1 S209024 Prof.

Rowe International Terrorism 5/9/12 Final Paper Violence is the use of unrestrained physical force for the sake of intentionally harming another. It is the capability of inflicting enough physical suffering on someone so that it becomes their world1 alleviating the pain becomes the sufferers only thought. Practically speaking, violence implies having the ability to kill someone. Since human beings (by nature) do not want to be subject to violence, the threat of it makes for a good coercion tool. To extrapolate, a major reason why people follow laws is that they believe the state is capable of enforcing them by whatever means necessary (if one is caught stealing in the United States, a gun-carrying, trained police officer will handcuff and arrest them). The (apparent) monopoly on violence then serves as the foundation of law and order. In other words, political power is derived from appearing to have a monopoly over the use of violence within defined geographic borders. The within defined geographic borders part is important because it implies that the state is militaristically strong enough to both wipe out violent competition within the state and protect citizens from those outside of the state. A states primary function is to protect human beings from each other it is where political legitimacy comes from. The point is that civilians should not have to be subject to violence, and in the event that it happens the state has the power to effectively punish the perpetrators and discourage others (including other states agents) by the threat of overwhelming force. Furthermore, the
1

Class definition.

2 more seemingly capable of violence a state is the more sway it holds internationally. A small, unstable country will not declare war on an economic juggernaut with unsurpassed military strength and proceed to attack it because it would be effortlessly defeated. On September 10th, 2001 one could forgive American citizens for feeling invulnerable. The United States was the most dominant international power in history, with the Gulf War revealing its insurmountable economic and militaristic advantages over the rest of the world2. There was no need to fear a war on American soil because it was assumed that any aggressors would be promptly dealt with. While the United States had not used nuclear weapons in the literal sense since the end of World War II, they used them in that they are a constant reminder of American power3. Nuclear weapons remain the most efficient and brutally effective tools of violence, so merely possessing them in vast quantities sends a message to the rest of the world. Then, two hijacked planes flew into the World Trade Center on September 11th. The 9/11 Commission Report estimates that 2,973 people were killed in the 9/11 attacks (311). The attacks were by far the most horrific display of violence against American civilians in the history of the United States. The destruction of the World Trade Center could be interpreted as an assault on American unipolarity and affluence. Americans consequently wanted swift, emphatic action against those responsible they wanted the United States to unrestrainedly exercise its military force. Yet, sating the ensuing bloodlust in the American people was not quite possible in the sense that the events of 9/11 were not acts of war by a state that the United States could immediately and absolutely obliterate. No autonomous states claimed full responsibility for the attacks
2 3

Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs 70(1990/1991): 24. Class Notes.

3 and it turned out that one terrorist group, Al Qaeda, and its leader Osama bin Laden were behind it. Since the states primary function is to protect its citizens, 9/11 represented a disastrous failure on that front. The use of violence against civilians compromises the regimes legitimacy and therefore the attacks demanded an immediate response. As a result, one of President Bushs first messages to the American people after 9/11 was to ensure them of their safety and to announce that the United States would do whatever necessary to find the terrorist perpetrators and bring them to justice4. America would use its unrivaled capacity for violence to eliminate the terrorist threat. Yet, that requires comprehensively and objectively understanding terrorism. As the 9/11 attacks emotionally devastated countless Americans, it is morally satisfying for them to define Al Qaeda and bin Laden purely as evil, psychopathic mass-murderers who resent their liberal freedoms. However, dismissing Al Qaedas motives in such arbitrary terms is a shortcut that makes achieving any sort of real understanding impossible. As difficult as it may be to do as an American, it is better to try and think like a member of Al Qaeda and identify their moral logic. With respect to 9/11, it is important to try and see bin Ladens goals as more complicated than just instilling fear in Americans. Al Qaeda was trying to upset the political status quo through the use of violence5. As a result, terrorism is fundamentally the use of violence by non-state actors to try and achieve political change6. Terrorists believe that using violence, the foundation of political power, against a state will compromise the regimes legitimacy and shake up the
4 5

Class Notes. This is not to validate terrorist motivations there is a stark difference between validation and understanding. 6 Ibid.

4 established order. In this sense, terrorists are actually hopeful. They commit violence because they hope it will result in a more morally just political future. As a result, terrorist acts are inherently moral acts that make moral claims7. Sickening as it may sound, the hijackers on 9/11 believed that they were giving their lives meaning and making a positive impact on the future by flying into the World Trade Center. It was not just a matter of meeting fifty virgins in heaven it was a serious, moral claim. This begs the complicated question of why terrorists have to use violence. It appears hypocritical that one would kill others while simultaneously claiming moral correctness (unless they believe they are fighting a cosmic war8). And in general, when discussing terrorism it is crucial to distinguish between justification and understanding. That being said, terrorists often feel the need to resort to violence when they cannot achieve a desired change through the political system. In the United States, extreme pro-life activists attempt to bomb abortion clinics because attempts to illegalize abortion have failed and they, finding abortion to be so abhorrent, are subsequently faced with a moral choice. Put bluntly, do they allow for the continued killing of babies? Or, do they use whatever means necessary (including violence) to try and end it? One could take it even further by saying that by not unrestrainedly acting against abortion that they are allowing it to happen. If an abortion clinic is bombed, could such a powerful, passionate display sway politicians in a more pro-life direction? While the last question invokes a ridiculous leap of logic and the hypothetical viewpoint is quite radical, it theoretically does explain why people become terrorists. People feel morally disadvantaged by their political situation and, seeing no other
7 8

Ibid. Ibid.

