DRAFT 30 December 2010, Prepared for The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 17, No.

3, September 2011

Parliamentary Questions, the Behaviour of Legislators, and the Function of Legislatures: An Introduction

Shane Martin

Abstract: The ability of parliamentarians to ask questions of members of the executive either in written form or on the floor of the chamber is a feature of many legislatures, and parliamentary questions often generate significant media attention and public interest. Despite the interest and importance, the nature and consequences of questioning in parliament remains obscure. As a working tool of parliamentarians, questions provide recorded data on individual members and the parliament as a collective institution. This paper suggests an analysis of parliamentary questions as a method for gaining better understanding of the preferences and behaviour of individual legislators and the role and function of modern-day parliaments.

Keywords: parliamentary questions; measuring legislator behaviour and roles; constituency orientation; legislative function; accountability

Parliamentary questions (PQs) are a feature of almost all national legislatures (Norton, 1993).1 Typically, an individual member or group of members tables a question to a member of the government.2 The number of questions tabled in parliament can be staggeringly high. Significantly, the media tend to pay relatively more attention to the period devoted to questions than to many other activities within the legislature, and the nature of question time appears to have consequences for citizens levels of engagement with the political process (Salmond, 2010). In many countries, questioning is a mechanism used to impose parliamentary accountability on the government (Wiberg, 1994a). Despite the centrality of PQs to the life of parliament, the content and nature of questions posed by parliamentarians in most legislatures remains relatively obscure, leaving the specifics of the questions parliamentarians ask and their reasons for asking open to conjecture. More generally, the value and specific usefulness of the institution of questioning to modern-day parliaments is contentious. The core suggestion of this essay is that an analysis of PQs provides unique opportunities to identify effectively the behaviour of individual parliamentarians and the function of modern legislatures. As recorded behaviour, PQs provide unique and exact insight into parliamentarians concerns. Arguably, questions are an important tool for measuring an individual legislators role orientation and the functions of parliament. Unlike much unrecorded or unobserved parliamentary activity, or recorded activity which may be subject to significant behavioural constraints from the party leadership, PQs can provide data for empirical analysis permitting reasonable inferences. The aim is to obtain a clearer understanding, theoretically and empirically, of the behaviour of legislators and the function of legislatures. The aim of the research

agenda is not simply to present a summary of questions asked, but also to use this data to test and empirically assess theories of legislative behaviour and function. For legislative or comparative scholars, or country-specific experts, each PQ provides at least two pieces of informational interest: First, PQs allow identification of a questions topic and thus formation of an opinion regarding the policy interests and agenda of the questioner. Second, the representative orientation of individual parliamentarians may become apparent from examining the question. By focusing, as many of the papers in this volume do, on the difference between personal and nonpersonal vote cultivation (Carey and Shugart 1995; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987), the personal-vote earning orientation, if any, of a parliamentarian should be evident from the content of questions asked. Consequently, questions may reveal interests in national and/or international policy or for more parochial, local constituency-oriented issues. A legislators choices for using the questioning tool provides unique insight into that members legislative behaviour and role-orientation. Importantly, PQs are a more valid measure of legislators activities in comparison with other recorded behaviour some of which has received significant attention from legislative scholars. Analyses of plenary speeches have become more common due to the advent of computer-assisted text analysis (see, for example, Laver and Benoit, 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2010a; and Quinn et al., 2010; for criticism see, Budge and Pennings, 2007). However, access to the legislative chamber floor for speeches tends to be controlled and restricted, thus limiting the validity of floor speech analysis as a measure of legislators activity. Problematically, even in legislatures recording publicly roll-call votes, the choice of which votes to select for plenary roll-calls creates difficulty for inferring significances from roll-call analyses (Hug, 2010). Even in legislatures which record all votes, such as roll-call decisions

are frequently party-based due to disciplined legislative parties (Depauw and Martin, 2009). In contrast, PQs allow discerning the true preferences and interests of individual members. Beyond the individual legislator, an analysis of PQs also permits the potential to discover new insights into the operating mechanisms and ultimate performances of parliament as a central institution in the political process. Such an analysis provides an opportunity to reconsider whether or not theories which point to the weaknesses of parliament, especially in terms of executive accountability, provide an accurate picture of legislative function and performance. The remainder of this introduction includes: a brief review of existing research on PQs; an explanation and illustration of the analysis of parliamentary questions as a way to uncover the true preferences and interests of individual parliamentarians; a discussion of individual-level behaviours simultaneously reflecting and shaping the function of modern legislatures. The final section constitutes a preview of the research reported in this volume. At the core of all the discussions is the idea that analysing PQs can improve understanding of both the activities of individual legislators and that of the legislative institution as a whole.

