Atiśa S Introduction To The Two Truths and Its Sources

CHR.
LINDTNER
A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO T H E TWO T R U T H S , AND ITS S O U R C E S
One can only agree with the observations of the eminent Belgian scholar Louis de La Vall6e Poussin that: "L'importance du probl~me des deux v6rit6s, v6rit6 de samvrti ou d'apparence, v6rit6 de pararndrtha ou v6rit6 absolue, est grande dans le Grande V6hicule, dans le Vedanta, dans la sp6culation indienne en g6n6ral, et, on peut dire, dans la philosophie universelle." Some kind of distinction between appearance and reality must, of course, be as ancient as human experience and reflection itself. While it would be easy to refer to various instances in support of such a distinction not only in Greek but also in Indian and Chinese sources from about the middle of the first millennium B.C. and onwards, I shall however, here confine myself to an attempt to give a preliminary sketch of the development of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths from the time of Nag~rjuna to Ati~a nearly thousand years later. The fact that Hfnayfina and Mah~yfina sources anterior to N~gfirjuna (second century A.D.) occasionally distinguish between a relative (sam.v.rti, Pali sammuti) and an absolute (pararndrtha, Pail paramattha) truth (satya, P~li sacca) shows that he was not the first to introduce the theory of two truths (satyadvayavdda) into Buddhism. 2 But when we examine his own conception of satyadvaya on the basis of such unquestionably authentic works as Malamadhyamakakdrikd (MK), Sanyatdsaptati (SS), Vigrahavydvartanf (VV) and Yuktisast.ikd (YS.) it proves feasible to determine the extent of Nag~rjuna's own innovations. Thus, first of all, we t'md that N~igarjuna encounters a dilemma. On the one hand, like so many other Indian religious thinkers, he accepts an absolute reality (tattva) beyond the range of discursive thought (vikalpa). On the other, as a Buddhist - and especially as a Buddhist teacher (dcdrya) conscious of his responsibility for the education and welfare of his proselytes - he has to cope with the grand edifice of Buddhist dogma handed down and codified in Abhidharma. In the system of Sarvfistivada, which is the main target of
Journal oflndian Philosophy 9 (1981) 161-214. 0022-1791/81/0092-0161 $05.40. Copyright 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A
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N~g~rjuna's criticism, 3 the existence of a plurality of discrete (prthak, anya, para) things (bMva) or concepts (dharma) is admitted, each of which has its own mode of being (svabhdva). The antagonism between these two worlds an absolute one beyond plurality and a relative one of plurality - he attempts to solve, not by discarding one of them, but by seeking a principle of interpretation so as to reconcile them. This principle he found in the theory of two truth which he, accordingly, turned into the pivot of his exegesis of Buddhist dogma. Thus it became possible for him to accept the truth of all the fundamental Buddhist concepts (dharma) - in a relative sense - and, at the same time, as a religious thinker, not to succumb to any kind of relativity, or plurality - in an absolute sense. N~garjuna was, in other words, not an independent philosopher faced with certain ontological problems, but above all a Buddhist exegete believing in an absolute reality but at the same time obliged, so to speak, to save phenomena (o(o~etv r~ ~aw6#eva), viz. the traditional concepts of aggregates (skandha), sense-fields (ayatana), elements (dhdtu) etc. And this he achieves by conceiving them as nothing but relative, and pedagogically indispensable means to the accomplishment of an absolute end. If the dharmas, one by one, are submitted to a penetrating analysis (pra/ad) they turn out, in the end, to lack independent existence. Hence they are empty of "own-being", and merely dependently originated, like reflections. Thus they cannot "bind" anymore. Neither in his Catu.h~atakanor in his *Sataka did ~a~jadeva, Nagarjuna's most eminent disciple, deviate from his master's conception of the relationship between the two truths as one of means to an end. 4 Similarly the extant writings of *Hfigala, Buddhap~lita and Candrakfrti show these commentators to have remained faithful to the tenets of the founders of the Madhyamaka school, s However, in the course of time the conception of two truths tended to take an epistemological and ontological turn which inevitably faced the old "pedagogical" coneption with some unexpected problems. - A very early piece of evidence to this effect has found its way into the Mahdvibhd.sd where objections are raised whether the relative (sam.vr.ti) exists in a relative sense (sam.vr.tita.h), or in an absolute sense (paramdrthata.h). Whatever the answer, only the absolute (pararndrtha) exists, and thus the theory of two truths is absurd. The M~idhyamika (?) attempts to retort to such an objection by claiming that the difference is one of view-points (vi~e.sapratyaya?),not one of substance (dravya) (cf. MK XXV, 9). 6
ATI~A'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS
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But as far as I can gather from the very imperfect state of our present knowledge, it was above all the objections advanced by some Yog~c~rins that challenged some Madhyamikas to response. Thus Dharmap~la inquired whether "relative" (samvrti) was to be understood as a mere synonym of "untrue" (asatyaparydya), for in that case there would not be two truths. 7 And, again, how is it possible that the same thing at one and the same time can be "true" (satya) as well as "untrue" (asatya)? s Sthiramati argued that it is impossible to maintain something relative without accepting an underlying substance.9 Other Yog~c~rins such as Dharmakfrti's pupil Devendrabuddhi also launched attacks at M~dhyamikas, above all Bhavya. ~ Similar objections are well-known from Kum~rilabha.t.ta's Slokavarttika (Nir~lambanavada, 5 - 1 0 ) to which the commentaries - Tdtparyat.ikd and Nydyaratndkara - pertinently quote N~ig~rjuna's MK XXIV, 8.1~ While Buddhap~lita and Candrakfrti would prefer to dismiss such controversies as symptomatic of obsession (grdha) and themselves retain a "non-committed attitude", 12 it was more than anyone else Bhavya who took up the challenge and developed some original ideas in order to obviate the opponents on their own premises. Thus, according to Bhavya's Madhyarnakdrthasam.graha, the absolute (paramdrtha) is, from one point of view (dkdra), not to be converted (aparydya) into concepts or words (prapaaca), from another however, it may, for the purpose of vindicating one's thesis in debate, be conveyed in words. When thus formulated it serves a double purpose, for it may either serve as a logical principle (hetunaya?) which proves, in four different ways, 13 emptiness, or it may serve as the "raison d'etre" for relativity, i.e. the fact that all things (bhdva) are nothing but appearances (dloka). ~4 In this way Bhavya avails himself of inference (anumdna) to prove, or at least to indicate, the absolute (paramdrtha) by qualifying all his assertions (prat~7ad) with the term "in an absolute sense" (paramdrthata.h). But to realize it one must resort to meditation (bhdvand). when we learn that Dharmapala queried the meaning of the term "paramdrthata.h" in a world of relativity, this must imply that Bhavya's attempt to vindicate the Madhyamaka theory of two truths by introducing an absolute with a double aspect met with opposition. ~5 In Bhavya's own extant works there is, if I am not wrong, no reply to this objection, but after the death of Bhavya (c. 570) the task of defending his views fell upon Jfi~nagarbha and ~rfgupta. 16 S~ntarak.sita and Kamala~fla also belong to this line of Madhyamikas who attempt to demonstrate
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ganyatd by utilizing the logical instruments inherited from Dignhga and

Dharmakfrti. Towards the end of this long development, which it is for future research to trace in details, we fred Prajfiakaramati's commentary (paajikd) to Sfintadeva's 17 Bodhi[sattva] carydvatdra IX, 2. Here we not only have the most comprehensive account of the satyadvaya-problem extant in Sanskrit but also by far the best of the commentaries ad locum at our disposal. Finally Ati~a's (980-1056) Satyadvaydvatdra (SDA) marks the end of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths. Nearly every line bears evidence of his indebtedness to the works of his forerunners. Here, as in his magnum opus, Bodhipathapradfpa (with the very informative Bodhirndrgadfpapafijikd, which was, incidentally, written later than the SDA 18), he appears not as an original thinker, but as a faithful and noble transmitter. He accomplishes his task in such an acceptable manner that this small treatise from the hand of a great personality surely deserves more attention than it has hitherto received stocked away in Tibetan blockprints. But before I turn to SDA itself, I shall review some of the most important sources upon which it proves to be dependent.
II In the sequel I have selected and translated those passages in the authentic works of N~g~rjuna which best serve to sh'ow his conception of the two truths. All the extracts are accompanied by one of the ancient extant commentaries. They are indispensable for an exact interpretation of N~g~rjuna's k~rik~is, and while each of them displays its own particular style there is, however, no reason to suspect any of them of being unfaithful to the meaning of N~garjuna.
1. AkutobhaydadMalamadhyamakakdrikd XXIV, 8 - 1 0 (TP, No. 5229, Tsa fol. 102b 2-103a I). Identical with Buddhapfilita's vr.tti (TP, No. 5242, Tsafol. 305a 8-305b 7). 19
[8.1
The Buddhas' teaching of the Dharma Presupposes the two truths, viz. The relative truth of the world And the absolute truth.
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS [9.] Those who do not know the difference Between these two truths Do not know the profound reality (tattva) In the doctrine of the Buddhas.
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The doctrine of the Dharma of the blessed Buddhas is dependent upon (dgritya) these two truths. "The relative worldly truth" (laukikasam.vrtisatya) is the experience of the origination of all phenomena (sarvadharmotpddadargana) since one has not understood the worldly illusion (laukikaviparyaya) which is based on phenomena (dharma) that are [absolutely speaking] empty of own-being (svabhdvaganya). Since this is that of the two truths which is relative, it is "the relative truth" (sam.vr.tisatya). "The absolute truth" (paramdrthasatya) is the vision of the unorigination of all phenomena (sarvadharmdnutpddadargana) which is due to the unperverted understanding (aviparftdvagama) of saints (drya). Since it is the absolute among the two truths it is "the absolute truth" (paramdrthasatya). Those who do not know (na vijdnann') the difference (vibhdga) between these two -sam. vr.tisatya and paramdrthasatya - do not know the profound (gambhfra) reality (tattva) in the doctrine (gdsana) of the Buddhas. Here one may think as follows: What is the purpose of a second truth, the common truth (vyavahdrasatya), 2 if the meaning one wants to express (vivaksitdrtha), the unorigination of all phenomena (sarvadharmdnutpdda), is in fact the absolute truth (paramdrthasatya)? To this the reply is [10.] Independently of the common truth The absolute truth cannot be taught. Without the absolute truth Nirv~u3.a cannot be obtained.
Since the absolute truth cannot be taught (na de~yate) without the common truth (vyavaha-rasatya), and since Nirv~. a cannot be obtained (nddhigamyate) independently of the absolute truth therefore it serves a purpose to have a concept of two truths (satyadvayaprajaaptiprayo]ana).
Z Sanyatdsaptativr. ttT"ad Sanyatdsaptatikdrikd 1 & 6 9 - 7 3 (TP, No. 5231, Tsafol. 126a 2 - 1 2 6 a 7 & 137b 6 - 1 3 8 a 6). 21
166 [1.]
CHR. LINDTNER The Buddha has spoken of duration, birth and Destruction, being and non-being, vile, good And excellent - due to the usage of the World, But not because (these phenomena) are real!
Duration (sthiti), origination (utp&/a), destruction (bhanga), being (sat), non-being (asat), vile (h~na), good (sama) or excellent (vigi.s.ta)- all these [phenomena] the Buddhas have spoken of due to the usage of the world (lokavyavahdravagdt), but [they have never maintained that they exist] by virtue of reality (tattvavaidt). [69.]
Paramdrtha is simply the fact [of emptiness].

