Why US National Intelligence Estimates Predict That The European Missile Defense System Will Fail

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group
Why US National Intelligence Estimates Predict that the European Missile Defense System Will Fail
Technological Issues Relevant to Policy
Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Voice: 617 253-8077; FAX: 617 258-5750; e-mail: postol@mit.edu
Plenary Lecture German Physical Society Berlin, Germany February 29, 2008
Major Issue
Major Issue
The US Intelligence Community Believes that Any Country with the Technology and Industrial Capacity to Field ICBMs Will Also Have the Technology to Field Certain Countermeasures. These Countermeasures Include:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Separating RVs Spin-Stabilized RVs RV Reorientation Radar Absorbing Material (RAM) Booster Fragmentation Low-Power Jammers Chaff Simple (Balloon) Decoys
Major Consequence
If these countermeasures can be fielded, they will totally defeat any and all current and future exoatmospheric US missile defenses
Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(1 of 2)
Major Findings (1 of 2)
x The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) cannot do the job (of discrimination). Simply speaking, it will not have sufficient detection ranges against warheads to function as a useful element of the defense. x The GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway, will instead be needed to perform the discrimination functions for the European Missile Defense. x The Forward-Based X-band radar (FBX) will, at best, only be able to perform limited initial tracking and discrimination against warheads launched from Iran. x All tracking/cuing over Europe will have to be performed by the lowfrequency early warning radar at Fylingsdale, England. x That radar will not even have the resolution to tell the difference between a real warhead and a 0.3 m length of wire. x One pound of 0.3 m aluminum covered glass wires could produce hundreds of thousands of false radar targets that would be indistinguishable from actual warheads.
Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(2 of 2)
Major Findings (2 of 2)
x The only available discrimination service for support of the Fylingsdale radar will have to come from the GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway. It appears that be Norwegian government has not yet informed the Norwegian population about this critical role for the Vardo radar. x If the Bush administrations unsupported assertions about the nature of the Iranian ballistic missile threat were to be correct, the interceptor farms that the US wants to deploy in Poland will have to be expanded. x Even if all the current deficiencies in the US proposed missile defense for Europe are corrected, and the necessary upgrades are made, the US intelligence community predicts that the first Iranian IRBMs and ICBMs will be will be able to defeat the upgraded European Missile Defense.
False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense
IMPORTANT FACT IGNORED BY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY x The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of warheads at X-Band is roughly 10 times larger than that of a Locust! x With RV orientation and/or RAM, the RCS of a warhead at X-Band can easily be made comparable to or smaller than the RCS of a Locust.
Discrimination Ranges PREDICTED for EMR and FBX Radars by the Missile Defense Agency
Clear Grand Forks Thule
Locations of Postulated ICBMs Launched from Iran to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=1.00 m2 Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=1.00 m2
Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the EMR and FBX Radars
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=0.01 m2
False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense
IMPORTANT FACT NOT DISCUSSED BY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY x The Only Radar Capable of Providing a Discrimination Service for the US Proposed European Missile Defense is the GLOBUS II X-Band Intelligence Radar at Vardo, Norway. x GLOBUS II Caused a Scandal in 1999 in Norway When It Was Discovered that the MOD Made False Claims About Its Actual Purpose to the Norwegian Parliament.
Radar-Range Fans for Vardo and US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars
Clear Grand Forks
Thule
Cape Cod
Cape Cod Tracking Vardo Tracking Thule Tracking
Thule Tracking
Vardo
Vardo Tracking
Range-Fan for S/N=100 with One Pulse and RCS=0.01 m2
Fylingsdale Tracking Fylingsdale Tracking EMR Tracking
Fylingsdale EMR EMR
Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