Parliamentary Questions: Existing Research Most studies of PQs tended to focus on the issue of accountability and control. A series of country-specific studies indicate that PQs are somewhat useful for holding the government to account. Such research covered the national parliaments of Canada (Franks, 1985), Denmark (Damgaard, 1994), Finland (Wiberg, 1994b), Israel (Osnat, 2011), Norway (Rasch, 1994), Sweden (Mattson, 1994), Turkey (Hazama, Genckaya, and Genckaya, 2007), the United Kingdom (Chester and Bowring, 1962; Franklin and

Norton, 1993; Cole, 1999) and New Zealand (Salmond, 2004). Yet, virtually all of these studies also note the weaknesses of PQs as a tool for legislative oversight. Examining PQs in four commonwealth countries, McGowan (2008) found considerable variation in the usefulness of PQs, dependent on the exact procedures used. Opedal and Rommetvedt (2010) note the importance of PQs for ensuring democratic accountability regarding non-departmental governmental agencies but find considerable variation in their usefulness for oversight of government health agencies in Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom. Significantly, Wiberg (1994a) asserted that fulfilment of the control function occurs despite individual parliamentarians lack of motivation to table questions designed to hold the executive accountable. Wiberg (1995) noted a temporal, cross- sectional co-variation between the size of the public sector and the number of PQ queries, which suggests that the demand for questions. arising from greater levels of governmental activity, drives the observed increase in PQs identified in many European parliaments. Beyond national parliaments, Proksch and Slapin (2010b) discovered that written questions in the European Parliament are an important source of control and oversight for national opposition parties. Unable to control European affairs in the domestic arena, MEPs from domestic opposition parties are more likely to ask questions of Commissioners. Furthermore, the evidence suggested that patterns of questioning relate to the policy specialism (as indicated by committee assignments) of MEPs and by their attitudes toward European integration, with euro-sceptical MEPs more likely to table questions. Examining the European Parliament (Raunio, 1996) found that PQs can serve as a two-way informational channel MEPs use questions not only to obtain information but also to highlight problems to the Council and Commission.

Bird (2005) used content of a sample of parliamentary questions in the 1997/98 session of the British House of Commons to gauge the prominence of gender-related issues among parliamentarians. Less than one percent of questions included the terms men women or gender, and female MPs were most likely to be the source of questions containing the latter two terms. Birds findings are significant for identifying the continued relative weakness of substantive representation of womens interests even at a time of greater descriptive representation of women in the British House of Commons. Russo and Wiberg (2010) attempt to explain the cause of variation in the structure and significance of PQs among different national legislatures. Given the importance of the legislature in managing coalition government, the Russo and Wiberg finding that parliaments in which single-party government is the norm tend to have questioning procedures with a higher potential for information, is particularly counterintuitive. Russo and Wiberg also find that PQ procedures tend not to co-vary with the electoral system or party system. In short, the causes of the variation in PQ procedures among different national legislatures remain largely unexplained. In much of the academic literature mentioned above, the assumption is that questions are a mechanism for holding the executive branch accountable, and questions have little application to cultivating relationships with constituents. One dissent to the conventional view is Raschs (2009) study which finds an electoral connection to PQs in Norway;3 however, this study only considered the total number of questions asked, not the nature or content of the questions. Exploring patterns of questions in the French National Assembly, Lazardeux (2005) found no support for an electoral connection. In this instance, the independent variable in the study was the total number of written questions submitted by each deputy. The total number of

questions asked is, at best, a rough proxy for constituency-focused behaviour and a deputys personal vote-earning strategy. Questions can take different forms in terms of content and role orientation being pursued. The significance of the alternative approach suggested next is to make a distinction between the constituency-based and extra-constituency-based questions by means of a relatively simple content analysis.

Parliamentary Questions as a Measure of Behaviour To illustrate the potential of parliamentary questions to reveal the preferences and role-behaviour of individual parliamentarians, consider two questions posed to the Prime Minister in the British House of Commons in October 2010. A Labour MP asked: Yorkshire Forward, the Yorkshire regional development agency, owns assets in my constituency in Barnsley that are crucial for a major redevelopment programme in the town centre. Will the Prime Minister look urgently at ensuring that the ownership of those assets is transferred from Yorkshire Forward to the local authority so that the programme can go ahead? Could that transfer be facilitated before the body's abolition in 2012? ( Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 27 Oct 2010, Volume 517, Col 309)

The content of the question clearly relates to a concern of local voters. The MP sought to ensure that the local authority in the constituency obtained control of assets necessary to facilitate regional development. The question has little consequence for national politics and is noticeably parochial. In contrast, the very next question to the Prime Minister dealt with the issue of government policy towards the European Union. A conservative MP asked the Prime Minister: It is claimed that the EU will need a new treaty to legitimise money going to Greece. What is the Prime Minister's response?

(Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 27 Oct 2010, Volume 517, Col 309)

Interestingly, in the cited example, a member of the prime ministers own party is asking a policy-related question, likely motivated by a desire to compel the prime minister to state clearly his position on a potentially controversial topic. In contrast, an opposition MP used a PQ to the Prime Minister to raise a constituency matter. That question was not an attempt to embarrass the prime minister, but rather to probe the policy of the government, an assumed role of opposition members. Aside from indicating the depth of knowledge required to provide immediate answers to a variety of questions at PM query sessions, the previous examples illustrate very different uses for PQs.4 Questions can tend towards representation of local interests or towards national and international policy concerns. An analysis of parliamentary questions to discover role-orientation provides a number of distinct advantages over existing mechanisms used to identify personal vote earning behaviour: 1. An allocation of time and resources occurs when tabling a parliamentary question. A parliamentarian or a staffer must research the question, format it appropriately, submit it, and await a reply. Tabling PQs, even if undertaken by staff, and even if the process is efficient and rapid, is not an entirely costless exercise in terms of time and opportunity cost. Effective limits restrict a legislator or staffer in the number of possibly posed questions. As such, the applications of parliamentary questions provide an indication of the priorities of legislators. 2. Unlike most other parliamentary activities, such as legislative voting and parliamentary speeches, the party leadership tends to exercise less control over parliamentary questions (Judge 1974). The control governing oral questioning, in

particular, does appear to vary cross-nationally, but control appears to be minimal, relative to the control exercised for floor debate and voting. Hence, questions provide a more reliable perspective of the choices parliamentarians exercise for focusing on parochial, national, or international issues. 3. Problems of selection bias and internal validity inherent in observational, interview and survey-based research of legislators activities are eliminated, because the behaviour of all backbench legislators can be examined through parliamentary questions. 4. Instead of relying on a legislators recollection and self-analysis of roleorientation and behaviour, the analysis of parliamentary questions provides a direct and unmediated measure of role-behaviour: Observations are of actual behaviour in the analysis of PQs, thereby eliminating differences between a parliamentarians normative perception of role and the actual behaviour. 5. The data is readily available. Parliamentary questions are on record and generally publicly available. In many cases, the data is electronically readable, making the raw data easily accessible for (computer-assisted) textual analysis. 6. Unlike many other data collection methods in role-orientation and rolebehaviour studies, replication is possible, thus enhancing the scientific process (King, Keohane and Verba, 1996). To aid replication, specific guidelines should direct determination of whether or not questions have a national or local focus. To aid in replication, the following procedure for content analysis of PQs is a suggested guideline for researchers: The Comparative Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones, 2006) provides an ideal framework to code subject matter of PQs.

That project provides a framework to code 19 major topics covering 200 subtopics.5 To code localism, a PQ should have one or more of the following characteristics: a. Did the member mention a geographic constituency specifically? For example, did the member say, in my constituency. or identify by name the constituency? b. Did the member mention a geographical location that the coder can confirm is within the geographical constituency of the member? c. Did the member mention a constituent or particular case surrounding an individual, reasonably assumed to be a constituent? d. Did the member mention a particular building or facility that the coder can confirm to be located in the geographical constituency of the member? e. Did the member mention a particular organisation or business that the coder can confirm to be located in the geographical constituency of the member? If the organisation or business is country-wide and the question is not specifically related to the part of the organisation or business in the members constituency the coding does not designate a local question. f. Did the member mention an event, such as a local festival, specifically taking place in the geographical constituency of the member,?

It should be accepted that PQs are just one of several tools that legislators can use to represent local interests. Legislators can write directly to a government minister; they can communicate directly with public service providers, and in many jurisdictions, legislators can petition the public service Ombudsman to investigate a

constituents concern. If these alternatives are available, considering a single mechanism to for addressing service concerns for a constituency provides an incomplete picture of legislative behaviour. Yet, the content analysis of PQs across many legislatures indicates that questions are a standard tool for constituency representation and gathering personal votes. Collective needs within the constituency, as well as representation concerning constituents individual cases, are frequently the subject of questions to government ministers. At the same time, parliamentary questions are also the method for obtaining information from, and construct challenges to, the government on national-level policies.