None the less the blessed Buddhas Have conceived the manifold world Relying on the usage of the world.
(citram. sarvam)
In the absolute sense (paramdrthata.h) all dependently arisen things (pratftyotpannabMva) are empty of own-being (svabhfvaganya). [The absolute] is simply that! But based on the worldly usage (laukikavyavahdra) the blessed Buddhas have conceptualized (prajadpita) all the various things without exception just as they actually are.
[70.1
The common teaching is not discarded But there is no real teaching of the Dharma. Since fools do not understand the Buddha's word They fear the absolute, not understanding the method. 22
The common teaching (laukikadharmadeiand) is not discarded but there is never a teaching (dharmadegand) in the absolute sense (tattvata.h). Thus fools ignorant of relativity (dgraydrtha) do not understand Buddha's statements and they lack understanding of the method (sciclhana) [and, consequently] become afraid of the [absolute] which is markless (animitta). [71.] The common method that This arises dependent upon that, is not discarded. The relative lacks own-being. The correct ascertainment is: How can it exist!
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The common method (laukikasddhana) that "this arises dependent upon that",23 is not discarded. That which is born dependently does not exist by virtue of own-being (svabhdvatah.) so the truth about it is: How can that which is unreal (asat) be [considered] real (sat)!
[72.]
One who with faith strives for the real Without depending upon a [dogmatic] teaching Pursuing this method systematically He abandons being and non-being and is appeased. 24
One who has faith (graddha) and strives for the real (tattva) without relying on any [dogmatic] teaching (dharmadegand) but pursues this method (sddhana) systematically (yuktyd) will abandon being (bhdva) and non-being (abhdva) and become appeased (giva). [73.] By knowing empirical relativity (idampratyayatd) Fictions, a net of bad do,has (kudr.st.ijdlakalpand) Perish, and one unsullied enters nirvana Desire, delusion and hatred having been abandoned. (TP, No. 5225,
3. Yukti.sa.s.tikdkdrikd30-35
extract from Candrakirti's 23b 1). 2s
Tsafol. 23b 8 - 2 4 a 4) with an Yuktisast.ikdvr.tti (TP, No. 5265, Yafol. 23a 2 -
[30.1
In the beginning a teacher should tell The seeker of the real that everything exists. Later, when he has understood the meaning, and Is dispassionate, he becomes detached. 26
When people whose minds (buddhi) are not pure first are confronted with the theory of emptiness (gfmyatdd.~t.i) they become very confused. Therefore the saints (drya) do not teach emptiness [to their pupils] in the very beginning. 27 To a seeker of the real (tattvagavesin) they should in the beginning say that everything exists (sarvam astfti) in order to captivate his interest by approving the ideas (is.tdrtha) of those materialists who are fond of analysing the nature of things (bhdvasvabhdvaprabheda). In other words: "The nature of this is precisely that"; "this definiendum (vivak.sitdrtha)
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which is connected with a general sense (sdmdnyabhdvasam. bandhin) must be related to this [specific meaning] "; "the specific nature of a thing (bh~a) refers to its mode of being (bhdva), only that, i.e. its svarapa, svabhdva, tathatd or ananyatva. "The seeker of the real" means that [the pupil] has a character devoted to the pursuit of the real (tattva). - What should a benign teacher say to a pupil who desires to experience the real? - he should say that everything exists (sarvam astfti). [As the Buddha] has explained: "Brahmin! The expression "everything, everything" (sarvam sarvam) refers to the five skandhas, the twelve dyatanas and the eighteen dhdtus." 2s _ Using his [pedagogical] understanding [the teacher] should say to him that this and that - the skandhas, etc. - exist. But the skandhas etc., are also derived (upada-ya) [from the four great elements]. The existence of this or that is relative just like long and short (dirghahrasvavat) or the light of a lamp (pradfpa). It is nothing independently of that, so it is simply dependent (updddya), or relative (dgr/tya). [31.1 Those who try merely to learn Without understanding the meaning of discernment (viveka) And who do not perform good karma (punya) Such inferior people are doomed! 29 [The Buddhas] have said that karma has a fruit And that the [six] stages of rebirth (gat/) exist, But also taught the full understanding (pari/hdna) And non-originaton (anutpdda) of their nature.a Just as the Buddhas have spoken Of ' T ' and of "mine" due to necessity (kdryavaMt) Thus they have also spoken of aggregates, Elements and sense-fields due to necessity, al The great elements etc. taught [by the Buddha] Can actually be reduced to consciousness: By knowing these [concepts to be empty] they vanish So, surely, they turn out to be falsely imagined! 32 When the Buddhas have declared That only nirv~, a is true Which wise man does not understand That all other [phenomena] are false! aa
[32.1
[33.]
[34.]
[35.1
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4. Madhyamakaratnapradfpa I (My critical edition, in preparation. Corresponds to TP, No. 5254, Tshafol. 326a 7-330a 2 ) ) 4
[1 .] Rendering homage to the Three Jewels (ratnatraya) That are purged of the f'dth of evil (do.samala) And the foundation of boundless virtues (gu.na) I intend to write about the Two Truths (satyadvaya)
1. Here I propose to set forth a jewel lamp (ratnapradfpa) that dispels all dogmatic obscuration (d.~.t.itirnira) in order to save those creatures in the five destinies (pa~cagatisattva) who are agitated by the currents of suffering (duh.khaugha) and wrecked by the waves of passions (klega) and discursive thinking (vikalpa). Here in the Arya-Dharmadhdtupral~.tyasam. bhedanirdegasatra it is stated: "My dear Mafiju~rf! When the absolute (dharmadhdtu) is taken as authority (pramd.na) there is neither relative truth (sam.vr.tisatya) nor absolute truth
(paramdrthasatya)."
2. We must, however, distinguish between two truths in view of the fact that the ignoramus with a confined outlook (arvdgdargana) has the eye of his intellect (buddhicaksu.h) obscured by the cataract of ignorance (avidydpa.tala); with the mighty belief in an ego (mahdhamkdra) dwelling in his heart he adheres to concrete phenomena (bhava) from time without beginning. In fact logicians (tdrkika) who give priority to inference (anumdna) as a pramd.na cannot by analysis (vitarka) and deliberation (vicdra) come to know the utterly transcendent reality (atiparoksatattva), the Buddha body (buddhakdya) or gnosis ffadna), since [inference only provides] a knowledge of confined outlook (arvdgdargana). [2.1 The sun is not accessible to blind people, Heaven is not accessible to wicked people, The real, and the ideal to be realized Is not accessible to logicians (tdrkika)) s How can one take blindness for authority When examining a precious jewel!
3. Here at first an account of [the two kinds of] relative truth. -
170 [3.]
CHR. LINDTNER The relative truth which is merely appearance Is such things as capillary flicker (kegond.uka), A ball of cotton (talapicu), a double moon (dvicandra) The [reflection of] the moon in the water (udakacandra), A village of the Gandharvas, a dream (svapna), An illusion (mdyd), a mirage (mar~cO, a phantom (nirmd.na), An echo (pratigrutkd), a reflection [in a] mirror (ddargabimba) Shadows, foam, rainbows and lightning, a6 The [genuine I relative truth of the confined outlook Is, however, like the pith of a plantain (kadalfskandha): When you do not examine it, it affords pleasure, And it is causally produced and efficient.
[4.1
The knowledge (jadna) of those with a confined outlook as well as its objects (jaeya) are as delusive (mrs.d) as capillary flicker (ke~on.duka), i.e. a state of dreaming in a slumber of ignorance from time without beginning
(anddikdlikdvidydsvapna).
But in [addition to] this delusive, or false (abhata) [relative truth] former masters (parvacarya) have exposed a genuine relative truth (tathyasam. vr.tisatya). 37 Thus our Madhyamaka school maintains [ - but only from the absolute point of view - ] that all exterior and interior phenomena (bdhyddhydtrnikadharma) are delusive, artificial, illusory (m~dk.rtimamdydvat) and like a dream (svapnavat), but they exist in a relative sense (sam.vrtito 'pi). The Master N~g~rjuna has declared " I f that which is perceived by the senses Were associated with any reality Fools would know the absolute So what would be the value of the absolute truth!" 38 - thus stating exterior things (bhdva) to be utterly delusive. But what about interior phenomena? - The Lord has said "Eyes, ears and nose are not authorities, Nor are tongue, body and mind authorities. If these [six] senses provided a valid norm To whom would then the path of the noble be of any use?" 39
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS The Master N~g~rjuna has also said "As to the senses You have stated That they are blunt, Unreliable and unprecise They afford erroneous knowledge. ''4 So since the senses (indriya) as well as their objects (vi.saya) are unsubstantial (adravya) cognition (j~dna) must also be unsubstantial. In other words, cognition (jaana) based on unsubstantial senses and objects does not exist substantially (dravyato 'siddha). But when their basis (adhikara.na) is unsubstantial, mind (citta) and mental phenomena (caitta) must also be unsubstantial since they are conglomerates. [5.] From imaginary causes and conditions Arises an effect which is only imaginary. If [you] fail to find the production of such Delusive and unsubstantial causes and effects logical, Who then creates the moon reflected in the water etc.? As long as there are delusive causes and conditions So long illusions arise, durate and disappear! 4~
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According to the Master [Nhg~rjuna] "Here [in reality] nothing definite arises And nothing is destructed. What arises and disappears Is only purely imagined conditions." The Master Candrakfrti adds "Whatever appears to creatures Who slumber in ignorance -Is maintained to be delusive like a dream." Herewith it has been established [according to the scriptures] that exterior and interior phenomena are delusive (m.r.sd).
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4. What about the absolute truth (paramdrthasatya)? - Again, in the words of the Master, in his Mft lamadhyamaka "I render homage to the best among preachers, The fully enlightened, for he has shown that Dependent coorigination is bliss And extinction of plurification (prapafica): It is without cessation, without generation, Without destruction, without permanence, Without unity, without plurality, Without moving to, without moving fro. ''42 Now we shall explain the meaning (artha) of the two truths. According to the Lord: .... Relative" means unabiding (asthira) and fickle (cala). Its truth is like [that of] the moon in water. "The absolute truth" refers to the eighteen kinds of emptiness." 43 The purport (abhiprdya) of this is as follows: "Relative" indicates things (bhdva) just as they appear (yathabhasam), for instance form, etc. (rapFnti). It is only a truth (satya) in as much as it constitutes an authority (pramd.na) from the viewpoint of people with a confined outlook and also because it is reliable (aviparita) for life in the world (lokavyavahdra). [In the word "paramdrtha"] "meaning" (artha) denotes the object of inquiry (vikalpaniya) and the object of comprehension (avagantavya). "Ultimate" (parama) indicates that it is supreme (uttama). It is meaning and ultimate, i.e. the ultimate meaning [or, in one word, absolute]. Or, again, the absolute is paramdrtha as it is the object (artha) of the supreme cognition (parama/adna). "Truth" (satya) means "reliable" (avisam.vddin). 44 [6.] In order to guide beginners To the absolute I shall show a method Comparable to the stairs of a ladder Which leads to perfect Buddhahood. 4s Without understanding of the relative truth The ultimate truth cannot be known. Only when the relative truth has been known We shall enter the absolute truth. 46
[7.]
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[8.]
[9.]
What then is the relative truth like? It is all the things that may be known (]~eyadharma) By their common and specific marks (svasdtrufnyalak.san. a). Such knowledge (j~dna) is the relative truth. When the relative just as it appears Is logically analysed nothing is attained (prdp-) The fact that nothing is attained is the absolute! Therefore the relative must [first] be understood. 47
(sam.vr.tidharrna) and understanding dharma) cannot be understood. ''4a
The Lord has also declared: "Without presupposing the relative norm it, the absolute principle (paramdrthaThe Master Candrakfrti has stated: "The relative truth functions as the means The absolute truth functions as the goal. If someone under the sway of wrong notions Fails to distinguish the two he is bound for damnation. ''49 If one scoms the relative [truth] And adheres to the theory of emptiness (ganyatadr.s..ti) Such an incurable (acikitsya) dogmatist is like A morbid patient given up by his doctor, s
[10.1
5. Here our opponents object: (i) It is inconsistent (bddha) on your part to admit of such concepts as the skandhas etc. (skandtufdidharma), and then [at the same time] to negate the existence of the very same! (ii) Likewise there is no other pramdna more fundamental (adhika) than experience due to sense-perception (indriyapratyak.sadar~ana), i.e. that activity which ascertains its specific object, sl So when you deny that objects (vi.saya) exist in the way you yourself experience (anubha.) them and common people (laukika) also directly (sdk.~t) experience them, you are also in conflict with direct perception (pratyak.sabddha). (iii) Likewise you are in conflict with opinio communis (prasiddha) in as much as you refute all commonly accepted concepts (prasiddhadharma) among men - things such as density, moistness, heat and motion, generally accepted among people from savages (gabara) to cowherds (gopala).
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(iv) And again, your opinion that nothing exists groups you among Nihilists (ucchedavddin) - so you are neither a Mah~yinist nor a disciple of the Buddha. s2 6. Reply [to these four objections] : (i) There is no conflict (b&lha) with us M~idhyamikas in admitting [that the skandhas etc. exist relatively], because our thesis (prat77ad) [that they do not exist] is qualified with the expression "in an absolute sense"
(param#thatah. ).
[11.] All the Buddhist concepts (ime dharmd.h), form etc. Are only experienced on the level of a fool's mind. Since we do not deny these [things relatively] The said mistake (do.sa) is not found with us. s3
We have [generally speaking] not committed any of these mistakes since not a tingle thing can withstand examination in front of (pura.h) an analysis of the ultimate meaning (paramdrthapral~d). (ii) Now I shall retort in detail: (a) Knowledge qaana) and its objects (jaeya) have [again and again] been demonstrated to be unoriginated (anutpanna), and (b) The complex of formative forces (samsk~asgmagr 0 lacks the energy (ces.td) [necessary for producing anything], and (c) The senses are blunt (mad.ha) and (d) Ideas (buddhi) are relative (sdm.vr.ta) as they are derived from the totality [of sense-impressions] since each of them is incapable of apprehending the object [as a "whole"]. Due to [these four reasons] anything we perceive is - even if it leaves an impression (Mdha!) upon us - indeterminable (avydk.rta) as an independent objective fact presented to perception (pratyak.sabuddhivisayarapa), and it is [consequently] unsubstantial (avastuka). [Reason: ] Because it is composed (sam.skTta). [Example :] Like the idea of a self (titmabuddhivat). s4 Besides, the eight particles (dravya) composing [an atom as maintained by the Vaibh~s.ikas] and the ideas (buddh 0 based thereupon are, since they lack substance, unreal like the idea of an army or forest [beyond their constituent "parts"] .ss So since perception (pratyak.sa) does not exist [in an absolute sense] we cannot be in conflict (bddha) with it. (iii) Nor are we in conflict with opinio communis (prasiddhabddha). An
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example: A pair of clear and sharp eyes may inspect a precious jewel but impaired by blindness or obscuration (timira) they fail to identify and determine it. Likewise, intelligent men who apply the ophthalmic remedy, viz. vision of emptiness (ganyatddr..s.~),gain an unobstructed vision, a pure and clear cognition (viguddhavimalajadna), without entering into conflict with the usages of the unintelligent, who in questions of correct experience (anubhavanayena) are chronically (atra) stultified by the membrane of ignorance (avidydpat.ala),and, since they are incapable of envisaging reality (tattva), akin to obscurants (taimirika). Their intellectual vision (buddhicaksu.h) is covered and disturbed by spots (ma/a) projected by the unreal relative understanding (abhatasamvr.tipratipatti) of the manifold phenomena of the universe (traidhdtukabhgva). (iv) Likewise the M~dhyamikas are not Nihilists (ucchedavddin). In fact Nihilists asperse the existence of a future life (paraloka) when they express themselves in such terms as "Fair maid, let's have a dinner well-prepared. It is like the tracks of a wolf when we are dead." s6 But M~dhyamikas will not accept this, for as ,~ryadeva says "Even if he doubts about a future life (paraloka) A wise man avoids bad karma (papa). If there is none there is simply nought, If there is - get rid of Nihilism!" s7 Relative truth is much like these "garlands of glimmer" (dlokamdld). We are innocent of any heinous fault (do.samala) being convinced that relative truth is like an illusion. Again, there is no question of Nihilism since nothing exists before the non-discursive cognition (nirvikalpajadna), the nature of things (dharmatd), the grand self-originated knowledge of the enlightened mind (bodhicittamahasvayam,bhajadna), i.e. the understanding of the absolute truth
(paramdrthasaty apra]~d) .
To afford an example: From an empirical standpoint (tatra) someone may ask whether space is broad or narrow, big or small, fragrant or stinking, sweet or sour, soft or rough. You may also inquire about the shape and colour of
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the horns of a hare, camel or horse, or about the smell of the nyagrodha-, udumbara-, or sky-flower, or about the taste of the is.fkd (?), ku~a, kaga or vidula, or about the lineage of a fairy - but poor fellow if you entertain such experiences! As far as we are concerned we neither experience, understand or reckon with such things. When stating so how can we [be accused of] harbouring nihilistic views (ndstikad.~.fl) or of confessing Nihilism
(ucchedavdda)!
[12.1 Not a single concept (dharma) of the Buddhas' Has been dismissed or advanced. The fact is that things are unproduced: Nothing is dismissed, nothing is affirmed.
And according to the Master [N~igArjuna] "Nothing should be subtracted from the real And nothing should be added to it: By seeing the real as real One is liberated by seeing truly." ss The MAdhyamikas are actually the foremost To quote -
(pradhana) among Buddhists.
"The Buddha always has an unproduced nature. All phenomena are similar to the Buddha. People with foolish minds believe in signs And live in a world of unreal phenomena." s9 And again "The absolute is the empty nature of everything. No subject is perceived, and attributes do not exist. One only speaks of causality to avoid clinging, But the absolute is ineffable and inexpressible." 60 And again -
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS "The entire existence is utterly empty: Empty of beginning, and empty of a final end, Empty of things born, durating or destructed. But to heretics emptiness is only partial." 61 And again "Everything has the mark of space But space has in fact no mark. Homage to You who are free from a basis And liberated from mark and marked! ''62
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Such and the like has been pronounced in numerous sfttras where you may accordingly look it up. The meaning will be explained in detail in the sequel. End of the Chapter on the Two Truths
5. Bodhicarydvatdrapa~jikd ad Bodhi[sattva] caryffvatdra IX, 2 (ed. Louis de

