand theTaliban.ByDecember7 theTalibanregimehadbeen

overthrownand alQaedasinfrastructureinAfghanistan largely disrupted.The lossof thatsanctuarywasamajorsetbackastrategic 87

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy defeatforthevanguardoftheSalafiJihad Movementandthe embryonicglobalinsurgency itwasfacilitating fromthatAfghan base. Itnow facedthechallengeofhaving toadaptandinnovate torecover whatithadlost.Coulditfindnewwaystoreplicatewhathad been establishedinAfghanistanin19962001?Thiswasthechallenge al QaedaanditsSalafiaffiliatesfaced.Couldtheyreinventthemselvesin theaftermathofOperationEnduringFreedom andcontinuetocarryout theglobalinsurgencytheyhadinitiated? Theremainderofthisstudyseekstoidentifyhowoverthelastfive yearsalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave attemptedto reorganize to continueto execute aglobalfight.Theyappeartohavedoneso through fourstrategicadaptations.Thedegreetowhichtheyhavebeenableto accomplisheachofthese strategicadaptations and,asaresult,the extenttowhichtheyareabletofightthelongJihadaprotracted irregularwaronseveralfrontscannotbeansweredbythisstudy.That requiresmuchfurtherresearchthatwasbeyondthisstudy.Herewewill focusondescribing whateachof these strategicadaptationsentails. One,the alQaedavanguardanditsaffiliateshaveemployed theInternettoestablishincyberspaceavirtualsanctuaryfrom whichtocarryoutmanyoftheactivitiestheyhadinitiatedfrom theirAfghanbase in19962001.These activitiesinclude propagatingtheSalafiJihad ideology tothe Ummahrecruiting, inspiring,andtraining Jihadisprovidingoperationalinformation andmaterialsnetworkingdispersedelementsoftheSalafiJihad movementirregularwarfaretrainingandplanningandexecuting operations. Two,alQaedaanditsaffiliateshave attempted to utilize ungovernedterritory inthetribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan border(and elsewhere inotherregions)asphysicalsanctuariesto carryoutsomeofthesameactivities. Three,theyhaveexploitedtheconflictinIraqutilizingitasa majorrecruitingandtraininggroundtohelpprepare athird generationof SalafiJihadis.Iraqnotonlyservesasanewfrontto engagetheUnited Statesdirectly,butitalso affordsanopportunity 88

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy todevelopanew cadreofskilledfighterswhocangain thekindof experiencethatafterIraqwillallowthemtomoreeffectivelyfight intheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inotherwords,inthefirst st decadesofthe21 centurytheseIraqiArabsmay servethesame th purposetheAfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century. Four,alQaedahascontinuedtoencourageandpromote the globalSalafiJihadmovementthat,asKilcullen contends,appears tofunctionatthelocallevelwithinnine regionalareas.Inthese locations,activitiescarriedoutbygroupsandcellsthatsee themselvesasapartofthismovementcontinued totakeplacesince 9/11,withsomeregionstoinclude Europeexperiencingmajor terroriststrikes. Below,the focuswillmainly beonthefirstadaptation.Howhas thealQaedavanguard anditsaffiliatesemployed theInternet?Towhat extentdotheyseektoestablishincyberspaceavirtualsanctuaryfrom whichtocarryoutmanyoftheactivitiesthathadtakenplace onthe groundduring19962001inthe Afghanbase?Thethree remaining strategicadaptationsutilizingungovernedterritory,exploitingthe conflictinIraq,and continuingthefightsagainstnearornationallevel enemiesbylocalarmedgroupswillreceivebrieferattention. VirtualSanctuary. Since9/11,growingattention hasbeenpaid in boththenewsmediaandmore scholarlypublicationstohow al QaedaandotherassociatedSalafiJihad groupshavemadeuseofthe Internet.Forexample,SteveCollandSusanGlassersuggested inthe WashingtonPostthatalQaedahasbecomethefirstguerrilla movementinhistorytomigratefromphysicalspacetocyberspace. WithlaptopsandDVDs,insecrethideoutsandatneighborhood Internetcafes,youngcodewriting Jihadistshavesoughttoreplicate thefacilitiestheylostinAfghanistanwithcountlessnewlocationson
77 theInternet.

GabrielWeimann,ina2004study,provided thefollowinginsights into theexpanding useoftheInternetby Jihadgroups.In1998, aroundhalfofthethirtyorganizationsdesignated[bytheUnited States] 89

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy asForeignTerroristOrganizationsmaintained Websitesby2000, virtuallyallterroristgroupshadestablishedtheirpresenceonthe Internet.OurscanoftheInternetin20032004revealedhundredsof Websitesservingterroristsandtheirsupporters.Hegoesontoadd: TerrorismontheInternetisaverydynamicphenomenon:Websites suddenlyemerge,frequentlymodifytheirformats,andthen swiftly disappearorseemtodisappearbychangingtheironlineaddressbut retainmuchthesamecontent.78 Since2004,whatWeimanndescribed hascontinuedtoburgeon. Weimannandotherspecialistshaveconceptualizedframeworksfor categorizing thedifferentwaysinwhich theInternethasbeenutilized, describing thefunctionstheseactivitieshopeto serve.Extrapolating fromthesestudiesandbasedon extensivedataminingofaprimary sourcedatabase compiledby theSITEInstitute,onecan observe these attemptstoreplicateincyberspacemanyof the activitiesthattook
79 placeonthegroundinAfghanistanin19962001. Herewe divide

thoseactivitiesintothefollowing seven categories: PropagatingtheSalafiIdeologyof Jihad. InspiringandMobilizingtheUmmahtoJointhe Jihad. PsychologicalWarfaretoDemoralizeEnemies. NetworkingtheglobalSalafiJihad Insurgency. OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks. OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses. CollectionforTargeting.

Ifeffective,thesevirtualactivitieswillprovidealQaedaandits associatedmovements(AQAM)withthecapacitytoreachlikeminded individualsandgroupsinvariousregionsoftheworld who arewilling tojointhecauseandtakeaction.ThroughAQAMWebsitesthese individualsandgroupswillhavetheopportunityto attain the operationalskillsandcapacitytoexecuteviolentstrikeslocallyandon 90

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy anindependentbasis.Thisisanewformofpowerprojectionnoradical movementhashadinthepast. Whatfollowsisadescriptionof each categoryandhowtheyfit together.Itisbasedon an assessmentofexamplesofthewaysinwhich alQaedaandassociatedSalafiJihadgroupshavecarriedouteach activityontheirInternetWebsites.However,beforedoingso,itisalso importantto briefly note theroleandcontributionthatSatellite televisionplaysin thisprocess.ForMuslimpopulationsintheArab world andelsewhere satellite channelssuchasAlJazeeraandAl Arabiyaare oftenthefirstwayin whichtheyareengagedwiththe issuesand themes,describedbelow,thatarefoundontheWebsitesof alQaedaandassociatedJihadgroups.Inotherwords,thereisa synergyalbeitanunintendedonebetweenthem.Indeed,itmaywell bethatAlJazeeraandAlArabiya,amongothers,aretheprecipitants provide anawakingthattakestheindividualtotheInternetforfurther information.Hereiswhattheywillfind. 1)PropagatingtheSalafiIdeologyofJihad.Recallthatthe first requirementtheSalafiJihadistshavetosatisfy tobeinapositionto initiate aglobalinsurgencyisto transmitatransnationalideologyto targetaudiences.Theyhavetobeableto successfullyperform thesame functionsontheInternetasthosecarriedoutbynationallevel revolutionarymovements.Throughalarge numberofdifferentWeb based activitiestoincludesophisticatedmediafronts,newsshows,and onlinemagazinesthey seektoexecute these functionsacrossthe globe.Bydoingso,they areabletodisseminate aseriesofideological framesandmessagesthatdescribeinglobaland localtermsthesocial andpoliticalconditionsrequiringimmediate anddrastic Jihad action. Salafiideologyoffersacomprehensivecritiqueoftheexisting local andglobalsocial/politicalsituation asimmoralandinhumanand seeks 91

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy toinstillinthe Ummah apowerfulsenseofmoraloutrageand commitmenttoholy war. The GlobalIslamicMediaFront,oneofthemainvoicesof al Qaedaonthe Web,isillustrative.Thissite,formerly knownasAlneda, isheavilyfocusedonideologicaltypeinformation.Theynotonlypost allofthedoctrinalspeechesandstatementsof binLadenandZawahiri, amongothers,butalsoprovideanalysisoftheseitemsfortheUmmah. AnexampleReading andAnalysisoftheHero TapesofUsamabin Laden,AymanalZawahiri,andAbuMusabalZarqawiwasposted onMay1,2006,andsubsequentlydistributedacrossseveralotherJihad forums. Anotherexamplethatfocuses,atleastinpart,onthe broader ideologicalthemesfoundinSalafiJihaddoctrineistheVoiceofthe Caliphate,aweeklynewsprogram issuedbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Front.Firstappearing in 2005,ittiestheoryandpracticetogetherby providingexamplesofhowtheglobalholywarisbeingcarriedoutby differentelementsoftheUmmah. Electronic Internetmagazinesserveasimilarfunction.Arecent exampleisTheEchoofJihad,a45pageperiodicalthatbegan appearingin2006.ItsAprileditionfeaturesdiscussionofthe importanceof Jihad,therelativeimportanceofIslamicscholarsversus Mujahideen leaderslikebinLaden,andrecentoperationsby MujahideeninChechnya,Afghanistan,Iraq,SaudiArabia,and elsewhere.Asecondexample Jaami(whichmeansmosque)is producedbythe MediaOfficeoftheIslamicFrontoftheIraqi Resistance. Finally,inthiscategoryofideologicalanddoctrinalmaterialsone mustinclude broadstrategydocumentssuchasalQaedas sevenstage planforthenexttwentyyears.Sinceitwasfirstposted,thisstrategy 92

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy documenthasbeengivenaprominentandpermanentstatusatopmany ofthemostfrequentlyvisited JihadistforumsontheInternet.Western expertstendtocharacterize itasverynave.Theydosoforthe followingreasons.First,thereisnowaythescenariodepictedinthe plancanbefollowed stepbystep.Itissimplyunworkable.Second,the ideathatalQaedacouldestablish acaliphateinthe Islamicworldis absurd.The20yearplanhasnothingtodowithreality.Itisfaroutof reach. However,thesematerialsare notaimedatconvincingWestern experts.TheyaredirectedatthosemanymembersoftheUmmah who readthesematerialsatJihadiforumsontheInternet.Whatimpactdo theyhaveonthem? Dotheyenvisionacomingmajortransformationof societyandreturntoanidealizedpast?Andiftheyagreewithit,are theyready,asonethreepartseriesrunbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontasks,toGearUpandpreparetojointhe Jihad? 2)InspiringandMobilizingtheUmmahtoJointheJihad.Itis onethingtonodinagreementwithbroadideologicalstatements. However,asthepreviousreviewofhowrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsinspiredand recruitedcadreexplained,nextcomesthe hardwork.Thesameistruehere.Butthe VietCongdidtheirinspiring andmobilizingfacetoface. AlQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistsseektosubstituteaplethoraof Internetmethodstoachievethesameend.Herewewillexamineone importantwaytheydosobycelebrating theachievementsand sacrificesofthoseonthefrontlinesoftheglobalfight. Considerthebiographiesofmartyrswhich areposted onthe Web withahighdegreeof regularity.AlQaedainIraq,forexample, publishesonaperiodicbasisadocumenttitled FromtheBiographies ofProminentMartyrs.Theeighth issueofit,dated January2006,tells 93

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thestoryoftheKnightsGroupofthreeMujahideen.Ingreatdetail thereaderlearnswhyandhoweachjoinedthe Jihad andtraveledto Iraqtofight.Anaccountoftheircourageousdemise follows.Thethree werepinneddowninahousetheywereusingasabase.Theauthor glorifiestheirdeaths,notingthe unwillingnessofeach to trytoescape orsurrender.Andoneofthe Jihadfighters,referredtoasthelionAbu Umar,issaidtohavecarriedinhishandsamortarshellthathehad preparedforthissituation.HesurprisedtheAmericansattackingthe house,pulledtheringout,throwingfourofthecriminalstohell,while hewentupto Paradise. Thisisbutoneexample.Manyothersarecontained intheSITE Institutedatabase.Andtheyonlymaintainasampleofthem.Thereare also otherformatsforthesebiographiessuchasthevideoed lastwill andtestamentofsuicidebombers.OneexampleistheWillofthe Martyr,AbualZobeiralMohajir,withvideofootageofhisoperation inKarmatalFallujah inJuly2005.Itdepictsacelebrationinwhichhe enthusiasticallydescribestheoperationheisabouttocarryoutandwhy heintendstodoso:Allahorderedustomake Jihadtodefendhis religion.IurgeallyoungMuslimmentofollowusin Jihad andgive theirlivesforthesakeofAllahsreligion.Heisthenshownbeing embracedbyhiscomrades,beforethefilmcutstothesceneofhis suicidecarbombingacrusaderscheckpointeastofFallujah.Again, thisisoneofmanyexamplesfoundatJihad Websites. Othermeansemployedtoinspireandmobilize are videosofthe preparationforandsuccessfulconductofoperationsagainstUSforces inAfghanistanandIraq.Theseappearonadailybasison Jihadiforums and Websites.Oneexample,issuedbytheGlobalIslamicMediaFront on January22,2006,isa28minutevideo titled:Jihad Academy, whichisdescribedasbutasingledayforthosewhostrugglein 94

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Allah'scause.IthighlightsanumberofattacksexecutedbyIraqi insurgentgroupstoinclude alQaedainIraq,theMujahideenArmy, andtheIslamicArmyinIraq.The attacksare showninthedawnhours andin thedarkofnight.Theyinclude sniperoperations,detonationof improvisedexplosivedevicesagainstavarietyoftargets,and rocket andmortarfire. Therealsoaremanypublicationspostedonthese Websitesthat fallintothecategoryofinspiring,motivating,andmobilizingthe Ummahtojointhefight.Theseguidesare advocacyandmotivational pieces.Theextenttowhichthemessageisbeingreceivedandacted uponremainstobedetermined. Parallelingtheseare othervideoswith Jihadifieldcommanders whoprovidethesamekindofinspirationalmessage.Ofcourse,the mostprominentwasAbuMusabalZarqawi.Anexample,titledA MessagetothePeople,wasissuedbytheMujahideenShuraCouncil,
80 whichclaimstobecomposedofsixinsurgencygroupsinIraq. Inthis

34minutevideo,Zarqawiwasseenplanningoperationsinawarroom, meetingwithlocalleadersofalAnbarprovince,leadingMujahideenin trainingexercisesandonthe battlefield.In anotherpartofthefilm Zarqawiwasseenfiringanautomaticweapon,andstating:America willgooutofIraq,humiliated,defeated. Finally,scoresof itemsonthese Websitesgothenextstepand includeguidesdescribinghowtoprepare forandthenjointhefightin Iraqandelsewhere.One example,"ThisistheRoadtoIraq,"provides instructionsforprospective Jihadisintentonenteringthewar.Thefirst half concentratesonmentalandphysicalpreparationforJihad,while thesecondhalffurnishesguidance forsuccessfullyenteringIraqand cultivatingcontactswithaninsurgentgroup.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Inaddition tocelebratingtheachievementsandsacrificesofthose onthefrontlinesoftheglobalfight,thereareotherways,andthe SalafiJihadistsemploytheInternettoinspireandmobilizetheUmmah tojointhefight.Theyusethesame Websites,forexample,to recount the sufferingandcarnage theyassertisbeinginflictedonMuslimsby theUnitedStatesandotherWesternpowers,Israel,andapostate regimesinIslamiccountries. 3)PsychologicalWarfaretoDemoralizeEnemies.Theflipsideof inspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointheSalafiJihadmovement andfightisthedemoralizingofthenearandfarenemiesof that movement,convincing themtogiveupthefight.Herewewillusethe insurgencyinIraq,thecentralfrontintheglobalJihad,asillustrative. A numberofInternetbasedtacticsareemployed bytheSalafi insurgentgroupstodemoralizetheirenemiesinIraq.Ofthese,themost terrifying andintimidatinghavebeen thebeheadings.Thistactichas beenusedagainstbothIraqisand foreignersworkingin Iraq.The messagetoeachgroupisunambiguous.Thenightmarevideoofthose capturedbeingdecapitatedbytheircaptorsisanythingbutarandomact ofterrorismitiscarefullydesignedforspecific audiences. WithrespecttomembersoftheIraqigovernment,andthose contemplatingjoiningit,thethreatofbeheadingwasexplicitlymade throughnumerousInternetpostedwarnings.Forexample,onApril20, 2006the ShariaCommissionoftheMujahideenShuraCouncilinIraq issued thethreatof theswordandslaughtertohewhojoinsthepolice andthearmy.TheCouncilstatedthatallMuslimswhojoin theIraqi securityforcestoservethosewhoworshipthe devils,thosewho disbelieveandfightinthecauseofTaghut[Satan],shallbeconsidered converterswhofightagainstAllah.Whatawaitsthem?sharp swords!Andinasimilarmessagepostedin December2005,insurgent 96

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy groupsinIraqwereencouragedtostartcuttingthroatsintheIslamic way.Slaughterthreeeverydaytoshow themthatyoudonothesitate inimplementingAllahsorders.To Westerneyesthisisimmoraland savagebehavior.ButforSalafiJihadistsitischaracterizedasreligious duty.TheblooddrippingswordhasapowerfulSalafimeaning. Inadditiontothe beheadingvideos,theinsurgentsinIraqalsopost alargenumberofvideosandreportsofotherkindsof executions. Theseincludeputtingcaptivestodeathbyfiringsquad,aswellas pullingpoliceoutofvehicles,offofstreetcorners,andsoontogun themdownonthespot. Membersofthe leadership inIraqareoftensingledoutbyname. Forexample,inNovember2005analQaedaaffiliated Jihad forum postedthephotographsof theTwentyMostWantedPeopleintheland oftheTwoRivers.Variousassassinationsofseniorlevelofficials since2003havedemonstratedsuch threatsareoftenbackedup.The devilGrandAyatollahAlialSistaniwasdesignatedasnumberone themostwanted.ThetextconcludedWeaskAllah thatthe Mujahideenwillbeable toremovetheirheads. WithrespecttotheUnitedStates,themostfrequenttactic employedisthepreviouslymentioneddailyreportsonallthe Jihad forumsand Websitesof alleged successfuloperationscarriedout againstAmericanforcesinIraq.Those thatstandoutamongalarge numberreviewedaretheTopTenvideosofinsurgentattacksthat begantoappearin2005.ReleasedbothbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontand agroupcallingitselftheMuslimLions,theyarewidely distributedacrossJihad forumstoday. Eachincludestenattacks perpetratedbygroupssuchasAnsaralSunnahArmy,IslamicArmyin Iraq,andalQaedainIraq.Theyareimpressiveproductions.These

97

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy attacksalsofrequentlyappearthedayaftertheyoccurinvarious Westernprintandelectronicnewsoutlets. Reportsofattacksonthe United StatesarenotconfinedtoIraq. Themessagefromthese WebsitesisthatAmericaisunderassaultin alltheplacesithasenteredintheMuslimworld.NexttoIraq, operationsagainstUSforcesinAfghanistan receivethegreatest attention.AndindividualspectacularstrikeslikethatontheUS ConsulateinJeddahbyalQaedainSaudiArabiaarefeaturedwidely. TakenintotalthepsychologicalwarfaremessageiscleartheUnited Statesisexposedandvulnerabletoeffectiveandcontinuous MujahideenattacksacrosstheMuslimworld. Finally,theleadersoftheglobalJihad usetheInternettomock failed USattemptstocaptureorkillthem.One example thatreceived wideattention (toincludebeingbroadcastonalJazeera) wasaspeech byZawahirifollowingthe January2006airstrikeonthevillageof DamadolainPeshawar.AlQaedasnumbertwowassupposedtobe hiding.He tauntedPresidentBushthe ButcherofWashington assertingthathisdeathwillonlycomeatthetimeofAllahsdecree, anduntilthattime,heremainsamidtheMuslimmasses,rejoicingin theirsupport,theirattention,theirgenerosity,theirprotectionandtheir participationin Jihaduntilweconqueryouwiththehelpandpowerof Allah. The above itemsallaimed atinfluencingandunderminingoneof AmericascentersofgravitytheUShomefront.Itisnotunlikewhat theVietCong successfully targetedoverthirtyyearsago.Thenasnow theobjectiveistofollow Clausewitzsadvice.Attack theenemys centerofgravityhisstrategicpressurepointsandyouwillweaken hiscapacitytofightwar.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy 4)NetworkingtheGlobalSalafiJihadInsurgency.In thelatter 1990s,alQaeda'suseoftheInternetconcentratedonthefirstcategory ofthisframeworkpropagatingtheSalafiideologyof Jihad toincite andunifytheUmmah foracommonpurpose. Since9/11,alQaedaand associatedmembersofthe SalafiJihadmovement(anumberofwhich are fightingatthenationallevel)havebroadenedthereuseofthe Web toinclude,ashighlightedabove,the secondandthirdcategories inspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointhe Jihad and psychologicalwarfaretodemoralizeenemies. However,thelossof theAfghansanctuaryresultedinafurther expansion.ItnowincludestheuseoftheInternetfortacticalpurposes, suchastraining,and foroperationalobjectives,toincludehowto organizevirtualcells. Eachofthesefunctionsrequiressecure communicationstoavoid thedisruptivetacticsthatUSintelligencehasbeenabletoemploy againstcertainkindsof JihadiInternetactivitye.g.,closingdown fixed Websites.Thus,alQaedaandothergroupsbegantoemploynew methodstoincludeprotected bulletinboards,freeuploadservicesby Internetproviders,andthecreationofproxyservers,amongothers.Up todateinstructiononhowtoemploythesetechniquesislikewisemade available.Considerthefollowing examples. Thefirsthastodowithhowtousethirdpartyhostingservices. Thistechniqueexploitsthese servers,paidforprimarilybyadvertising agencies,totransmitoperationallyrelatedinformationandsecret communications.Theseservers,availableacrossthe Internet,provide
81 relativelyanonymoushostingthatavisitorcaneasilymanipulate. A

secondwayoftransmittingoperationallyrelatedinformationandsecret communicationsisthroughpostedmessagesondiscussionboardsat passwordprotected forums.Andathird techniqueentailscreatingand 99

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy employingInternetproxyservers.Guidesandmanualsonhowto utilizeeachofthesemethodsareavailableattheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontsite,amongothers. Thesemethodscanbeusedtocirculate awiderangeofmaterials liketrainingvideos,operationalmanuals,andguidesforproducing weaponssuchasimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs).Alongwith othervirtualtechniquestheycanalsobe exploited byoperationalcells to secretly communicate andorganize. One wayofcommunicatingsecretly,reportedbyCollandGlasser, isthroughpublicemailservicessuchasHotmail.Hereishowit works:Anoperativeopensanaccounton Hotmail,writesamessage indraftform,savesitasadraft,and thentransmitstheemailaccount nameandpasswordduringchatteronarelativelysecuremessage board.Anotheroperativeopenstheemailaccountandreadsthe draftsincenoemailmessagewassent,therewasareducedriskof interception.Thisprocesshasbeencharacterizedasadeaddropin cyberspace.82 Virtualmethodssuchasthese andothersalsoprovide themeansto establishoperationalcellsincyberspace.Discussionofhowtodoso begantoappearondifferentalQaedaaffiliated Websitesin2004, accordingtosourcescollectedbytheSITEInstitute.Theseitemsgo into thedetailsofhowtodoso,suggestingthatonceformed,members canbothexchangeworkplans,strategies,andeducationalmaterials andeventually meetinrealityandexecuteoperationsinthefield. Anexampleofthiskindofcellwasreported inthespringof2004.
th OnMarch29 ,RoyalCanadianMountedPoliceofficersburstintothe

OttawahomeofMohammed Khawaja,a24yearoldcomputer programmerarrestinghimforallegedcomplicityinwhatCanadian andBritishauthoritiesdescribedasatransatlanticplottobombtargets 100

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy inLondonandCanada.Khawaja,whomethisBritishcounterparts onlinecametotheattentionofauthoritieswhenhetraveledtoBritain andwalkedintoasurveillanceoperation beingconductedbyBritish Police.Hehadgonethereto meetwithhisonlineacquaintances. Duringthemeetinghetoldthemhowtodetonatebombsusingcell

83 phones.HehadlearnedtodosofromtheInternet.

Theplotinvolvedsevenmenfromfourcountries(UnitedStates, United Kingdom,Canada,andPakistan)whothroughtheInternet formedavirtualcell.Duringthetimethecellwasdevelopingand movingtowardstakingaction thereappearstohavebeen training providedtoamemberofitinPakistan.WhetheranalQaedalinkage wasestablished toprovideposttrainingguidanceordirection isunclear fromopensources.Whenarrestedthecellwasintheprocessofgoing operational.Thiswasthekindofcellmainlyhomegrownmembers whometbothlocallyand incyberspaceismostfearedinEurope.As weshallsee later,throughthesenew WebbasedmethodsalQaedaand otherSalafiJihadgroupsseek toprovidethemeansbywhich prospectiveholywarriorsatthelocallevelcanfindlikeminded associatesand receivetheknowledgeandtrainingviatheInternetthat isnecessary tojointhefight.TheheadofBritainsdomestic intelligenceservice(MI5)statedpubliclyinNovember2006thatshe knewof30[such]conspiraciesandthatfutureattackscouldbe
84 chemical,biologicaloreveninvolvesomekindofnucleardevice.

5)OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks AlQaedahasestablishedanextensiveonlinecompilationof operationalmanualsandhandbooksforirregularwarfare. These range fromdocumentsnotunlikethedoctrinalmanualsofconventional militaryforcestomorenarrowlyfocusedinstructionalguidesonhowto carryoutaparticulartacticorproduce andemploy aspecificweapon. 101

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thenumberoftheseitemsisnowquitelarge.Herewewillonly highlightafewexamples. Broadermilitaryandintelligencematerialsprovidethemeans whereby trainingcanbegininvirtuallyanylocation,simplybygoing online.WenowknowthatalQaedawasproducingsuchmanualswell before9/11becauseofwhatwasfoundoncomputersanddisksleft behindinAfghanistan.Perhapsthebestknownofthese itemsiswhat intheWestcametobereferredtoas"TheEncyclopediaof Jihad."An alQaedaproduction of thousandofpages,itisaguideforhowto establish anundergroundorganization.Themanualhascirculated acrosstheInternet. Perhapsthemostwellknownandwidelycirculated doctrinal manualisa1600pagedocumenttitled TheCallforaGlobalIslamic Resistance.Itwaswrittenby MustafaSetmariamNasar,aSyrian nativewhofoughtagainsttheSovietUnioninAfghanistan.Inthe manualhehighlightshowsmallandindependentgroupsof Mujahideen canconductoperationsagainsttheWest.Intheaftermathof9/11, NasarcalledforathirdgenerationofSalafiJihadiststo planand executeoperationsontheirown butaspartofthebroadermovement andinsolidaritywithalQaedasideology.He issaidtohave spenttime inEurope attemptingtodo so.Insomecasesmembersofthesecells madecontactwithalQaeda,andreceivetrainingandoperational support.ThosewhocarriedouttheJuly 2005bombingsinLondon are
85 anexample.

Beyondthesebroadermanuals,aplethoraofmorenarrowly focusedhandbooksandguidesarealsoreadily available.Perhapsthe tactic/specificweapon receiving thewidestattentionon JihadiWeb addressessince2003istheIED.Manyofthese reportsarebasedon lessonsbeingdrawnfrom Iraq.Often thesereportsandhandbooks 102

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy includediagramsandothervisualdepictionssuchasonedistributedto apasswordprotectedalQaedaaffiliatedforuminDecember2005. The authorillustratestheconstructionofacharge,thedistancethatitis placedfromitstarget,andtheamountofexplosivetobeusedto achieveadesiredresultagainstdifferentkindsoftargets.Thereiseven adiscussionofphysicalprinciplessuchasblastwaves. Thisisbutoneexampleof theseriousattentionthatisbeinggiven toIEDs.Anditshouldnotbesurprisinginlightof theeffectivenessof theweaponinIraq,andtheeffortsthePentagonhasundertakentofind ananswertoit.Indeed,the JihadisarebusylearningaboutDOD effortsatcountermeasures.ConsiderareportpostedinApril2006toa passwordprotected Jihadistforumdiscussingastudyproducedby the USthink tank CSISoninnovationsin theuseofIEDsinIraqandthe USresponsetothesenewinsurgenttactics.Theauthordiscussesthe findingsinthe studyandannouncesitwillbetranslated intoArabic.He thenchidestheauthorsstatingthattheyshouldnotbesurprisedatthe innovativenessoftheMujahideeninrespondingtonewUStactics. Afterall,hepointsout,theyhaveAllahontheirsideandyouhave nobodyonyours. Earlierin2006,asimilaritemfocusedontheUSArmysplanto deploytheJointIEDNeutralizerinIraqasameanstoreducetherisk posedbyroadsideimprovisedexplosivedevices.Theauthorhighlights the specificationsoftheNeutralizer,whereitseemslessreinforced, anddiscussesaseriesofmethodsthattheMujahideencanusetodefeat it. BeyondIEDs,therearehandbooksandrelatedmaterialsonmany otherkindsofweapons.These rangefromhowtobuildabiological weaponanddirtybombstoinformationwarfaretacticstohowto serviceanAK47. 103

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy 6)OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses.Itshouldnotbesurprising thatnewInternetdevelopmentsin informationmanagementsince9/11are quicklybeing adopted and adapted bytheSalafiJihadists.Acaseinpointistheuseofvideosand slideshowsasthebasisforonlinetrainingprograms.Overthelastthree yearsprofessionallyproducedtrainingvideoshavebeengeneratedby alQaedato replicateonthe Webwhatithadbeenable toprovide prospectiveholywarriorsonthegroundinAfghanistan inthelatter 1990s.TheSITEInstitutehascompiledalarge quantityofthese materialsinitsdatabase. Recentexamplesinclude trainingcoursesproducedbyLabik,anal Qaedamediaorganizationoperating inAfghanistan.InMarch2006,it issued andposted aseriesof filmsofMujahideentrainingforcombat andpracticing tacticaloperationstoinclude conductingraidson houses,blowingupabridge,attacking atargetwithrocketpropelled grenades,andtakinghostages,amongotheractions. Othervideoproductionsconcentrateonhowtoexecute aspecific tacticoremployaparticularweapon.Anexampleisboobytrapping.In thispresentationthetraineelearnsthatthistechniqueforattacking an enemycanbeimplementedinmanywayswhichrequiredifferent levelsofexpertiseandequipment.Italsoexplainshowmanyof these techniquesweredevelopedbyinfidelstatessuchasEngland,Russia, Germany,Italy,andtheUnited States.Thenarratorsuggeststothe viewerthatthesetechniquesshould bestudied.Thisparticular instructionalexercise,whichappearedinanalQaedaforumin2005, concentratesonfourspecific typesofboobytrapping.Similarvideo presentationscanbefoundforalmosteveryirregularwarfaretacticand on eachoftheweaponsemployedinthisformofcombat.These includehowtooperateagainstUSsoldiersinIraqandAfghanistan, 104

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy howtoinfiltrateintothosecountries,andhowtofightindifferentrural andurbanenvironmentsineachlocation. Thesedevelopmentshaveledthe IsraelispecialistReuvenPazto proposethatthisvastandwiderangingbodyof instructional/training videosandslideshowspostedonthe Weboverthelastfewyearsby Jihad groupsconstitutesnothingshortofanInternetbasedOpen UniversityforJihad.Pazassertsthatthe SalafiJihadmovementhas turned theInternetintoacyberuniversityforrecruiting,indoctrinating, andtrainingfuture generationsofholywarriorsfrom theAraband
86 Muslimworld.

AlQaedasGlobalIslamicMediaFrontseeseyetoeyewithPazs assessment.Indeed,theymadethisclaimbeforePaz.In a2005article titledAlQaedaUniversityforJihad Subjects,theFrontdescribed theseactivitiesasconstitutingaglobalinstitutionincyberspace, providinginstruction andtraining inpsychological,electronic,and physicalwarfare fortheMujahideenoftomorrow.Thebottomline buddingholywarriorsnowhavethemeansavailabletobeginto undertakeanirregularwarfaretraining program incyberspace, completewithdiscussionboardsandchatrooms. Inconjunctionwiththepreviousfunctionsofthevirtualsanctuary, theuseofnewinformationmanagementtoolshighlightedinthis sectionfacilitatethedevelopmentofhomegrowncellsdiscussedearlier. Thesecellscanemergeinanylocationandontheirown anddevelop themeanstoprepareforandcarryoutoperations.Therearenow examplesofthishomegrownpatternthathavetakenplacesince9/11. Asnotedabove,insomecasesthelocalcellhasmadecontactwithand receivedassistancefromalQaeda,whileinotherinstancesthiswasnot thecase.TheattackontheLondonsubway,thetrainbombingsin Madrid,theseriesofsuicideoperationsinCasablanca,andtheactions 105

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy oftheHofstadgroupintheNetherlands,tonamethemostprominent cases,reflectboththesehomegrownvariations. 7)CollectionTargeting.Finally,theInternetprovidesSalafi operationalunitswithasignificantamountofdataaboutpotential targets,particularlyonesintheWest.Theextenttowhichtheyhave minedthe Webforthiskindofinformation wasfirstuncoveredon al QaedacomputersleftbehindinAfghanistan.Basedonopensources readilyavailableontheInternet,alQaedahad builttargetfolders/files priorto9/11onpublicutilities,transportationsystems,government buildings,airports,majorharbors,andnuclearpowerplants.Theyalso collectedUSgovernmentandprivatesectorstudiesofthe vulnerabilitiesoftheseandotherfacilitiestodifferenttypesofterrorist operations. Additionally,theyhaveaccesstooverheadimageryandrelated structuralinformationofmanypotentialtargets.Thisallowsthemto notonlyaccessthetargetintermsofitsmostvulnerablepoints,butto observe securitymeasuresthathavebeentakentoprotectit. Accordingto DanVerton,aspecialistincyberterrorism,since9/11 "alQaedacellsnowoperatewiththeassistanceoflargedatabases containingdetailsofpotentialtargetsintheU.S.TheyusetheInternet tocollectintelligenceonthosetargets,especiallycriticaleconomic nodes,andmodernsoftwareenablesthemtostudystructural weaknessesinfacilitiesaswellaspredictthecascadingfailureeffectof
87 attackingcertainsystems."

Since9/11theUSgovernmenthasundertakenmeasurestoprotect suchinformation,particularlywhereitconcernscriticalfacilitiesand infrastructure.Informationthatusedtobepubliclyavailableisnow secured.However,inthisgameofcatandmousethe Jihadisare teachingoneanotherhowtopenetratesecure Websites.Forexample, 106

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy recentlytheGlobalIslamicMediaFrontbegancirculatinga74page guideonhowtoidentifythevulnerabilitiesofandpenetratehack intothem.Theguidehighlightssoftwarethatcanbeusedtodoso. Sanctuariesin UngovernedTerritory. Beyondthisvirtual sanctuary,to whatextenthasalQaedaalso beenabletocarryoutin ungovernedandlargelylawlesstribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan border(andpossibly inotherregionsoftheworld aswell)those activitiesthatitaccomplishedduring 19962001in Afghanistan?Hasit establishedaphysicalsanctuary intheborderregion thatcontributesto itsability tocontinue tofosterglobalinsurgency activities? Thoughit beganoutofdirenecessity,itnowappearsthatalQaedas relocationto theungovernedtribalareasof NorthWaziristan hasevolved inthis way. IthasbeendifficultforUSsecurityagenciestoascertainexactly whathastakenplaceinWaziristan.Onlynow aretheopportunities providedtoalQaedainthese lawlessandungoverned areasbeing understood.Untilrecently,theextenttowhichsuch territoriescouldbe utilizedbyarmedgroupstoestablishsecuresanctuarieswasnot seriouslycontemplated. ForUSintelligence,theseareaswellconstituteyetanother new frontier,an importantfrontinthe longwar.Itwillneedtodevelopa clearpictureofwhatalQaedaandotherarmedgroupsofconcernare able toachieveinvariousungovernedterritories.Butthisisnoteasily accomplished accordingtoaformerintelligenceofficerfromanonUS servicewhohadattempted todosoagainstaterroristgroupoperating outofungovernedterritoryinAfrica.Theobjective,heexplained,was to acquireongoingintelligenceofhowtheterroristgroupwewere fightingagainstelsewhereusedthatungovernedterritory.Hisservice hadaverydifficulttimetryingtodoso. 107

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thetribalarea alongtheAfghanPakistanborderisillustrative.It existswithin alargerCentralAsianterritorythatencompassespartsof severalstatesandisdistinguishedbyruggedterrain,pooraccessibility, lowpopulationdensity,andlittlegovernmentpresence.Thiscreates safehavensforterrorists,insurgents,militias,andcriminalgroups.And localgovernmentsontheirown lacktheeconomic,military, intelligence,andpolicepowertodoanythingaboutit. Inearly2002,elementsoftheTalibanandalQaedaretreatedinto theAfghanPakistanfrontier.AndbinLadenwasbelievedtohave taken refuge inthemountainsofthisterritory.During2003,reports begantowarnthatalQaedaandTalibanforceswereregroupinginthis area andformingan alliancewiththeradicalIslamistpartyHizbi Islami.Sincethentheyhavefoughtaprotractedwaragainstthe United States,NATO,andlocalgovernmentforces.Itisbeyondthescopeof thispapertochroniclethatfight.However,therenow seemstobeno questionthatalQaedamaintainsarobustfightingforce andgrowing infrastructure inthearea. Butthespecific detailsofhowalQaedareestablishedfighting unitsin thisungovernedspace and thekindofinfrastructurefortraining andrelatedactivitiesitrebuilthasbeendifficulttodiscern forUS intelligence.Tobesure,Jihadiswereknowntobe travelingtothearea tojointhefightmuchliketheirpredecessorsdidinthe1980sand 1990s.Butaclearpictureofwhattranspired since2002hasbeen elusive. Onlyinearly2007did aclearerpicture emergeabouttheextentto whichalQaedaisnowexploiting thisnewsanctuary tocontinueto fosteraglobalinsurgency.Accordingto Americanofficialsthere wasmountingevidencethatOsamabinLadenandhisdeputy,Ayman alZawahri,hadbeensteadilybuildinga[trainingand]operationshub 108

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy inthemountainousPakistanitribalareaofNorthWaziristan.Recent intelligenceshowedthatthecompoundsfunctionedunderaloose commandstructureandwereoperatedbygroupsofArab,Pakistaniand

88 Afghanmilitantsalliedwith.

Whiletrainingcampshaveyettoreachthesizeandlevelof sophisticationofthe alQaedacampsestablishedinAfghanistanunder Talibanrule,neverthelessthey are nowassessed byUSintelligence as

89 muchmoreadvancedthathadbeenpreviouslythought. Moreover,the

emergenceofthissafehaveninNorthWaziristanandthesurrounding areahashelpedsenior[alQaeda]operativescommunicatemore
90 effectivelywiththeoutsideworldviacourierandtheInternet.