Parliamentary Questions and the Function of Parliament The resurgence of interest within political science in the origin and consequences of institutional design, allied perhaps with the prominent role of legislatures in newlydemocratised societies, has reinvigorated the study of the roles parliaments play in their respective political systems. The assumption of strong legislatures operating under presidentialism and parliaments in decline within parliamentary systems has encountered significant challenge in recent years (see, for example, Lijphart, 1999). An exploration of PQs should provide new insights into the roles and functions of parliaments. As discussed earlier, the long-held assumption is that PQs are a method for holding governments accountable. PQs are, apparently, effective for extracting information from government. From a principal-agent perspective, citizens delegate authority to the legislature, and particularly in parliamentary systems of government, the parliament subsequently delegates authority to the executive branch. An important control mechanism is the ability of the parliament to hold this executive authority accountable, and importantly, information regarding the executives actions

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or inactions is critical for the smooth operation of democracy. PQs solicit information from the government on issues of policy development and policy implementation, and therefore, have the potential to be an important ex post control mechanisms (Saalfeld, 2000). Much anecdotal evidence suggests that ministers and civil servants are highly sensitive to the content of PQs and carefully research and word responses to the parliamentarian asking the question. Indeed, while a relatively junior civil servant may draft the question, the practice in many governmental departments is for the most senior civil servant to approve the draft before providing the answer. As such, PQs maintain accountability for both the civil service and the elected government. Indeed, without PQs, opposition parties would have great difficulty extracting information from the executive branch.6 An important empirical question, then, concerns the degree to which PQs focus on holding the government accountable or the degree to which PQs are opportunities for the interrogator to build a reputation among a local constituency. The lack of content analysis of questions has, to date, hindered a clear differentiation for these two motivations. In the strongly candidate-cantered Irish parliament, Martin (2010) analysed written parliamentary questions from 1997 to 2002, and found that 55 per cent of questions do not have a constituency basis. This evidence suggests that parliamentary questions are frequently used to monitor government, and a portion of Irish parliamentarians maintain interest in issues beyond those of a narrow constituency, despite electoral incentives to focus on local matters. Recent innovative accounting of the activities of parliaments in Western Europe highlighted their partisan roles in coalition government to gather intelligence of each others manoeuvrings. Building on the intelligence gathering perspective

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(Thies 2001), parties use the legislative process to overcome problems of ministerial drift in coalition governments by scrutinizing more closely policies that have been drafted by coalition partners (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). PQs, ostensibly, provide an important avenue to achieve this. Yet, Russo and Wiberg (2010) find that PQs as accountability tools are no more effective in coalition parliaments than in parliaments with single party governments. An interesting empirical exercise would be explore the degree two which patterns in questioning within parliaments with coalition government align with the allocation of ministerial portfolios between parties. In other words, are ministers from Party A questioned more by members of party B, etc., and do patterns of inter-coalition PQs reflect the areas of most conflict between parties in the coalition? The suggestion then, is that PQs are a method of monitoring which legislators could use to scrutinize the activities and positions of each other. The opposition can monitor the executive, but also coalition parties in government can monitor each other.

Plan of this Volume In his research, Saalfeld uses parliamentary questions to uncover MPs preferences on issues related to Britains Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups. He finds mixed evidence that such MPs are most likely to substantively represent the interests of BME communities in Britain. Highlighting the weakness of assuming that electoral systems explain legislators behaviour, Russo finds that many Italian parliaments do play a constituency servant role despite the closed-list electoral system. Attempting to explain significant variation in the patterns of questioning, the research finds that Italian legislators without previous national roles are those most likely to focus on

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constituency-oriented questions, as are members of the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale parties. Combining a content analysis of PQs in the Swiss Nationalrat with a survey of Swiss parliamentarians, Bailer finds little evidence of an electoral connection or interest-group connection in questioning patterns. Instead, junior legislators who use the tool to showcase their activity and commitment to political affairs dominate questioning. The results suggest evidence of the use of PQs as a signalling tool to other political elites. In his research, Dandoy suggests and finds evidence of a link between roll-call voting unity and the number of questions asked in the Belgian House of Representatives. Questions are an efficient method of extracting information from the government and better organised Belgian parties use this mechanism more so than smaller, factionalised parties do. Looking at PQs in the Canadian House of Commons, Blidook and Kerby uses interest, electoral, and institutional variables to explain patterns of questioning. Combining an analysis of the agenda topic of each question with constituency and MP variables, they find that constituency representation through PQs are strongest when local interests have an economic component. The contribution of Sanchez De Dios and Wiberg provides an overview of the structure and function of questions in European parliaments combined with a detailed analysis of patterns of questioning in three cases (the United Kingdom, France and Spain). Rozenberg et al. suggests that oral questioning may perform functions other than creating a political battleground. Their research on oral questions of defence policies identify questions with political conflict between government and opposition