La Vall6e Poussin, p. 351, 13-367, 15). 63 1. And in order to show that one who examines according to logic and the scripture (dgama) gets an unperverted understanding of the basic reality [the author] announces the system of two truths -
[2.]
It is maintained that there are two truths: The relative and the absolute. The absolute is not within the range of understanding; Understanding (buddh 0 is said to be relative.
"Relative" (sa.mv.rt/) is that which envelops or covers the full ascertainment (par/jt~dna) of the real as it is by covering own.being and by showing [something] untrue (dnr.ta). Ignorance, delusion and error are its synonyms for ignorance (avidyd) presents itself imputing own.being to unreal things (asatpaddrtha) and covering one's vision of the proper nature (svabhdva). As stated in the,4rya~dlistambasatra: "Furthermore, not to understand the real (tattva), or to misunderstand it is lack of knowledge, i.e. ignorance." 64 It has also been said [in the Alokamala-] :
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CHR. LINDTNER "Ignorance shows a false (abhata) thing And persists enveloping the real. From the moment it arises It is like an attack of jaundice. ''6s
A dependently arisen concrete object shown by this [ignorance] is called "relative". It is called the truth of worldly relativity (lokasamvrtisatya) because it is a truth due to the relativity of the world only. - As is said [in the Madhyamakdvatdra VI, 28] "Relativity is delusion for it covers the proper nature; It causes an artificial truth to appear. The Buddha called this the truth of relativity And a created object is relative." 66 From the view-point of the world only (lokata eva) this relativity (samvrti) is twofold, viz. the genuine (tathya) relativity and the false (mithyd) relativity.67 Thus any dependently born object, such as blue, perceived with unimpaired senses is true but from the point of view of the world only. But something perceived with impaired senses and born dependently, such as illusions, mirages, reflections etc., and [second] something imagined variously in heretical systems (siddhdnta) is false from the point of view of the world only. - It has been stated [in the Madhyamakdvatdra VI, 25] "An object (grdhya) understood by the world Without impairment of any of the six senses Is truth from the view-point of the world only. The rest Is imagined and false from the view-point of the world only." But both these [kinds of relativity, the genuine and the false] are false (mr.~) in the eyes of saints (dr) a) who see correctly for on the absolute level the relative truth proves to be delusive. This we shall demonstrate logically in just a moment. Therefore the real truth is not obvious to ignorant beings. (p. 354, 2) "The absolute" (paramdrtha)is the ultimate (parama) or supreme (uttama) meaning (artha). It is the unfeigned reality by the understanding of which all the residues (vdsand) [due to the two kinds of] obstruction (dv.rti) and the
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related passions (anusam.dhikle~a) are abandoned. Its synonyms are: unsubstantiality of all phenomena, i.e. emptiness, suchness, reality limit or dharma element. Actually the absolute nature of all conditionally originated things is unsubstantiality because the relative ["thing"] as it appears is logically unfounded. 2. Now, first of all, a thing does not possess real own-being (satsvabhdva) 6a with such a nature as it is usually experienced because it does not abide later on whereas own-being must always [by definition] have a nature which cannot be changed because it is ]inherently] not adventitious. Surely the nature of something can never change! Otherwise it would simply lack substantial nature since it would imply that it lost its nature. Nor does a [thing] in the process of origination come from anywhere with real own-being, nor is it stocked somewhere when it ceases. On the contrary, it arises dependently on a totality of causes and conditions, like an illusion, and it ceases when they are deficient. How can a ["thing"] which is born dependently on a totality of causes and conditions and attains its identity thanks to something else, like a reflection, have real own-being! (p. 354, 17) However, in the absolute sense nothing whatsoever can possibly arise from a totality of causes and conditions because this ]totality] must also be unsubstantial as it attains its identity dependent on another [totality] which, again, must be created from yet another totality ]etc. in infinitum]. Thus it must be recognized that each of the other previous ]totalities] is unsubstantial as it must be born from its own specific totality of causes. How then can one who maintains that an effect is related (anurapa) to a cause concede that a real entity (satsvabhftva) arises from [something] unsubstantial? - As [the author] will say [IX, 144-145] "That which is created by magic And that which is created by causes Where does it come from, where does it go? Please consider that!" "That which is experienced in relation To something else, but not without it How can that be true since it is Feigned (kT.tima ) like a reflection!"
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It has also been stated [in the Anavataptahraddpasam. krama.nasatra] "A thing born of causes is unborn, Its origination has no own-being. That which depends on conditions is said to be empty. One who knows emptiness is attentive (apramatta)." ~9 Thus [the Pratftyasamutpddah.rdayakdrikd 4cd says] "Empty things Arise from utterly empty things." 7o 3. Again, it is not very reasonable that a thing is born related to a cause in the form of itself, something else, both or without relation to a cause. If things in fact possessed a specific mode of being (dtmasvar@a) due to their own creation it could, hypothetically, either be created or uncreated. But, first of all, a [thing] which is already created cannot, qua already existing (sata.h) be the cause of itself for being already created entirely by itself in which ["part"] should it be active again? [It cannot, in fact, be active in any part] because that ["part"] of it which still remains to be created cannot, qua uncreated, possess the [same] own-being as the other [part which is already created]. Moreover (ca) [it cannot have such a part] for as a unity (eka) it is partless. Besides it is not logical that the other ["part" retains] its [original] form of own-being when, later on, it is about to be created, for when it is created that which was [previously] uncreated loses that form of own-being. Therefore nothing at all can arise through its own creation. Besides, on the assumption of self-origination nothing can have a nature (svarupa) which is already created because it would imply the absurdity (do.saprasahgdt) than [things to be created] would be mutually dependent [and thus the process of creation could never start]. Nor could that thing which is not yet created obtain status of cause as soon as it created itself [because] it is incapable of anything, like a sky-flower. Otherwise it would imply that even the horns of an ass could give birth to their specific nature. (p. 356, 9) Nor is the [second] hypothesis that [something arises] from something else [valid], for it would also imply that darkness arose from the sun, or simply anything from anything, because there would be no specific difference
-
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(paratvdvigesdt) between the assumed active and non-active [cause] in relation to the effect in question. It will, moreover, be impossible in concreto to conceive the [relative] law of strict continuity (ekaikasamtati) between
[the effect] to be produced and [the cause] which produces it as long as the effect is not yet originated. Nor can one really speak about effects etc., with regard to phenomena which, as yet, belong to the future because an analysis will have to be in reference to the present existence (sadbhdva) of the nature of an object. Nor can [for instance] a seed be conceived as different in relation to the sprout which exists ["potentially"] in the seed-stage since the existence of the effect will then be excluded by the cause. - When the present empirical form of a thing cannot sustain a critical analysis there is no need to consider the possibility of something in the future etc. (p. 356, 18) Nor is the [third] hypothesis that [something arises] from both [valid], because it would imply the absurdities stated when speaking of each of the [two previous] hypotheses. Also because, in the ultimate sense (paramdrthatah.) a cause cannot [be admitted to] have both natures as long as the effect has not yet arisen. But even when it had arisen there would not be [any effect] to be created any more, so how could a cause having both natures be active [and thus correspond to its name] ? 71 Nor is it [a valid] hypothesis that [something arises] without a cause because it is not logical that a concrete thing (ayam) is uncaused in the sense that one denies that it has any affirmative implication (prasajyapratisedha), for, surely, if causality is denied (ahetukatve) it would imply that things were not limited by place and time, or, in other words, it would imply that they always exist or never exist. And, if so, those who strive for a goal (upeya) would have no certain means to rely upon. [Nor can one speak of other "causes"] because we shall deny that pradhdna, fgvara etc. can be causes. 72 Therefore things do not attain their nature uncaused. (p. 357, 10) Consequently, things do not arise with real own-being (satsvarapa) from themselves, something else, both or without a cause. - It has, accordingly, been stated [in the MOlamadhyamakakdrikd I, 1 ] -
"Never is anything found to arise Anywhere, either from itself, From something else, from both Or without a cause."
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4. Again, all things lack real nature (satsvabhdvatva) for by analysing whether they are "one" or "many" they [prove to] lack [such a] nature. Therefore we readily concede (astu) that empirical relativity as such (idampratyayata') is acceptable as long as it is not analysed [further], but why on earth cling to being (bh~a), the cause of all suffering! 7a So the point of the matter is that "Those things advocated by us or others Are, in reality, without own-being, Because they lack the nature of "one" or "many", Like a reflection." 74 Thus the inherent absolute nature of all things is simply lack of own-being (nih.svabhdvatd). This is precisely the most important aim of man (purusdrtha), it is said to be the absolute, i.e. the supreme goal. (p. 358, 5) 5. One must however not even cling to this for otherwise [i.e. if one did so] there would be no difference between clinging to being (bhdva) and clinging to emptiness because both of them are relative (sdmvrta) being inherently conceptual constructions (kalpand). Again, non-being (abhdva) does not have any proper nature because its real nature is imaginary (kalpita). Nor can non-being be taken as the negation of being because negation is devoid of own-being. But if being actually possessed some kind of own-being then non-being would, in fact, be the negation of that, but it has been definitely proved that being does not possess any own-being - therefore there is no non-being to be defined as the negation of being. And now that the existence of being and non-being has been established in the said manner a thing consisting of both is not possible, nor is a thing essentially negating both [being and non-being possible]. Since the conceptual construction of "being" is the foundation of all conceptual constructions all these [empirical] things are dispelled with one single blow when this is rejected. Consequently nothing should be thought of as the object of clinging, "neither being, non-being, being-non-being or that which has the nature of neither".Ts _ In the ,4rya-Prajadpdramitd it has been stated: "SubhOti said: Here, venerable S~radvatfputra, a bodhisattva-follower - a son or daughter of good family - but lacking skill in means understands that form is empty, so there is attachment. He understands that feeling is empty, but there is attachment.
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He understands that ideas are empty, but there is attachment. He understands that karmic formations are empty, but there is attachment. He understands that consciousness is empty, but there is attachment. Likewise he understands that eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind and, fmaUy, that emptiness of all phenomena is empty, but there is attachment" - to quote in extenso. - It has also been said [in the Loka-fftastava 23] "The ambrosial instruction in emptiness Serves to dispel all ideas. But You have said that one who Clings to it is utterly afflicted!" "M~dhyamikas acknowledge a reality (tattva) Devoid of the four extremes [for it is] Not being, not non-being, not Being-non-being, nor is it neither." 76 Thus we consider the whole world to be devoid of the four extremes and originally extinct (ddigdnta), and since it is beyond conceptual elaboration (prapaaca) - as its nature is not born, not stopped, not exterminated, not permanent etc. - [we consider it to be] unattached and unposited, like space. 77 (p. 359, 14) 6. "It is maintained that there are two truths". - Which? - "The relative and the absolute" should be constructed in apposition [to "satya"] just as when one says "The creature [n.] is this woman of the priestly caste [f.]', or, "The vessel [n.] is this fist [f.] ". - The relative is, for one, a truth, i.e. not false. The absolute is the other truth. The word "and" connects them alike merely as truths. But there is de facto a difference: The relative truth is the true nature of the world whereas the absolute truth is the unimpeachable (avisamvddaka) truth, i.e. the reality of holy men (drya). Thus the word "and" [in IX, 2] is also used with the purpose of indicating a difference. The meaning is that all these internal and external things occur having a double nature, viz. a relative and an absolute. The former has empirical status (samddargitdtmasattdka) as the object of the false experience of those ordinary people who experience unreal things as the eye of their intellect is shrouded in the darkness of ignorance. The latter presents itself as the object of the correct experience of those holy men who know the real as their eye
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of true cognition has been relieved of the cataract of ignorance with the coUyrium-pencll of discrimination (p. 360, 14) All categories (paddrtha) have this double nature. Of these two natures it is the relative truth which is the object of fools who experience wrongly whereas the absolute truth is the object of those who experience correctly as they have understood reality. This is how it is according to those who know the gdstras. - As is said [in the Madhyamakdvatdra VI, 23] "All things carry a double form which occurs Due to a true or a false experience. Reality is the object of those who see truly but The relative truth is said to be that of those who see falsely." So the word "two" is used to combine both of the two. "It is maintained", i.e. it is the opinion, or conviction, of the blessed Buddhas whose minds have cast off the [two kinds of] obstruction, and also of the holy ~r~vakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas who follow their principles. So there are only two truths and no other truth. Thus the word "and" is also employed in a restrictive sense. - It has been said [in the Malamadhyamakakdrikd XXIV,
8]"The instruction by the Buddhas Is based upon two truths: The relative truth of the world And the truth in the absolute sense." In the Pitdputrasamdgama it is also said "These are the two truths to knowers of the world, They have seen it themselves, not heard it from others: It is the relative and the absolute. There is no third truth." But has the Lord not stated in the Abhidharma that there are four truths, viz. about suffering, its origination, cessation and the method to this? So why do you speak of two truths only? True[ It is actually due to the attitudes and propensities of those who
-
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are to be converted that these two have been spoken of as four. They are in fact included in these two. Thus the truth about suffering, its origination and the method to this are included in the relative truth because their nature is that of relativity whereas the truth about cessation is the [same as the] absolute truth, so there is no contradiction. 7a - That may be so but how can the relative be a truth (satya) when analysis disperses it into hundred pieces as it has the nature of imputing something untrue due to the fact that it is presented by ignorance? That is also true! It is, however, due to the attachment of the world that one speaks of a relative truth for it is only the world which accepts a relative truth here. In compliance with that the Lords who seek the unconditioned reality have likewise spoken of a relative truth. This is also why the reverend Master [N~ghrjuna] has stated the difference in the gdstra." The relative truth of the world a n d . . . '. But in reality there is only one truth, the absolute. Hence there is no flaw whatsoever. - As is said by the Lord: "Ye monks! The ultimate truth is one only, i.e. undelusive nirvg.na whereas all karmic formations are false and delusive." 79 (p. 363, 2)
-
7. It was said that there are two truths. It was made clear that the relative truth is that which has that nature to those whose minds are beset with ignorance but it has not been known what the absolute truth is like, what its nature is and what its definition is. So in order to define its nature [the author] said: "[The absolute] is not within the range of understanding". It "is not within the range", i.e. not an object, " o f understanding", i.e. of all kinds of knowledge, because [the absolute] transcends the object of any kind of knowledge. It can, in other words, in no way whatsoever be made an object of any kind of understanding, so how would it be possible to establish its proper nature? In fact the reality [behind] the absolute truth has a nature which is free from all prapaaca so by which conceptual constructions could one experience it since it is void of all epithets! so Again, an entity transcending conceptual constructions is also beyond the range of words. Words are, of course, due to discursive thought so they cannot reach [the absolute] which is beyond the range of those who harbour discursive thinking, s~ So how can one demonstrate the absolute truth which is unimputed, non-relative and unutterable because it is devoid of all the expressions of discursive thought. None the less, in order to favour a receptive
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CHR. LINDTNER
audience something may be expressed by providing examples on the relative level dependent upon thought-constructions. (p. 363, 17) For instance, due to cataract a taimirika a2 sees the entire horizon pervaded by capillary flicker even though he tosses his head to and fro. One who does not suffer from cataract understands that he does so and approaches him to ask what he is doing and though he FLxeshis eyes on the "hairs" perceived by him he does not see any sort of hair, nor does he imagine various entities or non-entities based on those hairs. When the tairnirika then expresses his opinion to the one who does not suffer from cataract by saying: "HereI see hairs", then, in order to remove his ideas, he tells him the truth: "There are no hairs." His statement is only intended to negate as far as that which the taimirika perceives is concerned, and even though he expresses himself thus he does not negate - or affirm - anything whatsoever. - One who suffers from cataract looks upon the hairs as real but one who does not suffer from cataract does not. Thus the nature o f the aggregates, elements, bases etc., which fools ignorant of reality perceive due to an attack of the cataract o f ignorance is their relative nature. The blessed Buddhas who have got rid of all traces of ignorance perceive the very same aggregates etc. with another nature, in the manner one who does not suffer from cataract sees the ["hairs"] perceived [by the taimirika]. That is their absolute truth. - As [Candrakfrti] learned in the scriptures says [in the Madhyamakdvatdra IV, 29] "Forms such as hair etc. imagined due to Cataract are definitely false. The way in which a man of clear vision sees That is reality - thus one must understand here." So even though the absolute is unutterable the absolute truth can be communicated to some extent through examples by relying upon the relative. But as its nature is devoid of all relative procedures (sdm.v.rtavyavahdra) it cannot really be spoken of. As is stated "How can one learn or'teach The principle beyond words? Still a thing beyond words may be Learnt and taught - but by imputation."
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Therefore it is only based on conventional truth that the absolute is taught. And by understanding the teaching about the absolute the absolute is attained because the former is a means to the latter. - As is stated in the [Madhyamaka-] gdstra (XXIV, 10) "The absolute cannot be taught Unless one relies upon convention. If the absolute is not understood Nirv~. a cannot be obtained." Thus the teaching about the absolute functions as a means while the attainment of the absolute is the goal. Otherwise it cannot be taught. -- But even if [the absolute truth] is like that why can the absolute not be the object of an understanding (buddhi) of similar kind? -- To this [the author] answers: "Understanding is said to be relative". Surely, all understanding has the nature of conceptual thought (vikalpa) as its "support" is not [really] a support (dlambananirdlambanatayd). Again, all conceptual thinking has the nature of ignorance since it grasps something which is not real. - As is said -"This conceptual thought has all by itself Taken the form of ignorance." 83 But relativity is ignorance so no understanding whatsoever is capable of grasping the absolute as absolute, otherwise it would lose its status as absolute by being apprehended by the relative understanding, for the absolute is in fact not the object of relative knowledge. (p. 366, 9) In this connection the Lord has also said this in the.4rya-SatyadvaySvatdra, to quote in extenso: "Surely, Devaputra, if the absolute truth could come within the range of the body, of speech or of mind in an absolute sense it could not be recognized as the absolute truth, it would only be the relative truth. However, Devaputra, having passed beyond all common usages (vyavahdra) the absolute truth is unqualified, it is not really originated, nor has it ceased, it cannot be spoken of, nor is it speech, it cannot be known, nor is it knowledge etc. The absolute truth has, in fine, passed beyond those entities that are objects of the knowledge of the Omniscient [Buddha] who has obtained the most excellent of all modes."
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Consequently the [absolute truth] cannot be the object of any kind of conceptual thinking (kalpand) for reality (tattva) is not susceptible to various distinctions such as marks of being, non-being, own-being, other-being, truth, untruth, permanence, destruction, eternal, non-eternal, pleasure, pain, pure, impure, self, non-self, empty, non-empty, and unity, difference, origination, cessation etc., for they possess a relative nature. (p. 367, 2) In the Pl"tdputrasamdgamathe Lord has stated as follows: "This much must at least be known: The relative and the absolute. The Lord has also clearly seen, understood and realized this as empty. Therefore he is called "Omniscient" In this connection the Tathigata has regarded the relative as the behaviour (pracdra)of the world, but the absolute is unutterable and unknowable. It cannot be cognized or understood, it cannot be shown or displayed.., it is not to be made, it does not m a k e . . , it is not profit, not loss, not pleasure, not pain, not glory, not disgrace, not beauty, not ugliness Thus the Lord whose spirit is illuminated by the light of a knowledge extending over a multitude of endless things, has said that the absolute truth which has cast off the limited distinctions of all relative entities is free from all limitations (upddhO. Due to its self-experienced nature it can only be experienced personally by holy men (drya). Therefore they are the only authorities (pramdna) in this question. The relative truth, however, has been announced based upon the common usage (vyavahdra)of the world. So, by thus distinguishing correctly the thorough ascertainment of the two truths leads to a genuine insight into phenomena, a4 (p. 367, 15) III Having ventured to outline the development of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths in India and to provide documentation by rendering the relevant passages from the authentic works of N~ig~irjuna as well as a representative selection of subsequent Madhyamaka sources we may now turn to Ati~a's Satyadvaydvatdra, or SDA. SDA is a brief text in 120 lines, or 28 verses, which summarizes all the fundamental issues of a long development eschewing elaborate arguments and discussions. The author himself acknowledges Nagarjuna, Candrakfrti, Bhavya and Dharmap~la (of Suvar.nadvfpa) as his authorities but some verses also prove
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his dependence - directly or indirectly - upon Dharmak~rti (17), Sfintadeva (23) and S~ntarak.sita (3), which is, o f course, hardly surprising as these authorities are frequently referred to in Ati~a's other works, above all in
his Bodhimdrgadfpapaafikd.
Taking the above translations - especially the extracts from Madhyamakaratnapradfpa and BodhicarydvatdrapatTfikd - and the notes to each of the verses of SDA into account it seems superfluous to offer more than a brief analysis of the argument o f this text: There are two truths (1), a relative which has two aspects, i.e. a false which, again, is twofold (2), and a genuine (3); the absolute is only one, or undifferentiated, and though one may for practical purposes discourse about it it is really "beyond" any kind of dualism ( 4 - 9 ) . True, Buddhists avail themselves of two pramd.nas but this is merely for eristic purposes, not in order to realize the absolute ( 1 0 - 1 3 ) . The absolute, or emptiness, can only be experienced by following the instructions of N~g~rjuna and by practising accordingly (bhdvand) ( 1 4 - 1 7 ) . Still the relative truths of Buddhist practice (i.e. vyavahdra) are not to be discarded for they serve as an indispensable means to achieve the absolute, or emptiness ( 1 7 - 2 0 ) , which is realized by "progressive nullification", so to speak, of the world of relativity ( 2 1 - 2 3 ) . - Conclusion and exhortation ( 2 4 - 2 8 ) . The present recension of the text of SDA is based on a collation on the following editions o f the Tanjur (bsTan 'gyur) published in Narthang (TN) and Peking (TP): N ... M... P... Q... TN, No. 3371, Gifol. 7a 1--8a 3. (Corresponds to TN, No. 3298, Hafol. 65a 3 - 6 6 a 1. (Corresponds to TP, No. 5380, Gifol. 6b 7 8 a 8. (Corresponds to TP, No. 5298, Hafol. 70a 5 - 7 1 b 2. (Corresponds to P) Q) N) M)
APPARATUS (a, b, c, d, e and f after a number refers to the number of the line in a verse): - 5a, gis NMP: gi Q. - 6a, ni NMQ: na P. - 6c, rtogs med NP: rtog med MQ. - 8b, rtog NMP: rtogs Q. - 10b, bzufi NP: gzufl MQ. 12d, g~al NP: 'jal MQ. - 15a, ~e na MQ: .~es nas NP. - 15b, tiff MQ: cifi NP. - 17a, gyi NMP: gyis Q. - 18b, dben NP: bden MQ. - 18f, ldan phuh NP: rnams 'phufi MQ. - 19d, gis NP: yin MQ. - 19e, nas NMP: pas Q. 25c, las NP: la MQ. - 26b, 'os NP: nus MQ. - 27c, blahs pa hid du bya'i NP: blafi bar bya ba yi MQ. - 28a, ru NP: bu M: ku Q.
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[2.1
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/ saris rgyas mares kyi chos bstan pa / / bden pa gfiis la yafi dag brten / / 'jig rten kun rdzob Men pa daft / / de b~Jn don dam bden pa'o / / kun rdzob mare pa g~is su 'dod / / log pa daft ni yafi dag go / / daft po gfiis te chu zla daft / / grub mtha' fian pa'i rtog pa'o / / ma brtags gcig pu fiams dga' ba'i / / skye ba daft ni 'jig pa'i chos / / don byed nus daft ldan pa ni / / yafi dag kun rdzob yin par 'dod / / dam pa'i don ni gcig fiid de / / g~an dag rnam pa gfiis su 'dod / / cir yari ma grub chos fiid de / / gfiis daft gsum sogs gala 'gyur / / bstan pa'i tshig gis sbyor ba yis / / skye med 'gag med sogs pas mtshon / / don dam tha dad med tshul gyis / / chos can med cifi chos fiid reed / / stori pa fiid la tha dad ni / / curl zad yod pa ma yin te / / rtogs med tshul gyis rtogs pasna / / stori fiid mthori ~.es tha sfiad gdags / / ma mthori ba fiid de mthori bar / / ~in tu zab pa'i mdo las gsuris / / de la mthori daft mthori byed med / / thog ma tha ma med ~i ba / / drios daft drios med rnam par spafis / / roam par rtog reed dmigs pa bral / / gnas pa meal pa gnas med pa / / 'gro 'off med tiff dpe daft bral / / brjod du med pa bltar med pa / / 'gyur ba med pa 'dus ma byas / / rnal 'byor pa yis de rtogs na /
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS / fion moils ~es bya'i sgrib pa spoil / / nation sum daft ni rjes su dpag / / saris rgyas pa yis de gfiis bzuil / / gfiis pos stoil fiid rtogs so ~.es / / tshu rol mthoil ba'i rmoils pa smra / / mu stegs fian thos rnams kyis kyafi / / chos fiid rtogs par thai bar 'gyur / / rnam rigs pas lta smos ci dgos / / dbu ma pa la mi mthun med / / des na grub mtha' thams cad kyail / / tshad mas 'jal phyir mthun par 'gyur / / rtog ge thams cad mi mthun pas / / tshad mas g~al ba'i chos fiid kyaff / / mail po ~id du mi 'gyur ram / / rnfion sum rjes dpag dgos pa reed / / mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i phyir / / mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin / / luil las kyafi ni gsal po ru / / rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi / / ~es pa gfiis kyis mi rtogs ~es / / slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsuil [ / stoil fiid gaff gis rtogs ~e na / [ de b~,in g~egs pas luil bstan tiff / / chos fiid bden pa gzigs pa yi / / klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin / / de las brgyud pa'i man flag gis / / chos fiid bden pa rtogs par 'gyur / / chos fiid phuil po brgyad khri daft / / bZi stoil gsuils pa thams cad ni / / chos fiid 'di la g~ol ~ifi 'bab / / stoil fiid rtogs pas grol 'gyur gyi / / sgom pa lhag ma de don yin / / yaff dag kun rdzob khyad bsad nas/ / stoil pa fiid la goms byed na / / kun rdzob rgyu 'bras dge sdig sogs / / 'jig rten pha rol bslus par 'gyur / / curl zad thos pa la brten te /
191
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CHR. LINDTNER / rnam par dben don mi ~es ~ifi [ / lift gaff bsod nams mi byed pa / / skyes bu tha ~al de dag brlag / [ storl pa rid la blta ties na / / ~es rab churl ldan phurl bar 'gyur / / slob dpon zla grags 'di skad du / / thabs su gyur pa kun rdzob bden pa daft [ / thabs las byurl ba don dam bden pa dag / / gtis po'i dbye ba gaff gis mi ~es pa / / de dag log par rtogs has rlan 'gror 'gro ] / tha stad la ni ma brten par / / dam pa'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur / [ yaff dag kun rdzob rnams kyi skas / / med par yaff dag khaff chen gyi / / sterl du 'gro bar byed pa ni / / mkhas la ruff ba ma yin no / / kun rdzob ji ltar snarl ba 'di / / rigs pas brtags na 'ga' mi r~ed / / ma r~ed pa rid don dam yin / / ye nas gnas pa'i chos rid do / / rgyu rkyen dag gis bskyed pasna / [ kun rdzob ji ltar snarl ba grub / [ gal te grub par mi ruff na / [ chu zla la sogs su yis bskyed [ / des na rgyu rkyen sna tshogs kyis / [ bskyed pas snail ba thams cad grub / / rkyen rnams rgyun ni chad gyur na / / kun rdzob tu yah mi 'byurl rio / / de ltar lta bas ma rmorls ~ifi / / spyod pa ~in tu dag gyur na / / gol ba'i lam du mi 'gro tiff / / 'og min gnas su 'gro bar 'gyur [ / tsh9 ni yun thufi ~es bya'i rnam pa marl / / tshe yi tshad kyaff ji tsam mi ~es pas / / haft pa chu las 'o ma len pa ltar / / raft gi 'dod pa daft la blaff bar gyis / / tshu rol mthorl ba'i rmorls pa dag gis ni /