Locations of ICBM EMR Line-of Sight
EMR Tracking
Fylingsdale Line-of Sight FBX Cape Cod Line-of Sight Thule Line-of Sight Vardo Line-of Sight
Requirements for Expanded Numbers of Interceptors
Locations of Launch Sites Associated with European and US Missile Defenses
Interceptor Clear Farm Grand Forks Thule
US Interceptor Launch Site European Interceptor Launch Site
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Interceptor Farm
FBX
Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site
United States Capitol
Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site
United States Capitol
Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles
Throw Weights of Potential ICBMs to 10,000 Kilometers Range
Minuteman III Warhead
Midgetman ICBM Launch Weight 30,000 lbs Throw Weight 1000 lbs
Minuteman III Launch Weight 75,000 lbs Throw Weight 2,500 lbs
European GBI Launch Weight 49,500 lbs Throw Weight 1,500 lbs
Coverage of the Missile Defense Radars
Locations of Radars Associated with European and US Missile Defenses
Interceptor Clear Farm Grand Forks Thule
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Interceptor Farm
FBX
Clear Grand Forks
Thule
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR EMR
FBX
Clear Grand Forks
Thule
Cape Cod
Cape Cod Tracking Vardo Tracking Thule Tracking
Thule Tracking
Vardo
Vardo Tracking
Fylingsdale Tracking Fylingsdale Tracking EMR Tracking
Fylingsdale EMR EMR

Locations of ICBM EMR Line-of Sight
EMR Tracking
Fylingsdale Line-of Sight FBX Cape Cod Line-of Sight Thule Line-of Sight Vardo Line-of Sight
Relative Size of the Different Radars
Comparison of the Relative Sizes and Average Power of the Fylingsdale UEWR, the GLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar
Globus II UEWR
PAVE PAWS 31 meter Diameter ~ 755 m2 Antenna Area 150 KW Average Power
FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area 30 70 KW Average Power
FBX
GLOBUS II 27 meter Diameter ~ 570 m2 Antenna Area 150 KW Average Power
Comparison of the Relative Sizes of the European Midcourse Radar, the GLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar
EMR 105 m2 Antenna Area ~ 20 - 30 KW Average Power
GLOBUS II ~ 570 m2 Antenna Area 27 meter Diameter 150 KW Average Power
FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area 50 60 KW Average Power
The Forward-Based X-Band Radar (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition Abilities Against 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than 1000 km
Initial Discrimination Range Capabilities: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 390 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 1.2 Watts Average Power per T/R Module Ugraded Discrimination Range Capabilities: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 490 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R Module Tracking Range With Upgrades: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 020, 730 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R Module
US Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments
Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures
US Intelligence findings predict that even an upgraded US Missile Defense will be defeated by postulated Iranian/ North Korean ICBMs when they are first deployed!
Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat

Statement for the Record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 by Robert D. Walpole National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs September 16, 1999
Penetration Aids and Countermeasures We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies. x Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology including separating
RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoysto develop penetration aids and countermeasures.
x These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North Korea. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures. We assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to US theater and national missile defenses by deploying larger forces, penetration aids, and countermeasures. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably will sell some related technologies. Many of these countries probably have considered ballistic missile defense countermeasures. Historically, the development and deployment of missile defense systems have been accompanied by the development of countermeasures and penetration aids by potential adversaries, either in reaction to the threat or in anticipation of it. The Russians and Chinese have had countermeasure programs for decades and are probably willing to transfer some related technology to others. We expect that during the next 15 years, countries other than Russia and China will develop countermeasures to Theater and National Missile Defenses.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm
Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures Speeches & Testimony Iranian Ballistic Missile, WMD Threat to the US
The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 2015 Statement for the Record to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs (as prepared for delivery) September 21, 2000
2006-2010. Most believe Iran will likely test an IRBMprobably based on Russian assistance during this period. All assess that Iran could flight test an ICBM that could deliver nuclear weapon-sized payloads to many parts of the United States in the latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over the years. Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures. Many countries, such as Iran, probably will rely initially on readily available technologies to develop penetration aids and countermeasures, including: separating RVs, radar absorbent material, booster fragmentation, jammers, chaff, and decoys. These countries could develop some countermeasures by the time they flight-test their missiles. More advanced technologies could be available over the longer term. Some of the factors that will influence a nations countermeasures include: the effectiveness weighed against their cost, complexity, reduction in range-payload capability; foreign assistance; and the ability to conduct realistic tests.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/walpole_missile_092200
How the Countermeasures Work
Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats