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in Germany but within parties in the United Kingdom. In Spain, policy interests dominate questions while in France local issues are dominant. Salmond argues that the form of parliamentary question periods has consequences for the willingness of government ministers to delegate authority to the bureaucracy. He asserts that spontaneous or quick-fire question procedures lead to less delegation, as politicians are fearful of reputational risks resulting from being identified as the public face of misadministration. Greater levels of delegation between minister and their agents occur in regimes with least effective questioning procedures within parliament. Looking at the Norwegian Storting, Rasch identifies the importance of rules and agenda power in explaining patterns of parliamentary questioning. Parties exert no (or only mild) control over written questions with formulation of questions left to individual discretion. The same can be said about ordinary (oral) questions in the Stortings Question Time. The Question Hour, on the other hand, is subject to the party leaderships centralization of agenda power. This observationis a reminder of not only the importance of rules but also the ever presence of party discipline as an institutional boundary of all behaviour in European legislatures. Bringing the volume to a conclusion, Olivier Rozenberg and Shane Martin review the main findings of the research, comparing the benefits derived from

analysing PQs with the ambitions established in the introduction. The final discussion encompasses opportunities for further research involving the nature and impact of parliamentary questions.

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Acknowledgements The papers in the volume were original presentations at a conference on Parliamentary Questions, organised by Olivier Rozenberg and Shane Martin under the auspices of the ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments. We are grateful to Science Po and the French Snat for their hospitality in hosting the event and to Professor Lord Norton of Louth for his support in bringing this volume to fruition.

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References Akirav, O., 2011. The Use of Parliamentary Questions in the Israeli Parliament 19921996, Israel Affairs, forthcoming. Baumgartner, F. R., Green-Pedersen, C. and Jones, B. D., 2006. Comparative Studies of Policy Agendas, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (7): 95570. Bird, K., 2005. Gendering parliamentary questions, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 7(3): 353369. Budge, I. and Pennings, P., 2007. Do they work? Validating computerised word frequency estimates against policy series, Electoral Studies, 26(1): 121-129. Cain, B., Ferejohn, J. and Fiorina, M., 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. Carey, J.M. and Shugart, M.S., 1995. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, Electoral Studies, 14(4): 417-39. Chester, D.N. and Bowring, N., 1962. Questions in Parliament, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cole, M., 1999. Accountability and quasi-government: The role of parliamentary questions. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 5 (1): 77-101. Damgaard, E., 1994. Parliamentary Questions and Control in Denmark. In: M. Wiberg, ed. Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries. Jyvskyl: The Finnish Political Science Association, 4476. Depauw, S. and Martin, S., 2009. Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective. In Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit, eds., IntraParty Politics and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. London: Routledge, 103-120.

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Franklin, M. and Norton, P., eds., 1993. Parliamentary Questions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Franks, C.E.S., 1985. Debates and Question Period in the Canadian House of Commons: What purpose do they serve?, American Review of Canadian Studies, 15 (1): 1-15. Hazama, Y., Genckaya, O.F. and Genckaya, S., 2007. Parliamentary questions in Turkey, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 13(4): 539-557. Judge, D., 1974. Backbench Specialisation: A Study of Parliamentary Questions, Parliamentary Affairs, 27(2): 171-86. King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S., 1996. Designing Social Inquiry, New Haven: Princeton University Press. Lijphart, A., 1999. Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Quinn, K.M., Monroe, B.L., Colaresi, M., Crespin, M.H. and Radev, D.R., 2010. How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs, American Journal of Political Science, 54: 209228. Laver, M. and Benoit, K., 2002. Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: Wordscoring Dil Speeches, Irish Political Studies, 17(1): 59-73. Lazardeux, S., 2005. Une Question Ecrite, Pour Quoi Faire? The Causes of the Production of Written Questions in the French Assemble Nationale, French Politics, 3(3): 258-281. Martin, L. W., and Vanberg, G., 2011. Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, S., 2011. Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: An Application to the Irish Case, Political Studies, Forthcoming.