AccordingtoBruceHoffman: AlQaedahasregroupedandreorganizedfromthesetbacks metedoutbytheUnitedStates,itsalliesandpartnersshortly after9/11andismarshallingitsforcestocontinuethewar thatOsamabinLadendeclaredagainstAmerica10yearsago withhisthenmostlyignoredfatwa.Inthisrespect,alQaedais functioningexactlyasitsfoundersenvisionedit:asbothan inspirationandanorganization,simultaneouslysummoninga broaduniverseoflikemindedextremiststoviolencewhilestill providingguidanceandassistanceformorespectaculartypes 91 ofterroristoperations. TheAfghanPakistanborderisnottheonlyungovernedterritory outofwhich alQaedaand/oritsregionalaffiliateshavedevelopeda presence.Acaseinpointisthe AlgerianbasedGroupforPreaching andCombat(GSPC).AnadherenttoSalafiJihadistbranchof Islamism,theGSPClaunchedaruthlessinsurgentcampaigninAlgeria inthe1990s,targetingthegovernment,themilitary,andcivilians. AlongwiththeArmedIslamicGroup(GIA),itkilledtensofthousands
92 ofinnocentAlgerians.

MembersoftheGSPCleadershiphaveissuedpublicstatements declaringtheirsupportandconnectionswithalQaedaandotherSalafi 109

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Jihadistorganizations.Theyhavealsosaidtheyintendtoattack USand Europeantargetsaspartoftheglobalholywar.Anallegedmemberof theGSPCwasaccusedofinvolvementintheattackontheUSSCole. OtherGSPCoperativeshavebeenimplicatedin attemptedterrorist operationsinotherpartsoftheworld.Europeanintelligenceservices estimate thatthisSalafiaffiliatehasseveralhundredoperatives deployedoutsideofAlgeria.SomearefightinginIraq. TheGSPChasalsomovedintotheSahelregionof Africato establish baseareas.Largepartsofthatterritory,whichcutacrossMali, Chad,Niger,andMauritania,are ungoverned.Ofthesefourstates,the GSPCappearstohavethelargestpresenceinthenorthernpartofMali. However,likealQaedaspresenceinthetribalareasoftheAfghan Pakistanborder,opensourceinformationontheactivitiesbeing undertakenbytheGSPCintheSahelare sparse.Whatisknownisthat theyaretakingadvantageofthisremote areatoestablishapresence. They appeartobe abletomovefreely,smugglecontraband,recruit fromamongtheimpoverishedindigenouspopulationwithalargeyouth cohort,andestablishsecurebasesforvariousactivities.Buttheextent towhichtheyareabletodosoisnotknown.Neitherishowthisfits intothelargerSalafiJihad. Tosummarize,avacuumisburgeoningwithin the territoryof fragileandfailingstates.Thisexpanseoflawlessandungoverned space,estimated toinclude remotepartsofmorethan20countries,is beyond theauthorityof localgovernments.Itcreatespotentialsafe havensinwhicharmedgroupscanestablishsecurebasesforself protection,training,planning,andlaunching.Theextentanddegreeto whichalQaedaandotherSalafiJihadistsaretakingadvantageofitis inneed of extensiveinvestigation.

110

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheIraqiCentralFront. AlQaedaandmanyoftheassociated groupsthatcomprisetheSalafiJihadmovementhavecometosee the conflictinIraqwithinthecontextofthe long Jihad.Consequently, theyseektoexploittheinsurgencythere fortwoprincipalreasons. First,theyhaveanointedIraqthemain front,theforwardedgeof theglobalbattleonwhich toengage thefarenemytheUnited States. Theybelieve thatbyforcing the UnitedStatestogiveupthefightin Iraqtheywillinflictadefeatofenormousstrategicconsequencesonit. Second,theSalafiJihadistsalso believeIraqaffordsthemavital opportunitytospawnanewcorpsofskilledfighterswhocangainthe kindofexperiencethataftertheyleave Iraqcanbeputtogooduse fighting intheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inotherwords,inthefirst
st decadesofthe21 centurytheseIraqiArabscan servethesame th 93 purposetheAfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century.

Evidenceofthishasbeenfoundintheruinsoftheairstrikethatkilled ZarqawionJune7,2006.Accordingto TheNewYorkTimes,Atthe timeofhisdeath[he]wasstilltryingtotransformhisorganization fromonefocusedontheIraqiinsurgencyintoaglobaloperation capableofstrikingfarbeyondIraq'sborders.AccordingtoJordanian securityofficials,Zarqawisrecruitingeffortswerethreefold:He soughtvolunteerstofightinIraqandotherstobecomesuicidebombers there,buthealsorecruitedabout300whowenttoIraqforterrorist trainingandsentthembacktotheirhomecountries,wheretheyawait orderstocarryoutstrikes. Othersbelievethatbeyondtheirhome
94 countries,someof thesetraineesarealsoinWesterncountries.

StatementsbybinLaden,Zawahiri,Zarqawi,andotherleadersof alQaedahavemadeclearthattheyviewIraqwithinthistwofold context.Likewise,itisthemessagethatisrepeatedlyconveyedon their

111

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Websites.Iraqprovidesaunique andhistoricopportunitytofightand defeatthemainenemyoftheglobalJihadmovement. IraqhaseclipsedotherfrontstoincludeAfghanistan,Pakistan, SaudiArabia,Egypt,and Yemen intermsof centralitytotheglobal Jihad.ItdominatesSalafiWebsites,and isbeingusedtorouseradical Salafipassions,inspireArabandMuslimyouth,andanimatethe UmmahtoseeIraqthroughthelensofthe long Jihad.Thus,theyare toldtheMujahideenarefightingapivotalbattleinIraqtoexpelthe United Statesfromtheregion.Iraqispartofalongprotractedwara long JihadagainsttheWestthatseekstooverthrowallapostate regimes,liberatealloccupiedlands,andreestablishtheCaliphate. SincetheUSintervention in2003,thesethemeshave been employedaspartof amajorefforttoinspiremembersoftheUmmah fromacrosstheMuslim worldtotraveltoIraqandjointhefight. Moreover,itisnowapparentthatthere arenetworksforexpediting this processbothin theMiddleEastandbeyond.Tobesure,themajorityof IraqiArabscomefromtheregion.Andofthese,SaudiArabiaand Yemenappeartobeattheheadofthelist.ButforeignfightersinIraq are also drawnfromotherpartsoftheGulf,aswellasfrom Syria, Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,andSudan.BeyondtheregionMujahideen havecomefromBritain,France,andelsewhereinEurope. WithinIraqtheseforeignfightersarepartof severalSalafiJihadist groupsthathavejoined togetherundertheumbrellaof alQaedainthe LandoftheTwoRiversandestablishedtheoperationalcapabilitiesto emergeasamajorcomponentoftheinsurgency.Thereisnoneedtogo intothedetailshereoftheimpacttheyhavehadonthefightinIraq.It issubstantial.And,asnotedabove,itwillproduceathirdgenerationof Jihadifighters,young Muslimstransformedintoideologically

112

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy convincedand welltrainedthroughpracticeholywarriorsthelatest iterationof Qutbsvanguard. Insum,the bottomline isthatIraqhasbecome anintegralpartof howalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave soughtto adaptand re organize followingthestrategicsetbackinAfghanistan tocontinueto facilitate aglobalmillenarianinsurgency. FosteringtheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement. Finally,al Qaedasfourthadaptationappearstohavefocusedon reestablishing its selfassignedroleasvanguardoftheSalafiJihadmovement,arole that wassetbackasaresultofOperationEnduringFreedom.Howhasal Qaedasoughttodoso?Ofthefouradaptationsexamined,thiswasthe mostnebulousand atfirstblush difficulttodiscern.Moreover, developingadetailedmosaicofwhatisnowreferredtoasalQaedaand AssociatedMovements(AQAM)wasbeyondthe scopeofthispaper. Tobesure,the constructof suchamosaicisneeded,andbelowwewill identifytwo effortsthataddresselementsofit.Herewecan only highlightthebroadercontoursofAQAMandidentifykeyquestions thatremaintobe addressed. RecallHoffmansportrayalofalQaedaasbothan inspirationand anorganization.Withrespecttotheformer,alQaedasfounderssaw asoneofthecentralmissionsof theirorganizationthe realizationof the vanguardpartyconceptadvocated byQutb.And so,tothatend they soughttosummonabroaduniverseoflikemindedextremiststo
95 becomepartofaglobalJihadmovement. Inthe1990s,in

Afghanistan,alQaedawasableto begintocarryoutthismission by establishing anetworkoflinkageswithascoreofnationallevel Islamistgroups,whowere employingguerrillaviolence andterrorism againsttheirgovernments.ManyauthorstoincludeHoffmanhave chronicledthesepre9/11developments. 113

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AlQaedafromitsAfghansanctuaryprovidednationallevelJihad organizationswithfinancialassistance,training,weapons,andspiritual guidance. Inreturn,theseentitiesweretoseethemselvesaspartofal Qaedasglobalstruggle.Recipientsincluded radicalIslamistarmed groupsfromAlgeria,Morocco,Egypt,Uzbekistan,Chechnya, Kashmir,Indonesia,thePhilippines,andBosnia,among anumberof otherplaces. Thecapacity ofalQaedatocontinuetoplaythisvanguardroleand tomaintainconnectionswiththegroupsthatcomprisedthisnetworkof associationswassetbackconsiderably withthelossofitsAfghan sanctuary.WhathasalQaedadoneto adaptinorderto reestablish linkageswithitsold SalafiJihad affiliatesandaddnewones?Whatare theconstituentpartsofAQAM?Howdo localJihad groupsview their placeinAQAMand relationship toalQaeda? Howmanylocal affiliatesexist?Thesequestionshighlightwhatneedsto be discovered aboutalQaedaspost9/11effortsto reestablishanetworkoflinkages withnationallevelIslamistgroups. Aslateas2005,fouryearsafter9/11,USofficialswere still struggling tounderstandtherelationshipbetween alQaedaandits affiliates,andtheextenttowhichthoselinkageshadbeen reestablished.In2006,keyUSnationalsecuritydocumentsbeganto usetheterm and alQaedaAssociatedMovements(AQAM)toreferto thisrejuvenated relationship.USCentralCommands(CENTCOM) posturestatementforfightingthewarin2006isillustrative.Itassessed alQaedathroughthenearenemyfarenemylens.AQAMwas describedasaglobalmovementhavingastrongpresenceinthe
96 CENTCOMregion throughseverallocalSalafiJihadaffiliates.

These affiliatesweredescribedasfighting againstlocalapostate regimes(whoare partnersoftheUS)nearenemiesinthe 114

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy CENTCOMarea. Accordingtotheposturestatement,therelationship betweenalQaedaandlocalJihadgroupssince9/11hasbeenfacilitated bytheInternet. Thisenemyislinkedbymoderncommunications,expertly usingthevirtualworldforindoctrination andproselytizing. TheInternetempowerstheseextremistsinawaythatwould havebeenimpossibleadecadeago. Itenablesthemtohave globalreach.Andthissafehavenofwebsitesandthe Internetisproliferatingrapidly,spreadingalQaedasideology 97 wellbeyonditsbirthplaceintheMiddleEast. Tobesure,animportantway alQaedahassoughtto reestablish linkageswithlocalSalafiJihadgroupsisthrough itsvirtualsanctuary. Indeed,aswasdescribedearlier,alQaedausestheInternettopropagate itsSalafiJihadideology toinstillintheUmmahapowerfulsenseof moraloutrageandcommitmenttoholywar.Throughalargenumberof differentWebbasedactivitiesalQaedaseekstopropagateitsmessage toindividualsandgroupsacrosstheglobe.Indoing so,they disseminate aseriesofideologicalframesandmessagesthatdescribein globalandlocaltermsthesocialandpoliticalconditionsrequiring immediateanddrasticJihadaction. Thatthisistakingplaceisevident.Throughthisvirtualsanctuary alQaedaseekstoreestablishitsvanguardroleand attemptsto inspire andencourageaglobalmovementofradicalizedMuslimgroupsto fightlocallyagainstnearenemies,whileseeingthemselvesasapart ofalargerglobalstruggleagainsttheUnitedStates,thefarenemy. Buthoworganizedaretheseeffortsandwhodotheyreach?A recentstudybyRitaKatzand JoshDevonof theSITEInstitute describesthisInternetactivityasverystructured.Ahandfulof primarysourceJihadistWebsitesdistributethemedia[activities]ofthe leadersofalQaedaandotherJihadistgroups.Throughthissmall numberofspecific,passwordprotectedonlineforums,theleading 115

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Jihadistgroups,likealQaeda,posttheircommuniqusand propaganda.BykeepingprimarysourceJihadistWebsites small[they]canprovideatransparentmechanismtoauthenticate

98 communiqus.

Although theseprimary Websitesarerelativelyfew innumber, KatzandDevonnotethatmembersofthemdisseminate official communiqus,doctrinaltreatises,strategic andoperationaldocuments, specialmessages,andothermaterialsthroughamuchbroaderandfar reaching networkofotherWebsites,messageboards,egroups,blogs, andinstantmessagingservicesavailablethroughtheInternet.Hereis oneway theysaythisprocessfunctions: OnceanofficialmessagefromaJihadistgroupispostedtoa primarysourcemessageforum,membersoftheprimary messageforumwillthendisseminatethatpostingtoother secondarymessageboards.Fromthesesecondarymessage boards,otherperipheralindividualswillthendisseminatethe 99 informationontoothermessageboards. KatzandDevonproposethefollowingnetworkgraphictoillustrate howthisvirtualcapability seekstobe atoncedecentralizedbutrigidly hierarchical: Theprimary Websitesatthecenterofthenetworkgraphicare comprisedofalQaedaandorganizationsthatappearcloselyassociated withittoincludeinsurgentgroupsinIraq,theTalibanandothergroups inAfghanistan,theIslamicMaghreb(formerlythe GSPC),theLibyan IslamicFightingGroup,SaudiJihadistgroups,andothers.Since January2006,reportKatzandDevon,thewebbasedactivitiesofthese AQAMelementshavebeencoordinatedanddistributedthroughanew virtualentitythe AlFajrCenterto thesecondaryandtertiary Web sitesnotedontheabovegraphic.Whatthisportendsisthatindividuals andgroupsacrosstheglobemaynoweasilyacquirethekindsof

116

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy informationidentifiedineachofthesevencategoriesofthevirtual sanctuarydescribedearlier.

100 DisseminationofPrimarySourceJihadData

Insum,the activitiescarriedoutby the AlFajrCenterprovide the potentialforfosteringaunified,globalJihadistcommunity. Moreover,itcanassistalQaedaandkeyassociatescoordinate,share information,andconsolidatetheirpowertocontinuetoleadthe [global]Jihadistmovement,whichisoneofalQaedasoriginaland

101 enduringmissions.

Ifthisisakeyway alQaedahassoughttoreestablishitsself assignedroleasvanguardof theglobalSalafiJihadmovement,thenthe followonquestionishowdoweknowwho comprisesthelocal affiliatesofAQAMandonwhatbasisdotheyviewthemselvesasa partofAQAM? Onerecentstudyhassoughttoidentify criteriafor membershipinAQAM.Theauthor,AssafMoghadam,proposesthatto

117

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy beamemberofAQAMaSalafiJihadentitymustbeaSunniIslamic
102 groupandmeetoneofthefollowingfourcriteria.

First,agroupcanbeconsideredpartofAQAMif AlQaedais reflectedinthegroupsnameanditsmembersadheretoalQaedas

103 agenda. InthiscategoryheincludesalQaedainIraq,whichpriorto

September2004wasknownasJama'atalTawhidwalJihad.Founded byAbuMusabalZarqawi,in October2004hedeclared the allegiance ofthegroup tobinLadenandalQaedasstrategy.Thiswasfollowed byachangeinthenameofgroup.Amore recentexampleofthe first criteriacanbefoundin NorthAfrica.TheAlgerian SalafistGroupfor PreachingandCombat,known byitsFrenchinitialsGSPC,announced attheendof2006itwasswitchingitsnametoAlQaedaoftheIslamic Maghreb.Longassociatedwith alQaedaitwaschosenbybinLadento forgelinksandcoordinatetheactivitiesoflikemindedgroupsin
104 Morocco,Nigeria,Mauritania,Tunisiaandelsewhere. Thus,the

name change. Second,agroupmaybeconsideredpartofAQAMif,accordingto Moghadam,thereisevidence ithasinternalizedtheworldviewofAl QaedaandglobalJihad.Severalorganizationsfallintothiscategory includingtheIslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU)Jaishe Muhammad(JeM)andLashkareJhangvi(LeJ),bothwhosebaseof operationsisPakistanIndonesiaJemaahIslamiyya(JI)and the MoroccangroupAssiratalMoustaquim(DirectPath).Thesegroups andseveralotherssimilartothemmeetthissecondcriteriaestablished
105 byMoghadam.

Athirdcriteriaisthatagroupisdevotedtoandactivelypractices violencetooverthrowanexistingIslamicregimeorregimeswiththe
106 aimtocreateatransnationalCaliphateinitsstead. Herealso,

severalgroupsfitintothiscategoryincludingAnsaralIslam,aradical 118

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy IslamistgroupofIraqiKurdsandArabswhohavevowedtoestablish anindependentIslamicstateinIraq.EstablishedinDecember2001,it hashadaclose affiliationwithalQaedaand wasalignedwith Abu

107 MusabalZarqawi,whenheledalQaedainIraq. Alsointhis

categoryisasecondIraqigroup,AnsaralSunnahArmy,aswellasthe ArmyoftheLevant,JamatulMujahedinBangladesh(JMB)andHizb utTahriralIslami,aradicalIslamicpoliticalmovementthatseeksto implementpureSalafiJihaddoctrine andcreate anIslamiccaliphatein

108 CentralAsia.

Finally,agroupmaybeconsideredanalQaedaaffiliateandpartof AQAMif ithasengagedinthepracticeof takfir.Inotherwords,it haslabeledaMuslimregimeoritsleadersasapostatesbecausethey demonstratedisbelief.RecallthediscussionofQutbandhowhecame to chargethatNasserwasguiltyofconsciousbelief thatthere wasa betterway torule than thatbasedonIslam.Therefore,hewasan apostate rulerand alegitimatetargetforJihad.Severalofthegroups associatedwiththepreviouscriterialikewise fitintothiscategory. Theylabelthelocalregimestheyarefightinginthesametermsthat QutbusedtodiscreditNasser.Thishasbeentrue,forexample,ofthe AlgerianGSPC,andtheArmedIslamicGroup (GIA)fromwhichit splitin1998overadisagreementonwhetherciviliansconstitute legitimatetargets. Insum,thisfinalsectionhassoughttohighlightthebroader contoursofhowalQaedahasattemptedsince9/11toreestablishits selfassignedroleasvanguardoftheSalafiJihadmovement.Asnoted above,moreattentionneedstobefocusedonthisadaptationinorderto gainadeeperunderstandingofwhathastranspired inordertodevelop adetailedmosaicofAlQaedaanditsAssociatedMovements(AQAM).

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GLOBALINSURGENCYSTRATEGYANDTHE SALAFIJIHADMOVEMENT RichardH.Shultz

ANEWTYPEOFWAR? IntheaftermathoftheSeptember11,2001attack onstrategic targetsinsidetheUnitedStatesbyalQaeda,scholars,analysts,and policyspecialistsbegantointerpretandframethoseeventswithinthe largercontextofwar.Butwasitwar?Andif itwas,whatkindofwar wasit?AlQaedawasnotastatebutanonstateactor.Manylabeledal Qaedaatransnationalterroristorganization.Couldsuchanonstate armedgroupgotowarwithamajorstateactor? Whatkindofwar coulditcarryout?Therewerenoeasilydecipherable answerstothese questions,foralQaedadidnotreflectoremulate theconductofwaras itwasknownandpracticedin thepast. Within ashortperiodoftimetheUSgovernmentbegantodescribe thepost9/11conflictenvironmentoneinwhichAmericafound itself engagedinafightagainstunconventionalandasymmetricalenemies whocouldposemajor,evenstrategic,securitythreatsasaglobalwar on terrorism.Thisgeneratedagreatdealofdiscussionanddifferences ofopinion.Wasthisanaccurate portrayalofthepost9/11security environmentordid suchacharacterization lackstrategicclarity? Bythesummerof2005seniorBushadministrationofficials expressedseriousdoubtsaboutthisterminology and recasthowthey described thefightagainstalQaeda,itsaffiliates,andotherterrorist groups.IllustrativeofthiswasDefenseSecretaryDonaldRumsfeld.At newsconferencesand inpublicaddresseshe begantospeakofaglobal struggleagainstviolentextremismthelongwarratherthana globalwaronterrorism.Otherseniormilitaryleaders,toincludethe JointChiefsof Staff Chairman,followedsuit. 120

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Butthisbeggedthequestion,howshould weunderstandthose conducting thelongwar?Whoaretheyandwhatkindofbattle are theyfighting?Whataretheirobjectivesandwhatkindofstrategyand tacticsdotheyemployinthisfighttoachievethem?Onepossible answerthathasbeensuggestedisthattheUnited Statesanditsallies arenowconfrontedbyaglobalSalafiJihadinsurgency. Thosetakingthispositionargue thatamoreprecisedescriptionof thepost9/11conflictagainsttheSalafiJihadmovement,whichwillbe discussedindetaillater,wouldbetoframeitasaglobalinsurgency onethatchallengestheWesterndominatedstatesystem.Withinthis context,alQaedaandlooselyassociatedgroupsandmovementsare saidtocomprisean evolvingformofnetworkednonstateactorswho operate locally,regionally,andglobally.Ifthisisthecasethata globalinsurgency isunderwaythentheimplicationsforhowto counteritaresignificantandwillrequireimportantchangesinUS policyandstrategy. ButhowdoweknowthataglobalSalafiJihadinsurgencyis underway?Todeterminewhetherthisisthecase,thisstudyposesthe following core researchquestions:

Isadiverseconfederationofarmedgroups,linkedtogether byacommonideology(ornarrative)and strengthenedbynew powerenhancers,conductingaglobalinsurgencyagainstthe UnitedStatesanditsallies? Isthisglobalinsurgencybeingcarriedoutbyaradical Salafi Jihadmovement(anditsalQaedavanguard)anddoesit haveasitsgoalsa)to fosterregimechangelocallyinapostate Muslimstatesandb)internationalsystemtransformation globally? Isthestrategyadoptedbythe Salafi Jihadmovementa hybrid oran adaptationoftheinsurgencystrategythat revolutionarymovementsemployedagainststatesduringthe

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
th latterhalfofthe20 century?Ifso,whatdoesithavein commonwiththem andhowdoesitdiffer?

To answerthesecoreresearchquestions,aseriesofcorollaryissues willfirstbeexamined asapreludetoconceptualizing asetof requirementsormodelofahypotheticalglobalinsurgency. Theserequirementswillthenbetestedagainstexistingopensource informationonthe actions,activities,andoperationsoftheSalafiJihad movementanditsalQaedavanguard.Theobjectivewillbe to determinewhetherpreliminary evidencesupportsthepropositionthat thoseactions,activities,andoperations,whenseenthroughthelensof theproposedrequirements,canbedescribed,atminimum,asaglobal insurgency initsincipientstageofdevelopment.Whilethesefindings canonlyserveaspreliminaryindicators,thestudywillprovidethe basisforfurtheranalysis. INSURGENCY:CONCEPTSANDFRAMEWORKS The startingpointforconceptualizingahypotheticalmodelorset ofrequirementsforaglobalinsurgency isareviewofthefollowing conceptsandframeworks:1)definitionsandclassificationsof insurgency2)distinctionsbetweeninsurgencyandterrorismand 3) relationshipbetweeninsurgencyandsocialmovements.Belowarethe summarypointsfromthisreview,followedbythetextfromwhichthey arededuced.
SummaryPoints Fourtypesofnonstatearmedgroupsinsurgents,terrorists, militias,criminalorganizationstodayposemajorthreats(toinclude strategicones)tonationstatesincluding theUnitedStates. Importantdifferencesexistamongthesearmedgroups, particularlybetweeninsurgentmovementsandterroristorganizations. Anappreciationofthosedifferencesisessentialtocombateachof thesetypesofarmedgroups.

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Strategiesemployedbyinsurgentgroups,bothorganizationally andoperationally,aremore multifacetedanddiversethanthoseofits armedgroupcounterparts. Insurgenciesareprotractedformsofunconventionalwarfarethat seektoaccomplishtheirgoalsandobjectivesthroughtheemployment ofirregularmilitaryforcesandillegalpoliticalorganizations. Theinstrumentsofviolenceandinfluenceemployedby insurgents rangefromguerrillaoperations,terrorism,andsabotageto politicalmobilization,politicalaction,psychologicaloperationsand intelligenceactivities. Insurgenciesarestrugglesforpowerandlegitimacy.Insurgents seektodestroythepowerandlegitimacyofthegovernmenttheyare challenging,whileenhancingthepowerandlegitimacyoftheir movement. Thereisnoonetypeofinsurgency.Ausefulwaytocategorize themisbasedontheiraspirationsorobjectives.Oftheseveninsurgent variationsidentified,thegoalsofrevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgentmovements arethemostfarreaching.Eachenvisionsa majortransformationofthepoliticalandsocialsystem.Theformer seekstoadvancetoanidealizedfuture,thelattertoreturntoagolden past. Animportant lensthroughwhichtounderstandthe natureof revolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgenciesissocialmovementtheory. Indeed,thesetwoformsofinsurgencyhave severalcharactersin commonwithhighrisksocialmovements. Socialmovements representgroupsonthemarginsofstateand society thatseektoreformortransform the political system.Todoso theydevelopcomplexpoliticalstrategies,giventheirpolitical marginality. Themorefarreachingthechangesoughtbyasocialmovement, themoremultifacetedthetasksthemovementsorganizationhasto accomplish.Thesameistrueofrevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgencies. Toaccomplishfarreachingchange,radicalsocialmovements engageinhighriskactivism.Likerevolutionaryandmillenarian insurgencies,thisnecessitatesdevelopmentofamassbaseof dedicatedsupporterswhomustbemotivatedtotakeaction. Forhighrisksocialmovements,ideologyperformsanumberof vitalfunctions.Tobuilda massbase, ideologyplaysacentralrolein therecruitmentprocessthatattracts newmembers shapestheloyalty

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
ofthese newmemberstoretainthemand servesas atoolforwaging thestruggle. Highrisksocialmovementideologyconstitutesaseriesofframes thatmustcometoresonatewiththetargetaudience.Itisthroughthe movementsorganizationthatitcomestodo so.Ideologyand organizationaresymbioticallyconnectedtooneanother.

DefiningInsurgency Insurgencyisastrategyofunconventionalandasymmetricwarfare executed byoneoffourdifferenttypesofnonstatearmedgroupsthat todayposecomplicated analyticand significantoperationalchallenges to those statesthatareconfrontedbythem.Overthelasttwodecades eachofthese armedgroups,whocarryouttheiractivitiesbothwithin andacrossstateboundaries,haveincreasingly threatenedstate supremacy.Indoingso,theypresentnontraditionalchallengestothe intelligenceandsecurityservicesofgovernmentsthatareunlikethe conventionalonesposedbystates. Armedgroupscan bedividedinto afourparttypology
109 insurgents,terrorists,militias,andorganizedcrime. Whileitisthe

casethatthesenonstateactorshaveseveralcharacteristicsin
110 common, theyalsohaveimportantdifferencesthatdistinguishone

fromtheother.Itisimportantforgovernmentstounderstandwhyand howinsurgents,terrorists,militias,andcriminalorganizationsvary conceptuallyfromoneanotherandtocategorizeandrespondtothemas such.Failuretodosocanresultinseriouspolicyandcombat misfortune. Insurgency,fromanorganizationalandoperationalperspective,is themostintricate ofthefourtypesofactivitiescarriedoutbyarmed groups.Aswillbediscussed,thiscanbeseenwheninsurgent movementsarejuxtaposedwithterroristorganizations.Itislikewise thecasewhentheyareputsideby sidewithmilitiasandcriminal

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy groups.Insurgentscanattackthestatewith an arrayofpoliticaland paramilitaryinstrumentsbecauseofhowtheyorganizeandoperate. Numerousauthorshaveproposeddefinitionsofinsurgencyascan beobservedintheliteratureonpoliticalviolence.BardONeill,author of InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionaryWarfare,is oneofthemostfrequentlycited.Hedescribesinsurgentsasarmed groupsthatconsciouslyusepoliticalresourcesandviolenceto destroy,reformulate,orsustainthebasisoflegitimacyofoneormore
111 aspectsofpolitics[withinastate]. VariationsofONeillsdefinition 112 abound.

ConsiderthestatementputforwardintheCIAsmid1980sGuide totheAnalysisofInsurgencyInsurgencyisaprotractedpolitical militaryactivitydirectedtowardcompletelyorpartiallycontrollingthe resourcesofacountrythroughtheuseofirregularmilitaryforcesand

113 illegalpoliticalorganizations. Indoingso,insurgentsseekto

weakenand/ordestroythepowerandlegitimacyofaruling government.Theyalso simultaneouslyaimatincreasingtheirown powerandlegitimacy. Tothisend,aninsurgentmovement,dependingonitsgoalsand strategy,willdrawonandemployarangeofoperationalinstruments includingguerrillawarfare,terrorism,andsabotage,aswellaspolitical mobilization,politicalaction,intelligence/counterintelligenceactivities, andpropaganda/psychologicalwarfare. Insurgentscanadoptdifferentorganizationalformsrangingfrom thosebasedonpoliticalandparamilitarydimensionstomorenarrowly structuredconspiratorialones.Theclassicorrevolutionaryinsurgent modelfromtheColdWarerawasdesignedtorecruit,indoctrinate,and mobilizesupporterstoestablishan alternativepoliticalauthoritytothe existinggovernment,whileemployingintelligenceandmilitarymeans 125

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy toattackandweakenthatgovernmentthroughescalatingviolence.A conspiratorialvariation,bywayofcontrast,focusesmoreexclusively onusingviolencetounderminethewillofagovernmentoroccupying powertosustainlossesandstayinthefight.Itpaysmuchlessattention tocontrollingaparticularterritory,massmobilizationorbuildinga parallelpoliticalapparatus. Alsoaffectingthe approachtakenbyinsurgentsistheareaor terrain where theycarryouttheiractivities.Theycantakeplaceinan urbanand/orruralenvironment,aswellastransnationally.Eachof theselocationswillhaveanimpactonhowtheinsurgentsapproach eachofthecharacteristicsorelementsofthisstrategy. Onthebasisoftheaboveconsiderations,thefollowingarethe essentialcharacteristicsofinsurgencyasitwillbeapproachedinthis study: Insurgencyisaprotractedpoliticalandmilitarysetof activitiesdirectedtowardpartiallyorcompletelygainingcontrol overtheterritoryofacountry. Insurgentsseektoaccomplishtheseobjectivesthroughtheuse ofirregularmilitaryforcesandillegalpoliticalorganizations. Insurgentsemployinstrumentsrangingfromguerrilla operations,terrorism,andsabotagetopoliticalmobilization, politicalaction,psychologicaloperationsand intelligence/counterintelligenceactivities. Eachoftheseinstrumentsisdesignedtoweakenand/or destroythepowerandlegitimacyofarulinggovernment,whileat thesametimeincreasingthepowerandlegitimacyoftheinsurgent group. TypesofInsurgencies TherewaslittleagreementamongspecialistsduringtheColdWar overhowtocategorizedifferenttypesofinsurgency.Andthisremained trueinitsaftermathinthe1990s.Variousexpertswereanimatedby differentaspectsofthistypeofarmedgroup.Consequently,they 126

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy createdidiosyncraticorderingsortypologiesofinsurgency.Some focusedontheorganizationalandoperationaldimensionsofinsurgent movementstoclassifythem.Othersconcentratedontheiraspirations. Thefollowingexamplesareillustrativeofthesetwoapproaches. Theaforecited GuidetotheAnalysisofInsurgencysetsoutfour broadvariationsofinsurgencyinitstypologypoliticallyorganized,

Organizational Structure Politically organized Extensive, complexpolitical structure developedbefore military operationsare initiated. Strategy Vulnerabilities Other Characteristics

Shadow government createdto undermine authorityof existing regime political consolidation precedes military consolidation ofcontested areas.

Vulnerableto concentrated effortaimedat neutralizingthe infrastructure andestablishing administrative controlin contestedareas.

Protracted warfare tendency towards excessive revolutionary zeal.

Militarily organized Small, decentralized structureof armedinsurgents servingasa catalystfor mobilizing opposition againstan existingregime.

Insurgent groupshope toformfocus fordisaffected population destructionof regime legitimacyby military action military consolidation precedes political consolidation ofcontested

Vulnerableto aggressive militaryaction duringearly stagesof rebellionbecause ofundeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable logisticsand communications networksamong local populations.

Hopeto demoralize regimeand attainpower without extensive conventional warfare.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
areas. Traditionally organized Existingtribalor religious organizational structure.

Nounique strategy commonto allwilladopt strategyof oneofthe othertypes.

Limitedcapacity Recruitmenton forabsorbing basisofethnic economicand exclusivity. military punishment leadership conflictsare commonleaders oftenlack sufficient motivation, experienceas insurgents,and political discipline.

Urban insurgency Cellularstructure Threaten inurban regime environment. legitimacy throughurban disruption.

Restrictedto smallareaand musthidewithin population attritionresulting from military/police pressureandthe psychological stressof clandestinity.

Oftenin supportof wider insurgency wagedinrural areas.

militarilyorganized,traditionallyorganized,andurbanorganized.
114 Belowisabriefsynopsisofwhateachentails:

Ascanbeseen,inthiscategorizationtherearetwokeyordefining variables,theorganizationalstructureandoperationalstrategy employedtoachieveintermediateandlongterminsurgentobjectives. Othercharacteristicsreceiveconsiderationinthetextaccompanying thisdelineationideology,motivation,leadership,cadrebackground butorganizationalstructureandoperationalstrategyarethekey 128

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy variablesusedtodifferentiatethepolitical,military,traditional,and urbanvariations.AsimilarapproachcanbeseeninChristopher

115 ClaphamscategorizationofinsurgenciesinAfricainthe1990s.

BardONeill,ontheotherhad,concentratesoninsurgent aspirations.In InsurgencyandTerrorismhe identifiesseveraltypesof insurgencymovements.Foreach,theirprinciplegoalorobjectiveisthe centralvariables.Henotesthatbydoingsoimportantdistinctions emerge.Moreover,Ifwefailtoseethefundamentaldifferenceswith respecttogoals,wemakeamajormistake becausedifferentiating amonggoalshasnotonlyacademicvaluebutsomeveryvitalpractical implicationsforthoseinvolvedin[countering]insurgents.116 For instance,thiswouldbetrueintermsofwhetheraninsurgentmovement orelementswithinitareopentonegotiationandpoliticalcompromise. Basedonaspirations,ONeillsinglesoutseventypesofinsurgent movementsanarchist,egalitarian,traditionalist,pluralist, secessionist,reformist,and preservationist.Eachoftheseprototypes focusestheiractivitiesandoperationsprincipallyatthenationalor nationstatelevel.However,atleastinthecaseoftwoofthem,the insurgentsmayseetheirmovementaspartofalargerinternationalone basedonatransnationalideology. Thefirsttypeanarchisthasfarreachingbutunrealisticgoals. Theyseektoeliminateallinstitutionalizedpoliticalarrangements becausetheyviewthesuperordinatesubordinateauthorityrelationships
117 associatedwiththemasunnecessaryandillegitimate. To

accomplishthesegoals,anarchistcellstendtorelyonwhathasbeen calledpropagandaofthedeedviolentstrikesagainsttheauthority
th figuresoftheregime.Whileprevalentattheturnofthe20 century,in

theaftermathofWWIIexamplesofthisvariantarescant.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thesameisnotthecaseforegalitarianorwhatmoreaccurately shouldbetermedrevolutionaryinsurgentmovements.Inthisapproach, theinsurgentsseektoimposeanewpoliticalandsocialorderonthe statebasedonavaluesystemthatcallsfordistributionalequality.To doso,theinsurgentleadershipcreatesacentrallycontrolledapparatus ororganizationthatmobilizesthepeopletoradicallytransformthe

118 socialstructurewithintheexistingpoliticalcommunity.

IntheaftermathofWWIIanumberofcommunistrevolutionary movementsindifferentpartsofthedevelopingworldadoptedthis approach.PerhapsthemostillustrativeexampleoftheseColdWar revolutionaryinsurgencieswasthatinVietnam.Itwasable,in succession,toforce firsttheFrenchandthentheUnitedStatesto negotiatetheirwithdrawalfromtheconflict.Andaswillbediscussed later,theNationalLiberationFrontorVietCong(VC),whichthe United Statesfought,establishedahighlydevelopedversionofthis insurgentorganization.Whilefocusedonseizingpoweratthe localor nationstatelevel,nevertheless,theVietnameseandotherlikeminded insurgenciessawthemselvesaspartofalargercommunistinternational
119 movement.

A traditionalinsurgencyalsohasasitsgoalfundamentalchangeof thepoliticalandsocialorder.However,whatsuchmovementsplanto replacetheexistingsystemwithisonethatseekstoreturntoand restorearegimethatexistedineithertherecentordistantpast.Inthe caseofthelatter,the ancienrgimeisrootedinancestraltiesand religion.ONeillreferstothissubtypeasreactionary.Amore analyticallypreciseandobjectivecharacterizationistodescribethem asMillenarian. Millenarianmovementsareonesinwhichreligious,social,and politicalgroupingsenvisionacomingmajortransformationofsociety 130

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy and areturntoanidealizedpast.Suchmovementstypicallyclaimthat thecurrentregimeanditsrulersareirreparablycorrupted,unjust,and otherwiseirredeemable.Moreover,suchmovementsoftenbelieveina supernaturalpowerandpredeterminedvictorythroughtheintervention ofGodorothermetaphysicalforces. Millenarianmovements,generally,seetheworldthrough Manichaeanlensesaholywarbetweentheforcesofgoodandevil. Andtheyaretransnationalinscopeaswell.Revolutionaryand millenarianinsurgentmovementshavemuchincommonwithrespect toadogmaticcommitmenttoanideologybasedonaperceptionofthat ideologyasreflectingabsolutetruth. PostWWIImillenarianismismostoftenidentifiedwithcertain conceptionsofradicalIslamism.Inthe1950s,theMuslim Brotherhood,foundedbyHassanalBannain1928asareligious, political,andsocial/revolutionarymovement,wasthemostactive.The globalSalafiJihadmovementisitsforemostoffspring today. Thefinalinsurgentvariantwhichseeksarevolutionary transformationofthepoliticalsystemPluralististheonlyonethat isnotauthoritarianinorientation.Theirgoalistoestablishasystemin whichthevaluesofindividualfreedom,liberty,andcompromiseare emphasizedandinwhichpoliticalstructuresaredifferentiatedand autonomous.ONeillnotesthatWhilethehistoryofWestern civilizationismarkedbyanumberofsuchuprisings[armed insurgencies]inrecenttimestherehavebeenfewofanywecould classifyaspluralist.120 Whilethisistrueofarmedmovements,there areanumberofexamplesofmovementsemployingnonviolent
121 strategiesthathavethesamepluralistpoliticalobjectives.