5 alternatives, turn to violence in hopes of triggering positive political change. Ironically, one of the best examples of this comes from the revered Nelson Mandela, As I condemned the government for its ruthless and lawless, I overstepped the line: I said the time for passive resistance had ended, that non-violence was a useless strategy and could never overturn a white minority regime bent on retaining its power at any cost. At the end of the day I said that violence was the only weapon that would destroy apartheid and we must be prepared, in the near future, to use that weapon9 Mandela was forced into a similar quandary as the pro-life extremist. As all other attempts to fight apartheid had failed, he felt that the only two options were to use violence or remain oppressed. The political system offered no mechanism for achieving the desired change and consequently forced Mandela to morally prioritize. Hence, people become terrorists and use violence because all other options have failed. If terrorism results from people feeling morally oppressed due to (what they view as) an unjust society, it becomes difficult for America to fully eliminate the terrorist threat. By nature, even the most theoretically liberal state will disadvantage certain groups of people10. The realities of economic scarcity lead to a fortunate few enjoying a significantly better quality of life than others, sometimes without having done anything to earn their money. In this sense, ordered society is the root cause of terrorism. While there are clearly better ways of dealing with terrorism (and specific terrorist groups) than others, the concept of people resorting to violence for the sake of political change is an inevitable side effect of society11. This defines the terrorist threat facing America as one that cannot be eliminated
9

Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom 136. Class Notes. 11 Class Notes

10

6 with a nuke; which raises the question of how exactly a liberal state should deal with terrorism. Americas fundamental values as a liberal state come from John Lockes idea of natural rights that human beings universally wish to live free of violence, maintain control their property, and live freely. The point is to establish a state wherein people freely live their lives with minimal government interference. Liberal governments, existing to protect citizens aforementioned rights, still require effective political power meaning that they still need to monopolize the use of violence within the states borders to maintain law and order and protect from outside threats. Terrorism is not a typical outside threat though. The United States surplus of nuclear weapons did not protect it from suffering the worst terrorist attack in history. Rather than being a war based on military might, terrorism creates an endless series of battles over information12. For example, had the United States possessed the necessary intelligence, 9/11 would have been averted. Obtaining said information is obviously easier said than done though. If one is planning to attack the United States from within (a sleeper cell), they can use Americas laws as a shield13. To elaborate, the American government cannot (theoretically) do anything to anyone unless they break the law. This means that if a potential terrorist stays clean, then the government is (theoretically) powerless. They cannot (theoretically) invade citizens privacy on a hunch that they may be planning an attack. I repeat theoretically because the implication here is that effectively fighting terrorism forces the United States to compromise its liberal ideals. As preventing another 9/11 obviously takes precedence over the philosophic gratification resulting from adherence to these values, playing strictly by the liberal rulebook is out of the question.
12 13

Ibid. Ibid.

7 The larger issue raised is that of escalation. Since 9/11, the most prevalent terrorist threat has come from Al Qaeda and those with similar ideologies (due to increasing involvement in the Middle East). As a result, while unethical it makes more sense for the government to profile based on factors common to Al Qaeda members than to screen 80-year old women at the airport14. Furthermore, if there is a chance that an American citizen has knowledge regarding terrorist attacks then the problem of interrogation arises. Torture basically amounts to the use of violence (short of killing someone) for coercion purposes. In the event that a detained citizen may have information regarding a potential terrorist attack does that justify the use of torture? Would it justify torturing their family in front of them if it could prevent a nuclear attack? The obvious problem here is that torturing a citizen goes completely against the values of the state15. Using violence against someone who only has a small chance of being guilty, when the point of government is to protect citizens from violence creates insurmountable philosophic dissonance. More so than any specific organization, the biggest challenge facing liberal states (such as the United States) from terrorism is this conflict with inherent values. Liberalism as an ideology is not equipped for dealing with these problems. A third paradigm is obviously needed16 yet how can one effectively counter terrorism (acquire information), when the overriding political ideology blocks it? Although Al Qaeda has been the only organization to succeed in committing massive acts of violence against Americans the terrorist threat to the United States
14 15

Class Notes Ibid. 16 Etzioni, Amitai. "Terrorists: Neither Soldiers nor Criminals." Military Review 89, no. 4 (2009): 109

8 consequently extends far beyond that organization. As the United States is considerably involved in international affairs and throws its considerable weight around a fair amount, there is a strong likelihood of plenty of new potential terrorists coming about. The attempts to fight terrorism in the Middle East via the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also probably led to another wave of terrorists and ironically enough the occasional suspension of civil liberties in America have undoubtedly made some question the regime. Additionally, terrorism itself has become exponentially more deadly over the past fifty years for the simple reason of technological escalation. If such a relatively small organization was capable of killing thousands and radically affecting international relations and economics at a relatively low cost17 then it bodes poorly for the future. Although nuclear proliferation appears to be far away acts of violence have never been more efficiently and cheaply committed. The United States and the rest of the west face an enormously complicated problem that becomes steadily worse over the course of time, while effectively dealing with the problem requires completely departing from defining values.

17

Richard K. Betts, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror, Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002): 25.