[19.]
[20.]
[21 .]
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ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS / bden pa gfiis gtan la dbab par mi 'os kyaft / / bla ma rnams kyi gsuft la brten nas ni / / klu sgrub lugs kyi bden gfiis bkod pa 'di / / gser glift rgyal po'i ftor byas 'di la ni / / gal te deft salt skye bo dad gyur kyafi / / legs par brtags la blahs pa fiid du bya'i / / dad pa tsam daft gus pa tsam gyis min / / gser glifi rgyal po guru pha la yis / / dge sloft de ba ma ti btaft gyur nas/ / de yi ftor byas bden gfiis la 'jug 'di / / deft sail mkhas pa rnams kyis brtags par rigs /
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INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS
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The instruction (de,and) by the Buddhas is based upon two truths (dye satye): the relative truth of the world (lokasam. vr.tisatya) and the absolute truth (satyam. ca paramdrthata.h). The relative [truth] is maintained to be twofold: there is a false (mithyd) and a genuine (tathya) [relative truth]. The former is twofold: the moon in the water (udakacandra), and misconceptions (kukalpand) in the settled doctrines (siddhdnta). A phenomenon (dharma) which arises and is destroyed; which only satisfies when it is not analysed (avicdrarama.nfya),and is capable of efficiency (arthakriydsdmarthyavat) - is maintained to be the genuine relative truth (tathyasam.v.rti). The absolute (paramdrtha) is only one (eka eva). Others maintain it to be twofold. The absolute (dharmatd) cannot be proved to be anything specific (kdcid asiddhd), so how can it be "two" or "three" etc.! By applying (prayogena) explanatory terms [the absolute] is characterized by non-production (anutpdda), non-stopping (anirodha) etc. According to the undiversified principle (abhinnanaya) the absolute is neither subject (dharmin) nor predicate (dharma). Emptiness (~finyatd) does not possess the slightest difference (bheda) but by understanding in a non-understanding manner one may express the concept (prajfiapn') of "seeing emptiness".
194 [7.]
CHR. LINDTNER In the very profound sfitras it is stated that not to see [anything] is to see [the absolute]. Here [in the absolute] there is no seeing, no seer, no beginning (ddi), no end (anta) but only peace (Mnta). It is devoid of being and non-being (bhdvdbhdva), without conceptual constructions (nirvikalpa), without objective support (andrambana), without location, without duration, without going and coming (gatydgati) and without comparison (dar~ana). [It is also] inexpressible (avdcya) and invisible (adra.s.tavya), unchangeable (avikdra) and uncompounded (asam.skr.ta). When a yogi understands it he abandons the obstructions of defilement and cognizable (kle~ajaeydvara.na). Perception (pratyak.sa) and inference (anumdna) - these two [pramd.nas] are accepted by Buddhists (bauddha). Only narrowminded (arvdgdargin) fools claim that emptiness can be understood by [any one of] these two. [If it could] it would imply that even heretics (tfrthika) and disciples (grdvaka) understood the absolute (dharmatd)! Not to mention the [Buddhist] idealists! It is not [however] unlikely that the Madhyamika [understands the absolute]. Therefore all settled doctrines (siddhdnta) are alike because they measure [the absolute] by means ofpramdn.as. Since all speculations (tarka) differ the absolute which is measured by
[8.]
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[10.]
[ 11 .]
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pramd.nas . . .
[ 13.] Must it not also become manifold [and thus, of course, not absolute] ! Perception (pratyak.sa) and inference (anumdna) are useless. In order to refute heretical debaters (tfrthikavddin) learned [Buddhist logicians] have developed [a doctrine of two
pramd.nas] .
[ 14.] In tradition (tigama) it is also clearly stated by the learned teacher (dcdrya) Bhavya that [the absolute] cannot be understood either by a discursive (savikalpa) or a non-discursive (nirvikalpa) cognition qaana). But who has [actually] "understood" emptiness? - N~g~rjuna who was predicated (vydkrta) by Tath~gata, [and his] disciple (gis.ya) Candrakfrti who [also] saw the absolute truth (dharma-
[15.]
tasatya).
[16.] The absolute truth (dharmatdsatya) may be understood by means
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of the instructions (upade~a) hailing from him. The quantity of principles (dharmaskandha) is said to amount to 84,000. All of them are included in the absolute (dharmatd). One is liberated by understanding emptiness (ganyatd). All meditational development (bhdvand) is for this purpose. But if one discards the genuine relative truth (tathyasam.vrti) and meditates upon emptiness, the relative cause and effect (hetupha/a), good and bad (ku~alapdpa) etc., will deceive one in the next world (paraloka). People who, content with a bit of learning (gruta) do not know the meaning of discrimination (vivekdrtha) and do not perform merit (punya) - such mean (kha/a) persons (puru.sa) are doomed! If one sees emptiness badly it will ruin people of little wisdom. The teacher (dcdrya) Candrakfrti has stated as follows: "The relative truth functions as a means, and the absolute truth functions as the goal (upeya). Those who do not understand the difference between the two have a bad understanding and get a bad rebirth." The absolute cannot be understood independently of general [Buddhist] practice (vyavahdra). Without the ladder of genuine relativity a wise man cannot ascend to the top of the palace of reality ( tattva). If this relativity is logically analysed as it appears nothing is reached. To reach nothing is the absolute! It is the absolutely fixed reality (dharmatd). By being born by causes and conditions (hetupratyaya) the relative world (sam.vr.ti) is established as it appears. If it could not be established who can create the moon in the water etc.
(udakacandrddi)?
[23 .l Therefore the entire appearance is established by being created by various causes and conditions (hetupratyaya). However, if the continuum of conditions (pratyayasamtdna) is interrupted relativity will not arise again. So if one is not deluded by dogmas and one leads a very pure life one will go to the place (sthdna) of Akani.s.tha without following the wrong course. Time is short and things to be known (l~eya) are manifold. But
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CHR. LINDTNER since the span of time is [only] as long as ignorance (avidyd) one should select what oneself prefers (svamata), just like a goose extracts milk from the water. Though narrow-minded fools do not deserve a demonstration of the two truths (satyadvayanirnaya) still this [treatise] was written about the two truths of Nfigfirjuna's philosophy (mata) relying upon the statements (vdkya) of authoritative teachers
[26.]
(guru).
[27.] If people of today have faith in this [demonstration] composed under the auspices of the king of Sumatra (suvam. advfpard]a) it should be accepted after thorough analysis, not just by faith and not just out of reverence. Sages of today should examine this "Introduction to the Two Truths" which was made [by Ati[a], the monk (bhik.su) Devamati, when [he had] been granted [permission] by the kind of Sumatra, the guru [Dharma-] p~la, under his auspices!
[28.]
K~benhavns Universitet
NOTES 1. This often quoted verse in Mfflamadhyamakakdrikd XXIV, 8: dye satye samupd~ritya buddhdndm dharmade~and / lokasamvrtisatyam, ca satyam ca paramdrthatah. / ]. Cf. Ko~a VI, p. 139 (n. 5); Murti (1960), p. 243-255; May (1959), p. 255 (n. 773, with ref.). 2. The distinction between two kinds of samv.rt/was not, as sometimes maintained, introduced by Bhavya, cf. Imanishi (1975), p. 10 (n. 21). - The two kinds of mithydsamvrti axe savikalpa and nirvikalpa, cf. Madhyamaka-rthasamgraha 11; SarvaydnaTokakaravaibhdsya 424a 3 seqq. ( . . . de la gffis su yod pa bstan p a / rtog med ~hrul dmi kun brtags n i / rtog med lhun gyis 7hruipa ni dbah po la skyon chags pa la sogs pa'o // rtog bcas ni yid kyis te brtags pa'i bdag lta bu'o //; Satyadvayavibhaligapa~]ikd 17a 2. 3. Adopted from ~ntaraksita's Madhyamaka-lamkt[rala~rika-64: ma brtags gcig pu flams dga' ~ili // skye dmi 7igs pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // ra~i b~in kun rdzob pa yin rtogs // (5 la 4) See also Madhyamaka-lam. k~ravr,tti to this for an account ofsatyadvaya (68b 1-72a 1). While Madhyamakdrthasam.graha only mentions arthakriydsamartha as the mark of tathyasamvrti (10) Ratnapradipa, however, lists all three marks (avicdraraman. iya, hetu/dta and arthakriydsamartha): chu ~iti gi ni phuh po b~in // ma brtags ftams dga 'i mtshan ~id can//rgyu las skyes dad don byed nus // tshu rol mthofi ba'i kun rdzob yin // (326b 7). This is followed by many later authors (~rfgupta, Kamala[fla, ~ntaraksita, Vinftadeva, Haribhadra,
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION
TO T H E TWO T R U T H S
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etc., passim); for avicdraraman, fya one also finds avicdraikaramaniya, avicdramanohara, etc. 4. This is, in the words o f Madhyamakdrthasam.graha (4) the aparydyaparamdrtha, or, with Tarkajvdld, the nisprapa~caparamdrtha (64a 7). It is the abhinnanaya o f SDA 5, q. v. - Cf. also Siddhi, p. 760. See also Madhyamakdrthasam.graha 7-8. 5. This is the parydyaparamdrtha which, according to Madhyamakdrthasam.graha 5-6 has two forms, *yuktiparydya and utpddapratisedha. The former is established by means of the four mahdhetu (see the translation of an extract from Bodhimdrgadipapa~]ikd in the Appendix), the latter is, somewhat unclearly, defined as "all apparent things" (snah ba 'i dhos po thams cad), i.e. the absolute " b e y o n d " phenomena which accounts for their relative status. - The two fundamental forms of paramdrtha are also referred to by Avalokitavrata as the pdrarndrthika and sdm.ketikaparamdrthasatya, cf. Ejima (1980), p. 26. Here Ati~a has passages such as M~lamadhyamakakdrikd XXII, 11 d (praffutptyartham. tu kathyate) and XXV, 2 2 - 2 3 (b2nyes.u sarvadharme.su kim anantam kim antavat . . ) in mind. - The expression rtogs (rtog MQ) reed tshul gyis rtogs pasna apparently alludes to the stage o f nirvikalpddh~h, or avikalpd buddhih. (typical Bhavyan terms) cf. Madhyamakahr.dayal~rikti II1, 265; VII, 96. - For pra]~apti v. May (1959), p. 161 (n.494),item (1978), p. 240. A quotation from the Dharmasam.gitisatra. It often occurs, e.g. Tarka]va-la-125b 4; 126a 4 (cf. Madhyamakahr.dayakdrikd III, 246), etc. For similar lists describing paramdrtha which cannot be described, see Acintyastava 37 39; Bodhicittavivarana 46;Mtilamadhyamakakdrikd XVIII, 9 - 1 1 ;Madhyamakahr.dayakdrika- I, 1 - 3 , etc. Cf. Bodhipathapradipa 1 6 9 - 1 7 2 : de phyir ~on mobs kes bya yi // sgrib pa ma lus
-
6.
7. 8.
9.
spah ba 'i phyir // ~es tab pha rol phyin rnal 'byor / rtag tu thabs bcas bsgom par bya//(Eimer's translation " U m die Hemmnisse, n~imlich die "Befleckungen", restlos aufzugeben . . . . " i s wrong. This is, o f course, a reference to kle~a- and ]~eydvarana, see Siddhi, p. 566 - 574, with ref.; Madhyamakahrdayakdrikd III, 24 (Tarkajvdla- 62b 3 4 , q.v.); May (1959), p. 141 (n. 400).) lO. From the empirical point o f view (sam.vrtitah) Ati~a (unlike N~igfirjuna, Candrakirti, etc.) accepts two pramd.nas thus following Dharmak~rti, Dharmottara, etc. It is however only through bhdvand that tattva is realized, cf. Bodhirndrgad~papa~]ikd 326b 4: kha cig chos rnams yod par bsgrub // g~an dag chos rnams reed ces zer // yah dag Aid la rnam dpyad na // yod ces pa dab reed ces pa // yah dag mtha' la de dag reed//de bas gar yah bsgrub mi (ri) nus // bla ma 'i brgyud pa 'bral ba dag // ties su dpag pa'i ges rab kyis // yod med rtag chad sogs bsgrubs kya~i // hal 'gyur don la reg mi 'gyur // chos grags chos mchog la sogs pas // g~uh mah byas pa . . .
11. The endeavour to subordinate the views o f ~r~ivakas and Vijfi~nav~dins to Madhyamaka by taking them neydrtha is common in later Madhyamaka sources, see especially Ratnapmd~pa IV. 12. Apparently no pramdna can vindicate the absolute. None the less faith in paramdrtha depends on dgama, cf. 1 4 - 1 6 . 13. This is referred to in Bodhimdrgad~papa~]ika- 326b 6: mu stegs rgol ba bzlog pa'i
phyir // mkhas pa rnams kyis byas pa yin // de bas don darn bsgom pa la // tshad mas dgos pa reed do ~es bdag gis g~an du bkod pa h i . . . 14. From Ratnapradfpa 342b 6: rtog bcas rtog pa reed pa yi // kes pa gfiis kyis 'di mi
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rtog // sgra dab tshad ma'i tha s~ad dag // de don bsgom ia dgos pa med //. Cf. also Madhyamakahrdayakdrikti III, 285 and note to verse 6. 15. The advent of N[gfirjuna is believed to have been predicted in the Lahkdvatdras~tra, Maht~bheri-, Mahdmegha-, and in the Ma~]u~r~malatantra, see Ratnaprad[pa VIII; Madhyamakdvatdra, p. 76. 16. For the 84,000 dharmas cf. Lessing and Wayman (1968), p. 57. 17. The first two lines from Dharmakfrti's Pramd.navt~rttika I, 253 (ed. Y~sho Miyasaka): yuktis (read: muktis) tu ~u-nyatddrs.tes tadarthdh. ~esabhdvandh. . Also quoted Bodhicarydvatdrapaa]ikd, p. 438, with v.1. The last four lines express a common warning, see e.g. MaiamadhyamakakdrikaXXIV, 10-11 ; Catu.hgataka VIII, 18-20;Madhyamakahrdayaktirikt~ III, 12-13
-
(including 12* quoted by Haribhadra). 18. This is Yuktisas.Hkd 31 and Malamadhyamakak~rik.d XXIV, 11 (vind~ayati durd.rs.t.d ~nyatt[ mandamedhasam/; cf. below, note 29. 19. Madhyamakdvattfra VI, 80: updyabhfttam vyavaha-rasatyam upeyabhatam para-
mdrthasatyam / tayor vibhdgam na paraiti yo vai mithytfvikalpaih, sa kumdrgaydtah. / / (Some ref. in my ed. ofPaacaskandhaprakara.na, p. 89 (n. 13).) 20. Lines a, b fromMalamadhyamakak~rikd XXIV, 10 (with v.1 .); c, d, e, and f from Madhyamakahrdayakdrikd III, 12* (or 13 - this surely belongs to the text; also quoted in the Madhyamaka-lamkdrav.rtti 71b 2, ef. Paa]ikd 126b 3). 21. Adapted from Ratnapradfpa 328a 3: kun rdzob ]i Itar shah ba 'di // rigs pas brtags na 'ga' mi raed // ma raed pa Rid don dam yin // de phyir kun rdzob ~es par bya / /
(Var. in d). 22. Cf. Ratnaprad~pa 327a 8: gal te 'byuh bar mi rigs na fichu zla la sogs su yis
bskyed//.
23. Cf. Bodhi[sattva]carytivatdra IX, 14 (= 14cd, 15ab in the Tibetan version). The last two lines are from this (pratyaytindm tu viccheddt sam. vrtydpi na sam. bhavah ). 24. For Akani.s.tha see e.g. Lessing and Wayman (1968), p. 21-25. 25. This verse also occurs Bodhimt~rgad[papan]ikd 324a 3, q.v. 26. To Ati~a N~i~rjuna is the guru, see Paaiika-, passim. 27. The "King of Sumatra" is Ati~a's personal teacher. 28. Devamati seems to be a nora de plume of Ati~a. (Translation tentative.)
NOTES I La ValiSe Poussin (1937), p. 159. - For some recent discussions, see Murti (1960), p. 243-255; Sprung (1973), passim. 2 The main H~naygna sources (Mahdvibhdsd, Samghabhadra) are translated or referred to by La Vall6e Poussin, op. cit., p. 158-187. - In Mah~ygaaa-ga-strasthe most frequently adduced satras treating satyadvaya are: Latikdvatdra-, Pitdputrasarrufgama-, Satyadvayanirde~a-, Ak.sayamatinirde~a- and Samddhird]asatra. - For Pra]fut~dramittis~tras cf. Hikata (1958), p. lxviii. - Further references are given Siddhi, p. 547-555; Traitb, p. 27 (n. 1); May (1959), p. 225 (n. 773); Ko~a VI, 139. 3 Though N~ig~irjuna's own works (i.e. Malamadhyamakalafrikd and Sanyatdsaptati, passim; the svavr.tti to Vigrahavydvartan[ 7, and Ratna-vaH V, 1-34) do not leave any doubt that his opponents are mainly SarvdstivtMins it is, however, not possible to point any single extant Abhidharma text out as his source. (For details see my forthcoming
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work "Nagarjuniana" where I have ventured to survey his thought and background based on those thirteen texts which I, for various reasons, consider genuine.) 4 In his extant works ~,ryadeva never discusses the satyadvaya theory as such, but evidently presupposes it, e.g. Catuh.~ataka VIII, 8, 15, 18-21 ; IX, 25; XII, 11-12, 23, etc. 5 See their commentaries to Mfdamadhyamakakdrikd, Chung lun, Taish6 No. 1564, 32c 16-33a 7;Prasannapadd (ed. La Vall6e Poussin), p. 4 9 2 - 4 9 9 (tr. May (1959), p. 224-234); Candrak~rti's commentary to Yukti.sas.tika- 30-35 (extract given p. 167). - For Buddhap~lita see the extract given in Tsoh kha pa's Lain rim chert mo, tr. by Wayman (1978), p. 277. (Here many other relevant passages from Indian sources are also translated, q.v.) 6 Paraphrase of Taish6 No. 1545,400a 4 - 2 4 . The following passage raises the question whether samv.rt/and paramdrtha refer to one and the same thing. (Tr. La Vall6e Poussin, loc. cit., p. 165-167.) 7 ~ntaraksita's Satyadvayavibhahgapa~fika- 27b 3: . . . slob dpon chos skyoh gis"ci
ste kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ci ~ig yin / mi bden pa 'irnarn grabs yin nam "~es bya ba la sogs pa smras pa . . . 8 Ibid. 27b 7 : . . . slob dpon chos skyoh gis"dhos po gcig la cig car bden par yah 'gyur / mi bden par yah 'gyur"~es 'gal ba smras pa . . . (An old objection, see ref. note 6.) 9 Cf. Trim.~ikdbh~ya (ed. L6vi), p. 16: . . . atak cdyam upagamo na yuktiks.amo "vi/adnam api vi/~eyavat samvr, tita eva, na paramdrthata" iti, sam. vr.tito 'py abhdvaprasahgdn na hi sam. vrtir nirupddtind yu/yate. (Corresponds exactly to the Tib. version, TP, No. 5565, Si fol. 171b 3 - 4 . ) This objection (no doubt launched against Bhavya, but not yet located) is cited as Sthiramati's and refuted in SatyadvayavibhahgapaRjikd 32b 2: btsun pa blo brtan na re / "kun rdzob ni g~i reed par mi rub ho " ~es zer ba de'i dogs pa bsu ba 'i phyir / "kun rdzob 'di ni g~i reed par" / ~es bya ba smos te / rten reed par mi rub rio ~es kyah br/od par minus te / 'di ltar btags pa kun rdzob ni g~i dab bcas p a s t e / y a h dag pa ~ g~2idati ldan pa ni 'ga 'yah dhos po gab la yah mi shah ho . . . See also PaRcaskandhaprakara.na (my ed.), p. 116 (1.18); Vigrahavydvartan~ 10. lo Devendrabuddhi's objection cited Satyadvayavibhahgapaafika- 27a 1 : btsun pa lha dbah blos sun 'byin pa smras pa / 'Tcun rdzob dhos po med yin na" / gal te kun rdzob ces bya ba'i sgra d~ios po med par br/od par gyur na ~es bya ba'i tha tshig g o / / s k y e ba dhos po dhos po'i rnam grabs yin na ~es b~ad ces bya ba'i tha tshig g o / / H Slokavdrttika (ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri; rev. K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy), p. 196: yada- samvr, tisatyena sarvam etat prakalpyate // ffta-narndtre "pi kasmgd vo vrthdgraho ~thakalpane / [ 5//samvr.ter na tu satyatvam satyabhedah kuto nv ayam / satyam cet samvr, tih. keyam, mr..~ cet satyatd katham / / 6 / / satyatv'am. na tu sdrrt4nyam m.~.drthaparan~rthayoh. / virodha-n na hi vr.k.satvam sdmdnyam. vrks.asim, hayoh. / /7 / / tulydrthatve 'pi tenaisdm, mithy#sam, vr.ti~abdayoh. / vaacandrtha upanydso ia-ldvaktrdsavddivat / / 8 // ndstikyaparihdrdrtham, samvr,tih. kalpaneti ca / kalpandpi tv abhinnasya naiva nirvastuke bhavet // 9 // tasmdd yan ndsti ndsty eva yat tv asti paramdrthatah. / tat satyam anyan mithydiva na satyadvayakalpand / / 1 0 //. Cf. also Nydyabha.sa.na (ed. Svami Yogfndr~nanda), p. 254. (Against Dharmakfrti!)
12 I.e., to be sure, not a non-committed attitude as far as moral or religious issues are at stake but only towards ontological or epistemological questions (it being doubtful if these two view-point have ever really been clearly distinguished in Mah~y~na; cf. the very pertinent observation of La Vall6e Poussin, quoted by de Jong, JIP I, p. 401, 1. 3-5). This becomes clear in the Prdsangika's attitude to a philosophical debate (cf.
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M~lamadhyamakakdrikd IV, 8 - 9 ) . The moment the opponent maintains that anything is in possession of "own-being" (svabha-va) - a concept which basically admits of two
interpretations, either the specific essence of something ("heat"), or the essence of the thing as it exists in and by itself ("fire") (cf. de Jong (1972), p. 2) - he poses himself vulnerable to aPr#satigika's attack. The notion ofsvabhdva, it is generally agreed (also by a Mddhyamika, argumenti causa), connotes "permanent", "independent", "numerically one", and "uncompounded". However, by confronting the svabhdvavddin with two authorities which no realistic philosopher could afford to scorn, namely logic and experience, aPrdsahgika has an easy prey in reducing his opponent to an absurd position the notion of a permanent, independent, etc. svabha-va being incompatible with the demands of these two when subjected to an analysis. Turning his own weapons against him the Prdsat/g/ka then induces the svabh~vavddin to a philosophical suicide. From this it is evident that a Prdsahgika is not committed to ontological (epistemological) questions - he is rather "above ontology" - his motive for engaging in debate being a religious or moral one, viz. the conviction that the acceptance of own-being, or any kind of being at all (cf. M~lamadhyamakaka~ila~ XV, 6) is the source of all misery (cf. Yukti.sas..ffka-2; 4 6 - 4 7 ) . It is precisely the attitude towards debate (vdda) which distinguishes a Pr~sahgika, such as Buddhap~lita and Candrak~rti, from a Svdtantrika, such as Bhavya, who positively attempts to advance syllogistic proof of
-
~nyatd.
13 This is explained in the extract from Atia's Bodhimdrgadfpapa~fika- given in the Appendix. 14 Here is a translation of the Madhyamakdrthasamgraha based on the Tibetan version published by Ejima (1980), p. 1 8 - 2 1 . For the sake of convenience his numbering of the verses is adopted though it certainly cannot correspond to that of the original Sanskrit, now lost. Contrary to Prof. Ejima who denies the authenticity of MAS, I prefer to accept the traditional ascription to Bhavya not only since it is uncontradicted by any external evidence but also because the text does not contain anything which is in any way inconsistent with the doctrinal standpoint of Bhavya's other works (Praffut-pradfpa, Tarka]va-la, Ratnapradfpa and *Karatalaratna). - Here then is the translation (omitting the initial and final stanza): I have composed this [brief text] in order to make the actual meaning (yathdrtha) of the two truths (satyadvaya) intelligible (2). The teaching (dharmade~ana-) of the Buddhas' is consolidated in the two truths, viz. the absolute (paramdrtha) and the relative (sa.mv.rti) (3). - The absolute is devoid of the principle of language (prapa~ca), and it is of two kinds, viz. the absolute which can be rendered into words (pary~yapardmartha) and the absolute which cannot he rendered into words (aparydyaparamdrtha) (4). Again, the first is of two kinds, viz. the absolute which is expressed [in terms of] logic (yuktiparydyaparamdrtha) and the absolute [expressing] negation of origination (utpddapratis.edha) (5). The [absolute which is expressed in terms of] logic (yukti, or nydya) is concerned with the four logical reasons (hem) [refuting] origination, destruction, etc. of the quadrilemma (catus.ko.ff [viz. being, non-being, etc.] ). Again the absolute [expressing] negation of origination is every apparent thing (dbhdsabhdva) (6). [That which is] devoid of all empkical status (prapa~ica~nya) must be known as the absolute which cannot he rendered into words (aparydyaparamdrtha) (7). The absolute is [approximately] like this: totally devoid of both [extremes, i.e.] the extreme of being (bha-vdnta) and the extreme of non-being (abhdvdnta) (8). Relativity (sam . ~ ) as it appears (yath~bhdsa) must be known also to have two
201
forms, viz. false (mithyd-) relativity, and genuine (tathya-) relativity (samv.rt/) (9). A thing capable of efficiency (arthakriytisamartha) is called tathyasam, vr.ti, but one which appears incapable of efficiency is mithydsamvr, ti (10). This again has two forms: one with discursive thinking (savikalpa), and one without discursive thinking (nirvikalpa). Savikalpa is [e.g.] to take a rope for a snake, nirvikalpa is [e.g.] to "perceive" two moons (11). Thus it must be taught that everything consists in the two truths. By taking the meaning of this to heart full perfection (sampad) is achieved (12). Is Satyadvayavibhatigapaa/ika- 28b 4 : . . . slob dpon chos skyoh gis "don dam par ma
skyes ~es bya ba 'di la / don dam pa ~es bya ba ~ sgra ~ don ci yin "~es bya ba la sogs pas gnod pa smras pa . . . 16 Jfi~nagarbha is the author of two works only available in the Derge (sDe dge) edition, Satyadvayavibhapigaka~ika- (No. 3881) and Satyadvayavibhatigavr.tti (No. 3882). ~r fgupta composed Tattvtivatdravr.tti, a brief work in 22 k~tik~s most of which are closely related to those of ~ntarak.sita's Madhyamaka-lamkdrakdrika-as Ejima has pointed out (1980),
p. 221. - Both authors show many reminiscences of Bhavya. 17 The form ~ntadeva is better testified than the form ~ntideva, see note 5 to Appendix (p. 212). - Note also that the title of his work is an abbreviated form (madhyamapadalopa) of Bodhisattvacarydvatdra (the form given by all commentators previous to Prajfi~karamati and Vibhfiticandra). Hence the usual English translations " . . . path of light (or enlightenment, e t c . ) . . . " a r e unwarranted. 18 Since it quotes it, see note to SDA 13. 19 Though a unanimous Indian tradition (colophon, Avalokitavrata, Ati~a) ascribes the AkutobhaytiMalamadhyamakavrtti to N~g~rjuna himself the style of this text is so dull and unlike that of decidedly genuine texts like lOgrahavydvartanfvr, tti, Vaidalyaprakara.na, etc. that I am very reluctant to admit its authenticity. The fact that it also includes a quotation from Catuh.iataka makes it nearly certain that it was not composed by N~ig~irjuna. 2o The term vyavah~m, or samvyavahdra, admits of more than one rendering (cf. May (1959), p. 221 (n. 760)): common (Buddhist) usage, or practice; convention, or usage of language, etc. - For paramdrtha as "absolute", see de Jong (1972), p. 4, who counts three ways of expressing the inexpressible. - While via negativa (prasa/yapratis.edha) and metaphorical indications (up#ddya pra/aapti) are frequent in early Madhyamaka it seems difficult to find clear instances of paramdrtha conceived as coincidentia oppositorum. 21 Sanyatdsaptati (73 ka-nka-s with a svavr.ttt) seems to have been conceived as a supplement to Malamadhyamakaka~ika- which it partly expands, partly summarizes. Its authenticity is beyond doubt. The "lib. versions of the/~r/ka-s included in the sva~tti often differ considerably from the separate kdr/kd version which, again is practically identical with the version incorporated in Candrakfrti's Sanyatdsaptativr.tti (which does however omit k. 53). There is also a vivr.tti by Parahita. This only comments on selected verses. No Sanskrit fragment seems extant (cf. however Roerieh, G. N, The Blue Annals, Calcutta 1949, p. 342 for an oral tradition about the existence of a Sanskrit MS of Candrakfrti's commentary in Za lu). - I have compared the abovementioned sources for my translation. 22 The Tib. versions of this verse, q.v., vary considerably, but I think my translation gives the correct sense. 23 The usual manner of expressing empirical relativity (idam.pratyayata-) is asmin sati idam. bhavati, see Prasannapadd, p. 9 with n. 7. Of course N~g~rjuna would never disdain
202
the relative as such no matter how empty it is pararndrthatah.. In a sense prat~tyasamutpdda is the "bridge" connecting the two truths which are however only apart sam~titah. . 24 Faith (~raddha-) is indispensable (but in itself not sufficient) for the attainment of mok.sa, see Ratna-valf I, 4 - 6 . - The Sanskrit of 72d, and the svavrtti surely read bhdva and abhdva (with Candrakfrti etc.), not bhava and abhava (with svavr.tti etc.) 25 All 61 stanzas of Yukti.sas.t.ikdare only extant in Tibetan and Chinese but at least a dozen verses are known to me as quotations in Sanskrit. - 3 0 - 3 6 give Nfigfirjuna's thought on education in nuce. A student (monk) begins his career with a thorough study of Abhidharma under a competent teacher. He should live a moral life accumulating good karma (da~aku~alakarmapatha, etc., see RatndvaH I, 6 - 2 4 ; V, 1-64). Only thus will he finally become able to realize the "meaning of discernment" (vivekdrtha), or emptiness (= tattva), for himself. - Verses 3 0 - 3 3 are also quoted together in Kamala[fla's Madhyamaka'loka 166a 2 - 4 , q.v. 26 Sanskrit quoted Subhds.itasam. graha (ed. Bendall), fol. 10 (where MS has tvegave.~.~ in b), and Nydyavini~cayavivara.na (ed. M. K. Jain), II, p. 1 7 - 1 8 (also gaves.i.~ in b (but Candrakfrti's commentary 23a 2 & 6 shows a genetive) and bhdvagraho nivartate in d): sarvam ast~ti vaktavyam ddau tattvag~ve.~.nah. / pa~cdd avagattirthasya nih.sahgasya
viviktatd / /.
27 Similarly .~ryadeva's Catuh.~ataka V, 10; VIII, 19 (quotedPrasannapadt~, p. 370, q.v.). 28 Sanskrit in Tattvasam. grahapaajika- (ed. Shastri), p. 14, 618: sarvam sarvam iti brdhma.na yaduta paacaskandha~, dvddaMyatandni, a.st.dda~a ca dha-tavah. - See also May (1959), p. 206 (n. 689); Tarkajva-la- 63b 4, etc. 29 A verse related to this (but not identical) is quoted Subh~itasa.mgraha (ed. Bendall), fol. 102: evam a]adtatattvd ye ~rutamdtrdvalambinah. / naiva kurvanti pu.nydni hatds te
buddhaMsane //.
3o N~rjuna's accepts six stages of rebirth (.sa.dgati), see Suhr.llekha 77 seqq.; Bodhicittavivara.na 72; Maha-ytinavim.gikti 6, but this need not be very decisive, cf. Traitb, p. 614 & 1957. 31 Quoted Bodhicarydvata-rapaa/ik~, p. 376 where it has been identified by La Vall6e Poussin: mamety aham iti proktam yathti l~ryava~aT ]inaih. / tathd kdryava~a-t prokt~h.
skandha-yatanadha-tavah. //. 32 Quoted in Jfi~narf's Sa-ka-rasiddhi (ed. Thakur), p. 405 (with mahdbhattMiviffu~ne in a, and ydnti in c), and p. 545: maha-bh~ta-di viffut-ne proktam, samavarudhyate / ta//adne vigamam, yt~ti nanu mithyti vikalpitam //. 33 Canonical allusion: etad dhi bhik.savah, paramam, satyam yaduta amo.sadharma nirvt~nam, sarvasamskdrd~ ca mr.~ mo.sadharmdnah. (Prasannapad~, p. 41 & 237; Bodhicarydvatdrapaa/ika-, p. 363 (some var.), etc. 34 For my arguments in support of the traditional ascription of Ratnaprad~pa to Bhavya, see my article in ICZKSA XXVI. - My recension of this most important
text is based on the Narthang, Peking and Derge edition. 35 Cf. Madhyamakahr. dayakdrika- III, 286: pdlMtmandm ira svargah, sara.~ntim ivdra.nd /
]dtyandhdndm iwfdityas tdrkika-.n~m agocarah. //. 36 For all these m4ytMr.s.t.t$ntas, see TraitS, p. 357-387; May (1959), p. 507-509 (ref. s.s.v.); Mahdvyutpatti (ed. Sakaki), CXL; Vimalak[rtinirde~a (tr. Lamotte), p. 2 6 3 265. - Bhavya's use of the kadaHskandha to illustrate tathyasam, vrti in the following verse is unusual but probably influenced by Dharmadhdtustava 14, q.v.
203
37 The distinction between tathya- and mithyt~samvr.tisatya was not introduced (as occasionally maintained) by Bhavya, see Imanishi (1975), p. 10 (n. 21). 38 Acintyastava 19: indriyair upalabdham yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi / /dtds tattvavido
ba-la-stattvaffla-nena kim. tadti //. a9 Samddhirdlasatra (ed. Vaidya), IX, 23: na cak.suh, pramd.nam na ~rotra ghrd.nam na fihva pramd.nam net kdyacittam / pramd.na yady eta bhaveyur indriyd kasydryamargen, a bhaveta ka-ryam//. Also in Sarvadharmdbhdvasiddhi 313a 6; Yuktis.astikdvr. tti 6a 5,
etc. 4o Acintyastava 20: ]a.datvam apramd.natvam athdvydkrtatt~m api / vipar[tapari]fta-nam
indriydndm tram acivdn //.