ThefifthtypeofinsurgencySecessionistseekstobreakaway fromthestatetowhichitisformallyapartandestablishan 131

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
th independentpoliticalcommunity.Inthelatterhalfofthe20 century,

secessionistinsurgentmovementsburgeoned.Buttherewasno uniformityinthetypeofpoliticalsystemtheysoughttoestablish. Someoptedforasystemthatreflectedtheirethnicandreligious traditions,whileothersplannedformoremodernformsofgovernment. Nonearetransnational,seeingthemselvesaspartofalargerorglobal movement. ThefinaltwotypesofinsurgencyReformistand Preservationistarelessambitiousintermsoftheiraspirations.The formerseeksamoreequitabledistributionofthepoliticaland economicgoodsofthesystem,notaradicalreorderingofit.Thelater seeksevenless.Itseekstomaintainthestatusquo,becauseofthe relativeadvantagesitderivesfromit. DistinctionsBetweenInsurgencyandTerrorism Scrutinyrevealsimportantdifferencesbetweeninsurgent movementsandterroristorganizations.Understandingthese dissimilaritiesisnotonlyanacademicsprerogative.Suchan appreciationisessentialforthosegovernmentsfacedwithhavingto combateachofthesetypesofarmedgroups.Terrorismandthose armedgroupswhoseoperationalactivitiesarelimitedtothisformof politicalviolencehavebeendefinedinamyriadofways.Moreover, beginninginthe1960sterrorismcametobeusedpejorativelyto discreditanddelegitimizevarioustypesofarmedgroups. Themonikerterroristwasemployedbygovernmentsfor propagandaandpoliticalwarfare purposesagainstinsurgentor resistancemovements.Theobjectiveindoingsowastodebasethe reputationofthemovement,renderitscauseillegitimate,andportray itsmethodsasoutsidethelawsofwar.TheUScharacterizationofthe VietConginthe1960sisillustrative.However,fortheVietCong, 132

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy whileterrorismwasemployed,itwasdonesoasonetacticwithina
122 morecomplexpoliticalmilitarystrategy.

Inthe1970s,anumberofarmedgroupsdidemergethatnarrowed theiroperationalapproachto arelianceonterroristtactics.Examples includedtheBaaderMeinhof Gang(theRedArmyFaction),theItalian RedBrigades,andJapaneseRedArmy.Theyhadlittleornoapparent desire(orcapacity)toestablishamasssocialmovement.Rather,these terroristgroupswerecomprisedofsmallcellsofalienatedindividuals embeddedwithinnationalsocieties.Thefollowingaretheirkey characteristics: Terroristgroupsseekthedeliberatecreationandexploitation offearthroughthethreatand/oruseofthe mostproscribedkindof violenceforpoliticalpurposes. Theactisdesignedtohaveafarreachingpsychologicaleffect beyondtheimmediatetargetoftheattack.Theobjectiveistoinstill fearinandintimidateamuchwideraudience. Thetargetsofterroristgroupsincreasinglyarenon combatants,andlargenumbersofthem,whounderinternational normshavethestatusofprotectedindividualsandgroups. Basedonthesecharacteristics,itisobservablehowterroristgroups differfrominsurgentmovements.Forinstance,importantdistinctions existwithrespecttotacticsandtargeting.Asnotedabove,itisthecase thatinsurgentuseofviolencecanincludeterrorismaswehavedefined it.Buttheyalsorelyonguerrillawarfaretacticsdefinedhere as irregularsmallunitattacksagainstthestatesmilitaryandsecurity forcestoharass,exhaust,andforcethemtooverextendtheirresources. Inconjunctionwithviolence,insurgentsalsouseanumberof politicaltacticstoreallocatepowerwithin thecountry.Theymaydoso, asnotedabove,forrevolutionaryobjectivestooverthrowandreplace theexistingsocialorder.Ortheymayhavefarlessgrandiose aspirationsoverthrowanestablishedgovernmentwithoutafollowon 133

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy socialrevolutionaryagenda,establishanautonomousnationalterritory, causethewithdrawalofanoccupyingpower,orextractpolitical concessionsthatareunattainablethroughlessviolentmeans. Thesedifferencesarecapturedgraphicallyinthediagrambelow. Herewecanseethatthereissomeoverlapbetweenterrorismand insurgency,buttherearealsolargeareaswheretheydonotintersect.

InsurgencyandHighRiskSocialMovements Anadditionallensthroughwhichtounderstandthenatureof revolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgencystrategyissocialmovement theory.Indeed,thesetwoformsofinsurgencyshareseveral characteristicswithsocialmovements.Itisparticularlyrelevantwith respecttotherelationshipbetweentheorganizationalcharacteristicsof suchinsurgenciesandtheirworldview,ideology,andprograms.And byusingthislensweseehowtheterroristmonikercanconcealmore thanitrevealsaboutarmedgroups. Socialmovementsoftentaketheformof largescalegroupingsof individualsand/ororganizationsfocusedonachievingsomedegreeof politicalorsocialchange.Broadlydefined,asocialmovementis comprisedofanelementorgroupingofthepopulationwithinastate 134

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy acollectivitythatchallengesthedominantinstitutionalorderand proposesanalternativestructuralarrangement. Socialmovementsrepresentgroupsthatareonthemarginsofstate andsociety.Outsidetheboundariesofinstitutionalpowertheyseekto changethesystem,ofteninfundamentalways.Givenitspositiononthe marginsofstateandsocietyasocialmovementhastodevelopa sophisticated strategytoachieveitsobjectives. Socialmovementscomeinanumberofdifferentforms. Sociologistsdistinguishbetweenreformandradicalvariations.The formerincludesatradeunionseekingtoincreaseworkersrightsora greenmovementadvocatingnewecologicallaws.Radicalvariations includetheAmericanCivilRightsMovementwhichdemandedfull civilrightsandequalityunderthelawforallAmericansorthePolish Solidarity(Solidarno)movementwhichcalledforthetransformation ofthecommunistsystemintoademocraticone. Socialmovementsarealsodistinguishedbytheirmethodof operations.Someemploypeacefulmeansothersengageinhighrisk, highcostactivism.The laterofteninvolvesarmedviolenceand
123 undergroundorganizations. Revolutionaryandmillenarian

insurgenciesareillustrative. Whydoindividualsjoinhighriskmovementsandoncetheydoso howaretheyretained?Socialscientistshavefocusedonthosefactors thatfacilitateparticipationincollectiveaction.Answersaresoughtto thefollowingquestions:One,whatexplainshowanindividualinitially becomesinterestedinasocialmovement?Whatleadshimtobewilling toexposehimselftoanewway ofthinking?Two,onceexposed,how doesthemovementconvincehimthatitisalegitimatealternativeand persuadehimtoacceptitsworldview?Three,howisheconvincedto

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy engageinhighriskactivity.Four,howdoesthemovementretainhim tocontinue todoso? Highrisksocialmovementshavetoestablishstructured organizationswithconsciouslyconceivedgoalsandprogramsfor achievingthosegoals.Theyadoptcharacteristicsofaformal organization(evenwhentheyareclandestine).However,theydiffer fromotherorganizationsinthattheyexistexplicitlyforbringingabout majororsystemicchange.Andthemorefarreachingthatproposed change,themorecomplexthetasksasocialmovementorganization hastoaccomplish.Thisisespeciallytrueforsocialmovementsthat taketheformofrevolutionaryandmillenarianinsurgencies. TheRoleofIdeology. Akeyelementof ahighrisksocial movementistheroleplayedbyideologyinshapingitspurpose, programs,andoperations.Ideologicalappealsarecentraltotheir existence,torecruitmentstrategiesthatattractnewmembers,to a membersloyaltyandretention,andastoolsforwagingthefight. Ideology[A]nemotionladensystemofideas,beliefs,myths, andvaluesbindsamovementtogether.Animportantfeatureof ideologyisitsappealtoemotion anditselicitingofanaffective response.Andthemythsandvaluesofideologyare communicated throughsymbolsthatcapturelargeexpansesofmeaningand
124 communicatethatmeaning. Withinthiscontext,theideologyof

highriskmovementsperformsthefollowingactivities: Itprovidesacomprehensivecritiqueoftheexistingsocialand politicalorderasimmoralandinhuman,andinstillsinindividualsa powerfulsenseofmoraloutrage.Suchideologiespaintasituation inblackandwhiteterms.Therearenograys. Itprovidesanidealizedandsuperioralternativeorderasa substituteforthestatusquoandasetofvaluesthatwillserveas thebasisforanewidealizedsocietyorforthe returntoanearlier goldenage. 136

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Itservestomobilizeindividualstojointhemovementand givesthosewhobecomemembersasenseofunity,solidarity, cohesion,andsenseofpurpose. Itidentifiestheplansandprogramsbywhichthemovement intendsto reachitsobjectives,relatingspecificpatternsofactionto therealizationofitsvisionandvalues. Itisthroughtheseactivitiesthatamovementsideologicalappeal resultsinsuccessfulrecruitment.Ideologybuildsaseriesofframesthat describe thesocialandpoliticalproblemsrequiringimmediateand drasticactionandprovidesaroadmapforredressingthem.Ideology includesadiagnosticframethatdescribestheproblem,detailingthe graveinjusticethathastranspired.A prescriptiveframethatasserts whatmustbedonetorectifyit,proposinganewidealizedsystemthat willreplacethedepravedone.Andamotivational/mobilizationframe spellsoutthestepstobetakenthestrategytobefollowedtobring
125 tofruitionthe prescriptiveframe.

Revolutionaryandmillenarianideologiesnotonlyprovidean individualwithnewbeliefsbutanewidentityandreality.Theprocess amountstoaconversion.Therecruitcomestoseethesocialand politicalorderashighlyunjust,adoptsanewholisticworldviewto replaceit,andreceivesaplausiblestrategyforchangingit.Below,an examinationofoneofthemostsuccessfulpostWWIIrevolutionary insurgencymovementsrevealsthatthisis,toamajorextent,alabor intensiveprocessthatinvolveseducationandindoctrination. Mobilization,integration,andretentionconstituteaprocessfor reconstructingidentityandreality.Therecruitisconvertedtothecause andintegratedintoasocialnetworkofbelievers.Highrisksocial movementsthatadoptinsurgencystrategiesmobilizeindividualsinto groupsthatstruggleandfighttogethergotowartobringabout socialandpoliticalchange.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy IdeologyandOrganization. Theideologyofhighrisksocial movementscomprisesaseriesofframesthatmustcometoresonate withthetargetaudience.Itisthroughthemovementsorganizationthat thisisachieved.Ideologyandorganizationaresymbiotically connected.Asillustratedbelow,organizationisthemechanismthrough whichtheideologicalframesaremediatedwiththetargetaudience. Theinteractionbetweenideologicalcommitmentandorganizational structurecanbeseenparticularlywithrespecttomembership, leadership,andinstitutionalization. Asahighriskmovementbecomesembodiedinamore elaborate andstructuredorganizationalapparatus,theprocessesofmobilization, integration,andretention likewisebecomemoreformalized.Thelines betweenhardcoremembersandthosewhosympathizeand/orpassively supportthemovementaresharpened.Boundariesaredrawn and reinforced.Signsorsymbolsareestablishedtodemarcatemembers fromnonmembers.Thiscantakemanyformssuchasspecialwaysin whichmembersgreetandaddressoneanother. Inhighrisksocialmovementsmembershipbecomesfully socializedintoaninsularandideologicallybasednetworkwherethe demandsassociatedwithparticipationareunbending.Themembers placeintheorganizationandtheactivitiesheisexpectedtoengagein becomethecenterofhisexistence.Theinternalstrengthofsucha movementistheresultofintenseorganizationalworkthroughwhicha massbaseofsupportiscreatedoutof indoctrination effortsdirectedby aleadershipthatconsidersoneofitsmostimportanttasksthe translationofideologyintoaction.Onceinstitutionalized,highrisk socialmovements(toincluderevolutionaryinsurgencies)become professionalized.Theorganizationisabletooutliveitscharismatic founder(s)andbecomeroutinized. 138

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy REVOLUTIONARYINSURGENCY ANDITS TRANSNATIONALEVOLUTION ThroughoutthepostWWII erathedevelopingworldwasthescene ofextensiveconflict,instability,andinternalwarfare.Thepressures andchallengesunderlyingthatviolenceweretheresultofthede colonializationprocess,crisesofstatelegitimacy,redistributionof power,sectariandisputes,andsecessionistpressures.Inallofthese conflictsstateswerepittedagainstnonstatearmedgroups,thelatterof whichemployeddifferentirregularwarfarestrategies. Ofthosedifferenttypesofpoliticalmilitarystrife,themost comprehensive wasthatcarriedoutbynationalliberationmovements employingrevolutionaryinsurgencystrategy.Duetothiscomplexity, theywereoftenmisconstruedintermsof theirideology,narrative,and operationalactivities.Thissectionreviewsthecoreelementsofthat strategy,itsdifferentstages,theroleofexternalassistanceandthe operationalevolutionofrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategyontothe transnationalstagebeginninginthelatter1970s.Belowarethe summarypointsfromthatreview,followedbythetextfromwhichthey havebeendrawn.
SummaryPoints Ofthedifferenttypesofpoliticalmilitaryconflictinthe developingworldfollowingWWII,the mostcomplexwasthat conductedbynationalliberationmovementsemployingrevolutionary insurgencystrategy. Revolutionaryinsurgentstrategycombinedunconventional paramilitarytacticswithpoliticalandpsychologicaloperationsto establishacompetingideologicalstructureandwarfighting organization.Itsimmediate goalwas regimechange,whichservesas preludeforpoliticalandsocialtransformationofthestate. Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesemployedgrand strategies thatimplementedanintegratedoperationalplanofactionbasedonthe followingelements:ideology,leadership,massbase,logistics, organizationalapparatus,political,psychological,guerrillawarfare, paramilitarytactics,andexternalassistance.

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Whileeachelementisnecessaryforsustainingarevolutionary insurgency,the interrelatedelementsof leadership,ideology and organization lieatitscore.They constitute the remarkabletrinity of revolutionaryinsurgencystrategy. Leadershipisindispensable.LeadersofpostWWIIrevolutionary insurgenciesperformed key fundamentaltasks,mostimportantly devisinganeffectiveideologyandorganization. Tomobilizefollowersasuccessfulrevolutionaryinsurgency requiredanappealingideologythatplayedthe centralrolein attracting newmembersshapingtheirloyaltytoretainthemand servedas a vitaltoolforwagingthe politicalfightforlegitimacy. Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesinstitutedorganizational infrastructuresthatwere extensive andfunctionally multifacetedto1) broadenpolitical appeal, influence, andcontrol and 2)createawar fightingcapability sustainedthrougharobustcommand,logistical,and financialsystem.

Theincipientstageofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesfocusedon
buildingamassbaseofsupporters.Thiswasthefirststepin establishinganorganizationalinfrastructurecapableofconducting protractedrevolutionarywarfare. Recruitingamassbasetostaffaninsurgentorganizationwas difficult.Traditionalsocietieswerenotreceptivetosuchactivities. Therevolutionary leadershiphadtoshift traditionalloyaltiesand inducepeopletobecomerisktakers.Theyhadto acceptnewroles, integrateintonewsocialpatterns,follownewauthority,andtolerate thestressesinherentinprotractedwarfare. Todoso,leadership, ideology,andorganizationestablisheda process todrawandbindpeopletotherevolutionaryinsurgent movement. That processinculcatedthe movements ideologyand narrative intothoserecruited.The processconsistedofthreetasks mobilization,integration,andmaintenance. Mobilization beganthe processofconvincingindividualstobreak withexistingsocialandculturalcontextandacceptanewonesetout inideologyandnarrative.Thefirststage endedwithacceptanceof membership.Itconsistedmainlyofpersuasion throughideologicaland nationalisticappeals,thepromiseofrewards,selfsatisfaction, revenge,andadvancement.These methodscouldbeaccompaniedby morecoerciveones. Inthesecondstageintegrationtherecruitwassocializedinto theinsurgentmovement, broughtinto conformitywithitsgoals, convincedtomakea majorcommitment,andcametobesynchronized

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withandcontrolledbytheorganization.Newrecruitsdidnothavethis levelofcommitmentwhentheyjoined.Achievingitnecessitateda carefulsocializationandindoctrinationcourseofaction. Thefinal stagemaintenance orretentionfocusedthe highly stressfulnatureofprotractedwarandthechallengeof keeping membersinthefight.Maintainingcompliancewiththeleaderships authority,stayingloyaltoandidentifyingwiththemovements ideologyandnarrative,andsustaininginstitutional bondsrequired carefultending. TheVietCongapproachtothe mobilization,integration,and maintenance illustrateshow nationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsdevelopedamassbaseofsupportduringthe incipient stage. The processwasalocalized,individualized,handson,faceto face,andlaborintensiveexercise. Followingtheincipientstage, revolutionaryinsurgenciesentered into longperiodsofprotractedirregularwarfare.Insurgentsfought longwarsthatdemandedestablishing andstaffing warfighting organizations thatcouldsustainpolitical,psychological, guerrilla warfare,andotherparamilitaryoperationsoverlengthytimeperiods againststrongeropponents.Oftenprotractedirregularwarfare proceededthroughseveralstages. Becauserevolutionaryinsurgencieswereradicalsocial movements,politicaloperationswerevitalforfightingthestate. Throughparallelhierarchiesorshadowgovernmentthese activities tookdifferentformstoincludeincorporatingvarioussocialgroupings tobroadentheinsurgent apparatusandinstitutionalizeitsmassbases. Political operations includedtwoothercriticalactivities: 1) addressing thematerialandsocialinequalitiesthatwereimportant causesoftheinsurgency.Parallelhierarchiesprovidedsocialservices and2)establishingthemeansofproducingoracquiringwarfighting capabilities. Otherkeyoperationalactivitiesemployedbyrevolutionary insurgentstoexecute protractedirregularwarfareincluded1) propaganda,politicalwarfare,andpsychologicaloperations to propagate theirnarrativeinternally andinternationallythrough informationcampaigns2)intelligenceandcounterintelligenceand3) paramilitaryoperations(terrorism,guerrillawarfare,sabotage,and mobileconventionaltactics). Finally,revolutionaryinsurgentmovementsduringtheColdWar soughtand receivedexternalsupportmainlyfromtheSovietUnion. Theydidsobecauseofthepoweroftheregimestheywerefighting. Buttheyalsosawthemselvesaspartofaglobalideologicaland

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revolutionarystruggle.Still, thesewerefirstandforemostnational levelinsurgencies. Inthelatter1970scertainnationallevelgroupschallengingstate authoritythroughinsurgency warfarebegantoextendthebattlefieldto thetransnationalleveloutofoperationalnecessity.Intheforefrontof thisevolutionofinsurgencystrategywasthePLO.Theyintroduced twoimportantoperationalinnovations1)theyextendedtheirareaof operationstoattacktargetsinotherregions,primarilyEuropeand 2) throughtheseoperationsthePLOsuccessfullyexploitedpropaganda ofthedeedtopropagateitsmessage transnationallyto mobilize much widersupportforitscause. ThesePLOoperationalinnovationswithrespecttotheconductof insurgency wereemulatedby otherarmedgroupsduringthe1980s. Moreover,aswillbedescribedinalatersection,theseinnovations alsohadanimportantimpactonhowalQaeda plannedand conducted globaloperationsinthe1990s andbeyond.

Background PostWWII revolutionaryinsurgenciesgenerallywere basedon variationsofMarxismandnationalism.However,withinthecontextof theColdWarandtheEastWeststruggle,theformerwasoftenseenas ofgreaterconsequence thanthelatterand aslinkingthesenational levelconflictsto aglobalmovement.Becausetheideologyofnational liberationmovementsemployingrevolutionaryinsurgencystrategy tendedtobeavariationofMarxism,theywerefrequentlyseenas appendagesofaSovietledinternationalcommunistmovement.While theUSSRdidprovideassistancetoseveraloftheseinsurgencies,byno meanswasitthegeneralstaff thatdirected aglobalrevolutionary insurgency againsttheWest. Tobesure,worldrevolutioninternationalsystemchangewas theoriginalgoaloftheCommunistInternationalorComintern. FoundedinMoscowin1919,itwasestablishedbyLenintolayclaim tothe leadershipanddirectionoftheworldrevolutionarymovement. Anditdidprovidesome assistanceto localcommunistinsurgency movements.Lenin sawtheCominternasthegeneralstaffofaworld 142

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy revolutionwhichwouldoverthrowtheinternationalcapitalistorder. However,becauseofdeepinternaldivisionsandlackofcapabilitiesit

126 nevercameclosetoachievingthatloftygoalduringitsexistence. 127 TheCominternwasofficiallydissolvedonMay15,1943,byStalin.

DuringtheColdWartheSovietUnion reestablishedapolicyof supportingnationalliberationmovements,mostnotablyunder Brezhnev.Thisbegan inthelatter1960swithmajorassistancetothe NorthVietnameseandVietCong.Intheearly1970s,MiddleEastern andAfricanmovementslikewisereceivedparamilitaryaid.Bythe

128 decadesenditwasextended toLatinAmerica. Severalofthese

movementscametopower.ButMoscowsassistancewasnotthe principlereasontheywereabletodoso. Whileitisbeyondthescopeofthisstudytogointothedetailsof whyandhowthistookplace,two issuesareimportanttohighlight. First,Sovietpolicyappearstohavebeen drivenmorebythe superpowerconfrontation,internationalbalanceofpower,and expansionismthanbyacommitmentto communistinternationalism andworldrevolution.Ofcourse,itwasframedintermsofthelatter, buttheconsensusamongspecialistsistheformerwasthecentral
129 imperative.

Second,insurgentmovementsthatreceivedassistanceandcameto powerattheendofthedayenactedpoliciesthatreflectedtheirnational interestratherthan communistinternationalism.Theywerenotspokes inthewheelofworldrevolution.Consequently,itwouldbeamistake toseetherevolutionarywarsofthepostWWIIeraandtheiroutcomes aspartofaglobalcommunistinsurgency. TheinsurgencystrategythatpostWWIIrevolutionarymovements employedwasfrequentlymisconstrued,andequatedwithguerrilla warfaretacticsandterrorism.Whilethese tacticswerepartofthis 143

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy variationofinsurgency,theywerenottheessenceof it.Revolutionary insurgentstrategycombinedunconventionalparamilitarytactics guerrillawarfareandterrorismwithpoliticalandpsychological operationstoestablishacompetingideologicalstructure andwar fightingorganization.Itsimmediategoal,regimechange,served as preludetoamoredefinitiveobjectivepoliticalandsocial transformationofthestate. Thisvariationofinsurgency,whoserootslieintheChinese Communistmovementofthe1930s,required agrandstrategytobe successful.Inessence,anoperationalplanofactionthatincludedthe followingelements:ideology,leadership,massbase,logistics, organizationalapparatus,political,psychologicalandparamilitary tactics,andexternallinkages/assistance. Whileeachwasnecessaryformountingandsustainingprotracted warfare,thecloselyinterrelatedelementsof leadership,ideology, and organizationlieatthecoreofpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgent strategy.Theyplayedavitalroleineachphaseofconflict.Andthey wereparticularlycrucialintheincipientorinitialperiodofactivity.It isinthisembryonicmomentthatleadersmustemergeandshapean ideology andnarrativethatrespondstobothrealdomesticgrievances corruption,repression,unemployment,poverty,insufficientsocial services,anddisrespectfortraditionalnormsaswellasto thedesire forabetterandmoresecurewayoflife.Likewise,intheincipientstage thefoundationfortheinsurgentsorganizationalinfrastructureislaid. Thesethreeelementsleadership,ideology, and organization arecrucialtothe implementationofanoperationalplanofaction that seeksfirstandforemosttowoothepopulationovertothesideofthe insurgencymovement.Thepopulationisthevitalelementforinsurgent success.Theyhavetowinthepopulationovertoitsside. 144

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy CoreElementsofStrategy Effective leadershipwasakey aspectof successfulpostWWII revolutionaryinsurgentmovements.Leadersperformedcertain vital tasks.Theseincludedestablishing ideologyandorganization.Without effectiveleadershipthatwasabletodoso,ideologyandorganization were likelytobeineffectual. Withoutarelevantideology andnarrative,mobilizationofthe necessaryfollowerstojointheinsurgentmovementwillnotoccur. Lackinganappealingideology,massmobilizationwillnotgetoffthe ground.Forhighrisk socialmovementslike thesepostWWII revolutionaryinsurgencies,ideologyplayedakeyroleinestablishing supportforthemovement,itsleaders,objectives,andactions.Effective leadershipandideologymaximized appealtothepopulation,thevital elementkeyingredientforsuccess. While leadershipandideologywere necessary,alonetheywerenot sufficientformobilizationofamassbase totakeplace.Akeyenabling componentwasanorganizationalinfrastructurethatfacilitated cross cuttingsocialandpoliticalstructuresthatextenddowntothelocal level.Thisbroadened amovementsappeal,influenceandcontrol.And thatorganizationalsocreated awarfightingcapability. In OnWar,Clausewitzreferstothesymbioticrelationshipamong threeelementsofwhathecoinedtheremarkabletrinity:themilitary, thegovernment,andthepeople.Heproposedthatacentraltaskofthe strategistwastodevelopandmaintainabalancebetweenthem.Itwas essentialtosuccessinwar.We wouldproposethattheremarkable trinityforrevolutionaryinsurgencymovements,the sinequanonfor successisan effectiveinterrelationshipbetween leadership,ideology, and organization.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheIncipientStageandtheRevolutionaryInsurgentTrinity Toimplementarevolutionary insurgentstrategy,the leadershipof nascentmovementsduringtheColdWarrequired acapacitytorecruit thenecessary personnelfromwithinthepopulation.Withoutitthey wereunable toexecutetheoperationalactivitiespertinenttoeachofthe functionalelementsoftheirstrategy. Thecontemporaryhistoryofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesreveals thatthey succeedwhensupportedbyasufficientpartofthe population. Therefore,inthe incipientstage,leadershad tobeabletorecruit supportersbuildabaseforthemovement.Thiswasthefirststepin establishinganorganizationalinfrastructurecapableofconducting protractedrevolutionary warfare. Intheincipientstage,leadersestablished themeanstobring individualsfromvarioussocietalgroupingsintothemovementtostaff theinsurgentorganizationandexecuteoperationalactivities.Butthisis difficulttoaccomplish.Why?Traditionalsocietiesthelocationwhere postWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgenciestookplacewerenotreceptive tosuchactivities.Thismeantovercominglocalpredispositionsthatdid notlendthemselvestorisktakingandrecruitment.Traditionalculture revolvedaroundvillagelife,localsocialpatterns,andloyaltiesthat werenoteasilyaltered. Torecruitmembers,traditionalloyaltieshadtobebroadenedto inducepeopleto become risk takers.Unlesstheywerewillingtoaccept newroles,integrateintonewsocialpatterns,follownewauthority,and toleratethestressesinherentinprotractedwarfare,insurgent organizationscouldnotestablishabase fromwithinthepopulation and didnotmaintainthemselvesforlong.Therevolutionaryorganization hadtocreateenduringbondsbasedontheadoptionofideologyand narrative. 146

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Howdidthey bringthisabout?Leadership,ideology,and organizationestablishedaprocess abletodrawandbindpeopletothe insurgentmovement.Thatprocessprovidedthoserecruitedwithsocial psychologicalcompensationforhighrisktaking.Itcreatedmotivation. Ideologyandnarrative were inculcatedthroughthisprocess.Therank andfilethatconstituted the baseof successfulinsurgenciesdidnot automaticallyacceptideologyandnarrative.Itwasonlythroughthe processdescribedbelowthattheycametocommittoit. Thisprocessconsistsofthreetasksmobilization,integration,and maintenance (orretention).Eachisbrieflydefinedbelow,followedby acasestudyhighlightinghowtheNationalLiberationFrontorViet Congemployedthesemethodstobuildarevolutionaryinsurgent organization.Arguably,inthepostWWIIperiodtheyprovedtobe among themostproficientatit.And,aswillbeunderscored,itwasa handson,facetoface,laborintensive exercise. PhaseIMobilization. Mobilization(orrecruitment)wasthe startingpointwhereanindividualhadtobeconvincedtobreakwiththe existingsocialandculturalcontextandacceptanewonesetoutin ideologyandnarrative.Joiningthemovementtypicallywasnotasingle actbutaprogressionthatbeganwiththe individualsexposure tothe movementgenerally by someonewhowasalreadyanestablished member. The endofthe firststagewasacceptanceofmembershipinthe movement.Mobilizationorrecruitmentconsistedofvariouskindsof activitiesthatsoughttopersuadethrough ideologicalandnationalistic appeals,thepromiseofrewardsandstatus,selfsatisfaction,revenge, andadvancement.Thesemethodscouldalsoincludemorecoercive onessuchasgrouppressure,threats,andforcedinduction.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy PhaseIIIntegration. Inthesecondstageintegrationthe recruitwassocializedintotheinsurgentorganization.Through integrationtheindividualwasbroughtintoconformitywiththe insurgencysgoalsandconvincedtomakeaseriouscommitmentto theirachievement. Through integrationmethodsanindividualcametobe inharmony withandcontrolledbytheorganization.Achievingitnecessitated a carefulsocializationandindoctrinationcourseofaction.Throughthese techniquesnewmemberslearned totake ordersandfollowthe guidancetheyweregiven.Therecruitwasembeddedinthe organizationand agreed toperformthose tasksthatwere assigned. PhaseIIIMaintenance. Thefinalstageinvolved maintenance orretention.Giventhehighlystressfulanddangerousnatureof protractedwar,keepingmembersinthefightrequired attention. Maintainingcompliancewiththeleadershipsauthority,stayingloyal toandidentifyingwiththemovementsideologyandnarrative,and sustaininginstitutionalbondsrequiredcarefultending. Buildingandretainingabaseofsupportersthroughthe processof mobilization,integration,andmaintenance affordedpostWWII revolutionaryinsurgentmovementstheopportunitytodevelopthe meanstoconductprotracted irregularwarfare.Theywerenowableto movebeyondtheincipientstageto1)engageinbothunderground political,social,andinformationaloperationsand2)activatearmed elementstocarry outparamilitaryoperationstoincludeguerrilla warfare,sabotage,andterrorism. TheCaseoftheVietCong. TheVietnamese NationalLiberation Front(NLF)orVietCong(VC)followed the mobilization,integration, and maintenanceprocessduringitsincipientstage.DouglasPike,inhis study VietCong:OrganizationandTechniquesoftheNational 148

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy LiberationFrontofSouthVietnam noted:WhenIfirstapproachedthe subjectoftheNationalLiberationFront,Iwasstruckbytheenormous amountoftime,energy,manpower,andmoneyitspenton communicationactivities.Itseemedobsessedwithexplainingitself. Theneteffect,wrotePike,wasthattheybroughttothevillagesof SouthVietnamsignificantsocialchangeanddidsolargelybymeans

130 ofthecommunicationprocess. Throughittheyexposedtraditional

villagerstonew ideas,newmethods,andnewsocialstructures. AccordingtoPike,Thegoal[duringtheperiod]wascontrolof the populationandthroughthatcontrol,theorganizationofthepeopleinto aweaponagainstthegovernment,andlateragainsttheUnited

131 States. Todoso,theVChadtochangeattitudes,create an

alternativebelief system,andestablish anewsocializationpattern. Whatfollowsisabriefdescriptionof howtheyemployedthe mobilization,integration,and maintenanceprocess.Executionofit wasextensive,localized,andpersonalized.Itfocusedontheindividual whowasintroducedtotheNLFthroughavarietyofmeansand eventuallyrecruited.Andoncerecruitedtheindoctrinationandtraining workbegan inordertoturn theindividualinto acommittedmember. AsPikeintimatesabove,the processwaslaborintensiveandutilized indoctrinationefforts,sharedsocialmyths,andleaderled
132 relations. Mobilizationwasthefirststepincreatingamystiquethat

servedasthefoundationofanewidentityfortheindividual. Mobilizationbeganwithaninitialexposureto VCrecruitmentand culminatedwithacceptanceorrefusalofmembership.Theapproach taken wasbasedondetailedpersonaldossiersofindividualsina village.VCagentslookedforthosevulnerabilitiesthatwouldmakea potentialrecruitsusceptibletooneofitsmessages.Successcame

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy throughanunderstandingoftheindividualandthecircumstances surroundinghislife. Basedonthatunderstandingoftheindividualoneormoreofthe following approachescould beusedbyarecruitertopersuadehimto considerjoiningsocialpressure (friendsorfamilywhowerealready memberswouldbeusedtobringpressure)emotionalappeals(the targetwasyoungandcouldbeconvincedthroughproselytizing, convincinghim thathecouldachievehonorandglory)personal susceptibility (thetargetwasdissatisfiedwithhiscircumstancesand withvillagelife)personalrewards(thetargetsoughtsocial advancementandprestige) injusticesexperienced (thetargetandhis familyorfriendshadbeenabusedbythegovernment)nationalist sentiments(thetargetwaspatriotic)and ideologicalattraction (the Frontsnarrativewaspersuasiveanditsidealisticgoalsconvincing). Insum,theNLFwasanactiveagentthatsoughtoutrecruits.While itwouldusecoercionwhennecessarytogainaccesstovillagers,once accesswasgained,positiveformsofpersuasionweremostoften employedtoconvincethemtojoin.Avarietyoforganizational activitiesweredirectedtowardscreatingasettingconduciveto mobilization.Theseactivitiesvariedfromareatoareaandindividualto individual. Therecruitwasplacedintoasettingwherethroughintensive indoctrinationandtraininghewouldcometobe embeddedintothe revolutionarymovementandpreparedforanewroleandanew identity.Thiswasthesecondphaseoftheprocessintegrationofthe individualintotheNLF.Thegoalwastoinstillintotheindividual thosenormsandvaluesthatwouldbindhimtotheorganization.He wastocometo believetheideology andnarrative,becomecommitted topoliticalandsocialchange,and adoptaprescribedcodeofbehavior. 150

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Commitmentwasmeasuredintermsofobediencetotheorganization andallegiancetoitscause.The integratedrecruitwaswillingto sacrificehimselfforthecause ofthemovement,and submittothe leadershipandunityofitsorganization. TheVCpaidagreatdealofattentiontoturningthenewlyrecruited intoacommittedcadre.They expendedconsiderableresourcesto imbuesocializeandindoctrinateitsmembers.Attheendoftheday, thenewrecruithadanewidentitythatwasverydifferentfromthatof thepeasantintheVietnamesevillage.PaulBermansumsupthis transformationasfollows:Ratherthanacceptanceofnature,thereis masteryoverfateratherthandenialofemotion,thereishate, enthusiasm,andzealotryratherthanpoliticalapathy,thereis politicizationratherthanselfinterest,thereisselfsacrificeratherthan devotiontothefamily,thereiscommitmenttotherevolutionary
133 organization.

Retainingtheindividualin therevolutionary insurgentorganization wasthethirdstepinthe process.HerealsotheNLFcommitted considerableresourcesandeffort.Ithadtobecauseitwasinalong protractedwarwithasuperpower.Mobilizingandintegratingwasnot sufficient.Therevolutionaryorganizationhadtotakeactivestepsto

134 maintainitself. Thisincludedan aggressiveuseofinformationand

propagandatoconvincetherankandfilethattheywouldprevail. RecallwhatPikesaidabouttheinordinate amountoftimeand effort thatwentintotheFrontsuseofinformationandcommunication. Additionally,arangeofmoreproactivetechniqueswereusedto helpmemberscopewiththestressesoffighting.Theseincluded individualandgroupmoralebuildingprogramstoreinforcethe messagesfosteredin informationandpropaganda.Rewardswere likewiseused.Forthosefightingtheseincludespromotions, 151

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy commendations,andmedals.Materialprivilegesandotherformsof gratificationalsofortifiedcommitment. Maintenancealsotookplacethroughraisingthecostsofdissension and leaving.TheNLFdidsothroughconstantsurveillanceofits members,andtheuseof sanctionsandpunishmentsif warranted.The latterrangedfromreprimandsandreeducationfordesertionto executionfortraitorousbehavior. Insum,theVietCongapproachtothe mobilization,integration, and maintenanceprocessillustrateshow arevolutionaryinsurgent movementdeveloped amassbaseofsupportduringitsincipientstage. Itwasalocalized,individualized,handson,facetoface,andlabor intensiveexercise.Throughmobilizationandextensiveeffortsat integrationtheyproducedthepersonnelthatstaffedacomplexpolitical andmilitaryorganization,onecapableofprotractedwarfare.Their mobilizationandintegrationefforts,accordingtoseveralassessments,
135 werequiteeffective. Maintenanceofthatorganizationintheperiod 136 aftertheincipientstageprovedmuchmorechallenging fortheNLF.

Cansuchaprocessbereplicatedattheinternationalleveltomake possibleaglobalinsurgency?Whatmethodswouldhaveto be substitutedforthelocalized,individualized,handson,facetoface onesemployedbytheVCandotherpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgent organizations?Aswewilldiscusslaterinthispaper,duringthelatter 1970sanevolutioninthenationallevelinsurgencymodelbeganto takeplace.Nationallevelmovementsbegan togotransnational.This wasthefirststepinanevolutionaryprocessthat,asweshallsee,will begreatlyaffectedbyglobalizationand the informationrevolutionof the1990s.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheProtractedWarfareStage Followingtheincipientstage,nationallevelinsurgenciesentered longperiodsofprotractedirregularwarfare.Thisprovedtobehighly demanding.Insurgentorganizationsfoughtlongwarsthatcould proceedthroughseveralstages.Thesewerefirstformally conceptualized byMaoTseTung,basedontheChineseCommunist

137 experience. WhileMaoprovidedasetofguidelinesforprosecutinga

protractedwar,in thefieldthereprovedtobenooneformula.A numberofvariationstookplace inpractice.Comparativeanalysisbares

138 thisout.