First Generation Countermeasures Predicted by the US Intelligence Community
Separating RVs
Radical reductions in the radar detectivity of warheads against X-Band radars (Cross Sections of 0.01 m2 or less)
Spin-Stabilized RVs
Removal of potentially exploitable fluctuations in the size of an otherwise tumbling warheads X-Band Radar Cross Section. These can be used to increase detection ranges relative to tumbling warheads
RV Reorientation
Guarantee that warheads are oriented so as to minimize the X-Band radars detection range against the warhead
Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)

Guarantee that warheads will be invisible to the X-Band radar. Also confounds discrimination by X-Band Radars
Booster Fragmentation
Hides the low-Radar Cross Section warhead among numerous low and high Radar Cross Section fragments
Low-Power Jammers
Eliminates the ability of the X-Band radar to detect, track, or discriminate against either warheads or decoys. A dumb jammer of roughly 0.1 Watts would be adequate for defeating the proposed European Midcourse Radar to be located in the Czech Republic.
Chaff
100 grams of Chaff could easily hide a warhead or a decoy from the X-Band radar. The countermeasure would deply many clouds of Chaff, some of which contain warheads, decoys, or nothing, to overwhelm the X-band radars
Simple (Balloon) Decoys

Could be used to degrade the ability of kill vehicle to hit the warhead (note US anti-satellite attack on an alleged tank of Hydrazine). More importantly, can make it impossible for Kill Vehicle to know which of many balloons might contain a warhead. Can also be filled with radar absorbing foams, to make the balloons and warheads invisible to the X-Band radars
Separating RVs, Spin Stabilized RVs and Re-Oriented RV Countermeasures to the Defense
Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead
Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation
0.003 m2
Radar Cross Section of ICBM Upper Rocket Stages

Radar Cross Section of Circular Cylinders at Frequencies of 0.10 and 10.0 GHz
60 50 40 30
Cylinder Dimensions Approximate Titan II

3m Diameter x 30m Length
Rocket Motor Behaves Like Radar Corner Reflector Rocket Motor Radar Cross Section at X-Band
50
RCS - dBsm
20 10 0 -10 -20 RCS at 0.1 GHz

Cylinder with Endplates No Endplates Cylinder with Endplates
RCS at 10 GHz
-30 Spin Stabilized Warheads
Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation -40

-50 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Cylinder with No Endplates
70
80
90
Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]
Radar-Range Fans for 1 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=1.00 m2 Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=1.00 m2
Radar-Range Fans for 0.01 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars
Cape Cod
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR
Radar-Range Fans for US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars
Cape Cod
Vardo
1 m2 RCS 0.01 m2 RCS

EMR
Fylingsdale
Radar Absorbing Materials (RAM) Countermeasures to the Defense
Properties of Radar Absorbing Materials at Frequencies at or Near X-Band
Frequency of GBR X-Band Radar
Graded dielectric reticulated foam radar absorbing material. This material is about 1.9 centimeters thick and weighs about 3 ounces per square foot.
Resonant radar absorbing covering. This absorber is tuned to 8.5 GHz. It is roughly 1.8 centimeters thick and weighs about 1.1 pound per square foot.
Data from: Richard N. Johnson, Radar Absorbing Material: A Passive Role in An Active Scenario, The International Countermeasures Handbook, 11th Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc.,
Radar Absorbing Materials
Dual-band radar absorber with resonant absorbtion at 9 and 18 GHz. This material is about .45 centimeters thick and weighs about 1.5 pounds per square foot.
Booster Fragmentation Countermeasures to the Defense
False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT), Booster Fragmentation
False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT), Booster Fragmentation
6 Ft Man and Minuteman Warhead

Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program, The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201
Low-Power Jammer Countermeasures to the Defense
X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power 2 Watts, Peak Power 10 Watts
2.66 inches
1.05 in
Low-Power Jammers?
Devices that Can Be Used to Build X-band Jammers
Devices that Can Be Used to Build Low-Power X-band Jammers Low-Power Jammers
Chaff Countermeasures to the Defense
Defense Exhaustion Strategy Using Chaff Chaff
Weight and Frequency Dependence of Chaff

Roughly 100 grams or less of Chaff will Conceal a Warhead/Decoy for 10 to 20 minutes from an X-Band Radar!
Chaff
One Kilogram of Chaff Reflects More Than 1 million Times More Radar Signal than a Single Warhead
NOTE: Nose-On RCS of a RoundBack Cone-Shaped Warhead with a Pointy Nosetip at X-Band is About .0001 m2.
Frequency dependence of the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of chaff. The RCS per dipole is inversely proportional to radar frequency. This effect can be offset by reducing the dipole diameter as frequency increases. The data shown above is from R. Layne DuBose, Chaff Systems for Ships Defense, The International Countermeasures Handbook, 11th Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc., Palo Alto, California, pp.343-349.
Radar Cross Section of Chaff Dipoles
Chaff
The peak radar cross section of a tuned dipole is.
SO2
4
# .8O2
The average radar cross section of a randomly oriented tuned dipole is,
3V # .15O2 16
Radar Cross Sections of Various Shapes of Interest in Ballistic Missile Defense Applications Chaff
Balloon Countermeasures to the Defense
Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands

Targets As They Might Be Seen at 200 kilometers range ~20 seconds to impact, lateral separation ~3.5 km?, total divert ~.5 km/sec?
Target 7 Observed Brightness Target 1 Observed Brightness Target 2 Observed Brightness Target 6 Observed Brightness
Target 5 Observed Brightness
Target 3 Observed Brightness Target 9 Observed Brightness
Balloons
IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 250 km for FOV 1 1.5
2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead) Mock Warhead
~3 km
Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon
Balloons
~3.5 km
Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads
Large Balloon With Reflecting Coating
2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon With Black Coating
Balloon With White Coating
Light Rigid Replica Decoy
Minuteman Inflatable Decoy
Minuteman Warhead
Balloons
Statement Indicating that Top Management of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Knew About the Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-1A Experiment
"So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we expected. It presents a problem for the system that we didn't expect,"
Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, while being filmed by 60 Minutes II after learning that the 2.2 meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly) during the IFT-5 experiment
Balloons
IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 250 km for FOV 1 1.5
2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead) Mock Warhead
~3 km
Balloon Canister is Now the Least Bright Object: Hence, the Balloon Canister Looks Like the Warhead
Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon
Balloons
~3.5 km
Further Observations and Conclusions
Observations and Conclusions
Observations and Conclusions

x The Bush administration has been systematically providing inaccurate information to its European allies (and apparently to NATO) about the US proposed missile defense for Europe. x It is highly implausible that this campaign of providing such basically false technical information was or is an accident. x The implications of these US actions, and the passive response to it by the European allies and NATO, raises serious questions about the future of USEuropean security relations. x These problems will almost certainly be solved by any of the US Presidential candidates when they take the office, but the European allies should not assume that the US was solely to blame for this deplorable historical incident in US-European security relations.
Appendix
False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense
European Interceptors and Radars Cannot Possibly Defend Northern Japan
European Interceptors Are Fast Enough to Overtake and Intercept Russian ICBMs
The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for the European Defense System
Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
Orion 50XL Rocket Stage
Estimated Dimensions and Weight of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle
Rocket Components Shroud Payload (Kill Vehicle) Payload Adaptor 1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) Total Length (ft) 11.6 --33.8 11.7 51.4 Diameter (ft) 4.17 --4.17 4.17 -Component Weight (lbs) 200 155 -37,800 9,500 47,655
Orion 50XLG Rocket Stage
Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle

