Keeping A Proper lookout

Keeping A Proper lookout Report No. 98045 Many years ago the ritual of the daily noon sight was taking place on the bridge wing involving all the navigators. Fortunately, being rather bored with this fairly useless performance, I glanced forward and saw a ship right ahead about 1 mile away. A judicious leap into the wheelhouse and a rapid alteration to starboard allayed the fears of the ashen faced quartermaster and saved a potentially nasty situation. The FOC tanker passed down our port side - there was no-one on the bridge, and our Captain, 1st Mate, 3rd Mate and 4th Mate were stunned and shocked as their horizon suddenly disappeared. No explanation was given as to why the 8-12 watchkeeper had not seen this vessel, perhaps he was too busy preparing for the daily performance. Nor was the quartermaster blameless, he had seen the other ship but said nothing. This could have been another mystery of the sea, the tanker was loaded and if a collision had occurred with both ships at full sea speed in the middle of the Pacific with less than minimal other traffic, there would have been a disaster. One of the imperatives that I learnt on large sailing vessels was the requirement for a good lookout. Even with our comparatively small crew of about 30, there was always one person on formal lookout. Over the last few years I have become increasingly concerned over ships, even large container ships, with their One Man Bridge Operation. This is an unacceptable hazard which is waiting to become an incident. You can litter the bridge with as many radars, computers, DPGS, GMDSS, rasters, electronic charts and cellnet phones as you like but when something goes wrong with some of this gear then actual panic sets in. I experienced this on a very "high tech" car carrier of some 60,000 tonnes outwards from Sheerness to Antwerp. As we were passing through the banks late one night all three radars went down, one after he other. Screaming, shouting and blind panic ensued and, to ease the situation, I pointed out the clarity of the visibility through the bridge windows and the ease with which they could navigate to the Wandelaar Pilot by looking out and plotting their position by visual bearings. Some of the steam subsided and they presumably got there safely - fortunately an ETA had already been sent so the ship was expected. The same shipmaster, on a previous occasion, told me how the 2/O stationed at the ARPA, as they negotiated the separation scheme off Elsinore and into the Sound, totally misunderstood the information which she was being fed. There are many crossing ferries in this area and when asked about the approaching ferry on their starboard bow, announced that the vessel would pass 200 metres astern. As the radar she was using was right at the fore end of the ship overlooking the fo'c'sle head the Captain explained to her that 200 metres astern of where she was standing would have meant a collision on the

starboard quarter. This points out the dangers inherent in false information from ARPA at low ranges and fast moving vessels in these close quarter situations. Every radar screen should have the words "look out of the window" flashed up at irregular intervals and certainly the sentiment spelled out regularly to all watchkeepers in English and in their own language.

http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/search-all-marsreports.cfm/KeepingAProperlookout 08 mei 2012

Absent Minded Watchkeeper

Absent Minded Watchkeeper Report No. 99036 http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/search-all-marsreports.cfm/AbsentMindedWatchkeeper MARS 99036 Absent Minded Watchkeeper Some weeks ago I was navigating a large but slow roro going to Hamburg. We approached the buoy VL5 where we had to change course by 40 to starboard when a large container vessel was overtaking us on our port side. It was a bright night, with good visibility, but I kept anyway a close look at this vessel which was apparently also going to the Terschelling-German bight TSS as she was closing the VL5, while the ships remaining on a NE course stay closer to the VL Center. It is better to be always ready for the worse manoeuvre possible of the ships in the vicinity. I planned to remain some 5 cables of the VL5 when the worse effectively happened. While she was about abreast of us, the container vessel changed course suddenly to starboard and the nearest approaches was quickly diminishing. It was quite easy for us to come sooner to starboard, closing the VL5 or even considering leaving it on the port side in case of real emergency. It was not needed. While I was conducting this escape manoeuvre, I observed that the ship now came back almost as suddenly to port, just as if he had just noticed our presence at that moment. And a few seconds later we get a call on the VHF of the like: "Ship on my starboard side, this the container vessel on your port side. " The collision risk had been already removed, but I answered anyway: "If you are the ship heading ... near the VL5 buoy, yes I am the mv .... on your starboard side.." It took some time to get a confirmation as the watch keeper apparently did not know the name of the buoy he was passing. (GSM navigation in TSS?). Then he asked us, a little bit late, if we were heading for the TGB TSS or for the Vlieland junction. This later option was very unlikely for a ship passing so close from the VL5, and if it had been the case, we had already collided. I just re-assured him that we were also coming to starboard on a parallel track. But by then I was convinced he did not detect us at all before his change of Course