Because revolutionaryinsurgencieswerealso socialmovements, politicaloperationswere avitalpartof strategyforfightingthese long wars.Thesetookanumberofdifferentforms.Theyincluded incorporating varioussocialgroupingsreligious,occupational, women,writers,farmers,youthintotheinsurgentinfrastructure.That allowedarevolutionaryorganizationto broadenitsapparatusand institutionalizeitsbaseofsupporters.Indoingso,insurgentleaders wereabletoinvolvedifferentsegmentsofthepopulationinthe movementthroughavarietyoflocalpoliticalandsocialactivities. Politicaloperationsalso includedprovidingsocialservicesinareas wheretheinsurgentshad amajorpresence.Finally,politicaloperations involvedraisingfundsandmanagingfinancialstructures,aswellas establishinglogisticalnetworksforprocurementof warfighting and othersuppliesfromexternalsources. Asecondsetofoperationalactivitiescanbegroupedunderthe rubricofpropagandaandpsychologicaloperations.Thesewerewars forlegitimacy,andsuccessfulinsurgenciesputagreatdealoftimeand effortintopropagatingtheirnarrativeinternallythroughnewspapers, pamphlets,radiobroadcasts,rallies,meetings,andoneononesessions. 153

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Inmanyinstancestheylikewisecarriedoutthese information campaignsexternallythroughfriendlygovernments,international organizationswheretheyweregivenforums,andfrontorganizations. Intelligenceoperationswereathirdimportantcomponentofthe warfightingcapabilitiesofrevolutionaryinsurgenciesduringthe protractedwarstage.Withintheinsurgentapparatusspecialdivisions wereestablishedforbothintelligenceandcounterintelligence. Finally,theuseofviolencemanifesteditselfindifferentkindsof paramilitaryoperations.Thisincludedtheuseofterrorism,asitwas definedearlier.PostWWIIinsurgentsutilizedittodifferentdegrees. However,theprimarywayoffightingwasguerrillawarfare operations directedagainstthemilitaryandpoliceforcesoftheregime.The objectivewastoharassandunderminetheirwillingnesstofight.Only whenthebalanceofforcesbeginsto shiftwerelargerand more quasi conventionalunitsintroduced tofightpositionalbattlesanddefend thoseareaswhere theyestablished sanctuary. TheRoleofExternalAssistanceandInfluence RevolutionaryinsurgentmovementsduringtheColdWarsought andreceivedexternalsupportmainlyfromtheSovietUnionandits surrogates.Thereason theysoughtthisaid,inthefirstplace,hadtodo withthepracticalrealitiesofthe conflict.Tooffsetthesuperiorpower ofthestatestheywereconfronting,eveninsurgentmovementsthathad establishedamassbaseandorganizationalinfrastructurecapableof executingtheoperationsdescribedintheprevioussectionrequired additionalresourcestoaccomplishtheirobjectives.Externalhelp was evenmorecriticalforthose insurgenciesthathadnotreachedthis degree ofeffectiveness. Giventhattheideologicalbasisforrevolutionaryinsurgenciesat thattimewasMarxism,they soughtoutsideassistanceofvariouskinds 154

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy fromthemajorcommunistpower.WhydidtheUSSRcometoprovide it,particularlyinthelatter1960s? Aswasnotedearlier,therewas considerabledebateatthetimeoverhowtointerpretthemotives underlyingexternalassistance.WewouldconcurwithONeillthatit principallyhadtodowiththepostWWIIsuperpowerconfrontation. Thegreatestimpetustoexternalsupportforsuchinsurgent movements[was]thecontinuousrivalrybetweenthemajor

139 communistpowersandtheWestsincethelate1940s.

Sovietexternalsupporttooktwobasicforms.First,political instrumentstoincludepropaganda,theuseoffrontorganizations,and politicalaction inside internationalorganizationswereutilizedto championthecauseandobjectivesofrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsontheworldstage.Thegoalwastobuildsupportforthe justcauseofinsurgents,whiledelegitimizingtheincumbentregime

140 (andtheUnited Statesifitwasbackingit)theywere fighting.

Second,paramilitaryassistancewasalsoprovidedtoimprovethe fightingproficiencyof theinsurgentforcesagainsttheirpoliceand militarycounterparts.Theprinciplekindsofhelpincludedthetransfer ofweapons,traininginsurgentmembers,andproviding advisory support(mainlythroughsurrogates).TheSovietUnionnotonly providedparamilitaryassistanceonitsown,butalsocalledon itsEast EuropeanandCuban alliestodothesame. Inprovidingthisassistance,the USSRassertedthatitwasitsduty tomateriallyassistlocalrevolutionaryinsurgentmovementsthatwere ideologicallysimpaticowiththecauseofworldrevolution.Inother words,theselocalmovementsweresaidtobepartofaworld movementthataimedatinternationalsystemchange. ThisbegsthequestiondidthesumtotalofpostWWII national levelrevolutionaryinsurgenciesamounttoaglobalinsurgency under 155

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thedirectionoftheSovietUnion?Tobesure,theyallrhetorically assertedthey adheredtothesame ideologythatcalledforregime changelocallyandinternationalsystemtransformationglobally.And theUSSRasserteditwassupportingnationallevelrevolutionary insurgenciesonthatbasis.Thus,localinsurgencieswereframedaspart of aglobalstrugglebetweencompetingideologicalsystems.These nationallevelinsurgencieswere characterized bythemselvesandby theUSSRasmembersofaworldwide revolutionarymovementthat wasatwarwiththeWest.Butwasthisreallythecase? Formany revolutionaryinsurgenciestheideology andnarrative thattheyfoundedtheirmovementsonincluded,oftenmore importantly,nationalismandnationalidentityframes,aswellas contextualissuesrelatedtolocalpoliticalandsocialconditions.In otherwords,whilewecannotdiscountthefactthatthey themselves framed theirstrugglewithinthecontextoftheEastWestglobal ideologicalconfrontation,theirimmediatepoliticalobjective overthrowoftheregimetheywereatwarwithwasofparamount importance.Therefore,nationalandcontextualissueswereof preeminentimportanceinframingideologyandnarrative.Andoncein power,theydidnottakedirectionfromtheUSSRorcommitsignificant resourcestoconductingaglobalfight. Likewise,withrespectto theSovietUnion,thedecisiontomore activelypromotewarsofnationalliberationthroughpoliticaland paramilitaryassistance inthelatter1960sdoesnotappeartohavebeen basedonthegoalofestablishing anexistentialoridealinternational endstatethroughaglobalinsurgencystrategy.Rather,itwasmore aboutthebalanceofpowerandSovietexpansionism.Moreover, Moscow sawtheUnitedStatesasvulnerable intheaftermathof Vietnam,unwillingtouseforceorassistregimesthreatenedby 156

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy revolution.Therefore,theUSSRwasmorewillingtoprojectpowerand influence intowhatittermedthenationalliberationzoneofthe developingworld.Bythemid1980s,itfoundthecostsofmaintaining

141 thispolicyincreasinglyprohibitive.

TheTransnationalEvolutionofNationalLevelInsurgency Inthelatter1970scertainnationallevelgroupsandmovements challengingstateauthoritythroughunconventionalwarfare began to extendthebattlefield tothetransnationallevel.Theydidsomostlyout ofoperationalnecessity.Thecounterinsurgencymeasuresofthestates theywerefighting hadbecomeincreasinglyeffective,preventing the establishmentof aclandestineinfrastructureorshadowgovernmentin theareaofconflict.Becauseofthesedevelopments,the chancesof successfullygainingcontrolofterritorywithinthestateandinflicting realdefeatsongovernmentsecurityforceswereremote.Therefore,to continuethefightanewvariationorapproachtoinsurgencywas required. Amongthe firstarmedgroupstoextendthebattlefield transnationally werePalestinianonesfightingagainstIsrael.This transpiredovertheperiodfromthelate1940stothemiddleofthe 1970s.RecallthatduringtheArabIsraeliwarof1948manyPalestinian Arabslefttheirhomesforneighboringcountries,fleeingvoluntarilyor beingforcedtoleavebyIsraeliforces.Thiswasthebeginningofthe PalestinianDiasporacommunitiesthatexisttoday. LocatedinJordan,Syria,Lebanon,andEgypt,itwasfromthese refugeecommunitiesthatnewarmedpoliticalgroupsbegantoemerge. TheirleadersassertedthatifthePalestiniansweretoretaketheir homeland,theywouldhavetotakeresponsibilityfordoingso.The PalestinianLiberationOrganization(PLO)wasestablishedin1964for thispurpose.UnderthegeneraldirectionofYasserArafat,thePLO 157

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy servedasanumbrellaorganizationforseveralconstituentgroups. TheseincludedAlFatah,Force17,HawariGroup,PLF,andPFLP. Eachhaditsown fedayeenorcommando assaultunitsthatcarriedout crossborderstrikesagainstIsraeliterritoryfromthosecontiguous stateswherethePalestinianshadrelocated.Theseguerrillawarfare andterroristoperationsintensifiedintheaftermathofthe1967war. IsraelnotonlydefeatedthearmiesofitsArabneighborsin sixdays butalso seizedcontroloftheWestBankandGaza.Asaresult,the exodusofPalestiniansthathad begunin1948increaseddramatically especiallyto thenearsanctuariesofJordan andLebanon. Consequently,infiltration attacksacrossthebordersofthesestates againstfortifiedKibbutzs,militarytargets,andpublic facilities escalated.And JordanandotherArabstatesprovidedincreased support fortheseoperationsasanalternativemeanstoconventionalinterstate warfaretorecoverlostterritoryandadvanceothergoals. Israelcounteredbydevelopingarobustborderdefense system.It includedremovalofPalestinianvillages,smallunitpatrolling,rapid reactionoperationstoincludehotpursuitofinfiltratorsseekingtoflee backtotheirsanctuaries,and airartillery attacksagainstthose sanctuariesandthemilitaryforcesoftheregimesthatprovidedthesafe haven.Inthe caseofthelatter,Israelsobjectivewasto raisethecosts tothoseprovidingsupportforfedayeenoperations.Thiswascertainly trueforhowitdealtwith Jordan.In1968Israelbeganlaunchingairand artillerybarragesagainstJordanianarmypositions.Thesereprisals resultedinconsiderablemilitarycasualties. ForJordan,these attacksbyIsraelonitsarmywereonlypartofthe priceforbackingfedayeen operations.Asecondcostwasthe emergenceofthePLOasahostile statewithinastateinsidethe kingdom.In1969thisledtoseveralhundredviolentclashesbetween 158

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thePalestinianforcesandJordaniansecurityforces.Actsofviolence againstJordaniansecurityforcesincludedkidnappingsandritualistic murders.ByFebruary1970fightingwastakingplacebetween JordaniansecurityforcesandthePalestiniangroupsinthestreetsof Amman,resultinginabout300deaths.Thisescalatedthroughthe summermonthstoincludeseveralassassinationattemptsagainstKing Hussein.Therestoftheyearsawintensefightingthatresultedin thousandsofdeaths.Bythesummerof1971thePLOwasdrivenoutof Jordan,and hadtoreestablishitself inLebanon. HavinglostitsbasesinJordanandincreasinglyconstrainedin attackingcrossborderfromLebanonduetoIsraelicounterinsurgency tactics,thePLOturnedtotransnationaloperationstoextendthe battlefieldbeyondthe localregion.PLOoperativesbegantraveling fromtheMiddleEasttoEuropeinordertocarryoutattacks.Andthose operationsincreasinglybegantotargetcivilians.The foremostearly exampleofthiswastheattackbythePLOsBlackSeptember OrganizationonIsraeliathletesatthe1972MunichOlympicGames. Whiletheoperationactuallyfailedtoachieveitsimmediateobjective, itneverthelesswasamajorsuccessintermsofcapturingthe imaginationofthePalestinianDiaspora.Andinitsaftermaththousands ofPalestiniansrushedtojointhePLO.Otheroperationsensued inthe 1970sincluding skyjackings,hostagetaking,letterbombs,and assassinationsinvariouspartsofEurope. These attackswerepartofanewapproachwhich,accordingto JohnMackinlayandAlisonAlBaddawy,reflectedanimportant connectingfactor.Eachact,usuallyinitsfinalstages,becamehighly visibleandoften bydesignencouragedreporters,pressphotographers, and televisionandfilmcoverage.Theattackswereirresistibleasnews storiesbecausetheyweresovisuallysensationalbutalsobecausethey 159

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy werecarriedoutwithsuchdesperateconviction.Becauseofthemedia coverageofthesetransnationaloperationsthePLOleadership wasable toreach severalimportantaudiences:largenumbersoftheirown nationalsinforeigncountries,Arabstates,theMuslimcommunity worldwideandWesternstates,somewhichpreferrednottothinkabout

142 Palestine.

WiththeeffectivenessofIsraelicounterinsurgencytactics,thePLO hadtofindawayotherthan localized guerrillawarfaretoreachthese audiences.Itdidsothroughinternationalterrorismattacksmainly againstwhatinternationallawdesignatesasprotectedcategoriesof peoplethatareofflimitsinwar.Buttounderstandtheseattackssolely onthosetermsmisconstruesthepropagandaandpoliticalmobilization featuresoftheoperations. MackinlayandAlBaddawy describetheirsignificanceandhow theytransformedtheconductofinsurgency,introducinganew variationofthisformofwarfare.ThePLOgraspedthat[W]eare livinginaneraofviolentactivismthatacceptsthatweareanimatedby thepropagandaof thedeed,ratherthanthemilitaryvalueofthedeed itself.ThePLOadapteditscampaigntothisrealityandsucceededin gettingthemselvesandthePalestinianissueontotheglobalagenda. Theresultwasthattheseoperationscametobewidelysupported, clandestinelybyArabstatesandovertlybyradicalizedMuslim communities.Thesewere nottheactsofpoliticallyisolated
143 extremists. Rather,theywerekeyelementsofanewPalestinian

strategy,onethatthroughtransnationalterroristoperationssuccessfully exploitedpropagandaofthedeedtopropagateitsmessageand mobilizesupportforitscause. Insum,thePLOintroduced twoimportantoperationalinnovations duringthisperiodwithrespecttotheconductofinsurgency thatnot 160

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy onlyservedasaninspirationforotherarmedgroupsduringthe1980s but,asweshalldescribelater,alsohadanimportantimpactonhow al Qaedaconductedglobaloperationsinthe1990s.First,theyextended theirareaofoperationstostrikeatUStargetsacrosstheglobe.Second, theobjectiveofthoseoperationsbecamepropagandaofthedeed, ratherthanthemilitaryvalueofthedeeditself.Attackswereplanned andexecutedfortheirvisibilityandpropagandavalue.Inthe1990sthe mediabecamethepropagatorofalQaedasmessage.Andbytheendof thedecade itwasdoingthepropagatingofitsactivitiesandideology notonlythroughthemediabutbywayofitsownInternetnewsshows andonlinepublications. REQUIREMENTSFORAGLOBALSALAFIJIHADIST INSURGENCY IstheSalafiIslamistJihadmovementexecutingprotractedglobal insurgency warfare? Aretheyutilizingaglobalversionofthenational levelrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategy and/oritstransnationaladaptation asdescribedintheprevioussection?Toanswerthese questionsitis firstnecessarytoidentifythe requirementsorconditionsof aglobal insurgency.Fiveprimaryrequirementsare proposed.Theyare deduced from 1)thestrategyemployedbynationallevelrevolutionary insurgent
th movementsduringthelatterhalfofthe20 century,2)howinsurgent

groupsbeginning inthelatter1970sextendedthatbattlefield transnationallyandthroughterrorismexploitedpropagandaofthedeed, and3)thekeydistinguishing characteristicsofthe SalafiJihad movement.Belowarethemain summarypointsfromthereview, followedbythe accountfromwhichtheyare taken.
SummaryPoints FortheSalafiIslamistJihad movementtoexecuteaglobal versionofthenationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgentstrategyitwould havetomeetfiverequirementsorconditions.

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FirstrequirementConceptualizeanideologythatperformsthe samefunctionsasthoseadoptedbyhighrisksocialmovements.This entailsdevelopingaseriesofframesto:1)describethesocialand politicalproblemsrequiringimmediateanddrasticaction2)proposea newidealizedsystemtoreplacethedepravedonethatresonatedwith thepopulationand3)identifystepstobringthistofruition. SecondrequirementAninnovativeleadershipthatcan conceptualizethatideologyandestablishanembryonicorganization capableofoperationalizingittobegintoattractandrecruitacritical massofsupporters.Intheincipientphaseofinsurgencytheseare first ordertasks. ThirdrequirementEstablishaninfrastructurecapableof fightingaprotractedglobalinsurgency.Todoso,a process isneeded todrawandbindindividualstothemovement.Thatprocess inculcates themovementsideologyandnarrativeintothoseattractedtoit.Todo so,newfacilitatorsorenablersglobalization,informationsystems, andnetworkedorganizationshavetobesubstitutedforthisnormally localized,facetofaceapproach. FourthrequirementAstheincipientstageproceeds,aglobal insurgency(aswithitsnationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgency counterpart)entersaperiodofprotractedorlongwar.Indoingso,it hastosetoutforitself1)whereitintendstofight(theareaof operationsorAO)and2)howitintendstodoso(the organizational infrastructure and warfightingtacticstheyintendtouse). Fifthrequirement ToexecuteaglobalinsurgencytheSalafi Jihadistswouldhavetoemployanarrayofpolitical,psychological, and paramilitarymethodswithintheir areasofoperationsthattarget bothnear andfarenemies.

The SalafiJihadmovement,inthefirstplace,shouldbeunderstood asamillenarianmovement.Itseeksamajortransformationof the existingpoliticalstatusquo and areturntoanidealizedpast.TheSalafi Jihadistscharge thatcurrentregimesand rulerswhodominate the Ummah (communityofbelievers)areirreparablycorrupt,unjust,and repressive.Theylabeltheminfidelsand apostates. Second,likemedievalmillenarianstheSalafiJihadistsbelieveina supernaturalpowerandpredeterminedvictorythroughtheintervention
144 ofGod. They seetheworldthroughManichaeanlensesholywar

betweentheforcesofgoodandevil. 162

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Third,theSalafiJihadistsaretransnationalactors.Theirplanof actioncallsforholywarto 1)expelthe UnitedStatesfromIraq,the ArabianPeninsula,andMiddleEast2)eliminate thestateofIsrael3) overthrowapostategovernmentsin theMuslimworldand 4) re establishtheCaliphate,thehistoriccommunityofIslamwhich expanded beyondtheArabianPeninsulafollowing thedeathofthe prophetMohammedandcametoencompassintheseventhcentury bothIranandEgyptandbytheeighthcenturyNorthAfrica,theIberian Peninsula(SpainandPortugal),India,andIndonesia. Giventhesefarreachinggoals,the firstrequirementthattheSalafi Jihadistswouldhavetosatisfyto beinapositiontoinitiate aglobal insurgencyistoconceptualizeanideologythatsuccessfullyperforms the samefunctionsasthoseadoptedbyhighrisksocialmovements. Recallthatthisentaileddevelopingaseriesofframesthat1)described thesocialandpoliticalproblemsrequiringimmediateanddrastic action2)proposed anewidealizedsystemto replacethedepravedone thatresonatedwiththepopulationand 3)identified stepstobringthis tofruition thatappearedachievable. Alsorecollectthatconceptualizinganeffectiveideologywasa considerablechallenge fornationallevelrevolutionaryinsurgencies becausetheirideologyhadto attractandsustain amassbaseofsupport fromwithinsocietiesthatweretraditional,insular,anddiverse.That challengeismagnified fortheSalafiJihadistmovementgivenitsglobal areaofoperation.Whatwasdemanding toestablish atthenational level,itwouldseemreasonableto suggest,iseventougherto accomplish atthetransnationallevel. The secondrequirementisan innovative leadershipthatcancreate thisideology andestablishanembryonic organizationcapableof operationalizing itto begintoattractand recruitacriticalmassof 163

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy supporters.Successfulrevolutionaryinsurgenciesintheirincipient phase (andlaterprotractedwarfarestages)werecommandedbyleaders whoperformedthesefirstordertasksofdevisinganeffectiveideology andestablishinganembryonicorganization. Thesecoreelements,intheincipientstageof revolutionary insurgencies,concentratedon recruiting amassbaseofsupporters.This wastheinitialstepinestablishinganorganizationalinfrastructure that wouldbecomecapableoffighting protractedrevolutionarywarfare. Thisisthe thirdrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement. Todoso,nationallevelinsurgenciesestablishedaprocesstodraw andbindindividualstotherevolutionaryinsurgentmovement.That processsoughtto inculcate themovementsideologyandnarrativeinto thoserecruited.The process, asoutlinedabove,consistedofthree tasksmobilization,integration,and maintenance.Itwascarriedout, forthemostpart,withintheboundariesofthestatethe revolutionary movementwaschallenging. TheVietCongcasestudy illustrated theextenttowhichcarrying outthisprocesswaslocalized,individualized,handson,labor intensive,andfacetoface.Canaglobalinsurgencymovement replicatethe mobilization,integration,and maintenanceprocess atthe transnationallevel?Hasthe SalafiJihadmovementbeenabletodoso? Aretherenew facilitatorsorenablerssuchasglobalization,information systems,andnetworkedorganizationsthatcan be substitutedforthis localized,facetoface approach? Asthe incipientstageproceeded,nationallevelrevolutionary insurgentmovementsenteredtheperiodofprotractedwarfare.These werelongwars.Andtheareaofoperations(AO),asdefinedbythe insurgents,wasfirstandforemostwithintheboundariesofthenation state.Thatwaswheretheinsurgentsmainenemywaslocated andit 164

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy waswherethey builtandemployedtheirguerrillawarfighting organization.Tobesure,therecouldbe internationaltargetsaswell. Thiswasespecially the casewhere anoutsidepowerwasinvolvedin an internalwar.However,theinstrumentsusedbytheinsurgentson thesedistantbattlefieldsweremostoftenthoseforpoliticalwarfare. Thisbegantochange,aswasdescribedintheprevioussection,in thelater1970s.AtthattimethePLOextendedthebattlefieldoutof necessitytothetransnationallevelandnarroweditsparamilitarytactics topropagandaofthedeedthroughterroristoperations. Howwould aglobalinsurgencyduringtheprotractedwarfarestage defineitsareaofoperations,thecompositionofitswarfighting organization,andthetypeofviolenceitwouldemploy?Doingso isthe fourthrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement.Ithastosetout 1)where itintendstofightthegeographicalspaceand2)howit intendstodosothewarfightingorganization andtypeofoperations theyintendtoemploy.Towhatextenthavethe SalafiJihadmovement anditsalQaedavanguarddoneso? Tofightlongwars,revolutionaryinsurgentmovementsestablished andstaffedwarfightingorganizationsthatemployedpoliticaland paramilitary instrumentsoverlengthytimeperiods.Theseinstruments werepartofastrategy.Aswasnotedearlier,theirwarfighting apparatusemployedthesemethodsprimarilywithintheboundariesof thenationstate.ThatwastheirAOuntilgroupsstartingwiththePLO extendedtheAOtothetransnationallevel.Toexecute aglobal insurgencytheSalafiJihadistswouldhaveto carryoutsimilarpolitical, psychological,guerillawarfare,andotherparamilitaryoperations withinitsareasofoperationsthattargetbothnearandfarenemies. Thisisthe fifthrequirementforaglobalinsurgencymovement.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AGLOBALSALAFIJIHADINSURGENCY: MYTHOR REALITY? HastheglobalSalafiJihadmovementthatemerged sincetheearly 1980sdevised andinitiated aglobalinsurgency strategy?To determine whetherthisisthecase,theactions,activities,andoperationsofthe SalafiJihadmovementanditsalQaedaleadership areexamined throughthelensofthe fiverequirementsofaglobalinsurgency identifiedabove.Arethey consistentwith those five requirements,and ifsotowhatextent?Isthe SalafiJihad insurgencyintheincipientstage orhasitprogressedfurther? Hasitdevelopedadoctrineand capabilitiestocarryoutgloballyalong Jihad? Toanswerthesequestionsthe stagesthroughwhichtheSalafi Jihadmovementevolvedareexamined,employing achronological narrativeformat.Thenarrative canbedividedintothefollowingsix phases:1)Emergenceof SalafiIslamismandtheMuslimBrotherhood 2)ConceptualizationofSalafiJihadIdeology3)TheSovietAfghan War4)AfterAfghanistan:DecidingontheNextAreaofOperations 5)AfghanistanAgain:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgencyand6) GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11. Belowarethekeyfindingsforeachofthesixstagesthroughwhich theglobalSalafiJihadmovementevolved.Ontheeveof9/11,itcanbe argued itwasinthe early incipientstageofaglobalinsurgency.Next, thefindingsdescribehowalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave attemptedto reorganizethrough fourstrategicadaptationsto recover fromits2001setbackand continuetofacilitateaglobalmillenarian insurgency.Followingthesummaryofthefindingsisthenarrative fromwhichtheyaredrawn.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy SummaryPoints
HastheglobalSalafiJihad movementthatemergedintheearly 1980sbeenabletofightitsnearandfarenemiesthroughaglobal insurgencystrategy? Thisstudyproposesthreeconclusions. First,as9/11approached,aglobalSalafimillenarian insurgencywasinitsembryonic stage,carryingoutguerrilla warfareandotherparamilitaryoperationsagainstbothnearand farenemies. Second,OperationEnduringFreedomwasastrategicsetback forthatglobalinsurgency.Itnowfacedthechallengeofadapting torecoverwhatitlost.Overthelast severalyearsalQaedaand theSalafiJihadistshavesoughttodosothroughfourstrategic adaptations. Third.Howsuccessfultheyhavebeenandtheextenttowhich theyareabletofightthelong Jihadrequiresmoreresearchand aninnovativeanalyticeffortthatwasbeyondthescopeofthis study. Thesejudgmentsarededucedfromananalysisofthe sixphases thatconstitutetheevolutionoftheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement. Whatfollowsarethekeyfindingsforeachofthosephases. I.RevivalofSalafiIslam,theMuslimBrotherhoodandSalafiJihadism
th SalafiJihadistsarepartofa20 centurySalafiIslamicrevival. ThelatterisoneofIslamsmostpuritanicalforms.

TheSalafisseektoreturnIslamtoitsrootsbyimitatingthelife andtimesoftheProphetandhisimmediatesuccessors.Theydraw theirunderstandingofIslamfromaliteralinterpretationoftheQur'an andtheHadith. TheyrejectallsubsequentIslamicreinterpretationsand innovationsas Jahiliyya,astateofmoralignorance. TheSalafirevivalarguedthattheMuslimcommunitythe Ummahhadfalleninto Jahiliyya. Tosavethem,itwasnecessaryto reeducatetheUmmahintheoriginalpracticesoftrueIslam. ThisSalafirevivalbecamepoliticalthroughtheMuslim Brotherhood,foundedin1928.TheBrotherhoodwastoserveasa vanguardpartyforpoliticalchangeandsocialjustice. Asitgrew, Jihad entereditspoliticallexicon,callingforarmedstruggletoliberate Muslimlandsfromcolonialoccupationandlaterfromapostate Muslimregimes.

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II.TheOriginsoftheSalafiJihadMovement Inthe1950s,Salafi Jihad ideologybeganto takeshape.Itskey theoristwasSayyidQutb.HebelievednearlyallofIslamwasin Jahiliyya,havingbeenpollutedbyWesterndecadence,materialism, andfaithlessness. Islamiclawandreligiousvalueswerebeingsubvertedbyapostate Muslimregimes.He calledforJihad tooverthrowthem.Qutbcoupled apuritanicalinterpretationofIslamwithaviolentpoliticalideologyof revolt. QutbsawthecrisisinMuslimstateswithinthecontextofaglobal ideologicalbattlewiththenonMuslimworld,inparticularWestern civilization.TheWestwaspushingtheMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya. HepaintedanextremelydehumanizingpictureoftheWestas soulless,immoralanddepraved. QutbproposedatransnationalideologytomobilizetheUmmah forJihad againstnearenemies(apostateMuslimregimes)andfora globalfightagainsttheWest.Toleadthestrugglehecalledfor creationofaMuslimvanguard. ThefirstrequirementtoinitiateaglobalSalafiJihadist insurgency isconceptualizingauniversalideologythat1)describesthedepraved conditionrequiringJihad,2)proposesanidealizedsystemtoreplace it, and3)identifiesstepstobetakentobringittofruition,Qutb providedthisdoctrinalfoundation. III.TheSovietAfghanWar TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistangaveafledgingSalafiJihad movementasacredcausetomobilizebeyondthenationallevelto liberateapartoftheUmmahfromaforeigninfidelinvader. ThosewhocamefromtheMuslimworldtoresistaggression againstdaralIslam(thehouseofIslam)becamethe firstgenerationof transnational Jihadists.Theirvictorywasempoweringandinspiring forthemselvesandothers. InAfghanistantheelementsof leadership,ideology, and organization formountingaguerrillainsurgencymaterialized.Leaders espousedanideologythatbroughttogetherQutbsMuslimvanguard toleadtheUmmah. ThekeyleaderwasAbdullahYusufAzzam.Heimplemented Qutbsideas.TheSovietinvasionwasinfidelaggressionagainstdar alIslam.HeissuedafatwacallingMuslimstofightaJihad through guerrillawarfaretoexpelthem.Majorreligiousfiguresagreed.

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Azzamestablishedaninfrastructureforvolunteersfromaround theMuslimWorld.Afghanistanbecameatraininggroundtobreeda globalresistanceoftensofthousandsofmilitant Jihadiswhobecame skilledinguerrillaandotherparamilitarytactics. These AfghanArabsbecamethevanguardaninternational brigadeforcarryingoutglobalJihad.Afghanistanwasthe beginningthestartingpointforaglobalSalafiJihadist insurgency. Acorecadrenowexistedforit. IV.AfterAfghanistan:DecidingontheNextAreaofOperations Followingthewarthe AfghanArabsdebatedwherenextto fightfortheIslamiccause.Wherewasthenextareaofoperationsand who wastheenemy?Thesequestionsformedthebasisofastrategic reassessment. OnegroupproposedliberatingotherMuslimlandsoccupiedby infidels(e.g.,Bosnia).ThatwasthenewAO. Othersproposedreturningtotheirhomecountriestooverthrow apostateMuslimregimes.Among AfghanArabsitwaschampioned bytheEgyptiancontingent. IraqsinvasionofKuwaitaddedanotherdimensiontothedebate. TheSaudisallowedtheUSmilitary todeploytotheKingdom.Bin Ladenlabeledthattreason.ItallowedIslamsmostholyterritorytobe occupiedbyinfidels. ExiledtoSudan,binladenandalQaedaconcludedinlate1994 thatthenewAOandtargetshouldcenteronthe UnitedStates.If SalafiJihadistsweretorealizetheirglobalgoals, Americahadtobe defeated. Bythemid1990s, anewtargetingdoctrineforglobalinsurgency wasset.ToimplementitalQaedahadtoestablishanorganizationthat couldemploypolitical,psychological,guerrillawarfare, andother paramilitarytechniquestofightalong Jihad.Itwasattemptingtodo soinSudanwhenforcedtoleave. V.AfghanistanAgain:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgency AfghanistangavealQaedaanopportunitytobuildatransnational organization.TensofthousandsofSalafiorientedMuslimswere trainedandindoctrinated.They constitutedthe secondgenerationof internationalholywarriors. Duringthelatter1990s thefoundationwasestablishedbyal QaedaforinitiatingaglobalSalafiJihad insurgencythatreflectedthe fiverequirementsidentifiedinthisstudy.

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Doctrinewasrevisedtoemphasizeaglobalwarfightingmission thattargetedtheUnitedStatesthefarenemy. Beyonddoctrine,alQaedasorganizationgrewinsizeand complexity,allowingittoplanandexecuteterroristattacks againstUS targetsacrosstheglobe,whilenationallevelaffiliatesfoughtguerrilla warsathome. InAfghanistan,alQaedaestablisheditselfasthevanguardofthe globalJihad throughanetworkoflinkageswithascoreofnational levelIslamistgroups,manyemployingguerrillaviolenceagainsttheir governments. RadicalIslamistgroupsappearedtofunctionthroughnine regionaltheatresofoperations.AndalQaedaemergedastheir vanguard,seekingtoinspireandintegratethemintoatransnational SalafiJihad movement. Severalenablers,mostimportantlytheAfghansanctuary, enhancedalQaedascapacitytodrawnationallevelgroupsintoa broaderJihad networkthatontheeveof9/11reachedtheincipient stageofaglobalmillenarianinsurgency. VI.GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11? Following9/11, alQaedasAfghaninfrastructurewasdestroyed, astrategicsetbackfortheSalafiJihad vanguardandtheembryonic globalinsurgencyitwasfacilitating.Itnowfacedthechallengeof adapting torecover. SincethenalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshavesoughttodoso throughfourstrategicadaptations 1) employingtheInternetto establishavirtualsanctuary,2)makinguseofungovernedterritory,3) exploitingtheIraqconflict, and4)maintainingnationallevelJihad activitiesthroughthenine regionaltheatres. Thisstudyfocusedonestablishingavirtualsanctuaryonthe Internet.UtilizingungovernedareasandexploitingIraqconflict receivedbrieferattention.Particularsonthenine regionaltheaters werebeyondthestudysscope. TheextenttowhichalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshavebeen abletosuccessfullyimplementthese fourstrategicadaptationsto fightalong Jihadrequiresalevelofresearchbeyondthisstudy. VirtualSanctuary AlQaedaandassociatedJihad groupshavesoughttoreplicateon theInternetthosefacilitiesandcapabilitieslostinAfghanistanin

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2001.InthefollowingsevenwaystheInternethasbeenutilizedasa substitutesanctuary: 1)PropagatingtheSalafi Jihad ideology. Thisisthefirst requirementtoinitiateaglobalinsurgency.ThroughWebbased activitiestheSalafiJihadistsexecutethisfunctionglobally.They disseminateideologicalframesandmessagestoinstillintheUmmaha powerfulsenseofmoraloutrageandcommitmenttoholywar. 2)InspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointhe Jihad. Itis onethingtoagreetoideologicalmessages,anothertobeinspiredto action.AlQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistsuseaplethoraofInternet methodstoachievethisend.Onekeywaytheydosoisbycelebrating theachievementsandsacrificesofthoseonthefrontlinesoftheglobal fight. 3)Psychologicalwarfaretodemoralizeenemies. Theflipsideof inspiringtheUmmahtojointhefightisto demoralizenearandfar enemiestoconvincethemtogiveupthefight.TheinsurgencyinIraq isillustrative.AnumberofInternettacticsareemployedtodemoralize theAmericans,Iraqis,andforeignersworkinginIraq. 4)NetworkingtheglobalSalafiJihad insurgency. Lossofthe Afghansanctuaryledtotheuseoftheinternetfortrainingand operationalactivities,toincludeorganizingvirtualcells.Foreach, securecommunicationswereneeded.Newmethodshavebeen employedtoprotecttheseactivitiesfromdisruptiveUSintelligence tactics. 5)OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks. AlQaedaandassociateshaveestablishedanonlinelibraryofmanuals andhandbooksforirregularwarfare.Theserangefromdoctrinal guidestoinstructionsonhowtocarryoutaparticulartacticoremploy aspecificweapon.ReceivingthewidestattentionistheImprovised ExplosiveDevice. 6)OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses.NewInternettechniquessince9/11havebeenadoptedbythe SalafiJihadistsforonlinetrainingprograms.Overthelastthreeyears professionallyproducedtrainingvideoshavebeengenerated.Aglobal programintheartofterrorism(GPAT)nowexists. 7)CollectionTargeting. TheInternetprovidesSalafioperational unitswithdataontargets.ThroughWebbaseddataminingtheybuilt folders/filesonarangeoftargetsfromgovernmentfacilitiestonuclear powerplants.

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UngovernedTerritory Beyondthisvirtualsanctuary,alQaedaappearstohaveattempted tocarryoutinlargelylawlesstribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan borderactivitiesitexecutedduring19962001inAfghanistan. Theextenttowhichithasbeenabletodosoisunclear.Jihadis aretravelingtotheareatojointhefightmuchliketheirpredecessors didinthe1980sand1990s.Butadetailedpictureremainselusive,at leastinopensources. TheAfghanPakistanborderisnottheonlyungovernedterritory inwhichalQaedaand/orregional Jihadigroupshavedevelopeda presence.TheAlgerianbasedGroupforPreachingandCombat (GSPC)hasmovedintotheSahelregionofAfricatoestablishbases. TheIraqFront AlQaedaandothertheSalafiJihadgroupsseeIraqwithinthe contextofalong Jihad.Itisthemainfront,theforwardedge ofthe globalbattle,onwhichtoengagethefarenemythe UnitedStates. Theyhopetoinflictadefeatofstrategicconsequencesonit. TheSalafiJihadistsalsobelieveIraqaffordsthemavital opportunitytospawna thirdgenerationofskilledholywarriorswho aftertheyleaveIraqcanfightintheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inthe st firstdecadesofthe21 centurythese IraqiArabscanservethe th samepurposethe AfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century. IraqhasbecomeanintegralpartofhowalQaedaand Salafi Jihadistshavesoughttoadaptfollowingthestrategicsetbackin Afghanistantocontinuetofosteraglobalinsurgency. FosteringtheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement AlQaedasfourthadaptationfocusedonreestablishing its roleas vanguardofthe globalSalafiJihadmovement,arolethatwassetback asaresultofOperationEnduringFreedom. Developingadetailedmosaic ofwhatisnowreferredtoasal QaedaandAssociatedMovements(AQAM)wasbeyondthescopeof thispaper. Onlythe broad contoursofAQAMarehighlightedandkey questionsthatremaintobeaddressedidentified. Aslateas2005,USofficialswerestillstrugglingtounderstand therelationshipbetweenalQaedaanditsaffiliates,andtheextentto whichthose linkageshadbeenreestablished. In2006, key USnationalsecuritydocumentsbegantousethe termAlQaedaandAssociatedMovements(AQAM)torefertothis

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rejuvenatedrelationship.USCentralCommandsposturestatementfor fightingthewarin2006wasillustrative. Animportantway alQaedasoughttoreestablishlinkageswith localSalafiJihadgroupsisthroughitsvirtualsanctuary.Recent analysisofthisactivity depictsit asverystructured.Ahandfulof primarysourceJihadist Websitesdisseminateofficialcommuniqus, doctrinaltreaties,strategyandoperationaldocuments througha far reachingnetworkofotherWebsites,messageboards,egroups,blogs, andinstantmessaging services. Thisnetworkisatoncedecentralizedbutrigidlyhierarchical. WebsitesatthecenterofthenetworkcomprisealQaedaandgroups closelyassociatedwithit.Since2006, theirwebbasedactivitieshave beencoordinatedanddistributedthroughanewvirtualentitythe Al FajrCenterto secondaryandtertiary Websitesthatcomprisethe network. Akeyfollowonquestionaboutthisfourthadaptationinneedof attentioniswhocomprisesthe localaffiliatedgroupsofAQAMand onwhatbasisdotheyviewthemselvesasapartofAQAM?One recentstudyhassoughtto identify fourcriteriaformembershipin AQAM. Moreattentionneedstobefocusedonthisadaptationinorderto developadetailedmosaicofanditsAssociatedMovements(AQAM).