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Mattson, I., 1994. Parliamentary Questions in the Swedish Riksdag, In: M. Wiberg, ed. Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries. Jyvskyl: The Finnish Political Science Association, 276356. McGowan, A., 2008. Accountability or Inability: To What Extent does House of Representatives Question Time Deliver Executive Accountability

Comparative to other Parliamentary Chambers? Is there Need for Reform?, Australasian Parliamentary Review, 23(2): 66-85. Norton, P., 1993. Introduction: Parliament since 1960. In Franklin, Mark, and Philip Norton, eds. 1993. Parliamentary Questions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Opedal, S. and Rommetvedt, H., 2010. From Politics to Management - or More Politics? Public Management Review, 12(2): 191-212. Proksch, S.O. and Slapin, J.B., 2010a. Position-Taking in European Parliament Speeches, British Journal of Political Science, 40: 587-61. Proksch, S.O. and Slapin, J.B., 2010b. Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union, European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming. Rasch, B.E., 2009. Opposition Parties, Electoral Incentives and the Control of Government Ministers: Parliamentary Questioning in Norway. In S. Ganghof, C. Hnnige and C. Stecker (eds.), Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler: Festschrift fr Herbert Dring. VS Verlag fr

Sozialwissenschaften, 199-214. Rasch, B.E., 1994. Question Time in the Norwegian Storting - Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, In: M. Wiberg, ed. Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries. Jyvskyl: The Finnish Political Science Association, 247 275.

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Raunio,

T.,

1996.

Parliamentary Questions

in

the

European

Parliament:

Representation, Information and Control, Journal of Legislative Studies, 2(4): 356-82. Russo, F. and Wiberg, M., 2010. Parliamentary Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps towards Comparison, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(2): 215-232. Saalfeld, T., 2000. Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight, European Journal of Political Research, 37(3): 353-76. Salmond, R., 2010. Parliamentary Question Times: How Legislative Accountability Mechanisms Affect Mass Political Engagement, Manuscript, University of Michigan. Salmond, R., 2004. Grabbing Governments by Throat: Question Time in New Zealands Parliamentary Opposition, Political Science, 56(2): 7590. Thies, M.F., 2001. Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments, American Journal of Political Science, 45(3): 580-98. Wiberg, M., 1995. Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communication? In: Herbert Dring (Ed.) (1995) Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Verlag, 179-222. Wiberg, M., ed., 1994a. Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries: Forms of Questioning and Behavioural Trends, Jyvskyl: The Finnish Political Science Association. Wiberg, M., 1994b. To keep the government on its toes: Behavioural trends of parliamentary questioning in Finland 19451990. In M. Wiberg, ed., Parliamentary control in the Nordic countries: Forms of Questioning and

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Behavioural Trends, Jyvskyl: The Finnish Political Science Association, 103200.

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Endnotes 1. A notable exception is the United States Congress which lacks the mechanism of questions so familiar a part of parliamentary procedures in other countries. Congressional committees are empowered to question witnesses, but no formal question time takes place on the floor of the House or Senate. Neither can Members of Congress table written questions. Indeed, the absence of PQs in American politics (both at the federal level but also as a tool at the level of state legislatures) is a likely reason for the lack of research on PQs, given the dominance and research-agenda setting role of American scholarship in the study of legislatures. 2. The rules governing the exact format of PQs vary greatly from parliament to parliament and tend to be codified in the Parliaments Standing Orders and/or Rules of Procedure. The main differentiation tends to be among questions asked and answered orally in the chamber and questions tabled in written form (which tend to receive a written reply from the minister after associated civil servants have researched and drafted the answer). For example, in the British House of Commons, three types of PQs are common (Questions for Oral Answer in the Chamber with notice, Questions for Written Answer, and Urgent Questions in the Chamber [formerly Private Notice Questions]). 3. Again, this finding is particularly counter-intuitive give the party-centred nature of the electoral system and the related lack of incentive to cultivate personal votes. 4. A number of British television stations cover, live, Prime Ministers Questions, and the performance of the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition (who gets to ask more questions than any other individual member) encounters close scrutiny, Little wonder then, that some Prime Ministers, reportedly, spend considerable time studying likely topics on the day of Prime Ministers Questions.

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5.

Further

information

and

code

guidelines

are

available

at:

http://comparativeagendas.org/. 6. A strong committee system with the tools to inquire into ministerial and departmental action and Freedom of Information requests are two obvious tools which may compliment or even replace the need for PQs.

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