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What is a good international citizen?

Citizenship can be conceived as a series of expanding circle which are pushed forward by the momentum of conflict and struggle (Turner 1986) It is time to go higher in our search for citizenship,but also lower and wider. Higher to the world, lower to the locality...The citizen has been both too puffed up and too compressed. (Wright 1990) I Senator Evanss proposal that good international citizenship should be a central premis of Australia foreign policy forms the background to the present discussion (Evans 1989a, 1989b). When advocating good international citizenship, Senator Evans does not claim that the pursuit of intenational interest must be renounced fortwith. Instead,the argument is that foreign policy must also be animated by more elevated concerns surc as promoting world order, encouraging global reform and honouring duties to humanity. The good international citizen will blend the best in to use Senator Evanss own terminology realism and idealism. Although few will contest the proposition that foreign policy should be inform more by than strictly national concers, this does not mean that various complexities can be quickly set to one side. The normative defence of good intenational citizenship is a complex theoretical issue in its own right. Deciding the relative importance of national interest, international order and considerations of humanity for good international citizenship is a second complexity. A third a tes for the diplomatic imagination is how to formulate a coherent vision of Austarlian foreignpolicy that specifies the goals and the responsibilities of the good intenational citizen in the region and elsewhere. Complexities aside, the notion of good intenational citizen is an attractive one for at least three reasons. In the first place, it promises to overcome the conflict between citizenship an humanity that has been a recurrent feature of the theory and practice of international relations. Second, it appeals as one of the new concepts and ideals that Hedley Bull (1983 : 127 31) called for in his searching comments on the mounting problems of world order in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, its attractiveness is further underlined by the way in which recent patterns of global change have prompted the reconsideration of some past diplomatic conventions and encouraged the development of new intenational norms. In the more fluid circumtances of the present, the concept of the good international citizen can play an important role in synthesising the old that is dying with the new that is emerging and in seizing what Falk (1983 : 272) calls the Grotian moment. The discussion of good intenational citizen arises in the wake of the more general revival of citizenship theory in contemporary political thought. This renewed interest in the concept is especially evident on the Left, which, tradinionally, has been sceptical of the alleged achievments of citizenship. Its critique of citizenship argued that the legal and political rights of citizen have limited significance in the context of profound class inequalities. More recently, face with the challenge of neo-consevatism, the Left has sprung to the defence of citizenship. It has argued that citizenship was redefined in the early twentieth century to add welfare rights to the traditional legal and political rights of citizens. To be faithful to citizenship, the Left now argues, is to ensure that these welfare rights are not undermined. In recent radical thought, the commitment to citizenship is believed to

require support for collective action to assist the victims of unjustifiable forms of exclusion anchored in class, ethnicity, gender and race (Turner 1986 ; King 1987; Harris 1987; Barbalet 1988; Miller 1989). In much political theory, the analysis of citizenship deals with the rights and duties of citizens of particular states; very little attention is paid to the ways in which ideas of citizenship might be developed in international relations. Even so, several writers have added that the current internationalization of economic and political life requires, and might very well generate, the further transformation of citizenship. Bryan Turner (1986 : 140) has observed that we have a system of national citizenship in a socialcontext which requires a new theory of internationalism and universallitic citizenship. In a similai vein, Etienne Balibar (1988 : 173 30) has argued that the emergence of of cosmopolis of communications and financial transactions means that the struggle for citizenship as a struggle for equality must begin again on new ground and with new objectives. Although it is disappointing that these themes are not accompanied by any discussion of relevant literature on internation relations, the focus on the critique of unjust exclusion in recent discussion of citizenship can enrich the analysis of the good intenational citizen, as the following discussion attempts to show. The argument for this chapter is in five parts. The first section consider the meaning of citizenship and proceeds to ask whether its dialetical development within the modern state requires the creation of analogous concepts of citizenship in international relations. With this question in mind, the second, third and fourth sections consider realist, Grotian or rationalist and cosmopolitan responses to, and conceptions of, good international citizenship. These sections argue that these three perspectives can be combined in a more encompassing framework along the lines that Kant developed in Perpetual Peace. The fifth section defends Kants account of the multiple levels of citizenship and points to ways of revising the central themes in his sociology of world citizenship. The main revision is that the development of good internetional citizenship depends largely on the proliferation of social-democratic, liberal states. II At themost fundamental level, citizenship refers first of all to the primary legal right that all persons have as members of particular states. In the second place, citizenship refers to the rights og participation in political life of the community as a whole. In the third place, citizenship refers not only to the rights but to fundamental duties as well. Emphasizing this moral dimensiion of citizenship, Aristotle (1960 : book III, xii, section 12) argued that citizens are those who are able and willing to rule and be ruled with a view to attaining a away of life according to goodness. Recent writings on citizenship argue that it entails a willingness to place constraints on self-interest because of duties to promote a moral general good. This is the theme that Senator Evans emphasizes in his defence of good intenational citizenship. In the twentieth century, the contention that citizen have duties towards the whole community has been linked with the principle that the advantage have responsibilities to assit the more vulnerable members of society. The belief that citizens not simply belong to the same community but have an equal right to enjoy its manifold benefits has been a crucial theme in the development of modern states. The goal of dismantling various modes of exclusion that thwart this right is the key how to the original juridical rights rights of citizens have been expanded over approximately the last two hundred years. Collective action to generalize the rights of legal security and politival reprensentation that had been monopolized by dominant groups heralded the new