Emergenceof SalafiIslamism andtheMuslimBrotherhood TheSalafiJihadistsare anoutgrowthof,butnotsynonymouswith,

th amuch larger20 centurymovementofSalafiIslam.ThetermSalafiis

commonlyusedtodescribeperhapsthemostdoctrinaireor fundamentalistformofIslamicthought.Likeothermajorreligions, Islamhasanumberofdifferentvariants.TheSalafimovementconsists ofSunniMuslimsdrawnmainly (butnotexclusively)fromtheHanbali School,and theWahhabielementofit.OfthefourSunnitheological schoolsthatincludetheHanafi,Maliki,andShafii,the Hanbaliare consideredthemoststringentintermsoftheirconservative approachto thepracticeofIslam. TheSalafimovementiscomprisedofmanyofthemostpuritanical groupsintheMuslimworld.Thedifferentpartsofthemovementare

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy allunitedby acommonreligiouscreed.Theconceptof tawhidorthe unityofGod isthecentralelementoftheSalaficreed.Itincludesthose conceptsthatSalafisconsidernecessarytobeacceptedasatrue Muslim. To safeguard tawhid,Salafisbelieveinstrictly followingtherules andguidancefoundintheQuranandtheSunna(thepathfollowedby theProphetwhenhewasalive).Theyseek toreturnIslamtoitsroots by imitating thelifeandtimesoftheProphetandthatof thefirstthree generationsofMuslimsthecompanionsorSahabahoftheProphet, theirimmediatefollowerstheTabiin,andthefollowersoftheTabi'in. TheSalafisdrawtheirunderstandingofIslamfrom aliteral interpretation ofthe Qur'anand the Sunna.Thelatterconsistsof the deeds,sayingsandactionsofMuhammadduringthetwentythreeyears ofhisministry,asrecalledbythosewhoknewhim.Theessenceof SalafismissummarizedbyQuintanWiktorowiczasfollows: Toprotecttawhid,SalafisarguethatMuslimsmuststrictly followtheQuranandholdfasttothepurityoftheProphet Muhammadsmodel.Thelattersourceofreligiousguidance playsaparticularlycentralroleintheSalaficreed.Asthe Muslimexemplar,heembodiedtheperfectionof tawhidin actionandmustbeemulatedineverydetail.Salafisalsofollow theguidanceoftheProphetscompanions(the salaf),because theylearnedaboutIslamdirectlyfromthemessengerofGod andarethusbestabletoprovideanaccurateportrayalofthe propheticmodel(thetermSalafisignifiesfollowersofthe 145 propheticmodelasunderstoodbythecompanions). TheSalafiapproach rejectsallsubsequentIslamic cultural practices,reinterpretations,extrapolation,andinnovationsthat transpired sincethetimeof theProphet.Illustrativeofthisopposition arethe teachingsof MuhammadIbnAbdalWahhab.Itisbeyondthe scopeofthispapertoexaminetherootsoftheWahhabmovement (memberscallthemselvesMuwahhidun)whichbeganover200years
146 agoinArabia. Sufficeittonote,however,thatatthattimehe

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy preachedagainstsuchcustomarypracticesasbreechesofIslamiclaws andlabeledthem Jahiliyya,thesametermusedtodescribethe

147 ignoranceofArabiansbeforetheProphet. Theywereunbelievers,

hadfallenintoastateofmoralignorance,andshouldbe puttodeath. MuhammadibnAbdalWahhabsmostimportantconvertwas MuhammadibnSaud,headofoneofthemostpowerfultribesonthe ArabianPeninsula.Thisassociationconvertedpoliticalloyaltyintoa

148 religiousobligation. SincethenSaudrulehastovaryingdegrees

enforced compliance with theWahhabiinterpretationsofIslamic valuesonSaudiArabia. ItisimportanttonotethatmanySalafiIslamistswhoadhere tothis strictinterpretationofIslamarepeaceful.Whiletheybelieve inthe rulesandguidancefoundintheQuranand thattheimitationofthe behavioroftheProphetandhisclosestcompanionsshouldbethebasis forsocialorder,theydonotassigndeathsentencestoallthosewhodo notaccepttheirbeliefs.Rather,theybelievethebestwayof implementingtheSalaficreedisthroughpropagationofthefaith and religiouseducation,notviolence.TheseSalafistgroupsbelieveGods word shouldbespreadby dawa,nonviolentproselytizing.
149 Inthefirsthalfofthe twentiethcentury aSalafirevivalbegan.

ThoseinvolvedinitarguedthattheMuslimcommunitythe Ummahhadfallenpreytodeviationsfrom originalIslamicteachings. Indeed,theywerenowlivinginastateof Jahiliyya.Iftheyweretobe savedfromthiscatastrophiccrisis,itwasnecessarytoreeducatethe Ummah in theoriginalpracticesoftheProphetandhisearlyfollowers andreestablishtrueIslamtoitsdecisiveroleinpoliticalandsociallife. Thus,whattheSalafirevivalsoughttoaccomplish,firstandforemost, wasreembedding trueIslamintotheheartsofMuslimsandforthemto turnthosebeliefsintoalivingreality.Theywoulddosoby 175

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy acknowledgingonly the sovereigntyofGodandhissacredlaw(Sharia) inallspheresoflife.Thiswouldliberatethemfromhumanrulersand theirlaws,values,andtraditions. ThisSalafirevival,inpart,tooktheformofpoliticalparties. AmongthemostnotableofthesewastheMuslimBrotherhood,

150 foundedinEgyptin1928byHassanalBanna(19061949). When

alBannamovedtoCairo intheearly1920stoattend teachertraining school,he becamedeeplydisturbedby theeffectsofWesternization andtheconcomitantriseof secularism,thebreakdownoftraditional values,andthedeclineofIslamasthefoundationofpoliticaland social behavior.He eventually cametoadvocate thecreationofaMuslim state inEgyptbasedon Qur'aniclaw.TheBrotherhoodwasto serveas avanguardparty forbringing aboutthispoliticalchange. However,initsearlyyears,theBrotherhood resembledmoreof a socialwelfaresociety championingthecauseofdisenfranchised peoplesthrougheducationalandcharitablework.Duringthe1930s,the Brotherhoodpropagated an Islamicdoctrine thatemphasizedsocial justiceandclosing thegapbetweenEgyptianclasses.Italsosoughtto bringaboutanIslamicrenewalandassertedthatIslamshouldnotbe confinedtoprivatelife.Rather,itshould serveasthe foundationfora thoroughreformof theEgyptianpolitical,economic,andsocialsystem. TheBrotherhoodsconceptionofpoliticsandnationalismwasIslamic. Itbecamepoliticallyactive,identifyingwiththeEgyptiannational movement.Inthe1930stheoutcomeofthiswasanenergeticcampaign againstcolonialisminEgyptandotherIslamiccountries. AstheBrotherhoodgrewintheyearsleadinguptoWorldWarII, theterm Jihad begantoenteritspoliticallexicon intwoways.One,as aninnereffortthatMuslimsneededtomakeinordertofreethemselves andtoimprovethewellbeingoftheIslamiccommunity.Two,within 176

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thecontextofaneedforarmedstruggletoliberateMuslimlandsfrom colonialoccupation.There wasdisagreementovertheuseofforce withintheBrotherhood.Manyofitsleaderspubliclyremained committedtoanonviolentapproach.However,therewereelements, particularlyamongyoungermembers,whopushedhardforthe establishmentofasecretorclandestinearmedwing thatcouldemploy sabotage,assassination,andotherirregularwarfaretactics.AlBanna finallyagreed. TheBrotherhoodcontinuedtogrowrapidlyinthe1940sreaching anestimatedmillionmembers.AfterWWIIitplayedanimportantpart inthenationalmovement,aligningitselfwithseculargroupsand factions.Anditsclandestinearmedunitscarriedoutterroristattacks. Theorganizationbecame increasingpopularandcametobe seenasa seriousthreatbyEgyptian rulingelites.Asaresult,alBannawas assassinated in1949. TheBrotherhoodsupported themilitarycoupthatoverthrewthe monarchyin1952,havingformedacloserelationshipwiththeFree OfficersMovementintheperiod leadinguptotheirseizureofpower. ManymembersoftheBrotherhoodexpectedNasser,onceinpower,to form anIslamicgovernmentbasedontheirinterpretationsofIslam.But soon theBrotherhoodfounditselfatoddswith the policiesofthejunta. ItbecameincreasinglyclearthattheIslamictenetsoftheBrotherhood werelargelyincompatiblewiththesecularideologyofGamal'Abdal Nasser.In1954,therewasanattempttokillhim.Asaresult,the Brotherhoodwasdeclaredillegal.Awaveofrepressionensuedwiththe imprisonmentandtortureof thousandsofitsmembers. Thisrepression,inconjunctionwith domesticpoliciesthatwere seenastheantithesisoftrueIslam,ledtothechargeof Jahiliyyaby membersoftheBrotherhood andthecallto wage Jihad againstthe 177

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Egyptiangovernment.ThenewEgyptianleaderswereconsidered apostatesbecausetheywererulingbysomesetofprinciplesorsystem otherthanthosebasedonSharia. Itshouldbenotedthattherewasandremainsdisagreementamong variousSalafifactionsastowhethertheycandeclareincumbent Muslimrulersapostates(aprocessknownastakfir).Accordingto Wiktorowicz,debateoverthisissuerepresentsoneofthemost prominentsourcesoffissurewithintheSalaficommunityand exemplifiestheimpactofcontextualinterpretationonfactionalization. Althoughthefactionsshareasetofcriteriafordeclaringsomeonean apostate,rootedintheSalaficreed,theydifferoverwhetherthese criteriahaveactually beenmetwithregardstorulersintheMuslim
151 world.

TheOriginsof SalafiJihadIdeology Inthe1950san ideologyofSalafiJihadismbegantotakeshape.As itevolvedoverthenexthalfcenturyitcametoreflectthe characteristicsandrolethatideologyplayedintherevolutionary insurgenciesoftheperiodfollowingWWII.Indeed,thereareimportant parallelsbetweenthem. Thekey earlytheorist,whoarticulatedan adaptationofthe traditionalSalaficall,ashighlightedabove,wasSayyidQutb,a
152 memberofEgyptsMuslinBrotherhood. Hisinfluenceonwhathas

becometheglobalSalafiJihadmovementwascrucial.Whileinprison between1954and1964aspartofNasserscrackdownonthe Brotherhood,Qutbproduced importantworkswhichhavecometobe seenasdoctrinaltreatiesforSalafiJihadism.Theseincludedalong commentaryon the QuranIntheShadeoftheQuran(Fizilalal Qur'an)andamoreactionorientedmanifestoforJihadMilestones( Ma'alimfilTariq).Theseworkscapture Qutbsradicalandanti 178

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy establishmentviews.Theyarebasedonhisinterpretationofthe Qur'an andIslamichistory,assessmentof thesocialandpoliticalillsofEgypt, and anevaluationof thepollutingimpactofWesterndecadence, materialism,andfaithlessnessonthe cultureofIslam.In1964,having beenreleasedfromprison,Qutbpublishedtheseworks.He was subsequentlyrearrested,accusedofplottingtooverthrowthestate, foundguilty,andon29August1966,executedbyhanging. QutbcametobelievethatnearlyallofIslamwasindire decline, devolvingintoastateofignorance equivalenttothatwhich characterizedtheeraofpreIslamicArabia.Hedrewthisconclusion,in part,fromtheworkofMawlanaabualAlaMaududi,whofoundedthe
153 IslamicSocietyofIndiain1941. Maududifirstproposedthatanew

JahiliyyahadtakenrootintheMuslimworldduringthe1920s.He calledfortheestablishmentofaMuslimstateruledunderSharialawas aprescriptionforit.Maududiadvocatedareligiouscleansingofall Muslimsocieties.HeassertedthattheyhadbeeninfectedbyWestern ideasandpractices.Forexample,hearguedthatthetypeof governmentstheWestfoistedontheMuslimworldtookpoweroutof Godshandsandputitinthoseofman.ThisviolatedtheQuranwhich recognizedonlythepartyofGodandthepartyofSatan. Qutblikewise appliedtheconceptof Jahiliyyato Muslimstates andto Egyptinparticular.InQutb'sview,Islamiclawandreligious valueswerebeingignoredbythesepostcolonialapostateregimes, leavingtheirMuslimsocietiesinastateofdebasedignorance.These regimeswere,in Qutbsview,nonIslamicandtherefore illegitimate. Allsocietiesruledbysuchgovernmentswere likewise notIslamic,and Muslimslivinginthem werereligiouslyobligatedtoopposetheruling elitesandtorejecttheirpoliticalauthority.Thisresultedinhiscallfor themtocarryoutJihad tooverthrowsuchhedonistic regimes.Indoing 179

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy so,Qutbcoupled afundamentalistinterpretationof theQur'anwitha radicalandviolentpoliticalideology forarmedrevolution. Asnotedearlier,herewecansee inQutbsthoughthowSalafi JihadistsdifferfromthelargerSalaficommunity.Unlikethe latter, QutbandtheSalafiJihadistswhofollowedinhisfootstepsmoved the useofforceholywarto such apositionofimportancethatitwas equatedasequaltothefivepillarsofIslam.Oncearegimewas characterizedastakfiranditsleaderslabeledinfidels(kufi),thenarmed violencewasalegitimatewayofdealingwithit. Qutbswritingslaidthefoundationforthisinthe1950s.Rulers suchasNasser,throughtheirapproachtogovernanceandrule,revealed aconsciousdisbeliefinIslam.AndNasserspersistenceindoingso,in spiteofwarningsfromscholars,wasclearevidenceaboutwhathe believedanddidnotbelieve.Hisactionswere unIslamic.Thathe persistedinbehavinginthismannerdemonstrated thathebelievedit wasabetterwaythanIslam.Therefore,hewasanapostateanda legitimatetargetforwarfare. Likerevolutionaryinsurgents,Qutbscalledfortheoverthrowof antiIslamicMuslimgovernmentsthroughinsurrection astheprelude forradicalchangeof theentiresocialandpoliticalsystem.Thus,Qutb's understandingofIslamwasinextricablylinkedtohispoliticaland socialprescriptions.Islamwasacompletesocialsystem,andtherefore itsettherequirementsforgovernmentthatitshouldtaketheformofan Islamictheocracy.He deducedtheserequirementsfromhisreadingof theQur'an,includingitsinsightintomorality,justice,andgovernance. Morebroadly,Qutbsawthe crisisinEgyptandotherMuslim stateswithinthecontextofaglobalideologicalconfrontationwith the nonMuslimworld,inparticularWestern civilization.TheWestwas pushingtheMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya.Hepaintedanextremelyde 180

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy humanizingpictureoftheWest,characterizing itassoulless,greedy, arrogant,barbarous,immoral,anddepraved.Westerncivilization fosteredidolatry,themostheinousof sins.Theinfusionof Western waysintotheMuslimworldhadtobereversed,saidQutb,withallthe mighttheIslamistscouldmuster.Hesaw thisconfrontation inmore thanpoliticaltermsitwasacosmicstruggle betweenthosewho worshiped idolsandthosewhoworshiped God.ItwasaManichaean battleinwhich twoindependentrealms,onerepresentinggoodthe otherevil,werepittedagainstoneanother. Qutbprovidedthefoundationsof atransnationalideologyto mobilizetheUmmahforJihad againstbothnearenemiese.g.,the Egyptianregimeandforthe globalfightagainsttheWest.Andasthe abovesuggests,hesawthetwoasinextricably connected.Tocarryout thisstruggle Qutbproposed thecreationof aMuslimvanguard
th organizationin Milestones.Hisconceptwasconsistentwithhow20

centuryrevolutionarythinkers,beginningwithLenin,definedtherole ofavanguardparty inrevolution.Maoassignedthesamerole tothe vanguardparty forleadingwhathecalledPeoplesWar,whichwe referredtoabove asrevolutionary guerrillainsurgency.ForQutb,the Muslimvanguardwasaneliteorganizationcomprisedofeducatedand motivatedindividualswho weretoleadthemassesonthepath, marchingthroughthevastoceanof Jahiliyyawhichhasencompassed theentireworld.Thiswasacallto Islamicmilitancy andarmed revolutionarystruggle asthemeansforseizingpoliticalpowerfromthe state.154 AlongwithMawdudiandalBanna,Qutbisseenasoneofthe mostinfluentialtheoristsof radicalpoliticalIslamism.Histhinking influenced thewritingsandmanifestosofthosewhoshapedthe Salafi JihadmovementfollowingtheSovietAfghanwarofthe1980s.Thisis 181

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy trueof Qutbsconservative interpretationofIslamicprinciplesasfound IntheShadeoftheQuran,hisideaofmakingJihad apersonaland permanentdutytodefeatJahiliyyaandfosterpoliticalandsocietal change,andhisnotionofatransnationalUmmah andtheinevitability ofglobalideologicalconflictbetween"IslamandtheWest."Fawaz summarizesQutbsimpactasfollows: More thananyoneelse,SayyidQutbinspiredgenerationsof JihadistowageperpetualJihad toabolishinjusticeonearth, tobringpeopletotheworshipofGodalone,andtobringthem outoftheservitudetoothersintotheservantsoftheLord. [J]ihad forQutbwasapermanentrevolutionagainstinternal 155 andexternalenemieswhousurpedGodssovereignty. TheimpactofQutbsdoctrinalconceptsgreatlyinfluenced the leadersofsubsequentJihadgroupsinEgypt,mostimportantly MohammedAbdalSalamFarajandAymanalZawahiri.Theformer wastheideologicalandoperationalleaderinthe1970sofwhatcameto bewidelyknownasJama'atalJihad (theEgyptianIslamic Jihad).Faraj calledforholywar,recruitedfollowers,andcreatedanunderground organizationthatcarriedouttheassassinationofAnwarSadatin1981. ThisattackwaspersonallysanctionedbyFaraj.TheEgyptiansecurity forcesreactedswiftlyagainstalJihad'scampaignofterror,andFaraj himselfwasexecutedinApril1982. Farajwas areligiousnationalist,writesGerges,who assertedthat fightingthenearenemymusttakepriorityoverthatofthefar enemy.Jihadsfirstpriority [accordingtoFaraj]mustbetoreplace
156 infidelrulerswithacomprehensiveIslamicsystem. Ayman al

Zawahiri,asecondimportantdisciple ofQutbs,concurredwithFarajs focuson Jihad againsttheEgyptianregime,thenearenemy.However, Zawahirispositionwillchange inthevortexof the AfghanSovietwar anditsaftermath.

182

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Ifthe firstrequirementtheSalafiJihadistshad tosatisfyto initiate aglobalinsurgencywastoconstructauniversalideologythat1) described thedepraved socialandpoliticalconditionsrequiring Jihad, 2)proposed anewidealizedsystemto replacethisdepravedone,and3) identified stepstobetakento bringittofruition,Qutbprovidedthe doctrinalfoundation forit.HisinterpretationofJihad anditsrolein fosteringpoliticalandsocietalchange againstnearenemieslikethe secularandcorruptregimeinEgyptunderNasser,hisnotionofa transnationalUmmah,andtheinevitabilityofideologicalconflict between"IslamandtheWest"allcanbefound inthe globalSalafi JihadmovementthatemergedaftertheSovietdefeatinAfghanistan. However,beforewe examinethose ideologicalandoperational developments,itisimportanttohighlighthowthe eventsin Afghanistaninthe1980sprovidedthecontextforthe amplificationof SalafiJihadism andtherecruitmentofitsfirstgenerationoffighters. TheSovietAfghanWar TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistangave the fledging SalafiJihad movementthe sacred causeitneededtomobilizebeyondthenational level.Therewasnowanopportunitytoestablishaleadershipforthe worldwideUmmah,andinAfghanistan tohelpliberateapartofthat Ummah fromaforeigninfidelinvader.ThebattleinAfghanistan was portrayed asonebetweenMuslimsandkufarsorinfidels.Those who camefrom acrosstheMuslimworld todefendtheAfghansandresist aggressionagainstdaralIslam (thehouseofIslam)becamethefirst generationoftransnationalJihadists.Andtheirselfproclaimedvictory inAfghanistanthedefeatofasuperpowerwasempowering and inspiring forthem.Itcausedmanyinthisvanguardtothink andact globally,taking theirIslamistrevolutionontotheworldstage.

183

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy However,theeventsunfoldinginAfghanistaninthe1980swere onlyanopportunity.TheemergenceofQutbsvanguardpartywasnot agiven.Asnotedearlier,tomountandsustainrevolutionaryinsurgent warfare necessitatesthecloselyinterrelatedelementsof leadership, ideology, and organization.Eachplaysavitalroleineachphaseof protractedconflict.Andthisisparticularlythecase intheinitialperiod ofactivity.Inthisembryonicmomentleadersmustemergeandadopt anactionorientedideologythatrespondstobothpracticalgrievances andtoadesire foranidealizedandutopianfuture.Ifthiswastruefor postWWII revolutionaryinsurgency,itwaslikewisethecasefora radicalIslamistmessianicone.Suchleadersmustbringtogetherwhat QutbidentifiedastheMuslimvanguard,anelitegroup comprisedof highlyeducatedandmotivatedindividualswhoweretoleadthe Ummah inarmedinsurrection. ThecentralfiguretoplaythatroleduringtheAfghanSovietwar wasAbdullahYusufAzzam,alsoknownasShaikhAzzam.Bornin 1941intheprovinceofJeninontheWestBankoftheJordanRiverin theterritorythenadministeredundertheBritishMandateofPalestine, heattendedDamascusUniversityand earnedadegreeinSharialawin 1966.Afterthe1967warandIsraelsmilitaryoccupationoftheWest Bank,AzzamjoinedthePalestinianMuslimBrotherhoodand tookpart inguerrillawarfare operationsagainstIsrael.Itwasherethathefirst learnedabouttheseirregularandasymmetrictacticsforfightingmore powerfulenemies.However,hesoonbecamedisillusioned withthose Palestiniansleadingthe armed resistance forideologicalreasons.In particular,heopposedthePalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)and itschief,YasserArafat,rejectingtheirsecularandMarxistorientation. Azzam optedoutandcontinuedhisIslamicstudiesatCairos Al AzharUniversitywhereheearnedaMastersdegreein1970,andhis 184

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Ph.D.inIslamicJurisprudencein1973.DuringthistimeinEgypt,he metmany MuslimBrotherhoodfollowersofQutb,includingAymanal Zawahiri.Moreover,AzzamcametoadoptQutbsideasincludingthe beliefinaninevitableglobalclashbetweentheIslamicandnonIslamic worlds.NotabletoteachinJordan becausePalestinianmilitantswere notwelcomeKingHusseinhadexpelledthePLOduringwhat becameknownasBlackSeptemberhemovedtoSaudiArabia and a positionatKingAbdulAzizUniversity.OsamabinLadenwasenrolled asastudentand itwastherethatSheikhAzzamfirstmethim. TheSovietinvasionofAfghanistanwas,forAzzam,akufaror infidelaggression againstdaralIslam.Heimmediatelyissueda fatwaDefenseoftheMuslimLands,theFirstObligationafter Faithwhich calledallMuslimstofightaholywartoexpelthe
157 invadersfrom thehouseofIslam. Majorreligiousfiguressuchasthe

GrandMuftiofSaudiArabia,AbdalAzizBinBazz,concurred. Subsequently,atthepeakoftheAfghan Jihad,Azzam published Join theCaravanwhichbecameoneoftheprincipalinspirationsfor

158 drawing thousandsofMuslimsto fightinAfghanistan. Thus,inthe

1980sAzzamemergedastheinspirationalideologistandacentral figureinwhatweretheinitialstepsin thedevelopmentofthemilitant Islamistresistancemovement.Azzamhadcharisma,andhiswords drewmanytothefight. ButAzzamsrole wasmorethan thatofinspirationalideologist.He alsoknewhowtoorganizeandlead.AfterrelocatingtoPakistanin 1980heestablishedMaktabalKhadamat(ServicesOffice)toorganize asupportinfrastructure inPeshawartohousethosewho cametobe knownasAfghanArabsJihad volunteersfromaroundtheMuslim world.Inthemid1980sbinLadenprovidedfinancialassistanceto expandthateffort.TheinfrastructureestablishedbyAzzam included 185

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy campsfortraininginguerrillaandparamilitarytacticstoprepare internationalrecruitstofightonan unconventionalandasymmetric battlefield.Accordingto Greges,Azzam createdamilitarycollegeto providevolunteerswithmethodicalmilitarytrainingandtoprepare seniorofficerstolead Jihadistoperationsanywhere.Bydoingso,the AlFaruqMilitaryCollegefosteredtheemergenceofnewprofessional Jihadistcadres.159 TorecruitfightersandraisemoneyforthecauseAzzamtraveled throughtheMuslimworld,aswellastoEuropeandtheUnitedStates. Hisgoalwastoawakenthe Ummah toitsdutyinAfghanistan.Andhis charisma,prose,andpoliticoreligiousproselytizingdrewmany.He playedakeyroleinestablishingnetworksforfinancing,recruiting,and trainingradicalMuslimstofightthe Jihad inAfghanistan.ButAzzam sawAfghanistan,accordingtoRoy,asmorethanthedefenseofthe Ummah there.Itwasalsotoserve asatraininggroundtobreedthe vanguardthatwouldsparkanoverallresistanceagainstthe encroachmentoftheinfidelsontheUmmah.Jihad inAfghanistan
160 wasaimedatsettingupthevanguardoftheUmmah.

RoynotesthatTensofthousandsofmilitantswenttoAfghanistan
161 throughthese Islamicnetworksfortrainingand Jihad. They

respondedtothecallandpassedthroughtheparamilitarytraining infrastructure establishedbyAzzam,andlaterbybinLaden.According to Marc Sageman,theycamefromallover:coreArabcountriessuch asSaudiArabiaandEgyptMagrebArabcountrieslikeAlgeriaand MoroccoSoutheastAsiacountriessuchasthePhilippinesand IndonesiaandtheMuslimimmigrant[ordiaspora]communitiesofthe

162 UnitedStatesandEurope.

Those whowenttoAfghanistanestablishedbondsofsolidarity amongthemselvesthatwentbeyondthatconflict.Theybecamea 186

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy potentialvanguardaninternationalbrigadeforcarryingoutglobal Jihad.Sagemanwritesthat,theglobalSalafiJihadevolvedthrougha processofradicalizationconsistingofgradualselfselectionand recognitionofthesinglecommontargetofthe Jihad.AndRoyadds thatthevolunteersinAfghanistanexperiencedaconcrete internationalizationbasedonpersonalcontacts,thebrotherhoodof comradesinarms,friendshipsandaffinities.Theylearnedtoknow otherpeopleandotherlanguages.InAfghanistan,theyfoundanew
163 communityandbrotherhoodwithwhichtoidentify.

Theyalsobecameskilledinguerrillawarfare tactics,having learnedthatartfromtheindigenousAfghan Mujahideen who,ineight yearsofprotractedandbloodyirregularwarfareinamountainousand ruggedland,woredownthemightySovietArmy. Intheirbook, AfghanGuerrillaWarfare:IntheWordsoftheMujahideenFighters, GrauandJalalichroniclethedaytodayguerrillatacticsperfectedby Afghanwarriorsduringtheconflict.Itwastheseirregularwarfare methodsthatenabledtheriflewieldingMujahideentodefeatafully
164 armoredSuperpower. Thiswasanimportantlessonthatthe

internationalJihadistsexperiencedupclose. Nothingcaptured thedaytodaytacticalbattlebetterthanthe Mujahideensinnovativeuseofambushandhitandruntacticsin mountainousterrain.Itwasclassicguerrillawarfare,anditworked. DuringtheeightyearwartheMujahideenresponsetothepresenceof theRedArmyinAfghanistanwastoutilize these traditionaltribal warfaretacticstoinflictcasualties,cutsupplyandcommunication lines,anderodetheSovietwilltooccupyAfghanistan.Between1985 and1987alonetheMujahideenconductedover10,000ambushes.They usuallyattackedatnightorinthefadinglight,utilizingdenialand deceptiontacticsandemployingmines,machineguns,grenade 187

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy launchers,andsniperfiretotakefulladvantageofthecoverofferedby Afghanistansrocky terrain.Intheend,itwasthenatureoftheAfghan tribalandclansocialstructureanditstraditionalirregularmethodsof warfarethatallowedaguerillaforcetorendertheSovietsconstantly

165 vulnerableandeventuallycausedtheirwithdrawal.

Insum,Afghanistan wasthebeginning,the startingpointfora globalSalafiJihadistinsurgency.Whenthatwarcametoanend,acore cadre ofinternationalJihadwarriorsexistedforit.In theaftermathof Afghanistan theyemergedequippednotonlywiththerequisite ideologicalandorganizationalframework,buttheguerrillaand irregularwarfaremethodsforconducting asymmetricalfightsagainst superiorenemies.However,wheretheywouldfightnextwasunclear asthelastunitsoftheRedArmyrolledacrosstheFriendshipBridgeon theAfghanUzbekistanborderonFebruary15,1989. ForAzzamandhisfollowers,thevictoryinAfghanistanwasnot theendbutonlythebeginning.A journalarticlepublishedin1987by Azzammadethisclear.In AlQaedaalSulbahorTheSolidBase, heenvisionedaMuslimvanguardorganizationthatwouldoverthrow apostateregimesintheMiddleEastandestablishIslamicrule.The conceptforthiswasdrawnfromQutb,whowasAzzamsspiritual guide.ThisvanguardwoulddirecttheenergiesoftheAfghan mujahidinintofightingonbehalfofoppressedMuslims.Heviewed Jihad asareligiousobligationindefenseofIslamandMuslimsagainst adefinedenemy,whetherlocalunIslamicrulersoroccupyingoutside
166 infidels.

AfterAfghanistan:Decidingon theNextAreaofOperations? Duringthe incipientstage,nationallevelrevolutionary insurgent movementshavetoconsiderstrategicdecisionsaboutwheretocarry outthearmed strugglewithin theboundariesofthenationstate.In 188

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy otherwords,theareaorareasofoperations(AO)hadtobedetermined. ForpostWWIIrevolutionaryinsurgentsthemainenemywaslocated withinthenationstate.Thatwaswheretheinsurgentvanguardhadto buildandemploytheirwarfightingorganization. IntheaftermathoftheSovietAfghanwarmanyoftheAfghan ArabsAzzamsJihadvanguardwerefacedwiththeissueof whether,andifsowhere,tonextfightfortheIslamiccause.Where wouldthatAObe?Andwhowasthe nextenemy?In1989,these questionswereatthecoreof whatamountedtoastrategicre assessment. BeforehewasassassinatedinNovember1989,Azzamproposed thatthe JihadiswhohadhelpedousttheSovietUnionfrom Afghanistanusethesamefightingmethodstodo soinotherpartsof daralIslam(thehouseofIslam)occupiedbyinfidelse.g.,Kashmir, Somalia,andBosnia.Theyshouldhelpliberatethoseareasaswell. AndAfghanvetssoughttodo sointhe1990s.Forexample,the declarationofBosniaHerzegovinaindependenceinOctober1991 openedupanewethnicandreligiousconflictin theheartofEurope. BesiegedontwofrontsandseeminglyabandonedbytheWest,the Bosnianregime,withitsMuslimmajority,acceptedhelp from wherevertheycouldgetit.Thus,theywelcomedArabveteransofthe Afghanwar.However,attemptsbythese JihadistoIslamicize the Bosnianpopulation anduseofexcessiveviolence appearstohavenot
167 beenopenly welcomed.

OtherJihadveteransadvocatedreturning totheirhomecountriesto overthrowwhatcametobecalledthe"nearenemy."Thesewere characterizedasdistortedMuslimregimeswhose repressive,corrupt, andsecularnaturepreventedthecreationofatrueIslamiccommunity

189

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy andwayoflife.Thepriority forthese Jihadinationalistswastorestore Islamathome.ThatwasthenextAO. Thiswascontroversialbecauseitadvocated fightingandkilling otherMuslims.AmongAfghanArabveteransitappearstohavebeen championedbytheEgyptiancontingent.Andtheyattempted inthe 1990sunsuccessfullytofightitoutwiththeMubarakregime.In doingso,theyemployedguerrillawarfareandterrorismtacticsto achievetheirobjectives.However,theywerenomatchforEgyptian governmentforcesthatkilledorarrested somanyoftheircommanders andkeyoperativesthatthe Jihad campeventually splitunderthe pressure.Onefaction,theEgyptianIslamicGroup,initiatedaunilateral ceasefire.Theleadershipoftheotherfaction,EgyptianIslamic Jihad,
168 fledthecountry.

TheAlgeriansweretheothernationalcontingentthatfollowed theirparticipationintheAfghanSovietwarwithfullscale irregular warfareagainsttheirhomegovernment.Andtheviolencecarriedout bythe EgyptianspaledincomparisonwiththatemployedbytheArmed IslamicGroup anditssuccessor,theSalafistGroupforDawahand Combat.However,inthe endtheAlgeriansecurityforcescontainedthe
169 threatthroughabrutalcounterterrorismcampaign.

Finally,yetotherAfghanArabsstayed behind inAfghanistan and Peshawarand continued tocontemplatehowandwheretoextendthe Jihad tonewareasofoperations.Asthiswastakingplace,Iraqinvaded andoccupiedKuwait,adding anewdimensiontothedebateoverthe futureAOforthe Jihadists. ThepossibilityoffurtherIraqiexpansionfromKuwaitintoSaudi ArabiacreatedacrisisofmonumentalproportionfortheHouseof Saud. InthefaceofamassiveIraqimilitarypresence,SaudiArabia's ownforceswerehopelessly outnumbered.Inthemidstofthis 190

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy predicament,binLadenoffered toprotectSaudiArabiafromtheIraqi armybydeploying100,000Mujahideento theKingdom.IfSaddam chosetoinvade,heassuredKingFahd,theywould berepulsedbythe Mujahideenusingthesameprotractedguerrillaandirregularwarfare tacticsthathadbeenemployedtoousttheRedArmyfromAfghanistan. AfterthinkingitovertheSaudiMonarchdecidedto refuse binLaden's offer.Aprotractedeightyearguerrillawarlikethatfoughtin Afghanistanwashardly an attractiveoption.Instead,heopted toallow theUnitedStatesandalliedforcestodeployonhisterritory anduseit asalandbridgetodrivetheIraqiarmyfromKuwait. BinLadenconsideredthisahereticalact.Hechargedthatthe presenceofinfideltroopsinthe"landofthetwomosques"(Meccaand Medina)wassacrilegiousanddesecrated sacredsoil.Itwasalso confirmationofwhatQutbandotherSalafitheoristshadassertedabout thecomingglobalconfrontationbetweentheMuslim worldandthe West.NotonlywastheWestdriving theMuslimworldinto Jahiliyya, itnowoccupied itsmostholyterritory.Afterpubliclycastigatingthe Saudigovernmentforallowingthistohappen,binLadenwasforced intoexilein SudanandhisSaudicitizenshipwasrevoked. Paradoxically,itwasintheaftermathofthissetback thatthe organization binLadenhelpedfoundinAfghanistan begantoemerge asatransnationallyfocused organizationwith linkagestoJihadigroups inAlgeria,Egypt,Libya,Oman,SaudiArabia,Tunisia,Jordan, Lebanon,Iraq,Morocco,Somalia,andEritrea,amongotherplaces, severalofwhichwerefightingprotractedinsurgencies.AlQaeda forged tieswithmanyofthesemilitantIslamistgroups. WhileinSudan,alQaedabacked thesenationalfocused Jihadists withtraining,arms,andfunding.Todoso,itestablishedweapons cachesandtrainingcampswheretheguerrillaandirregularwarfare 191

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy methodshonedinAfghanistanweretaught.AlQaedaalsomaintained itstrainingcampsinAfghanistan forthesamepurpose.Sudanese intelligenceofficersaidedalQaedabyprovidingfalsepassportsand shippingdocuments.Atthattime,theoperationalroleofalQaedawas principallytoprovidesupportthroughfunds,training,andweaponsfor nationallevelattacksby Jihadistgroupsitwasalignedwith.However, aswewillhighlightbelow,thefirstattacksonUStargetsalsooccurred duringtheSudanperiod,andotherswereplanned. AsalQaedaspresence inSudangrew,itsleadersengaged in discussionsovertheareaofoperationsandwhichenemiesshouldbe targeted.Withrespecttothelatter,thesedeliberationsrevolvedaround whathasbeen coinedthe nearandfarenemies.Uptothispointthe targetingfocus,asnotedabove,hadbeentwofold:1)liberating occupiedMuslimterritoryfrominfidelforces(e.g.,Afghanistan),and 2)attacking andoverthrowing localMuslimgovernmentsthatwere apostateregimes.Bylate1994athird targetandnewAOwasunder considerationthefarenemy. Ifthe definitiveobjectiveoftheSalafiJihadistmovementwastobe realizedinternationalsystemtransformationwiththere establishmentoftheCaliphate,thehistoriccommunityofIslamthen themainimpedimentto thataspiration hadtobetargetedanddefeated. Sagemanexplainsthatthosewhochampionedthisnewtargeting doctrinearguedthemaindangerfortheworldwideIslamistmovement wastheUnitedStates,whichwasseenasmovinginonMuslimlands suchastheArabianPeninsulaandEastAfrica.Itwastheheadofthe snakethathadtobekilled.[T]hepriorityhadtobeswitchedfrom
170 thenearenemytothefarenemy. Bythemid1990sbinLaden

andhistopcollaborators,includingAymanalZawahiri,adopted this importantchange. 192

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Moreover,itappearsthatbeforethiswasformally espoused and laterrecordedbybinLadeninfatwasissuedin thelatter1990s, operationswere carriedoutbyalQaedaagainstUStargets.In1993 thereissomeevidence thattrainersweresenttoSomalia.Aslearned since9/11,binLadensawUSinvolvementthere asanextensionofits presenceinSaudiArabiaand otherGulfstatesthatgrewoutofthe 1991wartoexpelIraqfromKuwait.HebelievedthatWashingtonwas followinganimperialpolicyoftakingoverpartsoftheMuslimworld. Consequently,in1993oneofbinLadenstoplieutenants, MuhammadAtef,traveledtoSomaliatodeterminehowalQaedamight attackUSforcesstationedthere.HearrangedtoassistAididsmilitia. Subsequently,oneofalQaedascommandersandasmallnumberof Mujahideen,veteranIslamicHolyWarriorswhohadfoughtin Afghanistan,weredispatchedtoprovidemilitaryassistanceand training.ThetrainingincludedtacticslearnedintheAfghanWarfor fightingagainstheavily armedhelicopters.Aididsgunnersweretaught themosteffectivewaytoshootdownahelicopterwastouserocket propelledgrenades(RPGs)riggedwithtimingdevicestotakeoffthe
171 tailrotoroftheBlackHawk,itsmostvulnerablepart.