41 Cf. SDA 22-23. The following verse ascribed to dcdrya (i.e. N~igfirjuna) cannot be located in any of the works ascribed to him. However, like sever/d other stanzas in his works it has a close parallel in Lahkdvatdrasatra (ed. Nanjio), X, 85: na hy atrotpadyate kim. cit pratyayair na nirudhyate / utpadyante nirudhyante pratyayd eva kalpitt~h. / / ; cf. also Sdka-rasiddhi (ed. Thakur), p. 488: dharmo notpadyate ka~cin rt4pi ka~cin nirudhyate / utpadyante nirudhyante pratyayd eva kevala-h//; a third version of this verse occurs in Madhyamaka-lamkdravrtti 79b 5: 'di ia skye ba ci yah med // 'gag par 'gyur ba ci yah med // skye ba dab ni 'gag pa dag // ~es pa 'ba' ~ig kho n a b / / ( f r o m Lahl~vatdrasatra acc. to Kamala~a's Paa]ikti 138b 2). The final verse is from Candrakfrti's Tri~ara.nasaptati 3 b - d . 42 The mahgala~lokau of Mala-Pra]aa-. It is quoted in all extant commentaries and must be considered authentic (cf. the discussion in Yukti.sas..ffka-vr.tti 2b 3 - 8 ) : anirodham
anutpddam anuccheclam a~a-svatam / anekdrtham andndrtham andgamam anirgamam // yah prat[tyasamutpa-dam, prapaacopa~amam ~ivam / de~aydm tisa sambuddhas tam vande vadattim varam // (cf. SDA 5). 43 An exhaustive treatment of these are given Traitb, p. 2029-2151. See also Murti
(1960), p. 351-356. 44 An ancient definition, see Ratnt~val~ II, 35a: (na) avisamvddavat satyam... (bslu
ba mi idan bden (min)te).