Collision in TSS
Collision in TSS MARS Report 200957 Official report; edited from MAIB accident flyer 5/2009 http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/mars2009.cfm/Collision%20in%20TSS A general cargo vessel was on passage from the Thames estuary to Antwerp. She was crossing the NE traffic lane of the Dover Strait TSS when she was in collision with a bulk carrier which was heading NE in the Sandettie deep water route. No lookout was posted on either bridge at the time of the collision. The vessels both had fully operational radars, fitted with Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), although no radar targets had been acquired by either vessel before the collision. The general cargo vessel was the give-way vessel, but, on a clear, dark night with good visibility, neither vessel saw the other until moments before the collision. The watchkeeping officer on the bulk carrier, after seeing the other vessel very close to port, put the helm hard to starboard just before the collision occurred. A fuel tank was breached on the general cargo vessel, causing pollution, while the damage to the bulk carrier, although less severe, took more than a week to repair on arrival at her next port. Root cause/contributory factors The lookouts on both vessels were allowed to leave the bridge in an area of high navigational risk. In the absence of a dedicated lookout, neither OOW made best use of the available navigational aids (radar, AIS) visually to maintain an effective appreciation of the traffic situation. The bulk carrier, despite having a draught of less than six metres, was using a deep-water route, which is meant for vessels with a draught of 16 m or more. Although neither master was on the bridge, standing/night orders were not used to alert the watchkeepers to the risks they were likely to encounter during their bridge watch. There was no encouragement for the lookout to become an integral part of the bridge team of either vessel. Lessons learnt Complacency continues to be a recurring safety issue in accidents investigated by the MAIB. Shipowners should recognise the risks posed by complacency and ensure that their vessels operate with effective bridge teams at all times. Masters should make best use of standing/night orders to set operational benchmarks and heighten bridge watchkeepers' awareness of risk when appropriate. Masters must lead by example. Ships' crews are unlikely to apply the high professional standards demanded if these are not observed by the officer in overall command. The use of designated lookouts is an essential requirement for safe navigation, but continues to be regarded as a low priority on some vessels. The use of navigational aids is not a substitute for maintaining a visual lookout.

Collision with Lighthouse

Collision with Lighthouse Danish/Swedish Official Report

The following report is an extract from an investigation by the Danish Authorities into a ship sinking. It has been translated into English by a member of the Swedish Investigation Branch and kindly forwarded to me. The Swedish Authorities have also had two similar incidents. It therefore seems appropriate to publish these incidents as widely as possible in an attempt to stop mariners rounding lighthouses too closely. A coaster was on a journey in a fjord. Early in the morning, when the ship was to change course, she collided with a small lighthouse. The reason why the collision took place is unknown but the ship must have turned too late or too slowly. The foundation of the lighthouse was circular with a flat top just underneath the water surface. Its diameter was bigger than the diameter of the lighthouse itself, situated right on top of the foundation. This construction causes a rather sharp outer edge, which could easily rip a ship's hull. This was what happened - the ship's hull was ripped open and she sank within minutes. Two persons on the bridge died. Two other crew members survived although they could not reach the survival suits which were kept under port bridge wing as the ship immediately listed to port and put them out of reach. One of the survivors managed to launch the starboard liferaft. Another crew member was down in the mess room and threw out a couple of life jackets. He did not manage to get out of the mess room. The investigation found that the hydrostatic releases to the rafts had not been properly mounted. If the starboard side raft had not been launched manually, no raft would have been released. Hydrostatic releases are often wrongly mounted. Every ship is recommended to check their releases. The storage space of survival suits and life jackets can be discussed. In this case, they were almost immediately unreachable. The placing of the jackets caused one of the crew members to die while reaching for the jackets. The construction of lighthouses and their foundations is a potential danger if a ship should come too close. Several times ships have got damaged under the waterline when coming too close to a lighthouse. It is essential that navigators know that this extra risk is to be calculated when rounding a lighthouse. The sketch and the diagram show the extent that the base of these type of lighthouses extends from to superstructure. Good seamanship dictates that all fixed structures should be given a wide berth.