Theoutcomeischronicledin BlackHawkDown,MarkBowdens
172 accountofthatbattle. Inastrictmilitarysense,theTaskForce

Rangerraidwassuccessful.TheAididlieutenantsthathadbeen targetedwerecaptured.Butthehumancostsoftheoperationwere high:nineteenAmericansdeadandmissing,seventeenfromTask ForceRanger,andeightyfourwounded.OneMalaysianwasalsokilled andsevenwerewounded,alongwithtwowoundedPakistanis.Many hundredsofSomaliswerekilledandwounded. AlsoduringtheSudanperiod,atleastoneofthetwoattacksin SaudiArabiainthemid1990smayhavebeentheresultofthisnew 193

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy targetingpolicy.ThosewhocarriedoutthebombingoftheNational GuardtrainingcenterinRiyadhconfessedtohavingbeentrainedbyal QaedainitsAfghancampsandwereinspiredbybinLaden.Atleast thatiswhattheSaudishavereportedbeforetheywereexecuted. Finally,duringthisperiod building theinfrastructurenecessaryto attackmajorUStargetsinEastAfricawasinitiated.Seniormembersof alQaedaweredispatchedtoKenya. Insum,bythemid1990sthetargetingdoctrinetosupportaglobal insurgencywasinplacetosupportastrategywhichhadasitsdual objectivestofostera)regimechangeslocallyandb)international systemtransformationglobally.Toaccomplishthesegoalsboth near enemiesandthe farenemyhadtobeattacked.However,todosoal Qaedahadtoestablishandstaffwarfightingorganizationsthatcould employanarrayofpolitical,psychological,guerrillawarfare,andother paramilitary techniquestofightalong Jihad. InSudan,itappearsthatalQaedawasattemptingto establish those capabilitieswhenitwasforcedtoleave.In1996,binLadenwasasked todepartthecountryaftertheUSpressuredtheSudanese government toexpelhim,citingpossibleconnectionstothe1994attempted assassinationofEgyptianPresidentMubarak whileinAddisAbaba, Ethiopia.BinLadenand200ofhiskeysubordinatesleftinlate1996, returningtoAfghanistan. Afghanistan Again:TheFoundationsforGlobalInsurgency ReturningtoAfghanistanprovedfortuitousforalQaeda.Itwas given anopportunitytoaccelerate building atransnationalwarfighting organizationithad begun to form inSudan.Nowalliedwith the Taliban,whohadabelief system similartothatofbinLadenandal Qaeda,Afghanistanprovidedanidealbase todoso.Itturnedintoan everexpandinginfrastructureandsafehaven,farfromAmerican 194

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy politicalinfluenceandmilitarypower.Accordingtothe 9/11 CommissionReport, The Talibanseemedtoopenthedoortoallwho wantedtocometoAfghanistantotraininthe [alQaeda]camps.The alliancewiththeTalibanprovidedalQaedaasanctuaryinwhichto instructandindoctrinatenew fightersandterrorists,importweapons, forgetieswithotherJihadgroupsandleaders[globally],andplotand
173 staffterroristschemes.

Between1996andtheattacksonSeptember11,2001,Salafi orientedMuslimsfromaroundtheworldtraveledtoAfghanistanto receive irregularwarfare trainingandindoctrinationinthese facilities. Howmanydidsoishardtodetermine.Estimatesvarywidely.The 9/11 CommissionReportnotedthatU.S.intelligenceestimatesputthetotal numberoffighterswhounderwentinstructionin binLadensupported
174 campsinAfghanistanfrom1996through9/11at10,000to20,000.

Othersproposemuchhighernumbers.Forexample,accordingto Germanpolice testimonyinthe 2006retrialofMouniralMotassadek, aMoroccanaccusedofinvolvementinthe9/11attacks,over70,000 receivedparamilitarytrainingandreligiousinstructioninalQaedas

175 campsinAfghanistan. Whateverthenumber,aconsiderablecorpsof

secondgeneration holywarriorstraveledtoAfghanistanfromsome fiftyormorecountries. AnassessmentofdevelopmentsinAfghanistanbetween 1996and theSeptember11,2001attacksontheUnited Statessuggestthatthe foundation wasbeing established byalQaedaforinitiating aglobal SalafiJihad insurgencythatreflected therequirementsidentifiedearlier inthisstudy.AlQaedasexpanding infrastructureinAfghanistan allowedittoundertakeseveralactivitiesthattracked withthese requirements.

195

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Firstofall,duringthisperiodbinLaden revisedalQaedas ideologyanddoctrinetoemphasize aglobalmissionfortheSalafi Jihadmovement.HedidsobyfocusingontheUnitedStatesthefar enemyandthedangersAmericaposedforthe very survivalofthe Muslimworld.Thisrecastingofdoctrinecanbeseenmostsuccinctly inhis1998fatwa,entitled,"DeclarationoftheWorldIslamicFrontfor Jihad againsttheJewsandtheCrusaders."TheUnited Stateswas attempting todestroyIslam,andMuslimswereinacataclysmicbattle withtheWest.AmericasoccupationofSaudiArabiahadhad a humiliatinganddebilitatingimpactontheUmmah.Accordingtobin Laden,"SinceGodlaiddowntheArabianPeninsula,createditsdesert, andsurroundeditwithitsseas,nocalamityhaseverbefallenitlike theseCrusaderhoststhathavespreadinitlikelocusts,crowingitssoil,
176 eatingitsfruits,anddestroyingitsverdure."

AnditwasnotjustSaudiArabiathatwasendangered.TheUnited States,byorchestratingUNsanctionsagainstIraq,wasannihilating Muslimsthereaswell.BinLadenassertedthatWashingtondidnotrest afterthe"slaughter"oftheGulfWarbutinsteadsoughtthe "dismembermentandthedestruction...ofwhatremainsofthis

177 people. Ininterviewsduringthelate1990s,he also includedthe

plightofMuslimsinKashmir,EastTimor,Sudan,Somalia,Chechnya, andelsewhereinthismessianicvisionof awarof survivalforIslam againstthe WestledbytheUnitedStates. ThroughanassessmentofbinLadensfatwas,otherwritten statements,andinterviewsduringthissecond periodinAfghanistan,it isevidentthatherevisedalQaedasideology anddoctrineforaglobal SalafiJihad againsttheUnitedStates.Thus,inthe1998fatwa,after specifyingtheAmericancrimeofoccupationoftheholyplaces,the waritwaswagingthroughsanctionsagainsttheIraqipeople,and 196

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AmericassupportofJewishaggressioninPalestine,binLaden assertedthattheUnitedStateshaddeclaredwaronGod.Therefore,it wasthedutyofeveryMuslimto killtheAmericansandplundertheir moneywhereverandwhenevertheyfindit."Thefatwachargedthatto killAmericans,bothcivilandmilitary,isanindividualdutyforevery Muslimwhoisable,inanycountrywherethisispossible,untilthe

178 USdepartsfromallthelandsofIslam.

Civiliansareofflimitsundertheinternationallawsofwar.Butfor binLadenallAmericanswereinonewayoranothercomplicitwiththe policiesoftheirgovernmentandthereforelegitimatetargets.Itwasa millenarianoutlookthatsawtheworldthroughManichaeanlensesa holywarbetweentheforcesofgoodandevilthateschewedthe distinctionsofinternationallaw.Recallthatmillenarianmovementsare onesinwhichreligious,social,andpoliticalgroupingsenvisiona comingmajortransformationofsocietyandreturntoanidealizedpast. Suchmovementstypicallyclaimthatthecurrentregimeanditsrulers areirreparablycorrupted,unjust,andotherwiseirredeemable.They havetobecompletelyvanquished. Insum,binLaden asserted thatsinceMuslimseverywhereinthe worldweresuffering atthehandsoftheUnitedStates,theUmmah mustwageholywaragainsttheirrealenemy,andnotonly actto rid itselfofunpopularandapostate regimesbackedbytheAmericans.It wasthedutyoftheMuslimcommunity toprotecttheirfaith.BinLaden declared thattheUnited Stateswasvulnerableandcouldbedefeatedin warbymujahideen inthesamewaytheUSSRsufferedahumiliating defeatattheirhands. Beyonddoctrine,importantorganizationaldevelopmentstook placeduringthelatter1990saswell.AlQaedaasanorganizationgrew insizeandcomplexity.Thiswasdue,inpart,tothefactitwasableto 197

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy selectandaddpersonnelfromthethousandsofindividualsthatflowed throughitstrainingcamps.Ithadaverylargepoolfromwhich to screenandevaluatecandidatesfrom itstrainingprogramfor membershipinitscoreorganization.Alsofacilitatingthis organizationalevolutionwasthesecuresanctuarythatalQaeda enjoyedinAfghanistan. AlQaedawasable duringthelatter1990stoexpandits hierarchicalapparatusandformalizeitsstructure,withbinLaden,the
179 emirgeneral,atthetop,followedbyotheralQaedaleaders. Below

binLadenashuramajlisorconsultativecouncilwasestablished,with fourcommitteesreportingtoit.Amilitarycommitteerecruitedfighters andranthetrainingcampsinwhichtheywereinstructedinthe guerrillaandirregularwarfaremethodslearnedinAfghanistaninthe 1980s.Indeed,inhis1996DeclarationofWaragainsttheAmericans Occupying theLandoftheTwoHolyPlaces,binLadensingledout theimportanceofthesetechniquesforfightingconventionallysuperior enemies.Hestated:[I]tmustbeobvioustoyouthat,duetothe imbalanceofpowerbetweenourarmedforcesandtheenemyforces,a suitablemeansoffightingmustbeadopted,i.e.,usingfastmoving, lightforcesthatworkundercompletesecrecy.Inotherwords,to initiateaguerrillawar,wherethesonsofthenation,andnotthe
180 militaryforces,takepartinit.

Themilitarycommitteealsoplannedand launchedglobalstrikes againsttheUnitedStates.Finally,itoversawotherclandestine functionsincludingaspecialofficeforprocuring,forging,oraltering identitydocumentssuchaspassportsandvisas. Afinancecommittee establishedaglobalfinancialnetworktoraise the resourcesnecessarytosustain alQaedasexpandingapparatusand activities.Itsfinancialnetworkwasbasedonredundancy.AlQaeda 198

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy secureditsmoneythroughtheWesternbankingsystem,theIslamic bankingsystem,andthetraditionalhawalasystem.Thisnetworkwas linkedtoanumberofmoneysourcestoincludeMuslimcharitable organizations,which alQaedainfiltrated andused tocollectandmask thefundsitneeded.TheseincludedtheInternationalIslamicRelief Organization(IIRO),theBenevolenceInternationalFoundation,theal HaramianIslamicFoundation,BlessedReliefFoundation,andthe RabitaTrust.Theseorganizationshavebranchesworldwideandengage inactivitiesrelatedtoreligious,educational,social,andhumanitarian programs.Buttheyalsoknowinglyorunknowinglyassistedin financing alQaeda.Wealthyindividuals,particularlyintheArabian Gulfstates,likewisewereasourceoffunds,aswerealQaedarun businesses. Justifying itsactionsbyissuingrulingsonSharialawwasthe responsibilityofthereligious/legalcommittee.Italsohadarolein indoctrinatingthosemanythousandMuslimswhowenttoAfghanistan tobetrainedforholywar.Finally,amediacommitteedisseminated informationinsupportofalQaedaspoliticalandmilitarygoalsand activities.In the latter1990s,alQaedabeganusingtheInternetto publicizethose goalsandactivities,todisseminateinformation,to inspireandrecruit,andtogatherandshareinformation.However,this wasonlyinitsembryonicstageatthispoint.Asweshallseelater,the useoftheInternetburgeoned after9/11foralQaedaandtheSalafi Jihadmovement. ThisgrowthofalQaedasorganizationinAfghanistanallowedit togooperationalinawayitcouldnotduringitsSudanphase.Itnow wasabletoplanseveralterroristoperationstostrikeattheUnited Statesacrossthegloballandscapeandhadthecapacitytodirectand deployclandestineunitstoexecutethoseoperations.Andtheyhad 199

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy threemajorsuccessesasaresult.Theseincluded 1)theattacksonUS embassiesinNairobiandDaresSalaam,inAugust19982)the suicideattackontheUSSColeinAden,inOctober2000and 3)the strikesagainsttheWorldTradeCenterandPentagononSeptember11, 2001.Additionally,asisnowknown,alQaedahadplannedand deployedpersonneltocarryoutotherattacksaswell.However,for variousreasonsthesewerenotsuccessful. FromitsAfghanistansanctuary,alQaedaatthispointintime also soughttoestablishitselfmorebroadly asaheadquartersandvanguard fortheglobalSalafiJihadmovement.Recallthatthe1998fatwa instituted aWorldIslamicFrontforJihad.ThepurposeoftheFront wasto create atransnationalorganizationwithaworldwidepresence andlinkagewithnationallevelradicalIslamistaffiliatesinnumerous countries.Itsultimategoalswerefourfold:1)tounitetheUmmah2)to overthrow allcorruptandapostateMuslimgovernments3)todrive Westerninfluencefromthosecountriesand 4)toabolishstate boundariesand establishtheCaliphate. Tothisend,duringthe19962001phaseofdevelopment,aglobal networkoflinkageswasestablishedby alQaedasWorldFrontwitha scoreofnationallevelmilitantSalafiandotherradicalIslamistgroups aroundtheworld,manyofwhomwereemployingunconventionaland asymmetricviolenceagainsttheirhomegovernments.TheWorldFront emergedasanumbrellaorganizationthatsoughttotie theselike minded,nationallevelpartiesandsmallercellularunitstogetherfora commonpurpose,asdescribedinthefourfoldobjectivesnotedabove. These affiliatesandtheirlinkstoalQaedawerefirstdelineated ina comprehensiveway by RohanGunaratna.In InsideAlQaeda: AGlobal NetworkofTerror,heidentified onesinPakistan,SaudiArabia, Yemen,Sudan,Uzbekistan,Egypt,Syria,Lebanon,Jordan,the 200

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Palestinianterritories,Algeria,Libya,Eritrea,Somalia,Bosnia, Chechnya,Indonesia,thePhilippines,Malaysia,Germany,Britain,and

181 theUnitedStates.

Anexaminationofnationallevelgroupssuggeststhatwhilethey havedifferencesthatare shapedby thelocalcontextinwhichthey operate andfight,they appearto adhere tothesamegeneral ideological/religiousprinciplesandSalafiJihadistorientation.And whiletheyhave localobjectivesto includeoverthrowing apostate governmentsand expulsionofoutsideforces,they seetheirfightwithin alargercontextand subscribetothe broadergoalofaglobalIslamic reorderingof the internationalsystem sothatitisnolongerUS dominated. Anumberofspecialistshave suggesteddifferentframeworksfor delineating theglobalSalafiJihadmovementthatemergedduringthis 19962001period.Oneofthemoreconceptualandanalytic assessmentswasputforward byDavidKilcullen.Heproposesthata worldwidemilitantIslamistmovementappearsto functionthrough regionaltheatresofoperation ratherthanasamonolithicbloc. Islamistgroupswithin thesedifferenttheatresfollow general ideologicalorstrategicapproachesthatconformtothepronouncements of alQaeda,andshareacommontacticalstyleandoperational lexicon.However,Kilcullencontendsthatthereisnoclearevidence thatalQaedadirectlycontrolsordirectsJihadistsineachtheatre. [R]atherthanbeingasinglemonolithicorganization,the [emerging]
182 globalJihadmovementappearstobeamorecomplexphenomenon.

Withinthiscontext,alQaedawassaidto resembletheCommunist International(Comintern)ofthe 20thcenturyaholdingcompanyand

183 clearinghouseforworldrevolution. Inotherwords,alQaedawas

moreofavanguardthatsoughtto inspire andintegratethesenational 201

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy levelgroupsandtheirlocalgrievancesintoabroadertransnational SalafiJihad ideologyandtolinkthesedisparategroupstogether throughitsAfghansanctuary,emergingglobalcommunications, finances,andtechnology. Nineregionaltheatresare identified byKilcullen.Inthreethe Americas,WesternEurope,andAustralia/NewZealandSalafiJihad groupshadengagedprimarily in subversion,fundraisingand organizationaldevelopment.However,duringthelatter1990s,afew terroristoperationswere attempted intheseregionsthroughalQaedas forwarddeployedclandestineoperationalunits.Andsince9/11,other localcellshavealsoexecutedoperationsorbeenuncoveredinthe processofpreparingtodoso,aswillbediscussedlater. Theremainingsixregionaltheatersallexperienced,according to Kilcullen,varyingdegreesof armedviolenceinwhich localradical IslamistandSalafiJihadistarmedgroupsemployedthesamecommon methodsofguerrillaandirregularwarfare tacticsagainstlocalregimes. AlQaedacouldalsobeactiveinthesetheatres.Thefollowing, summarizedfromKilcullensassessment,highlightsthese developments,which bothpredateandpostdate9/11: The GreaterMiddleEasttoincludeTurkey,theLevant, Israel/Palestine,Egypt,and theArabianPeninsulaisthemost activetheatre.Duringthe1990s,andfollowing9/11,ongoing insurgentviolence bylocalIslamistarmedgroupshastakenplace inIraq,Jordan,Egypt,SaudiArabia,Yemen,Turkey,Lebanonand Israel/Palestine.Thisincludedbombings,suicideattacks, kidnappings,andraids.AlQaedaalso establishedregional affiliatesin severalpartsof theregion.However,muchofthe insurgentandterroristactionin theatreisnotdirected,controlled, orcarriedoutby alQaeda. The Maghrebstates,toincludeAlgeria,Mauritania,Mali, Niger,Morocco,andTunisia,allhaveexperienced terroristand insurgentviolencecarriedoutbyradicalIslamistarmedgroups.Al Qaedaalso hasapresencein severalstatesinthetheatre. 202

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy EastAfricaexperiencedalQaedaterrorismin1998withthe bombingsof USembassiesinKenyaandTanzania.Kenyasuffered asubsequentattackinMombassain2002.Thereislikelyongoing alQaedapresence inKenya,Somalia,Eritrea,andEthiopia.The EastAfricaandMiddleEasttheatresoverlap,withconnections betweenYemen,Sudan,andtheHornofAfrica. SouthandCentralAsiahaslong beenatheatreofradical Islamistviolence.AfghanistanwasalQaedassanctuaryuntil9/11. Andremnantsofitremain holdup alongthePakistanborder.Both Pakistan andIndiahaveexperiencedIslamistinsurgency and terrorism.TheinsurgencyinKashmirhasIslamistelements,and theareaisabase foralQaedaaffiliates.TheCentralAsian republicsofthe FSUhaveseenIslamistlowlevelinsurgency. SoutheastAsiahasradicalIslamistinsurgenciesinIndonesia, thePhilippinesandThailand,and lowerlevelactivityinSingapore andMalaysia.ThemaingroupintheatreisJemaahIslamiyah(JI), whichoperatesacrosstheregion,maintainslinksto alQaeda, cooperateswithlocalmovements,andhaslinksintoothertheatres. The Caucasusregionhasseen separatistinsurgenciesturn increasinglyIslamistwiththeseelementsalliedto alQaeda.This clearlyhasbeenthecaseinChechnya.Ithasbecomealaunching padforradicalIslamistattacksintoRussiasincethelate1990s. Thesehaveincludedsuicidebombings. WhatcommonthemesandfactorsdrewalQaedaandtheselocal groupstogether? Howdidlocalgroupscometoseetheirsituation withinthecontextofalQaedasglobalconstruct? Whatroledidal QaedasideologyandactivitiesfromitsAfghanbaseplayin facilitatingthesedevelopments? Perhapsthekeyoverarching themethatdrewlocalgroupsto identifywithalQaedasglobalmessage wastheproposition thatIslam wasincrisis.Ofcourse,thisthemeisacentraltenetofalQaedas SalafiJihadistideology and,asnotedearlier,wasfirstpromulgated by Qutb.Thecrisisischaracterizedasoneaffecting theentireUmmah. Thus,Muslimsliving inArabandMuslimcountrieswho feelastrong senseofalienation because theybelievethattheirgovernmentdoesnot

203

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy trulyrepresentIslam andisfailingpoliticallyandeconomically, perceive theirlocalsituationnotasuniquebutpartofalarger phenomenon.Thus,radicalIslamistgroupsfightingagainstthese conditionsatthelocallevelseetheirstruggleinaglobalcontext. AddingtothiscrisisofIslam,andplayingamajorpartinit accordingtoalQaedasideology,wasWestern andparticularly American aggression anddomination.Thedimensionsofthisincluded USandotherWesternoccupationofMuslimlandseitherdirectlyor throughIsraelcollaborationwithdespotic,apostate,andpuppet regimessuchasEgypt,Jordan,andSaudiArabiaappropriating MuslimresourcesandtheultimategoalofhegemonyovertheMiddle Eastpolitically,economically,andculturally. Furtherfacilitating thespreadofSalafiJihadistdoctrineandthe riseof alQaeda,whichlikewisecontributed totheidentificationof localgroupswithaglobalmovement,waswhatone specialistdescribes asthe reachofWahhabismapuritanformofIslamvirtually synonymouswithSalafismtoasmanycountriesaspossible beginninginthe1970s.Overthenextthreedecades,thekingdom wouldmustersome$70billioninoverseasaid,overtwothirdsof whichwasdestinedforIslamicactivitiessuchasthebuildingof mosques,religiouslearninginstitutions,orWahhabireligiouscenters. Whatthisresultedinwasadiffusionofindividuals,institutions,and financialassetsthathelpedto radicalizeyoungMuslimsandpromote
184 Jihad intheircountriesagainstapostateregimes.

Insum,alQaedasideologyconstitutedacomprehensivenarrative withwhich localJihadgroupscouldfindcommonground.Inaddition, therewereseveralotherenablersthatpermittedalQaedatodraw nationallevelarmedgroupsintoabroaderglobalSalafiJihadnetwork that,asSeptember11,2001approached,canbecharacterizedasan 204

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy embryonicglobalmillenarian insurgency.Anddifferentelementsof thatnetworkwereexecutingoperationsagainstbothnearandfar enemies,employingtherangeofguerrillaandotherirregularwarfare tactics. Wehavealready identifiedthemostimportantoftheseother enablersalQaedassanctuaryinAfghanistan.Throughthatsafe haven,alQaedawasabletoexpandandaddto itsfirstgenerationof JihadiststhosewhofoughttheSovietUnionasecondgeneration thatwastrained byalQaedaduring19962001.Bothgenerationscame fromthenine regionsidentifiedabove.Manywerealreadymembersof nationallevelIslamistorganizations.Throughtheseindividuals, relationshipswereestablishedthatlinked the alQaedavanguard and its WorldFronttonationallevelmovements.Anetworkof acquaintance, friendships,andmutualobligationsdevelopedthatstretchedworldwide betweenandamong these groupsandthealQaedavanguard.Similarly, within these theatres,groupscameto cooperateanddevelopbondsof sharedexperienceandmutualobligation.Commonexperiencesand historiescementedrelationshipsbetweenthevariousmembersofthe globalJihad network. Threeadditionalenablersalso enhanceditspotentialtodraw nationallevelgroupsintoabroaderSalafiJihad networkthatcanbe characterizedasintheincipientstageofaglobalmillenarian insurgencyonagloballevelontheeveof 9/11.They included globalization,informationagetechnologies,andanetworkbased approachtoorganization.Eachaugmented alQaedascapacitytodo so. Globalizationerodedthetraditionalboundariesthatseparatedand securedthenationstate.Itallowspeople,goods,information,ideas, values,andorganizationstomoveeasily acrossinternationalspace 205

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy withoutheedingstateborders.Moderntransportationand communicationssystems,inconjunctionwith thepostColdWar breakdownofpoliticalandeconomicbarriersaroundtheworld, accelerated theglobalizationprocess. Informationagetechnologiesarecentraltoglobalization.Theseare thenetworksthroughwhichcommunicationstakesplaceona worldwidebasis.Cellularandsatellitephonesallowcontactbetween themostremoteandthemostaccessiblelocationsoftheglobe. ComputersandtheInternetaretheotherpillarsoftheinformation revolution. Totakeadvantageofglobalizationandinformationage technologies,alQaedaadoptedaneworganizationalapproach thatwas lesshierarchicalandmorenetworkedtolinkgroupsintheninetheatres together.Indoingso,theyfollowedtheleadoftheinternational businesscommunity,whichwasintheforefrontofsuchchange.Small andlargecorporationsdevelopedvirtualornetworkedorganizations thatwereabletoadapttotheinformationageandglobalization. Globalization,informationagetechnology,andanetworkbased approachtoorganization,inconjunctionwith the aforementioned enablerofasecuresanctuary,contributedinimportantwaystothe
th appearanceattheendofthe20 centuryofaglobalmillenarian

insurgency,initsincipientstageofdevelopment,thatwascarryingout guerrillawarfareandotherparamilitaryoperationsagainstbothnear andfarenemies. GlobalInsurgencyintheAftermathof9/11? Intheaftermathof 9/11theUnited Stateswenttowarwithal

th Qaedaand theTaliban.ByDecember7 theTalibanregimehadbeen

overthrownand alQaedasinfrastructureinAfghanistan largely disrupted.The lossof thatsanctuarywasamajorsetbackastrategic 206

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy defeatforthevanguardoftheSalafiJihad Movementandthe embryonicglobalinsurgency itwasfacilitating fromthatAfghan base. Itnow facedthechallengeofhaving toadaptandinnovate torecover whatithadlost.Coulditfindnewwaystoreplicatewhathad been establishedinAfghanistanin19962001?Thiswasthechallenge al QaedaanditsSalafiaffiliatesfaced.Couldtheyreinventthemselvesin theaftermathofOperationEnduringFreedom andcontinuetocarryout theglobalinsurgencytheyhadinitiated? Theremainderofthisstudyseekstoidentifyhowoverthelastfive yearsalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave attemptedto reorganize to continueto execute aglobalfight.Theyappeartohavedoneso through fourstrategicadaptations.Thedegreetowhichtheyhavebeenableto accomplisheachofthese strategicadaptations and,asaresult,the extenttowhichtheyareabletofightthelongJihadaprotracted irregularwaronseveralfrontscannotbeansweredbythisstudy.That requiresmuchfurtherresearchthatwasbeyondthisstudy.Herewewill focusondescribing whateachof these strategicadaptationsentails. One,the alQaedavanguardanditsaffiliateshaveemployed theInternettoestablishincyberspaceavirtualsanctuaryfrom whichtocarryoutmanyoftheactivitiestheyhadinitiatedfrom theirAfghanbase in19962001.These activitiesinclude propagatingtheSalafiJihad ideology tothe Ummahrecruiting, inspiring,andtraining Jihadisprovidingoperationalinformation andmaterialsnetworkingdispersedelementsoftheSalafiJihad movementirregularwarfaretrainingandplanningandexecuting operations. Two,alQaedaanditsaffiliateshave attempted to utilize ungovernedterritory inthetribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan border(and elsewhere inotherregions)asphysicalsanctuariesto carryoutsomeofthesameactivities. Three,theyhaveexploitedtheconflictinIraqutilizingitasa majorrecruitingandtraininggroundtohelpprepare athird generationof SalafiJihadis.Iraqnotonlyservesasanewfrontto engagetheUnited Statesdirectly,butitalso affordsanopportunity 207

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy todevelopanew cadreofskilledfighterswhocangain thekindof experiencethatafterIraqwillallowthemtomoreeffectivelyfight intheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inotherwords,inthefirst st decadesofthe21 centurytheseIraqiArabsmay servethesame th purposetheAfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century. Four,alQaedahascontinuedtoencourageandpromote the globalSalafiJihadmovementthat,asKilcullen contends,appears tofunctionatthelocallevelwithinnine regionalareas.Inthese locations,activitiescarriedoutbygroupsandcellsthatsee themselvesasapartofthismovementcontinued totakeplacesince 9/11,withsomeregionstoinclude Europeexperiencingmajor terroriststrikes. Below,the focuswillmainly beonthefirstadaptation.Howhas thealQaedavanguard anditsaffiliatesemployed theInternet?Towhat extentdotheyseektoestablishincyberspaceavirtualsanctuaryfrom whichtocarryoutmanyoftheactivitiesthathadtakenplace onthe groundduring19962001inthe Afghanbase?Thethree remaining strategicadaptationsutilizingungovernedterritory,exploitingthe conflictinIraq,and continuingthefightsagainstnearornationallevel enemiesbylocalarmedgroupswillreceivebrieferattention. VirtualSanctuary. Since9/11,growingattention hasbeenpaid in boththenewsmediaandmore scholarlypublicationstohow al QaedaandotherassociatedSalafiJihad groupshavemadeuseofthe Internet.Forexample,SteveCollandSusanGlassersuggested inthe WashingtonPostthatalQaedahasbecomethefirstguerrilla movementinhistorytomigratefromphysicalspacetocyberspace. WithlaptopsandDVDs,insecrethideoutsandatneighborhood Internetcafes,youngcodewriting Jihadistshavesoughttoreplicate thefacilitiestheylostinAfghanistanwithcountlessnewlocationson
185 theInternet.

GabrielWeimann,ina2004study,provided thefollowinginsights into theexpanding useoftheInternetby Jihadgroups.In1998, aroundhalfofthethirtyorganizationsdesignated[bytheUnited States] 208

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy asForeignTerroristOrganizationsmaintained Websitesby2000, virtuallyallterroristgroupshadestablishedtheirpresenceonthe Internet.OurscanoftheInternetin20032004revealedhundredsof Websitesservingterroristsandtheirsupporters.Hegoesontoadd: TerrorismontheInternetisaverydynamicphenomenon:Websites suddenlyemerge,frequentlymodifytheirformats,andthen swiftly disappearorseemtodisappearbychangingtheironlineaddressbut retainmuchthesamecontent.186 Since2004,whatWeimann describedhascontinuedtoburgeon. Weimannandotherspecialistshaveconceptualizedframeworksfor categorizing thedifferentwaysinwhich theInternethasbeenutilized, describing thefunctionstheseactivitieshopeto serve.Extrapolating fromthesestudiesandbasedon extensivedataminingofaprimary sourcedatabase compiledby theSITEInstitute,onecan observe these attemptstoreplicateincyberspacemanyof the activitiesthattook
187 placeonthegroundinAfghanistanin19962001. Herewe divide

thoseactivitiesintothefollowing seven categories: PropagatingtheSalafiIdeologyof Jihad. InspiringandMobilizingtheUmmahtoJointhe Jihad. PsychologicalWarfaretoDemoralizeEnemies. NetworkingtheglobalSalafiJihad Insurgency. OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks. OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses. CollectionforTargeting.

Ifeffective,thesevirtualactivitieswillprovidealQaedaandits associatedmovements(AQAM)withthecapacitytoreachlikeminded individualsandgroupsinvariousregionsoftheworld who arewilling tojointhecauseandtakeaction.ThroughAQAMWebsitesthese individualsandgroupswillhavetheopportunityto attain the operationalskillsandcapacitytoexecuteviolentstrikeslocallyandon 209

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy anindependentbasis.Thisisanewformofpowerprojectionnoradical movementhashadinthepast. Whatfollowsisadescriptionof each categoryandhowtheyfit together.Itisbasedon an assessmentofexamplesofthewaysinwhich alQaedaandassociatedSalafiJihadgroupshavecarriedouteach activityontheirInternetWebsites.However,beforedoingso,itisalso importantto briefly note theroleandcontributionthatSatellite televisionplaysin thisprocess.ForMuslimpopulationsintheArab world andelsewhere satellite channelssuchasAlJazeeraandAl Arabiyaare oftenthefirstwayin whichtheyareengagedwiththe issuesand themes,describedbelow,thatarefoundontheWebsitesof alQaedaandassociatedJihadgroups.Inotherwords,thereisa synergyalbeitanunintendedonebetweenthem.Indeed,itmaywell bethatAlJazeeraandAlArabiya,amongothers,aretheprecipitants provide anawakingthattakestheindividualtotheInternetforfurther information.Hereiswhattheywillfind. 1)PropagatingtheSalafiIdeologyofJihad.Recallthatthe first requirementtheSalafiJihadistshavetosatisfy tobeinapositionto initiate aglobalinsurgencyisto transmitatransnationalideologyto targetaudiences.Theyhavetobeableto successfullyperform thesame functionsontheInternetasthosecarriedoutbynationallevel revolutionarymovements.Throughalarge numberofdifferentWeb based activitiestoincludesophisticatedmediafronts,newsshows,and onlinemagazinesthey seektoexecute these functionsacrossthe globe.Bydoingso,they areabletodisseminate aseriesofideological framesandmessagesthatdescribeinglobaland localtermsthesocial andpoliticalconditionsrequiringimmediate anddrastic Jihad action. Salafiideologyoffersacomprehensivecritiqueoftheexisting local andglobalsocial/politicalsituation asimmoralandinhumanand seeks 210

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy toinstillinthe Ummah apowerfulsenseofmoraloutrageand commitmenttoholy war. The GlobalIslamicMediaFront,oneofthemainvoicesof al Qaedaonthe Web,isillustrative.Thissite,formerly knownasAlneda, isheavilyfocusedonideologicaltypeinformation.Theynotonlypost allofthedoctrinalspeechesandstatementsof binLadenandZawahiri, amongothers,butalsoprovideanalysisoftheseitemsfortheUmmah. AnexampleReading andAnalysisoftheHero TapesofUsamabin Laden,AymanalZawahiri,andAbuMusabalZarqawiwasposted onMay1,2006,andsubsequentlydistributedacrossseveralotherJihad forums. Anotherexamplethatfocuses,atleastinpart,onthe broader ideologicalthemesfoundinSalafiJihaddoctrineistheVoiceofthe Caliphate,aweeklynewsprogram issuedbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Front.Firstappearing in 2005,ittiestheoryandpracticetogetherby providingexamplesofhowtheglobalholywarisbeingcarriedoutby differentelementsoftheUmmah. Electronic Internetmagazinesserveasimilarfunction.Arecent exampleisTheEchoofJihad,a45pageperiodicalthatbegan appearingin2006.ItsAprileditionfeaturesdiscussionofthe importanceof Jihad,therelativeimportanceofIslamicscholarsversus Mujahideen leaderslikebinLaden,andrecentoperationsby MujahideeninChechnya,Afghanistan,Iraq,SaudiArabia,and elsewhere.Asecondexample Jaami(whichmeansmosque)is producedbythe MediaOfficeoftheIslamicFrontoftheIraqi Resistance. Finally,inthiscategoryofideologicalanddoctrinalmaterialsone mustinclude broadstrategydocumentssuchasalQaedas sevenstage planforthenexttwentyyears.Sinceitwasfirstposted,thisstrategy 211

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy documenthasbeengivenaprominentandpermanentstatusatopmany ofthemostfrequentlyvisited JihadistforumsontheInternet.Western expertstendtocharacterize itasverynave.Theydosoforthe followingreasons.First,thereisnowaythescenariodepictedinthe plancanbefollowed stepbystep.Itissimplyunworkable.Second,the ideathatalQaedacouldestablish acaliphateinthe Islamicworldis absurd.The20yearplanhasnothingtodowithreality.Itisfaroutof reach. However,thesematerialsare notaimedatconvincingWestern experts.TheyaredirectedatthosemanymembersoftheUmmah who readthesematerialsatJihadiforumsontheInternet.Whatimpactdo theyhaveonthem? Dotheyenvisionacomingmajortransformationof societyandreturntoanidealizedpast?Andiftheyagreewithit,are theyready,asonethreepartseriesrunbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontasks,toGearUpandpreparetojointhe Jihad? 2)InspiringandMobilizingtheUmmahtoJointheJihad.Itis onethingtonodinagreementwithbroadideologicalstatements. However,asthepreviousreviewofhowrevolutionaryinsurgent movementsinspiredand recruitedcadreexplained,nextcomesthe hardwork.Thesameistruehere.Butthe VietCongdidtheirinspiring andmobilizingfacetoface. AlQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistsseektosubstituteaplethoraof Internetmethodstoachievethesameend.Herewewillexamineone importantwaytheydosobycelebrating theachievementsand sacrificesofthoseonthefrontlinesoftheglobalfight. Considerthebiographiesofmartyrswhich areposted onthe Web withahighdegreeof regularity.AlQaedainIraq,forexample, publishesonaperiodicbasisadocumenttitled FromtheBiographies ofProminentMartyrs.Theeighth issueofit,dated January2006,tells 212

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy thestoryoftheKnightsGroupofthreeMujahideen.Ingreatdetail thereaderlearnswhyandhoweachjoinedthe Jihad andtraveledto Iraqtofight.Anaccountoftheircourageousdemise follows.Thethree werepinneddowninahousetheywereusingasabase.Theauthor glorifiestheirdeaths,notingthe unwillingnessofeach to trytoescape orsurrender.Andoneofthe Jihadfighters,referredtoasthelionAbu Umar,issaidtohavecarriedinhishandsamortarshellthathehad preparedforthissituation.HesurprisedtheAmericansattackingthe house,pulledtheringout,throwingfourofthecriminalstohell,while hewentupto Paradise. Thisisbutoneexample.Manyothersarecontained intheSITE Institutedatabase.Andtheyonlymaintainasampleofthem.Thereare also otherformatsforthesebiographiessuchasthevideoed lastwill andtestamentofsuicidebombers.OneexampleistheWillofthe Martyr,AbualZobeiralMohajir,withvideofootageofhisoperation inKarmatalFallujah inJuly2005.Itdepictsacelebrationinwhichhe enthusiasticallydescribestheoperationheisabouttocarryoutandwhy heintendstodoso:Allahorderedustomake Jihadtodefendhis religion.IurgeallyoungMuslimmentofollowusin Jihad andgive theirlivesforthesakeofAllahsreligion.Heisthenshownbeing embracedbyhiscomrades,beforethefilmcutstothesceneofhis suicidecarbombingacrusaderscheckpointeastofFallujah.Again, thisisoneofmanyexamplesfoundatJihad Websites. Othermeansemployedtoinspireandmobilize are videosofthe preparationforandsuccessfulconductofoperationsagainstUSforces inAfghanistanandIraq.Theseappearonadailybasison Jihadiforums and Websites.Oneexample,issuedbytheGlobalIslamicMediaFront on January22,2006,isa28minutevideo titled:Jihad Academy, whichisdescribedasbutasingledayforthosewhostrugglein 213

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Allah'scause.IthighlightsanumberofattacksexecutedbyIraqi insurgentgroupstoinclude alQaedainIraq,theMujahideenArmy, andtheIslamicArmyinIraq.The attacksare showninthedawnhours andin thedarkofnight.Theyinclude sniperoperations,detonationof improvisedexplosivedevicesagainstavarietyoftargets,and rocket andmortarfire. Therealsoaremanypublicationspostedonthese Websitesthat fallintothecategoryofinspiring,motivating,andmobilizingthe Ummahtojointhefight.Theseguidesare advocacyandmotivational pieces.Theextenttowhichthemessageisbeingreceivedandacted uponremainstobedetermined. Parallelingtheseare othervideoswith Jihadifieldcommanders whoprovidethesamekindofinspirationalmessage.Ofcourse,the mostprominentwasAbuMusabalZarqawi.Anexample,titledA MessagetothePeople,wasissuedbytheMujahideenShuraCouncil,
188 whichclaimstobecomposedofsixinsurgencygroupsinIraq. In

this34minutevideo,Zarqawiwasseenplanningoperationsinawar room,meetingwithlocalleadersofalAnbarprovince,leading Mujahideenintrainingexercisesandonthe battlefield.Inanotherpart ofthe film Zarqawiwasseenfiringanautomaticweapon,andstating: AmericawillgooutofIraq,humiliated,defeated. Finally,scoresof itemsonthese Websitesgothenextstepand includeguidesdescribinghowtoprepare forandthenjointhefightin Iraqandelsewhere.One example,"ThisistheRoadtoIraq,"provides instructionsforprospective Jihadisintentonenteringthewar.Thefirst half concentratesonmentalandphysicalpreparationforJihad,while thesecondhalffurnishesguidance forsuccessfullyenteringIraqand cultivatingcontactswithaninsurgentgroup.