4s Inspired by Kambala's .41okama-la- 176: t$dikarmikalokasya paramdrthdvatdrane / updyas tv esa sambuddhaih, sopdnam iva nirmitah / / (On this work see my article in WZKSA XXVI.) 46 Adaption ofM~lamadhyamakakdriktf XXIV, 10, q.v. - Cf. SDA 20. 47 See SDA21. 48 Presumably the passage from the Ak.sayamatinirde~a upon which M~lamadhyamakaka-nkd XXIV, 8 is based, cf. Vaidya (1923), p. 21. 49 Madhyamakdvatdra VI, 80, see SDA 19. s0 Like Ml~lamadhyamakakdrikd XIII, 8 this verse is inspired by Kdgyapaparivarta, 6 3 - 6 5 (cfo Prasannapadd, p. 247-249). 51 Bhavya's definition of pratyaksa (yul so sor ties pa la ]ug pa aid) is closer to that of Nydyabha_sya (ed. Thakur), p. 182: ak.sasytik.sasya prativi.sayam, vrttih, pratyak.sam, than to that of Nydyamukha: ak.sam ak.sam, prati vartata iti pratyak.sam ; cf. Hattori (1968), p . 7 7 . - I have failed to identify the opponent. s2 M~dhyamikas are careful to distinguish themselves from N~istikas, see my article "BuddhapliUta on Emptiness" IIJ 23, 182, n. 92. May (1959), p. 123 (n. 323). 53 Cf. Madhyamakahrdaya~rikd III, 177: d.rs.t.am. ]anma ghatdd~ndm ba-lasdmdnyayd
dhiyti / pratis.edhas tathd ndyam ndto dos.o yathoditah. //.
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CHR. LINDTNER
s4 For the end o f this passage (which is taken over from Tarka/va-ld 107b 5 - 1 0 7 b 6) see Madhyamakahrdayalafrikd III, 180ab: n@i tadgocaram vastu samskrtatvdd
yathdtmadMh. /. ss See Koga II, p. 147; Vipaficitdrtha (ed. Shastri), p. 78.