politics of overcoming the systematic forms of exclusion. Socialist arguments about inadequacy of these first rights led to the development of novel concepts of citizanship taht included social and economic entittlements. Resistance to economic and other forms of social and political exclusion haas been the hallmark of radical theory and practice for the best part of two centuries (Marshall 1973 : 71-4, 91). A certain dialectic might be thought to be at work here. Thatvwas the conclusion that T.H. Marshall reached his analysis of the development of citizenship in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Marshall argued that civil, political and social rights comprised by three principal stages in the evolution of modern citizenship. Civil rights, which typified citizenship in the eighteenth century, highlighted the rights necessary for individual freedom. The institutions most directly associated with civil rights, Marshall argued, *were+ the couts of justice. Political rights, which became integral to new definitions of citizenship in the nineteenth century, place the accent on the right to parcipate in the execise of political power. These rights were realized through participation in the parliamentary process. Social rights the crucial addition of the twentieth century added the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security *and+ the right to share to the full in the social heritage. These new rights required political initiatives to givethe mos vulnerable members of the community access to the educational system and to adequate social services. The link between citizenship and social justice was forged out of the realization that the formal recognition of an equal capacity for rights *is+ not enough. This is the theme that is stressed repeatedly in social democratic and left liberal conceptions of citizenship. Marshalls analysis has been criticized for its unabashed evolutionism (Mann 1987). It is far from clear, however, that Marshall believed that extending the original juridicial rights of citizens was an inevitable part of the history of modern states. His argument noted that the case for extending citizenship rights grew out of ethical deliberations about what the possession of these firs legal entittlements actually entailed. In this respect, Marshall was right to argue that the idea of citizenship has possessed its own forward momentum. Rights of protection under the law were found wanting without the right to participate in the law-making process. These pollitical rights generated demands for measures to redress inequalities of wealth and power. In each case, the original claim made in defence of citizenship engendered additional demands for change and farreaching, though not inevitable, patterns of political development. Recent stages in the evolution of citizenship have moved beyond confronting class-based forms of exclusion. The dialectic of citizenship has been carried forward into the realm of ethnic and gender forms of exclusion. According to one approach, this dialectic does not stop there but now encompasses questions about the rights of non-human species (Turner 1986 : 127-31). The point that the willingness to tackle unjustified forms of exclusion is intrinsic to citizenship raises crucial questions in international relations. How far does the development of citizenship within the state create the need for development of new rights and duties in world politics? Many points have been made for and againts this proposition. The case againts often begins with the observation that citizenship codifies the special rights and duties of those who belong to the same bounded community and cherish similar practices and traditions. In defence of this proposition, the early modern theories of the state and international relations sharply contrasted the concrete rights and duties of citizens with the indeterminate and unenforceable rights and duties of human beings in an original state of nature (Linklater 1990b). At times, considerable emphasis has been placed on the tragic conflict between citizenship and humanity. This is especially so in the writings of Rousseau. In international relations, he argued, where the struggle for security

and survival forces citizens to become the enemies of mankind, it is impossible to solve the problem of how to be a good citizen of a nation and a good citizen of the world (Hoffmann 1965 : ch. 3). In the twentieth century, various writers, such as E.H. Carr and Franz Borkenau, argued the inclusion of welfare rights within national citizenship had deleterious consequences for the system of states. The concomitant rise of economic nationalism intensified political competition between exclusionary states (Borkenau 1942; Carr 1945). More recently, Raymond Murphy (1988 : 74) has drawn attention to the exclusionary role of citizenship by arguing that citizenship laws in the industrialized societies prevent the dilution of the benefits of industrialisation . . . through the exclusion of people born elsewhere. Restrictions on immigration and controls on the intake of refugees are crucial in this regard.

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