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ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Inaddition tocelebratingtheachievementsandsacrificesofthose onthefrontlinesoftheglobalfight,thereareotherways,andthe SalafiJihadistsemploytheInternettoinspireandmobilizetheUmmah tojointhefight.Theyusethesame Websites,forexample,to recount the sufferingandcarnage theyassertisbeinginflictedonMuslimsby theUnitedStatesandotherWesternpowers,Israel,andapostate regimesinIslamiccountries. 3)PsychologicalWarfaretoDemoralizeEnemies.Theflipsideof inspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointheSalafiJihadmovement andfightisthedemoralizingofthenearandfarenemiesof that movement,convincing themtogiveupthefight.Herewewillusethe insurgencyinIraq,thecentralfrontintheglobalJihad,asillustrative. A numberofInternetbasedtacticsareemployed bytheSalafi insurgentgroupstodemoralizetheirenemiesinIraq.Ofthese,themost terrifying andintimidatinghavebeen thebeheadings.Thistactichas beenusedagainstbothIraqisand foreignersworkingin Iraq.The messagetoeachgroupisunambiguous.Thenightmarevideoofthose capturedbeingdecapitatedbytheircaptorsisanythingbutarandomact ofterrorismitiscarefullydesignedforspecific audiences. WithrespecttomembersoftheIraqigovernment,andthose contemplatingjoiningit,thethreatofbeheadingwasexplicitlymade throughnumerousInternetpostedwarnings.Forexample,onApril20, 2006the ShariaCommissionoftheMujahideenShuraCouncilinIraq issued thethreatof theswordandslaughtertohewhojoinsthepolice andthearmy.TheCouncilstatedthatallMuslimswhojoin theIraqi securityforcestoservethosewhoworshipthe devils,thosewho disbelieveandfightinthecauseofTaghut[Satan],shallbeconsidered converterswhofightagainstAllah.Whatawaitsthem?sharp swords!Andinasimilarmessagepostedin December2005,insurgent 215

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy groupsinIraqwereencouragedtostartcuttingthroatsintheIslamic way.Slaughterthreeeverydaytoshow themthatyoudonothesitate inimplementingAllahsorders.To Westerneyesthisisimmoraland savagebehavior.ButforSalafiJihadistsitischaracterizedasreligious duty.TheblooddrippingswordhasapowerfulSalafimeaning. Inadditiontothe beheadingvideos,theinsurgentsinIraqalsopost alargenumberofvideosandreportsofotherkindsof executions. Theseincludeputtingcaptivestodeathbyfiringsquad,aswellas pullingpoliceoutofvehicles,offofstreetcorners,andsoontogun themdownonthespot. Membersofthe leadership inIraqareoftensingledoutbyname. Forexample,inNovember2005analQaedaaffiliated Jihad forum postedthephotographsof theTwentyMostWantedPeopleintheland oftheTwoRivers.Variousassassinationsofseniorlevelofficials since2003havedemonstratedsuch threatsareoftenbackedup.The devilGrandAyatollahAlialSistaniwasdesignatedasnumberone themostwanted.ThetextconcludedWeaskAllah thatthe Mujahideenwillbeable toremovetheirheads. WithrespecttotheUnitedStates,themostfrequenttactic employedisthepreviouslymentioneddailyreportsonallthe Jihad forumsand Websitesof alleged successfuloperationscarriedout againstAmericanforcesinIraq.Those thatstandoutamongalarge numberreviewedaretheTopTenvideosofinsurgentattacksthat begantoappearin2005.ReleasedbothbytheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontand agroupcallingitselftheMuslimLions,theyarewidely distributedacrossJihad forumstoday. Eachincludestenattacks perpetratedbygroupssuchasAnsaralSunnahArmy,IslamicArmyin Iraq,andalQaedainIraq.Theyareimpressiveproductions.These

216

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy attacksalsofrequentlyappearthedayaftertheyoccurinvarious Westernprintandelectronicnewsoutlets. Reportsofattacksonthe United StatesarenotconfinedtoIraq. Themessagefromthese WebsitesisthatAmericaisunderassaultin alltheplacesithasenteredintheMuslimworld.NexttoIraq, operationsagainstUSforcesinAfghanistan receivethegreatest attention.AndindividualspectacularstrikeslikethatontheUS ConsulateinJeddahbyalQaedainSaudiArabiaarefeaturedwidely. TakenintotalthepsychologicalwarfaremessageiscleartheUnited Statesisexposedandvulnerabletoeffectiveandcontinuous MujahideenattacksacrosstheMuslimworld. Finally,theleadersoftheglobalJihad usetheInternettomock failed USattemptstocaptureorkillthem.One example thatreceived wideattention (toincludebeingbroadcastonalJazeera) wasaspeech byZawahirifollowingthe January2006airstrikeonthevillageof DamadolainPeshawar.AlQaedasnumbertwowassupposedtobe hiding.He tauntedPresidentBushthe ButcherofWashington assertingthathisdeathwillonlycomeatthetimeofAllahsdecree, anduntilthattime,heremainsamidtheMuslimmasses,rejoicingin theirsupport,theirattention,theirgenerosity,theirprotectionandtheir participationin Jihaduntilweconqueryouwiththehelpandpowerof Allah. The above itemsallaimed atinfluencingandunderminingoneof AmericascentersofgravitytheUShomefront.Itisnotunlikewhat theVietCong successfully targetedoverthirtyyearsago.Thenasnow theobjectiveistofollow Clausewitzsadvice.Attack theenemys centerofgravityhisstrategicpressurepointsandyouwillweaken hiscapacitytofightwar.

217

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy 4)NetworkingtheGlobalSalafiJihadInsurgency.In thelatter 1990s,alQaeda'suseoftheInternetconcentratedonthefirstcategory ofthisframeworkpropagatingtheSalafiideologyof Jihad toincite andunifytheUmmah foracommonpurpose. Since9/11,alQaedaand associatedmembersofthe SalafiJihadmovement(anumberofwhich are fightingatthenationallevel)havebroadenedthereuseofthe Web toinclude,ashighlightedabove,the secondandthirdcategories inspiringandmobilizingtheUmmahtojointhe Jihad and psychologicalwarfaretodemoralizeenemies. However,thelossof theAfghansanctuaryresultedinafurther expansion.ItnowincludestheuseoftheInternetfortacticalpurposes, suchastraining,and foroperationalobjectives,toincludehowto organizevirtualcells. Eachofthesefunctionsrequiressecure communicationstoavoid thedisruptivetacticsthatUSintelligencehasbeenabletoemploy againstcertainkindsof JihadiInternetactivitye.g.,closingdown fixed Websites.Thus,alQaedaandothergroupsbegantoemploynew methodstoincludeprotected bulletinboards,freeuploadservicesby Internetproviders,andthecreationofproxyservers,amongothers.Up todateinstructiononhowtoemploythesetechniquesislikewisemade available.Considerthefollowing examples. Thefirsthastodowithhowtousethirdpartyhostingservices. Thistechniqueexploitsthese servers,paidforprimarilybyadvertising agencies,totransmitoperationallyrelatedinformationandsecret communications.Theseservers,availableacrossthe Internet,provide
189 relativelyanonymoushostingthatavisitorcaneasilymanipulate. A

secondwayoftransmittingoperationallyrelatedinformationandsecret communicationsisthroughpostedmessagesondiscussionboardsat passwordprotected forums.Andathird techniqueentailscreatingand 218

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy employingInternetproxyservers.Guidesandmanualsonhowto utilizeeachofthesemethodsareavailableattheGlobalIslamicMedia Frontsite,amongothers. Thesemethodscanbeusedtocirculate awiderangeofmaterials liketrainingvideos,operationalmanuals,andguidesforproducing weaponssuchasimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs).Alongwith othervirtualtechniquestheycanalsobe exploited byoperationalcells to secretly communicate andorganize. One wayofcommunicatingsecretly,reportedbyCollandGlasser, isthroughpublicemailservicessuchasHotmail.Hereishowit works:Anoperativeopensanaccounton Hotmail,writesamessage indraftform,savesitasadraft,and thentransmitstheemailaccount nameandpasswordduringchatteronarelativelysecuremessage board.Anotheroperativeopenstheemailaccountandreadsthe draftsincenoemailmessagewassent,therewasareducedriskof interception.Thisprocesshasbeencharacterizedasadeaddropin cyberspace.190 Virtualmethodssuchasthese andothersalsoprovide themeansto establishoperationalcellsincyberspace.Discussionofhowtodoso begantoappearondifferentalQaedaaffiliated Websitesin2004, accordingtosourcescollectedbytheSITEInstitute.Theseitemsgo into thedetailsofhowtodoso,suggestingthatonceformed,members canbothexchangeworkplans,strategies,andeducationalmaterials andeventually meetinrealityandexecuteoperationsinthefield. Anexampleofthiskindofcellwasreported inthespringof2004.
th OnMarch29 ,RoyalCanadianMountedPoliceofficersburstintothe

OttawahomeofMohammed Khawaja,a24yearoldcomputer programmerarrestinghimforallegedcomplicityinwhatCanadian andBritishauthoritiesdescribedasatransatlanticplottobombtargets 219

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy inLondonandCanada.Khawaja,whomethisBritishcounterparts onlinecametotheattentionofauthoritieswhenhetraveledtoBritain andwalkedintoasurveillanceoperation beingconductedbyBritish Police.Hehadgonethereto meetwithhisonlineacquaintances. Duringthemeetinghetoldthemhowtodetonatebombsusingcell

191 phones.HehadlearnedtodosofromtheInternet.

Theplotinvolvedsevenmenfromfourcountries(UnitedStates, United Kingdom,Canada,andPakistan)whothroughtheInternet formedavirtualcell.Duringthetimethecellwasdevelopingand movingtowardstakingaction thereappearstohavebeen training providedtoamemberofitinPakistan.WhetheranalQaedalinkage wasestablished toprovideposttrainingguidanceordirection isunclear fromopensources.Whenarrestedthecellwasintheprocessofgoing operational.Thiswasthekindofcellmainlyhomegrownmembers whometbothlocallyand incyberspaceismostfearedinEurope.As weshallsee later,throughthesenew WebbasedmethodsalQaedaand otherSalafiJihadgroupsseek toprovidethemeansbywhich prospectiveholywarriorsatthelocallevelcanfindlikeminded associatesand receivetheknowledgeandtrainingviatheInternetthat isnecessary tojointhefight.TheheadofBritainsdomestic intelligenceservice(MI5)statedpubliclyinNovember2006thatshe knewof30[such]conspiraciesandthatfutureattackscouldbe
192 chemical,biologicaloreveninvolvesomekindofnucleardevice.

5)OperationalInformationSharingManualsandHandbooks AlQaedahasestablishedanextensiveonlinecompilationof operationalmanualsandhandbooksforirregularwarfare. These range fromdocumentsnotunlikethedoctrinalmanualsofconventional militaryforcestomorenarrowlyfocusedinstructionalguidesonhowto carryoutaparticulartacticorproduce andemploy aspecificweapon. 220

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thenumberoftheseitemsisnowquitelarge.Herewewillonly highlightafewexamples. Broadermilitaryandintelligencematerialsprovidethemeans whereby trainingcanbegininvirtuallyanylocation,simplybygoing online.WenowknowthatalQaedawasproducingsuchmanualswell before9/11becauseofwhatwasfoundoncomputersanddisksleft behindinAfghanistan.Perhapsthebestknownofthese itemsiswhat intheWestcametobereferredtoas"TheEncyclopediaof Jihad."An alQaedaproduction of thousandofpages,itisaguideforhowto establish anundergroundorganization.Themanualhascirculated acrosstheInternet. Perhapsthemostwellknownandwidelycirculated doctrinal manualisa1600pagedocumenttitled TheCallforaGlobalIslamic Resistance.Itwaswrittenby MustafaSetmariamNasar,aSyrian nativewhofoughtagainsttheSovietUnioninAfghanistan.Inthe manualhehighlightshowsmallandindependentgroupsof Mujahideen canconductoperationsagainsttheWest.Intheaftermathof9/11, NasarcalledforathirdgenerationofSalafiJihadiststo planand executeoperationsontheirown butaspartofthebroadermovement andinsolidaritywithalQaedasideology.He issaidtohave spenttime inEurope attemptingtodo so.Insomecasesmembersofthesecells madecontactwithalQaeda,andreceivetrainingandoperational support.ThosewhocarriedouttheJuly 2005bombingsinLondon are
193 anexample.

Beyondthesebroadermanuals,aplethoraofmorenarrowly focusedhandbooksandguidesarealsoreadily available.Perhapsthe tactic/specificweapon receiving thewidestattentionon JihadiWeb addressessince2003istheIED.Manyofthese reportsarebasedon lessonsbeingdrawnfrom Iraq.Often thesereportsandhandbooks 221

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy includediagramsandothervisualdepictionssuchasonedistributedto apasswordprotectedalQaedaaffiliatedforuminDecember2005. The authorillustratestheconstructionofacharge,thedistancethatitis placedfromitstarget,andtheamountofexplosivetobeusedto achieveadesiredresultagainstdifferentkindsoftargets.Thereiseven adiscussionofphysicalprinciplessuchasblastwaves. Thisisbutoneexampleof theseriousattentionthatisbeinggiven toIEDs.Anditshouldnotbesurprisinginlightof theeffectivenessof theweaponinIraq,andtheeffortsthePentagonhasundertakentofind ananswertoit.Indeed,the JihadisarebusylearningaboutDOD effortsatcountermeasures.ConsiderareportpostedinApril2006toa passwordprotected Jihadistforumdiscussingastudyproducedby the USthink tank CSISoninnovationsin theuseofIEDsinIraqandthe USresponsetothesenewinsurgenttactics.Theauthordiscussesthe findingsinthe studyandannouncesitwillbetranslated intoArabic.He thenchidestheauthorsstatingthattheyshouldnotbesurprisedatthe innovativenessoftheMujahideeninrespondingtonewUStactics. Afterall,hepointsout,theyhaveAllahontheirsideandyouhave nobodyonyours. Earlierin2006,asimilaritemfocusedontheUSArmysplanto deploytheJointIEDNeutralizerinIraqasameanstoreducetherisk posedbyroadsideimprovisedexplosivedevices.Theauthorhighlights the specificationsoftheNeutralizer,whereitseemslessreinforced, anddiscussesaseriesofmethodsthattheMujahideencanusetodefeat it. BeyondIEDs,therearehandbooksandrelatedmaterialsonmany otherkindsofweapons.These rangefromhowtobuildabiological weaponanddirtybombstoinformationwarfaretacticstohowto serviceanAK47. 222

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy 6)OperationalInformationSharingTrainingVideosand Courses.Itshouldnotbesurprising thatnewInternetdevelopmentsin informationmanagementsince9/11are quicklybeing adopted and adapted bytheSalafiJihadists.Acaseinpointistheuseofvideosand slideshowsasthebasisforonlinetrainingprograms.Overthelastthree yearsprofessionallyproducedtrainingvideoshavebeengeneratedby alQaedato replicateonthe Webwhatithadbeenable toprovide prospectiveholywarriorsonthegroundinAfghanistan inthelatter 1990s.TheSITEInstitutehascompiledalarge quantityofthese materialsinitsdatabase. Recentexamplesinclude trainingcoursesproducedbyLabik,anal Qaedamediaorganizationoperating inAfghanistan.InMarch2006,it issued andposted aseriesof filmsofMujahideentrainingforcombat andpracticing tacticaloperationstoinclude conductingraidson houses,blowingupabridge,attacking atargetwithrocketpropelled grenades,andtakinghostages,amongotheractions. Othervideoproductionsconcentrateonhowtoexecute aspecific tacticoremployaparticularweapon.Anexampleisboobytrapping.In thispresentationthetraineelearnsthatthistechniqueforattacking an enemycanbeimplementedinmanywayswhichrequiredifferent levelsofexpertiseandequipment.Italsoexplainshowmanyof these techniquesweredevelopedbyinfidelstatessuchasEngland,Russia, Germany,Italy,andtheUnited States.Thenarratorsuggeststothe viewerthatthesetechniquesshould bestudied.Thisparticular instructionalexercise,whichappearedinanalQaedaforumin2005, concentratesonfourspecific typesofboobytrapping.Similarvideo presentationscanbefoundforalmosteveryirregularwarfaretacticand on eachoftheweaponsemployedinthisformofcombat.These includehowtooperateagainstUSsoldiersinIraqandAfghanistan, 223

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy howtoinfiltrateintothosecountries,andhowtofightindifferentrural andurbanenvironmentsineachlocation. Thesedevelopmentshaveledthe IsraelispecialistReuvenPazto proposethatthisvastandwiderangingbodyof instructional/training videosandslideshowspostedonthe Weboverthelastfewyearsby Jihad groupsconstitutesnothingshortofanInternetbasedOpen UniversityforJihad.Pazassertsthatthe SalafiJihadmovementhas turned theInternetintoacyberuniversityforrecruiting,indoctrinating, andtrainingfuture generationsofholywarriorsfrom theAraband
194 Muslimworld.

AlQaedasGlobalIslamicMediaFrontseeseyetoeyewithPazs assessment.Indeed,theymadethisclaimbeforePaz.In a2005article titledAlQaedaUniversityforJihad Subjects,theFrontdescribed theseactivitiesasconstitutingaglobalinstitutionincyberspace, providinginstruction andtraining inpsychological,electronic,and physicalwarfare fortheMujahideenoftomorrow.Thebottomline buddingholywarriorsnowhavethemeansavailabletobeginto undertakeanirregularwarfaretraining program incyberspace, completewithdiscussionboardsandchatrooms. Inconjunctionwiththepreviousfunctionsofthevirtualsanctuary, theuseofnewinformationmanagementtoolshighlightedinthis sectionfacilitatethedevelopmentofhomegrowncellsdiscussedearlier. Thesecellscanemergeinanylocationandontheirown anddevelop themeanstoprepareforandcarryoutoperations.Therearenow examplesofthishomegrownpatternthathavetakenplacesince9/11. Asnotedabove,insomecasesthelocalcellhasmadecontactwithand receivedassistancefromalQaeda,whileinotherinstancesthiswasnot thecase.TheattackontheLondonsubway,thetrainbombingsin Madrid,theseriesofsuicideoperationsinCasablanca,andtheactions 224

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy oftheHofstadgroupintheNetherlands,tonamethemostprominent cases,reflectboththesehomegrownvariations. 7)CollectionTargeting.Finally,theInternetprovidesSalafi operationalunitswithasignificantamountofdataaboutpotential targets,particularlyonesintheWest.Theextenttowhichtheyhave minedthe Webforthiskindofinformation wasfirstuncoveredon al QaedacomputersleftbehindinAfghanistan.Basedonopensources readilyavailableontheInternet,alQaedahad builttargetfolders/files priorto9/11onpublicutilities,transportationsystems,government buildings,airports,majorharbors,andnuclearpowerplants.Theyalso collectedUSgovernmentandprivatesectorstudiesofthe vulnerabilitiesoftheseandotherfacilitiestodifferenttypesofterrorist operations. Additionally,theyhaveaccesstooverheadimageryandrelated structuralinformationofmanypotentialtargets.Thisallowsthemto notonlyaccessthetargetintermsofitsmostvulnerablepoints,butto observe securitymeasuresthathavebeentakentoprotectit. Accordingto DanVerton,aspecialistincyberterrorism,since9/11 "alQaedacellsnowoperatewiththeassistanceoflargedatabases containingdetailsofpotentialtargetsintheU.S.TheyusetheInternet tocollectintelligenceonthosetargets,especiallycriticaleconomic nodes,andmodernsoftwareenablesthemtostudystructural weaknessesinfacilitiesaswellaspredictthecascadingfailureeffectof
195 attackingcertainsystems."

Since9/11theUSgovernmenthasundertakenmeasurestoprotect suchinformation,particularlywhereitconcernscriticalfacilitiesand infrastructure.Informationthatusedtobepubliclyavailableisnow secured.However,inthisgameofcatandmousethe Jihadisare teachingoneanotherhowtopenetratesecure Websites.Forexample, 225

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy recentlytheGlobalIslamicMediaFrontbegancirculatinga74page guideonhowtoidentifythevulnerabilitiesofandpenetratehack intothem.Theguidehighlightssoftwarethatcanbeusedtodoso. Sanctuariesin UngovernedTerritory. Beyondthisvirtual sanctuary,to whatextenthasalQaedaalso beenabletocarryoutin ungovernedandlargelylawlesstribalareasoftheAfghanPakistan border(andpossibly inotherregionsoftheworld aswell)those activitiesthatitaccomplishedduring 19962001in Afghanistan?Hasit establishedaphysicalsanctuary intheborderregion thatcontributesto itsability tocontinue tofosterglobalinsurgency activities? Thoughit beganoutofdirenecessity,itnowappearsthatalQaedas relocationto theungovernedtribalareasof NorthWaziristan hasevolved inthis way. IthasbeendifficultforUSsecurityagenciestoascertainexactly whathastakenplaceinWaziristan.Onlynow aretheopportunities providedtoalQaedainthese lawlessandungoverned areasbeing understood.Untilrecently,theextenttowhichsuch territoriescouldbe utilizedbyarmedgroupstoestablishsecuresanctuarieswasnot seriouslycontemplated. ForUSintelligence,theseareaswellconstituteyetanother new frontier,an importantfrontinthe longwar.Itwillneedtodevelopa clearpictureofwhatalQaedaandotherarmedgroupsofconcernare able toachieveinvariousungovernedterritories.Butthisisnoteasily accomplished accordingtoaformerintelligenceofficerfromanonUS servicewhohadattempted todosoagainstaterroristgroupoperating outofungovernedterritoryinAfrica.Theobjective,heexplained,was to acquireongoingintelligenceofhowtheterroristgroupwewere fightingagainstelsewhereusedthatungovernedterritory.Hisservice hadaverydifficulttimetryingtodoso. 226

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Thetribalarea alongtheAfghanPakistanborderisillustrative.It existswithin alargerCentralAsianterritorythatencompassespartsof severalstatesandisdistinguishedbyruggedterrain,pooraccessibility, lowpopulationdensity,andlittlegovernmentpresence.Thiscreates safehavensforterrorists,insurgents,militias,andcriminalgroups.And localgovernmentsontheirown lacktheeconomic,military, intelligence,andpolicepowertodoanythingaboutit. Inearly2002,elementsoftheTalibanandalQaedaretreatedinto theAfghanPakistanfrontier.AndbinLadenwasbelievedtohave taken refuge inthemountainsofthisterritory.During2003,reports begantowarnthatalQaedaandTalibanforceswereregroupinginthis area andformingan alliancewiththeradicalIslamistpartyHizbi Islami.Sincethentheyhavefoughtaprotractedwaragainstthe United States,NATO,andlocalgovernmentforces.Itisbeyondthescopeof thispapertochroniclethatfight.However,therenow seemstobeno questionthatalQaedamaintainsarobustfightingforce andgrowing infrastructure inthearea. Butthespecific detailsofhowalQaedareestablishedfighting unitsin thisungovernedspace and thekindofinfrastructurefortraining andrelatedactivitiesitrebuilthasbeendifficulttodiscern forUS intelligence.Tobesure,Jihadiswereknowntobe travelingtothearea tojointhefightmuchliketheirpredecessorsdidinthe1980sand 1990s.Butaclearpictureofwhattranspired since2002hasbeen elusive. Onlyinearly2007did aclearerpicture emergeabouttheextentto whichalQaedaisnowexploiting thisnewsanctuary tocontinueto fosteraglobalinsurgency.Accordingto Americanofficialsthere wasmountingevidencethatOsamabinLadenandhisdeputy,Ayman alZawahri,hadbeensteadilybuildinga[trainingand]operationshub 227

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy inthemountainousPakistanitribalareaofNorthWaziristan.Recent intelligenceshowedthatthecompoundsfunctionedunderaloose commandstructureandwereoperatedbygroupsofArab,Pakistaniand

196 Afghanmilitantsalliedwith.

Whiletrainingcampshaveyettoreachthesizeandlevelof sophisticationofthe alQaedacampsestablishedinAfghanistanunder Talibanrule,neverthelessthey are nowassessed byUSintelligence as

197 muchmoreadvancedthathadbeenpreviouslythought. Moreover,

theemergenceofthissafehaveninNorthWaziristanandthe surroundingareahashelpedsenior[alQaeda]operatives communicatemoreeffectivelywiththeoutsideworldviacourierand

198 theInternet. AccordingtoBruceHoffman:

AlQaedahasregroupedandreorganizedfromthesetbacks metedoutbytheUnitedStates,itsalliesandpartnersshortly after9/11andismarshallingitsforcestocontinuethewar thatOsamabinLadendeclaredagainstAmerica10yearsago withhisthenmostlyignoredfatwa.Inthisrespect,alQaedais functioningexactlyasitsfoundersenvisionedit:asbothan inspirationandanorganization,simultaneouslysummoninga broaduniverseoflikemindedextremiststoviolencewhilestill providingguidanceandassistanceformorespectaculartypes 199 ofterroristoperations. TheAfghanPakistanborderisnottheonlyungovernedterritory outofwhich alQaedaand/oritsregionalaffiliateshavedevelopeda presence.Acaseinpointisthe AlgerianbasedGroupforPreaching andCombat(GSPC).AnadherenttoSalafiJihadistbranchof Islamism,theGSPClaunchedaruthlessinsurgentcampaigninAlgeria inthe1990s,targetingthegovernment,themilitary,andcivilians. AlongwiththeArmedIslamicGroup(GIA),itkilledtensofthousands
200 ofinnocentAlgerians.

MembersoftheGSPCleadershiphaveissuedpublicstatements declaringtheirsupportandconnectionswithalQaedaandotherSalafi 228

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Jihadistorganizations.Theyhavealsosaidtheyintendtoattack USand Europeantargetsaspartoftheglobalholywar.Anallegedmemberof theGSPCwasaccusedofinvolvementintheattackontheUSSCole. OtherGSPCoperativeshavebeenimplicatedin attemptedterrorist operationsinotherpartsoftheworld.Europeanintelligenceservices estimate thatthisSalafiaffiliatehasseveralhundredoperatives deployedoutsideofAlgeria.SomearefightinginIraq. TheGSPChasalsomovedintotheSahelregionof Africato establish baseareas.Largepartsofthatterritory,whichcutacrossMali, Chad,Niger,andMauritania,are ungoverned.Ofthesefourstates,the GSPCappearstohavethelargestpresenceinthenorthernpartofMali. However,likealQaedaspresenceinthetribalareasoftheAfghan Pakistanborder,opensourceinformationontheactivitiesbeing undertakenbytheGSPCintheSahelare sparse.Whatisknownisthat theyaretakingadvantageofthisremote areatoestablishapresence. They appeartobe abletomovefreely,smugglecontraband,recruit fromamongtheimpoverishedindigenouspopulationwithalargeyouth cohort,andestablishsecurebasesforvariousactivities.Buttheextent towhichtheyareabletodosoisnotknown.Neitherishowthisfits intothelargerSalafiJihad. Tosummarize,avacuumisburgeoningwithin the territoryof fragileandfailingstates.Thisexpanseoflawlessandungoverned space,estimated toinclude remotepartsofmorethan20countries,is beyond theauthorityof localgovernments.Itcreatespotentialsafe havensinwhicharmedgroupscanestablishsecurebasesforself protection,training,planning,andlaunching.Theextentanddegreeto whichalQaedaandotherSalafiJihadistsaretakingadvantageofitis inneed of extensiveinvestigation.

229

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy TheIraqiCentralFront. AlQaedaandmanyoftheassociated groupsthatcomprisetheSalafiJihadmovementhavecometosee the conflictinIraqwithinthecontextofthe long Jihad.Consequently, theyseektoexploittheinsurgencythere fortwoprincipalreasons. First,theyhaveanointedIraqthemain front,theforwardedgeof theglobalbattleonwhich toengage thefarenemytheUnited States. Theybelieve thatbyforcing the UnitedStatestogiveupthefightin Iraqtheywillinflictadefeatofenormousstrategicconsequencesonit. Second,theSalafiJihadistsalso believeIraqaffordsthemavital opportunitytospawnanewcorpsofskilledfighterswhocangainthe kindofexperiencethataftertheyleave Iraqcanbeputtogooduse fighting intheirnativelandsorelsewhere.Inotherwords,inthefirst
st decadesofthe21 centurytheseIraqiArabscan servethesame th 201 purposetheAfghanArabsdidatthecloseofthe20 century.

Evidenceofthishasbeenfoundintheruinsoftheairstrikethatkilled ZarqawionJune7,2006.Accordingto TheNewYorkTimes,Atthe timeofhisdeath[he]wasstilltryingtotransformhisorganization fromonefocusedontheIraqiinsurgencyintoaglobaloperation capableofstrikingfarbeyondIraq'sborders.AccordingtoJordanian securityofficials,Zarqawisrecruitingeffortswerethreefold:He soughtvolunteerstofightinIraqandotherstobecomesuicidebombers there,buthealsorecruitedabout300whowenttoIraqforterrorist trainingandsentthembacktotheirhomecountries,wheretheyawait orderstocarryoutstrikes. Othersbelievethatbeyondtheirhome
202 countries,someof thesetraineesarealsoinWesterncountries.

StatementsbybinLaden,Zawahiri,Zarqawi,andotherleadersof alQaedahavemadeclearthattheyviewIraqwithinthistwofold context.Likewise,itisthemessagethatisrepeatedlyconveyedon their

230

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Websites.Iraqprovidesaunique andhistoricopportunitytofightand defeatthemainenemyoftheglobalJihadmovement. IraqhaseclipsedotherfrontstoincludeAfghanistan,Pakistan, SaudiArabia,Egypt,and Yemen intermsof centralitytotheglobal Jihad.ItdominatesSalafiWebsites,and isbeingusedtorouseradical Salafipassions,inspireArabandMuslimyouth,andanimatethe UmmahtoseeIraqthroughthelensofthe long Jihad.Thus,theyare toldtheMujahideenarefightingapivotalbattleinIraqtoexpelthe United Statesfromtheregion.Iraqispartofalongprotractedwara long JihadagainsttheWestthatseekstooverthrowallapostate regimes,liberatealloccupiedlands,andreestablishtheCaliphate. SincetheUSintervention in2003,thesethemeshave been employedaspartof amajorefforttoinspiremembersoftheUmmah fromacrosstheMuslim worldtotraveltoIraqandjointhefight. Moreover,itisnowapparentthatthere arenetworksforexpediting this processbothin theMiddleEastandbeyond.Tobesure,themajorityof IraqiArabscomefromtheregion.Andofthese,SaudiArabiaand Yemenappeartobeattheheadofthelist.ButforeignfightersinIraq are also drawnfromotherpartsoftheGulf,aswellasfrom Syria, Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,andSudan.BeyondtheregionMujahideen havecomefromBritain,France,andelsewhereinEurope. WithinIraqtheseforeignfightersarepartof severalSalafiJihadist groupsthathavejoined togetherundertheumbrellaof alQaedainthe LandoftheTwoRiversandestablishedtheoperationalcapabilitiesto emergeasamajorcomponentoftheinsurgency.Thereisnoneedtogo intothedetailshereoftheimpacttheyhavehadonthefightinIraq.It issubstantial.And,asnotedabove,itwillproduceathirdgenerationof Jihadifighters,young Muslimstransformedintoideologically

231

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy convincedand welltrainedthroughpracticeholywarriorsthelatest iterationof Qutbsvanguard. Insum,the bottomline isthatIraqhasbecome anintegralpartof howalQaedaandtheSalafiJihadistshave soughtto adaptand re organize followingthestrategicsetbackinAfghanistan tocontinueto facilitate aglobalmillenarianinsurgency. FosteringtheGlobalSalafiJihadMovement. Finally,al Qaedasfourthadaptationappearstohavefocusedon reestablishing its selfassignedroleasvanguardoftheSalafiJihadmovement,arole that wassetbackasaresultofOperationEnduringFreedom.Howhasal Qaedasoughttodoso?Ofthefouradaptationsexamined,thiswasthe mostnebulousand atfirstblush difficulttodiscern.Moreover, developingadetailedmosaicofwhatisnowreferredtoasalQaedaand AssociatedMovements(AQAM)wasbeyondthe scopeofthispaper. Tobesure,the constructof suchamosaicisneeded,andbelowwewill identifytwo effortsthataddresselementsofit.Herewecan only highlightthebroadercontoursofAQAMandidentifykeyquestions thatremaintobe addressed. RecallHoffmansportrayalofalQaedaasbothan inspirationand anorganization.Withrespecttotheformer,alQaedasfounderssaw asoneofthecentralmissionsof theirorganizationthe realizationof the vanguardpartyconceptadvocated byQutb.And so,tothatend they soughttosummonabroaduniverseoflikemindedextremiststo
203 becomepartofaglobalJihadmovement. Inthe1990s,in

Afghanistan,alQaedawasableto begintocarryoutthismission by establishing anetworkoflinkageswithascoreofnationallevel Islamistgroups,whowere employingguerrillaviolence andterrorism againsttheirgovernments.ManyauthorstoincludeHoffmanhave chronicledthesepre9/11developments. 232

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy AlQaedafromitsAfghansanctuaryprovidednationallevelJihad organizationswithfinancialassistance,training,weapons,andspiritual guidance. Inreturn,theseentitiesweretoseethemselvesaspartofal Qaedasglobalstruggle.Recipientsincluded radicalIslamistarmed groupsfromAlgeria,Morocco,Egypt,Uzbekistan,Chechnya, Kashmir,Indonesia,thePhilippines,andBosnia,among anumberof otherplaces. Thecapacity ofalQaedatocontinuetoplaythisvanguardroleand tomaintainconnectionswiththegroupsthatcomprisedthisnetworkof associationswassetbackconsiderably withthelossofitsAfghan sanctuary.WhathasalQaedadoneto adaptinorderto reestablish linkageswithitsold SalafiJihad affiliatesandaddnewones?Whatare theconstituentpartsofAQAM?Howdo localJihad groupsview their placeinAQAMand relationship toalQaeda? Howmanylocal affiliatesexist?Thesequestionshighlightwhatneedsto be discovered aboutalQaedaspost9/11effortsto reestablishanetworkoflinkages withnationallevelIslamistgroups. Aslateas2005,fouryearsafter9/11,USofficialswere still struggling tounderstandtherelationshipbetween alQaedaandits affiliates,andtheextenttowhichthoselinkageshadbeen reestablished.In2006,keyUSnationalsecuritydocumentsbeganto usetheterm and alQaedaAssociatedMovements(AQAM)toreferto thisrejuvenated relationship.USCentralCommands(CENTCOM) posturestatementforfightingthewarin2006isillustrative.Itassessed alQaedathroughthenearenemyfarenemylens.AQAMwas describedasaglobalmovementhavingastrongpresenceinthe
204 CENTCOMregion throughseverallocalSalafiJihadaffiliates.

These affiliatesweredescribedasfighting againstlocalapostate regimes(whoare partnersoftheUS)nearenemiesinthe 233

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy CENTCOMarea. Accordingtotheposturestatement,therelationship betweenalQaedaandlocalJihadgroupssince9/11hasbeenfacilitated bytheInternet. Thisenemyislinkedbymoderncommunications,expertly usingthevirtualworldforindoctrination andproselytizing. TheInternetempowerstheseextremistsinawaythatwould havebeenimpossibleadecadeago. Itenablesthemtohave globalreach.Andthissafehavenofwebsitesandthe Internetisproliferatingrapidly,spreadingalQaedasideology 205 wellbeyonditsbirthplaceintheMiddleEast. Tobesure,animportantway alQaedahassoughtto reestablish linkageswithlocalSalafiJihadgroupsisthrough itsvirtualsanctuary. Indeed,aswasdescribedearlier,alQaedausestheInternettopropagate itsSalafiJihadideology toinstillintheUmmahapowerfulsenseof moraloutrageandcommitmenttoholywar.Throughalargenumberof differentWebbasedactivitiesalQaedaseekstopropagateitsmessage toindividualsandgroupsacrosstheglobe.Indoing so,they disseminate aseriesofideologicalframesandmessagesthatdescribein globalandlocaltermsthesocialandpoliticalconditionsrequiring immediateanddrasticJihadaction. Thatthisistakingplaceisevident.Throughthisvirtualsanctuary alQaedaseekstoreestablishitsvanguardroleand attemptsto inspire andencourageaglobalmovementofradicalizedMuslimgroupsto fightlocallyagainstnearenemies,whileseeingthemselvesasapart ofalargerglobalstruggleagainsttheUnitedStates,thefarenemy. Buthoworganizedaretheseeffortsandwhodotheyreach?A recentstudybyRitaKatzand JoshDevonof theSITEInstitute describesthisInternetactivityasverystructured.Ahandfulof primarysourceJihadistWebsitesdistributethemedia[activities]ofthe leadersofalQaedaandotherJihadistgroups.Throughthissmall numberofspecific,passwordprotectedonlineforums,theleading 234

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy Jihadistgroups,likealQaeda,posttheircommuniqusand propaganda.BykeepingprimarysourceJihadistWebsites small[they]canprovideatransparentmechanismtoauthenticate

206 communiqus.

Although theseprimary Websitesarerelativelyfew innumber, KatzandDevonnotethatmembersofthemdisseminate official communiqus,doctrinaltreatises,strategic andoperationaldocuments, specialmessages,andothermaterialsthroughamuchbroaderandfar reaching networkofotherWebsites,messageboards,egroups,blogs, andinstantmessagingservicesavailablethroughtheInternet.Hereis oneway theysaythisprocessfunctions: OnceanofficialmessagefromaJihadistgroupispostedtoa primarysourcemessageforum,membersoftheprimary messageforumwillthendisseminatethatpostingtoother secondarymessageboards.Fromthesesecondarymessage boards,otherperipheralindividualswillthendisseminatethe 207 informationontoothermessageboards. KatzandDevonproposethefollowingnetworkgraphictoillustrate howthisvirtualcapability seekstobe atoncedecentralizedbutrigidly hierarchical: Theprimary Websitesatthecenterofthenetworkgraphicare comprisedofalQaedaandorganizationsthatappearcloselyassociated withittoincludeinsurgentgroupsinIraq,theTalibanandothergroups inAfghanistan,theIslamicMaghreb(formerlythe GSPC),theLibyan IslamicFightingGroup,SaudiJihadistgroups,andothers.Since January2006,reportKatzandDevon,thewebbasedactivitiesofthese AQAMelementshavebeencoordinatedanddistributedthroughanew virtualentitythe AlFajrCenterto thesecondaryandtertiary Web sitesnotedontheabovegraphic.Whatthisportendsisthatindividuals andgroupsacrosstheglobemaynoweasilyacquirethekindsof

235

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy informationidentifiedineachofthesevencategoriesofthevirtual sanctuarydescribedearlier.

208 DisseminationofPrimarySourceJihadData

Insum,the activitiescarriedoutby the AlFajrCenterprovide the potentialforfosteringaunified,globalJihadistcommunity. Moreover,itcanassistalQaedaandkeyassociatescoordinate,share information,andconsolidatetheirpowertocontinuetoleadthe [global]Jihadistmovement,whichisoneofalQaedasoriginaland

209 enduringmissions.