s6 These lines are by a certain Lok~yatika called *Lol~k.sa, see m y article ref. to n. 52 (n. 30). - The incident a b o u t the ~kapacla is related in the commentaries to .Sa.ddar~anasamuccaya 81, q.v. (Tarkarahasyad~pika- (ed. Suall), p. 303; Laghuvr.tt/(ed. Mishra), p. 65. s7 Not identified. Presumably from a lost work o f .~ryadeva's. s8 Source uncertain, see m y article in ICZKSA XXVI. Sanskrit often quoted:
ndpaneyam atah. kimcit prakseptavyam, na kimcana / dra.st.avyam bhfttato bhatam bh~tadar~ vimucyate //. s9 Sanskrit quoted Prasannapadd (ed. La Vall6e Poussin), p. 449: anutpddadharma(h.) satatam tatha-gatah sarve ca dharma~ sugatena sddr~h / nimittagrdhe.na tu ba-labuddhayo 'satsu dharme.su carant/loke//; cf. IIJ XX, p. 237. Ace. to Avalokitavrata it is from Sarvabuddhavi.saydvatdraj~a-na-loka-lamkdrasatra, see ICZKSO VIII, p. 128. Also cited Tarkajva-la- 124a 6; Sarvadharmdbha-vasiddhi 33 l a 4. 60 F r o m the Candrapradfpasatra (acc. to Bodhimdrgad~papaafikd 327b 7). 61 F r o m the *Vinayasdgara (ibid. 327b 8). 62 Same source as in n. 59; also in Tarka/va-la-250a 8;Prajfut-pradfpa 311a 3 (with tfkd 358b 4). All have saris rgyas for thams cad in a. 63 For an account of the MSS, editions and translations of Bodhicarydvatdra and a list
of its Indian commentaries see Pezzali (1968) p. 4 7 - 6 5 . F r o m a cursory reading o f these commentaries (all are to be f o u n d in vol. 100 o f the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka. - Note that No. 5279 is merely an extract from No. 5274!) I a m convinced that Prajfi~ikaramati's Paa]ikti is b y far the m o s t exhaustive o f t h e m all. However, since most o f t h e m are earlier t h a n his and often contain m u c h interesting material t h e y are by no m e a n s negligible. - Comparing the Tib. version o f the Paafika- (TP, No. 5273, La fol. 210a 2 - 2 1 7 a 4) with the Sanskrit edited by La Vall6e Poussin I have made some emendations as follows: p. 352, 5 - read 5nr.ta for dvrta (cf. MCB V, p. 160 n. 1)); 352, 11 - read t i s t h a t / f o r vartate (see m y forthcoming ed. o f Alokama/a'); 353, 10 read bimbddi tu for bimbddisu; 355, 11 read utptidasvabhdvatdst/for utt~du sabhdvato 'st/(cf. MCB II, p. 74 (n. 3)); 356, 16 - read ka-lpanikam for aka-lpanikam; 357, 9 - read kdra.natvasya prat/setsyamdnatvdt for kdranatve 'sya prat/s.edhasyesyamd.natvdt; 359, 13 - read andsahgam andspadam for dsatigdndm andspadam; 365, 6 - read 'vdcyo 'pi for 'vdcyam api. - I have reduced m y notes to a m i n i m u m since La Vall6e Poussin has already furnished his edition with a good apparatus. 64 For this sfitra see May (1959), p. 267 (n. 967). From the very beginning it was one of the most i m p o r t a n t dgamas in Madhyamaka. 6s Kambala's ,41okama-ld 18, cf. n. 45; Siddhi, p. 548. - For kdma/a- (= pand.uroga) see Jolly (1977), p. 10. 66 Prajfi~ikaramati's main source for the following a c c o u n t is Candrak[rti's Madhyamakdvatdra VI, 23 seqq., see La Vall6e Poussin's translation, Le Muskon XI, p. 299 seqq., or his edition of the Tibetan version, p. 102 seqq. 67 For the two kinds o f s a m ~ t / see SDA 2. 68 satsvabhdva is a late term hardly f o u n d in early Madhyamaka. Could also be rendered "real essence", etc. 69 For this sfitra see May (1959), p. 224 (n. 770); ICZKSO VIII, p. 128.
205
70 See my article in WZKSA XXVI. 71 Change is necessary before one can speak of causality, see e.g. Catuh.gataka IX, 9 ab (cited Prasannapadd, p. 398): kdra.nam vikrtim gacchaj ]dyate 'nyasya kdranam. 72 See IX, 119-126 (~varav~ida), 127-138 (S~mkhya). Text not quite satisfactory. 73 For idampratyayatd see n. 23. - For bhdvdbhiniveka as sarvaduhkhahetu see the often quoted Yuktis.as..~kd46-47: rdgadves,odbhavas Hvradus.tadrs#parigrahah. / vivddds
tatsamuttha~ ca bhavdbhyupagame sati // sa hetuh, sarvadr.s.t.[ndmklekotpattir na tam rind... 74 Madhyamaka-lamkdraka~ika- 1, identified by Vaidya (1923), p. 5 8.
75 Allusion to the text ref. to in the following note. 76 This is from J~a-nasdrasamuccaya 28, see Mimaki (1976), p. 188. It is difficult to accept the traditional attribution of this text to .~ryadeva. 77 Cf. Rzihulabhadra's Praffldpdramitdstotra 2ab: t~kdgamiva nirlepdm nis.prapaacdm.
nirak.sardrn . . . 78 Based on Madhyamaka-vatdra, p. 70-71. Cf. MCB V, p. 165.