Rocket Components Shroud Payload (Kill Vehicle) Payload Adaptor 1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) Total Burn Time (sec) ---70 70 140 Vacuum Specific Impulse (sec) ---295 289 -Vacuum Thrust (lbs) ---149,500 36,000 -Component Weight (lbs) 200 155 -37,800 9,500 47,655 Propellant Weight (lbs) ---35,480 8,680 -2,320 820 0.0614 0.0859 Empty Weight (lbs) Empty/Full Mass Fraction
Pegasus Launch Vehicle
Ground-Based Interceptor Achieves 6.3 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 1950 lbs
Orbital Sciences GBI
Ground-Based Interceptor Achieves 8.5 to 8.7 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 220 to 155 lbs
The GBI Has a Higher Lift Capability than the US Midgetman ICBM!
Midgetman ICBM
The Ground-Based Interceptor Can Carry a Full Minuteman III BUS and Three Warheads to 6,000+ Kilometers
Minuteman Shroud, Warheads, and BUS
European Interceptors and Radars Cannot Possibly Defend Northern Japan
European Interceptors Are Fast Enough to Overtake and Intercept Russian ICBMs
The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for the European Defense System
False Claim That Japan Can Be Defended from Europe

False Claims Made in Presentations to European (and Japanese?) Allies by Missile Defense Agency that US Proposed European Missile Defense Can Defend Northern Japan
NO PLAUSIBLE WAY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEM TO OBTAIN PRECISION TRACKING DATA NEEDED TO GUIDE INTERCEPTORS FROM ALASKA!
X-Band Radar in Czech Republic Below Radar Horizon
Sea-Based X-Band Radar Off Adak Below Radar Horizon
FBX in Eastern Turkey too Far from Missile Trajectory to Track the Deployed Warhead (RCS ~ 0.01m2)
Launch from Iran
False Claim That Interceptors Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles

Interceptor launched 250-300 sec after threat 1,200 sec 1,000 sec 800 sec ICBM Apogee 600 sec 400 sec ICBM Burnout
Russian ICBM
Moscow
Interceptor
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved for Public Release 07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07) ms-109673B / 061407
27
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles

Interceptor launched 250-300 sec after threat 1,200 sec 1,000 sec 800 sec ICBM Apogee 600 sec 400 sec ICBM Burnout
Russian ICBM Russian ICBM Trajectory

Moscow
Interceptor
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved for Public Release 07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07) ms-109673B / 061407
27

Location of SS-18/19 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight
SS-18/19 Powered Flight Profile

500
Burnout (340sec)
Locations Every 5 Seconds
400
Altitude (km)
300
200
Second Stage Ignition I t t
100
0 800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Range (km)

Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-18/19 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia
Interceptor Completes Powered Flight
ICBM Burnout (SS-18/19) at 300 seconds also Launch of Interceptor from Poland ICBM Breaks Radar Horizon
4 3
9 8.5
8 7.5
6.5 5.5 4.5 3.5
1 minute
300 seconds
1 0 minutes
2.5 minutes

Location of SS-25 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight
SS-25 Powered Flight Profile

500 Locations Every 5 Seconds 400
Altitude (km)
300
Burnout (170 sec)
200
Third Stage Ignition I t t
100
0 800
Second Stage Ignition I t t
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Range (km)

Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-25/27 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia
Interceptor Completes Powered Flight ICBM Burnout (SS-27) at 180 seconds also Launch of Interceptor from Poland 3 ICBM Breaks Radar Horizon 2 3.5 1 minute 2.5 minutes
3 2
4 6 5 4.5
180 seconds
1 0 minutes

Intercept Points for Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-25/27 and SS-18/19 ICBMs Launched from Vypolzovo Russia
Intercept Point Against SS-18/19 ICBM
Intercept Point Against SS-25/27 ICBM
False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense
False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense
Clear Grand Forks
Thule
Vardo
Fylingsdale EMR EMR
FBX
Appendix
Statements Made by Responsible US Officials
Some Notable Quotes