Ifthisisakeyway alQaedahassoughttoreestablishitsself assignedroleasvanguardof theglobalSalafiJihadmovement,thenthe followonquestionishowdoweknowwho comprisesthelocal affiliatesofAQAMandonwhatbasisdotheyviewthemselvesasa partofAQAM? Onerecentstudyhassoughttoidentify criteriafor membershipinAQAM.Theauthor,AssafMoghadam,proposesthatto

236

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy beamemberofAQAMaSalafiJihadentitymustbeaSunniIslamic
210 groupandmeetoneofthefollowingfourcriteria.

First,agroupcanbeconsideredpartofAQAMif AlQaedais reflectedinthegroupsnameanditsmembersadheretoalQaedas

211 agenda. InthiscategoryheincludesalQaedainIraq,whichpriorto

September2004wasknownasJama'atalTawhidwalJihad.Founded byAbuMusabalZarqawi,in October2004hedeclared the allegiance ofthegroup tobinLadenandalQaedasstrategy.Thiswasfollowed byachangeinthenameofgroup.Amore recentexampleofthe first criteriacanbefoundin NorthAfrica.TheAlgerian SalafistGroupfor PreachingandCombat,known byitsFrenchinitialsGSPC,announced attheendof2006itwasswitchingitsnametoAlQaedaoftheIslamic Maghreb.Longassociatedwith alQaedaitwaschosenbybinLadento forgelinksandcoordinatetheactivitiesoflikemindedgroupsin
212 Morocco,Nigeria,Mauritania,Tunisiaandelsewhere. Thus,the

name change. Second,agroupmaybeconsideredpartofAQAMif,accordingto Moghadam,thereisevidence ithasinternalizedtheworldviewofAl QaedaandglobalJihad.Severalorganizationsfallintothiscategory includingtheIslamicMovementofUzbekistan(IMU)Jaishe Muhammad(JeM)andLashkareJhangvi(LeJ),bothwhosebaseof operationsisPakistanIndonesiaJemaahIslamiyya(JI)and the MoroccangroupAssiratalMoustaquim(DirectPath).Thesegroups andseveralotherssimilartothemmeetthissecondcriteriaestablished
213 byMoghadam.

Athirdcriteriaisthatagroupisdevotedtoandactivelypractices violencetooverthrowanexistingIslamicregimeorregimeswiththe
214 aimtocreateatransnationalCaliphateinitsstead. Herealso,

severalgroupsfitintothiscategoryincludingAnsaralIslam,aradical 237

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy IslamistgroupofIraqiKurdsandArabswhohavevowedtoestablish anindependentIslamicstateinIraq.EstablishedinDecember2001,it hashadaclose affiliationwithalQaedaand wasalignedwith Abu

215 MusabalZarqawi,whenheledalQaedainIraq. Alsointhis

categoryisasecondIraqigroup,AnsaralSunnahArmy,aswellasthe ArmyoftheLevant,JamatulMujahedinBangladesh(JMB)andHizb utTahriralIslami,aradicalIslamicpoliticalmovementthatseeksto implementpureSalafiJihaddoctrine andcreate anIslamiccaliphatein

216 CentralAsia.

Finally,agroupmaybeconsideredanalQaedaaffiliateandpartof AQAMif ithasengagedinthepracticeof takfir.Inotherwords,it haslabeledaMuslimregimeoritsleadersasapostatesbecausethey demonstratedisbelief.RecallthediscussionofQutbandhowhecame to chargethatNasserwasguiltyofconsciousbelief thatthere wasa betterway torule than thatbasedonIslam.Therefore,hewasan apostate rulerand alegitimatetargetforJihad.Severalofthegroups associatedwiththepreviouscriterialikewise fitintothiscategory. Theylabelthelocalregimestheyarefightinginthesametermsthat QutbusedtodiscreditNasser.Thishasbeentrue,forexample,ofthe AlgerianGSPC,andtheArmedIslamicGroup (GIA)fromwhichit splitin1998overadisagreementonwhetherciviliansconstitute legitimatetargets. Insum,thisfinalsectionhassoughttohighlightthebroader contoursofhowalQaedahasattemptedsince9/11toreestablishits selfassignedroleasvanguardoftheSalafiJihadmovement.Asnoted above,moreattentionneedstobefocusedonthisadaptationinorderto gainadeeperunderstandingofwhathastranspired inordertodevelop adetailedmosaicofAlQaedaanditsAssociatedMovements(AQAM).

238

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy

NOTES
1

RichardH.Shultz,DouglasFarah,andItamaraV.Lochard, Armed Groups:ATierOneSecurityPriority (ColoradoSprings,CO:USAF InstituteforNationalSecurityStudies,USAFAcademy,Colorado,2004).

2

Whilethereareimportantandcomplexdifferencesamongandbetween armedgroups,theyneverthelesssharecommondefiningcharacteristics. Theseinclude: One, armedgroupschallengetheauthority,powerand legitimacyofstates,seekingtoeitherundermineorcooptthem.Two,in doingso,theydonotadheretoandwillseektomanipulatetheruleoflaw anddemocraticprinciples. Three, theleadersandfollowersofarmed groupsbelieveintheuseofviolencetoachievepolitical,religious, economic,andpersonalaims. Four, thesegroupsuseviolencein unconventional,asymmetric,andindiscriminateways.Five, theyoperate withinandacrossstateboundaries,acrossgeographicalregionsand, sometimes,globally. Six,armedgroupsusuallyareclandestine organizations,althoughtheymaymaintainovertpoliticalfronts.Their clandestineinfrastructureincludesintelligenceandcounterintelligence capabilities. Seven, armedgroupsallhavefactionalandexternalrivalries thataffecttheircooperation,interaction,andeffectiveness.
3

BardONeill,InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionary Warfare,NewYork:Brasseys1990),13.
4

SeeJohnJ.McCuen, TheArtofCounterRevolutionaryWarfare, (Harrisburg:StackpoleBooks,1965)MaxBoot,TheSavageWarsof Peace:SmallWarsandtheRiseofAmericanPower,(NewYork:Basic Books,2002)C.E.Callwell, SmallWars:TheirPrinciplesandPractice: ATacticalTextbookforImperialSoldiers, (London:LionelLeventhal, 1990)T.E.Lawrence, SevenPillarsofWisdom,(NewYork:Anchor Books,1926)ThomasMarks, MaoistInsurgencySinceVietnam, (London: FrankCass,1996)NathanLeitesandCharlesWolf,Rebellionand Authority:AnAnalyticalEssayonInsurgentConflicts, (SantaMonica,CA: RAND,1970)SirRobertThompson, DefeatingCommunistInsurgency: TheLessonsofVietnamandMalaya, (NewYork:Praeger,1966)John MacKinlay,GlobalisationandInsurgency,(London:TheInternational InstituteforStrategicStudies,2002)andMichaelFowler, Amateur Soldiers,GlobalWars:InsurgencyandModernConflict, (Westport,CT: PraegerSecurityInternational,2005).
5 6 7

CentralIntelligenceAgency,AnalysisofInsurgency, (undated),2. Ibid.,5.

ChristopherClapham, AfricanGuerrillas, (Oxford:JamesCurry,1998), 68.

239

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
8 9

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,17. Ibid. Ibid.18.

10 11

WilliamJ.Duiker, TheCommunistRoadtoPowerinVietnam,(New York:Westview,1981) HoChiMinh,(NewYork:Hypersion,2000) StanleyKarnow, Vietnam:AHistory, (NewYork:Viking,1983) Spencer C.Tucker,ed., EncyclopediaoftheVietnamWar:APolitical,Social,and MilitaryHistory,3volumes(SantaBarbara,CA:ABCCILO,1998).
12

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionary Warfare,19.

13

PeterAckermanandJackDuVall, AForceMorePowerful:ACenturyof NonviolentConflict,(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,2000).

14

RichardShultz,TheLimitsofTerrorisminInsurgencyWarfare:The CaseoftheVietCong,Polity (Fall1978).

15

CharlesTilly,ThePoliticsofCollectiveViolence, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2003).

16

MostafaRejai,TheStrategyofPoliticalRevolution, (GardenCity,NY, AnchorPress,1973), 36.

17

FortheuseofthisapproachtoassessradicalIslamismseeQuintan Wiktorowicz,RadicalIslamRising, (London:Rowman&Littlefield, 2005).

18

KevinMcDermottandJeremyAgnew,TheComintern:AHistoryof InternationalCommunismfromLenintoStalin, (NewYork:St.Martin's Press,1997).

19

ItisassertedthatStalindidsobecausehewantedhisWorldWarIIallies tobelievethattheUSSRwasno longerpursuingapolicyoftryingto fomentrevolution.SeeRobertService,Stalin:ABiography, (London: Macmillan,2004),pp444445.

20

RichardShultz, TheSovietUnionandRevolutionaryWarfare, (Stanford, CA:TheHoverInstitutionPress,1988).

21 22

ForareviewoftheseargumentsseeIbid.

DouglasPike,VietCong:TheOrganizationandTechniquesofthe NationalLiberationFrontofSouthVietnam,(Cambridge,MA:TheM.I.T. Press,1966),ix.AlsoseeTangTruongNhu, AVietCongMemoir:An InsideAccount oftheVietnamWarandItsAftermath, (NewYork:Vintage Books,1985)CarlyleA.Thayer, WarbyOtherMeans:National

240

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
LiberationandRevolutioninVietNam,195460, (Sydney,Australia: AllenandUnwin,1989).
23 24 25

Pike, VietCong,374. Ibid,377.

PaulBerman, RevolutionaryOrganization:InstitutionBuildingWithin thePeoplesLiberationArmedForces,(Lexington,MA:D.C.Heath, 1974),87.

26 27

Ibid.,ch.9.

Seeforexample, WilliamDarrylHenderson,WhytheVietcongFought: AStudyofMotivationandControlinaModernArmyinCombat, Westport,CT:Greenwood,1970).

28 29

Berman, RevolutionaryOrganization,ch.10.

Mao,Tsetung. SelectedWorks,5volumes(NewYork,International Publishers,1954).AlsoseeSamuelB.Griffith, ed, MaoTsetungon GuerrillaWarfare, (NewYork,Praeger,1961).

30 rd ThomasGreene, ComparativeRevolutionaryMovements,3 ed. (Englewood,NJ:PrenticeHall,1990). 31 32 33 34

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,112. Ibid.,ch.2. Ibid,201203.

JohnMackinlayandAlisonAlBaddawy,RethinkingCounter Insurgency, (SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,forthcoming2007), 2021.

35 36

Ibid. 23.

NormanCohn, ThePursuitoftheMillennium:Revolutionary MillenariansandMysticalAnarchistsoftheMiddleAges,revisedand expanded(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990) StevenO'Leary, ArguingtheApocalypse:ATheoryofMillennialRhetoric, (1994)JonR. Stone(ed.), ExpectingArmageddon,(London:Routledge,2000)and CatherineWessinger(ed.), Millennialism,Persecution,andViolence: HistoricalCases,(Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,2000).
37

QuintanWiktorowicz,AnatomyoftheSalafiMovement, Studiesin ConflictandTerrorism, (MayJune 2006),209.

38

HamidAlgar,Wahhabism:ACriticalEssay (Oneonta,NY:Islamic PublicationsInternational,2002) NatanaJ.DelongBas,WahhabiIslam: FromRevivalandReformtoGlobal Jihad, (Oxford:OxfordUniversity

241

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
Press,2004)and GillesKepel, TheWarforMuslimMinds:Islamandthe West,(London,BelknapPress,2004)and Jihad:TheTrialofPolitical Islam, (London,I.B.Tauris,2004).
39

TheteachingofulWahhabwasfoundedonthatofIbnTaimiyya(1263 1328),whowasamemberoftheschoolofAhmadibnHanbal.Ibn Taimiyyaclaimedthepowerofamujtahid(onewhocangiveindependent decisions).ThesedecisionswerebasedontheKoranheunderstoodina literalsense.Herejectedallinnovationssuchasthevisitingofthesacred shrinesandtheinvocationofthesaintsasidolatry.

40

AccordingtoalWahhab,aMuslimmustpresentanoathofallegianceto aMuslimrulerduringhislifetimetoensurehisredemptionafterdeath. Therulerwasowedunquestionedallegiancefromaslongasheleadsin conformity tothelawsofGod.ThepurposeoftheMuslimcommunityisto becomethelivingembodimentofGod'slaws,anditisthedutyoftheruler toensurethatpeopleknowGod'slawsandlivebythem.

41

JohnL.Esposito,Islam:TheStraightPath, (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1988) UnholyWar:TerrorintheNameofIslam, (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2002) TheOxfordHistoryofIslam, (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1991)KarenArmstrong,Islam:AShortHistory,(New York:RandomHouse,2000) Muhammad:ABiographyoftheProphet, (NewYork:HarperCollins,1991) SeyyedHosseinNasr,Islam:Religion, History,andCivilization, (NewYork:HarperCollins,2002).
42

RichardP.Mitchell,TheSocietyoftheMuslimBrothers, (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1969) GillesKepel,MuslimExtremisminEgypt: TheProphetandPharaoh, (Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 2003) ZiadAbuAmr,IslamicFundamentalismintheWestBankand Gaza:MuslimBrotherhoodandIslamic Jihad, (Bloomington,IN:Indiana UniversityPress,1994).
43

Wiktorowicz,AnatomyoftheSalafiMovement,228.Alsosee Olivier Roy,GlobalizedIslam:theSearchforaNewUmmah,(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004).

44

GillesKepelMuslimExtremisminEgypt, (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,2003) PaulBerman,ThePhilosopherofIslamicTerror , NewYorkTimesMagazine, (March23,2003)Berman, Terrorand Liberalism, (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,2003) Barry Rubin, IslamicFundamentalismInEgyptianPolitics, (NewYork:Palgrave, 2003).
45

SeyyedValiRezaNasr,TheVanguardoftheIslamicRevolution:The Jama'atiIslamiofPakistan, (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1994)and Mawdudi&TheMakingofIslamic Revivalism,(Oxford UniversityPress,1996).

242

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
46 47

SayyidQutb,Milestones, (Damascus,Syria:DaralIlm),Introduction.

FawazGreges, TheFarEnemy:Why Jihad WentGlobal,(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),8.

48 49

Ibid,911.

SheikhAbdullahAzzam,DefenceOfTheMuslimLands:TheFirst ObligationAfterIman. www.religioscope.com/info/doc/Jihad/ azzam_defence_1_table.htm.

50

SheikhAbdullahAzzam, JointheCaravan,(London:Azzam Publications,2001).

51 52 53 54

Greges,TheFarEnemy,134. Roy,GlobalizedIslam, 296. Ibid,297.

MarcSageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworks,(Philadelphia,PA: UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2004).36.

55 56

Roy,GlobalizedIslam,300.

LesterW.GrauandAliA.Jalali, AfghanGuerrillaWarfare:Inthe WordsoftheMujahideenFighters,(Minneapolis:MBIPublishing Company,2001).

57

RichardShultzandAndreaDew,Insurgents,Terrorists,andMilitias: TheWarriorsofContemporaryCombat, (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,forthcomingAugust2006),ch.6.

58

RohanGunaratna,AlQaedasIdeology,CurrentTrendsinIslamist Ideology, (May2005), http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/ research/pubID.34/pub_detail.asp.

59

EvanKohlmann, AQaedasJihad inEurope:TheAfghanBosnian Network,(NewYork:BerBerg,2004).

60 61

Greges,TheFarEnemy,ch.45.

LuisMartinez, TheAlgerianCivilWar19901998, (London:Hurst, 1998) HughRoberts,TheBattlefield:Algeria19882002,Studiesina BrokenPolity, (London:Verso,2003)and MartinStone,TheAgonyof Algeria,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1997).

62 63

Sageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworks,44.

ShultzandDew,Insurgents,Terrorists,andMilitias: TheWarriorsof ContemporaryCombat,ch.4.

243

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
64

MarkBowden, BlackHawkDown,(NewYork:AtlanticMonthlyPress, 1999).

65

The9/11CommissionReport, (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company, 2004),66.

66 67

Ibid,67.

AlQaedacampstrained70,000, BBCNews,(January4,2005). http://news.bbc.co.uk.

68

DeclarationoftheWorldIslamicFrontforJihad againsttheJewsand theCrusaders,accessedat http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ 980223fatwa.htm.

69 70 71

Ibid. Ibid.

KeyfiguresincludetheEgyptianbornAymanalZawahiri,the ideologist,anddiscipleofPalestinianscholarguerrillaorganizerAbdullah Azzam,whorecruitedthousandsofMuslimstofightinAfghanistan. ZawahiriwasfounderoftheEgyptianIslamic Jihad,whichopposesthe EgyptianGovernmentthroughviolentmeans.Hehelpedforgethecoalition ofalJihad,alQaeda,twoPakistanigroupsandanotherfromBangladesh inFebruary1998towagewaronthe UnitedStatesMohammedAtef,the militarycommander,wasalsoborninEgypt.HeheadedalQaeda's militarycommitteeandhadprimaryresponsibilityforsupervisingtraining campsinAfghanistanandplanningglobaloperations.Amonghisfirstwas attacksonUStroopsbyprovidingtrainingtoSomalitribesfightingthem in1993. AbuZubaydah,theoperationschief,wasborninSaudiArabia. FollowingtheEastAfricanembassybombingsheappearstohavereplaced Atefastheprimarycontactforrecruitsandastheorganizerofoverseas operations.
72

DeclarationOfWarAgainstTheAmericansOccupyingTheLandOf TheTwoHolyPlaces,accessedat http://www.meij.or.jp/new/ Osama%20bin%20Laden/Jihad1.htm.

73

RohanGunaratna, InsideAlQaeda:AGlobalNetworkofTerror,(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2002).AlsoseeSageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworksRoy,GlobalizedIslamandGreges,The FarEnemy:Why Jihad WentGlobal.

74

DavidKilcullen,CounteringGlobalInsurgency:AStrategyfortheWar onTerrorism,4.Accessedat www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/ Articles/CounteringGlobalInsurgency.pdf.

75

Ibid,15

244

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
76

AssafMoghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda, Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks,(TheFletcherSchool, TuftsUniversity:Draftdissertation,January2007),118119.

77

SteveCollandSusanGlasser,TerroristsTurntotheWebasBaseof Operations, WashingtonPost, (August7,2005),A1.

78

GabrielWeimann,HowModernTerrorismUsestheInternet, United StatesInstituteofPeaceSpecialReport116, (March2004),2.

79

Throughcontinuousandintensiveexaminationofextremist Websites, theSITEInstitutehasdevelopedanextensivedatabaseofmaterialsonhow variousJihad groupsmakeuseoftheInternet.Thisdatabasewasemployed astheprimarysourceforthispartofthestudy.TheSITEInstitutecanbe accessedat http://www.siteinstitute.org.

80

AlQaedainIraq,VictoriousArmyGroup,AnsaralTawhidBrigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades,theStrangersBrigades,andtheHorrorsBrigades.

81

Thereappearstobeatleasttwowaystofindoutwhichthirdpartysites arebeingusedtodistributeinformationandcommunications.Oneis throughJihadiInternetforumswhichprovidelinkstoindexpages.These pagescontainalistofsourcesfromwhichtheinformationcanbededuced anddownloaded.

82 83 84

Coll andGlasser,TerroristsTurntotheWebasBaseofOperations. Ibid.

DarkDays,DifficultTimes, TheEconomist, (November18,2006),p. 55.

85

CraigWhitlock,ArchitectoftheNewWarontheWest, Washington Post,(May23,2006),1.

86

ReuvenPaz,ReadingTheirLips:TheCredibilityof JihadiWebsitesin Arabic asaSourceforInformation, www.eprism.org.

87 88

Weimann,HowModernTerrorismUsestheInternet,7.

AlQaedaChiefsAreSeentoRegainPower,TheNewYorkTimes, (February19,2007),1.
89 90 91

Ibid. Ibid.

BruceHoffman,WhatWentWrong? NewLooksAtTheBinLaden NetworkAndThePanelThatTriedToExplainItsMostViciousAttack, WashingtonPost, (August27,2006),BW6.

245

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
92

AlexisBrooks,ANewCounterterrorismStrategy, (UnpublishedMasters Thesis,FletcherSchool,TuftsUniversity,2006),2432.

93 94

ThistermisborrowedfromGerges, TheFarEnemy.

MichaelSlackmanAndScottShane,TerroristsTrainedbyZarqawi WereSentAbroad,JordanSays,TheNewYorkTimes, (June11,2006),1, 16.

95

BruceHoffman,WhatWentWrong? NewLooksAtTheBinLaden NetworkAndThePanelThatTriedToExplainItsMostViciousAttack, BW6.

96

StatementofGeneralJohnAbizaid, 2006PostureofUnitedStates CentralCommand (March14,2006),8. www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/PostureStatem ent2006.htm.

97 98

Ibid, 910,47.

RitaKatzandJoshDevon,TheOnlineJihadistThreat,Testimony before theHouseArmedServicesCommitteeTerrorism,Unconventional ThreatsandCapabilitiesSubcommitteeUSHouseofRepresentative, (February14,2007),4. www.armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/ TUTC021407/Katz_Testimony021407.pdf.

99

Ibid, 5. Ibid. Ibid, 7.

100 101 102

Moghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda,Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks.SeeCh4andAppendix A.

103 104

Ibid, 101.

CraigSmith,NorthAfricaFearedasStagingGroundforTerror, The NewYorkTimes (February20,2007),1.

105

Moghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda,Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks,102andAppendixA.

106 107 108

Ibid, 102. Ibid, 368. Ibid, 370.

246

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy

NOTES
109

RichardH.Shultz,DouglasFarah,andItamaraV.Lochard, Armed Groups:ATierOneSecurityPriority (ColoradoSprings,CO:USAF InstituteforNationalSecurityStudies,USAFAcademy,Colorado,2004).

110

Whilethereareimportantandcomplexdifferencesamongandbetween armedgroups,theyneverthelesssharecommondefiningcharacteristics. Theseinclude: One, armedgroupschallengetheauthority,powerand legitimacyofstates,seekingtoeitherundermineorcooptthem.Two,in doingso,theydonotadheretoandwillseektomanipulatetheruleoflaw anddemocraticprinciples. Three, theleadersandfollowersofarmed groupsbelieveintheuseofviolencetoachievepolitical,religious, economic,andpersonalaims. Four, thesegroupsuseviolencein unconventional,asymmetric,andindiscriminateways.Five, theyoperate withinandacrossstateboundaries,acrossgeographicalregionsand, sometimes,globally. Six,armedgroupsusuallyareclandestine organizations,althoughtheymaymaintainovertpoliticalfronts.Their clandestineinfrastructureincludesintelligenceandcounterintelligence capabilities. Seven, armedgroupsallhavefactionalandexternalrivalries thataffecttheircooperation,interaction,andeffectiveness.
111

BardONeill,InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionary Warfare,NewYork:Brasseys1990),13.
112

SeeJohnJ.McCuen, TheArtofCounterRevolutionaryWarfare, (Harrisburg:StackpoleBooks,1965)MaxBoot,TheSavageWarsof Peace:SmallWarsandtheRiseofAmericanPower,(NewYork:Basic Books,2002)C.E.Callwell, SmallWars:TheirPrinciplesandPractice: ATacticalTextbookforImperialSoldiers, (London:LionelLeventhal, 1990)T.E.Lawrence, SevenPillarsofWisdom,(NewYork:Anchor Books,1926)ThomasMarks, MaoistInsurgencySinceVietnam, (London: FrankCass,1996)NathanLeitesandCharlesWolf,Rebellionand

247

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
Authority:AnAnalyticalEssayonInsurgentConflicts, (SantaMonica,CA: RAND,1970)SirRobertThompson, DefeatingCommunistInsurgency: TheLessonsofVietnamandMalaya, (NewYork:Praeger,1966)John MacKinlay,GlobalisationandInsurgency,(London:TheInternational InstituteforStrategicStudies,2002)andMichaelFowler, Amateur Soldiers,GlobalWars:InsurgencyandModernConflict, (Westport,CT: PraegerSecurityInternational,2005).
113 114 115

CentralIntelligenceAgency,AnalysisofInsurgency, (undated),2. Ibid.,5.

ChristopherClapham, AfricanGuerrillas, (Oxford:JamesCurry,1998), 68.

116 117 118 11

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,17. Ibid. Ibid.18.

WilliamJ.Duiker, TheCommunistRoadtoPowerinVietnam,(New York:Westview,1981) HoChiMinh,(NewYork:Hypersion,2000) StanleyKarnow, Vietnam:AHistory, (NewYork:Viking,1983) Spencer C.Tucker,ed., EncyclopediaoftheVietnamWar:APolitical,Social,and MilitaryHistory,3volumes(SantaBarbara,CA:ABCCILO,1998).
12

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism:InsideModernRevolutionary Warfare,19.

121

PeterAckermanandJackDuVall, AForceMorePowerful:ACentury ofNonviolentConflict,(NewYork:St.Martin'sPress,2000).

122

RichardShultz,TheLimitsofTerrorisminInsurgencyWarfare:The CaseoftheVietCong,Polity (Fall1978).

123

CharlesTilly,ThePoliticsofCollectiveViolence, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2003).

124

MostafaRejai,TheStrategyofPoliticalRevolution, (GardenCity,NY, AnchorPress,1973), 36.

125

FortheuseofthisapproachtoassessradicalIslamismseeQuintan Wiktorowicz,RadicalIslamRising, (London:Rowman&Littlefield, 2005).

126

KevinMcDermottandJeremyAgnew,TheComintern:AHistoryof InternationalCommunismfromLenintoStalin, (NewYork:St.Martin's Press,1997).

127

ItisassertedthatStalindidsobecausehewantedhisWorldWarII alliestobelievethattheUSSRwasno longerpursuingapolicyoftryingto

248

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
fomentrevolution.SeeRobertService,Stalin:ABiography, (London: Macmillan,2004),pp444445.
128

RichardShultz, TheSovietUnionandRevolutionaryWarfare, (Stanford,CA:TheHoverInstitutionPress,1988).

129 130

ForareviewoftheseargumentsseeIbid.

DouglasPike,VietCong:TheOrganizationandTechniquesofthe NationalLiberationFrontofSouthVietnam,(Cambridge,MA:TheM.I.T. Press,1966),ix.AlsoseeTangTruongNhu, AVietCongMemoir:An InsideAccount oftheVietnamWarandItsAftermath, (NewYork:Vintage Books,1985)CarlyleA.Thayer, WarbyOtherMeans:National LiberationandRevolutioninVietNam,195460, (Sydney,Australia: AllenandUnwin,1989).
131 132 133

Pike, VietCong,374. Ibid,377.

PaulBerman, RevolutionaryOrganization:InstitutionBuildingWithin thePeoplesLiberationArmedForces,(Lexington,MA:D.C.Heath, 1974),87.

134 135

Ibid.,ch.9.

Seeforexample, WilliamDarrylHenderson,WhytheVietcongFought: AStudyofMotivationandControlinaModernArmyinCombat, Westport,CT:Greenwood,1970).

136 137

Berman, RevolutionaryOrganization,ch.10.

Mao,Tsetung. SelectedWorks,5volumes(NewYork,International Publishers,1954).AlsoseeSamuelB.Griffith, ed, MaoTsetungon GuerrillaWarfare, (NewYork,Praeger,1961).

138 rd ThomasGreene, ComparativeRevolutionaryMovements,3 ed. (Englewood,NJ:PrenticeHall,1990). 139 140 141 142

ONeill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,112. Ibid.,ch.2. Ibid,201203.

JohnMackinlayandAlisonAlBaddawy,RethinkingCounter Insurgency, (SantaMonica,CA:RANDCorporation,forthcoming2007), 2021.

143 144

Ibid. 23.

NormanCohn, ThePursuitoftheMillennium:Revolutionary MillenariansandMysticalAnarchistsoftheMiddleAges,revisedand

249

ShultzGlobalInsurgencyStrategy
expanded(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990) StevenO'Leary, ArguingtheApocalypse:ATheoryofMillennialRhetoric, (1994)JonR. Stone(ed.), ExpectingArmageddon,(London:Routledge,2000)and CatherineWessinger(ed.), Millennialism,Persecution,andViolence: HistoricalCases,(Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,2000).
145

QuintanWiktorowicz,AnatomyoftheSalafiMovement, Studiesin ConflictandTerrorism, (MayJune 2006),209.

146

HamidAlgar,Wahhabism:ACriticalEssay (Oneonta,NY:Islamic PublicationsInternational,2002) NatanaJ.DelongBas,WahhabiIslam: FromRevivalandReformtoGlobal Jihad, (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2004)and GillesKepel, TheWarforMuslimMinds:Islamandthe West,(London,BelknapPress,2004)and Jihad:TheTrialofPolitical Islam, (London,I.B.Tauris,2004).
147

TheteachingofulWahhabwasfoundedonthatofIbnTaimiyya(1263 1328),whowasamemberoftheschoolofAhmadibnHanbal.Ibn Taimiyyaclaimedthepowerofamujtahid(onewhocangiveindependent decisions).ThesedecisionswerebasedontheKoranheunderstoodina literalsense.Herejectedallinnovationssuchasthevisitingofthesacred shrinesandtheinvocationofthesaintsasidolatry.

148

AccordingtoalWahhab,aMuslimmustpresentanoathofallegiance toaMuslimrulerduringhislifetimetoensurehisredemptionafterdeath. Therulerwasowedunquestionedallegiancefromaslongasheleadsin conformity tothelawsofGod.ThepurposeoftheMuslimcommunityisto becomethelivingembodimentofGod'slaws,anditisthedutyoftheruler toensurethatpeopleknowGod'slawsandlivebythem.

149

JohnL.Esposito,Islam:TheStraightPath, (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1988) UnholyWar:TerrorintheNameofIslam, (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2002) TheOxfordHistoryofIslam, (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1991)KarenArmstrong,Islam:AShortHistory,(New York:RandomHouse,2000) Muhammad:ABiographyoftheProphet, (NewYork:HarperCollins,1991) SeyyedHosseinNasr,Islam:Religion, History,andCivilization, (NewYork:HarperCollins,2002).
150

RichardP.Mitchell,TheSocietyoftheMuslimBrothers, (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1969) GillesKepel,MuslimExtremisminEgypt: TheProphetandPharaoh, (Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 2003) ZiadAbuAmr,IslamicFundamentalismintheWestBankand Gaza:MuslimBrotherhoodandIslamic Jihad, (Bloomington,IN:Indiana UniversityPress,1994).
151

Wiktorowicz,AnatomyoftheSalafiMovement,228.Alsosee OlivierRoy,GlobalizedIslam:theSearchforaNewUmmah,(NewYork: ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004).

250

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152

GillesKepelMuslimExtremisminEgypt, (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,2003) PaulBerman,ThePhilosopherofIslamicTerror , NewYorkTimesMagazine, (March23,2003)Berman, Terrorand Liberalism, (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,2003) Barry Rubin, IslamicFundamentalismInEgyptianPolitics, (NewYork:Palgrave, 2003).
153

SeyyedValiRezaNasr,TheVanguardoftheIslamicRevolution:The Jama'atiIslamiofPakistan, (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1994)and Mawdudi&TheMakingofIslamic Revivalism,(Oxford UniversityPress,1996).

154 155

SayyidQutb,Milestones, (Damascus,Syria:DaralIlm),Introduction.

FawazGreges, TheFarEnemy:Why Jihad WentGlobal,(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),8.

156 157

Ibid,911.

SheikhAbdullahAzzam,DefenceOfTheMuslimLands:TheFirst ObligationAfterIman. www.religioscope.com/info/doc/Jihad/ azzam_defence_1_table.htm.

158

SheikhAbdullahAzzam, JointheCaravan,(London:Azzam Publications,2001).

159 160 161 162

Greges,TheFarEnemy,134. Roy,GlobalizedIslam, 296. Ibid,297.

MarcSageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworks,(Philadelphia,PA: UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2004).36.

163 164

Roy,GlobalizedIslam,300.

LesterW.GrauandAliA.Jalali, AfghanGuerrillaWarfare:Inthe WordsoftheMujahideenFighters,(Minneapolis:MBIPublishing Company,2001).

165

RichardShultzandAndreaDew,Insurgents,Terrorists,andMilitias: TheWarriorsofContemporaryCombat, (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,forthcomingAugust2006),ch.6.

166

RohanGunaratna,AlQaedasIdeology,CurrentTrendsinIslamist Ideology, (May2005), http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/ research/pubID.34/pub_detail.asp.

167

EvanKohlmann, AQaedasJihad inEurope:TheAfghanBosnian Network,(NewYork:BerBerg,2004).

251

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168 169

Greges,TheFarEnemy,ch.45.

LuisMartinez, TheAlgerianCivilWar19901998, (London:Hurst, 1998) HughRoberts,TheBattlefield:Algeria19882002,Studiesina BrokenPolity, (London:Verso,2003)and MartinStone,TheAgonyof Algeria,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1997).

170 171

Sageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworks,44.

ShultzandDew,Insurgents,Terrorists,andMilitias: TheWarriorsof ContemporaryCombat,ch.4.

172

MarkBowden, BlackHawkDown,(NewYork:AtlanticMonthlyPress, 1999).

173

The9/11CommissionReport, (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company, 2004),66.

174 175

Ibid,67.

AlQaedacampstrained70,000, BBCNews,(January4,2005). http://news.bbc.co.uk.

176

DeclarationoftheWorldIslamicFrontforJihad againsttheJewsand theCrusaders,accessedat http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ 980223fatwa.htm.

177 178 179

Ibid. Ibid.

KeyfiguresincludetheEgyptianbornAymanalZawahiri,the ideologist,anddiscipleofPalestinianscholarguerrillaorganizerAbdullah Azzam,whorecruitedthousandsofMuslimstofightinAfghanistan. ZawahiriwasfounderoftheEgyptianIslamic Jihad,whichopposesthe EgyptianGovernmentthroughviolentmeans.Hehelpedforgethecoalition ofalJihad,alQaeda,twoPakistanigroupsandanotherfromBangladesh inFebruary1998towagewaronthe UnitedStatesMohammedAtef,the militarycommander,wasalsoborninEgypt.HeheadedalQaeda's militarycommitteeandhadprimaryresponsibilityforsupervisingtraining campsinAfghanistanandplanningglobaloperations.Amonghisfirstwas attacksonUStroopsbyprovidingtrainingtoSomalitribesfightingthem in1993. AbuZubaydah,theoperationschief,wasborninSaudiArabia. FollowingtheEastAfricanembassybombingsheappearstohavereplaced Atefastheprimarycontactforrecruitsandastheorganizerofoverseas operations.
180

DeclarationOfWarAgainstTheAmericansOccupyingTheLandOf TheTwoHolyPlaces,accessedat http://www.meij.or.jp/new/ Osama%20bin%20Laden/Jihad1.htm.

252

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181

RohanGunaratna, InsideAlQaeda:AGlobalNetworkofTerror,(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2002).AlsoseeSageman, UnderstandingTerrorNetworksRoy,GlobalizedIslamandGreges,The FarEnemy:Why Jihad WentGlobal.

182

DavidKilcullen,CounteringGlobalInsurgency:AStrategyforthe WaronTerrorism,4.Accessedat www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/ Articles/CounteringGlobalInsurgency.pdf.

183 184

Ibid,15

AssafMoghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda, Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks,(TheFletcherSchool, TuftsUniversity:Draftdissertation,January2007),118119.

185

SteveCollandSusanGlasser,TerroristsTurntotheWebasBaseof Operations, WashingtonPost, (August7,2005),A1.

186

GabrielWeimann,HowModernTerrorismUsestheInternet, United StatesInstituteofPeaceSpecialReport116, (March2004),2.

187

Throughcontinuousandintensiveexaminationofextremist Websites, theSITEInstitutehasdevelopedanextensivedatabaseofmaterialsonhow variousJihad groupsmakeuseoftheInternet.Thisdatabasewasemployed astheprimarysourceforthispartofthestudy.TheSITEInstitutecanbe accessedat http://www.siteinstitute.org.

188

AlQaedainIraq,VictoriousArmyGroup,AnsaralTawhidBrigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades,theStrangersBrigades,andtheHorrorsBrigades.

189

Thereappearstobeatleasttwowaystofindoutwhichthirdpartysites arebeingusedtodistributeinformationandcommunications.Oneis throughJihadiInternetforumswhichprovidelinkstoindexpages.These pagescontainalistofsourcesfromwhichtheinformationcanbededuced anddownloaded.

190 191 192

Coll andGlasser,TerroristsTurntotheWebasBaseofOperations. Ibid.

DarkDays,DifficultTimes, TheEconomist, (November18,2006),p. 55.

193

CraigWhitlock,ArchitectoftheNewWarontheWest, Washington Post,(May23,2006),1.

194

ReuvenPaz,ReadingTheirLips:TheCredibilityof JihadiWebsitesin Arabic asaSourceforInformation, www.eprism.org.

195

Weimann,HowModernTerrorismUsestheInternet,7.

253

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196

AlQaedaChiefsAreSeentoRegainPower,TheNewYorkTimes, (February19,2007),1.
197 198 199

Ibid. Ibid.

BruceHoffman,WhatWentWrong? NewLooksAtTheBinLaden NetworkAndThePanelThatTriedToExplainItsMostViciousAttack, WashingtonPost, (August27,2006),BW6.

200

AlexisBrooks,ANewCounterterrorismStrategy, (Unpublished MastersThesis,FletcherSchool,TuftsUniversity,2006),2432.

201 202

ThistermisborrowedfromGerges, TheFarEnemy.

MichaelSlackmanAndScottShane,TerroristsTrainedbyZarqawi WereSentAbroad,JordanSays,TheNewYorkTimes, (June11,2006),1, 16.

203

BruceHoffman,WhatWentWrong? NewLooksAtTheBinLaden NetworkAndThePanelThatTriedToExplainItsMostViciousAttack, BW6.

204

StatementofGeneralJohnAbizaid, 2006PostureofUnitedStates CentralCommand (March14,2006),8. www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/PostureStatem ent2006.htm.

205 206

Ibid, 910,47.

RitaKatzandJoshDevon,TheOnlineJihadistThreat,Testimony before theHouseArmedServicesCommitteeTerrorism,Unconventional ThreatsandCapabilitiesSubcommitteeUSHouseofRepresentative, (February14,2007),4. www.armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/ TUTC021407/Katz_Testimony021407.pdf.

207 208 209 210

Ibid, 5. Ibid. Ibid, 7.

Moghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda,Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks.SeeCh4andAppendix A.

211 212

Ibid, 101.

CraigSmith,NorthAfricaFearedasStagingGroundforTerror, The NewYorkTimes (February20,2007),1.

254

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213

Moghadam, TheGlobalizationOfMartyrdomAlQaeda,Salafi Jihadism,AndTheDiffusionOfSuicideAttacks,102andAppendixA.

214 215 216

Ibid, 102. Ibid, 368. Ibid, 370.

255