79 See n. 33 and SDA 4. 8o upddhi (khyad par), not a specific Madhyamaka term. See Nydya-ko~a (ed. Jhalakikar and Abhyankar), p. 176-181. 8t Allusion to the celebrated line ascribed to Digmiga again and again: vikalpayonayah kabda-vikalpdh. ~abdayonayah.. I have not found it in any of his extant works. a2 About the taimirika (a person suffering from cataract) see ref. in May (1959), p. 187 (n. 610). a3 This line also in Tattvasam.grahapa~fikt~ (ed. Shastri), p. 633. 84 The classical Abhidharma definition of pra/aa-is dharmd.ndm,pravicaya, for the Madhyamaka interpretation of which see above all Pa~caskandhaprakara.na (my ed.), p. 110-121.
APPENDIX
A T I S A ' S C O M M E N T A R Y TO BODHIPATHAPRAD[PA 1 8 9 - 2 0 8
While English, F r e n c h and G e r m a n translations o f Ati~a's most celebrated w o r k , the Bodhipathapradfpa, are n o w available his a u t o c o m m e n t a r y , the
Bodhimdrgadfpapa~fikd, does n o t seem to have received the a t t e n t i o n to

which its i m p o r t a n c e entitles it. T h o u g h a late source it is n o n e the less n o t e w o r t h y for its rich historical i n f o r m a t i o n and as a t e s t i m o n y o f one o f the last a t t e m p t s to provide a comprehensive survey o f Buddhism in India. Traditionally Buddhists c o u n t three degrees o f analytical insight, or w i s d o m (pra/ad). One is o b t a i n e d by the study o f scripture (~ruta), one b y reflection (cintd) and the third b y a personal realization t h r o u g h m e d i t a t i o n (bhdvand). In M a d h y a m a k a the object ofpra/~d is to ascertain the
206
CHR. LINDTNER
"unorigination" (anutpdda), or emptiness, of all things (bhdva), especially the traditional Buddhist (Abhidharmic) concepts (dharma). In the following extract, which is concerned with the two former kinds ofpra/ad, Atiga first gives an account of the four "main logical reasons" (mahdhetu) why things are really unoriginated (anutpanna). Historically speaking this attempt to formalize arguments already occurring in early Madhyamaka appears to have been introduced by Bhavya in his Madhyamakdrthasam,graha (6), and there is evidence that it was accepted by subsequent Mfidhyamikas, the best survey of them, if I am not wrong, being given here by Atiga. The last part of the extract provides a list of the main textual sources which at the time of Atiga were considered to establish the analytical insight into the emptiness of all dharmas.
1. Thus [prajad] is also spoken of in the basic text (rraila) [of my Bodhipathapradfpa] -
[189-192]
To know that the aggregates, elements and sense-fields Which have [all] been understood to be unoriginated Are empty of own-being - [such knowledge] Has been described as "insight" (pra/aa).
All external and internal phenomena (bdhyddhydtmikadharma) are comprised by the aggregates (skandha), the elements (dhdtu) and the sensefields (dyatana). The Lord has said: .... Everything, everything", Brahmin, refers to the aggregates, the elements and the sense fields." 1 "To be unoriginated" will be explained later on. "Has been described", i.e. it has been explained by the Buddha and by my teacher (guru)? Here it is said The pdramitd, the sam.grahavastu The four aprarruf.na,the seven ahga The ten dharmdcdra, and the other kugalakarma The seven noble dhana, the six anusmr.ti, etc. The ma.n(l.alas,the offerings, circumambulations, etc. Are the means (updya): the sam.bhoga, and nirmd.nakdya. The perfection of wisdom (praj~dpdramitd)"alone is Insight (pra/~d): the dharmakdya, a
207
2. Kulaputra, by which method does such an insight (prajad) manifest itself
(pratyak.sa)?
By the four great reasons (mahghetu). Which four? - These [four] reasons (hem): (1) Negation of the four points of origination (catus.kotyutpddapratis.edha-), (2) The adamant spark (vajraka.na-),(3) The lack of unity and manifoldness (ekdnekav(~oga-) and (4) Dependent origination (pratftyasamutpdda). And which are they? - This is shown in the four glokas beginning with "It is not logical that being is born" etc., i.e. -
[193-196]
It is not logical that being (sat) is born; [Neither can] non-being (asat) which is like a sky-flower. Nor are both [being and non-being] born For this would imply both flaws (do.sa).
This shows the reason being a negation of the four points of origination (catuskot.yutpddapratis.edhahetu). In fact phenomena (dharma) which exist (sat) are not born because they have already been born (]dtatvdt). Phenomena which do not exist (asat) are not born either because they are not established by themselves (asvayam.siddha), and because there is no cause for creating [them] (janmahetu). There is in fact simply no group called "both". 4 This opinion has also been expressed by ,~c~irya-~ntadeva, for as is said [in Bodhi[sattva]carydvatdra IX, 146-150] s _
-
"What is the purpose of a cause For a thing that already exists? And again, what is the purpose of a cause If the [thing] does not exist? Non-being cannot be changed By even ten thousands of millions of causes. How can there be being in the state [of non-being] ; Or what else [than being or non-being] can come into being? If there is no being at the time of non-being When can there be being, For such non-being cannot go away Its mode of being being unborn.
208
CHR. LINDTNER Nor is it possible for being to have a chance When non-being has not yet gone away. Again, being cannot become non-being For that implies that it has two natures. Thus there is no stopping And there is no constant being. Therefore this entire world Is unborn and undestructed."
[197-2001
A thing is not born from itself, Nor is it born from something else, or both Or without a cause. Therefore, By nature, it lacks own-being.
This [verse] shows the adamant spark (vajraka.na). In fact, the Self (atman), Fortune (bhdga), God (fgvara), the Person (purus.a), karma, Nature (svabtuiva), the Constituents (gu.na), Brahma, Vi.s.nu, Mah~deva and all such extemal and internal creators (kara.napuru.sa), and, moreover, our own companions' (svayathya) acceptance of the origination of things (bhdva) due to the four conditions (pratyaya) and the six causes (hem) - [all such theories] are false conceptual constructions (mithydkalpand). 6 - In order to refute them Arya-N~g~rjunap~da has said in the Malaprajfta [I, 1] -
"Nothing whatsoever is ever found To arise from itself, from Something else, from both Or without a cause." The meaning of this must be seen in extenso in that very [text, viz. Malamadhyamakakdrikd], and in its six great commentaries (vr.tti), the two huge subcommentaries (maha-.tfkd), the Madhyamakavaidalya, Prasannapadd, Tarkajvdld and Madhyamalafvatdra. 7
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS . [201-2041 Again, when all phenomena are analysed [To see if] they are one [or] manifold They certainly prove to lack own-being Since no own-being can be perceived.
209
This [verse] shows the reason "lack of unity and manifoldness" (eka-nekaviyogahetu). This meaning is indicated by the word "again". "When all phenomena are analysed": the meaning of this is expressed by Santarak.sita [in his Madhyamakdlam. ka-rakdrikd 1] "The entities advocated by ourselves and others Are in reality without own-being, Because they lack the modes of unity And manifoldness, like a reflection." a It is also formulated by Ac~rya-Srfgupta [in his Tattvdvatdra 1] "All these external and internal "facts" Are, in the absolute sense, devoid of own-being, Because they lack unity and manifoldness, Just like a mirage." 9 Their opinion in extenso is to be looked up in their works. . [205-208] In Sanyatdsaptati, Yukti [sa.st.i ~ r i k d ] and In Malamadhyamaka etc. it has also been Established that the nature of things Is emptiness (ganyatd).
This [verse] refers to the reason "dependent origination" (pratftyasamutpddahetu) and the purport of this must also be checked in those very texts. "Established", i.e. the ancient Masters (parvamahdcgtrya) have established the non-origination of all things (sarvabhdvdnutpdda).
210
CHR. LINDTNER
With such four great reasons (mahdhetu) these previous great pandits have well established that all things (bhdva) are unborn (anutpanna), unabiding (apratis.thita), naturally extinguished (prakr.tinirv.rta),originally pure (ddiviguddha), rootless (amalaka), unbased (andlaya), and that no dharma is established [as existing by virtue of own-being] .1o In India learned men have claimed that Arya-Asafiga advocated a modification of the Teaching (degan@arydya)for he took the meaning of praj~dpdramitd to be mere consciousness (vijfiaptimdtra) and at present this is also the opinion of my guru Suvam.advfpa and guru Santipa. AchryaN~ghrjuna however preached the essence of the Teaching (de~anasdra)for he understood the meaning of pra/adpdrarnitdin the deep sense of the Middle Way (mahdmadhyamak#rtha) transcending being and non-being, and this was also advocated in the tradition of other learned men. At present this is also the opinion of my guru Bodhibhadra and bhat..tdrakaKusulupa. This nectar (amrta) of Arya-N~g~rjunaphda satisfied Aryadeva, Candrakfrti and Bhavya, ~ntadeva, and finally Bodhibhadra. A bit of it has also sprinkled upon me. Having thus established these four great reasons Why all phenomena are unoriginated One should, closely following the former masters, Abide in the great system of Madhyamaka. It is, again, like this Now-a-days [people] are subject to deterioration of Health, times, passions, ideologies and life. 11 Since it is not necessary to learn [all] the texts One must develop the yoga of the essential meaning. Since to-day there is no time to learn The huge texts which are like a [large] ship, One must abandon everything disturbing the mind And develop the true instruction (sadupade~).
ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS Time is short and [things] to be known manifold. Since one cannot know the span of one's time, So, as a goose extracts milk from water One should select the things one prefers.
211
But [now I] must explain the basic text (mala) itself. "Malamadhyamaka" is the Madhyamaka-Malapraj~d. "Etc." refers to Akutobhayd, Yukti.sa.s.tikd,
VigrahavydvartanL Sanyatdsaptati, RatndvalL Mahdydnavim~ikd, Ak.sara~ataka, Sdlistambavr.tti, etc.12 But "etc." also refers to the ~dstras written by the noble Master [N~garjuna's] true pupils (bhdva~i.sya) the venerable Aryadeva, Ac~ryaCandrakfrti, Acarya-Bhavya [or] Bh~viveka, and Acarya-S~intadeva, etc. Again the venerable (bhadanta) Aryadeva wrote *Mahdmadhyamaka-Vaidalya, Hastavdla, *A~gulikalpavydkhydna, J~dnasdrasamuccaya, etc. t3 Ac~ryaCandrakfrti wrote Madhyamakdvatdra, Yuktisas.tikdvr.tti, MadhyamakaPaacaskandhaka and Prasannapadd, etc. 14 Acarya-Bhavya [or] Bh~viveka c om posed Madhyamaka- Tarkajvdld, Pra/adpradfpa, etc. is In this connection there are eight commentaries to the MadhyamakaMalaprajad: ( 1 ) A k u t o b h a y d written by Acarya [N~garjuna] himself, (2) Prasannapadd composed by Acarya-Candrakfrti, (3) Pra/adpradfpa composed by Acarya-Bhavya [or] Bhaviveka, (4) Buddhapdlita written by sthavira Buddhap~lita, (5) the one written by Ac~rya-Sthiramati and those composed by (6) Acarya-Gunamati, (7) Acarya43una~rf, and (8) Ac~rya-Gu.nadatta. There are two huge sub-commentaries (maha-.trkd) on the Prajadpradfpa: the one made by Acarya-Avalokitavrata and the *Suklabhyudaya made by Acarya-Deva[arman.16
NOTES My translation of this paragraph is based on the Tibetan text in the Peking edition: TP, No. 5344, Ki fol. 322a 1-324b 4. - The numbering of lines follows the edition of Eimer (1978). 1 For the Sanskrit see above n. 28 (p. 202). 2 Here the term guru hardly refers to Dharmapala (cf. SDA 27-28), but to Bodhibhadra whose Bodhisattvasamvaravim~akapa~]ikdand SaraddhisambhdraparivartaAti~a sometimes refers to (see Paa]ikd297b 3; 299b 3; 312b 4; 316a 7; 317a 4; 318a 2; 321a 4, etc; cf. Ejima (1980), p. 257). 3 This samgraha~lokasummarizes the opinion of Bodhibhadra according to whom all ptiramitds - apart from pra]fufpa-ramitd- should be classified as updya, or pu.nyasambhtira, see Paa]ika-321a 4-5. - All the technical terms will most conveniently be found explained in Har Dayal (1932), s.s.v.; or in TraitS,passim.
212
4 See above allMfflamadhyamakaka~ika-I, 6; VII, 30-31;~finyatdsaptati 3: yodparyod phyir skye ma yin // med pa med pa ~ phyir ma yin // chos mi mthun phyir yod med min // skye ba med phyir gnas 'gog med /[; *Dvdda~advdraka 3 (Taish6 1568, 160b 18-19): "That which already exists is not born; that which does not exist is not born either. That which exists and exists not is not born. What then can be born?" s ~ntadeva - not ~ntideva - is invariably the transcribed form found in Ati~a's Paa]ikt (288b 5; 288b 7; 299b 7; 329a 2; 329a 7) and probably the most authentic this being our earliest source for his name in its Sanskrit form. 6 For the six causes and the four conditions see TraitS, p. 2163-2181. 7 See below about these texts. - Madhyamakavaidalya does not refer to N~ig~irjuna's Vaidalyaprakara.na but to Aryadeva's Catuh.~ataka. 8 See note 74, above p. 205. 9 See note 16, above p. 201. 10 Cf. SDA 7-10. 11 These are the five ka.~ya (dyuh.-, drs.~-, klega-, sattva- and kalpa-), see Har Dayal (1932), p. 61. 12 Nearly all these texts are authentic.Akutobhayd, Ak.sara~ataka and Sa-listambavrtti are however of dubious authenticity, see my work mentioned note 3, above p. 198. To Ati~a N~g~rjuna is also the author ofBodhicittavivara.na (Pafi]ikd 325a 8; 325a 2-5), Niraupamyastava (298b 3),Paramdrthastava (284a 5) and *Nirdlambastava (?) (329b 5). 13 Here only *Maha-madhyamakavaidalya (which must be Catuh.~ataka) is decidedly genuine. Of *Atiguh-kalpavya-khyt~na nothing can be said at present. - To Ati~a .~tryadeva is also the author of Madhyamakabhramaghdta (Paafika- 325a 3), but this work is actually composed by Bhavya, see my article in ICZKSA XXVI. 14 These works are authentic but the list is not exhaustive, see my edition of Paacaskandhaprakara.na (1979), p. 88-92. Is See my list in ICZKSA XXVI. 16 This account requires some rectification. It was Gunadatta who like Avalokitavrata wrote a commentary to Praffta-pradipa, not Deva~arman whose *Sukldbhyudaya is quoted twice in Pra]aa-pradipa (cf. ICZKSO VII, p. 37-39). Moreover there is a fragment of Asafiga's commentary (Taish6 No. 1565) and a tradition that Ra-hula also commented upon Malamadhyamakaktirikti, see Traitb, p. 1374. - All the commentaries mentioned by Ati~a are still extant apart from those of Gunamati, Guna[rf and Gunadatta. However, only Prasannapadd is extant in Sanskrit and also the only commentary translated into European languages in its entirety. BIBLIOGRAPHY ~,ryadeva. Catuh.~ataka. TP, No. 5246, Tshafol. l b 2-20a 5. For Sanskrit fragments Vaidya (1923), p. 69-128. (Incomplete) Atyadeva. *Sataka. Taish6 No. 1569. Atia. Bodhipathaprad~pa, see Eimer (1978), p. 104-141. (Tib.-Germ.) Ati~a. Bodhimdrgadfpapa~fikd. TP, No. 5344, Ki fol. 277b 6 - 3 3 9 b 2. Bhavya. *Karatalaratna. Taish6 No. 1578. Bhavya. Madhyamakaratnapradfpa. TP, No. 5254, Tshafol. 326a 6-365a 8. Bhavya. Madhyamaka-rthasamgraha, see Ejima (1980), p. 18-23. (Tib.) Bhavya. Madhyamakahr.dayaka~ika-, see Ejima (1980), p. 268-361. (San.-Tib.) Bhavya. Tarkajva-M. TP, No. 5256, Dsafol. 43b 7-380a 7.
213
Candrakfrti. Madhyamalaivatdra. Traduction Tib6taine pubfi6e par Louis de La Vall6e Poussin. St-P6tersbourg 1907-1912: Bibliotheca Buddhica IX. Candrakfrti. Paacaskandhaprakarana. Tibetan text edited by Chr. Lindtner. Acta Orientalia 40 (1979), 87-145. Candiakfrti. Prasannapadd, in M~lamadhyamakaka~ikds de Ndgdr]una avec la Prasannapadd Commentaire de Candrak[rti. Publi6 par Louis de La Vall~ Poussin. St-P6tersbourg 1903-1913: Bibliotheca Buddhica IV. (Addenda by de Jong in llJ XX, p. 25-59 and p. 217-252.) Candtakfrti. Yukti.sas.ffkdvrtti. TP, No. 5265, Yafol. lb 1-33b 3. Dayal, H. (1932). The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Hterature. London: Kegan Paul. Dharmakfrti. Pramd.navdrttikal~rikd (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Edited by Yfisho Miyasaka. 1972: Narita-Shi Chiba-Ken. Elmer, H. (1978). Bodhipathaprad~pa. Ein Lehrgedicht des Ati~a (D~pamkara~rij~4na) in der tibetischen Lrberlieferung. Wiesbaden: Asiatische Forschungen, Band 59. Ejima, Y. (1980). Ch~gan-shisO no tenkai - Bhdvaviveka kenky~ [Development of M~dhyamika philosophy in India, studies in Bhvaviveka]. Tokyo: Shunjfisha. Hattori M. (1968). Digndga, On Perception, being the Pratyak.sapariccheda o f Digndga's Pramd.nasamuccaya. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Oriental Series XLVII. Hikata, R. (1958). SuvikrdntavikrdmipariprcchdPra]~a~ramitdsfftra. Edited with an introductory essay. Kyushu University. Fukuoka. Imanishi, J. (1975 ). Fragmente des Abhidharmaprakara.nabh(syam in Text und Crbersetzung. G6ttingen: Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in G~ttingen. I. Philologisch-HJstorische Klass. Jfifinagarbha. Satyadvayavibhatigaka-rikd, see note 16, p. 201. Jfi~nagarbha. Satyadvayavibhaligavrtti, see note 16, p. 201. Jfifina~Hmitra. Sa-ka-rasiddhi~dstra. In Jf~a-na~r~mitranibandhdvali. Edited by Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1959: Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series V. Jolly, J. (1977). Indian Medicine. Translated by C. G. Kashikar. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. de Jong, J. W. (1972). 'The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School', and 'Emptiness'. Both in JIP 2, 1-15. Kamala'sfla. Madhyamaka-lamla~rapa~]ikd. TP, No. 5286, Sa fol. 84b 7-143 b. Kamalaila.Madhyamaka'loka. TP, No. 5287, Safol. 143b 2-275a 4. Kamala fla. Sarvadharmdbhdvasiddhi. TP, No. 5289, Sa fol. 312a 5 - 385a 5. Kamalafla. Tattvasamgrahapa~]ikd, see ~,~ntarak.sita. Tattvasamgraha. Kambala. Alokama'ld (Sanskrit and ~betan). My edition, in preparation. Ko~a = L 'Abhidharmako~a de Vasubandhu. Traduction et annotations pax Louis de La Vall6e Poussin. Paris 1923-1931: Geuthner; J.-B. Istas. 6 vols. (Ref. to chapter and page) Lessing, F. D. and Wayman, A. (1978). Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems. Translated from Mkhas Grub Rje's Rgyud sde spyihi rnam par g~ag pa rgyas par br]od. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. May, J. (1959). Candrakfrti Prasannapada-Madhyamakavr.tti. Paris: Collection Jean Przyluski. Tome II. Mimaki, K. (1976). La R~futation Bouddhique de ia Permanence des Choses (Sthirasiddhidti.sa.na) et La Preuve de la Momentanbitk des Choses (K.sa.nabhahgasiddhD. Paris: Publications de l'lnstitut de Civilisation Indienne. Faseicule 41.
214
Murti, T. R. V. (1960). The CentralPhilosophy o f Buddhism. A Study of the M~dhyamika System. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Nfig~rjuna. For Acin~astava, Dharmadhdtustava, Bodhicittavivara.na, Loka-fftastava, Yukff.~s..ffkd and Sanyatdsaptati, see my Nagarjuniana Copenhagen 1982. N[gLrjuna. RatndvalL In Tucci, G. "The Ratn~valf of N~igftrjuna". JRAS 1934, p. 307325 ; 1936, p. 237-252,423-435. (Incomplete) N~g~rjuna. Vigrahavydvartan The Dialectical Method o f Ndgdr]una. Translated by K. Bhattacharya. Text critically edited by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst. Delhi 1978: Motilal Banarsidass. Pezzali, A. (1968). Santideva, mystique bouddhiste des VIIe et VIIIe sibcles. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore. Poussin, Louis de La Vallbe (1937). 'Documents d'Abhidharma. Les Deux, les Quatre, les Trois V~rit~s'. MCB V 159-187. Prajfi~karamati. Bodhicarydvatdrapa~/ika_ Commentary to the Bodhicarydvata-ra o f C~dntideva. Edited with indices [never appeared] by Louis de La ValiSe Poussin. Calcutta 1901-1914: Bibliotheca Indica. ILShulabhadra. Praffta-pdramita-stotra, see Hikata (1958), p. 1-2. (San.) ~dntadeva [~intideva]. Bodhi[sattva ] carydvatdra, see Prajf~karamati. ~fintara~ita. Madhyamaka-lamkdrakdrikd. TP, No. 5284, Sa fol. 48b 7-52b 1. ~ntara~ita. Madhyamaka-lam. kdravrtti. TP, No. 5285, Sa fol. 52b 1-84b 7. ~ntarak.sita. Satyadvayavibhahgapa~jikd. TP, No. 5283, Sa fol. 1b 1-48b 7. ~ntaraksita. Tattvasam. graha. Edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, with the Commentary "Pafijik~i" of Kamalafla. Varanasi 1968: Bauddha Bharati Series
I-II.
~,qntarak.sita. Vipaficitdrtha. Edited by Swami Dwaridas Shastri in Dharmak~rtinibandhdvali (2). Vtidanydyaprakara.nam... Sambandhapart-k.~. Varanasi 1972: Bauddha Bharati Series VIII. Siddhi = Vi]futptimdtratdsiddhL La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et annot~e par Louis de La Vall6e Poussin. Paris 1928-1948: Paul Geuthner. 3 vols. Sprung, M. (1973). Editor. The Problem o f two truths in Buddhism and Veddnta. Dordrecht-Holland / Boston-U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland. ~rfgupta. Tattvdvata-ravrtti. TP, No. 5292, Hafol. 44b 2-49a 5. Sthiramati. Trim~ika-bh@ya. Edited by Sylvain L~vi in Vi]fzaptimdtrata~iddhi: deux trait~s de Vasubandhu, Vim~atiluf et Trim. ~ik~. Paris 1925: Bibfioth~que de l'l~cole des hautes etudes. 245. TP = 7~betan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, reprinted under the supervision o f the Otani University, Kyoto. Ed. by D. T. Suzuki. 168 Vols. Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-1961.
Traitb = Le Trait~ de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Ndgdr]una (Mahdpra/fta-pdramitaMstra)

par l~tienne Lamotte. Louvain 1949-1980: Institut Orientaliste. 5 vols. Vaidya, P. L. (1923). Etudes sur Aryadeva et son Catuh.~ataka. Paris: Paul Geuthner. (See also May (1959), p. 26; TraitS, p. 1371-1372) Wayman, A. (1978). Translator. Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, Buddhist Meditation and the Middle View. From the Lam rim chen mo o f Tsoti-kha-pa. New York: Columbia University Press. Williams, P. M. (1980). 'Some aspects of Language and Construction in the Madhyamaka." JIP VHI 1-45.

Atiśa S Introduction To The Two Truths and Its Sources

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CHR.

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO T H E TWO T R U T H S , AND ITS S O U R C E S

ATI~A'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ganyatd by utilizing the logical instruments inherited from Dignhga and

Paramdrtha is simply the fact [of emptiness].

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

Tsafol. 23b 8 - 2 4 a 4) with an Yuktisast.ikdvr.tti (TP, No. 5265, Yafol. 23a 2 -

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

3. Here at first an account of [the two kinds of] relative truth. -

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

(sam.vr.tidharrna) and understanding dharma) cannot be understood. ''4a

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

(pradhana) among Buddhists.

5. Bodhicarydvatdrapa~jikd ad Bodhi[sattva] caryffvatdra IX, 2 (ed. Louis de

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

CHR. LINDTNER SATYADVAYAVATARA

INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO THE TWO T R U T H S

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO THE TWO T R U T H S

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO THE TWO T R U T H S

indriydndm tram acivdn //.

ba mi idan bden (min)te).

dhiyti / pratis.edhas tathd ndyam ndto dos.o yathoditah. //.

yathdtmadMh. /. ss See Koga II, p. 147; Vipaficitdrtha (ed. Shastri), p. 78.

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO THE TWO T R U T H S

nirak.sardrn . . . 78 Based on Madhyamaka-vatdra, p. 70-71. Cf. MCB V, p. 165.

Bodhimdrgadfpapa~fikd, does n o t seem to have received the a t t e n t i o n to

ATISA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS

2. Kulaputra, by which method does such an insight (prajad) manifest itself

A T I S A ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N TO THE TWO T R U T H S

Traitb = Le Trait~ de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Ndgdr]una (Mahdpra/fta-pdramitaMstra)

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