"As you see, if there are Russian launches from interceptor sites we could establish tracks on those, but although we can establish those coverages the interceptors cannot catch them." LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. TREY OBERING, III Director, Missile Defense Agency March 1, 2007 Q&A SESSION http://prague.usembassy.gov/obering-mar1.html As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia." http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/roo050307.htm "U.S. missile defense plans are neither directed at nor a threat to Russia. Due to the location and capabilities of the European missile defense assets, the proposed system would have no capability against Russian ICBMs." Missile Defense Cooperation U.S. Missile Defense Factsheet http://prague.usembassy.gov/md704-factsheet.html "Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limited capabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the European-based assets would have no capability against Russian ICBMs launched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran." Brian R. Green Statement for the Record to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 3/27/07 http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat032707/Green_Testimony032707.pdf
Some Notable Quotes
"First of all, these interceptors, the radars, are not designed against the Russian threat. You're not going to counter the hundreds of Russian ICBMs and the thousands of warheads that are represented by that fleet with 10 interceptors in a field in Europe. The radar that we were putting there -- first of all, it is designed against the Middle Eastern threat, not against the Russian threat. With the radar that we have there that we have proposed, it is a very narrow beam radar. It has to be queued. And so even if we wanted to try to track Russian missiles with that radar, we could only track a very, very small percentage of those missiles. And even if we could, passing that information off and having an interceptor try to intercept the Russian missile, we can't do it. The interceptors that we would place in Europe are not fast enough to catch the Russian ICBMs. We're in a tail chase from a location in Poland and if you'd like, in that -- in response to any questions, I can show you some slides on that as well. " AIR FORCE LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2007, 12:00 P.M. EST http://kiev.usembassy.gov/files/070223_missile_defense_eng.html "MR. HADLEY: Of course the deployment that we're talking about in Europe is not about Russia at all. It's not aimed at Russia. The systems we would deploy do not have capability of any significant character against Russian ICBMs destined for the -- that are aimed at the United States. Just doesn't have any capability." Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley on the President's Trip to the G8 Summit and Europe White House Conference Center Briefing Room June 1, 2007 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070601-11.html

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MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(1 of 2)

Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(2 of 2)

Clear Grand Forks Thule

Clear Grand Forks Thule

Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=0.01 m2

Clear Grand Forks

Range-Fan for S/N=100 with One Pulse and RCS=0.01 m2

Fylingsdale Tracking Fylingsdale Tracking EMR Tracking

Fylingsdale EMR EMR

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

Requirements for Expanded Numbers of Interceptors

Locations of Launch Sites Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

Interceptor Clear Farm Grand Forks Thule

US Interceptor Launch Site European Interceptor Launch Site

Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United States Capitol

Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United States Capitol

Throw Weights of Potential ICBMs to 10,000 Kilometers Range

Minuteman III Warhead

Minuteman III Warhead

Minuteman III Warhead

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

Coverage of the Missile Defense Radars

Locations of Radars Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

Interceptor Clear Farm Grand Forks Thule

Clear Grand Forks

Range-Fan for S/N=100 with One Pulse and RCS=0.01 m2

Fylingsdale EMR EMR

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

Clear Grand Forks

Range-Fan for S/N=100 with One Pulse and RCS=0.01 m2

Fylingsdale Tracking Fylingsdale Tracking EMR Tracking

Fylingsdale EMR EMR

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration and RCS=0.01 m2

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

Relative Size of the Different Radars

FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area 30 70 KW Average Power

GLOBUS II 27 meter Diameter ~ 570 m2 Antenna Area 150 KW Average Power

EMR 105 m2 Antenna Area ~ 20 - 30 KW Average Power

GLOBUS II ~ 570 m2 Antenna Area 27 meter Diameter 150 KW Average Power

FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area 50 60 KW Average Power

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

US Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments

Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures

Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat

Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

How the Countermeasures Work

Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats

Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)

Simple (Balloon) Decoys

MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group

Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead

Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation